originsofthefirstworldwar davide.kaiser

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Germany and the Origins of the First World War

David E. Kaiser

The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 55, No. 3. (Sep., 1983), pp. 442-474.

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Germany and the Origins of the First World WarD avid E . K aise rC a r n e g i e M e l l o n U n i v e r si tyTw enty- two years ag o Fr i tz F i sche r s Grif f nach der Wel tmacht (Di is -s e l do r f , 1961) r e ope ne d t he que s t i on o f G e r ma ny s r e spons ib i li ty fo r theF i rs t Worl d W a r . G e rma ny , F i s c he r a rgue d , had pu rpos e l y b rough t a bou ta Euro pean conf l i c t in 19 14 in an e f for t to becom e a wor ld pow er . Eq ua l lys ign if i can t ly , he sugge s ted tha t the sources of Germ any s cond uc t mus tbe sought in her dom est ic pol i tica l , eco nom ic , and socia l s t ructure . F ischerla te r e l abora ted h i s thes i s in another work , Krieg der Il lusionen (Diis-se ld or f , 1969 ) . N o pos twar h i s tor ian has been m ore in f luen ti a l ; a s t eadys t ream of mo nograp hs has e l abo ra ted F i sche r s thes i s dur ing the la s t twode c a de s . I n t he l ong run F i s c he r s me t hodo l og i c a l e mpha s i s on t he ne e dto foc us o n the in te rac t ion of imper ia l d om es t i c a nd fore ign policy-anear -heresy in G erm any in 196 1 desp i t e the ea r l ie r p ion eer ing wo rk ofEckh art Kehr-has been at least as influential as his substan tive conclu sionthat the Ge rm an gove rnm ent wa s primari ly responsible for the Firs t WorldWar. M ost subsequent l i te ra ture has focused upon the inf luence of dom est icf a c t o r s on G e r ma n fo re i gn po l i c y , pa y ing pa r t i c u la r a t te n ti on t o t he i n -augu ra t ion of Weltpoli t ik in 1897 and the ou tbreak of the w ar in 19 14 .

I t i s pe rhaps the emphas i s o f F i scher and h i s successors upon theconne c t ions be tween in te rna l and ex te rna l po l i ci es tha t has made Ge rm anrespons ib i l ity for the war on e of the ve ry few E uropea n d ip loma t ic ques -t ions to exc i t e such widesp read in te res t ove r the l a s t twenty y ears . Yetthe resu l t s o f the i r a t t empt to broaden the focus of d ip lomat ic h i s toryhave been d i sappoin t ing ; the fasc ina t ing and c r i ti ca l p roblem of re l a t ingG e r ma n s oc i e t y a nd po l it ic s t o t he c onduc t o f t he Impe r i a l gove rnme n thas no t been so lved . F i scher h imse l f has been f requent ly and r igh t lyc r i ti c ized for m ere ly conca tena t ing d i scuss ion s of the po li t ica l an d ideo-logical c l im ate of pre- 19 14 Germany-l ibera lly spl ice d wi th quo ta t ion sfrom extrem e polemicis ts-with mo re tradi tional analy ses of the Ger ma ngov e rnm e n t s m a j o r de c i s i ons , w h i l e fa i l ing t o e xp l a in e xac tl y how t heform er in f luenced the l a t t e r . O ther h is tori ans hav e deve loped much more

I would like to thank Lamar Cecil, Thomas Childers, Timothy J . McKeown,Ernest R . May, and Samuel R . W illiamson, Jr ., for their comments on earlierdrafts of this work.[ J o u r n u l o f M o d e r n H l sr or ? 5 5 ( S e p t e m b e r 1 9 8 3 ) : 442 474

983 b y the U n ~ v e r s ~ t yf C h i c a g o . 0 0 2 2 - 2 8 0 1 : 8 3 . 5 5 0 3 i O l S 0 1 . 0 0A l l r ~ g h t sr e s e r k e d .


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G erm an y and the O r ig in s of W or ld W ar 1 443exp l ic i t models re la t ing German fo re ign po l icy to domes t ic s t ruc tu res ,bu t these have genera l ly been too unsub t le to uncover the rea l mot iveso f t h e German g o v e rn men t .

Desp i te many d i f fe rences o f em pha s i s and op in ion , it is fa ir to say tha ta f a r -r each in g co n sen su s o f G erm an , B r i t i sh , an d Amer i can h i s to r i an snow ag rees tha t Ge rm an fo re ign po l icy a f te r 1897 mus t be unders toodas a r e sp o n se t o t h e i n te rn a l th rea t o f so c i a l i sm an d d emo cracy . In 1 8 9 7the Imper ia l government dec ided to dea l wi th domes t ic d i scon ten t bypursu ing an agg ress ive fo re ign po l icy ; subsequen t ly i t regarded a fo re ignwar a s a u se fu l o p t io n sh o u ld d o mes t i c p ro b l ems b eco me in to l e rab l e .Th is in turn has l ed to the v iew tha t Ber l in he lped un leash w ar in 1914b ecau se war h ad b eco m e th e o n ly way o u t of G erma n y ' s d o mes t i c d i f-f i cu l t i es . These v iews have been mos t spec i f ica l ly advanced by V. R .Berghahn in G erm an y and the Approach o f W ar in 1914 (New Yo rk ,1973) and H ans-Ul r ich Wehler in D a s D eu t sche Ka i ser re i ch 1871-1918(G ot t inge n , 197 3) , bo th o f who m se e the in t roduct ion o f Weltpol i t ik in1897 and the dec i s ion fo r war in 191 4 as a t t empts by an a r i s tocra t ic -agrar ian e l i t e to escap e the po l i ti ca l con sequ ence s o f the indus t r ia l i za t ionof Germany . ' Pau l Kennedy ' s The Rise o f the Anglo-G erma n Antagonism1860-1914 (L o n d o n , 1 9 8 0 ) a l so s t re s ses t h e g o v e rn m en t ' s u se of W el t -politik as a wea pon against the poli tical consequence s of industrial ization,and agre es tha t increas ing concern w i th the r i se of the Socia l Dem ocra t scon t r ibu ted to the go ve rnm en t ' s po lic ies in Ju ly 191 4 . In an essa y onthe causes o f the F i rs t World War Arn o M ayer sugges ted tha t in 191 4elem ents wi th in the G erm an government -poss ib ly inc lud ing the cha n-ce llor - looked to a sm ash in g d ip lom at ic o r mi l i t a ry t r iumph to con -so l id a t e t h e mo n a rch y , t o p e rp e tu a t e P ru s s i a ' s t h ree -c la s s f r an ch i s e , an dt o c h e ck b ot h r ef or m is ts an d r e v o l ~ t i o n a r i e s . ~n Ju ly 1914 . The Outbreakof the F irs t W or ld War (N ew Yo rk , 1 9 7 4 ) Imm an u e l Ge i s s en d o rsed man yaspec ts of these v i ew s , a l though Ge iss , l ike F i sch er , i s equal ly in te restedin ideo log ica l and psycho log ica l in f luences on German po l icy . In R e -shaping the G erm an R igh t . Rad ica l Na t iona l i sm and Po li ti cal Ch angea f t e r B i sm arck (New H av e n , 1 9 8 0 ) Geo f f E ley a rg u es th a t t h e Germa ng o v ern m en t ' s m an ip u la t io n o f n a ti o n a li sm h as b een v as tl y ex ag g e ra t ed ,ye t adds tha t by 191 4 the G erm an government was in an imposs ib le~ i t u a t i o n . ~ o l fg a ng M o m m s e n , w h il e su p p ly i n g m a n y c o rr ec ti ve s to

See also W ehler's Probleme des Imperialismus, K r i senherde de s K a i s -e r y i c h s 1871-1914 (Gott ingen, 19 70), p p . 133-134.- Domestic Causes of the First World War, T he R espons ib i l i ty o f P ow ered. Leonard Krieger and Fritz Stern (New York, 1967), p . 297.Eley, Reshaping the Germ an Right: Radical Nationalism and Polit ical Chan gea f t e r B i sm ark (New Haven, 1980), p . 351.


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444 Kaiserm o r e e x t r e m e i n t e r p r e ta t io n s , h a s c o n c l u d e d t h a t wa r b r o k e o u t l a r g e l yb e c a u se t h e G e r m a n g o v e r n m e n t fa i le d t o f u n c t io n e f f e c ti v e ly i n 1 9 1 4 ,l e a v in g C h a n c e l l o r T h e o b a l d v o n B e t h m a n n Ho l l we g u n a b l e t o r e s i st th ein fluence o f the m i l i ta ry .4 In the m ean t ime o the r h i s to r ians have shedwelcome l ight on par t icular c r i ses , ins t itu t ions , and individuals impor tantt o Ge r m a n f o r e ig n p o l i cy i n t h e y e a rs 1 8 9 7 - 1 9 1 4 : D i r k S t e g m a n n o n t h er o l e o f i n t e re s t g r o u p s , K l a u s W e r n e c k e o n t h e p r e s s a n d p u b l i c o p i n i o n ,He ine r Rau l f f on the f i r s t Moroccan c r i s i s , Barba ra Voge l on German-R u ss i a n r e la t io n s , R a y m o n d Po i d e v i n o n F r a n c o - Ge r m a n e c o n o m i c a n df inanc ia l r iva l r i e s , I sabe l Hul l on the e mp eror and h i s en to urag e , Pe te rW i n z e n o n B e r n h a r d v o n B i i l o w, a n d Ko n r a d Ja r a u sc h o n B e t h m a n n~ o l l w e g . ~Unqu es t ionab ly the G erm an governm ent in the yea rs 1897 -1 9 14 ca re -fu l ly cons ide red fo re ign po l i cy in i t i a tives in l igh t o f the i r domes t i c con-sequ ence s . Yet on the w hole recen t l i t e ra tu re has d i s to r t ed the domes t i ca ims which fo re ign po l i cy w as des igned to ach ieve be fore 191 4 , rnis -unders tood the goa l s o f Weltpol i t ik as o r ig ina l ly adop ted in 189 7 , andobscured the rea l r easons fo r the 191 4 dec i s ions tha t he lped un leash awor ld wa r .6 Insuff i ci en t a t t en t ion has a l so been g iven to the c r i t i ca l lyd i f fe ren t app roac hes o f the l a s t two prew ar ch ance l lo r s , B ii low and Be th-m a n n H o l l w e g .

T h u s , a l t h o u g h t h e g o v e r n m e n t d i d a d o p t Wel tpo l i t i k i n 1897 l a rge lyfor dom es t i c r easo ns , bo th i t s in t ended dom es t i c func t ion and i t s ac tuaWolfgang Mommsen, "Domestic Factors in German Foreign Policy Before1914," Ce n t r a l Eu r o p e a n H i s to r y 6 : 1 (March 1973): 11 -4 3.Dirk Stegmann, Die Erbe n Bisma rcks. Parteien und Verbande in der Spatphasedes Wilhelminische n Deutschiands 1897-1918 (Cologne and Berlin, 1970); KlausWernecke, D e r W i l l e z u r W e l tg e l tu n g . Au s s en p o li t ik u n d O f f e n t t l c h k e i im Ka i s -e r r e i c h a m Vo r a b e n d d e s Er s t e n W e l t k r i e g e s (Diisseldorf, 1969); Heiner R aulff,

Zwischen Machtpolit ik und Imperialismus. Die deutsche Frankreichpolit ik 1904- 5(Diisseldorf, 197 6); B . Vogel, D e u t s c h e Ru s s la n d p o l i t i k . D a s S c h e i t e r n d e rdeu tsche n Wel tpo l i ti k un ter Bi i low (Diisseldorf, 197 3); Raymond Po idevin, L e sre la t ions econ omiq ues e t j in anc i2r es en tre la France e t 1 Al lemagne de 1898 d1914 (Paris , 196 9); Isabel V. H ull, Th e En tou rage o f Ka iser Wi lhe lm I1 1888-191 8 (New York, 198 2); Peter W inzen, Bi i lows Wel tmach tkonzep t (Boppard amRhein, 197 7); Konrad Jarausch, T h e En ig m a t i c Ch a n c e l lo r . Be th m a n n H o l lwe gand the Hubr is o f Imper ia l German?) (New Haven, 197 3). Another importantaddition to the literature is K a i s e r W i l h e l m I I . N e w I n t er p r e ta t io n s . T h e C o r f uP a p e r s , ed. John C. G. Rohl and Nicolaus Sombart (New York, 1982).Since our concern is with alte rnative explanations of G e r m a n foreign policybefore 19 14 the qu estio n of Germ any 's responsibility for the war relat ive to thatof other powers is momenterily being left open. Few historians would now denythat Germany bore substantial responsibility for the conflict; whether Berlin wasprincipal ly responsible will be discussed later.


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446 KaiserPa r ty , dem anded the cons t ruc t ion of a much l a rger fl ee t, and ca l led fora s t ronger l ine agains t the So cia l Dem ocrats . W il l iam's f requent a ttemptsto conduc t fore ign po l i cy over the heads of the Fore ign Off i ce weremaking the gover nm ent 's s i tua t ion untenable . M ore ser ious yet , Wil l iam'sex t ravag ant u t t e rances , inc lud ing h i s s t a t emen t to fe l low pr inces in ea rly1897 that Bismarck had been a pygmy bes ide W il l iam I and his discuss ionof a coup d 'e t a t wi th the Grand Duke of Ba d e n , ha d a l a rme d t he s out hGerm an s t a tes to the po in t tha t the P russ ian min i s t e r to Bav ar ia regardedthe d i s in tegra t ion of the Re ich as a rea l poss ib i l i ty .7 W i l l i am's behav iorhad a l so l ed so m e Cente r Par ty l eaders to su gges t that i t was h igh t imef o r G e r m a n y t o b e c o m e a p a r l i am e n t a ry r e g i m e . 8H ow w a s t h i s c ri si s t o be de a l t w i th? S om e o f t he K a i s e r ' s more e x t r e mea dv i s e r s li ke G e ne ra l A l f r e d von Wa l de r s e e a nd P h i l ipp Eu l e nburg c a ll edfor a coup d 'e t a t , and Wi l l i am h imse l f s eems a t the ve ry l eas t to havew a n t ed t o i nc re a s e t he gove rnm e n t ' s a u t ho r i ty ove r t he Re i c hs t a g . Thecontex t o f h i s l a te 189 5 rem ark , Bi ilow wi l l be my Bism arck , ind ica testha t he had in mind the I ron Ch ance l lor ' s ro le in br ing ing the P russianL a n d ta g in li ne d u ri n g t h e c o n st it ut io n a l c ~ n f l i c t . ~u t the mo re sens ib lebureaucrat s -who as we sha l l s ee never sur rende red cont ro l o f Ge rm anpol icy be fore 1914-real ized tha t Ge rm any had to re ta in it s l imi ted con-st i tut ional gov ernm ent. You inst inct ively incline to an autocrat ic regime,wrote F r iedr ich von Hols te in to Eulen burg in 1 89 6 . 1 am in favor of amo dera te use of a p rac t i cab le sys tem of cons t i tu t iona l coo pera t ive gov-e rnme n t w h i c h , w i th t he e xc e p t i on o f S t . P e te r sbu rg a nd Cons t a n t i nop l e ,i s in opera t ion in the res t of the European and c ivi l ized world. 1 Anda l though Bulo w h imse l f a rg ued in 1897 tha t the chance l lor mus t s e rvethe emperor ra the r than the Re ichs tag , he c lea r ly in tended to reconc i l ethe upper and middle c las ses and the emperor wi th in the f ramework oft he e x is t ing r e g i m e . N o t on l y d i d he t oo oppo s e a c oup d ' e t a t , he a l s ore fused to becom e excess ive ly a la rmed by the r i se of soc ia l i sm.

W i n z e n , B i i low s W e l t ma ch t konz ep t , pp . 36-38 , show s tha t Bi ilow dur ing the1 8 9 0 s w a s a l so s e r i o u s l y c o n c e r n e d b y t h e d a n g e r of t h e d i s i n t e g r a t io n o f t h ee m p i r e .S e e J . C G . R o h l , G e r m a n y w i th o u t B i sm a r c k . T h e C r i s i s o f G o v e r n m e n ti n th e S e c o n d R e i c h , 1 8 9 0 - 19 0 0 ( B e r ke l e y an d L o s A n g e l e s , 1 9 6 7 ) , p p . 1 5 6 -175, 212-222. E le y , Reshaping the Germ an R igh t , and David Blackbourn, C l as s ,R e l i g i on and L oca l P o l i ti c s in W i l he l m i ne Ger man . T he C en t e r P ar t y i n W i i r t -t ember g be f o r e 1 9 1 4 ( N e w H a v e n , 1 9 8 0 ) , h a v e b o t h a r g u e d th a t i n c re a s e d m a s sp a r t i c i p a t i o n i n G e r m a n p o l i t i c a l l i f e a l so h e l p e d p r o d u c e a c r i s i s i n t h e l a t e1 8 9 0 s .Q u o t e d i n Ro h l , G e r m a n y W i t h o u t B i s m a r c k , p . 1 5 8 .

O I b i d . , p . 1 7 0 .I Kathy Le rm an, The D ecis ive Relat ionship: Kaiser Wilhelm I and ChancellorBernhard von Bii low, 1900-05, Kaiser W i lhe lm I I , pp . 221-47 ; Winzen , BiilowsW el t mach t konz ep t , p p . 3 8 - 4 0 .


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erm any and the Or ig ins of Wor ld W ar 7The c onstruct ion of a f leet and the inaugurat ion of a m ore act ive foreign

p o li cy h ad b een d eman d ed fo r so me t ime b y rad i ca l n a t i o n a l i s t s , man yacad em ics , an d t h e emp e ro r h imse l f , a l l of w h o m b e l i ev ed t h a t a s t a t eo f Ge rma n y ' s s i ze an d w ea lth r eq u i red a l a rg e r n av y an d emp i re . l 2 Butf ro m th e s t an d p o in t o f t h e g o v e rn men t t h e Nav y L a w ' s mo s t imp o r t an tfu n c t io n was t o r eco n c i le t h e em p ero r , t h e g o v e rn men t , t h e Re i ch s t ag ,t h e s o u t h G e r m a n s t a t e s , a n d p u b l i c o p i n i o n . B u l o w , w h o h a d s h o w nl i tt l e in te res t in a l a rge f lee t before h i s appo in tmen t as s ta te secre ta ry f o rfo re ign af fa i rs in 189 7 , qu ick ly d i scove red tha t Wi lhe lm w ould ins i s tu p o n o n e ; by t h e fo l l o win g y ea r h e co u ld wr i t e t h at t h e new Nav y L awwould be a t remendou s t r iumph and would benefit our t rade, our securi ty ,o ur f ut ur e a n d a b o v e a ll t he pe rs on o f o u r d e a r ~ a i s e r . ' ~y secur inghe passage of the law B ulow a nd Tirpi tz bols tered the emp ero r ' s confidence

in th emse lv es an d i n t h e Re ich s t ag . E v en th e ir co n t in u in g d ep en d en ceon the Cen ter seem ed less reprehens ib le a f te r the 1898 b i l l passed wi ththe supp or t o f two - th i rds o f the C en ter depu t ies .14 I t s passag e sho we dth at t h e emp ero r , t h e g o v e rn m en t , an d t h e p a rt ie s co u ld wo rk t o g e th e r ,an d t h e reb y eased t h e imm ed ia t e c r i s i s .

W h e n h o w e v e r o n e a s k s w h e t h e r Weltpoli t ik i n v o lv ed a b as i c ch an g ein the power base upon w hich the governm ent re l ied o r even s t reng thenedth e g o v e rn men t ' s e l ec to ra l b ase , t h e an swer mu s t b e i n t h e n eg a t iv e .Weltpoli t ik was n o t a mag ic wan d cap ab le o f mak in g t h e g o v e rn men t ' s ,prob lems d i sap pea r . Ins tead i t se rved as a pa t r io t ic umbre l la undernea thwhich Bulow bought o f f a l l the major par t i es and in te res t g roups wi tho th e r co n c es s io n s . Jo h an n es v o n M iq u e l 's Sammlungspo l i t i k b ro u g h t t o -ge ther agrar ian Conserva t ives and heavy indus t ry beh ind a p rogram ofh igh t a r i f f s . Bu lo w a l so wo o ed th e Co n se rv a t i v es wi th a mo re s t r en u o u san t i -Po l i sh po l icy , whi le heavy indus t ry p ro f i t ed f rom the cons t ruc t ionof the f lee t . Bu t these measu res d id not tu rn indus tr ia li s ts and landow nersinto rel iable governme nt sup porters . Th e Pruss ian Conservatives defeatedthe gov ern m ent ' s c ana l b i ll in 1 899 af te r a b i t te r s t rugg le , and heavyin d us try was co mp la in in g ab o u t t h e g o v e rn m en t ' s l ib e ral so c i a l p o l icyb y 1 9 0 1 I5 Bu lo w in an y ca se n ev e r d reamed th at h e co u ld r e ly o n su cha nar row po l i ti ca l base .16 Th e supp or t o f the Cen ter remained cr i t i ca l ,an d t h e n ew s t a t e s ec re t a ry o f t h e i n t e r io r , Ar th u r v o n Po sad o wsk y -

Winzen, Biilows Weltmachtkonzept pp. 62-64, 69-73.Rohl, Germany Without Bismarck p. 253.Winzen, Bulows Weltmachtkonzept pp. 83-86. For i t s part the Center wasmore than willing to collaborate with the government in an effort to improve thesocial and economic lot of German Catholics; see Blackbourn, Class Religionand Local Politics In Wilhelmine Ger many pp. 23-60.Stegmann, Die Erben Bismarcks pp. 131 -39.Winzen, Biilows Weltmachtkonzept p. 428.


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448 K a i serW ehner , worked closely with the C enter in des igning new social leg is la t iond u r in g th e n ex t t en y e a r s . ' 7 Th e so u th G er m an s t a t e s a l so h ad to b eco n c i l i a t ed , an d th e B av a r i an M ax v o n Th ie lman n b ecame R e ich s t a t esecre ta ry o f the t r easu ry . Al f red K rup p , a majo r benefic ia ry o f the NavyLaw , s t a r t ed th e n ew sp ap e r S u d d eu t sch e K o rresp o n d en z t o h e lp in c r easepa t r io tic f ee l ing o u ts ide P russ ia .18 The e lec to ra l e f fec ts o f Weltpol i t ikw er e l imi t ed in d eed . I n 1 8 9 3 th e f o u r ma jo r R e ich s t ag p a r ti e s t h a t h adsuppo r ted the Navy Law-Conserva t ives , F ree Con serva t ive s , Nat iona lLibera ls , and the Center -had won 249 sea ts . Th ey won 227 seats in1 8 9 8 an d 2 2 6 in 1 9 0 3 . M an y l ead e r s of ex t r ap a r l i amen ta r y o r g an iza t io n ssu ch as t h e N av y Leag u e an d th e Pan - G er man Leag u e h ad h ig h e r h o pesfo r Wel tpo l i t i k ; they w an ted th e f lee t and o ther na tiona l i s sues to over r idethe var ious sec t ion a l , r e l ig ious , and po l i t ica l c le avag es tha t s t i l l d iv idedthe empire . Bu t a l though the Germ an government ' s adopt ion o f Weltpol i t ikenabled the Na vy Lea gue in par t icu lar to form and f lour ish , the governm entd id n ot sh a r e i ts v is ion a r y g o a l s . T o B u lo w ' s g o v e r n men t Weltpol i t ikw as th e o ccas io n f o r a n ew se r i e s o f b a r g a in s amo n g en t r en ch ed in te r e st sand ins t i tu t ions which lef t the Reich government-the cha nce l lor , thesecretar ies of s ta te , and the emperor-in a s ignif icant ly s t ron ger posi t ionthan h i ther to .

More impor tan t to the i s sue o f the o r ig ins o f the F i r s t Wor ld War i sthe ques t ion o f whether Wel tpo l i t i k mad e w ar mo r e l i k e ly . G iv en th a t tWil l i am, B i i lo w , T i r p i t z , an d M iq u e l h ad d ec id ed u p o n a mo r e ac t iv ewor ld po l icy la rge ly fo r dom es t ic r easons , was w ar part o f the i r p lan?This ques t io n can be answ ered in two ways : by de lv ing in to the fo re ignp o l icy g o a l s o f t h e G er m an l ead e r sh ip a t t h e t ime Weltpol i t ik was in tro-d u c ed , an d b y s tu d y in g the i r b eh av io r d u r in g th e d ecad e a f t e r t h e in tr o -duc t ion o f the F i r s t Navy Law . Bo th approaches -and espec ia l ly thesecond-suggest that the or ig ina tors of Weltpol i t ik l o o k ed f o r w ar d to aser ies o f smal l - sca le , marg ina l fo re ign po l icy successes , no t to a majo rw ar .

I t is h igh ly s ign i f ican t tha t the exha us t ive r esearches o f the las t twe n tyyear s have no t m ad e i t poss ib le to say jus t what the fo re ign po l icy goa lsof Weltpol i t ik w e r e . B u lo w in p a r t i cu l a r s eems to h av e av o id ed p u tt i ngany spec if ic ideas abou t G erm an y ' s fu tu re on paper ,20 and T i rp itz had

I Tirp i tz a l so made s ign i fi can t co ncess ions to win the Cen te r ' s a s sen t to thesecond Navy Law of 1900; ib id . , pp . 108-126.Rohl , G e r m a n y w it ho u t B i s m a r c k pp . 223 - 251 .l E l e y , R e s h a pi n g t h e G e r m a n R i g h t pp . 167 - 84 , s how s t hat B h l ow f ough te f for t s o f ex t reme Navy League na t iona l i s t s to tu rn the navy in to a weaponaga ins t the an t i -na t iona l Cen te r .W i n z e n , B u l o w s W e l t m a c h t k o n z e p t pp . 431 -32 .


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Ge rm any and the Or ig ins of Wor ld W ar 1 449only s l igh tly m ore to say . In the la te 1890s bo th a rgued tha t Germ an y spopulation and industrial grow th required both a fleet and a larger colonialem p i re . M o s t ed u ca t ed Ge rma n s s eem to h av e sh a red th i s b e li e f . Du r in gth e 1 8 9 0 s , wh en reco v e ry f ro m th e g rea t d ep res s io n was b y n o mean ssecu re an d F ran ce an d th e U n i t ed S t a t e s were r a i sin g t a r i ff s , t h e p ro b l emo f fo re ig n mark e t s s eemed s e r io u s . E v en C ap r iv i , an o p p o n en t of W e l t -po l i t i k had be l ieved i t necessa ry to secure a l a rger indus t r ia l m arke t fo rG erm an y , th o u g h h e p re fe r red t o lo o k fo r it in C en t ra l E u ro p e . S t i l l , t h eex t remely l imi ted economic s ign i f icance o f the t e r r i to r ies the Germansac tua l ly t r i ed to a cqu i re a f te r 1897 sugges t s tha t the governm ent d id no tregard new co lonial markets as a real ly urgent necess i ty , and as Ger ma ny sforeign t rade grew s teadi ly du ring the 1900s th is need undoubtedly seeme dev en l e ss acu t e .

Recen t wo rk h as emp h a s i zed t h e An g lo p h o b ic ch a rac t e r of We l tpo l i t i kargu ing tha t Bu low and T i rp i tz were p repar ing fo r an even tua l t r i a l o fstrength with B ritain. C ertain ly the decisio n to build the fleet immediatelya f fec t ed An g lo -G erman re l a t i o n s . Pe t er Win zen an d Pau l Ken n ed y h av eshown how Bulow dec ided tha t in the shor t run Br i t i sh fee le rs fo r anAn g lo -Germ an a l l i an ce h ad t o b e r e j ec t ed , s i n ce German y co u ld n ot y e tsecure favorable terms . 2 Yet wh ethe r Tirpitz or Bii low actually en visionedan even tua l war wi th Br i ta in i s much more d i f f icu l t to say . In o rder tojus ti fy the exp en se of the f lee t T i rp i tz had n o cho ice bu t to speak in t e rmsof an eventua l clash with Britain; otherw ise his belov ed batt leships wou ldhave no rea l use . We sha l l see tha t he sang ano ther tune when w ar wi thEngland loom ed as a real poss ib i l ity . Nor m ust B ulow s d ip lom at ic tacticsnecessar ily have harb ored s in i s te r in ten t ions . W hi le re jec t ing an a l l i ancewi th Br i ta in he d id no t exc lud e coopera t ive a r ra ngem ents . In 190 0 hewa s more than ready to jo in Lond on in a par t it ion o f the Por tugu esee m p i r e . 2 2His r e se rv e t o ward s L o n d o n can j u st a s eas il y b e r eg a rd ed a san a t tempt to make a v i r tue o f necess i ty . The s ta te o f German pub l icopinion in the era of the Boer War probably mad e an al l iance with Englandimp o ss ib l e an y way .Bulow s po l icy exc lud ed e i ther an a l l i ance wi th Br i ta in o r an immine n tc l a sh ; n o ev id en ce su g g es t s t h a t h e a imed a t an ac tu a l d ip lo ma t i c o rmi l i t a ry v i c to ry o v e r t h e Un i t ed Kin g d o m. Hi s sp eech es an d p r iv a t eremark s d u r in g t h e ea r ly y ea r s o f Weltpol i t ik d o t en d t o cas t E n g lan d a sb o th t h e l ead in g w o r ld p o wer an d th e p r inc ip al o b s t ac l e t o Germ an wo r ldpo l icy , ye t they do no t in any way deny the leg i t imacy o f the Br i t i sh

Ib id . , p p . 80-81 293-353; Kennedy, Anglo-German Antagonism pp. 226-27 . W i n z e n , Biilows Weltmachtkonzept p p . 265-77.


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450 aiserEmpire o r imply tha t i t s s ize shou ld be reduced . His p r inc ipa l concern ,as expressed in a Dec em ber 1899 Reichstag speech in t roducing the SecondNavy Law, was tha t Germany no t be le f t beh ind in the d iv i s ion o f thewo r ld ' s we ak e r emp i r e s . He f req u en tly r e fe r red to th e Sp an i sh -A me r i canWar a s t h e ev en t wh ich h ad ex p o sed Ge rm an y ' s weak n es ses mo s t c l ea r ly ;h ad we b een s t ro n g e r a t s ea , h e s e ems to im p ly , we mig h t h av e p rof it edf rom the conf lic t ours e lves . Th e f lee t , on e migh t in fer f rom the spe ech ,was no t des igned to cha l lenge the Br i t i sh Empire d i rec t ly bu t to makesure tha t Germany secured i t s r igh t fu l inher i t ance when some of LordSa l i sb u ry ' s d y in g n a ti on sH-the Po r tu g u e se , O t to m an , an d Ch in eseem pir es proba bly f igured most promine nt ly in Bi i low 's mind-finallyexp i red .13 In th i s and o ther speeches Bi ilow a l so tended to p lace theg o v ern men t m id way b e tween th o se wh o a rg u ed th a t Be r l in h ad d o n e to omuch to p ro tec t G erm any ' s overseas in te res t s and those who asked tha tthey be pursued wi th g rea te r zea l .14Th e conduct of the Germ an go vernment in the years af ter 1 897 suggeststha t Bu low sough t re la t ive ly cheap successes tha t would impress theemp ero r an d Germ an o p in io n wi th o u t ca r ry in g an y rea l ri sk of w ar . T h eac tua l co lon ia l t e r r i to ry which Bulow se ized a t Kiaochow and in thePaci fic l acked g rea t s t ra teg ic o r econ om ic s ign i f icance , ye t he lped focuspublic opinion upon the w orld-shaking and decisive problem s of foreignpolicy. Th is gain will s t imulate people and navy to follow your M ajestyfur ther a long the pa th w hich leads to wor ld pow er , g rea tness and e te rna lg lo ry , Bi ilow wro te W i l l i am pub l ic ly o n the occas ion o f the se izure o fthe wor th less Ca ro l ine 1s lands .I ' Ru ss ia , he wro te H ols te in in A ugus t of1 9 0 1 , co u ld r ece iv e a sh a re o f t h e Bag h d ad ra i lway , b u t an y th in g wh ichmig h t l o ok l ik e a r e t r ea t , o r w o rse , a d e fea t fo r Germ an p o l i cy i n As i aMinor mus t be carefu l ly avo ided in th i s . On the con t rary the mat te rshou ld be d ressed up as renewed proof o f the sk i l l wi th which the menin charge of our foreign pol icy furthered Ger ma ny 's world in teres ts wi thoutendanger ing our good re la t ions wi th our neighbor^. ^^ Ap p earan ces , in

23 F o r th e sp e e c h a n d so me v e ry in t e r e s t i n g c o mme n ta r i e s s e e R he t or i k undW e l t po l i t i k . E i ne i n t e rd i s zep l i n ii r e Un t e r s uchu ng po l i ti s cher R ede n von W . E .G l a d s t o n e , J . C h a m b e r l a i n u n d B . v. B u l o w , e d . H e l m u t W i e b ro c k ( W i e s b a d e n ,1 9 7 4 ) , p p . 1 4 5 -1 9 2 .' ee h is conf iden t ia l rem arks to the Re ichs tag budge t com m it tee on March2 7 - 28 . 1 9 0 0 , q u o t e d in W i n z e n . B u l o w s W e l t m a c h t k o n z e p t , p p . 1 2 0 -2 2 , a n d

h is Re ichs tag remarks o f March 3 , 1 9 0 2 , W in z e n , P r in c e B i i l o w ' s W e l t m a c h t -po l it ik , Au s t ra l ia n Journal of Pol i t i cs an d His tory 2 2 : 2 ( A u g u s t 1 9 7 6 ) : 2 3 9 .5 K e n n e d y . A n g l o - G e r m a n A n t a g o n i sm , p p . 3 6 5 . 2 3 6 .6 No rma n R ic h a n d M . H . F i s h e r , e d s . , T h e H o l s t e i n P a p e r s ( C a m b r i d g e .1 9 6 3 ) . 4 : 7 8 4 .


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Ge rm any and the Origins of W orld War 1 451short , were mo re important than rea l i ties . Ti rpi tz was even m ore caut ious .W hi le eager to s t res s the long- te rm threa t f rom Eng land in order to jus t ifythe f l ee t , he opposed the se izure of Kiaochow on the grounds tha t i tinvolved an e xces s ive r i sk of a confl ic t wi th R uss ia .

T h e rea l na ture of B ulo w 's po l i cy de f ini te ly em erge d dur in g the years1904-06 , w he n t he Rus s o - J a p a ne s e W a r , t he A ng l o -F re nc h e n t e n t e , a ndF re nc h mo ve s i n t o M o roc c o t h r e a te ne d t o t r a ns fo rm t he i n te rna ti ona ls i t ua t i on . Re c e n t monogra phs ha ve s t r e s s e d G e rma ny ' s e f fo r t s du r i ngthese years to br ing a bou t a d rama t ic chan ge in the European b a lance ofpow e r , a nd s pe c if ic a l ly to c on c l ude a R us s o -G e rm a n a l l ia nc e a nd b rea kor weaken the Anglo-French en ten te . Th e Germ an governm ent , however ,pursued these aims without losing s ight of important constraints . Berl in 'smore a gg re s s i ve po li c ie s s ome t i m e s s e e m e d t o i nc re a s e t he da nge r o f aEurope a n w a r , bu t no c ons e ns u s in f a v o r o f w a r e ve r e me rge d w i t h in t heImpe r ia l gove rnm e n t . Weltpoli t ik remained a po l icy of l imi ted r i sks andl imi t e d a i ms .

W i th r e s pe c t t o t he Rus s o - J a pa ne s e W a r , Bu l ow c l ea r ly w e l c ome d t heconf li c t and hope d to benef it f rom i t even before it had beg un . F romthe po in t o f v iew of our in te rna l po l i t i c s and to counte rac t the genera ld i s sa t is fac t ion in Ge rma ny, he wro te Hols te in in January 190 4 , i twould of course be a good th ing i f ' somewhere fa r away ' the na t ionscame to b lows . 28 The war would a l so sharpen the conf l i c t be tweenRus s i a a nd Eng l a nd -A m e r i c a , w h i ch Bu l ow c l e ar l y r e ga rde d a s a na dva n t a ge , a nd c ou l d b re a k up t he D ua l A l li a nc e, s i nce F ra nc e w ou l dno t j o in Rus s i a i n a w a r a ga i ns t Eng l a nd . W he n in O c t obe r 1904 t heD og ge r Ba nk i nc ide n t t h re a t ene d t o b ri ng En g l a nd i n to t he w a r Bu l owdec ided the t ime was r ipe for an ac tua l Russo-German a l l i ance whichFranc e would subsequent ly b e forced to join . Germ an offers of an a l l iancein Oc tober of 190 4 and Ju ly 190 5 got now here because on ly the t s a ramong the respons ib le Russ ian of f i c i a l s s eemed in te res ted . Ye t the re -s i s t ance wi th in the German government to such a dras t i c reor i en ta t ionof po l i cy i s equa l ly s ign i f i can t . When Bulow put the ques t ion of thea l l iance be fore a counc i l o f min i s te r s on Oc tob er 26 , 190 4 , T i rp i t z ,desp i t e h i s suppor t o f an eventua l Russo-German a l l i ance , a rgued tha ta t the presen t moment i t would on ly provoke an Engl i sh a t t ack aga ins twhich Russ ia would be no he lp wha tever . Chie f o f the Genera l S ta f fCount Al f red von Schl i e f fen a l so doubted the mi l i t a ry benef i t s o f sucha n a l l i a nc e ; s hou l d Eng l a nd a t t a ck G e rm a ny he r ega rde d a Rus s ia n m oveaga ins t Ind ia as un l ike ly . Hols te in suppor ted Bulow 's sugges t ion , bu t

'' ogel Deutsche Russ lar rdpol i t i k ; R a u l f f , M a c k t p o l i ti k u n d / m p e r i a l i s m u s .H o l s t e in P a p e r s : 8 1 8 .


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452 aiserSta te Secre ta ry fo r Fore ign Af fa i r s Oswald von Rich thofen ag reed wi th~ i r ~ i t z . ~ u l o whimsel f came to share the v iew tha t such an a l l iancewould no t be wor th the r isk o f w ar . On e th in g i s cer ta in , he wro teHolste in o n Decem ber 13: while an agreement with Russia safeguardingthe peace an d ra i sing o ur posi t ion in the wor ld w ould be a g rea t successf o r o u r fo r e ig n p o l icy an d w o u ld b e w e lco m ed in w id e an d in th e b estc i r c les as a r e tu rn to the t r ad i t ions o f B ismarck ian po l icy , a bond wi thRuss ia whic h wou ld in con t ras t to th i s d raw E ng land ' s hos t i li ty upon usw o u ld ce r t a in ly b e co n d em n ed u n an imo u s ly b y th e w h o le n a t io n , b y th eGerm an Pr inces f ir s t o f a l l . 30 Nei ther the c hance l lo r , no r the Fore ignO f f ice , n o r t h e a r m y , n o r t h e n av y w er e in t h e l ea st an x io u s f o r w ar .

G er m an p o l i cy d u r in g th e M o r o ccan c r i si s a l so sh ied aw ay f r o m an yr i sk o f w a r . H av in g f a i l ed to w eak en E n g lan d ' s p o s i ti o n b y co n c lu d in gan a l l iance wi th Ru ss ia , the Ge rm an government- led in th i s ins tanceby Holste in -dec ided to s t r ike a b low a t the new Ang lo -Fren ch en ten teby sho wing the French tha t they cou ld no t r e ly upon Br i t i sh supp or t tor ea l i ze th e i r co lo n ia l a ims . Th ey d id not i t is clear , act on behalf ofGerm an comm ercial in teres ts in M orocco, who had no objection to workingw ith th e ~ r e n c h . ~ 'o r d id they wan t concre te te r r i to r ia l ga ins . Whi leWil l iam and ce r ta in Fore ign Of f ice o ff ic ial s had toyed wi th the idea o fa sk in g f o r co mp en sa t io n in th e C an a r y I s l an d s sh o u ld F ran ce an d Sp a inpar t i t ion Morocco , Hols te in and Bu low s imply wan ted to b r ing Francein l i ne b y f o r c in g th e F r en ch to su b mi t t h e M o r o cco q u es t io n to a co n -ference . ' ~ usu a l , p res tige-both dom es t ic and fo re ign- remained thekey cons idera t ion . S ign i f ican t ly , a f te r Delc asse r esigned in June 1905an d R o u v ie r ag r eed to a co n f e r en ce th e f o l lo w in g mo n th , b o th B u lo wan d Wi l l i am co n c lu d ed th a t t h ey h ad ach iev ed th e ir a im s . H o l s te in d i s -ag r eed , b e l i ev in g tha t F r an ce m u s t b e f o r ced to mak e m a jo r co n ces s io n s ,bu t he cou ld no t car ry the day , a nd h is f a i lu re to conv ince h is super io r sto ho ld to an uncompromis ing po l icy he lped lead to h is r es igna t ion .33N o o n e w i t h i n t h e G e r m a n g o v e r n m e n t p u s h ed f o r a w a r o v e r M o r o c c o .Thou gh nei ther Raulff nor Ke nnedy has d iscovered any specific s ta tementof Tirp i tz ' s opin ion , the la t ter reasonably assum es that h is a t t i tude towardsa war invo lv in g England- in whic h the Imper ia l Navy would have noc ha nc e-w as n o m o r e f a vo r ab l e t h an in t h e f al l of 1 9 0 4 . ~ ~o u n t v o n

2 9 Vogel, D e u t s ch e R u s s l a n d p o l i t i k pp. 206-212.u H o l s te i n P a p e r s 4: 867.

3 Raulff, M a c h t p o l i t i k u n d Im p e r i a l i s m u s pp . 123-25.32 Ibid ., pp. 54-55.33 Ib id ., pp. 105-106, 123; see also Norman Rich, F r i e d r i c h v o n H o l s te i n(Cam bridge, 1 965 ), 2: 696-745.3%ennedy, A n g l o - G e r m a n A n t a g o n is m p. 276. Tirpitz's failure to expressa written opinion could also be interpreted as evidence that the question wasnever seriously raised.


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ermany and the Origins of World WarI 453Schl ie f fen no ted tha t th i s would be a favorab le moment to r a war wi thFran ce , b u t t h i s was n o t m u ch m o re t h an a s t a t emen t of t h e o b v io u s , an dPruss ian War M inis ter Karl von Einem argu ed on the contrary that G erm anar t il l e ry was no t ready fo r war .35 W il l i am charac ter is t i cal ly ran ho t andco ld ; h is t h rea t s so m e t imes f r i g h t en ed th e F re n ch , b u t h is eag e rn es s fo ra s e t t l emen t f r eq u en t ly sh o wed th ro u g h . An d wh i l e Ho l s te in co n t in u a l lyins is ted on secu r ing rea l concess ions f rom Fra nce , h is l e t te rs in June1 9 0 5 sh o w th a t h e w an ted a su cces s fu l co n fe ren ce , n o t a F ran co -Germanwar w h ich h e su sp ec t ed E n g lan d o f t ry in g to b r in g ab o u t .3 6H e h a d e a r li e rg iven ano th er reason f o r a reserved po l icy : tha t the emp ero r , in case o fEurop ean comp l ica t ions , would unco ndi t iona l ly reserve fo r h imsel f themi l it a ry co m m an d , wh ich , s i n ce h e is en t ir e ly i n cap ab le mi l i t a r i ly ,m us t lead to h orr ib le c a t a ~ t r o ~ h e s . ~ 'i ilow favored a se t t l eme nt wi thFrance as ear ly as Ju ly 19 05 , and in February 1906 he summ arized h i spos i t ion . Every th ing depen ds on our se iz ing the r igh t mo me nt fo r an,,accep t ab l e co m p ro m ise , h e wro t e Ho l s t e in . We can n o t t o le ra te a h u -mi l i a t i o n . T h e f a i l u re o f t h e co n fe ren ce wo u ld b e , n o ma t t e r h o w o n elooked a t i t , a d ip lomat ic se tba ck fo r us . Nei the r pub lic op in io n , Par li a -men t , P r in ces , o r ev en t h e a rm y wi l l h av e an y th in g t o d o wi th a war o v e r~ o r o c c o . ~ ~

Of par t i cu lar in te res t in l igh t o f recen t h i s to r iography i s the genera lag reemen t t h at a war o v e r M o ro c co wo u ld n o t be p o p u la r . T h e co n cu r ren tco lon ia l war in sou thw es t Afr ica had no t been a pub l ic re la t ions su ccessan d th e German p res s d id n o t r eg a rd M o ro cco a s a p ro p e r casu s b e l l i .Even con serva t ive papers po in ted to the Russ ian Revo lu t ion as ev idenc etha t war m us t no t be under taken wi thou t a f irm pa tr io tic bas i s , and W arM in i s t e r E in em n o ted t h at th e M o ro c co is su e l ack ed th e n eces sa ry i n -tegra t ing power . 39 Under the c i rcumstances the ou tcome of the c r i s i swas v i r tua l ly a fo regone conclus ion . Af te r the government avo ided abreakdow n of the Algeciras conference by m aking substant ia l concess ionsto the French , Bu low pa in ted the ou tcome in rosy co lo rs fo r the p ressan d p a r l i amen t .

Du r in g h i s r ema in in g t h ree y ea r s in p o w er B u low co n t in u ed to ex p lo i tWeltpolitik d o mes t i ca l l y wh i l e ab an d o n in g an y a t t emp t t o t r an s fo rm th ein te rna t iona l s i tua t ion . In l a te 1906 he faced a d i l emma s imi l a r t o t h ato f 1 8 9 7 ; t h e em p ero r h ad ag a in b eco me an g ry a t th e g o v e rn me n t ' s d e -p en d en ce u p o n th e Re ich s t ag , an d e sp ec i a l l y u p o n th e Cen te r Pa r ty .

' aulff, M n c h t p o l i t ik u n d I m p e r i a l is r n u s p p . 130-33.36 H o l s te i n P a p c r s : 891 897.R a u l f f , M a c h t p o l i t ik u n d I m p e r i a l is r n u s p . 73 n . I b i d . , p p . 123-25; H o l s te i n P a p e r s 4: 936.39 R a u l f f , M n c h t p o l i t ik u n d I m p e r i a l i s m u s p p . 80 133-44


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454 Ka i s erW h en the C en t e r s udden ly j o ined t he Soc i a l Democra t s i n oppos i t ion t othe wa r i n s ou thwes t Af r i ca B u low d i s s o lved t he R e i chs t ag and t u rnedthe ens u ing e l ec t i on i n to a r e f e rendum on Wel tpo l i t i k . Cri t i ca l to thegov e rnm en t ' s s ucces s we re t he l e f t l ibe ra l pa r t i e s , wh ich adop t ed a pro-gove rnmen t s t ance i n fo re ign po l i cy and gene ra l l y r e fus ed t o s uppor tSoc i a l Dem ocra t s i n t he s econd round o f t he R e i chs tag e l ec t i ons . A s are s u lt t he Soc i a l Dem ocra t i c r ep re s en t a t i on f e l l f rom e igh ty -one s ea t s tojus t fo r t y - t h ree , and B u low fo rm ed a gove rnmen t ma jo r it y t ha t en ti r elyexc luded t he cen t e r . T he e l ec t i ons r ea ff irmed t he coun t ry ' s s uppo r t fo rWeltpol i t ik and t he gove rn m en t ' s i ndepende nce o f any pa r ti cu l a r pa r t y .

Des p i t e t h i s b r il li an t s ucc es s , t he w eaknes s e s o f Weltpol i t ik both as afo re ign and a s a dom es t i c s tr a t egy began t o eme rge du r ing the r ema in ingthree years of B u l o w ' s ~ c h a n c e l l o r s h i p .By the t ime he l e f t o ff ice in 190 9B ulow had de c ided t ha t nava l cons t ruc t i on , i n pa r t i cu l a r , had t o be cu r -t a il e d . H e h a d a l s o b e c o m e e v e n m o r e c o n v i n c e d th a t w a r c o u l d n evers e rve e it he r t he dom es t i c o r t he fo re ign po l icy i n te r e st s o f t he Ge rm angove rnmen t . The chance l l o r had ques t i oned whe the r t he f l e e t p rogramwou ld eve r imp rove G erm any ' s ex t erna l s it ua ti on a s ea r ly a s 190 7 , bu tnew Eng l i s h cons t ruc t i on , popu l a r p re s s u re , and t he en thus i a s m o f t heemp ero r fo rced h im to endor s e new inc rea s e s in t he navy i n the fo l l owingyea r . B y 1908-09 he had de f in i te l y dec ided tha t the naval gam e was notwor th t he can d l e . In Aug us t o f 1908 he m ade c l ea r i n l et te r s t o Ho l st e intha t he f av ored an even tua l nava l ag reemen t in o rde r t o avo id a hope l e s sw a r w i th E n g l a n d , a l t h o u g h a s a lw a y s h e e m p h a s i z e d t h at G e r m a n y m u s tneve r s eem to y i e ld t o fo re ign p re s s u re . B u low ' s wa rn ings t o W i l l i amaga ins t c l os ing t he door t o nava l conv e r s a t i ons , w h ich V. R . B e rghahnin te rp re t s s imply a s a p loy t o r ea s s u re London t ha t Ge rm any d id no t p lanwar , ac tua l ly re f lec ted h i s in ten t io n of ma king a dea l when agi ta t ion h add ie d d o w n . 4 '

S ign i f i can t l y , B i il ow now rega rded a nava l s l owd own a s e s s en t ia l fo rdom es t ic as wel l as fore ign pol icy re ason s . Th e financ ia l burden of nava larm am ents had be com e intolerable . In the mids t of drawing up the f inancialr e fo rm, i nc lud ing an i nhe r i t ance t ax , wh ich was even tua l l y t o de s t royhis coa l i t ion and lead to h i s fa l l , Bulow repea ted aga in and aga in tha tG e r m a n y c o u l d n o t a f f or d t h e w o r l d ' s l ar g es t a r m y , a h u g e n a v y , a n dthe wo r ld ' s mo s t expens ive s oc i a l po l icy . H e c lea r l y in t ended t o r educenava l expend i tu re s by i ns i s t i ng on t he p ri o ri ty o f t he a rmy . Th e Germ an

G e o r g e D u n l a p C r o t h e r s , T h e G e r m a n lections of 1907 ( N e w Y or k, 1 9 4 1 ) ,pass im. The Soc ia l i s t s ' recen t d i scuss ions of a mass s t r ike probably f r igh tenedaw ay som e vo t e rs a s w e l l .B e r g h a h n , G e r m a n a n d t h e A p p r o ac h of W a r , pp . 64 -69 .


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G e r m a n y a n d the Origins o f World War 55go ver nm en t ' s perenn ia l defic it had to be e l imina ted ; wh i le the fl eet i t se l fi n su red t h e an t ag o n i sm o f En g lan d an d i n c rea s ed th e d an g e r o f wa r , t h elo ans n ece s s a ry t o f i n an ce it ro b b ed G erm an y o f an imp o r t an t mea n s o fex tend in g i ts in f luence peace fu l ly . " I t i s increas ing ly c lea r to me ," hewro te Hols te in in Sep tem ber 190 8 , "what th i s re fo rm of our f inanceswi l l mean no t on ly econom ica l ly an d mi l i t a r i ly , bu t a l so pure ly d ip lo -mat ically . T he undim inished enormo us inf luence of France, her unshakablepres t ige , i s no t on ly the resu lt o f her mi l i t a ry s t ren g th nor eve n o f hercu l tu re and language , bu t i s to a g rea t ex ten t the p roduc t o f her wea l thof cap i ta l and i t s liqu id ity . Tha t i s the p r ima ry reason fo r the Frenchin flu en ce in S p a in , I ta l y , R u s s i a , an d m an y o th e r co u n t r ie s . No w th eFrench a re t ry ing to find a f inanc ia l we dge in Hunga ry . T ha t wi ll em erg emo re c l ea r l y t h e l o n g e r we co n t i n u e o u r mi s e rab l e eco n o mic d ep en d en ceo n l o an s an d co n t r i b u t io n s f ro m th e i n d iv id u a l Ge rman s t at e s. " 42

Bi ilow, the n , had se t upon a course o f f inanc ia l re fo rm a t hom e, nava l .-l imi ta t ion and improved re la t ions wi th Br i t a in to reduce the danger o fwa r , an d a g rad u a l ex p an s io n o f G e rm an in f lu en ce in t h e wo r ld a t l a rg e .Th e q u es t i o n o f wa r an d p eace a ro s e o n ce ag a in i n ea r ly 1 9 0 9 as a r e s ul tof t h e B o s n i an c r i s i s . H e lmu th v o n Mo l tk e , t h e n ew ch i e f of t h e g en e ra ls t a f f , r eg a rd ed t h e Eu ro p ean s i t u a t i o n a s p ro p i t i o u s fo r wa r , an d s o mearmy o f f ice rs apparen t ly fe l t tha t a war migh t p rov ide the occas ion fo ra co u p d ' e t a t . Kn o w in g , a s d id a l l Eu r o p e , t h a t R u s s i a co u ld n ot f ig h t awar , Bi ilow character is t ical ly scored a cheap d ip loma t ic success by issuingh is March 1909 u l t ima tum . On ly a year l a ter he admi t ted tha t th i s wasmore a t r iumph o f s ty le than o f subs tance : " I co n s id e red , " h e wro t e ,. . . t h a t we w o u ld b reak t h e n e t o f en c i r c l emen t wh ich ex i s t ed mo re

in imag ination than in fact ."43 Yet his at t i tude tow ards w ar had not cha nged .In Oc to b e r 1 9 0 8 , d u r in g a min o r c r i si s o v e r Mo ro cco wh ich ev en tu a l l yco n c lu d ed w i th a n ew F ran co -Germ an ag re em en t , t h e c ro wn p r in ce r e -proa che d Biilow for an insufficiently vigorous defe nse of G erm an interestsand an excess ive love o f peace , add ing tha t "a g rea t par t o f the na t ionth in k s as I d o , an d t h e wh o le a rmy is l o n g in g t o ' g e t a t ' em . ' B i il o w 'sr ep ly d es e rv es t o b e q u o t ed a t s o m e l en g th .. I entirely agree with Your Imperial and Royal Highness that it is inadvisabletoo frequently to express on e' s love of peace, since this gives others too great afeeling of self-assu rance . I too am convinced that, if a case involves one's country'shonor, i t is necessary to strike, c o li te qu e c o f i t e , and whatever the chances mayseem to be. But, unless our honor is engaged, we should always ask ourselveswhat is to be expected from a war. No war in Europe can bring us much. There

H o l s t e i n P a p e r s , : 128; see also p p. 1 1 17 and 1 120arausch, T h e E n i g m a t ic C h a n c e l l o r , p . 6 2 .


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456 Kai s e rwould be nothing for us to gain in the conquest of any fresh Slav or Frenchterritory.' f we ann ex small countrie s to the Em pire we shall only strengthenthose centrifugal elements wh ich, ala s, are never wanting in Germ any.In 1866 and 1870 there was a great prize to be won. T oday that is no longerthe case. Above all, we ought never to forget that nowadays no war can bedeclared unless a whole people is convinced that such a war is necessary andjust. A w ar, lightly provok ed, even if it were fought succ essfully, would havea bad effect on the cou nt ry ; while if it ended in de fea t, it might en tail the fall ofthe dynasty. History shows us that every great war is followed by a period ofliberalism, since a people demands compensation for the sacrifices and effortwar has entailed. But any war which ends in a defeat obliges the dynasty thatdeclared it to make concessions which before would have seemed unheard of.In affairs of this kind the op inion of the army cann ot be decisive. It is exce llen t,no doubt, that the army should not feel its sword has rusted in the scabbard: itis necessary even that soldiers should be bellicose. But the task of a leader ofpolicy is to get a clear view of consequences. Q uidq u id ng i s , p r ude n t er agas e tr e s p i c e j n e m [W hoev er would ac t, act prudently and consider the consequence^.]^^

T h i s l e t te r a d d r e s s e s e v e r y m o t i v e f o r w a r t h at h i st o r ia n s h a v e a s c r i b e dt o t h e I m p e r i a l G e r m a n g o v e r n m e n t a l e l it e . T o th e c l a i m t h at d e m o c r a -t i za t io n m i g h t t h e r e b y b e c h e c k e d B u l o w r e p l ie d t h a t e v e n a v i c t o ri o u sw a r w o u l d r e s u l t i n m o r e c o n c e s s i o n s t o th e p e o p l e , w h i l e a d e f e a t m i g h tl e a d t o s o m e t h i n g m u c h w o r s e . W h i l e n o t i n g t h at t h e m il i ta r y g e n e r a l l yt e nde d t owa rds wa r , he s t r e s s e d t he r e s pons ib i l i t y o f t he po l i t i c a l a u -t h o r it i es . R e s p o n d i n g i m p l i ci t ly t o s u g g e s t i o n s t h a t G e r m a n y s h o u l d e x -p a n d i n E u r o p e , h e a r g u e d t h a t n e w s u b j e c t s w o u l d b e a s t r o u b l e s o m ea s t h e A l s a c e - L o r r a i n e r s a n d P o l e s . I f h e d i d n o t m e n t i o n c o l o n i e s , i tw a s b e c a u s e, a s h e d i d s a y , E n g la n d w o u l d b e a m o n g G e r m a n y ' s e n e m i e s ,a n d n o n e w o u l d b e a c q u i r e d . D i p l o m a t i c s u c c e s s e s a n d c o l o n i a l a c q u i -s i t ions might he lp the govern men t ; wa r would no t . Weltpol i t ik wa s s im p ly ;o n e a s p e c t o f a b r o a d s t r a te g y t o h o l d t h e G e r m a n E m p i r e t o g e t h e r a n dg o v e r n i t e f f e c t i v e l y , a n d B u l o w c o r r e ct ly e s t i m a t e d th a t w a r w o u l de x a c e r b a t e G e r m a n y ' s d o m e s t i c di ff ic u lt ie s w i t h o u t w i n n i n g a n y w o r t h -w h i l e p r i z e s .

B y 9 9 T i r p i t z h a d a l s o s h o w n h im s e l f d e e p l y a v e r s e t o w a r , c e r t a i n l yin t h e s h o r t ru n a n d p r o b a b l y i n t h e l o n g a s w e l l . T i r p i t z n e v e r t i r ed o fd i s c u s s ing t he fo re ign a n d dom e s t i c be ne fi ts t ha t h i s f le e t wa s c e r t a in t ob r i n g t o G e r m a n y ; o n l y i n t h i s w a y c o u l d h e j u s ti f y i ts c o s t . Y et i t b e c a m eclear-as he r e pe a t e d ly s t a t e d du r in g on e c r i s i s a f t e r a no the r t ha t t hef le e t w a s n o t y e t r e ad y f o r w a r a n d i g n o r e d t h e e v i d e n c e t h at G e r m a n yc ou ld ne v e r ov e rc om e B r i t i s h num e r i c a l s upe rior it y- tha t fo r h im the

' inzen, Pr ince Biilow 's Weltrnnchtkonzepr ," p. 238, states that Biilownever showed any interest in continental expansion.5 Memoirs of Pr ince ?on Bi i lobt , (Bos ton , 193 , 2: 458-61.


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G e r m a n y a n d t h e O r i g in s o f W o r l d W a r I 457n a v y w a s n o t a m e a n s , b u t a n e nd . t r u e c o l d w a r r i o r , h e c o n t in u a l lys t ressed England ' s suppo sed th rea t to Ge rm an y ' s w or ld pos it ion to jus t ifyt h e f l e e t ' s e x i s t e n c e w h i l e p u s h i n g t h e d a t e o f a n y c l a s h o f a r m s f u r t h e ra n d f u r t h e r i n t o t h e f u t u re . F r o m ti m e t o t i m e t h e g r a n d a d m i r a l s o u g h tn e w p r e t e x t s f o r t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e f l e e t, i n c l ud i n g a p r o p o s e d l a wt o m a k e a l l o v e r s e a s G e r m a n s c i t i z en s o f t h e e m p i r e . 4 8T h e re a l goa l o fh i s p o l i cy w a s n o t a v ic t o r y o v e r E n g l a n d , b u t a n a v a l l a w t h a t w o u l dg u a r a n t e e h i m t h r e e n e w s h i p s a y e a r f o r e v e r a n d re l e as e t h e n a v y f r o mth e e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l o f t h e ~ e i c h s t a ~ . ~ ~e c o n s i st e n tl y o p p o s e d w a r i ne v e r y c r i si s f r o m 1 8 9 7 t h r o u g h 1 9 1 4 , re f u s ed t o r is k t h e f le et a g a i n st t h eB r i ti s h whe n w a r d id c o m e , a nd , af t er the wa r , b l a m e d B e thm a nn Ho l lwe gb i t t e r ly fo r p ro vok ing t he c on f l i c t t ha t ha d de s t roy e d h i s l if e ' s w ork . 5 0

B y t h e t i m e o f B u l o w ' s r e s ig n a t io n i n 1 9 0 9 th e i d e a of t h e n e c e ss i tyo f G e r m a n e x p a n s i o n h a d b e c o m e s o d e e p ly e m b e d d e d a m o n g la r g e s eg -m e n t s o f the Ge rm a n popu l at ion t ha t h i s gove rnm e n t ' s m ode ra t e Weltpoli t ikw a s b e i n g s e r i o u s l y c h a l l e n g e d . T h u s in 1 9 0 7 - 0 8 T i r p i t z , b o w i n g t o t h ea g it a ti o n o f A u g u s t K e i m a n d t h e N a v y L e a g u e , h a d t o i n t r o d u c e a ne wnaval l aw ca l l in g fo r the cons truc t ion o f four cap i ta l sh ips annua l ly th rou gh1 9 1 1 , a b a n d o n i n g h i s o r i g i n a l p l an w h i c h w o u l d s i m p l y h a v e g u a r a n t e e dthe cons truc t ion o f th ree sh ips annua lly fo r al l t ime .51Undoub te dly B u lowa n d T i r p i t z h a d f o s t e r e d t h e e x p a n s i o n i s t c l i m a t e w i t h i n G e r m a n y b ye m b r a c i n g a n d i m p l e m e n t i n g Wel tpo l i t i k , a n d i n t h i s s e n s e t h e y b e a rsom e respons ib i li ty fo r the even tua l ou tbr eak of war . Yet a s Pau l Ken nedyh a s r e c en t l y s u g g e s t e d , t h e n e e d f o r G e r m a n e x p a n s i o n w a s s o w i d e l ya c c e p t e d b y t h e 1 8 9 0 s t h a t it i s a l m o s t i n c o n c e i v a b l e t h at a n y g o v e r n m e n t

6 This was clearly grasped by Be thm ann , who in 1914 rema rked, ForTirpitz the Navy is an end in its el f (Ku rt Rie zler , T a g e b i ic h e r , A u f s a f z e , D o k -u m e n t e , ed . Karl Dietrich Erdmann [Go ttingen , 19721, p. 18 8).V. R . Berghahn, R ii st un g u n d M a c h t p o l i t i k . Z u r A n n t o m i e d e s K a l t e nKrieges vor 1914 (Diisseldorf, 1973) draws several interesting analogies betweenthe Anglo-German and postwar Soviet-American arms races.Holstein to Biilow, August 25 , 190 8, H o l s t e i n P a p e r s , : 1121. Accordingto Holstein, only Bethmann Hollweg of all the other ministers supported thislaw.j V. R. Berghahn, Der T i rp i f z -P la n . Genes i s und Ver fa l l e iner innenpol i f i s chenKrisens trategie unter Wilhelm 11 passim. Berghahn in my 02inion overemphasizesthe significance of Tirpitz's professed domestic political goals.Kennedy, A n g l o - G e r m n n A n t a g o n i sm , p. 422.Berghahn, D e r T i r p i t z -P l n n , pp . 505-591. Tirpitz especially regretted thenew law because it left a five-year ga p, beginnin g in 1 91 2, during which co n-struction would drop to two ships annually, and would therefore necessitate yetanother naval law. Keim and the Navy League did not share his overridinginterest in freeing the navy from parliamentary control once and for all


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458 K a i sercould have forsaken such pol ic ies ent i re ly .52 n this context Bii low d eservesc red i t fo r recogniz ing tha t the ga ins of expans io n had to be ba lancedaga ins t the poss ib ly d i sas t rous conseq uences of p rec ip i ta t e ac t ion , nev erforge t t ing the es sen t i a l s t rength of Ge rm an y ' s in te rna t ional pos i t ion , andconten t ing h imse l f wi th ch eap succ esses . Bi i low 's successor lacked h isunde rs tanding of the sub t l e t ie s o f Wel tpo l i t i k and of the impo ss ibi l ity ofG e r ma ny ' s ga i n i ng a ny t h i ng me a n i ng fu l from a ne w w a r .

T h e G e r m a n g o v e r n m e n t d id no t he lp prec ip i t a t e a wor ld war in 1914be c a us e Cha nc e l l o r The oba l d von Be t hma nn H o l l w e g r e garde d w a r a s ausefu l so lu tion to h i s do mes t i c d i f fi cu lt i e s, o r because the 1912 e lec t ions ,in which th e Soc ia l Dem ocra t s becam e the l a rges t pa r ty in the Re ichs tag ,l ef t the govern ing e l i t e wi th n o op t ion bu t to emb ark upon a r isky fore igna dve n t u re . Th e r ec o rd o f Be t hm a nn ' s c ha nc e l l o r s h i p s how s tha t he w a snot e spec ia l ly concerned by any Soc ia l Democra t i c th rea t , t ha t he wasno l onge r a b l e t o u s e fo r e ign po l i c y t o s o l ve dom e s t ic po l it ic a l p ro b l e m s ,tha t h i s governm ent bec ame mo re ra the r than l es s e ffec t ive as a resu lt o fthe 19 12 e lec t ion , and tha t he an t i c ipa ted tha t war would t end to over turnthe s tatus qu o rather than ma intain i t . Yet despite all this , in 19 14 Be thm annknowingly pursued policies carrying with them a substantial r isk of worldw a r . H e d i d SCI because he be l i eved mo re deeply than h is p redecessor inthe inadequacy of Germ any 's in ternational pos i t ion, and because he fa i ledto unders tand the chan ce l lor ' s c r i ti ca l ro le wi th in the Imper ia l Germa ngove rnme n t .

Like Bii low in 18 97, Bethm ann in 1909 assumed power dur ing a domest icpol i ti ca l c r i s i s . Yet Be thma nn ' s p ro ble m s , l ike Bi i low 's , had l i t tl e to d owith Socia l Demo cracy; they s temm ed from r ight -wing a t tempts to maintaint he s t a tu s q uo r a t he r t ha n l e f t -w i ng a t t e mpt s t o ove r t u rn i t . Te ns i on ha dbegun b uilding up after the form ation of the Biilow bloc of Co nserv at ives,F re e Cons e r va t i ve s , N a ti onal L i be ra l s , a nd P rog re s s i ve s i n 190 7 . TheN a t iona l L i be ra l s , l e d by E rns t Ba s s e rma n a nd G us t a v S t r e s e m a nn , s e tt he t one of t he b l oc ' s dome s t i c po l i c y . The y ha d n o w i s h t o ove r t u rn o rdem ocrat ize the poli tical s tru cture of the em pir e, but they deep ly resentedt he e xc l us i on o f t he uppe r bou rge o i s i e f rom t he l e a de r s h i p o f the gov-e rnme n t , t he c i v i l s e rv i c e , a nd t he a rmy , a nd fough t fo r a more e qua ld i s t r ibu t ion of bo th the burd ens and rew ards of Imp er ia l l i fe .53 Bi ilowdid l it t le to broa den h is admin istrat ion's social ba se, but he clearly agreed

Paul Kenn edy, The Kaiser and German W el t po l i t i k :Reflexions on Wilhelm11's Place in the Making of German Foreign Policy, K a i s e r W i l h e l m I I pp.1 4 8 -1 5 2 .See especially Theodor Esch enburg , D a s K n i s e r r e i c h a m S c h e id e w e g . B a s -se rm an n Biilo\v und de r Block (Berl in, 1 9 2 9 ) , pp. 20-25. and Beverly Heckart.Fro m Ba.\serrnann to Be be l (New Haven, 1 9 7 4 ) , pp. 1 2 4 -1 3 4 .


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G e r m a n y an d t h e O r i g i n s o f W o r ld W a r 459th at t h e Co n se rv a t i v es m u s t p ay mo re Imp er i a l t ax es . T h u s i n 1 9 0 9 h emad e the in t roduc t ion o f a linea l inhe r i t ance tax a ques t ion o f conf idenceand subm it ted h is res ignat ion whe n the Center and Conservat ives managedto defea t i t .

As Bi i low had a l ready p red ic ted ,5%he res t o f the na t ion immedia te lytu rned b i t t e r ly aga ins t the Conserva t ives . The Cen ter -Conser i i a t ive de-cis ion to rely on indirect taxes to c lose the imperial defic i t - includingtaxes on secur i t i es t ransac tions - led to a l ibera l resurgen ce . In 1909in d u s t ry , co mmerce , an d f i n an ce fo rmed th e Hansabund to p ress fo rmo re equal t axa t ion . Al tho ugh hea vy indus tr ia l is t s regarded th i s mere lyas a t emporary ma neuve r an d p refer red the i r o ld a l l i ance wi th the Co n-serva t ives , the success o f the Hansabund sh o wed th a t i t s d em an d s h adstruck a responsive chord am ong the Ge rm an middle classes . Th e quest ionof a new tar if f a l s o d iv ided con serva t ives and l ibera l s . As B i i low' s t radet rea ties neare d exp i ra t ion the agrar ia ns and heavy indus t ry asked fo r newincreases , whi le f inancial and com merc ial in teres ts com mit ted themselvesto curren t l eve l s . For the t ime be ing the po l i t i ca l l eadersh ip o f the :b o u rg eo i s i e u n q u es t i o n ab ly r eg a rd ed th e Co n se rv a t i v es an d t h e ir Cen te rall ies a s m ore s er io us en em ie s than th e S oc ia l ~ e m o c r a t s . ~ ~n th esec i rcumstances the government cou ld no t use fo re ign po l icy to bu i ld anan t i -So c i a l is t f ro n t .

Though forced temp orari ly to rely upon a Conserv at ive-Center coal i tion ,Be th man n H o l lweg s aw wh ich way th e p o l it ica l w in d w as b lo win g . L ik ehis predecessor , Bethm ann wa s only a very mode rate reforme r. He regardedthe Conserva t ives as a c r i t i ca l though i r respons ib le p i l l a r o f the s ta te ,h e d e fen d ed th e emp ero r i n p u b l i c ev en wh en h e co mp le t e ly d i s ag reedwi th h im , a n d h e r e so lu t e ly o p p o sed t h e p a r li amen ta r i za t i o n o r d emo c-ra t iza t ion o f the empi re . S t i l l , he conce ived the reconci l i a t ion o f theNa t io n a l L ib e ra l s , Cen te r , an d Co n se rv a t i v es a s h i s p r in c ip a l t a sk , t o

ma ke poss ib le the concre te coope ra t ion o f a l l bourge o is [ sem ble bur-ger l i ch ] par t ies , and he recogn ized tha t i t wa s the Con serva t ives wh owere s t an d in g i n h i s way .5 6 Hi s 1 9 1 0 p ro p o sa l s fo r t h e r e fo rm o f t h ePruss ian su f f rag e re flected these a im s per fec t ly : in no way de m ocr a t ic ,t h ey a imed a t man ip u l a t i n g t h e ex i s t i n g sy s t em so a s t o g iv e t h e mid d lec l a s s mo re r ep resen t a t i o n . T h e o b s t i n acy o f t h e Co n se rv a t i v es , wh ichbrought even these m inor changes to gr ief , confi rmed Bethm ann 's prejudiceagains t them : Perhaps they wi l l f ir s t have to pass th rough the hard

5 Eley, R e sh a p in g t h e G e r m a n R i g h t p . 315.' ee Stegm an n, E r b e n B i s m n r c k s p p . 176-95.Jarausch, T h e E n ig m a t i c C h a n c e l l o r p p . 71-73, 84-88.


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460 K a i se rschool o f Reichstag elect ions, he co m m en ted , befo re they would seereason.57

In 19 Alfre d vo n Kid erlen -W ach ter, the Secretary o f State for ForeignA ff a ir s , revived the idea o f using a foreign policy success to benef i t thegovernmen t e lectora lly, but his attempt was a disastrous failure. W h e nFrance's intention to establish full political control over Morocco becameclear he suggested the dispatch o f warships to secure com pen sation ,adding in con clu sion that such a step could have favora ble domestice f f e ct s: W it h the sole except ion o f the Social D emocratic Party publicopinion at hom e wou ld seriously blame the Imperial governmen t i f i tallowed even ts in the S hari f Kingd om merely to take their course whereaswe m ay as sum e w itho ut a dou bt that tangible resillts will change th eview s o f ma ny dissatisf ied voters and will have a not inconsiderablee f f e c t on the ou tcome o f t he pending Re ichstag e l e~ t i o n s . ~ ' e t thepreconditions that wo uld h ave promised success for such a strategy wereentirely absent.In the elec tion years in wh ich the Imperial gove rnm ent had used fo reig npolicy to secure a pro-government majority-1884, 188 7, 1893, and1906-issues lik e colo nies and arm y bills had served to bring tog ethe rparties essentially in agreement anyway while isolating parties like theC en ter, Progressives, or Social De mo crats, w ho took an antinationalstand. In 191 the parties w ho se support Bethm ann coveted-the C on -serv atives , Free C on se rv ati ve s, National Libera ls, and the Center-couldbe counted on to support a forward policy over M oro cco. Y et in theafterm ath o f he breakup o f he Biilow bloc such an issue could not bridgethe cha sm betw een National Liberals and Co nserv atives. In a ddition , thele ft- w in g parties had learned their less on . During the crisis the SocialDemo crats and Progressives ca re fu lly avoided any position that couldb e ch ara cterized as a n t i n a t i ~ n a l . ~ ~ors t o f a l l , whe n the governmentdecided to accept limited gains rather than risk war with England, therig ht-w ing parties cond emn ed its pusillanim ity. Rather than putting asidetheir domestic complaints the National Liberals blamed the aristocratsat the Foreign O ff ic e for a policy wh ich in their view to ok ins uffic ien taccount o f G er m an y's real national interests.Foreign policy played virtually no part in the 1912 election s. Th evarious indirect taxes upon which the Conservatives and Center hadinsisted in 1909 had seriously af fec ted the cost o f iv in g , and th e NationalLib era ls, Prog ressives, and Social Democrats used this issue against the

Ibid. p . 79.8 Fischer W a r of I l lus ions , pp. 71 -73.j Wernecke D e r W i l l e z u r W e l t g e lt u n g , p p . 88-92.


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Germany and the Origins of World War I 46Blue-B lack b loc wi th dev as ta t ing e f fec t . A lmos t wi thout except ion thesethree pa r t i e s jo ined wi th on e another in the second round of Re ichs tage lec t ions .60Th e B l ue -Bl a c k b l oc , w h i c h ha d w on 2 19 s e at s in 190 7 , w onjust 167 in 1 9 1 2 . ~ ' he b ig winners , of course , were the Social Democra t s,w h o w e n t f r o m 43 sea t s to 110Re c e n t w o rk h a s a s s i gne d c r i t i c a l i mpor t a nc e t o t he 1912 e le c t i ons ,a rgu ing tha t they l ed to an impor tan t r igh t -wing reac t ion , l e f t the gov-ernm ent in a di f ficult if not imp oss ib le pos i t ion , an d renew ed interes t inwar as a solution to the empire 's dom est ic problem s. U ndoub tedly cer ta inr igh t-wing in teres t and pres sure g roups w ere suf fi ci en t ly f r igh tened bythe Soc ia l Demo cra t i c v ic tory to conso l ida te the i r fo rces and mak e newde ma nds upon t he gove rnme n t . The A gra r i a n Le a gue , t he Ce n t r a l A s -socia t ion of Ge rm an Indus tr ial is t s. and the Imperia l League of the MiddleCl a s s e s fo rme d a ne w Ca r t e l of t he P roduc t i ve C l a s s e s o f 191 3 . The s ea nd o t he r r i gh t -w i ng g roups i nc l ud i ng t he P a n -G e rma n Le a gue c a l l e dfor new measures aga ins t s t r ikes and p icke t ing , res t r i c t ive changes inRe ich s tag suf f rage , rad ical an t i -Sem i t i c me asures , and a cu tback of theinf luence of the Reichs tag wi thin the governmen t . Th e Pan-Germ an leaderH e i n ri c h C l a s s ' s popu l a r p s eudonym ous boo k , Wenn ich der Kaiser warl inke d t he s e de m a nds t o c a l l s f o r e xpa ns i on a b roa d , a nd E l e y ha s a rgue dtha t a new a l l i ance be tween the Car te l and the Pan-Germ ans now begant o e m e rge .6 2 n l a te 19 13 C l a s s a nd t he P a n -G e rma n G e ne ra l K ons t an t invon Gebsa t t e l fe l t suf f i c i en t ly emboldened to submi t a m e m o r a n d u mem body ing these v iews to the c rown pr ince , wh o in tu rn passed i t a longto the chanc e l lor and h i s fa the r the emp eror .63So m e have a rgued tha t the Soc ia l i s t v ic tory and r igh t-wing reac tionworsened Bethmann's posi t ion and that i t seriously affected his policies .64Yet in fac t the e lec t ion w as ne i the r a surpr i se nor a g rea t d i sappoin tm entt o Be t h ma nn , a nd t he c ompo s i t ion o f t he Re i c hs t a g a l l ow e d h i m t o b re a kthe deadlock of 1907-1 1 and pass an ex t raord inary amou nt of impo r tan tne w l e g i s la t i on . N a va l c ons t ruc ti on w a s s l ow e d , t he a rmy w a s g re at lyexp an ded , and in 1913 Be thm ann f ina lly succeeded in pass ing a d i rec t

J i i r gen Ber t r am, D i e W a h l e n z u m D e u t s c h e n R e i c h s ta g v o m J a h r e 1 9 1 2( D i i s se l do r f , 1974) , pp . 167- 251 .6 ' These f igures inc lud e the ant i -Semi t ic and o ther f r inge con servat ive par t ies .S t egmann , E r b e n B i s m a r c k s , pp. 277-3 04, 3 60-68; Eley , R e s h a p i n g t h eG e r m a n R i g h t , p . 3 1 8 .

Fi scher , W a r of I l l u s i o n s , p p . 2 8 2 - 8 3 .Thu s Berghahn on the 1912 elections: The situation which Bethmann Hollweghad been dreading s ince 1 909 had com e about G e r m a n y a n d t h e A p p r o a c h o fW a r , p . 1 0 3 ) . E l e y , R e s h a p in g t h e G e r m a n R i g h t , p . 351 , argues that new r ight -wing al l iances placed the gov ernm ent in an imposs ible s i tuat ion .


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462 KaiserI mp er ia l p r o p e r ty t ax d esp i t e t h e o p p o s i t i o n o f t h e C o n se r v a t iv es . T h i sd id no t in the leas t d i s tu rb h im : The tax com prom ise reached by thema jo r i ty o f t h e b o u r g eo i s [ s emb le b i ir g e rl i ch ] p a r t i e s , h e co m me n ted ,

m ay por tend a g radu al leve l ing o f our po l i t ica l an tagon isms . 65 Nowthat the Nat ional Liberals ' main gr ievan ce had been assua ged the chancel lormight reasonably look forward to a gradual renew al of cooperat ion am ongth e b u r g e r l i c h par t ies and to a dec l ine in Soc ia l i s t r ep resen ta t ion a t then ex t e l ec t io n . D esp i t e t h e in c r eas in g r ig h t - w in g h y s t e r i a B e th man n ' smo d er a t e co n s t i t u t io n a l co u r se h ad s e r v ed h im w e l l , an d th e f a t e o f t h eG eb sa t t e l mem o r an d u m in d ica t e s th a t h e s ti l l en jo y ed th e emp er o r ' s e s -sen t ia l suppor t . In le t te r s to the c rown p r ince bo th the chance l lo r andth e emp er o r b l a s t ed G eb sa t t e l ' s p r o p o sa l s a s i r r e sp o n s ib l e f an ta s i e s . 6 6In th e Zab e r n a f f a ir B e th man n ap p ea r ed to h av e l ea rn ed f r o m B i i lo w ' sexper ience in the D a i l y Te l e g r a p h affair . Reco gnizing that only the empe rorr e t a in ed th e p o w er to d i smis s h im , h e b o w ed to Wi l l i am ' s w i sh es an dd e f en d ed th e a r m y ' s co n d u c t i n t h e R e ich s t ag in co mp le t e co n t r ad ic t io nto h i s r ea l v i ew s . A n d a l th o u g h th e R e ich s t ag p as sed a mo t io n o f n oconf idence as a resu l t , th e vo te d id no t r ea l ly th rea ten h is pos i t ion . W he nth e So c ia l D emo cr a t s a r g u ed th a t th e v o te r eq u ir ed B e th man n to r e s ig n ,the Nat iona l L ibera ls , P rogress ives , and the Cen ter a l l con tes ted th i sin terpretat ion . 6 7

Thu s dur ing the year s 1912-14 the Imp er ia l chan ce l lo r , wh i le re jec t ingany rad ica l so lu t ions to Germany ' s in te rna l po l i t i ca l p rob lems , had suc-cessful ly imp leme nted several ma jor reforms: a much larger army , s lowerincrease s in the n av y , a nd ev en a ro le fo r the par t ies o f the le f t in pass ingth e n ew f in an c ia l r e f o r ms . A t h o me B e th man n h ad acco mp l i sh ed mo s to f what B i i low had hoped to ach ieve in 19 08 .

I n f o r e ig n p o l i c y , h o w ev er , t h e n ew ch an ce l lo r ' s p o l ic i e s sh o w e d ac r i t i ca l d i f f e r en ce in emp h as i s . Pe r h ap s b ecau se B e th man n h ad r i s enth rough the r anks o f the domes t ic Pruss ian bureaucracy h is to r ians havetended to d iscoun t h i s ow n v iews o n fo re ign po l icy , genera l ly s t r ess ingon ly h is des i re fo r be t te r r e la t ions wi th Br i ta in . Konrad Jarausch ' s b i -ography sho ws how ever that Bethma nn had s t rong v iews on foreign pol icyan d th a t h i s emp h as i s o n an ag r eemen t w i th B r i t a in w as mer e ly o n e

' arausch, T h e E n ig m a t i c C h a n c e l l o r pp. 98-99.Jarausch, The Enigmat ic Chnnce l lor p . 104; Hartmut Pogge-von Strandmann,Staatstreichpl2ne, Alldeutsche und Bethmann Ho llw eg, H. Pogge-von Strand-mann and lmmanuel G eiss, Di e E r f o r der l i chke i t de s Unm i i g l i chen . Deu t s ch l nndnrn V or nbend de s E r s t en W e l t k r i eges (Frankfurt am M ain, 1965), pp . 18-26,32-39.h Heckart, F r om B as s e r rnnnn t o B eb e l pp. 250-257.


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Ger ma ny and the Or ig ins of W or ld W ar I 463asp ec t o f a f a r - r each in g s t r a t eg y fo r German ex p an s io n . Be th man n , i nfac t , was m o re co n ce rn ed wi th G erm an ex p an s io n t han B i il o w, wh o by1909 had rea l ized tha t G erm an y had ev ery reason to be p leased w i th i t sposit ion in the world a nd no longer fel t any great urgency ab out improvingi t . Pe rh ap s b ecau se Be th man n was n o t a fo re ig n p o l i cy sp ec i a l i s t , h eaccep t ed r a th e r u n c r i t i ca l l y t h e p rev a i l i n g v i ew th a t German y ' s wo r ldpos i t ion d id no t cor respo nd to i t s s t reng th o r in te res t s .

Be th man n b e l i ev ed t h at Ge rma n y mu s t ex p an d in t h e wo r ld , sp e -ci f ical ly in central Africa and Asia in or.^' For for ty years , he to ldFren ch Amb assad o r Ju le s Cam b o n in ea r ly 1 9 1 4 , F ran ce h as fo l l o weda g r a n d io s e p o l ic y . S h e h a s a c q u ir e d a n i m m e n s e e m p i r e . D u r i n gth is t ime an i n ac t i v e G erm an y h as n o t fo l l o wed h e r ex am p le an d to d ayshe n eed s a p l ace i n t h e su n . German y , h e r u n i ty e s t ab l i sh ed , s ees h e rp o p u la t io n g ro w en o rmo u s ly ev e ry d a y , h e r n av y , h e r i n d u st ry an d h e rco m me rce sh o w a d ev e lo p m en t wi th o u t eq u a l an d sh e is in a s en se co n -d emn ed to sp read outward^. ^^ Rejec t i n g T i rp it z ' s a rg u men t t h a t su chex p an s io n wo u ld o n ly b e p o s s ib l e wh en th e German f l ee t was s t ro n gen o u g h to d e t e r t h e E n g l i sh , Be th man n sh a red Bu lo w ' s v i ew th at i t wasimp o ss ib l e to a l t e r t h e n av a l b a l an ce o f p o wer an d co u n ted o n p e r su ad in gL o n d o n th at G erm an an d Br i t i sh i n t e re s t s n eed n o t c l a sh . In ea r ly 1 9 1 2he comm ented to A dm ira l von Mu l le r tha t an a l l i ance wi th Br i ta in woulda l lo w Ge rma n y to fo rm a g rea t co lo n i a l emp i re (Po r tu g u ese co lo n i e s ,B e l gi a n C o n g o , D u t c h c o l o n i e ~ ) . ' ~ y t h en h e ha d be gu n a c o m p le xser ies o f nego t ia t ions wi th London des igned to p rec ip i ta te the par t i t ionof the Por tuguese co lon ies , acqu i re a t l eas t par t o f the Belg ian Congo ,and arrange the construct ion of the Baghdad rai lway an d the correspondingd iv i s ion o f spheres o f in f luence in the Ot toman Empire .

Bu t wh i l e w o rk in g w h o leh ea r t ed ly fo r a co lo n ia l en t en t e with B r i t a in ,Bethm ann was wil l ing to l imit the Germ an navy only if Germ any 's leverageo v e r F ran ce an d Ru ss i a co u ld t h e reb y b e i n c reased . T h e p r i ce o f anAnglo-German naval ag reement was a guaran tee o f Br i t i sh neu t ra l i ty ina Co n t in en t a l war . Be th man n h ad so u g h t su ch t e rms a s ea r ly a s 1 9 0 9 .In tha t year he had res i s ted Kider len-W achter ' s sugges t ion tha t Londonand Ber lin s imply agree no t to t ake par t in an unprov oked a t tack uponthe o ther and ha d ins i s ted tha t Br i ta in ' s neu t ra l ity ob l iga t ion shou ld

hX J a r a u s c h , T h e E n i g m a ; ic C h a n c e l l o r , p . 1 1 0 . Ministere des Affaires Etran geres. Comm ission de Publication des Docum entsRe l a t if s aux Or i g i nes de l a Guer r e de 191 4 , D o c u m e n t s d i p l o m a t i q u e s f r a n c a i s ,3rd s e r . ( Pa ri s , 1929- 36) , 9 : 177 ( Cam bon t o Doum er gue , J u l y 28 , 1 914 ) . Be t h -mann warned Cambon not to thwar t Germany in Turkey.F i s c h e r , W a r o f l l l u s i o n s , p . 2 5 9 .


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6 Kaiserc ove r a ny c a s e i n w h i c h G e rm a ny ha d a c t e d under t he T r i p l e A l l ia nc e .He went even fu r the r in 19 12 , ins i s t ing tha t Br i t a in a nd Germ any p ledgeon e another neu t ra li ty shou ld e i the r becom e en tang led in a war wi thon e o r mo re pow e r s. 71 Th e Br i ti sh r e fus e d t o c ons i de r th i s p ropos a l in19 12 , bu t w e sha l l s ee tha t Be thm ann rever ted to i t at the he igh t o f theJuly cr is i s in 1914.Be thm ann's arm am ents policy closely reflected his foreign policy goals .As Bi ilow had p lanned as ear ly as 1908 , Be thm ann in 1912 successfu l lyreduced th e temp o of naval construct ion a fter a long s truggle with T irpi tz ,p lead ing bo th f inanc ia l necess ity and the need for a mass ive expan s ionof t he a rmy . The s l ow dow n i n na va l c ons t ruc ti on kep t t he c ha nc e s fo ran agreemen t wi th England a l ive ; the a rmy w as vast ly expanded for thef i r s t t ime in many years pa r t ly as a means to reduce nava l spending ,par t ly b ecause of a dec i s ion w i th in the a rm y f ina lly to accept more bour -geois off icers, and par tly b ecause of a growing fear of French and R uss ians t rength which B e thm ann very de f in i te ly shared .72But the new em phas i son the arm y did not reflect any renew ed interest in Continental ex pans ion.Both Be thmann ' s p rewar s t a t ements and h i s war a ims po l i cy ind ica tetha t he fu l ly a pprec ia ted the d i f f icu l t ie s o f any ex tens ion of Ge rm an y ' sfrontier^.^' The i nc re a s e s in t he a rm y s e e m i nst e ad t o ha ve be e n d e s i gne dt o e x t o r t o r c onque r a c o l on i a l e mpi r e on t he ba tt le f ie l ds of E urop e . O nc eBr i t ish neu t ra li ty h ad been p urchased by nava l l imi ta t ions , the en la rgedG e rm a n a rmy w ou l d l e a ve F ra nc e a nd R us s i a no c ho i c e bu t t o g i ve in i nany fu ture c r i s i s over As ia M inor or Afr i can co lon ies .The G e rma n gove r nm e n t ' s de t e rmi na t ion t o s ha re i n ne w c o l on i a l e x -pans ion brought war s ign i f i can t ly neare r dur ing the second Moroccancr i s i s , bu t the cau t ious a t t i tudes of a few key of f ic ia ls s t il l kep t th e peace .Kider len ' s s t ra t egy in 1 91 1 resem bled Hols te in ' s in 1 90 5 , bu t wi th thedifference that Kiderlen w anted substantial colon ial gain s. War, h e ini t ial lya rgued , would no t be necessa ry , bu t the F rench would be wi l l ing tosur rende r the w hole F rench Conego as com pensa t ion if co nvinced tha t

I b i d . pp. 64-65 , 124-26. In the spring of 190 9, shortly before Biilow'sresignation, the chancellor had discussed a possible naval and political agreementwith various high officials. Curiously a draft of an ~ n g lo -G e rm a n eutralityagreem ent prepared in the Germ an Foreign Office at that time included an escapeclause releasing either party from its obligation to remain neutral should theother party attack a third cou ntry; see J . Lepsius et al . , e d s. , D i e G r o s s e P o l i ti kd e r E u r o p k i s c h e n K a b in e rr e 1871-1914 (B erlin , 1924 -28), 28: nos. 10302-03,10306. Bethmann refused any such escape clause.Martin Kitchen, T h e G e r m a n O f i c e r C o r p s 1890-1914 (Oxford , 19 68) , pp.3 1-36.Jarausch, T h e E n ig m a t ic C h a n c e l l o

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