in its disputes with India canpelled Pakistani leaders to

reorient their policy and to forge close links with the United

States. Pakis tan• s des ire to secure the sup port of a strong

ally touched a responsive chord in the United States which was

evolving its policy of ttcontaillllent of communism. n Thus the

US-Pakistani link was forged despite the differences in the

foreign policy objectives of the two countries. The Soviet

102

.Union could not rena in indifferent to these developnents in an

area which was close to its borders. The Soviet leaders resented

Pakistan1 s entry into the Western military alliances which were

alleged to be aggressive in nature and directed against the -

soviet Union and othe.r communist countries. It employed various --- -

instruments of diplomacy to dissuade Pakistan from moving into

the American or~it.- When virulent attacks in press and

diplomatic protests proved equallY ineffective the Soviet Union

chose to work for undermining Pakistan1 s interests by identifying

its elf with the claims of India and Afghanis tan for the Kas'ilnir

and Pakhtoonistan issues r~pectively. These developnents had

as their sequel the creation of stage in the Soviet-Pakistani

relations characterized by heightened tension and bitter

hostility~

Chapter III

THE PERIOD OF EE I GHTENED TENS IOO

•

Pakistan's participation in the Western-sponsored militar.y

alliances and the USSR's open support to India and Afghanistan on .. 1 Kashmir' and 1 Pakhtoon1s tan• 1S sues respectively generated mutual

bitterness and hostility between the two countries. Yet, even at

this stage, the Soviet Union did not appear to write off PakiStan

altogether. In an article published in August 1955 Izvestia

observed that Pakistan was not altogether lost to the west in spite

of its membership in SEATO and CENTO. In support af this contention

it was asserted that even in the Pakistan! goverrrnent there were

nprogres s ive forces " which were determined to carey the country

~orward towards freedan and trae independence. It was further

argued that PakiStan• s endorsement of the five principles of peace-

. tul co-existence at the Bandung Conference indicated that it wanted

, to side with the Asian countries and sh<Med its willingness to l

reorient its foreign policy on more independent lines. In tact,

the Soviet Union renained anxious and continued its efforts to

persuade Pakistan to helP in easing tensions between the two

countries by lessening Pakistan's camnitments to the western-

1.. Izvestia, 14 Aogt~St 1955.

The Soviet Union hailed the change in the leadership of -Pakistan. On ll August 3955 Chaudhri Mohammed Ali asstJDed the office of Prime Minister follaving the resig~tion of Mohaumed Ali on 7 August in the wake of the former's election as the President of the Masl:fm League. It weleaned the statement the new Pr:lme Minister broadcast shortly after the swearing in ceranony on ll .August in which he declared that the country's foreign relations would be governed by a nresol ve to do everything in our power to pranote iaternational peace •• ••" •Political Changes in Pak:fstann, International .Affairs (MoScow), SeptEmber 3955. See also Dawp, 12 .Aagust 1955.

sponsored alliance systems. The motivation behind Soviet endeavours

tor keeping the relations with Pak:fstan on an even keel appeared to

be its concern for its own security. Pakistan's strategic location

in the sub-continent- and the Indian !Ocean region and its prox:fmity

to Soviet Central Asia could not be ignored by USSR. In soviet

strategic thinking both India and Pakistan were considered equalU'

important~ It is important to bear in mind that in the speech made

at a public reception at Srinagar on lO December J~55 Nik.ita

Khrushchev while recording Soviet support to Ind1a1 s stand on the

Kashmir question was, nevertheless, careful to keep the door open

for normalizing relations with Pakistan. Said Khrushchev on that

occasion that the Soviet Union would like to have tttr1endlJ'

relations with Pakistan ••• (and) we shall pers 1Stently strive to 2

improve these relations.~ Lat'er in the SuprEI!'le Soviet he again

declared: "We on our side are ready to meet attempts to.establish 3

friendly relations with PakiStan.•

.A s:lmnar opinionwas expressed by Marshal BuJ.ganin in the

suprane Soviet when he said:

••• The soviet Union woUld like its relations with Pakistan to be no less friendly than its relations with India, Bunna and .Afghanistan, aOd it is not our fault that this is not so as yet. However, the Soviet GOvernnent W 111 continue to exert efforts to imprGve

/ our rela tioRS with Pak1S tan. 4

For :Improvement of soviet-PakiStani relations Moscow did

not contend that Pak:fstan must completely extricate itself f'rcm . .

_.,..·

N.A. Bulgan1n and N.s. Khrushchev, Visit of FriendShip to India, B uma, .Affhanis tan (llos cow, l956)f p. ii4. See a!so Pravda, 11 Decan · er''·:J956. . .

a. BUl.ganin and Khrushchev, n. 2, p. ~J..

4. Report by N • .A. Bulgan1n, Pravda, 30 December 1955.

;,

105

SEATO and the Baghdad Pact. This was clear tram Khrushchev's

report of the Central Canm1ttee of the CPSU presented to the 20th

congress in which he observed that •the opportunities for improving

relations among countries, particularly among neighbours, have by

no means been completely exhausted," even while al1gnnents existed.

He dec.lared that for its part the Soviet Union was prepared to 5

conclude treaties of non-aggression and friendship.

Earlier in December ].956 on the occasion of the Qaid-e­

Azam1s (Jinnah•s) birthday celebrations at the Pakistan Embassy

in Moscow, A. I. Mikoyan, First Vice-Chairman of the Council of

Ministers of the USSR, hinted that npacts or no pacts, the Soviet 6

Union wanted cordial relations with PakiStan. •

Again, for improvement of Soviet-Pak:Jstan relations, the

USSR, contrary to its earlier stand, did not stipulate the

condition that Pakistan should not ~accept aid from the west.

Khrushchev in his speech to the Suprene Soviet on 29 December J955

had stateda

We do not say to the peoples o-f Asia: do 'not take aid offered to you by the .American am British monopolists. But we honestly warn them that they must be careful with such 1 aid1 , because the monopolists do not give anything free. 7

The fact that Pakistan's alliance with the west did not

come in the way of its accepting economic aid from the USSR was

also made clear. The USSR told the Asian members of the UNESCO

5. curreat Soviet Policies - II. (The Documentary Record of the 20th Party Congress and its Aftermath) (N9w York, ].957 ), p.36.

6. DaW r; 30 March 1956.

7. B ulgan1n, n. 2, p. ~3.

l06

that tt was in a position to give economiq assistance in large

quantities even to non-camnunist countries including those which 8

were aligned with the west. In thiS connection, it may be noted

that the offer made by the Soviet Union to Pakistan in February

l956 to share Soviet technical kna.vledge on the peacef'ttl useS of

atomic energy was an indication that Pakistan was not being left

oats ide the scope of the Soviet aid prograume. PrE~Dier BuJ.ganin

also reminded Pakistan that nthere are adequate op,P)rtunities for

otutuallY beneficial economic co-operation between the Soviet Union

and Pakistann provided there was willingness on both sidel• On

trade, he stated that "there exists a practical possibility for

promotion of trade relations between the two countries n and hinted

at the desirability o:f' having a trade agreement between the Soviet 9

Union and Pakistan.

The Soviet Union stepped up its efforts for wooing PakiStan

during the celebrations connected with Pak:lstan1s proclamation as a

Republic on 23 March ]956. For several days the Soviet Press gave

prominent and considerable coverage to the events connected with

' Pakistan's celebrations as a Republic. ~ 23 March an article by

K. 'Petrov in Izvesti!.t. described this proclamation as nan important

:-:,event in the life of' the coWltry, signifying its advancement on the

·:path of' national developnent. •• It farther stated that the Soviet l - .•

s. Dawg, m February ]956.

9. Izvestia, 7 Fe~ruary 1956•

The Soviet Prime Minister's observations were contained in his replies by the UPP through the soviet Embassy in Karachi after hiS statement 1n the supreme Soviet that the relations between the Soviet Union and Pakistan would improve. Questions and replies appeared in ibid. See also DaW!lf 7 February 1956.

107

Union •could sbare with Pak1stan its knowledge and experience in

the utilization ot atomic energy and soviet-Pakistani trade could lO

also develop to mutual advantage.•

In Moscow, the Republic DaY celebration was attended by the

Soviet Foreign Minister, v.M. Molotov, who in a toast to the neW

Republic said, "For our part we drink to the establisbnent o:t good

neighbourliness between Pakistan and the soviet Union," and hinted

th8t the USSR would be willing to construct a steel. mill in ll

Pakistan as it had done in India. It was not without sign1f'icanee

that it was the first time when a high-ranking Soviet leader

visited the Pakistani Embassy, which had been more or less ignored

until then becatlS e of Pakistan• s alliance w 1th the west •

.As a special repres entat1 ve of the Soviet Governnent,

A •. I. Mikoyan, First Vice-Chairman of the Council o:t Ministers of ' .

the USSR, pa~ticipated in the RepLiblie Day Celebra~i,ons in Karachi

where .he said:

I would like to emphasize our sincere desire .for. the :lmprovenent and developnent of fr 1endl.)" relations, for cooperation between our countries and for creating an atmos}:here of mutual under• standing and necessary confidence. 12

Mikoyan renewed the otter ~f economic aid to Pakistan and also

delivered an invitation to the Speaker of the const.1tuent Assembly

of Pakistan for sending a ·parliamentary delegation to visit the

------10. . K.' Petrov, ttOn Proclamation of Pakistan as a Republic•,

Izvestia, Z3 March l$56. See also o. Orestov's article in PraVda, 23 March 1956.

11. fa!:stan.T1me;!7 25 March 1.956.

12. Izvestia, 24 ~reh 1956.

108

l3 USSR. J..t Karachi on 25 March 1956, when asked for his opinion on

Kasbn1r, he replied that the future of Kasbnir was not tor us to 14

decide. "That is for the people ot Kasbnir to decide." While

in New Delhi, an '0 March he interpreted Khrushchev's statement

on Kasbnir to signifY that Kasbnir had already become a part of

India. DeSpite these d1f'.f'ering statements, it was clear that

Mikoyan was trying to repair the damage done by the Soviet

leaders (by their pro-In:lian stance on Kashmir) to Soviet-Pakistan

relations. Commenting on W.koyan• s visit to Karaehi and Naw Delhi,

an Indian weekly, 'Eastern 'Econcm:lst, observed.t

• • • the USSR 1S prepared to play an equallY generous and captivating role as suitor in both countries. In a sense In:lia had lost her favoured position with the USSR since the same advances are now being made to Pak:Jstan.

It further added,

Indian opinion should take note of the fact that, if it considers that the U3SR will back India in every· dispute against Pakistan, Mr. Mikoyan•s statements in Karachi and Delhi gave no credence to that belief. 15

Mikoyan•s visit to Pakistan. undoubtedly was actuated by

the USSR's desire to normalize Soviet-Pakistan relations. It

was viewed as "a step that might lead to the establ:lshnent of

aconfidence" between the two countries. The political circles

in Karachi described Soviet-Pakistan relations as Ubetter ott•

Ibid., 27 March J956. See also NeW T:lmes, no. 14, a9 March 3956, p. 31.

14. Pakistan T1meS, 26 March J956.

15.. Eastern Economist (NeW Delhi), 30 March J956, .P. 5l4.

16 foll<Ming Mikoyan•s vis it to Karachi.

l09

However, it should be noted that while the USSR made some

friendly overtures to Pakistan it remained unreconciled and, in ' fact, steadfastly opposed to the latter's alignment with the west.

The Soviet leaders and the press continued to express grave concern

on PakiStan's alliance w itb the West. Pravda blamed Pakistan for

joining SEATO and the Baghdad Pact and pointed out that because

of alliance w ith the West Pakistan now found its elf ttthrea tened 17

with isola-tion. • New T1mes wrote that alliance with the west

weakened Pa~1.,stan1 s position in foreign affairs resulting in its

political isolation and the soviet Union and China were justifi­

ably suspicious of the intentions of Pakistan in as much as it was lS

a member of two military blocs aimed against these countries.

The Soviet journal, International Affairs stated:

The facts show neither the Baghdad nor American 1 aid' bave c<lllpensated Pakistan for the loss.es it has sustained as a result of its one-sided political alignn.ents with reactionary elements in the west. J.9

Commenting on SEATO Conference which opened in Karachi on

5 March, Pravda. stated that the participation of Pakistan, Thailand

and the Philippines in SEATO

is at presemt giving rise to annoyance among the broad popUlar masses who take the view that. their national iDterests call not for participation in

16.. Dawn, 30 March 1956.

·Commenting on his visit to Pak:fstan, Mikoyan .declared •In my opinion Pakistan and the Soviet Union have cane nearer after my visit to Karachi." Ibid., 26 March 1956.

17. Pravda, 30 January 1956.

18. New T:1mes, no. 3, 1956, p. 14.

l9. International Affairs (Moscow), .March 1956, p. so,

military alignments knocked together by western powers but for increased solidarity with all Asian peoples in the struggle for national independence and peace. 20

llo

The principal a:fm of the organization, as lt>Sc<M Radio put

it, •is to use the pretext of the so-called communist danger in

order to establish bases for military gambles and to strengthen . 21

colonialist domination in ASia."

The Soviet leaders, Khrushchev am Bul.ganin, emphasized

during a two-hour discussion on 4 August ]956 with a Pakistani

parliamentary delegation which visited the USSR in July-August

]956 that they were •very disturbed" about Pakistan's adhesion

to the Baghdad Pact and SEAT·O which they considered hostile to 22

the U3SR.

l. -~'l!

Im;eact of ~ufz am Hun:irian Crises on soviet• a iS tan ke1a Ions ·

The Slight improvement that became noticeable in relations

between the Soviet Union and Pakistan following M1koyan1 s visit to

Karachi did not last for long. The Soviet-Pakistan relations, on

the contrary, received a serious setback on account of PakiStan's

helpful policy towardS the west in the Suez crisis and 1'ts strong

. opposition to Soviet policy in Hungary.

It iS true that like India and the Soviet Union, Pak1s tan

also disapproved the Anglo-French action against 'Egypt. As a

22.

Pravda, 6 March l956. . Izvestia described SEATO as tta rotten fruit of the policy of the position of strength." Izttestia, 7 March J956.

Cited in Dawg, 7 March 1956.

pawn, 10 August 1956.

protest a~imt British policy, Pakistan, Iraq, Turkey and Iran

did not invite Britain to a meeting of the Baghdad Pact held in

Novenber ]956. The joint ccmmu.nique is sued at the end of the

meeting called upon Britain and France to withdraw their forces

trom lSgypt. But throughout the suez crisis, although Pakistan

lll

·voted always with the Afro-As ian group in the United Nations, the

tone of its delegate• s speeches was milder than of many others in

the group. Moreover, outside the United Nations, the Pakistani

governnent 1s reaction was not in conformity with the popular

feelings which rose to a high pitch of sympathy for the EgyptiaBS

and of 'condemnation of the Anglo-French military action. Th:LS

contention can be substantiated by the Governnent•s attitude iD

its offer of mediation between Egypt ani Britain which the former 23

turned down.

Denouncing Pak1Stan•s stand in the Suez crisis, Izvestia

stated that Pakistan's position in the Suez Canal controversy was

further proof that SEATO and the Baghdad Pact were directed against

the USSR and the independence of tJ:le IE as tern countries. " It

further alleged that ttsome Pakis tan1 circles who are now trying

to make PakiStan's official position on Suez look more attractive

than it actually is, are counting on the PakiStani public's paor

knowledge of what happened at the London Conference where the

Pakistani delegation supJX)rted· the colonizing proposal of the 24

Western Powers.

24.

See the editorial remarks of Daw~ l November :1956 which reflected the people's reaction o the Anglo-French m 1l.1tary action against Egypt. Contrary to Pakistan•s starn Imia was extremelY critical of the Anglo-French invasion or 'Egypt and was mild in its attack on ·soviet action in Hungary.

Izvestia, 6 September l956.

I

~

--·--

/ ---r,

112

For putting across the view that official Pakistani policy

towards. the Suez crisis did nor reflect the popular sentime.nts

within Pakistan itself, Izvestia drew attention of its readers to

an editorial write-up that ha~ appeared in the Times of Karachi,

where it was stated:

it is painful~to see that our Minister of Foreign Affairs hastilY decided to participate in the conference (in London). Such a move was contrary to public opinion and popular sentiment. · 25

It might also be relevant to point out here that the Soviet

Union and Pakistan exPressed ~arkedly different views and opinions

on the "EisenhONer Doctrine" which was proclaimed with a view to

enabling the United States through the instrumentalities of

economic and military aid to sane countries of the Middle East

region to fill the power vacuum that was likely to result fran

the erosion of the British ~nfluence from that region.

While Pakistan welcomed the 'Eisenhower Doctrine' fQr the 26

Middle East as a step towards securing stability in that region,

the Soviet Union attacked President EiSenhower's Middle East

policy declaration as "a serious threat to peace and security ~

in the area •••• n

In marked contrast to its attitude 'towards the Anglo­

French involvement in the Middle East, Pak:fstan st]'ongly opposed

the Soviet action in Hungary. The Prime Minister ot Pakistan,

H.s. Suhrawardy, who succeeded Chaudhri Mohammad Ali on

J9 September 1956, sent an appeal to the soviet Premier, Marshal

.25. Ibid., 25 September J956.

26. Dawn. 8 January 1957.

27. Pravda, 13 January 1957.

113

Bulganin, to desist fr<ln using farce in HWlgary and to allCM the

Hungarians an opportunity to decide for themselves without coercion ::s

the form of sovernnent they w iS bed to es ta blis h in their country •

In the United Nations, where the events in H~g_tiry were

dis cussed, Pakistan voted constantly and cons is tentiy with the

United States. Its delegate in the General Assembly of the United

Nations sponsored a resolution Which described the Soviet action I

as "violent repressionn of the Hungarian people. The resolution

stated that the ttforeign intervention" in Hungary was an "intoler­

able attempt• to deny the Hungarian people freedcm am ind.epen-29

denee. Later, Pak:fstan also voted in favoar of the American

sponsored resolution in the General Assembly which condemned the

Soviet action of crushing Hungarian independence and called on 30

MoscON to withdraw its armed forces from the revolt-torn land.

Pakistani press was equally critical of Soviet action in

Hungary. In a strong edi to~ial, Dawn observed:

If the Russ :lan.leaders refuse to show that much of sanity and diSregarding the fresh call of the General Assembly for an immediate Withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary, persist in their brutal efforts to murder a whole nation, it is inescapable daty of the United Nations to bring them to their senses. 'Boycott' and •sanctions• are distasteful remedies, but the ease for using even these has never been stronger. 31

28. D,IWJJ. 10 November 1956.

29. lb id., ll November ]956.

30. Ibid., l4 December 1956.

Later, in the General Assembly debate on the Hungarian report, Pakistan was the sole Asian sponsor of a 37-eountry resolution proposing to .send the Assembly President Prince wan Wa ithaykon of ThailaBi on a special miss ion to Moscow and Badapest. Ibid., 14 Septanber 1957.

31. Ibid., 14 December 1957,.

114

Countering Pakistan• s accusations, the Soviet News .Agency,

Tass, reported that Suhrawardy' s letter addressed to the Soviet

Premier, Bulganin, gave a picture of Hungary which was canpletely 32

opposed to facts and reality. However, Moscow chose to react

mildlY and sought to play dONn PakiStan• s violent opposition to

Soviet policy in Hungary. This might have been done out of a

des ire not to imperil the bas is !or a rapprochement with Pakistan

in the future. In spite of what Pakistan said or did on the

Hungarian episode Moseoo continued to keep the door open for

normalizing relations with Pakistan. It was not without signifi·

cance that the soviet Foreign Minister, Dnitri S~J>il~v, on

J.2 February told the USSR S ttpreme Soviet that "the Soviet Govern­

ment has affi~ed repeatedly its ~ire to maintain friendly

relationS with Pakistan and the countries located near the USSR

despite their participation in aggressive blocS • SEATO and the

Baghdad .Pact." He further added:

It is true that so far relations between our two countries have not been sufficiently developed. To reach such a develollJlent, it is obviously necessary that the PakiStan Goverrment should also show good-will~ · 33

Kashnir in the SecuritY .CoWlcil aiil 1 ts :tnl:eact ·

Despite the obvious Soviet efforts at playing down

PakiStani criticisms on the Hungarian 'episode the political

relations between the two countries, hcmever, continued to

deteriorate and this was caused to some extent by the Kashnir

32. Izvestia, 9 December l9S6.

33. !!!:!vda, 13 February 1957.

issue which came up for discussion in the Security Council iA

early ~:J.957. PakiStan appeared to have believed that it could --.

us

relY upon the United States to give in its favour a· clear and full

diplomatic support on Kashmir, especiallY when the Soviet Uhion

had abandoned its earlier neutral stand and had started giv!Rg

11 open and unconditional support to India on this issue. It ; :.;,., ... ·t

mlght also have calculated that Moscow•s desire to secure diminu­

tion of Pakis tan• s opposition to Soviet policy in Hungary and the

Middle East and its anxiety to improve relations with PakiStan, 34 might induce 1t to adopt a neutral attitude towardS Kasbnir.

Pakistan was opJOSed to the convening of the Kasllnir Constituent

Assembly which was being called then to accept certain provisions

of the Indian constitution and to make Kas:tmir a constituent part

of the Indian Republic With effect fran 26 January 1957. A

resolution moved in the UN Security council on 24 January 1957 _.-· . . ~-· ··---

' with Anglo-American support, reiterated the Council's earlier

resolution that the future atatus of the State of Jammu and

Kashmir should be determined 1n accordance With the will of the

people expressed through a plebiscite, after all the Indian and 35

Pakistani forces had been withdrawn from the area. But contrary

to Pakistan• s calculations the Soviet delegate A. Sobolev,

although he did IlQt veto the Anglo-American sponsored resolution,

supported the Indian position that "The Kashmir question was

settled by the Kashmir people thanselves, who consider thEmSelves

34. Dawn, 27 Januar,y 1967.

as. SCOR, yr 12, mt g 765, 24 January 1957, p. ~.

(

36 to be an inalienable part of the Republic of India.• However,

when at a subsequent meeting of the UN Security council held on.

21 February 1957" the Anglo-American sponsored resolution recommend-

-·~~g •·a consideration of the us~of' force• to implement the Council's

resolution on plebiscite was tabled, the Soviet delegate promptly

vetoed. it. It is true that the Soviet veto greatly disappointed

Pakistan, but the Soviet stand appeared to have its. own logic.

Having optosed the UN intervention in Hungary hem could the soviet

Union be expected to endorse the decision to send UN troops to

Kasbnir, a region locateO. right on its own frontiel"? However, it

is significant to note that the Soviet delegate, with a view to

soften Pakistan's ruffled feelin~, made a conciliatory speech in

the Security Council on 21 February 1957 in which he did not

attempt to answer the criticism and charges levelled by Foreign

Minister of Pakistan, Malik Feroz Khan Noon,· against the Soviet 37

· veto. But the Soviet Union remained firm in its opposition to

·.~the idea of stationing UN police force in Kasbnir and before the

: ~~esu:nption of the debate on Kashmir again in the Security Council,

<the USSR Goverrment intimated Pakistan that it .would veto a~G' dra:f't 38

·resolution put forward in the Security Council to that effect.

36. Ibid.,. p. 16.

See also Y. Popov•s article ttKasbn:lr - Artificial Issuett, New T:fmes, .no •. 10, 1957, pp. 9•10, where the author says, "In 1954 the constituent Assembly, freely elected by the people endorsed union with India. Kashmir is now· one of the states of ~he .Republic of India •••• "

See also Chandra Sekhar1s article, '"The Kashnir .Issuen, International .Affairs (M:>scON ), July 1957, pp. 64-72.

37. Daw g, 3 March 1957.

38. Ibid., 8 September J957.

ll7

On 5 November l957 when debate on Kas:tmir was res aned in

the Security Council, the Soviet delegate supported the contention

of India that any solution of the Kasbnir problem must take into

account changes of a political, economic, and strategic nature

which had occurred over the last ten years in Kashmir proper as

well as in that part of Asia and it would be unrealistic to

continue to take as a basis tar a solution •ancient resolutions•

adopted in different circumstances. He further asserted that the

Kashnir people considered themselves now as belonging to the

Indian Union. Declaring that the present deadlock over Kasbn1r

was the result of •non-canpliance' by Pakistan with previous

conmitments, he threatened to veto any proposal Which WOUld 39

provide for s tatio~ning of ~ t;r-oops in K~shnir. Although the c. ~- - _ ...

stand Which Pakistan bad taken earlier on the suez and Hungarian

crises, to certain extent, injected a hardening element into the

Soviet attitude towards the Kashmir issue, the basic motive for

that attitude continued to be Pakistan•s membership of the

western military alliance system.

Quite understandably the distinctly pro-Indian attitude

. which the Soviet Union adopted at the ~ecurity Council discussions

on Kashmir evoked widespread resentment and anger in Pakistan.

Commenting on the Soviet threat to veto the five-power resolution

on Kashmir in the S.ecurity council, the new Pr:tme Minister or 40

Pakistan, I. I. ChWldrigar, said that the Soviet Union regarded

39. scm, yr 12, mtg 799, 5 NOvEmber l957, PP. 3-4.

40. He ass tmed the office on 18 Dctober 1957 foll<7N 1ng the resignation of H.S. Suhrawardy on 12 October l957 after the Republican Party had withdrawn from its coalition with the Aw ami League,''

the Kashmir question as an issue in the cold war betw~en liast and

WeSt and 1t ~esns evident that Russ 1a was taking its .cue f'rom 41

India."

Analysing the .motives behind the Soviet attitude towards

the Kastmir issue the editor of' the ~awa, stated that "it 1s

obvious that the attitude of the Soviet Union on the Kashn1r issue

is not dictated by considerations of right or wrong or by the facts

of the ease, but spite against Pakistan because she is a member of 42

the Baghdad and SUTtO Pacts." One of the eorres pendants of the

news);Bper Dawn observed that -

3.

the juxtaposition of the Soviet delegate's menacing speech in the Security Council on 21 Novenber 1957 with the statement made recently by the Russian Deputy Premier, Mr. Anastas Mikoyan, to the former Food Minister, Mr. Dildar Ahnad, namely that onJ.y Pakistan's mEmbership of the Baghdad Pact stood in the way of better relations between soviet-Pakistan understanding shows that the Kremlin is not averse to using a big stick in order to cajole Pakistan away fran friendly connections with the West. 43

Continued Soviet efforts to nonnalize relations with Pakistan

Notwithstanding t~e s_tra~-and stresses that bedevilled

soviet-Pakistani relations, especiallY after the casting of the

Soviet ~o on behalf of India on the Kasbnir issue, the Soviet

efforts directed towards nor.malizing relations with Pakistan

41. DaWB, 23 November 1957.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid., 24 November 1957.

The British newspaper Sundg Expr$2SS stated in an article that the neW SOViet moves to smash the Baghdad Pact included "Secret intimation" of Soviet support on Kasbn1r 1! Pakistan left the Baghdad Pact. Sundcaz Express, 20 iOctober 1957.

119

·continued. The des ire for such a normalization was made evident

by the reP0rted extension of an informal Soviet invitation to ~ 44 .

Pr:fme Minister Sllbrawar~ to vis it the Soviet Union. The diplo-.·- ~ -·-..

matic and political circles abroad attached considerable

importance to this. invitation which, it was interpreted, was ained

at repairing the damage done to Sov1et-Pak1stan relations by the 45

recent Soviet veto on Kashmir in the Security council. Commenting

on the invitation, a Pakistani correspondent observed:

It appears that, following on the pattern set by the western Powers, in respect of Bharat, the Soviet Union is nCNI also alternating between opposing Pakistan over Kasbnir and trying to woo her. Whenever the Western PGJ(IJers try to woo Bharat, the soviet Union seizes on the situation to drive a wedge between Pak1s tan and her western allies and weaken, ·if .not disrupt, the Baghdad Pact and SEATO. 46

Although S~rawardY did not favourably react to the Soviet

invitation he discerned some changes in the Soviet attitude on

Kashmir. He pointed oat that:

Since the first outburst of Khrushchev and Bulganin against Pakistan on the Kashmir issue there have been indications that Moscow has -to a certain extent if not fullY - revised her attitude towards Pakistan. 47

But the' acknowledgement of this change did not indicate that

Pakistan was reconciled to the idea of normalizing relations with

the USSR on the latter's terms. Apparently SuhrawardY was yet

unconv1Rced against the benefits that might accrue to Pakistan from

'

44. ~we, 3 March 1957.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid., 7 July 1957;.

patching up its differences with Moscow. Possibly he believed

that his acceptance of the Soviet invitation might affect the very

cordial relations that existed between Pakistan and the United

States. The degree of importance which Pakistan still attached to

its friemship with the United States was made evident by the fact

that Suhrawardy while he· ranai~_d cool tONards the soviet overture, 4B

he was quite eager to visit the United States. Soon after his

arrival in Washington on ll July he told the US HQJJSe of Represen­

tat1vesa

It is indeed a privilege for my country that we may consider ourselves your allY in the great adventure on what you have .embarked, the adventure to establish in the world the rights of the. . · individuals and to ma1:nta in and promote peace. 49

The joint ccmnunique issued on the eve of S uhrawardy1 s

departure from Washington made clear once again Pakjstan•s

deter.mination to remain :ln the Western camp. It was stated in the

communique that international camnunism continued to pose the major

threat to the security of the free world; the two countries

concerned were camnitted to support and strengthen the system of

collective security Which had been forged in Asia. It was

recognized that this determination, expressed in such organizations

as the SEATO and the Baghdad Pact, as well as through the Mutual

Security Agreement between the United States and Pak:tstan had

acted as a powerful deterrent to communist aggression and had

48. Like Liaquat Ali Khan, S uhrawardy preferred to vis it washington instead of Moscow. See Ralph Joseph, "Pakistan­Soviet Relations •t, Eastern Worlg, vol. l9, no. a, March

· J.965, p. lO.

49 • DaW Df 12 JuJ.y 1957 e

so promoted stability in the treaty areas.

Addressing the world Affairs Council of California,

Suhrawardy made a blistering and the most outspoken attack on

International Communism. He said: .

We are gravely apprehemive of communist domination, infiltration and aggression ••• {and) we have no difficulty in cooperating With you in helping keep the world safe fran communist aggression •••• Sl

121

S uhrawardy 1 s hardening attitude towards conmunism could be

explained partly as a reaction to tne Soviet veto in the Security

council to the Five-Power resolution providing for the stationing

of UN police force in Kashmir. · That attitude might also hav~ been

motivated byt.the desire to impress upon the American leaders the

fact that Pakistan continued to be a faithfUl allY of the United

States in containing communism in the treaty areas and therefore

it behoved on the part of the United States not merely to extend to

Pakistan open diplanatic support on •tKashnir" but also material

aid for the economic developnent of the country.

Mos_gow observed discreet si~nce on the diplomatic s_p.ub it

had received at the handS of Prime Minister Suhrawardy and also

on the over-*ealous profession of friendship to the United States

which he had made in the course of his official visit to that

country. It still kept the door open for Pakistan's acceptance I ------··--

of the offer of economic and technical aid. In a message to a

:, . new publication, The Diplomat issued from Karachi, the soviet

Ambassador in Pakistan stated that practical poss ibilit1es for

so.

51.

Paul E. Zinner, ed., Documents on American Foreign Relations J!§7. {NaY! York, :W66 )9 p, 28it,

Dawn. 18 July l9S7.

122

I t i mutuallY beneficial co-operation 1n economic, trade, cultural and

other fields existed between the Soviet Union ani Pakistan. 10n

its part the Soviet Union was prepared to share with Pakistan its

technical experience including the experience of peaceful uses of . 52

atomic energy.

Welcoming the presence in MoscON f'or the first t:fme of a

Pakistan Cabinet Minister, B.H. Dildar Abnad, in Septembe_r 1957, (!'

the Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Mikoyan expressed the hope that

Ahnad1s visit would be a prelude to better relations between the 53

USSR and PakiStan.

A ten-member delegation of the Supreme Soviet of the U3SR ----- --- -.. - __ .... . ....

led by Alexandrovich Benedi_~tov, Minis t~r of Agriculture, visited

Pakistan in January 1958. On arrival at Karachi on 19 January

1958 the leader of the delegation expressed the hope that the

delegation's ViSit W01lll.d help in Strengthening the friendly aai 54

neighbourly relations between the soviet tlnion and Pakistan.

Answering the nawsmen at Dacca on 3 February 1958, Benediktov

renewed the offer of aid and said that his country was ready to

give economic and technical as-sistance to Pakistan. It could either

be arranged on a bilateral basis or worked through the United 55

Nations. Commenting on the prospects for further co-operation

52. Ibid., 17 March l957.

53. Eiavda, l4 September l957.

· B .H. Dildar Ahnad. the Central Minister of Food ani .Agriculture, visite.d the USSR at the invitation of the Agricultural Minister of the USSR. He was received by Mikoyan on l3 September 1957.

54. DaWB, 20 January 1958.

55. f!avda, 5 Februa17 · 1958.

between Pakistan and the Soviet Union, Benediktov said:

I fir.mly believe that close friendly and good neighbourly relations are in the interests of both countries. If until now no improvement has taken place in the relations between the two countries, the blame does not rest on the Soviet Union.

He further added that

rapprochement of our two countries based on .friendship and mutual confidence could be furthered by an agreement on cultural cooper­ation ••• and also by expansion of trade based on equality and mutual benefit. 56

As a gesture of diplomatic courtesy, Premier Nikita

. Khrushchev in a message sent to his Pakistani counterpart

expressed the hope that proposals on cessation of hydrogen and

atomic tests of the Soviet Governnent would find a favourable 57

123

response on the part of the Governnent of Pakistan. This time

the Pakistani Premier chose not to brush as ide the Soviet overture

and he hai;Led the Soviet Union•s unilateral decision to cease "

atomic and nuclear tests nas a first step in the process of 58

easing international tension.• made

Notwithstanding the efforts/by the Soviet Union to improve

relations with PakiStan, it remained concerned over Pakistan's

continued adherence to military alliance with the West. This

concern found ample expression in the Soviet press. For instance,

commenting on the third meeting of the Economic Committee of the

Baghdad Pact held at Karachi on 3 June 1957, Izvestia stated that

the Baghdad Pact with further backing from the United States had

56. International Affair:,. (Moscow), April 1958, PP. 64-65. I

57. Cited in~~ ll April J958.

58. Ibid., J.8 April 1958.

59 now become more menacing to peace am security of other states.

l24

Q~oting the ~ news agen~, Pravda declared that the Karachi

council meeting took a series of decisions which prepared tt.var

against the USSR and socialist countries." It :further stated

that among the decisions were plans for the building of airfields

and the installation of radar posts close to the :frontier of the so

socialist camp.

zorin, the Soviet delegate at the Dis armament Committee

_held in London on 2 August 1957 mentioned Pakistan as one of the 61

areas in which there were foreign bases. In a Radio broadcast

on 12 .Augw;t, MoscCMJ alleged, despite Feroz Khan Noon1s denial,

the existence of. foreign bases in Pakistan and named :four such

places - Nowshera in West Pakistan, Gilgit in 1Azad' Kashmir, 62.

Chittagong and Chains in East Bengal.

Criticizing Pak1stan1s alliance with the West, Izvestia,

stated that the United States used Pakistan's membership primarilY

59. ~stia, 9 June J£)57.

60.

62.

Dn 3 JWle 1957 it was amounced that the United States had joined the Military Committee of the Baghdad Pact.

Pravda, ll JWle 1957. I

J2.t!wq, lO August 1957.

Ibid., 14 August 1957.

Refuting the Soviet allegation, a Radio Pakistan Representative said on 13 August that Radio Moscow was deliberately misrepresenting the facts to·support the erroneous statement made by the Soviet representative at the Disarmament Conference in London. lb1d.

In reply to one qa.estion on 24 August in the National Assembly of i'ak.tstan, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, ·. Malik Feroz Khan Noon, said ttthe whole of Bharat is a Russian base. tt Ibid., 25 August 1957~,

to ensure .American monopolies a free access to Pakis tan• s

economy whose development was now shaped by foreign capital 63

rather than by governnent plans. In the opinion of a soviet

125

political commentator Pakistan participated in western military

alliance in exchange for economic assistance. But "economic

prosperity proved an illusion and involvement in military blocS a

hard reality. Pakistan is cast in the role of Eastern anchor of

the Baghdad Pact and Western bridgehead of the SEATO." He advised

PakiStan to foll<i1N )an independent policy like its neighbours and 64

improve its relations with the socialist countries.

The Soviet Union stronglY reacted to Pakistan's suggestion

made at the Baghdad Pact session at Ankara (27 January 1958) that

the member countries· of the Pact should be supplied with the most 65

modern weapons. The Soviet Union sent a diplomatic note to

Karachi in April alleging that Pakistan had allowed the United

States to construct launching grounds for guided missiles, military

installations and runways capable of entertaining modern bombers.

It further warned Pakistan that in view of its "geographical ' proximity to the Soviet borders grave consequences Will inevitably

await Pakistan if its territory Will be allowed for the establish­

ment of military ba~es with the purposes of using them against the

63. K. Smirnov, "Reflections in Karachi", Izvestia, 16 April 1958.

64. D1mtry vols ky, ttPakis tan• s worries n, NeW T:firnes, no. 28, 1958.

65. At this meeting Feroz Khan Noon, 1n an obvious reference to the CommuniSt bloc• s advance 1n armament techniques, dreW the council's attention to the urgent necessity of equipping the Baghdad Pact countries with ltfleapons similar to those which they may have to encounter shoUld peace 1n this a~ea be unfortunately disturbed. •• Daw,u, :±B January 1958.

126

I I '

Soviet Union and other peace-loving countries.» It finallY

warned that "in case of aggressive actions against the ·USSR the

latter Will be forced to use all the means at its disposal to

latmch a counter .. blON upon the aggressor as well as upon the 66

aggressor's bases in foreign countries. n

Pakistan in its reply to the Soviet note, categoricallY

denied existence or construction of launching sites for miss nes on

Pakistani soil and said that the Soviet Union tthas continuously

miSunderstood the policy adopted by Pakistan.» Reiterating that

the Baghdad Pact and SEATO were defensive alliances, the reply

reminded the Soviet Union of its association with the warsaw Pact,

a politico-military alliance. The Soviet Union was told that its

nobj actions to other nations doing the likew 1S e are, therefore,

not comprehensible. n The Pakistani note accused the Soviet Union

of adopting a partisan attitude with regard to the Kasllnir iSsue, ' ~

which created great bitterness and disappointment in Pakistan.

The fact that, the Soviet Union was not entirely convinced

by the Pakistani reply was made evident by what Izvestia dhose to

write on the subjects

The Goverrment of Pak:fstan, while denying the existence and construction of launching padS for guided miss 1les in Pa}t:fstan, admits at the same t:!me, Pakistan military airfields are being renovated with the help of foreign specialists. 68

.The Musl:fm ~embers of the Baghdad Pact were warned that

ttthos e Who j anp into the flames for alien interests 1 suffer

66. Izvestia, l9 June 1958.

67·. DaW £!, 28 May J958.

68. Izves t1a, l9 June 1958.

69 burns • - 1 often fatal'. n

127

The sinmering tensions between the two countries came once

again into the open when they found themselves at loggerheads on

the Lebanese crisiS. While the Soviet Union chose to condemn

strongly the American action and demanded immediate withdrawal of

the American marines Pakistan accused the Soviet Union that its 70

statement had increased tens ion in the Middle East.

Frcm the foregoing it iS clear that the efforts made by

the Soviet Union to improve its relations with Pakistan did not

bring about any positive results in view of the latter's tendency

to continue.to look to the United States to attain the objectives

of its foreign policy. The exchange of notes revealed the extent

of differences that existed between the two countries which made

the creation of a cordial and good neighbourly feeling between

them a difficult job. In fact, on the eve of the military takeover

in .Pakistan the two countries were still searching for a mutually

acceptable basis of relationship.

4. The 1958 Military couE d1 etat am its impac_! ,.

The military coup d 1 etat in Pakistan in October 1958 ' brought General Ayub Khan to power. Frcm the Soviet viewpoint the

accession of Ayub Khan to supreme power in Pakistan was hardly an

event to rejoice. The whole background of the man and his rather

cut and dry formulae for resolving the problems involved in the

relations between the two blocs appeared to militate against the

69. Cited in DaW!:,!, 13 July J958.

70. :Im!.nt 17 July 1956.

128

possibility of any radical changes in the role of Eakistan in world

affairs. In the initial period of his rule anyway, President AyUb

had identified himself rather ostentatiously with th~ doctrine of

'containment•. .operating w.ithin that framework he read homilies

to the United States about ways and means of making the policy of

containment more effective. Calling upon the Uhited States to

build up and strengthen the power of West Germany, Turkey, Pakistan

am Japan as the main bulwarks of its strategy, President AyUb went

on to sayt

We have s<l'rlebody sitting next door who can handle the situation, and I maintain that a strong Japan could control China; a strong Pakistan could save a lot of situation in that part of the world. A strong Turkey Will be an as set, a s. trong Germany backed by western s upJOrt, I maintain, Will one day contain Russia. And that is the basis on which the positions of strength should in future be treated. 71

Moreover, the General had played a key role in cementing Pak:fs tan• s

alliance with the west. In 1953 as Commander-in-Chief of the

Pakistan JA.nny, he had accanpanied Prime Minister Mohammed Ali to

washington. Later he had accam~anied Governor-General Ghulam

Mohammad to Ankara. And the discuss ions in washington and .Ankara

resulted in the Agreement for friendly co-operation between

Pakistan and Turkey, signed on 2 April 1954 and the Military Pact 72

with the United States in May 1954.

71.

72.

Islamic Revie'Y,t July-August 1958, p. ll.

iA. clOSe associate of Ayub Khan, Colonel Mohammed Abned observes in his book ~hie! that 'the idea of getting military aid from the west was born in Ayub's mind as early as August :1952 and that ttit was through his. negotiations With American political and military leaders that the United States Government invited Pakistan to enter into a Mutual Defence Pact. tt Mohammed Abned, MY Chief (Lahore, l960 ), pp. 73•74.

' .,

'

l29

General AyUb 1 s proven pro-western views also found

expression in the proclamation he issued on 7 October l958 on

assuning the office of the President of Pakistan. Though the

proclamation condemned ''POlitical adventures" of the past for

creating "bad blood and misunderstanding between us and countries

like the USSR, the tUlR and the People1 s Republic of China, " it

categoricallY stated that Pakistan would adhere to its inter-73

national commitments.

Ayub 1 s reiteration of commitments to the West led the

Soviet Union to bel!eve that the State Department had a hand in

'-.. the cou;e and that when Washington realized that the "Parliamentary

regime" i!l Pakistan could not follow a policy suitable to the

United States, on account of spread of political consciousness 74

among the masses, it got it "liquidated"• At the XXI CESU

congress, Premier KhrushChev reasoned that the military co~ in

. Pakistan indicated that nan attack iS developing against the

democratic gains of the peoples who have won national indepen.-75

dence. • '

The Soviet Union!~s !us picibns appeared to be confirmed a

when the .&yub regime entered into negotiations for conclusion of

a bilateral military pact with the ltnited States - a move over

which the Soviet Press expressed great concern. Commen~ing on the

73. President's Proclamation of 7 October J958. Pakistan Horizon, ]):) camber l958, p. 305.

74. D. volsky, "TWo Coups n, New T:lmes, no. 51, December 1958, p. 16. .

75. Khrushchev• s Report to the 21St Congress of the CJ:S u, Pravda, 28 January 1959.

negotiations, Pravda warned Pakistan that it was "dangerously

playing with fire" and the USSR could not remain indifferent to 76

the development near its borders.

130

Denouncing the new move for conclusion of bilateral

military agreement, the Soviet Defence Ministry paper, Red Star,

stated that the establishment of American bases in areas prox~ate

to the Soviet frontiers constituted a grave threat to the security

of the Soviet Union and warned that the latter had all the modern

weapons necessary "to destroy the aggressor's bases wherever they 77

are."

Dn President Ayub 1 s trip to Iran and Turkey in November 1959

which was meant to explore prospects for forging a close alliance

among the three Muslim states, Pravda commented that "events show

the governnents of Turkey, Iran and PakiStan continue to look for

solutions to internal difficUlties on the paths of preparation

for military ventures. They are attempting once again to justify

their policy to the "threat of communism." The President of

Pakistan had seen this threat even in the peaceful co-operation 78

of the USSR and ./Afghanistan.

Commenting on the stor,rny diplomatic activitY on the part of

these three As ian states, Red Star stated that the Soviet people

"could ~t remain indifferent to the Baghdad Pact, because the 79

Pact directly endangers the southern frontiers of the USSR. tt

76. Pravda, 22 November 1958.

77. ~naia Zvezda, 23 Novsnber l958.

78. Pravda, 8 December l958.

79. Krasna1a Zvezda, 17 January 1959.

l3l

~On ::a December in an a ide memo ire handed over by the soviet

Charge d 1Aff'aires in ~arachi to Pak1stan1 s Foreign Minister,

Manzur Qadir, the Soviet Goverrment sought an explanation .from

its Pak:fs tani counterpart concerning the Pakis tan.-.iAJnerican

negotiations on a new military agreement. According to the ~

!!!§rllOire, the Soviet Goverrment felt that the-conclusion by Pakistan

of a new military agreement with the United States would

"undoubtedly complicate the situation in South 'East Asia and the

Middle East" which "lie in the immediate proximity 'to the Soviet ~

Union and affects - and cannot but affect - its security interests. n

It further referred to the soviet Goverrment 1s previous note

regarding foreign bases in Pak:fstan and asked the Goverrment of

Pakistan to give the present international situation a more sobre

consideration and to think of possible conseq'Ltences for Pakistan

if its territory was used by third powers for military strategic

purposes.

On 7 January the Governnent of hkistan sent its reply

which confirmed that negotiations on a new military agreement were

indeed underway between the United States and the member-states of

the Baghdad Pact including Pakistan. But Pakistan reiterated the

defensive character of the pacts, as well as the proposed treaty

and strongly repudated the Soviet allegation that the proposed

bilateral agreement would complicate the existing s ituat1on in

south-East Asia and the Middle East and involve Pakistan in

military ventures of third powers which would adversely affect

the interests of the countries in the neighbourhood.

so. Text in Izvestia, 20 February 1959.

132

The Pakistani reply further pointed out that the Soviet

Union had itself been supplying arms and building air fields and

other military installations in countr.1 es in the neighbourhood of

Pakistan, but Pakistan had not regarded this as an infringement of

its interests or security, as it +s the sovereign right of indepen­

dent countries to strengthen their capacity for self-defence.

It further asked the soviet Goverrment to use its great

influence in helping to reduce tens ions existing in the regions of

South-east Asia and the Middle East by ass :lSting in the solution

of disputes which constituted a threat to international peace and S:l

security.

That ,the Soviet Union was not satisfied with Pakistan's

reply was evident when the USSR Embassy in Pakistan was instructed

to state the following:

The ·soviet governnent cannot agree with the statements in.the reply of the Pakistani Goverrment which attempt once mQre to j~tif'1 the aggressive nature of the military blocs in the Middle East and in South-east Asia of wb1,ch Pakistan is a member and also the steps taken by Pakistan as a participant of these alignments. Neither can nl.t agree with the assertion that the said military blocs do not lead to the aggravation of tension in these areas and do not threaten peace since this is contrary to the actual state of affairs. 82

Further, the Soviet Governnent reiterated its attitude

as expressed in its statement of 26 December 1958 and warned

Pakistan that tt1t Will have to bear full responsibilitY for the

consequences of any steps it undertakes to transform it~ territory 83

into a foreign military base.•

8l. Dawn, 13 January 1959.

82. Text in ~vestia, 20 February 1959.

83. Ibid.

l33

A write- up in Izves t1a attacked Pakistani leaders for

allegedly denying that they had on their territory nunited States

military bases a~ed against the USSR and other peaceful neighbour­

ing countries. n It further said that the Soviet security was

directly affected by the development of the present situation in 84

Pakistan because both nations are 1 almost• neighbours.

Reacting to the Soviet second note, a Pakistan Foreign

Office spokesman asserted categoricallY that "there iS no foreign

military base on the soil of Palistan.n He characterized the

Soviet move as "a part of a deliberate Soviet campaign to mislead 85

international public opinion and the Soviet people themselves."

Qn 2:7 February, Pakistan in its reply reaffirmed, in

unequivocal terms, its right to take suitable measure to safeguard

the independence and territorial integrity which are ntoo sacred

to be omitted on any account.•

Pakistan's reply further added· that the Government of

Pakistan had persistentlY and categorically stated that Pakistan

would not allow its territory to be used by another power for

aggressive purposes. It was also stated that Pakistan desired to 86

maintain with the Soviet Union ttthe most cordial relations. n

S~rply reacting to the threatening attitude in the Soviet

note to Pakista.n, the editor of !!!!.e wrote:

We cannot give up our defence- preparations s :Imply because the Kremlin chooses to mistake their purpose. Is it not utterly ridiculous :for any one in Moscow

84. Ibid., 1 March 1959.

85. Dawn. 21 February 1959.

86. Ibid., 3 March 1959.

to think that Fak:lstan can have aggressive designs against so mighty a Power as Russia, either singly or in combination with others? • • • • It is, therefore, hoped that the Pakistan Goverrrnent•s latest assurances will be accepted by the Kremlin with good grace, and instead of riding the high horse the Soviet rulers will try the method of friendShip for a change. 87

In the meantime in pursuance of the successful negotiations

the United States signed on 5 March 1959 at Ankara bilateral

agreements separately with Pakistan, Iran and Turkey providing

for military assiStance to those countries. This developnent ' .

appears to have strengthened the soviet suspicions about Pakistan's

role and about the kind of explanations coming from its leaders.

In an official statement released on 25 March 1959 the Soviet

Government stated that the conclusion by the United States of

bilateral military agreements with Iran, Turkey and Pakistan,

with the direct participation of Great Britain, was a hostile

action against the soviet Union. The statement claimed that the

objectives of the United States was to interfere in the internal

affairs of the Eastern countries and to eliminate fran thEm the

forces which displeased ·the colonisers. The statenent ended with.

a warning to Pakistan Goverrment about the "consequences of her 88

dangerous policy. 1t

Attacking the military agreements, a member of the

Pres idiun of the Supreme Soviet and the leader of the Soviet

delegation to India, A.A. Andreyev, in reply to a civic address

by the Srinagar Municipal Council on 15 March 1959 said that they

were of an aggressive nature and were directed against not only

87. Ibid., 4 March 1959.

88. Izvestia, 26 March J959.

the Soviet Union but in no smaller deg~ee agains't peace-loving

As ian countries - India, China, Afghanis tan, Iraq, the UAR and

Indonesia. These agreements meant that American imperialism

needed strategic springboards for their rockets, hydrogen and

135

atomic bases, for unleashing a new war. Secondly, the political

regimes in such countries wanted the support of American bayonets

against their people striving for peace. Thirdly, the .American

military clique and the members of these countries combined their

efforts against the just desire of nations to affect free national

developnents arrl against neighbouring countries which were directing 89

their efforts for developing a peaceful econcmy.

Denouncing the bilateral agreement, Moscow Radio said. that

the Soviet Goverrment had several times drawn the attention of

Pakistan Governnent to the "grave consequences" of Pakistan's

members'9ip of the Baghdad Pact which had made that count1-oy nan 90

American bridgehead for the atomic bombardment of the USSR."

Commenting on this subject, the Soviet Deefenee Ministry• s

newspaper, Soviet AviatiOE, stated that the Soviet Goverilnent was

going ttto have all the measures necessary to ensure the security 91

. of its frontiers. tt Another news organ of the same Ministry, the

Red Star charged that the Pakistan Goverrrnent was trying nto

camouflage the setting up of military bases in Pak:ls tan and 92

thereby to deceive world . opinion. tt

89. Reported in naw.g, 17 Iv1arch 1959.

90. Ibid.,· ~ March 1959.

91. Soviet Aviatio!}, 2 April 1959.

92. Krasna1a Zvezda, 6 September 1959.

136

What is significant to note in this connection is that

despite all the mounting of stresses and strains in the Soviet•

Pakistani relations some Sovt:e~_o:ffic:tals continued to talk of the

possibilities that existed :for improving the ties between the two

countries. The Soviet .Ambassador in Karachi, for instance, not

only characterized the new government as "very energeticn but also

stated that there were many :fields not yet explored in which his

country and Pakistan could cooperate. According to h~:

Only 10 per cent of the problems are contro­versial in nature, and on the remaining 90 per cent there is possibility of developing friendlY relations. 93

' The Soviet Ambas sador1 s remark was indeed s igni:f'icant. It

not only gave the new Pakistani government a clear bill of health

by describing it as nvery energetic" but also made clear that the

differences that divided t~e two governments werg not maqy {only a < .

mere ten per cent as the Ambassador called it) and not uns unnount­

able. What was even more. s igni:f'icant. about it was the emphasiS

that it placed on the fact that there ex is ted such a la_rge cannxm --~gr_ound between the two countries, and ~Y implication, stating that

it was rather time an earnest attemp~1 was made tran both sides to I

patch up their differences. The So{riet Ambassador might have made

his remarks to probe the minds of the new Pakistani leaders and .....---

might be, he was also aware of the pressures that were likely to

build up on the new government for a reconciliation with the Soviet

Union. Not everything was going well with Pakis tan• s alliance with

the United States.

93. Pakistan Times, 13 June 1959.

137

The US Senate made a drastic cut in the size of the military ~r'" -- ·- ..--·"

allocations for_As ian nations proposed by President Eisenhower in

that year•s budget (1959). Democratic Senator Way:ae Morse opposed ..__. -r

e~ension of even economic ai~~o Pakistan on the ground that the

latter would "fall into Russian hands if the Russ ian juggernaut

decides to move." Senator Morse opposed US expenditure in

Pakistan because these were "causing a loss of u.s. prestige in

India ••• , and forcing India to spend more money than is necessary . 94

on her military strength. tt

()piOS ition in the US Senate to extend economic aid to

Pakistan had their repercussions in Pakistan. In an interview

published in the French newspaper La Monda, President Ayub stated

that Pakistan might turn to •other powers" for help if the United ---States continued to underestimate Pakistan's needS. He said, •the

camp opposed to the Americansattaches a great importance to our

. country both militarilY and politicallY and persistently makes 95

advances to us. tt The Pakistan Times in an editorial commented:

94.

95.

• • • ,Our foreign aid requirements are vi tal and urgent, and we cannot be expected to wait indefinitely in the hope that opinion in America will eventuallY be persuaded to view our need.S with greater sympathy and understanding. Same other states in a position to help have, in the recent past, repeatedly expressed their desire to give us substantial aid without political strings, and America should have no grouse if we turn to those countries to make up the shortfall between our needs and the aid available to us from our major allies. 96

Dawn, 12 July 1959. There was demand in the Senate for giving massive economic aid to India.

Ibid., 1 August 1959.

Pakistan Times, 2 August 1959.

138

Reviewing the trade policy of lfak.is tan, the Commerce

Minister, ZUl:fikar Ali Bhutto, dis closed in JUly 1959 that "Special

attention has been given to promoting trade with the USSR, the East

European countries, including Yugoslavia and the Chinese Mainlam."

He hoped to "develop a regular trade relationship with these 97

countries as other Commonwealth countries have developed. ••

To exploit the anti-Western sentiments in Pakistan and to

improve its own relations with Pak.is tan, the USS]Linvi~e:i_ Bhutto

to visit Moscow for discussing trade proposals between the two 98

countries. It is significant to note here that among .Ayub•s team

Bhutto was identified as a person favouring;·::.': closer relations

·with the communist bloc countries. But as it had done many times

before fakis tan preferred to show that it was not in hurry to

respond favourably to the Soviet gesture. Im tead, it chose to

express. its concern over the growing Soviet influence in .Afghanistan.

Referring to this development, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Manzur

Qadir, on 21 .october 1959 stated, "lf Russian influence increases 99

somewhere, you cannot exclude the possibility of a threat."

President Ayub also voicing his concern over this subject stated

on 20 December 1959:

When Sardar Na:lm, .ifghanis_tan•s Foreign Minister comes to Pakistan; we w 111 again point out the l.~~rious _consequences that will fo~low fran the

- ·deveropnent of conununications in .Afghanistan by :Russians. · It is not only a danger to Pakistan,

. l'it is a danger to the whole subcontinent. It iS a danger to the whole sea littoral.

97. Ibid.' 12 JulY 1959.

98. lDawn, 17 January 1960.

98. Ibid., 22 October J959~,

/

He further added:

There may be a conceted move one day fran Russia through this area down to the sea and from China in the direction of Burma down to Malaya. This was clear to him as a military man. 100

The President warned the Western democracies that "a Russian-

139

Chinese drive to the Indian ,Ocean is a major aim in the communist 101

drive for world domination."

In an article published in the July 1960 issue of Foreign

Affairs, President Ayub wrote:

As a student of war and strategy, I can see quite clearly the in~xQ,!,et.bl~e__push of the North in the direction of the Wann Waters of the Indian Ocean.

To counteract nthe push frQn the North" he suggested that

India and Pakistan should resolve their disputes and try to forge

a common front against the thrusts of aggression fran without.

Despite the fact that Pakistan expressed its disappointment

at the prospect of the dwindling of the US econanic aid and even

warned that it might be forced to turn to the Cemmunist bloc for

securing aid, it is likely that, at this stage anyway, its

leaders did not favour a radical re-orientation in the country's

foreign policy. One reason for such an attitude might be

continued scepticism and uncertainty in Pak:is tani Governnent

circles about the ability and willingness of the Soviet Union

to meet the aid requirements of Pakistan and secondly the belief

that the United States could still be persuaded to continue

100. Ibid., 21 December 1959.

101. Ibid., 19 November 1959. '

102. Mohammad A.yub Khan, "Pakistan Perspectiven, Foreign .!Affairs, vol. 38, July 1960, p. 556. ,

140

to underwrite Pakistani develo~ent programmes. In this context,

it was not surprising that the Pakistani leaders continued to

profess their country's loyalty to their Western allies.

Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Manzur Qadir, for instance,

.declared on 11 March 1960 that ~lliance with the west is the 103

sheet anchor of Pakistan's foreign policy. n The same year,

President Ayub wrote:

In the context of present day wo.rld politics, Pakistan has openly.and unequivocally cast her lot with the wast, and unlike several other countries around us, we have shut ourselves off almost completely from the possibility of aqy major assistance from the communist bloc. We

· do not believe in hunting with the hound and running with the hare. We wish to follow, and· are foll<:ming a clear and unambiguous path. 104

. So long ~s Pakistan continued to adhere f'innly to the

Western alliance system there was not much scope left for the

Soviet Union to wean Pakistan away from the western orbit. Not

that the Soviet Union did not make any attempts ~n this direction

but series of rebuffs from Pakistan's side to its overtures over

the years had led it to the belief that the t:lme was not yet ripe

enough for beginning a meaningful dialogue with Karachi. In the

meantime, all efforts must continue to bring pressure on Pakistan,

direct as well as indirect, to abandon its West-oriented foreign

policy. The Soviet deSire to keep up the pressure on Pakistan

found expression when Premier Khrushchev visited .Afghanistan in

March J96Q where he once again reiterated Soviet support to the

Afiban cla:lms over the tribal terri tory. The s upJX>rt was further

103.

104.

Manzur Qadir, "The Foreign Policy of fakis tann, PakiStan Horizon, vol. 13, no. 1, 1960, P. 12.

,Ayub, n. 102, p. 555.

141

confirmed in a joint communique in which Khrushchev and the Pr:fme

Minister of Afghanistan Sardar Daud declared: "The solution of

the problem of people on the Pa~Afgban border should be reached 105

under the principles of the United Nations Charter."

There was a sharp reaction in Pakistan to the soviet support

to Afghanistani cla:lm to the tribal territory. Pakistan's Foreign

Minister, Manzur Qadir, on 6 March 1960 described this Soviet

support to Afghanis tan as interference in Pakis tan• s internal 106

affairs. President Ayub 1 s reaction to the Kabul communique

was understandable. He termed it as "an attempt to aggravate

the problems in this part of the world" and to ttpave the way for

the age-old attempt of the North to dominate the Indo-Pakistan sub-107

continent and the areas surrounding it."

Under the circumstances, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister,

Pushkin1 s visit to Karachi soon after Khrushchev's support to

Afghanistan suggested an attempt on the part of the soviet Union lOB

to pacify Pakistan.

5. The 1 U-21 Incident and its impact

The soviet-Pakistan ·relatiom touched the lOW point ' .

following the shooting down of an American • U-21 plane while

flying over USSR on l May 1960. Subsequent reports confirmed that

the plane had.taken off from one of the US military bases located

in Pak:fstan. Referring to this incident, Premier Khrushchev

105. Dawe, 5 March 1960.

106. Ibid., 7 March 1960.

107. Ibid., 26 March 1960.

108. Ibid., 25 March 196~

stated on 5 May in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR:

I believe it is also necessary ·to warn, from this lofty platform and in the sternest manner, those countries that make their territory available to aggressive forces and thereby make it easier for those forces to act ·against us. The governnents of these countries should have understood a long t~e ago that they are playing with fire, since the retaliatory blows will shower on these countries as well and they will pay for the shortsighted actions of their governments, which make the 'territory of their countries available to the aggressive forces of third states. 109

142

At a Czech Embassy function held on 9 May 1960 in Moscow,

Premier Khrushchev confronted the diplomats of fakistan an1

NOIWaY and told them rather bluntly ttif you continue to let the

Am_ericans flY from your air bases into Russia, then we Will not

only shoot down the US planes, but will have to aim our rockets 110

at your bases as well."

Within four days after this event the Soviet Foreign

Minister, Granyko, handed over to the Pak:fstan Ambassador in

Moscow a protest note in which Pakistan was accused of the charge

of providing facilities. to foreign military planes for carrying

out aggressive acts against the Soviet Union. It warned that if

similar provocations were'repeated., the Soviet Union had the ll1

•tneans to render harmleSs" bases providing such facilities.

109. Pravda, 6 May 1960. I

Canmenting on Khr~hchev•s allegation, the Foreign ~_Office spokesman of Pakistan said that the soviet leaders appeared to have a 1 pathological1 conviction that foreign bases existed in Pakistan. He further added, "We have frequently told quite categoricallY· that no such bases exist in Pakistan." )2awg, 8 May 1960.

110. Izvestia, 10 May 1960.

111. Ibid., 14 May 1960.

143

11 ;' t f Pakistan, however, chose to reject the Soviet protest and

denied any complicity in either the preparation or execution of

flights intended to gather military intelligence over soviet

territory. The Pakistani reply in addition to denying any

complicity in the U-2 affair also accused the USSR of gross and 112

repeated violations of fakistan1 s air space. The charges and

counter-charges inj ectad into the Soviet-Pakistani relations

considerable bitterness and hostility.

That the Soviet Union was not satisfied with Pakistan's

reply was evident when Khrushchev disclosed on 28 May that another

note had been sent to Pakistan in which the Soviet Union had

rejected the 1 duplicity 1 of the denial of Pakistan's responsi-113

bility in the 'U-21 affair. The note also warned that in case

of any 'provocative• flights from any Pakistani airfields the

Soviet Goverrment WOuld be forced to strike at then. The soviet '

Government felt that the rejection of its earlier protest note by

Pakistan demonstrated that the latter was underrating the 114

seriousness of the question. Thus it was clear that the U-2

incident tended to worsen the already tension-ridden relationship

between the two countries and to further complicate the prospects

of a rapprochement. In fact, it would not be wrong to state that

in May-_June 1960 the Soviet-Pakistani relations touched the lowest

point and the gulf dividing them had widened considerably.

112. Dawn, 25 May 1960.

113. Izvestia, 26 May l960,

J.l4. Ilblid., 23 Jwe 1960.