osint oliver-johnson-research intl501

American Military University – School of Security and Global Studies

WHAT ARE THE WEAKNESSES OF OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE (OSINT)?

LISA N. OLIVER-JOHNSON

INTELLIGENCE 501

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE

SPRING 2013

DR. RHEA SIERS

AMERICAN MILITARY UNIVERSITY

SCHOOL OF SECURITY AND GLOBAL STUDIES

JULY 10, 2013


INTRODUCTION

In recent years, Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) has grown and is considered as

important as other disciplines within the Intelligence Community (I.C.). Within the intelligence

community, open source intelligence is destined to remain a major constituent for all-source-

intelligence capabilities, including classified sources. The acknowledgment of OSINT shows

through its wide use within the intelligence community, where it provides “eighty and ninety five

percent of the information used by the intelligence community” (Center for Security Studies

2008, 1). However, the growing debate in how to use OSINT within the intelligence community

and for national security is daunting, while others argue on how best to use the collected

information. OSINT has many advocates who believe that it is the answer for the intelligence

challenges during this current war era. Nevertheless, there are also non-supporters who warn

supporters in the treatment of OSINT “as more than a component of a continuing, all-source

approach to intelligence-gathering and analysis” (Center for Security Studies 2008, 1). The

Center for Security Studies, argues, that the “evolution of the OSINT debate can be attributed to

three main factors” (Center for Security Studies 2008, 1). The first factor began with the

cultivation of the ‘security agenda’ within the past two decades. The Center for Security Studies,

mentions that during the Cold War, “intelligence services were preoccupied with a limited

number of largely state-centric challenges” (Center for Security Studies 2008, 1). Therefore,

determining the intentions and capabilities of the Soviet Union was the main task of the

intelligence services of Western nation-states. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the threat to the

security of the United States has “multiplied and become more diverse in terms of their agents

and nature” (Center for Security Studies 2008, 1). These threats range from the proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction to intra-state conflicts, illegal immigration, energy security, fragile


or failed states, and organized crime. Therefore, what the intelligence community currently has

to deal with has broadened immensely.

RESEARCH QUESTION(s) AND PURPOSE STATEMENT

The research questions are what are the weaknesses of open source intelligence? Should

open source intelligence become the foundation of secret disciplines within the intelligence

community? How should open source intelligence be processed, collected, analyzed, and

disseminated? Is there room for open source intelligence reform? Therefore, the purpose of this

research is to present a hypothesis that will prove the weaknesses in open source intelligence and

the need for reform. The author will do this by putting forth ideas on strengthening the trade,

showing that open source intelligence should not be the main foundation, and exploring how to

better process, collect, analyze and disseminate OSINT.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Robert David Steele, author of Strategic Intelligence: The Intelligence Cycle mentions

that OSINT is uniquely important to the development of strategic intelligence not only for the

government, but also for the military, law enforcement, business, academia, nongovernmental

organizations, the media, and civil societies. [This] includes citizen advocacy groups, labor

unions and religions for the simple reasons that the reliance on strictly legal and open sources

and methods allows OSINT to be shared with anyone anywhere” (Steele 2007, 95). Steele

argues that OSINT should not become the foundation “for all secret disciplines” (Steele 2007,

97), however, it could become the “foundation for a total reformation of both the governmental

function of intelligence and the larger concept of national and global intelligence, what some call

collective intelligence or the world brain” (Steele 2007, 97). Steele adamantly argues that secret

collection has made significant errors within intelligence management regarding OSINT. These


errors include the denigration of OSINT, and choosing to “ignore open sources of information,

assuming that the consumers of intelligence were responsible for their own OSINT” (Steele

2007, 101). While there is a lack of processing OSINT, it can provide the combination of

collection, processing and analyzing all information in all languages. The United States

intelligence community collects twenty percent of what is needed at ninety-nine percent of the

cost, and according to Steele, the intelligence community “spills most of that for lack of

processing capabilities” (Steele 2007, 102). Therefore, there is a weakness in collection abilities,

processing and training of analytical staff as well as intelligence managers. However, Steele

argues that “apart from our failure to actually invest in processing (tasking, processing,

exploitation, and dissemination)” (Steele 2007, 103), the United States has created three

consistent errors throughout the decades since the evolution of OSINT, which “have made it

virtually impossible, and now unaffordable, to actually do automated all-source analysis” (Steele

2007, 103). These errors include no standards (failing to establish data standards), no geospatial

attributes (machine speed all-source analysis and fusion), and no integration (no single space

where all known information comes together). Failures in analysis also stems from factors that

intelligence analysts are too young, “too inexperienced in the real world, and too isolated from

foreign or even U.S. private-sector experts, to realize that the secret information that [the

analysts] are receiving are out of context, often wrong, and largely irrelevant to strategic

analysis” (Steele 2007, 105). Another area of failure is that the U.S. intelligence community and

the military focuses on and spends most of the budget on hard targets. Therefore, focusing on

big threats and denying ‘lower-tier’ threats, that may blow up in the face of the intelligence

community, because of denying strategic OSINT analysis. In summation, Steele argues that

there are weaknesses in OSINT collection abilities, processing and training of analytical staff as


well as intelligence managers. However, Steele also states that apart from U.S. failures to

actually invest in tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination, the nation has created

three consistent errors throughout the decades since the evolution of OSINT, which “have made

it virtually impossible, and now unaffordable, to actually do automated all-source analysis”

(Steele 2007, 103). Is this true or is it that policymakers do not want to focus on building an

appropriate OSINT system? With the building of data standards, geospatial attributes and with

the process of integration and trained staff, OSINT failures will be minimal, and the successes

after building the OSINT management platform, will outweigh the negative attributes mentioned

above.

Richard A. Best, Jr. and Alfred Cumming argue that analysts have long faced obstacles in

the use of open source intelligence. One principle obstacle, according to Best and Cumming is

that “many analysts lack sufficient subject matter expertise” (Best and Cumiming 2007, 4).

Those who lack analysis skills are able to damper intelligence collection or cause an INTL

failure with the inability to analyze OSINT appropriately. Analysts need to have linguistic

knowledge, and cultural knowledge of the target, while also acquiring the experience in analysis,

and critical thinking skills. Yet, another obstacle is the biased mindset of many analysts. Best

and Cumming argue that “some analysts believe that such information generally is not as

carefully vetted as clandestinely collected intelligence and therefore is less credible, and

ultimately provides less value to the policymaker” (Best and Cumiming 2007, 4). Best and

Cumming’s statements are true in regards to the past obstacles of OSINT. With the lack of

subject matter expertise as explained in the analysis and conclusion section of this research,

analysts must be trained in the targeted subject matter in order to research, analyze, and

disseminate timely intelligence.


The U.S. Army FMI 2-22.9 mentions that characteristics of open source intelligence, is to

provide a foundation from accessing information either directly or indirectly, through “publically

available information [which] forms the basis of intelligence and non-intelligence operations”

(Army 2006-2008). OSINT also is able to answer requirements through the depth and range of

the public information made available – enabling “intelligence and non-intelligence

organizations to satisfy many of the commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs).

Therefore, OSINT enhances collection and production of collection – assisting in the

dissemination of intelligence in a timely manner.

Andrew M. Borene argues, however, that “other basic elements of a OSINT program are

plain common sense and critical thinking skills, as they pertain to operational security while

conducting tailored searches on open internet platforms like Google, Yahoo, Bing, and other

major search providers” (Borene 2011, 11). If an analyst lacks analysis and critical thinking

skills, then their inability of such – will hinder any intelligence and collection technique.

Intelligence analysts have accessed information for decades from OSINT to supplement

data, according to Borene. This has been done through “systematically collecting open source

information [which is currently being perceived] as not be[ing] a priority [in] the U.S.

Intelligence Community” (Borene 2011, 11). The lack of priority perception is due to analysts

believing that OSINT is not vetted as clandestinely collected intelligence and therefore is less

credible, and ultimately provides less value to the policymaker. However, from a defense –

sector aspect, Borene argues, “OSINT …has great value for traditional preparation of the

battlespace activities in the age of information warfare” (Borene 2011, 12). In doing so, the

commander will be able to “immediately build an ‘order-of-battle’ for its area of operations,

encompassing both ‘adversary’ and ‘neutral friendly media’ (Borene 2011, 12).


In conclusion, once analysts remove the biased thinking that OSINT is not vetted as

clandestinely collected intelligence and provides less value to the policymaker, then OSINT can

be seen for what it truly is. Not only does OSINT have great value for traditional preparation of

the battlespace activities in the age of informational warfare but OSINT is able to enhance the

production of collection and the dissemination of intelligence in a timely manner.

Mark M. Lowenthal mentions that the “main qualifiers to open source information are

that it does not require any type of clandestine collection techniques to obtain it” (Lowenthal

1998, 1). According to Lowenthal, OSINT has the ability to provide analysts with raw

information, transforming it into an unclassified intelligence product “that represents judicious

source discovery and validation, multi-source integration and subject-matter expertise”

(Lowenthal 1998, 1). However, Lowenthal points out myths and new realities regarding OSINT,

in which myth number one is that OSINT is a threat and a savior. With advocates believing that

OSINT is able to provide what the intelligence needs, anyone who believes such does not

recognize the “realities of intelligence” (Lowenthal 1998, 3). Lowenthal points out an important

factor, that as long as there is denied information from United States, then there will be a need

for clandestine activities in all areas. Another myth is that OSINT is a silver bullet as the

government tirelessly looks for and spends money “to find some search engines that will make

Internet searches easier, while spending even more money to make the Internet available to each

analyst” (Lowenthal 1998, 3). There is no silver bullet and there is not one source that will make

the jobs of analysts everywhere any easier – it will still require critical thinking skills and the

knowledge base of the culture and the operational codes of the target. Therefore, in agreement

with Lowenthal, technology “cannot replace skilled analysts who make difficult choices about

what to collect and what to analyze” (Lowenthal 1998, 3). After all, analysts need to exploit and


process OSINT like all other raw intelligence. Therefore, with all of the myths regarding

OSINT, the facts are that OSINT provides analysts with raw information, transforming it into an

unclassified intelligence product “that represents judicious source discovery and validation,

multi-source integration and subject-matter expertise” (Lowenthal 1998, 1).

METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH STRATEGY

The methodology of this research and analysis was successful through exhaustive data

research using the qualitative analysis method. Peer reviewed articles, academic databases from

the American Military University and open source intelligence (OSINT) was exploited in order

to find the weaknesses of OSINT, while determining if open source intelligence should become

the foundation of secret disciplines within the intelligence community. In addition, the same

databases were used to analyze how open source intelligence should be processed, collected,

analyzed, and disseminated, and if open source intelligence needs to be reformed. Using the

Grounded Theory method, the author was able to collect volumes of data, and extract from the

text - historical evidence, and studies on the techniques of OSINT. Through the commitment of

inductive and deductive analysis, the author was able to determine that OSINT should not be the

main foundation of any intelligence collection, tasking, processing, exploitation, or analysis.

What is imperative is for analysts and managers in all levels of the intelligence community to

have foreign and domestic experience, as well as cultural and linguistic abilities, in order to

determine if the raw information received through OSINT is up-to-date, timely, and accurate.

With the use of the methodology mentioned above to ascertain the weaknesses of OSINT, it has

been determined that the weakness is not within the trade itself, but within those who access

OSINT to exploit, task, analyze, produce, and disseminate the raw information.


ANALYSIS

It is the hypothesis of this research that OSINT is not a weak method in ascertaining,

producing, analyzing, exploiting, and disseminating raw information into classified intelligence.

The root cause of OSINT weaknesses derives from the biased mindsets of analysts or managers

in the intelligence field. Such individual have formed opinions that either OSINT is not carefully

vetted as clandestinely collected intelligence, and therefore is less credible and valuable to the

policymaker, or believing that OSINT is the answer and foundation for the intelligence

challenges for this current war era. However, in lieu of the above aforementioned, analysts who

are not able to determine that the secret information they are receiving is out of context, wrong,

or irrelevant, then these same analysts become the root of any intelligence analysis failure. It

requires analysis and critical thinking skills in order to determine if the product received is

indeed usable. As long as OSINT is received and produced in a timely matter – and is not out of

context, incorrect or irrelevant, then OSINT is able to assist intelligence community personnel in

the dissemination of intelligence in a timely manner. As Mark M. Lowenthal argues, the “main

qualifiers to open source information are that it does not require any type of clandestine

collection techniques to obtain it” (Lowenthal 1998, 1). Therefore, OSINT has the ability to

provide analysts with raw information, transforming it into an unclassified intelligence product

“that represents judicious source discovery and validation, multi-source integration and subject-

matter expertise” (Lowenthal 1998, 1).

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the weakness of OSINT is not the process of intelligence gathering, but

begins at the roots – who are the managers or the analysts of the intelligence community. Many


intelligence analysts do not have target cultural or linguistic abilities in order to analyze correctly

the disseminated product. In addition, many lack analysis and critical thinking skills to

determine if the raw information is fact driven, timely, or if the secret information they are

receiving is out of context, wrong, or irrelevant. Proper training can motivate the analysts or

intelligence managers to properly task analysis of OSINT. Nevertheless, how can the United

States remove the weaknesses from the process of OSINT? According to the Department of the

United States Army’s ATP 2-22.9, first in order to exploit OSINT, “intelligence and non-

intelligence personnel must comply with the legal restrictions, policies and guidelines outlined in

Executive Order 12333 and other associated regulations, instructions and directives” (U.S. Army

2012, A-1). As with the U.S. Army, the intelligence community should create a solid foundation

for OSINT. This would include reforming the trade with an overseer or person in-charge (i.e.

OSINT Director), that will oversee “exercising integration, evaluation, and oversight” (U.S.

Army 2012, A-4). This would include providing “strategic oversight and the guiding of strategic

involvement and ensuring the integration of OSINT collection strategy, [and] overseeing

interagency sharing of OSINT” (U.S. Army 2012, A-4). Also, the OSINT Director would

“oversee [the intelligence community in the] evaluation of OSINT, establishing appropriate

source and information validation and verification procedures, develop metrics for overall open-

source activities, and make all open source information, products and services available

throughout the intelligence community” (U.S. Army 2012, A-5).

Other areas that qualify for reformation are the re-establishment of the OSINT

architecture, with analysts prioritizing tasks and requests with the ability to task organize. In

order to build a OSINT architecture, the U.S. Army mentions to establish a complex system that

“include sensors, data flow, hardware, software, communications, communications security


materials, network classification, technicians, database access, liaison officers, training and

funding” (U.S. Army 2012, 2-4). All this included with the training of analysts and managers

with analysis and critical thinking skills will create a solid foundation for OSINT – but it still

will not be great enough to become the main foundation for intelligence gathering and should

never become the main foundation for intelligence gathering. Therefore, the U.S. Army argues

that a “well-defined and designed intelligence architecture can offset or mitigate structural,

organization, or personnel limitation[s]” (U.S. Army 2012, 2-4). A well oil and established

OSINT architecture will “incorporate data flow, hardware, software, communications security

components and databases that include:

Conducting OSINT intelligence research (through rapid and timely information and

direct collaborative and information sharing).

Develop and maintaining automated intelligence networks (through providing

information systems that connect assets, units, echelons, agencies, and multinational

partners for intelligence, collaborative analysis and productions, dissemination and

intelligence reach).

Establishing and maintaining access (to classified and unclassified programs, databases,

networks, systems, etc.).

Creating and maintaining databases (through the establishment of interoperable and

collaborative environments for the intelligence community and military organizations)

(U.S. Army 2012, A-3 - A-4).

Therefore, a OSINT management system is imperative in order to remove all weaknesses

from the trade – and beginning with training of the intelligence staff, this is very promising. In

addition, in the planning of OSINT management, certain conditions should apply. These


conditions are open source reliability, credibility, compliance of laws, operations security,

classifications, coordination, removal of deception and biases, analyst linguist requirements,

foreign language translation systems, foreign media monitoring, and assigning personnel to

OSINT section duties (monitoring, correlating, screening, disseminating, providing feedback and

the cueing to effectively confirm or deny information to information collection efforts).

With the above aforementioned, the United States intelligence community and military

organizations, will be able to expect greater productions of OSINT with a decrease in failures. It

is true that if intelligence analysts or intelligence managers are not able to analyze appropriately

or critically think, no determination of a OSINT oversight will assist in this process, after all, as

Lowenthal so plainly points out, technology “cannot replace skilled analysts who make difficult

choices about what to collect and what to analyze” (Lowenthal 1998, 3). Therefore, in short,

with the above OSINT management systems suggested, formed opinions of intelligence analysts

that OSINT is not carefully vetted as clandestinely collected intelligence and therefore is less

credible and valuable to the policymaker, can be buried. Supporters and non-supporters of open

source intelligence must first realize that the inability of analysts to determine whether or not the

secret information they are processing is out of context, wrong or irrelevant, is the root cause of

OSINT problems. More energy must be placed into training current intelligence managers and

analysts in order to eliminate such problems, and in doing so, ensure a stronger foundation for

the future of OSINT.


BIBLIOGRAPHY

Army, United States. "FMI 2-22.9." Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army, 2006-

2008.

Best Jr., Richard A., and Alfred Cumming. "Open Source Intelligence (OSINT): Issues for

Congress: RL34270 Congressional Research Service: Report (December 5, 2007):.

International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center, EBSCOhost."

Congressional Research Service: Report: International Security & Counter Terrorism

Reference Center, D.C., 2007, 1-23.

Borene, Andrew M. "Unclassified Information." Journal Of Counterterrorism & Homeland

Security International ( International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center)

17, no. 4 (Winter 2011): 10-12.

Center for Security Studies. CSS Analysis in Security Policy (ETH Zurich) 3, no. 32 (April

2008).

Lowenthal, Mark M. Open Source Intelligence: New Myths, New Realities. Defense Daily

Network Reports, D.C.: Office of Strategic Services, 1998.

Steele, Robert David. "Open Source Intelligence." In Strategic Intelligence: The Intelligence

Cycle, by Loch Johnson, 96-122. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007.

The United States Army. Open Source Intelligence. ATP 2-22.9, Headquarters of the United

States Army, 2012.

osint oliver-johnson-research intl501

Documents

global intelligence

intelligence challenges

collective intelligence

intelligence cycle

intelligence management

consumers of intelligence

intelligence community

intelligence community