osprey, men-at-arms #246 the romanian of army world war 2 (1991) ocr 8.12

5/25/2018 Osprey, Men-At-Arms #246 the Romanian of Army World War 2 (1991) OCR 8.12

1/48

M L T RY 6


2/48

mmMILIT RY

EDITOR M RTIN W N ROW

MEN T RMS S R S 6

ext byM RK XWORT Y

olour plates byORI SERBANESCU


3/48

Published in 99 byOsprey Publishing Ltd9 Grosvenor Street, London W X 9D A Copyright 99 Osprey Publishing Lt dAll rights reserved. Apart from any fair dealing for thepurpose of private study, research, eritiei m or review, aspermitted under the opyright Designs and Patents Act,1988, no part of this publication may be reproduced,stored in a retrieval sy tern, or transmitted in any form orby any means, electronic, electrical, chemical,mechanical, optical, photocopying, recording orotherwise, without the prior permission of the copyrightowner. Enquiries should be addressed to the Publishers.ISB 85532 1696Filmset in Great BritainPrinted through Bookbuilders Ltd Hong KongEditor s oteThe Editor would like to thank Adam Ward for his

assIstance.Re ade rs m ay wish to study this volume in conjunc-

tion with MA A I3T mnany sEastern Front llies

Authors ote and AcknowledgementsThrough a c om bi na ti on of historical circumstanRom an ia has received l it tle cove ra ge in stu di es ofS ec on d W or ld War. The no t insignificant role ofRomanian Army on the decisive front of thedemands closer attention; and this book offers a conbut comprehensive survey of its uniforms, equipmor ga ni sa ti on a nd o pe ra ti on s. As t he first suc h p ub ltion to use substantial Romanian sources it also offenew pe rsp ect ive on t he titanic s tru ggl e o n t he Ea sFront.

We would especially like to acknowledge the genous h el p of Cristian Craciunoiu, editor of ,Modelimagazine, who i ntrodu ced th e a uthors to each otan d of Colonel Cristian M. Vladescu, who has donmuch to keep alive the study of Romanian uniforAlso of great assistance have been Colonel SaDirector of the Muzeul Militar National, an d his libstaff, Professor Carol Konig, Colonel loan TalpCornel and Rodica Scafes, Cristina Craciunoiu and,least, loana . erbiinescu. Their researches an d hosality have made this book possible.

In th e UK we would like to extend our t ha nk s toHooper Charles Bennett, George JohnstonPercival-Maxwell, Alistair Boyd an d igel Thomas

All photographs are courtesy of th e Muzeul Milational.

Text an d M ap AbbreviationsIn order to condens e th e maximum informationb ot h t ex t an d maps the following abbreviated codebeen used.A Latin numeral indicates an Army Corps.A number alone signifies an Infantry Division.Specialist divisions are suffixed by:

Independent brigade-size units are suffixed by:

Fo r a catalogue of all books published by Osprey Militaryplease write to:

The Marketing ManagerCOnSlUTICr Catalogue Depal tmcnt

Osprey Publishing LtdMichelin House 8 FuLham. Road

London SW3 6R B

c CavalryM Marinea ArmouredG GuardF Frontier

b brigademc 1J10untain command

m Mountainf Fortesss Securityt Training

d detachment


4/48

TH E RO M N I N RMY 94 45

T H E RM Y N DTH ST T

Southern Dobrogea with their extensive borfortifications to th e USSR Hungary and BulgaThe rest of Romania now had to rely on Germanyguarantee its survival and with little choice, formajoined the Axis on 3 ovember 1940. From tpoint on Romania s consistent objective, whichpursued with equal vigour in both th e Axis and Allcamps, was to regain th e territories lost in 1940.

In reaction to th e territorial losses of 1940autocratic King Carol was forced to abdicate oSeptember. A nationalist coalit ion government westablished with young King Mihai as the theoretiHead of State and the armed forces. After suppreing a coup by th e fascist I ro n G ua rd in January real p owe r lay wi th the Conducator Leader) Geral de Armata Io n Anto ne scu . A strong -wilprofessional soldier whose abili ty was respectedRomanians an d Germans alike, Antonescu s pWestern sentiments were dominated by his pragmism. Often critical, he remained Germany s mdependable ally until his overthrow on 3 Aug1944The Romanian officer corps contained mapolitically a pp oi nt ed generals a nd colonels whabilities were far from adequate and, despAntonescu s attempts to purge these elements,c or ps was n ev er r ed uc ed to unqualified obedienThe generally con servative senio r officers didprove receptive to modern German metho

behind him is an Air Fogeneral between then] isparatrooplocotcnentwearing a San] Browneover his jump sui tand aberet bearing his rank

G e ne ra l d e C o rp s deArma ta Petre Dumitrescuinspecting th e firstparatroop companyAugust 1941. Note the twobroad red stripes down hisbreeches Inunediately

IN T R O DU T IO NFrom 1941-44 Romania was militarily the thirdlargest European Axis po we r, h ad th e fourth largestAllied army in 1 94 4- 45 , an d he r natural resourceswere vital to th e German war effort.

Romania had fought with th e Allies in th e FirstWorld Wa r an d gained the predominantly Romanianpopulated provinces of Transilvania and Basarabia.However, both contained substantial foreign minorities which generated th e hostility of Hungary and th eSoviet Union. As a result Romania adopted adefensive posture and sought alliances with similarlythreatened powers such as France Czechoslovakiaand Poland. In th e late 1930S Romania began torearm with largely Czech an d French weapons bu t bymid-194 both ha d fallen. R om an ia , wi th no substantial ally left, was then forced by Germany tosurrender Basarabia, Northern T ra ns il va ni a a nd


5/48

nS gn a

achieved by conscripting th e liberated populationBasarabia, Northern Bucovina and orthern Trsilvania, by th e cancellation of exempt ions andpremature call-ups. Reservist strength was boosby calling up ever older age groups. Draft evasion adesert ion grew however, and these measures wthus no t fully effective. Furthermore shortagesheavy weapons prevented manpower increases betranslated into new field divisions.

6-

Q U PM N TRomania r es po nd ed to European and particulaHungarian re-armament in the mid-1930S, by pchasing or licence-manufacturing a series of modFrench Czech, British, Italian and Germweapons. B y 1941 Romania could produce mingre na de s, light a nd heavy machine guns, 60mm a81mm mortars, 47mm T guns, 37mm and 75ml g un s a nd a wi de variety of ammunition. In 1a 120mm mortar w en t i nt o production and in 1th e locally designed Orita 9m m SMG a nd Re75mm T gu n were introduce d. Romania s choof weaponry, although sound for th e late 193became rapidly obsolete during t he war but low raof import an d local production meant this, and mupre-WWl equipment had to remain in servGermany s weak war industry was un ab le to supsignificant quantities of equipment until 1943-44 ain th e interim much captured Soviet equipmentpressed into service. The Soviets greeted Roman

[93 37 22 4 1 5Officers 15,341 16,369 16

Active Army NCOs 24,024 29,299 37Conscripts 9 984 166,100 89Officers 2 J

Reservists NCOs - 474,490 29Me n - 775

Recruits 154 T otal U nder Arms 30,349 686,258 1,224

MobilisationRomania r e- ar me d a nd expanded her acti ve a rm yafter 1937 but the territorial losses of 1940 reducedavailable manpower from 2,200,000 to 1,500,000.This necessitated t he disbanding of three infantry 12, 16, 17) a nd th re e res erve divisions 26, 33, 34)All specialist divisions were carefully preservedintact. Progressive increases in manpower were

although Antonescu did promote able generals suchas Dumitrescu Lascar and Korne. Junior officersproved much mor e op en new German methodsthe ir e xpertise improving marke dly as th e war progressed, though this was offset by a decline inmotivation after 1942. Junior officers led from thefront as is e vide nc ed by their proportionally highcasualties, but the social gulf between t he m a nd th elower ranks and their limited man-management skillscaused problems. This was further exacerbated by anarchaic and brutal disciplinary system.

The numerically weak corps of CO s was expanded considerably during th e war. While t hey werecompetent within a res tric te d area of expertise, theirlimited education an d training did no t allow them todisplay the full range of initiative expected in amodern army. The hardy peasant soldiers who madeup three-quarters of th e army were good m at er ial ,but they lacked t he e du ca ti on a nd industrial moraleto adequately conduct or face modern mechanisedwarfare. It was weaknesses in tra ining, equipmenta nd lea de rs hip which, a bove all, were to compromisetheir performance.

Romania was essentially pro-Western its alliancewith Germany being one of temporary necessity.Despite the wide difference i n th e aims, characteristics and capacities of their respective armed forces, acr ed it abl e d egr ee of cooperation was initiallyachieved. This was most apparent in th e rapportbetween r e ~ l Antonescu an d Field Marshal vonM anst ei n. By cont rast , th e behaviour of Germantroops towards their Romanian co-belligerents did attimes result in friction a nd r es en tm en t. 54,000Romanian-born Germans served in th e SS andanother 15,000 i n th e German Army and TodtOrganisation. The mutual hostility of Romania andHungary complicated considerably German wartimeplanning, and frequent border clashes diverted th eRomanian 1st Army to watch the Hungarian border.


6/48

]S tanks of 1944. The decisive contributionarmoured operations on the Eastern Front madea fatal defensive flaw.

MechanisationMechanisation and particularly the provisionmodern a rm ou r was Ant ones cu s main preocpation. Romania s was fundamentally a horsedraarmy but the loss of 525 752 horses between and 1944 from a national herd of 1 268 716 serioulimited even this obsolescent means of transport.1938 there were only 34 000 motor vehicles inentire country of which about 10 000 were trucand only a single Ford assembly plant withmaximum capacity of ten vehicles per day. Tseverely restricted the army s ability to mechan

defection the Allies in August 1944 by confiscatingmuch of its best frontline equipment and all capturedSoviet weapons. 0 assistance was received from theo the r Allies an d ma int ena nce of German weaponsbecame increasingly difficult. As a result Romaniahad to conduct the remainder of the war almostentirely from its own meagre resources. The muchreduced 1944-45 divisions and their heavy casualtiesreflect this.

Romanian infantry became better armed as the warprogressed alt hough t he i nt ro du ct io n and scale ofissue of new equipment such as SMGs and snipersrifles lagged b eh in d th e Soviets an d Ge rma ns . Thedivisional artillery and infantry guns were invariablylighter and older than their opponents forcingreliance on manpower instead pf firepower withconsequent heavy casualties. As artillery caused 5per cent ofall casualties on the Eastern Front this wasa maj or weakness. Only the corps and motorisedartillery was modern. Until t he i nt ro du ct io n oflimited numbers of 75mm f guns in late 1942there was no effective counter to Soviet KV and T34tanks and even these were of limited use against the

Gen Pantazi the Minister Defence leading ageneral de divizic themountain corps on his lefta colonel ca valry on hi sright and variousreginJental oRicers themountain rifles cavalryand infantry in the

rimea 26 December I9Several wear the staffcollege badge on the rigchest and the ]rd ClassOrder ofMihai Viteazuthe left ote the rank bworn on the left front the boneta.


7/48

Wartime attrition and reparations to th e Sovietsreportedly reduced vehicle holdings to a mere 3,000by 1945.

In 1934 a motorised rifle battalion, later to becomeAntonescu s bodyguard, was formed to reinforce th ecavalry; and in th e 1936 m an oe uv re s two in fa nt rybattalions were successfully mounted on buses. Thearmy consequently bought over 2,000 locally assembled Ford 4 x 2 trucks and imported various four-

vand six-wheel-drive Skoda, Praga, Tatra, Steyr an dHorch trucks an d cars to motorise the 3r d an d 4t hRifle Regiments, six cavalry regiments, the sevencorps artillery regiments and various command, antitank, engineer an d signals elements. Limited deliveries of Mercedes, Volkswagen, W al te r, Bu ssi ng

AG and Opel trucks an d cars an d Czech vehiclescontinued up to 1944. From 1937 to 1942 numbers offully tracked Czech Praga T - VI-R heavy artillerytractors were delivered and these were later supplemented by German Sd.Kfz 8 half-tracks.Romania s armour was never numerous or modernen ough to allow it a major role on th e Eastern Front.Ro ma nia had possessed s om e 70 Renault F T tanks

The locotenent-colollelwith the hebnet wears th egrey collar patch amotorised unit, cavalryboots and a tank driver s

badge probably identifyinghinJ as motorised cavalry,possibly a reconnaissanceunit operating R-r lighttanks Crinlea r942 .

since the 1920S. These were supplemented bySko da O Av z 27 and 2 Tatra OAvz 30 armoucars which fled Czechoslovakia in March 1939were assigned to corps HQs for reconnaissanDuring th e late 1930S 1st Armoured Regiment

re-equipped with 126 R- 2 Czech 10.5 ton SkS-I1-a) light tanks; and in 1940 was combined wth e four motorised battalions of 3rd and 4t h Rian d the 1st Motorised Artillery R eg im en t i nt oArmoured Division. 2nd Armoured Regiment, w4 French and 34 ex-Polish I I ton Renault R-3remained independent.

From 1939 60 French Renault UE2 chenilletknown in Ro mania as the Malaxa , were assemblocally as a first step toward th e creation ofindigenous armour industry. Romania applied

build th e Skoda T2 1 7 to n medium tank in 1940th e Germans refused a licence. This upset th e lobalance of power, as they simultaneously gavlicence for th e similar T22 to Hungary. Romanown r e ~ l tank destroyer, named after Antonesentered production in mid-1944, only to haveSoviets stop th e programme.

During th e liberation of Basarabia 1st ArmouDivision ha d considerable operational success,for th e siege of Ode ssa it was sp li t up and dissipain th e infantry support role. 2nd ArmouRegiment s undergunned and underpowered R-proved inadequate and the unit was relegatedtraining after Odessa.

When th e refitted 1st Armoured Division returto th e front in August 1942 it still had 87 R-2s, buthese were obsolete th e Germans deliveredPzKpfw III Ausf. s an d ten PzKpfw IV s KurzOctober. The division was all but wiped ou tStalingrad and most of its vehicles lost.By 1942 th e six cavalry brigades each in clu desingle motorised cavalry regiment, an d until 1943reconnaissance squadron of each brigade had f

vR-I Cz ec h 4.2 t on CKD AH-IV) light tanks. Ein th e Stalingrad campaign th e 1st an d 7t h CavDivisions exchanged regiments so that the 7t h cobecome largely motorised. P lans to combine it innew Moto-Mechanised Corps with 1st ArmouDivision were aborted du e to th e Stalingrad disasAs a stop-gap while 1st Armoured Divisionrebuilding after Stalingrad th e Germans deliveredobsolete PzKpfw 38 t)S to 2nd Armoured Regim


8/48

and these were deployed with the Cavalry andMountain Corps in the Kuban and Crimea wheremost were lost in 1943-44. The 6th and 9th CavalryDivisions lost all their vehicles in the 1944 evacuationof the Crimea and never rebuilt their motorisedelement.

In 1943-44 the Romanians themselves refurbishedover 30 of their captured Soviet T -60 light tanks andat least 2 surviving R-2s and converted them to tankdestroyers T aca ms ) by mounting Soviet 76.2mmf guns. They saw frontline service in August 1944,but the Tacam T -60S were all confiscated by theSoviets in September. They also up gunned most ofthe remaining R-35s with captured Sovi et 4 5m mtank guns.

During 1943-44 8th and 5th Cavalry Divisionswere to be fully motorised and strengthened bytransferring in the motorised regiments of the 1St and7th Cavalry Divisions. However, due to a lack ofvehicles 5th Cavalry were on foot in August 1944.The1St became an entirely horsed division while the 7thwas disbanded to bring the 1St 5th and 8th up to fourregiments each.

1St Armoured Division was rebuilt during 1943-44and returned to the front in the summer of 1944eq ui pp ed with 90 PzKpfw IV Ausf.Hs, StuG IllsT ac am s a nd SdKfz 222 armoured cars. One of itsmotorised infantry battalions was upgraded toP an ze r- Gr en ad ie r s ta tu s by the issue of SdKfz 250and 251 armoured half-tracks. The division sufferedheavily when counter-attacking the Soviets at a ~ i on21 August 1944. Surviving elements managed tobreak out of encirclement into the C arpathians andtook part in the liberation of Transilvania.

In early August 1944 8th Motorised Division s 4thR o ~ i o r i Regiment was converting to an armouredunit and the division, with some 60 AFVs, was brieflyref er red to as 8th or 2nd) Armoured Division untilthe defection to the Allies later that month. Alsowithin the country the Romanians had 2ndArmoured R egiment, the depot elements of 1StArmoured Division and the Cavalry and Armourschools equipped with an assortment of obsoleteRenault FT 17S R -IS, R -2s, R -35s, PzKpfw 38 t)SFrom left to right: aRomanian mountain riflesoflicer, two infantryofficers and a tank officer

with a German tank officerback to camera at ananti-tank training centre,r94

and Tacams and a few StuG Ills and PzKpfw IC ombined with 8th Motorised Division and 11Infantry Regiment into the Moto-MechaniC orps, they played an important role in t he Bu chest, l o i e ~ t i and Trans ilvania fighting againstGermans up to October.

The Peace Treaty of 26 October requireddisbanding of 1St A rm ou re d and 5th Cavalry Dsions. The Soviets t hen ord ered the s urr en derremaining armour to Red Army depots. HowevRomania secured Soviet agreement to sendArmoured Regiment to the front in January 19equipped with 79 AFVs comprising all workexamples of virtually every type previously issplus some captured Hungarian and German armoServiceability was con seq uen tly low, and the rment was reduced to only two runners by the wend. It is probable that the unit was deliberatelyinto the ground by the Soviets under whose dicommand it fought and who confiscated its vehias they became disabled. Lack of spares progressivreduced much of the 8th Motorised Divisionmarching.


9/48

U TOR N IS T IO N

ArmiesRomania maintained three Army HQ;: St 3rd and4th two of which were usually in the field. The maincombat elements amongst the Army troops wereobsolete horsedrawn heavy artillery battalions andan independent anti tank regiment which initiallyincluded Schneider 47mm guns and Renault UEtractors. Later it had Pak 40 and e ~ i l 7smm gunsand Steyr RSO/01 tractors.

combat elements were a pioneer battalion a machgun battalion a cavalry reconnaissance group antwo battalion motorised artillery regiment with moern Schneider 10smm and Skoda Isomm guns.1944 the Corps troops were down to 6 217 men machine gun battalion had gone and a smalreconnaissance group was more mechanised. Cooften had an air squadron of IAR 39S for reconnasance observation and light bombing. An XI Coexisted briefly in 1941.

Infantry DivisionsThe elite Guard and Frontier Divisions were orgised like the 8 infantry divisions which formed

CorpsEach of the seven territorial Infantry Corps I-VIIbegan the war with 8 000 Corps troops. The main

Oflicers the 9th RoioriRegt on canlpaign in theCaucasus SUmnler T942Note the tent sheets worn

as ponchos and that therosettes have beenremoved fr 111 the boots


10/48

bulk of th e army. Overwhelmingly reservist initiallyunder trained always under-equipped and oftenpoorly led the line infantry had limited offensivepotential but were capable of stubborn defence.However premature concessions by some units oftencompromised their neighbours and sometimes provoked a wider collapse. Major Soviet offensivesinvariably required German intervention and havetended to overshadow the m an y occasions when localSoviet attacks were repulsed.

From 1941 th e organisation of th e R om ani aninfantry division was based on the German model. Ithad three infantry regiments of three battalions eacha partially mechanised reconnaissance group ahorsedrawn 47mm A /T company an assault pioneerbattalion and two mixed artillery regiments one withtwo 75mm battalions an d one Ioomm howitzerbattalion and the o th er with a single battalion of each.Strength was 17 500.

The 1942 infantry division decreased manpower infavour of more artillery an d specialist troops as aresult of lessons learnt at Odessa. E ach infa ntryregiment was reduced to two battalions while th ereconnaissance assault pioneer an d artillery battalions were all strengthened an d th e f companyadded six Pa k 97/38 75mm guns in October. Strengthwas 13 500.The irreplaceable losses of materiel and specialistsat Stalingrad led to an increased infantry componentraising th e strength of th e 1944 division to 17 200. Itreverted to three battalions pe r infantry r eg im en twhile th e reconnaissance an d assault pioneer battalions were reduced. A second A /T battery of six Pak4 75m m guns was added and the artillery reduced totwo two-battalion regiments theoretically now including 150mm howitzers.In 1943-44 each field division had an identicallynumbered training division with three infantry regi-ments of two battalions each and a weak artillerybattalion of 75mm guns. Strength averaged 6 50.

The 1945 infantry division was much reduced du eto equipment shortages an d resembled th e Sovietrifle division. I t again reverted to three two battalioninfantry regiments. The reconnaissance an d assaultpioneer battalions were reduced to companies a nd t heartillery amalgamated into a single regiment of threebattalions with 75mm guns Ioomm howitzers an d120mm mortars. Both A /T batteries were maintained

with th e locally produced Reira 75mm f gun.strength was 9 173.

Mountain DivisionsThe four brigades later divisions of the MountCorps had a high regular component and particuexpertise in mountain and winter warfare. Ebattalion numbered I to 24 was trained toindependently. Battalions 25 and 26 were speciaski units. The 18th Infantry Division was converinto th e 18th Mountain Division in late 1943 andbattalions renumbered 27 to 32 bu t it revertedinfantry status in 1944 45.

The mountain brigades began the war with tmountain rifle groups of three battalions each asingle reconnaissance f and pioneer companThe single artillery regiment had two battalions wSkoda 75mm and Ioomm mountain guns. Thmule-borne artillery was extremely light and twere hard pressed to hold a line in the open stephowever they came into their own in broken terraStrength was about 12 000.

By 1944 t he m ountain division had expanded tstrength of 15 896. The artillery regiment had adda third 75mm battalion and could have a 150mbattery attached. The reconnaissance and pionelements had grown into weak battalions and thwere two 75mm A /T companies.

In mid- 1944 th e training elements of each diviswere organised as independent commands numbe to 104 a nd se nt to the front. They each had finfantry battalions and on e of artillery. 3 MountCommand briefly became an ad hoc divisionAugust/September 1944. The 1945 mountain dsion was very similar to the infantry division excthat its infantry remained in two three battalgroups.

Cavalry DivisionsThe Cavalry Corps six brigades later divisions wat the forefront of mechanisation and experiencmost organisational change. They acted as mounor motorized infantry an d were essentially reguunits. They lacked substantial reserve elements at heir str engt h and quality were partly maintained


11/48

accepting volunteers with their own horses o r motorcycles. The 1st, 4th, 6th, 7th, 8th, loth an d 12th

l a r a ~ i Regiments provided reconnaissance squadrons for all corps an d divisions.

The 1941 cavalry b ri ga de h ad o ne m oto ri se d an dtwo horsed cavalry regiments each equivalent to astrong infantry battalion, a motorised reconnaissancesquadron, a 47mm f gun company, a pioneercompany and a two-battalion horse artillery regimentwith 7smm guns a nd 1 00 mm howitzers. Strengthwas about 6,800, g row in g to 7,600 i n 1942 an d 8,778 1943.

By August 1944 th e cavalry divisions were eithermotorised 8c), horsed IC), on foot sc, 6c, 9c) ordisbanded 7C . Each ha d f ou r cavalry r eg im en ts , aweak reconnaissance battalion, two f companieswith 7smm guns, a pioneer company, an d a two-

battalion artillery regiment with 7smm a nd 100gun s which could have an atta ched Isomm battStrength was about 10,000. They also hadidentically numbered training division about 3,strong.

The Romanian mounta in a nd cavalry divisiwere arguably Germany s most consistently usallied f or ma tio n a nd scored a number of operatiosuccesses in their own right. Several were almcontinuously on operations between 1941 and 19building up considerable experience and alwretaining some offensive potential, though their wa rtiller y usually n ee de d s up pl em en ti ng . Bothmountain and cavalry divisions began th e warbrigades, bu t were redesignated divisions in Ma1942 as they were as large as the equivalent SovietHungarian divisions.

ROMANIAN DIVISIONAL ORDERS O F BATTLE 1941-45

Armoured/Cavalry/Mountain/Infantry Regiments Artillery RegimentsDivision

Regt 2 Regt 3 Regt 4 Regt Regt 2 Regt YearsI Armd I Ar m a) 3 Rif m) 4 Rif m) I Mor.Art 4 -44 P)I Cay I I Cal m) 1 Ros h) 2 Ros h) Hs.Art 41I Cay I Ros h) 2 Ros h) G.Cal h) I Hs.Art 42I Cay I I Cal m) I Ros h) 2 Ros h) 5 Ros h) I Hs.Art 44-455 Cay 6 Ros m) 7 Ros h) 8 Ros h) 2 Hs.Art 41-425 Mo t 6 Ros f) 7 Ros f) 8 Ros f) Ros f) 2 Mor.Art 44 P)6 Cay 10 Ros m) 9 Ros h) 5 Cal h) 4 Hs.Art 4 I-44 P)7 Cay I I Ros m) 12 Ros h) 9 Cal h) 5 Hs.Art 417 Cay Ros m) I I Ca l m) 5 Hs.Art 42-43 d)8 Cay 3 Cal m) 4 Ros h) 2 Cal h) 3 Hs.Art 41- 4 28 A rmd 4 Ros a) 3 Cal m) 12 Ros m) 2 Cal m) 3 Mot.Art Aug448 Mo t 3 Cal m) 4 Ros m) 2 Cal m) J2 Ros m) 3 Mot.Art 44-459 Cay 5 Ros m) 3 Ros h) 13 Cal h) 6 Hs.Art 41-4 5I Mt I Mt.Rif 2 Mr.Rif I Mt.Art 4 I-44 P)2M t 4 Mr.Rif 5 Mr.Rif 2 Mr.Art 41-4 53 Mt 3 Mt.Rif 6 Mr.Rif 3 Mr.Art 41-4 54 Mt 8 Mt.Rif 9 Mt.Rif 4 Mr.Art 4 I-44 P)

103 Mt 17 Inf 8 Fr.Gd 25/26 Sk.Bn I I Art 16 Art 44 d)I Gd 6 Gd.Inf 2 Gd.Rif 9 Gd.Rif J Gd.Art 2 Gd . Art 41-4 52G d 2 Fr.Gd. 3 Fr.Gd 4 Fr.Gd 3 Gd.Art 4 Gd.Art 42-43 d)I Frnt I Fr.Gd 2 Fr.Gd 5 Fr.Gd I Fr . Art 2 Fr . Art 4 J-43 d)I In f 85 Inf. 93 Inf 5 Ri f I Fd.Art 38 Fd.Art 4 I-44 P)2 I n f I I n f 26Inf 31 Inf 9 Fd.Art 14 Fd.Art 41-4 53 Inf 4 Inf 30 I n f I Ri f 6 Fd.Art IS Fd.Art 4 J-45 t)4 In f 5 In f 20Inf 2 I I n f 2 Fd.Art 10 Fd.Art 4 I 44 P)5 Inf 8 I n f 9 Inf 32 I n f 7 Fd.Art 28 Fd.Art 4 I-44 P)6 I n f I o I n f IS Inf 27 Inf I I Fd.Art 16 Fd.Art 4 J-45 t)


12/48

Fortress Division1St Fortress Division and 2nd Security Division wereformed from 1St and 2nd Fo rt ress Brigades whichhad manned the fortifications lost in 1940; theygarrisoned Odessa and the Transnistrian coast in1942-43. In 1944 106, lIS and 121 Fortress Detachments, each of one artillery and three infantrybattalions, were formed from reserve elements of 6th,15th and 21St Divisions to man th e Foqani fortifications. Where divisions raised such independentbrigades, commands or detachments it was normal prefix the original division with number

Reserve DivisionsIn 1941 the 25th, 27th, 30th, 31St, 32nd and 35thReserve Divisions were mobilised but only the last

saw action in Basarabia. Their organisation was asthe infan try divisions but their equipmentobsolete. All were soon broken up to make up1941 losses of the infantry divisions and formsecurity divisions.

Security Divisions1st, and 3rd Security Divisions policed the interioTransnistria in 1942-43. Each had a standard thrbattalion infantry regiment, three lightly armgendarme battalions, a weak reconnaissance battaland a single 75mm artillery battalion. They andFortress and 2nd Security Divisions were usedrebuild 5 9, 6 and 15 Divisions in 1943 The 2Infantry Division formed in 1943 for essentisecurity duties had two standard infantry regimeand a single artillery regiment.

ROMANIAN DIVISIONAL ORDERS OF BATTLE 1941-45 continued

ArmouredfCavalryfMountainflnfantry Regiments Artillery RegimentsDivision

1 Regt 2 Regt 3 Regt 4 Regt I Regt 2 Regt Years7 1nf 14 lnf I6lnf 37 lnf 4 Fd.Art 8 Fd.Art 4I-44 P)8lnf 29 lnf 7 Rif 8 Rif 12 Fd.Art 17 Fd.Art 4I-44 P)9 lnf 34 lnf 36lnf 40lnf 13 Fd.Art 18 Fd.Art 41-45Iolnf 23 lnf 33 lnf 38lnf 3 Fd.Art 20 Fd.Art 41-45I I lnf 2lnf 3 lnf I9 lnf 21 Fd.Art 26 Fd.Art 4 I-45 t

13 lnf 7 lnf 22 lnf 89 lnf 19 Fd.Art 41 Fd.Art 4 I-44 P)14 lnf 13 lnf 39 lnf 6 Rif 24 Fd.Art 29 Fd.Art 4 I-44 P)15 lnf 25 lnf 35 lnf 10 Rif 23 Fd.Art 25 Fd.Art 4 I-44 P) nff t nff t 90lnffMt 92lnffMt 35 Fd.Art 36 Fd.Art 41-4519 lnf 94 lnf 95 lnf 96lnf 37 Fd.Art 42 Fd.Art 41-4520 lnf 82 lnf 83 lnf 9[ lnf 39 Fd.Arr 40 Fd.Art 4 I-44 P)21 lnf ln I2lnf 24 lnf 5 Fd.Art 30 Fd.Art 41-4524 lnf II I lnf II2 lnf 104 Fd.Art 43-44 d)25 Res 48 Res.Inf 49 Res.Inf 72 Res.Inf 61 Res.Art 62 Res.Art 41 d)27 Res 74 Res.Inf 75 Res.Inf 76 Res.Inf 67 Res.Art 68 Res.Art 41 d)30 Res 41 Res.Inf 66 Res.Inf 71 Res.lnf 51 Res.Art 52 Res.Art 41 d)31 Res 42 Res.Inf 43 Res.Inf 59 Res.Inf 53 Res.Art 54 Res.Art 4 1 d)32 Res 46 Res.Inf 73 Res.Inf 78 Res.Inf 55 Res.Art 56 Res.Art 4I d)35 Res 50 Res.Inf 55 Res.Inf 67 Res.Inf 63 Res.Art 64 Res.Art 41 d)

1 Fort I Fort.Inf 2 Fort.Inf 68 Fort.Inf 1 Ft.Art 4 Ft.Art 41-43 dI Sec 72 lnf 3 Sec.Bns 1 55 Art 42-43 d2 Se c 28 Fort.Inf 53 Fort. lnf 56 Art 42-43 d3 Se c lnf 3 Sec.Bns 1 55 Art 42-43 d

a) Armoured m) Motorised h) Horsed d) Disbanded t) R ebui lt from Training Div, Sept 1944 f Foot p) Disbanded Oct. 1944

Note: The 1945 Artillery Regiments were amalgamated due to equipment shortages.


13/48

C M P IG N S9 9 5

The 1941 Call1paign: OdessaThe Romanian 4 th A rm y s III Corps II, 15) an d VCorps G, F, 21, 7C assaulted across th e River Prutinto Basarabia on the night of 2/3 July 1941, with 35thReserve Division an d II Corps 10, M ar in e D et .)mounting diversionary attacks on their flanks. As theGermans h ad a ttacked t he So viet Union on 22 Junesurprise had already been lost. The Guard an d 21stDivisions captured a bridgehead at Falciu but werecontained in heavy fighting by three Soviet divisions.Further north the 15th, Ith an d Frontier Divisionsand 7 th Cavalry Brigade and a German division madebetter progress; an d 1st Armoured Division wasi ntr od uc ed to sp ea rh ea d th e joint advance which

Junior oflicers in Hungary12 December 1944. Notethe late war woollen hatsand mess tin The cap on

the left is non regulationbut the plaited f lse chinstrap inlplies the owner is cavalryman.retook the Basarabian capital ofChiinau on 15 JuIt pushed on to the Nistru Dnestr) by the 26forcing a complete Soviet withdrawal across tfiver.

In northern Basarabia the German Ith Armwhich had th e R om an ia n 5th , 6th, 8 th , 13th and 1Divisions under command, advanced even faswhile 3 rd R om an ia n A rm y s Mountain Corps 12m, 4m, 7) an d Cavalry Corps 5C, 6c, 8c) rapireoccupied Northern Bucovina. Romania lost 4,dead, 12,120 wounded and 5,506 missingBasarabia and Northern Bucovina but had achievits legitimate war aims against the USSR withimonth.

Odessa was the main Soviet Black Sea port andimportant c om mu ni ca tio ns h ub . The Germn ee de d i t c ap tu re d but lacked the available trooand so requested Rom an ia n help. After some hitation Antonescu agreed. This decision to contininto genuinely Soviet terri tory was one of pragmanecessity but was greeted by increasing politiopposition at home and led to later British aAmerican declarations of war.

On 7 August 4t h Army crossed the Dnestr and


14/48

I3 August a rapid thrust by elements of Ist ArmouredDivision and Ist Cavalry Brigade had reached theBlack Sea coast behind Odessa and isolated it. TheOdessa garrison initially comprised the equivalent offive Soviet divisions occupying three concentric ringsof hastily built defences, but control of the seaallowed them to be reinforced. By early October thegarrison had grown to 86,000 men despite dailycasualties somet imes exceeding 2,000 woundedalone.

Initial Romanian plans aimed to take Odessa by 2September. The first assault on the city was launchedon I8 August by I Corps (2I , G, F) and III Corps (7,3, S, I I) from the north. Some ground was gained andthe city s water reservoir was taken, but no breakthrough was achieved. Important success only camewhen V Corps (I3, IS, IC) joined the assault from theeast on the 23rd. In the following days it advancedbetween IO and 20 kms, taking 7,000 prisoners andcapturing Fontanka on the 28th. From thereRomanian heavy arti llery was able to shell the vitalport area ofOdessa. This was the most critical periodfor the defence, but V Corps was unable to break intothe city because the approach funnelled into a narrowand readily defended isthmus.

On 28 August the northern attack was resumedwith the fresh XI and IV Corps (6, 8, I4, 7C). Onceagain ground was gained but no breakthrough made.The Guard and I4th Divisions did force a dangeroussalient into the defences at Lenintal, but were unableto exploit it due to a successful Soviet counter-attackon 8th Division on their left flank. The assault was

called off on S September. Antonescu demandGerman technical assistance before he would resuthe offensive, but this was to prove insufficientsignificantly influence the battle.

A new plan envisaged two preparatory attackssecure a start line for a final assault on the city itsOn I2 September XI Corps (7C, 8, I4), I Corps (GIII Corps (F, 7) and IV Corps (I I, 3) resumedattack from the north-west. Important advances wmade, and on the night of the I4th/I sth the Soviwere obliged to fall back on their second linedefence.

Encouraged by this success the Romanialaunched their second preparatory attack on the nSoviet position at Dalnik prematurely, and althouthey resumed i t daily until 2I September ferocioSoviet resistance s topped them well short ofplanned start line for the final assault. They begregrouping for a new attack fur ther south at Tataron the 22nd.

On the same day the Soviets counter-attackedCorps (I 3, I5) on the passive eastern front . A fremarine regiment was landed by sea behind I5Division defending Fontanka while two rifle disions, one newly landed, attacked V Corps frontalCaught by surprise, V Corps was pushed back sevekilometres and lost over 2,000 men and the vartillery positions at Fontanka. As a resultproposed attack south of Tatarka scheduled for23rd was suspended, and 4th Army went over todefensive to await significant German assistanexpected in late October.

.. .... ----~ .....,.,.-::.-........J.:'l..... St aIingrad. ~ , : ~ ~\ 1.1 3 :.

VI-',,;'::- ~ 4 2 L - : : .......40/ ....... ~ \ ) o l '..... 9 ~ 6 C

Kharkovo

UKRAINEU. S. S R.

' .::..... .. K e :. T...I I , \\ 11111111111 111 1~ - 1 ,, - 4 = :.,::.::: ::::. rim en .... ,:: . : ; 1 ; ' r ~ . I . II\\\ Caucasus Mts ~ ,h \ 11 1 111\ - . . . . , , ,\ .- ~ - ., / . 7/\ ~ \. . . ,- : 1 \ \\\\ . ,: . . . 0..: 0 I : . ~ .... cz, CJ : : : : : : q::: ::.. l :)--v r..;.:.;.. I I I V .- () .- - I I /K= Kerch Peninsula ROMANIA :...::. ..... ':: :... I l . . :::.. / 1.:::;: 01.) x v ;.:.:.:.:.:::::. 111 / \\11T=Taman Peninsula ,J , - - - - - , . . . _q; BLACK SEA ....:::: ::.=. :: ,:: ; / 1

C ~ = C h i s i n a u . ~ ~ ~ ~.. . . ,The Western Campaign, 1944-45. The Eastem Campaign, 1941'44.ROMANIAN ARMY CAMPAIGNS, 1941 - 1945.


15/48

Soviet Defence Lines ' ' .. 14 Aug ~ 1 8 A u g ~ ~ 24 Aug- .. _ 30Aug _._. 5Sep-- 15Sep-._. 23 Sep__ 150ct

SIEGE OF ODESSA. 1941

the Romanians. Some divisions lost more than thoriginal strength, and total losses of 17,729 de63,345 wounded and 11,471 missing largely negaany sense of triumph and prevented much of theinfantry from ever gaining a moral ascendancy othe Soviets. It also exposed the infantry s pleadership, training and equipment; and most of4th Army was withdrawn to its depots for reorganation over the winter.

evertheless, Odessa represents the nearest thto a significant success achieved during the war bminor Axis power independent of substantial Gman support, and threwMussolini into a jealous raA back-handed compliment to the determinationthe Romanian assault was the Soviet declarationOdessa as a Hero City . The absence of so mSoviet troops in Odessa greatly assisted the Germbreaking into the Crimea.

Odessa and its hinterland were administeredRomania as Transnistria until early 1944. Transntria was subject to exploitation but not annexNotably weak Soviet partisan activity was largelyto the comparatively lax and sometimes enlighteRomanian administration which, after initial sevity, oversaw a significant improvement in the wbeing ofmost of the local population in 1942 and 1when compared with previous Soviet rule orneighbouring German administrations. The FortrDivision and three Security Divisions based thwere well able to control the territory assistedlocally recruited police and labour corps.

3rd Army s Cavalry Corps (sc, 6c, 8c) and Motain Corps (1m, 2m, 4m) had meanwhile bsubordinated to the German I Ith Army and engain mobile operations up to the Dnepr by eaSeptember. Romanian engineers there buil t 30cent of the Berislavl bridge, the longest ever cstructed under fire, which enabled the GermRomanian advance to continue up to the approacof the Crimea.

On 26 September 3rd Army was deployed inNogai Steppe covering the rear of the German 1Army attacking the Crimea when it was assaulted12 Soviet divisions. Most units held, but 4th Motain Brigade was partially overrun and German forhad to restore the situation. On I OctoberGermans and Romanians went over to the offenand on 7 October the opposing Soviet forces w

BLACKSEA

Soviet Counter-attacks {

1a15 ~ :: .-. - ~ . D ' . 'I3f \

If \7 \I I \ 2. .. .f / 6 , i i3 . . / I isFJ 3, i \7 ' . IF.... \ . _. - \ F \ . . ~ 8.. .:: . ::.:.G , I / G .::::', 8 t - \6 . 21 .._... .._... :::: .::- - . 21 G .hr: . ~ t a r k a {(/::.. . . 1 ~ 8 . .:14 .-. 7 : x:::::;7C. .j - LenintaIO,(. . : . / / \ /.. ' ... '. ' . ;.:.: :: . .7 , . . . c ,. ,..,. , ..,....:: : : : ~ : .., ... - . . .. . .

Main Axes of Romanian Attack

On 30 September the Soviets decided to evacuateOdessa because its supply base in the Crimea wasthreatened. To conceal this decision they undertook atwo-division assault westwards from Dalnik on 2October. After initially losing some ground theGuard and Frontier Divisions rallied to drive theSoviets back with heavy losses to their startline byevenmg.

Local probing attacks continued and on 6 Octoberthe fresh loth Division succeeded in capturing asignificant lodgement in the Soviet line south ofDalnik. However, the Soviets skilfully withdrew thelast of their 86,000 troops on the night of 15/16October without arousing Romanian or Luftwaffesuspicions. The Romanians moved in the followingday capturing over 7,000 stragglers.During the siege 4th Army deployed a total of 17infantry divisions, the armoured division, threecavalry brigades and a fortress brigade, but not allcould be committed simultaneously or completely.They included 1st, 2nd and 18th Infantry and 35thReserve Divisions, 9th Cavalry and 2nd FortressBrigades which either had passive roles or arrivedlate. 34,000 troops served, but due to acute supplyproblems 4th Army s available strength usuallyaveraged about 160,000.

Although they came close to a decisive victoryOdessa was only a partial and expensive success for


16/48

~

K =KletskayaB =Blinov

Don Front

Soviet Advances late Dec. -

/ Kotelnikovski

R D South Western Front. on

Romanian ~ German - - Italian ~ 19-11-42 3-12-42 ~ ~ 23-12-42 _ .. ..

... .. :;- ... ...11 B ..........9 9... .. t 4- S 6 K. \. / : ; : \ 13 ... ~ /

7c 1C 7 ( ~ . . . . - : : : ~ 1 Q 1S 1 ~ , ,2 i ~ ~ . P22PZ \m 1a . na 1S:>C _ ~ : : . . ....nts t 3rd Armi'....... / Ifc .,/

- - - ~ 6th Army(G),t, STALING-,......--- - . \ / \ 001 If _ _ 4th P z , . ~ . 1 \ I ,... _ - Army . 0 a._ . - . _. ' '-.20':-/ -- 2 Stalingr

I 1 ; \ Fro.I .. -,,_ ..,.............. .., .. - : . . .-- : -\f y , + e , ~ 1I .... ~ ~ \0. , . ,I . 4th 4 \/ - . . . - - - , ......._..... ......... \. Army \ \8c 2 18 :.,.... D\ 4..... \re . 1 ..... \

/mnants . Sc \. . Sc \- _.. ----::I

German Counter-offensive 12-23 Dec.STALINGRAD. 1942.

Soviet Offensive 19120 Nov. > Romanian Counter-attacks

assaulting the city. It was later joined by 1Division and VII Corps (5c, 8c). During Octobewas subject to several effective Soviet probing attawhich exposed its vulnerability.

By mid-November VI Corps infantry and arlery were seriously below strength, but each divishad to hold 25-40 kms of front. All VI and VI I Codivisions were in th e line and the German element4t h Panzer Army had to be relied on for reserves.and VII Corps came under command of a newRomanian Army from 20 November-the verythey were attacked.

On 10 October General Dumitrescu s experien3r d Army H Q was transferred from the Caucasuscommand the deployment of the reorganisedOdessa divisions north of Stalingrad. The new lwas an open steppe, but Dumitrescu was refuGerman permission to launch an immediate attackorder to drive th e Soviets north of the River Do nthat it could be used as a much needed anti-tobstacle. From 20 October 3rd Army began to repSoviet preparations for an attack on its front, but

surrounded, the Romanians taking 6,700 prisoners.By I I November 3rd Army s losses since Junetotalled 2,559 dead, 6,366 wounded and 1,913

mlssmg.3rd Army was then deployed on coastal defence in

the Ukraine, bu t 1st and 4t h Mountain and 8t hCavalry Brigades were sent into th e Crimea tosupport the overextended German I Ith Army. On 30December the latter brigades failed to contain aSoviet landing at Feodosiya and the Soviets were ableto build up large forces in the Kerch Peninsula.Antonescu immediately made available VII Corps(10,19, 8c), and with their support the Germans wereable to wipe ou t the Kerch bridgehead in Ma y 1942.In March the cavalry and mountain brigades wereredesignated divisions, and later expanded

InJune X Mountain Corps (1m, 4m, 18) joined theGerman assault on Sevastopol. 1st Mountain Division took the important Sugar Loaf position i n m id June and 4t h Mountain Division captured 10,000prisoners clearing Balaklava in early July.

The Crimea operations were th e high point ofGerman-Romanian co-operation thanks to the goodrapport between the German commander, VonManstein, who was sensitive to the limitations of hisRomanian troops, and a r e ~ a l Antonescu, whoreadily made available the necessary Romanian unitsto release overstre tched German formations foroffensive operations. Romanian losses were 6,306dead and missing and 16,735 wounded.

T he 1942 Camp aig n : St ali n g radAs Romania s war aims were more than achieved ittook considerable German pressure to secure apromise of 500,000 Romanian troops for the 1942campaign, an d even then a peak of only 382,000 werefielded. Between January an d April 1942 VI Corps I,2, 4, 20) was placed under the command of GermanArmy Group South. In early Ma y th e inexperienced1st and 4t h Divisions had th e misfortune to face thefirst Soviet attempt at a modern armoured offensivesouth ofKharkov and were badly shaken.

VI Corps was subordinated to 4t h Panzer Army forthe German summer offensive on Stalingrad. In earlyAugust it was involved in heavy fighting crossing theRiver Aksai south of Stalingrad; and by earlySeptember it was deployed on a defensive linecovering the southern flank of the German forces


17/48

Germans were so fixated on capturing Stalingrad thatthey would only move the chronically understrength22nd Panzer Division in support.

On 9 November 3rd Army had I Corps 7, II , IICorps 9,14 , V Corps 5, 6) and IV Corps 13, lC inthe line and 7th Cavalry, 15th Infantry and 1stArmoured Divisions in reserve. The units werenearly up to strength, and despite extended 20-24 kmfrontages they had successfully repulsed most Sovietprobing attacks.

The supply situation of both 3rd and 4th Armieswas difficult as the Germans attacking Stalingradnecessarily dominated rail transport . A shortage ofRom an ia n t ruc ks delayed deliveries from the railheads, and reliance on horsed transport necessitatedthe positioning of supply depots perilously close tothe front. Engineering equipment was in shortsupply, and although the Romanians dug in determinedly most of their front lacked wire or mines.With the onset of winter none of this i mp ro ve dmorale, especially in VI Corps. The only redeemingfeature was the delivery of six Pak 97/38 75mm antitank guns to each division in October.

By engaging the Germans in Stalingrad withminimum forces the Soviets were able to build uplarge concentrations on their flanks facing 3rd and 4thArmies. With a high proportion of Guards andarmoured u ni ts th ey were the cream of the availableRed Army, and achieved a crushing materiel andnumerical superiority at their points of attack.

On 9 November 3rd Army was attacked fromKletskaya and Blinov. Romanian infantry resistancewas unexpectedly determined and the first wave ofSov iet rifle divisions failed to br eak through. As aresult the armoured units intended to exploit anexisting b re ac h ha d to fight their way through withunforeseen losses. Several Romanian counter-attacksfrom 15th Infantry and 7th Cavalry Divisions weredriven off but further delayed the Soviets, who fellshort of their first-day objectives. Nevertheless, byevening their armour had decisively broken through9th, 14th and 13th Divisions fronts and was beginning to force the neighbouring units to draw back theirflanks.

The well-led Ith Division repulsed several infantry assaults and prevented the Soviet right flankwidening the breach as planned. 1st Cavalry Divisionheld its front throughout the day. 1st Armoured

Infantry regulationuniforJ11s I7 October I9This was to be the ofliciscale ofissue throughouthe war However the bpack was usuaJJy carriethe regimental train anonlyLMG number twosassault pioneers andmedics seem to have wothem regularly oncampaign The tent sheand/or blanket was usuaworn bandolier fashion

Division counter-attacked during the night, butmostly l ig ht tanks were u na bl e to tackle the heavSoviet armour, and it had to be content wpreventing the two arms of the Soviet offensive frcompletely surrounding 5th, 6th and 15th Divisiand elements of the 14th and 13th Divisions whhad been consolidated under General Lascar ofDivision.

In the following days 1st Cavalry Di vi sio n wsurrounded with the German 6th Army in St agrad; 9th Division was subordinated to I Corwh ich was lightly attacked a nd co nt in ue d to holdoriginal position. 7th Cavalry Division and parts14th Division withdrew behind the River Chir.

Until 3 November 1st Armoured Division maged to offer an escape rou te for the Lascar Grobut Lascar was ordered by Hitler to hold on urelieved by 22nd Panzer Division. Howev er,weak unit was i ts el f p in ne d d own by Soviet armand unable to intervene actively. Only 1st ArmouDivision, resupplied with fuel by Romanian Ju 5and parts of 15th Division managed to break throuto 22nd Panzer Division; the remnants of th e thformations broke out across the Chir on the 25


18/48

~ L

15th Division s co mm an der being posthumouslycommended by the Germans. The 27,000 survivorsof the Lascar Group surrendered on the 24th.Throughout December II Corps la , 7c, 14, IS) wasintegrated with German units which stabilised thefront on the Chir, and with their support managed tohold the river line.

4th Ar my s VI Corps was attacked on 2 November. 1st and 4th Divisions were quickly overrun,although once again Soviet tank losses were unexpectedly heavy. General K or ne s 8 th Cavalry Divisionrushed north; although it was unable to restore thesituation it managed to retain cohesion as it coveredthe retreat of the remnants of 4th, 1st, 18th and 2ndDivisions, and gave German reinforcements time tostabilise the line in front of 4th Army H Q atKotelnikovski from the 24th. 5th Cavalry Divisionhung on to the right flank of the army, while the bulkof 20th Division was t rap ped with the German 6t hArmy in Stalingrad.

On 12th D ec em be r German armour began a

counter-attack from Kotelnikovski to relieve Stagrad with VI Corps 18, 2 I) and VI I Corps 4,8c) covering its flanks. However, on 18 DecemSoviet armour broke through the Italian 8th Armythe left of I Corps 7, 9), which was still onDon, and began to attack the German division onright. Mindful of the Lascar Group s fate I Cobegan to withdraw on the 20th without Germpermission, bu t was nevertheless surrounded infollowing days and most of it destroyed. Furtsouth II Corps fought its way out with Germtroops. Wi th its left flank collapsing the Germwere forced to withdraw their Stalingrad relief forand the demoralised Romanian infantry divisionsVI and VI I Corps began to disintegrate beforeSoviet counter-offensive. 8th Cavalry Division hfought well.

By th e end of Decembel few of the units of 3rd4th Armies were battleworthy, and they werewithdrawn from the line and repatriated to Romain early 1943 for rebuilding. 1st Cavalry and 2


19/48

Infantry Divisions were destroyed with the German6th Army in Stalingrad at the end of January. VonPaulus, 6th Army s commander, felt that theirfighting spirit and leadership deserved specialcommendation.

Between July and October the Romanians advancing on Stalingrad and into the Caucasus lost 9,252dead, 28,213 wounded and 1,588 missing. On 9ovember 3rd and 4th Armies totalled 228,072 men,but by 7 January 1943 155,010 had been lost,including 12,607 still trapped in Stalingrad.

Most Romanians had been unenthusiastic aboutserving in the depths of Russia since Basarabia sliberation in 1941, but it was Stalingrad that destroyed confidence in German victory. Romanianresistance there had been more determined than theSoviets had anticipated but rather less than theGermans had hoped for, and mutual recriminationsresulted at all levels.

Bad as Stalingrad was for the Germans, it was a

great deal worse for Romania. Romania s 27 divisicontributed significantly to making Germany s 1strategic offensive in southern Russia possible; bur et urn German overextension had left 3rd andArmies exposed to the full weight of the Red Armand Romania consequently lost two-thirds of its farmy in a strategic disaster beyond its control.

The lack SeaCampaigns 1942-44The Cavalry Corps 5c, 6c, 9c) formed the right wof the German advance into the Caucasus whbegan in late July 1942. In an independent operatit cleared the coast of the Sea of Azov and then swsouth to reach the Black Sea on 2 September, takthe port of Anapa by turning captured Soviet heartillery on the other defences. This cut offpart ofSoviet 47th Army in the Taman Peninsula and itto be withdrawn by sea. T her eaf te r loth 19th3rd M ou nt ai n Divisions and several G er ma n dsions were able to cross over the straits fromCrimea unopposed, leaving only the Mountain Co 1m, 4m) in the Crimea.

On 9 September 3rd Mountain Divislaunched an attack across the Caucasus MountainsTuapse but after gaining 6 km it was repulsed. OnOctober 2nd Mountain Division, which had entethe Caucasus with German forces in July, launchesurprise attack on Nalchik. In a day and a hacrossed three fast-flowing mountain rivers to captthe city and trap 7,000 Soviets against advancGerman armour.

Defeat at Stalingrad forced an Axis retreat frthe Caucasus into the Kuban bridgehead aroundTaman Peninsula. The performance ofRomanian units there deteriorated and the Germincreasingly deployed them in coastal protectionanti-partisan roles, only placing them in the frontout ofabsolute necessity. Morale in the loth and 1Divisions was so bad that they had to be disperamong German divisions, but the mountaincavalry divisions remained more cohesive. OnF eb ruar y 1943 the 80,000 Romanian troops inKuban amounted to 4 per cent of the Axis forand were to suffer 1,598 dead, 7,264 woundedcyclistshowing the basicinfantry uniform tronl thefront ote th e paleness th e natural leather

ammunition pouchcs asissued they darkened wuse


20/48

ROMANIA 1941-1944

4th Mountain Division from the Crimea but retainits number as a deception measure. The demoralidivision suffered heavily during the Soviet recquest of the ogai Steppe, which led to the isolatof the Germans and Romanians in the Crimea

ovember 1943, but escaped across the Dnepr.By December 1943 3rd Army HQhad begun

assemble III Corps (8, IS, 24) in TransnistHowever, no determined attempt was made to defthe territory and Odessa was abandoned toSoviets on 10 April 1944. 24th Division revertedbeing 4th Mountain Division on recrossingDnestr.

The 1944 Campaign: Ia ji-Chi jinauThe Soviets were now within the Romanian fronand throughout the summer the Romanian deplment grew, helping the retreating Germans to staise the front in Basarabia. Antonescu suggestecontrolled withdrawal to the more defensiCarpathian-Danube line which he had prudenbeen fortifying around Foqani since 1942; but Hirefused, promising to keep sufficient German forto protect Basarabia and back up the weaRomanian armies. However, events elsewhere forthe withdrawal ofmost German armour, leavingfront vulnerable,By 19 August 3rd Army had II Corps (9, MarDet), III Corps IIob, 2 IS) and a German co(incl. 21, 4m) under command. The neighbourGerman 6th Army included 14th Division. Barmies came under the Romanian Army GroDumitrescu, which had 1St Cavalry Division inreserves. To its north Army Group Wohler inclu1St Armoured, 8th Infantry and 18th MountDivisions in reserve. Its German 8th Army incluI ah Division and IV Corps (I02mc, sc, 7 3), wits Romanian 4th Army comprised VI Corps (inclIOImc), a German corps (incl. 1,13), V Corps (4,I Corps (6, 20) and VII Corps (I03mc, I04mRomanian morale, already shaken, was furtherdermined by rumours of peace feelers, and Germunits, often under Romanian command, were inspersed with the Romanians to brace their resistan

On 20 August the Soviets attacked both 3rd Arsouth of Tiraspol and 4th Army north of I a ~ i . Areporting fierce fighting they broke throughMountain and 21St Divisions and advanced deep i

-.

/ 8HU G R ,/ ..... , cBucovina: Y /, _ - ~ . ./ N.Transilvania .

117 IHung. 40 44)i./.. ......... . 16) . . .... 7. /- ....... . 15I .... : ... : ::::: :.::::: , lc 20 3 m :... Sc Basarabia ~ . i : r ; : : : < \ Ussr 40 41) : . ~ ; ? ?\ F.l 18.27r ....... 8c 6 Ussr 44) : ~ f : i i~ c 1m .. 3 S ~ 22 (12) : i/, :::ROM A N I A 5 10. : ~ : ; . :\ 4 la 13 2Sr 32r .t;19 m . ..... 3 .....::::;::

2 11. 6cBucharest 9 . ~ d J ; > 31r G 4 _: :::: BLACK30r 7c :-:::: SEA\ . - _ l R U . D : a l . Q n ~ u b e .....: 06 ..... :: )r ... .0 . ....., Q :::.:;.BULGARIA - .:.:0 ;;;;;,::,. ,.::::;....;.1939 Border Wartime Changes .Divisional Depots 1941-44 Divisions Disbanded 1940 (- )

806 missing before final evacuation to the Crimea inOctober. By that time 1St and 4th Mountain Divisions had also been rotated through the Kuban.

Romanian strength in the exposed Crimea fellfurther as personnel losses were not replaced. In

ovember 1943 the Soviets cut off the Crimea andmade two landings on the Kerch Peninsula. 6thCavalry and 3rd Mountain Divisions, both considered by the Germans as good units, finished off thesouthern one at Eltigen on 7 December and took over

2,000 pnsoners.On 8 April 1944 the Soviets attacked loth Division

across the Sivash and broke through in three days ofintense fighting. All Axis forces then had to race theSoviets to the only evacuation point at Sevastopol.Romanian troops were several times used as rearguards, especially in the Yaila Mountains, where 1Stand 2nd Mountain Divisions covered the flank of theGerman V Corps; but by the time Sevastopol wasreached most units had disintegrated. Of 64,712Romanians in the Crimea 42,190 were evacuated bythe Romanian avy and Air Force, as were tens ofthousands of Germans. All their equipment was lost.The Stalingrad and Crimea disasters had cost the

Romanians the entire equipment of 24 divisions, andthe army had to be almost completely rebuilt. Suchlosses made it impossible to raise new field divisionsduring the war. During the summer of 1943 a 24thDivision, composed of reserve elements of IahDivision and penal units, guarded the north coast ofthe Sea ofAzov. In September it amalgamated with


21/48

th e rear of 3 rd Army. 3 rd Army began a prepl annedwit hdrawal to t he Danube line, but was pre-emptedby Soviet mechanised forces and naval landingswhi ch had near ly surrounded it against th e coast bythe 23rd. The Soviets reported that 3r d Army foughthar d to break out .

North o f a ~ i th e Soviets soon broke through partsof V, VI and IV Corps. 1st Armoured and 18thMountain Divisions put in an immediate counterattack, but th e Soviets had six times as many tanksand t hey wer e qui ckly surrounded. The remnants of4t h Army were thrown back in to th e C ar pa th ia ns ,and by 23 August th e Soviets were deep in th e rear ofth e German 6th an d 8t h armies which were inimmediate danger of being surrounded.

However, if the Romanian IIsth, 106th and 121stFortification Detachments resi sted fr om th e fixedfortifications in th e Foqani Gap supported by th elocally raised III Training Corps 6t, 1St, 2It and8th Armoured Division which ha d been ordered upfrom th e interior with 88mm guns from P l o i e ~ t i itwas still possible that th e Germans, 3r d and 4t hArmies might escape to th e more defensibleCarpathian-Danube line which, unknown to them,was the planned limit of th e Soviet offensive. Thiswould have saved th e P l o i e ~ t i oil fields vital to th eGerman war economy.Antonescu ha d deployed his entire available field

army in a genuine attempt to prevent t he Sovfrom overrunning the country. Romanian resistawas u ne ve n but Soviet reports confirm that thinitially put in some determined, if ineffectucounter-attacks. The Germans, who had bwrong-footed by Soviet deployments, believed theselves b et ray ed by th e Romanians on 20 AuguElements of the Romanian officer corps had certaigrown increasingly unco-operative during the sumer, but si gnif icant operati onal collusion wit hSoviets only occur red af ter 23 August. The Sovvictory was largely du e to good planning a

executIOn.For three years the Romanian Army, for all

failings, ha d proved Germany s largest, most efftive and most resilient ally on the Eastern FroUntil Stalingrad losses inflicted on th e Red Armatched those suffered, but th e ratio then swuheavily i n th e Soviets favour. Losses againstSoviets were 71,000 dead, 243,000 wounded a310,000 missing. Most of th e latter died in th e fieldas POWs.

The August 1944 DefectionRomanian opposition parties, th e court, and mucht he a rm y had long been in favour of negotiatingpeace, an d by mid-1944 even Antonescu was seekterms. However, his plan to negotiate from a posit

---

14 t 7t 21t 1St 4t

ROMANIA AUGUST 1944.Romanian- erm n Front. 20 A_._._._._Soviet Breakthrough. 20 23 A Romanian Counter - at tacks. P

Front. 23 August.

Romanian Fortifications, , lI ,,

Soviet Advance Aug.- Sept.. .. ..

Axis Counter - attack s

- 7Limit of Axis Penetration. Sept_ _ _ _ _ _ _


22/48

10, 19, 6c, 9c, 1m, 2m, 3m), screened by fronguard brigades and nine territorial battalions alothe Hungarian border.

In early 1943 the Romanians had decided to reta th ird of the personnel of each division at its depBy A ug us t 1944 they had bu il t up a shadow army7 training infantry divisions Gt, It, 2t, 3t, 4t,6t, 7t, 8t, 9t, I It , 13t, 14t, 1st, 18t, 20t, 2It , ttraining cavalry divisions ICt, sct), 4th TrainMountain Division and 1st Training ArmouDivision 7,848 strong) in th e interior. They w

of strength was shattered by the Soviet breakthrough,and on 3 August he was arrested by King Mihai,who immediately sued for peace. The Luftwaffepromptly bombed Bucharest, ans Romania declaredwar on Germany on 5 August. Bucharest wasrapidly secured by part of the currently converting8th Armoured Division, guard, par atroop and A/Aunits, which repulsed a German attack from l o i e ~ t iwhere the 18th Security Detachment and A/A unitswere also fighting the German garrison.

Existing plans to counter an invasion by Hungaryand Bulgaria had quickly to be extended to deal withthe 56,714 German troops in the country andGerman external intervention from Yugoslavia.However, of 3 rd a nd 4th Armies only those elementsof 4 th A rm y which h ad escaped i nt o the Carpathianswere later available to face the Hungarian frontier.Nevertheless, 1st Army improvised an effectivedefence of the frontiers and interior from the divi-sions being rebuilt after evacuation from the C rimea

RonJanian engineersclearing Soviet woodencase nJines an excellentillustra tion thecontrasting textures andshades the khakiwoollen trousers and fadedcotton sumnJer tunic thecoarse ma terial which

couldresemble hessianThe engineer holding thmine prodder has applimud to his helmet; hiscolleague wears the yellarm band used todistinguish Romanianfrom Soviet troops


23/48

very weak in artillery and automatic weapons, but allhad some operational capacity.

The Germans failed to appreciate the potential ofthese measures and were surprised by the effectiveness of Romanian operations after their defection tothe Allies. 61,000 mostly rear-echelon Germans werekilled or captured in the ensuing fighting for the lossof 8,586 Romanians. The Russians were offered noresistance at the Foqani Gap and were able complete the encirclement and annihilation of theGe rma n 6th and 8 th Armies without interference.Accompanied by the Tudor Vladimirescu Division,they were then able to flood across Romania withminimal obstruction, and by mid-September joinedthe Romanian covering forces on the Hungarian andYugoslav borders.

Romania s defection significantly accelerated theend of the war. Bulgaria joined the Allies, Greece andmost of Yugoslavia were soon liberated, and c on -

An infantry section undertraining March I944Weapons ar e ZB 24 rifles aBeretta SM G and ZBJoLMG. otethecutofthetrousers and th e jacket scuffs and pocket pleats

have been simplified. Th eimmaculate condition th e oflicergraphicallyillustrates th e exaggeratedgulfbetween oflicers andmen.

siderable losses were inflicted on retreating Germforces in the Balkans. The loss of Romaniancrippled German operations for the rest of the wand was estimated by one Allied source to hshortened it by up six months. The Romanians hlearnt well from t he fiascos of earlier Italian aHungarian defection attempts and were active ageof their own liberation, extending the results ofSoviet I a ~ i h i ~ i n a u operation far beyond its origiambitions.

The 1944-45 Campaign1st Army 2m, 3m, 9c, 19, It lCt) spent eaSeptember repulsing Hungarian German attaacross t he western borders aimed at regainingsouthern Carpathian passes before the Sovreached them. In one battle Hungarian tanks wdisabled. 4th Army, forming round units retrievfrom the Eastern Front or the interior, was similaengaged in fending offan Axis attack on the southCarpathian passes from orthern Transilvania. Barmies simultaneously reorganised themselves infield, adopting a smaller divisional structure aupgrading some training divisions.


24/48

From 9 to 25 October, 4th Army s VI Corps 9,21,7t , II Corps 8c, 20 an d Mountain Corps 1m, 3, 6with I Ith Division in reserve played a major part inliberating orthern Transilvania, as di d 2nd, 18than d 103rd Mountain Divisions attached to Sovietforces. Romanian losses from I September to 25October totalled 49,744. Axis losses inflicted in cluded 21,434 killed and captured an d manywounded. A belated addition to th e armistice im posed by the Soviets in late October disbanded 3rdArmy, th e Mota-Mechanised, Cavalry, Mountainand three Infantry C orp s, an d 1st A rm ou re d, 5 thMotorised, two cavalry an d 13 mountain and infantrydivisions.

Between 8 October an d 15 January Romanianforces support ed t he Soviets in Hungary. 1st Armydeployed VII Corps 9c, 19 an d IV Corps 2, 4 inth e initial invasion in October an d VII Corps 9c, 19,2 w en t on to h el p s to rm B ud ap es t in January 1945.The Cavalry Corps ICt, It), 2n d an d 3r d Mountainan d Tudor Vladimirescu Divisions served in northwest Hungary under direct Soviet command, capturing th e city of Debrecen amongst other localities. 4t hArmy also campaigned across north-east Hungaryinto Czechoslovakia. In Hungary th e Romanianstook 21,045 Axis p ri so ne rs a nd 9,744 dead werefound on the battlefield; th e number of woundedinflicted is unknown. Romanian losses total led42 ,700 .

For th e remainder of the war 1st Army with VIICorps 9C, 2, 19 an d IV Corps 2m, 3m , 10 an d 4t hArmy with II Corps 3, 9, 21 an d VI Corps IC, 18 fought across eastern Czechoslovakia. 8t h Motorised Cavalry, 6 th I nf an tr y a nd th e Tudor Vladimirescu Divisions fought under Soviet command, while2n d Armoured Regiment campaigned up to Vienna.The Guard Division made a belated reappearance inApril. By 12 May Romanian forces ha d taken 20,478prisoners, 2,325 dead had been found an d a substantial number wounded. Romanian losses totalled66,495

Romanian losses of 169,822 between 23 August1944 an d May 1945 were very heavy but comparablewith those inflicted on their opponents. Recklessnessliberating Transilvania, atrocious weather an d mount ai no us t er ra in in Czechoslovakia, th e removal ofmany experienced officers under Soviet pressure an dinexperience in th e former training divisions all

A caporal in Hungary inovember I9 He carriesan Orifa SMG and acombination ofMA andKyser grenades at his belt

Note the foliage aroundthehebnet and theobsolete anklets insteadputtees


25/48

compounded the losses. Furthermore Romania wasobliged to conduct the last nine months of the warentirely from her own limited resources, and severeequipment shortages resulted. Finally, the Soviets,who were wasteful with the lives of their own men,were certainly no less so with the Romanians.

In 1944-45 538,536 Romanians served against theAxis, which placed Romania s contribution fourthbehind the USSR US and UK and losses considerably exceeded those of the latter. Yet, despite acontribution far greater than Italy s, Romania wasnever granted similar co-belligerent status. Romaniaregained Northern Transilvania, bu t Basarabia remained in the Soviet Union as the Moldavian SSR.Antonescu was executed in 1946 and the King forcedinto exile in late 1947, leaving the Communists inabsolute contro

TH PL T SAI r e ~ l al Romaniei Ion AntonescuMareal Io n Antonescu was originally a cavalryofficer and normally sported that arm s uniform withthe addition of Mareal s rank insignia. As officershad their uniforms made up by their own tailorsmany indulged in non-regulation variations, especially of the lapels, shoulder straps and pocket flaps.Antonescu had a reputation as a smart dresser andwas no exception. He wears the M1941 officer s cap,distinguishable from its predecessor by its largercrown and narrow cap band; the latter is in the cherryred of the cavalry, while the badge is that of thecavalry with a general s starburst rosette addedcentrally. The peak bears the double row of gold oakleaves exclusive to general officers. The tunic is theM1934 pattern, of British influence, bu t the pointedcorners to the breast pocket are non-regulation. Theshoulder boards are of the stiffened rectangular shapeused on formal occasions and bear the Mareal scrossed batons rank insignia. Prior to his promotionfrom general in August 9 Antonescu had wornthat rank s four gold bars overlaid with the badge ofhis original unit, the 1st Roiori Regiment, whichconsisted of two crossed lances with a horseshoe attheir crux. The lapels bear the M1930 general s collar

patches of gold embroidery on a dark red baground. The Mareal also sports the fashionable,non-regulation, cream riding breeches popular incavalry; officially khaki breeches or trousers shohave been worn, with two broad dark red stridown either side of the outer seam and narrowpiping actually over the seam. Antonescu wearsthree classes of the Order of Mihai Viteazul,highest Romanian military award. The second clasworn at the neck, the first as a star on the chest,the third class from a ribbon on the chest. The lahe won as an outstanding young staff officer inGreat War. On his left pocket is a special GermCombined Pilot-Observer Badge in gold wdiamonds, apparently given by Goering in early Ju9 in return for Goering s admission to the Orof Mihai Viteazu . Hi s boots are the standRomanian cavalry officer s issue, decorated witsmall brass rosette at the top. Antonescu was a shman and reportedly wore raised heels to increasestature.A : Capitan General Staff I94Staff officers wore the regulation uniform of thoriginal arm but with gold emboidery on their copatches and gold aiguillettes on the right shouldThis capitan wears the full M1934 uniform withM1930 Army dagger. Above the right breast poche has the M1930 staff college badge, which itfashionable to wear angled towards the shoulder. TGeneral Staff aiguillettes were of gold or yellow sbu t the War Ministry, Army and Corps ADCs wthem in silver or white silk. ADCs to the Kadditionally wore a gold sash with red and blongitudinal stripes diagonally over the right shoder and running below the Sam Browne belt toleft hip.A3: General de Armata Petre Dumitrescu; Stingrad winter I94 43General Dumitrescu was the most experienced senRomanian field commander of the war and commded the 3rd Army for almost the entire campaagainst the Soviet Union. He wears the univeissue tall lambswool caciulii winter hat withgeneral s starburst cap badge on its front. Tcaciula, traditional peasant wear, was issued ivariety of colours: white, black, brown or a comb


26/48

ation of these. It was of a conical shape, butRom anian soldiers showed an infinite capacity topersonalise its appearance in use. It failed to protectt he ears an d neck fully an d of ten had to be worn witha head scarf. Dumitrescu wears the M1934 generalofficer s greatcoat with dark red lapels. Regimentalofficers often lined their greatcoats with wool.Officers also made use of the superior Soviet winterclothing to supplement their own, in this case ve/enkifelt boots and mittens.A4: SubJocotenent 20th Infantry Division; StaJingrad winter I942-43This Sublocotenent wears the heavy wool linedwatch coat issued in limited numbers to each sub-unit for sentries to wear over their great coat. Thehelmet was commonly worn over the caciula, boneta,capela or beret for insulation in winter.BI: r u n t a ~ I3th Infantry Division; OdessaI94 I

T h i s f r u n t a ~ is a section LM G gunner an d wears t hestandard M1939 infantry uniform widely worn in1941. The helmet is the Dutch M2 3/ 27 p at te rnadopted by Romania in 1939 after extensive comparative testing. Pre- war issues had an embossedbadge bearing the double C monogram of KingCarol, as here, bu t wartime examples were without. Itwas painted the greenish shade of khaki also adoptedfor Romanian Army vehicles. At the outbreak of wari t was not yet in universal service and khaki A dr ianhelmets were still common amongst the artillery,service and reserve troops. The other ranks tunic wasa simple practical design which was further simplifiedlater when shirt cuffs were adopted. This f r u n t a ~wears the cotton summer tunic, bu t in winter awoollen tunic of the same cu t was worn. Withexposure to the sun and repeated washing thesummer tunic commonly bleached to a very paleshade whereas the woollen tunic and the woollentrousers worn in all seasons kept their colour well.

o l d a t i f r u n t a ~ j capO/ a/i and sergeanti all conscriptranks, had no collar patches, but all ranks above soldatwore their rank insignia on their shoulder straps.

T h i s f r u n t a ~ wears a yellow cotton slip-on band edgedin blue piping, the infantry colour. Su ch piping onthe other ranks insignia was a peacetime practice anddecreasingly c om mo n d ur in g t he war, bu t was the

only indication of their arm of service. So datdifferent arms could not be distinguished by insignA general order of 1939 stipulated that the arshould adopt straight khaki trousers tucked ileather anklets, as shown here. A further orderApril 94 decreed a return to breeches and putteso both types oflegging were to be seen in the campaign. However, by mid-1942 puttees were aguniversal.

T h e J r u n t a ~ is wearing the equipment specifiedan LM G gunner: pouches containing the aaircraft sight and accessories on the belt andmagazine case and a holstered Steyr M1912 9automatic pistol slung over his shoulders. Tgunner commonly stuffed extra magazines inbread bag, while his No 2 carried others and a spbarrel in a rucksack. The universal issue canvas brbag was slung over the left shoulder with the standdark green enamel mess tin fastened to its flap bweb strap. The olive green canvas bag for the M1or M1939 gas mask was slung over the right shoulAn enamel canteen covered in khaki felt was suspded by a clip from the waist belt over the left hifront of the gas mask. Slung diagonally over his rshoulder is a rolled sheet which formed half of a tma n tent, and could be tied with cord at the necform an improvised rain cape. A blanket was ofrolled within it. The m ai n weapon carried islicence-manufactured ZB30 7.92mm LMG whwas the standard section weapon throughout the and entered British service in modified form asBren gun). He also carries the ZB24 rifle bayonethis right hip and the standard Inemann pattentrenching tool on the left.

B2: Locotenant IOth Infantry Division sumer I943This officer is the commander of a platoon inKuban bridgehead. The bonela very Frenchstyle, was adopted in July 1940 and was intendereplace the traditional cape/a field cap. By regation, officers bore rank devices in gold braid chrons on the boneta s front which were similar to thworn on the shoulder straps, bu t i t was known forshoulder insignia to be sewn onto the left front ofboneta as here. Other ranks had a plain bonetacoarser material. In April 94 the restoration ofcape/a was ordered bu t i t only supplanted the bo


27/48

in 1943. The weapon carried s the Romanian OritaM41 mmSMG which entered service in 1943. TheRomanians entered the war without an SMG and theOrita was the local solution. It was a comparativelywell-made and advanced weapon of its type, and by1944 was the most common SMG in the army. Thepistol is the officer s s ta nda rd issue Beretta M1934

9mm automatic.B3: Locotenant Colonel 7th Mountain Rif leBattalion I942The Mountain Rifles wore khaki Cha sse ur Alpinstyle berets. Officially the officer s beret bore an ovalrifle green patch bearing an embroidered hunt inghorn like the Rifle Regiments but with an additionalpi ne needle cluster at its centre. However, oncampaign regimental officers tended to wear only thepineneedle cluster which formed the letters VMVanatori de Munte Mountain Rifles . Generals

added a central starburst badge to the beret, wjunior NCOs and so/dati wore plain berets. Tlocotenant colonel wears the M1941 officer s tuwith the M1920 ski specialist badge on his sleeAbove it is the German Crimea Shield; Romantroops were eligible for both this and the KuShield. Below it is a gold lace wound chevron. Aseen occasionally was the German Mountain Trooedelweiss badge, probably worn by officers of usubordinated to the German 49th Mountain Corpthe Caucasus. On his left chest he wears the OrdeMihai Viteazul 3rd class, an Iron Cross and theBattalion s badge. Most unit s had discarded sbadges in 1940 as they contained the discredited KCarol s monogram. The plus-four style trousputtees, white ankle socks and mountain boots wprescribed for all ranks, but officers often wstandard officer s boots. The pistol s the BerM1934

A caporal in winter tunicand carrying an OrifaSMG between two pnva te s SU 7UTIer tunICSwith ZBz4 ritle and ZB30LMG. All three areliberally supplied withMAN and Kyser grenades.These anTIS, most locallymade were th e typicalsection weaponry by 944

CI: Fruntas ISt CavalryBrigade; Odessa I9The cavalry tunic was the same s the Infantry sthe cavalry breeches were of khaki wool with rforced seats and inside legs. The rank insign


28/48

C2: Motociclist, ]rd i i l i i r a ~ i Regi17lent SU 17ler I942The Romanian cavalry had historically been dividinto regular o ~ i o r i regiments and territorial i l a rRegiments. By the outbreak of war the only signcant difference was in their titles. The i l a rregiments had traditionally accepted volunteers wtheir own horses a nd in 1940 this was extendedinclude motorcyclists with their own machine o2S CC or sidecar combination over 600cc; thiscouraged a more skilled and better motivated recruMotorcycle volunteers were awarded their obadge seen here on the left breast. The uniform wessentially that of the cavalry. The only additioequipment appears have been a pair of goggOfficers and warrant officers of motorised troshould have worn grey collar patches but many innewly motorised cavalry regiments preferredr etain t heir c her ry -r ed cavalry patches. The b

yellow braid bar is on a khaki slip-on and of the morecommon unpiped variety. The cavalry wore kneelength black leather boots with spurs. At the top frontof the boot a small clip-on brass rosette was worn buton campaign these were usually removed. Themotorised cavalry regiments appear to have worn thecavalry boots without the redundant spurs. Howeverby t he last w in te r of the war many cavalrymen wereoperating on foot and infantry boots and puttees wereincreasingly common. The cavalry and artillery hadsaddlebags rather than back packs and wore a Y-yoketo support the belt. The Romanian yoke was ofnatural brown leather and the junction at t he backcould be either sewn or held together by a black metalring. German p at te rn yokes also e nt er ed service in1944. The cavalry carried the same ZB24 rifle as theinfantry but some units began the war with the oldMannlicher M1893 smm carbine. The carriage ofswords was no longer normal although in 94 manycavalrymen still sported the M1906 cavalry sword ashere. A Soviet report claims that a u ni t of 1st CavalryDivision attempted an unsuccessful sabre charge on2 November 1942.

MG34 teaIn September 944 The peaks thecapeIa left have beenpressed in. The numbertwo carries an Orifa SMG;

his helmet showsindications that theunpopular ex-King Caromonogram has beenscratched out.


29/48

-t


30/48

slip-on bearing a white zig-zag line distinguishedsecondary school graduates, special reserve officer or

ICO obligations. The weapon carried is th e oldMannlicher MI893 6.5mm carbine, shortly to bereplaced by the ZB24 rifle. Volunteers brought avariety of motorcycles, mostly of German makes; thearmy standardised on the BM W Type R35 motorcycle an d Zundapp KS600 sidecar combination. Thewhite square and U Uscat=land) number plateprefix were typical of all Army vehicles.

Motorcyclists were distributed to reconnaissancesquadrons in all divisions an d corps. In th e summerof 1942 a two-squadron reconnaissance group captured a Soviet divisional H Q, 3,100 troops, gunsand 4 tanks in sixteen days, illustrating whatRomanian troops could achieve given modern equipment and the opportunity.C : Plutonier Ist Armoured Division I943The khaki cotton overall was prescribed in September1940 forthewholearmytowearon fatigues. In practiceonly the technical bran ches seem to have receivedexamples, and they often wore it with a small civilianb ere t to keep their hair clean. Some wore their rankinsignia on this unofficial headgear. The reported useof Czech yellow-ochre overalls early in th e war is verypossible as th e bulk of Romanian tanks u nt il 1943were Czech. However, for the mo st part tank crewsseem to have worn MI939 infantry-style uniformsduring th e 1941 c am pa ig n an d th e MI941 infantrystyle uniform in subsequent campaigns. Their distinguishing feature was a black tank crew beret of th esame pattern as that worn by th e mountain troops.The silver tank corps beret badge represented aRenault FTI7. On th e left breast pocket is the silverMI920 tank driver s badge of a Renault 7 in a laurelwreath; it was no t worn by junior other ranks. Greycollar patches were wo rn by the mechanised units.Romanian senior CO s wore th e Sa m Browne waistbelt without th e diagonal shoulder strap. A n o rd er ofApril 1944 decreed a new tank crew uniform ofG erma n cut but th is does no t seem to have beenintroduced before Romania s defection to th e Allies.The two motorised Rifle Regiments of the ArmouredDivision wore the basic infantry uniform.Cavalry regulation kit issue throughout theuniform and horse war. The saddle bagsfurniture r7 October I94r. replaced the infantry sThis was to b e t he oRicial rucksack see Plate CrY

DI: Soldat I9th Infantry Division; BudapeI945The caciulii s inade quacie s had become apparduring winter 1942-43 and by 1944 a more suitawhite woollen cap based on the Russian fleece cap wbeing widely issued. It differed from the Russmodel, which usually had a round, flat crown, in tit fitted th e skull closely; this allowed the helmet toworn over it when th e ear flaps were down. Tgreatcoat is th e standard other ranks issue. Equment shortages were becoming acute at this time acaptured khaki Hungarian greatcoats and other itewere often worn. Obsolete Romanian equipment areappeared- in this case th e old 1939 pattern ankan d Austrian ammunition pouches. The practicetucking the entrenching tool into the waist belt wthe blade over the heart was recommended asimprovised shield. The rifle is the Czech 7.92mmM1924, a Mauser derivative, which entered servic1935. It was the standard infantry weapon throuou t the wa r a lt hou gh n ot yet in universal service1941. At h an d is a Pa nze rfa ust ; this German equment could have been from pre-August 1944 deeries or captured since.D2: Soldat Ist Mountain Division SevastaI942From 1941 the Mountain Rifles plus-fours wincreasingly replaced by ordinary infantry trousan d p uttees or the long trousers illustrated. Thelmet bears a broad white stripe down the reapplied to aid night deployments and artillery obsvers. The lightly equipped mountain troops wereissued with rucksacks and wore the same broleather yoke as th e cavalry. The water bottleG erma n. Mule s were th e basis of th e mo un ttroops mobility. Shown is the pack used in bo thcavalry an d mountain corps for the carriagesupport weapons. It bears the ZB54 MI937 HMwhich was the standard s uc h weapon in all ar msformed the secondary armament on Romania s Ran d R- 2 tanks. It entered British service as the Btank machine gun.D3: Soldat 25th Ski Battalion I942-43Ski training was widespread among the 24 mountbattalions of th e four mountain divisions, bu tindependent 25th and 26th Schiori Battalio


31/48

organised s the loth Mountain Rifle Group werethe only units exclusively trained and e qu ip pe d forsuch operations. Ski units were used in the CrimeaCaucasus and Carpathians a nd both battalionsformed part of the ad hoc I03rd Mountain Divisionin late 1944. The complete white snow suit appears tohave been exclusive to these units; some were quilted.The weapon is t he Beretta M34 SMG wrapped inwhite lint bandaging for camouflage.EI: Vamltor de Care IOth Infantry DivisionCrimea I943 44.Unlike the Germans the Roma nian inf antry did n othav a nti-tank rifles a nd h ad difficulty destroyingeven the lightest Soviet tanks. FurthermoreRomania s light anti-tank guns were chronicallyinadequate against Soviet medium and heavy tanks.A capitan and NCOs the thCavalry Brigade afterreceiving the Iron Cross:Crimea 7January I94 2 .

This led to the creation of special two-man tdestroyer teams throughout the infantry and cavaUntil the introduction of the Panzerfaust in 1944means at their disposal were limited and usur equ ir ed the team leader to reach or mount the taRegulations therefore required that they discardaccoutrements likely to restrict movement; howethe wearing of a helmet was compulsory. Picked min each unit were selected for this role and their ractivity was recognised by the special tank destroybadge seen on the left sleeve. The team leader caronly an automatic pistol for personal protection.was covered by his NO 2 who carried an SMAmongst the more practical options open to himto de ton ate a cluster of German stick grenadesrecognised weak point on the tank. On the M1tent sheet can be seen its neck-draw string Moffensive and fragmentation grenades two CIsmoke sticks a MAN mine carrying handledetona tors a nd thr ee Czech Kyse r G -3 4 grenaThe J.D. disc is Romanian.


32/48

resistance on the vital airfields around BucharThis pre empted their seizure by the German Brdenburg Regiment, which lost an entire battalionfour giant Me323s shot down attempting airlandinHowever, shortly afterwards the battalion was adentally bombed by US aircraft and suffered hecasualties. The unit was dissolved in February 19by which time 1,300 paratroops had been trained.

This figure wears the uniform of the August 1fighting. The sidecap is standard Air Force offissue; a small black beret was also worn. P

osprey, men-at-arms #246 the romanian of army world war 2 (1991) ocr 8.12

Documents