ottoman empire 2

HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIREAND MODERN TURKEY

Volume II: Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Riseof Modern Turkey, 1808-1975

HISTORY OF THEOTTOMAN EMPIREAND MODERN TURKEYVolume II: Reform, Revolution, and Republic:The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975STANFORD J. SHAWProfessor of HistoryUniversity of California, Los Angeles

EZEL KURAL SHAWAssociate Research HistorianG.E. von Grunebaum Center for Near Eastern Studies,University of California, Los Angeles

CAMBRIDGEUNIVERSITY PRESS

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESSCambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, Sao Paulo

Cambridge University Press

The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 2RU, UK

Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York

www. Cambridge, orgInformation on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521214490 Cambridge University Press 1977

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exceptionand to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,no reproduction of any part may take place withoutthe written permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published 1977

Reprinted 1978, 1985, 1992, 1994, 1995, 1997,2002

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication dataShaw, Stanford Jay.History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey.Vol. 2 by S. J. Shaw and E. K. Shaw.Bibliography: p.Includes index.CONTENTS: v. 1. Empire of the Gazis : the rise and decline of the Ottoman Empire,1280-1808, v. 2. Reform, revolution, and republic: the rise of modern Turkey,1808-1975.1. Turkey - History - Ottoman Empire, 1288-1918.2. Turkey-History 1918-1960.3. Turkey-History- 1960- I. Shaw Ezel Kural. II. Title.DR440.S5 949.61 76-9179ISBN-13 978-0-521 -29166-8 paperbackISBN-10 0-521 -29166-6 paperback

Transferred to digital printing 2005

CONTENTS

List of Tables viPreface viiPreface to the second printing xList of Abbreviations xiNote on Pronunciation xxiMap of the Growth of the Ottoman Empire, 1280-1683 xxiiMap of the Decline of the Ottoman Empire, 1683-1975 xxiv

1 The Beginnings of Modern Ottoman Reform:The Era of Mahmut II, 1808-1839 1

2 The Era of Modern Reform: The Tanzimat, 1839-1876 553 Culmination of the Tanzimat: The Reign of Abdulhamit II, 1876-1909 1724 The Young Turk Period, 1908-1918 2725 The Turkish War for Independence, 1918-1923 3406 The Turkish Republic, 1923-1975 373

Appendix 438The Ottoman Grand Vezirs and Prime Ministers, 1839-1922 438Presidents of the Turkish Republic 440Prime Ministers of the Turkish Republic 440

Bibliography: History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey,1808-1975 441Index 467

TABLES

1.1 The Tanzimat Structure of Titles and Ranks 392.1 Offices Held by the Principal Men of the Tanzimat, 1839-1876 622.2 The Progress of Ottoman Education, 1867-1895 1122.3 Ottoman Students in 1895 1132.4 Refugees Entering the Empire, 1876-1896 1172.5 The Male Population of the Ottoman Empire, 1831-1906 1172.6 Imports and Exports in 1876 1223.1 The Armenian Population of the Six Provinces, 1882 2013.2 The Armenian Population of Major Kazas in Eastern Anatolia, 1882 2013.3 The Armenian Population of the Ottoman Empire, 1882-1914 2053.4 The Population of Macedonia, 1882-1906 2083.5 Changes in Ottoman Departmental Budgets Between 1880 and 1907 2253.6 The Budget of the Ottoman Empire Under Sultan Abdulhamit II, 1877-

1907 2263.7 The Major Ottoman Crops in 1909 2343.8 The Major Ottoman Exports in 1897 2373.9 The Major Ottoman Imports in 1897 2373.10 The Ottoman Trade Balance, 1878-1912 2383.11 Composition of the Ottoman Population in 1897 2393.12 Ottoman Population by Religion, 1884-1897 2403.13 Ottoman Population by Religion in 1906 and 1914 2413.14 The Religious Make-up of Istanbul, 1844-1886 2423.15 The Occupational Make-up of Istanbul's Population in 1886 2444.1 Ottoman Revenues and Expenditures, 1908-1911 2866.1 Turkish Assembly Election Results, 1950-1973: The Major Parties 4066.2 The Senate Results, 1961-1968 421

VI

PREFACE

During the nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire witnessed a sustained effort ofreform that saw the long-preserved and honored institutions of the classical Otto-man state replaced by new ones, inspired by an increasing knowledge of Europeanthought, society, and government and modified to satisfy Ottoman needs and con-ditions. In the process the scope of government was extended far beyond the limitsimposed by the traditional Ottoman way into every aspect of life, overwhelming theautonomous religious, economic, and social groups that had survived for so long asthe substrata of Ottoman society. A new, modern, westernized ruling bureaucracyreplaced the old Ruling Class, extended its power throughout the empire, andcreated a highly complex system of government that ruled with an autocracy un-matched in traditional times.

The era of modern Ottoman reforms began in the last decade of the reign ofSultan Mahmut II (1808-1839), who laid the foundations for what followed. Hiswork was extended and at least partially completed during the Tanzimat reformperiod, which encompassed the reigns of his sons Abdulmecit I (1839-1861) andAbdulaziz (1861-1876), and it was carried out by the reformist bureaucracy of theMen of the Tanzimat, led by able statesmen such as Mustafa Reit Paa, Ali Paa,and Fuat Paa.

Reform in the Ottoman Empire was a complex process; each solution created newproblems. The application of new laws and practices was slowed for a number ofreasons. First of all, the empire remained very large, with a heterogeneous societyand relatively poor communications. Second, the inexperience of the reformers andthe greed of the imperial powers of Europe for profits at the expense of the rela-tively undeveloped empire and its people perpetuated and deepened a series ofeconomic problems inherited from the past. Third, demands for social and politicalreforms, themselves consequences of the Tanzimat, conflicted with the desire of itsleaders to modernize as rapidly and efficiently as possible, without the delays andcompromises inherent in any democratic system. Fourth, nationalistic elementsamong the subject minorities, nourished and sustained by Russia and, to a lesserextent, the other Western powers, demanded autonomy or independence from theempire and dramatized their ambitions with sporadic terrorism within the Ottomandominions and with anti-Muslim propaganda in Europe and America. Finally, thegreat powers, though held back from breaking up and partitioning the empire bytheir concern to preserve the European balance of power, intervened in internalOttoman affairs to secure political and economic advantages for themselves. Whilethe Ottoman reformers adjusted themselves and their programs as much as possibleto meet these and other challenges, they lacked the knowledge, experience, andstrength needed to solve them within the relatively short time left by their enemies.

Though the Tanzimat reforms were accompanied by an extension of the principleof representative government, ironically they culminated in the sovereign autocracy

vii

viii Prefaceof Abdulhamit II (1876-1909), who brought them to full realization. After a briefperiod of democracy following his deposition, there was a return to autocracy lednot by his successors but rather by the leaders of the Young Turk regime (1908-1918), who continued the reforms in many areas while dragging an unpreparedempire into the quagmire of World War I, where devastation and defeat led to itsultimate dissolution. Well meant but not always well executed, frustrated by manyproblems not of its own making as well as many that were, the Ottoman reformbrought the empire closer to contemporary European society and institutions butfailed to preserve it. The foundations had been laid, however, for the Republic ofTurkey, which rose on the ruins of the empire under the leadership of MustafaKemal Atatiirk (1923-1938) and his successors.

The story of modern Ottoman and Turkish history has been told many times, butusually on the basis of European source materials and in the context of Europeanambitions and prejudices. It has only been in recent years that a beginning has beenmade in telling the story on the basis of Turkish sources. It is the object of thiswork to bring together the Western and Turkish sources, adding the results of theauthors' research in the Ottoman archives and libraries and presenting the story inits own context.

We would like to pay tribute to the small band of pioneering scholars who havebegun this work since the end of World War II: Omer Liitfi Barkan, of the Uni-versity of Istanbul, Cavit Baysun, of the University of Ankara, Niyazi Berkes, ofMcGill University, Roderic Davison, of George Washington University, HalilInalcik, of the University of Chicago, Kemal Karpat, of the University of Wis-consin, Enver Ziya Karal, of the University of Ankara, Erciiment Kuran, ofHacettepe University, Ankara, Barnard Lewis, of Princeton University, erifMardin, of the Bosporus University, Istanbul, Lewis V. Thomas, of PrincetonUniversity, and Ismail Hakki Uzunc,arih, of Istanbul. We also would like toexpress our particular gratitude to Midhat Sertoglu, Turgut Iiksal, and RaufTuncay, of the Basjbakanhk Archives, Istanbul; and to the directors and staffs of theTopkapi Palace Archives and Library, the Istanbul University Library, the IstanbulMunicipal Library, the Istanbul Archaeological Museum Library, the Hakki TankUs Library, the Suleymaniye Library, and the Bayezit General Library, Istanbul;the Turkish National Library and the Library of the Turkish Historical Society inAnkara; the British Museum, Public Record Office, and Commonwealth RelationsOffice, London; the Bodleian Library, Oxford; the Cambridge University Library;the Quai d'Orsay Archives, Archives Nationales, Archives of the Ministry of War,Chateau de Vincennes and Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris; the Haus-, Hof- undStaatsarchiv and National Library, Vienna; the Harry Elkins Widener Library,Harvard University; the Firestone Library, Princeton University; and the Uni-versity Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles, without whosehelp the research for this work could never have been completed. We would liketo pay particular tribute to two scholars of European diplomatic history whose lackof prejudice and search for truth regarding the Turks have stimulated our ownwork: William L. Langer, of Harvard University, and Leften Stavrianos, of North-western University. Finally, we are grateful to the very competent and cooperativestaff of the Cambridge University Press American office in New York, and inparticular to Colin Jones, Rhona Johnson, Claire Komnick, and Richard Hollick,who have assisted us with great patience and dedication in producing this work.

The study of Ottoman history involves unusually complicated problems regardingtransliteration and place names. Ottoman Turkish was written in the Arabic script,

Preface ixand its transliteration into Western characters has varied widely according to thelanguage of the transliterators. Thus the sound rendered " j " in English has beenpresented as "dj" in French and "c" in modern Turkish. The names given indi-vidual cities and even entire provinces have also varied by language; thus Istanbul,Izmir, and Edirne in Turkish have remained Constantinople, Smyrna, andAdrianople in most Western languages. For purposes of consistency and accuracy,in this work the modern Turkish spellings and place names have been used, with,only a few modifications when they have become particularly accepted in English,or are renderings of Arabic or Persian phrases. Ottoman dates are rendered intotheir European equivalents for book citations only when the original calendar inuse is given or can be deduced from internal evidence. The Arabic article al- istransliterated according to the most common modern Turkish usage for each wordbut here, as in other respects, modern Turkish orthography is not consistent andhas changed over time.

S T A N F O R D J . S H A WE Z E L R U R A L S H A W

Los Angeles, CaliforniaJanuary 1977

PREFACE TO THE SECOND PRINTING

This second printing of Reform, Revolution, and Republic has provided an opportunityto incorporate many useful comments and to correct a number of errors.

We also have noted communications from Armenians who contend that we have failedto sufficiently take into account their situation in the Ottoman Empire and, in particu-lar, their sufferings in the last half-century of the Empire, and that this was the resultof overemphasis in the use of Ottoman sources.

We make no apology for using Ottoman sources for a history of the Ottoman Em-pire. For too long the Ottomans have been studied without the use of any of theirsources, resulting in serious distortion and error. No history of France would be con-sidered methodologically sound and balanced if it were written on the basis of Englishand Italian observations. At the same time, however, we have made use of a mass ofrelevant non-Ottoman materials, as is evident in the Bibliography.

No one denies, or seeks to deny, that the Armenian people suffered terribly duringthe last years of the Ottoman Empire. We do make this clear, but in the context ofOttoman history. What may be overlooked is that the experience of the Armenians,however terrible it undoubtedly was, was not unique to them. It was part of a generaltragedy that engulfed all the people of the Empire - Turks, Greeks, Armenians, Arabs,Jews, and others, all of whom have traumatic memories of the period. This was theterrible result of the final breakup of a multinational society as the result of a wholeseries of brutal and destructive foreign invasions, terroristic attacks, national revolts,massacres and counter massacres, and famine and disease, in which all the Empire'speople, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, had their victims and criminals. We appreciate,understand, and sympathize with the sensitivity of the Armenians and others on thisissue. But it is to the interest of all concerned that all sources be examined withoutpreconceptions or prejudice. As additional research uncovers new information, it is in-evitable that this and other books on the subject will be modified. Only through con-sultation of all relevant records by different researchers, each giving his own differentialweight to the sources at his disposal to present his interpretation, will a definitive pic-ture emerge. The many facets of truth will appear only when the inquiring mind ofthe reader examines all the interpretations and reaches its own conclusions.

S T A N F O R D J . S H A WE Z E L K U R A L S H A W

G. E. von Grunebaum Center for Near Eastern StudiesUniversity of California, Los Angeles

ABBREVIATIONS

Ahmad

Ahmet Midhat

Allen and Muratoff

Arapyan

Aristarchi

Asim

Ata

Ataturk Soylev

Ataturk TTB

Atasagun

Bayar

Bayur, Kdmil Pasa

Bayur, Turk InkildbtTarihi

Berkes

Biyikhoglu, AtaturkAnadoluda

BVA

Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks: The Committeeof Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914, Oxford, 1969.Ahmet Midhat, Ziibdet el-hakayik, Istanbul, 1295/1878.W. E. D. Allen and Paul Muratoff, CaucasianBattlefields: A History of the Wars on the Tutco-Caucasian Border, 1828-1921, Cambridge, 1953.Kalost Arapyan, Rusquk dydm Mustafa Pasa'nxnhayatx ve kahramanhklan, tr. Esat Uras, Ankara,1943.G. Aristarchi Bey, Legislation ottomane, ou recueildes lois, reglements, ordonnances, traites, capitula-tions, et autres documents officiels de I'EmpireOttoman, 7 vols., Constantinople, 1873-1888Ahmet Asim Efendi, Tarih-i Asxm, 2 vols., Istan-bul, n.d.Tayyarzade Ahmet Ata, Tarih-i Ata, 5 vols.,Istanbul, 1292-3/1875-6.Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Ataturk'un Soylev veDemeqleri, 4 vols., Ankara, 1945-1964.Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Ataturk'un Tamim,Telgraf ve Beyannameleri, Ankara, 1964 (vol. IVof the preceding entry).Y. S. Atasagun, Turkiye Cumhuriyeti ZiraatBankasx, 1888-1939, Istanbul, 1939.Celal Bayar, Ben De Yazdxm, 8 vols., Istanbul,1965-1972.Hilmi Kamil Bayur, Sadrazam Kdmil Pasa-Siyasi Hayatx, Ankara, 1954.Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, Turk Inkildbx Tarihi,3 vols., in 10 parts, Ankara, 1940-1967.Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularismin Turkey, Montreal, 1964.Tevfik Biyikhoglu, Ataturk Anadolu'da (1919-1921)

11, Ankara, 1959.Basvekdlet ArsivL Prime Minister's Archives,Istanbul. For more information see S. J. Shaw,

xii Abbreviations

Cebesoy, Hdttralar

Cebesoy, Siyasihdttralart

Cemal Pas_a, Hattrat

Cevat

Cevdet1

Cevdet2

Cevdet Askeri

Cevdet Dahiliye

Cevdet Maliye

Cevdet, "Maruzat"

"Ottoman Archival Materials for the Nineteenthand Early Twentieth Centuries: The Archives ofIstanbul," IJMES, 6 (1975), 94-114. Collectionsconsulted and cited: Bab-i Ali Evrak Odasi;Buyuruldu; Cevdet Askeri; Cevdet Dahiliye;Cevdet Maliye; Irade, Meclis-i Mahsus; Irade,Meclis-i Vala; Irade, Dahiliye; Kanun-u Kale-miye; Maliyeden Miidevvere; Meclis-i Tanzimat;Mesail-i Muhimme; Tekilat-i Devair; and Yildiz.Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Milli Mucadele hdttralart, I,Istanbul, 1953.Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Gnrl. Ali Fuat Cebesoy'unsiyasi hdhralan, 2 vols., Istanbul, 1957-1960.Cemal Paa, Hdttrat, 1913-1922, Istanbul, 1922(published also as Djemal Pasha, Memoires of aTurkish Statesman, 1913-1919, New York, 1922,and as Cemal Paa, Hattralar, Istanbul, 1959).Ahmet Cevat, Tarih-i Askeri-i Osmani, I-Yenigeriler, Istanbul, 1297/1880; Fr. tr. byG. Macrides, Etat Militaire Ottoman depuis laFondation de Vempire jusqu'a nos jours; TomeI Livre I: Le Corps des Janissaires, Constan-tinople, 1882. Vol. II, books 2 and 3, on Selim Ill'smilitary reforms, are in manuscript TY 4178 ofthe Istanbul University Library; vol. II, book 4,on Mahmut IPs military reforms, and vol. I l l ,book 5, on those from Abdulmecit to Abdulhamit II,are in manuscript TY 6127 in the same li-brary.Ahmet Cevdet, Tarih-i Cevdet, 1st ed., 12 vols.,Istanbul, 1270-1301/1854-1883.Ahmet Cevdet, Tarih-i Cevdet: Tertib-i Cedit,2nd rev. ed., 12 vols., Istanbul, 1302-1309/1884-1891.Collection of documents on military affairs in theBVA.Collection of documents on internal affairs inBVA.Collection of documents on financial affairs inBVA.Ahmet Cevdet, "Cevdet Paa'mn maruzati,"TTEM, 14, no. 1 (78), 1 Kanunusani 1340/1924,pp. 52-57, no. 2 (79), 1 Mart 1340/1924, pp. 109-120, no. 3 (80), 1 Mayis 1340/1924, pp. 186-192,no. 5 (82), 1 Eyliil 1340/1924, pp. 300-306, 15,no. 7 (84), 1 Kanunusani 1341/1925, pp. 55-72,no. 10 (87), 1 Temmuz 1341/1925, pp. 269-292,no. 11 (88), Eylul 1341/1925, pp. 336-56, no. 12(89), 1 Terinisani 1341/1925, pp. 402-414, 16,no. 14 (91), 1 Mart 1926, pp. 117-132, no. 15

Cevdet, Tezakir

D

Danimend

Davison

Der Saadet Nilfus

Devereux

Dodd

Diistur1

Diistur2

Diistur*

Diistur*

Diistur5

Du Velay

E

Edib, Memoirs

Edib, Turkish OrdealEdib, Turkey Faces WestEl 1

El 2

Abbreviations xiii(92), 1 Mayis, 1926, pp. 165-190, no. 16 (93),1 Temmuz 1926, pp. 220-233.Ahmet Cevdet, Tezakir, ed. Cavid Baysun, 4 vols.,Ankara, 1953-1967.Defter. Collection of registers in archives of theTopkapi Palace Museum, Istanbul.Ismail Hami Danimend, Isahlt Osmanlt TarihiKronolojisi, 4 vols., Istanbul, 1947-1961; repr. in5 vols., Istanbul, 1971-1972.Roderic Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire,1856-1876, Princeton, 1963.Bab-i AH, Nezaret-i Umur-u Dahiliye, Sicil-iNiifus Idare-i Umumiyesi, Ba-Irade-i Senniye-iCenab-% Padisahi icra olunan tahrir-i sabtk yokla-masx mucibince der saadet ve bilad-% selesedemevcut niifusun istatistik cetvelidir, Istanbul,1302/1886-7.R. Devereux, The First Ottoman ConstitutionalPeriod: A Study of the Midhat Constitution andParliament, Baltimore, 1963.C. H. Dodd, Politics and Government in Turkey,Manchester, England, 1969.Diistur, vol. I, Istanbul, 1863, repr. 1865, 1872;vol. II, Istanbul 1873; vol. I l l , Istanbul, 1876;vol. IV, Istanbul, 1879. Diistur Zeyil, 4 vols.,Istanbul, 1879-1884, Diistur Birinci Tertib, vols.IV-VIII, Ankara, 1937-1943. (Ottoman laws,1883-1908).Diistur: Tertib-i Sani, 11 vols., Istanbul, 1329/1911-28 (Ottoman laws, 1908-1922).Diistur: Tertib-i Salis, 41 vols., Ankara, 1921-1971 (Laws of the First Turkish Republic, 1920-1970).Diistur: Dordiincii Tertib, 3 vols. Ankara, 1961(Laws issued by the National Unity Committee in1960 and 1961).Diistur: Besinci Tertib, Laws issued by theSecond Turkish Republic, Ankara, 1961 to date.A. Du Velay, Essai sur VHistoire Financiere dela Turquie, Paris, 1903.Evrak. Document collections of the TopkapiPalace Museum, Istanbul.Halide Edib, The Memoirs of Halide Edib, Lon-don, 1926.Halide Edib, The Turkish Ordeal, London, 1928.Halide Edib, Turkey Faces West, London, 1936.The Encyclopaedia of Islam, Leiden, 1913-1938.The Encyclopaedia of Islam: New Edition,Leiden, 1954 to date.

xiv AbbreviationsErgin, Belediye

Ergin, Maarif

Esat, Tarih

Esat, Zafer

Farhi

Fatma Aliye, AhmetCevdet

FO

Gologlu, ErzurumKongresi

Gologlu, Sivas KongresiGologlu, Uqiincu

MesrutiyetGologlu, Cumhuriyete

dogruGologlu, Cumhuriyet

Gologlu, Devrimler

Gologlu, Tek Partili

Gokbilgin

Griffeths

Hershlag1

Hershlag2

Hershlag, Challenge

Osman Ergin, Mecelle-i Umur-u Belediye, 5 vols.,Istanbul, 1914-1922.Osman Ergin, Turkiye Maarif Tarihi, 5 vols.,Istanbul, 1939-1943.Mehmet Esat Efendi, Tarih-i Esat Efendi, 2 vols.,manuscript in Istanbul University Library,TY6002, TY6003, TY6004 and TY6005; vol. Ialso in Siileymaniye Library, Istanbul, EsatEfendi collection Y2084. References in this workfor vol. I are to the Siileymaniye Library copy;and for vol. II are to the Istanbul University Li-brary copy.Mehmet Esat Efendi, Uss-u Zafer, Istanbul, 1243/1827, 2nd ed., 1293/1876; Fr. tr. by Caussin dePerceval, Precis historique de la destruction ducorps des janissaires par le Sultan Mahmoud en1826, Paris, 1833.David Farhi, "T*he eriat as a Political Slogan-or the 'Incident of the 31st Mart/" MiddleEastern Studies, 7 (1971), 275-316.Fatma Aliye, Cevdet Pasa ve Zamam, Istanbul,1332/1914.Foreign Office Archives, Public Record Office,London.Mahmut Gologlu, Erzurum Kongresi, Ankara,1968.Mahmut Gologlu, Sivas Kongresi, Ankara, 1969.Mahmut Gologlu, Oguncii Mesrutiyet, 1920,Ankara, 1970.Mahmut Gologlu, Cumhuriyete Dogru, 1921-1922,Ankara, 1971.Mahmut Gologlu, Turkiye Cumhuriyeti, 1923,Ankara, 1971.Mahmut Gologlu, Devrimler ve Tepkileri, 1924-1930, Ankara, 1972.Mahmut Gologlu, Tek Partili Cumhuriyet, 1931-1938, Ankara, 1974.M. Tayyip Gokbilgin, RumeWde Ydrukler, Tatar-lar ve Evlad-i Fatihan. Istanbul, 1957.M. A. Griffeths, "The Reorganization of the Otto-man Army Under Abdiilhamid II, 1880-1897,"unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University ofCalifornia, Los Angeles, 1966.Z. Y. Hershlag, Turkey: An Economy in Transi-tion, The Hague, 1968.Z. Y. Hershlag, Introduction to the ModernEconomic History of the Middle East, Leiden,1964.Z. Y. Hershlag, Turkey: The Challenge ofGrowth, Leiden, 1968.

Heyd, Foundations

Heyd, Revival

Heyd, "Ulema"

Hovannisian, Republicof Armenia

Hovannisian, Roadto Independence

HTVD

Hurewitz, Diplomacy1

Hurewitz, Diplomacy2

IA

Ihsaiyat-% Maliye

IJMES

Inal

Inalcik, "Sened"

Inalcik, "Tanzimat'inuygulanmasi"

Inalcik, Tanzimat veBulgar

Istatistik-i Umumi

IY

Juchereau, Histoire

Abbreviations xvUriel Heyd, Foundations of Turkish Nationalism:The Life and Teachings of Ziya Gokalp, London,1950.Uriel Heyd, Revival of Islam in Modern Turkey,Jerusalem, 1968.Uriel Heyd, "The Ottoman Ulema and Westerni-zation in the Time of Selim III and Mahmud II,"Scripta Hierosalymitana, IX (Jerusalem, 1961),63-96.Richard G. Hovannisian, The Republic of Ar-menia, vol. I., The First Year, 1918-1919, Berkeleyand Los Angeles, 1971.Richard G. Hovannisian, Armenia on the Road toIndependence, 1918, Berkeley and Los Angeles,1967.T. C. Genelkurmay Bakanhgi Harp TarihiDairesi, Harp Tarihi Vesikalan Dergisi, Ankara,18 vols., 68 issues, 1510 documents, 1951-1969.J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Mid-dle East: A Documentary Record,'2 vols., Prince-ton, N.J., 1956.J. C. Hurewitz, The Middle East and NorthAfrica in World Politics: A Documentary Record.Second Edition, Revised and Enlarged. Volume I,European Expansion, 1535-1914, New Haven,Conn., 1975.T. C. Maarif Vekaleti, Islam Ansiklopedisi,Istanbul and Ankara, 1940 to date.Devlet-i Aliye-i Osmaniye, Maliye Nezareti,Ihsaiyat-% Maliye. Varidat ve Masarif-i Umumi-yeyi Muhtevidir, 3 vols., Istanbul, 1327-30/1911-4.International Journal of Middle East Studies,vol.1 (1970) to date.Ibnulemin Mahmut Kemal Inal, Osmanh DevrindeSon Sadnazamlar, 6 vols. in 14 parts, Istanbul,1940-1953.Halil Inalcik, "Sened-i Ittifak ve Giilhane Hatt-iHiimayunu," Belleten, 28 (1964), 603-622.Halil Inalcik, "Tanzimat'in uygulanmasi ve sosyaltepkileri," Belleten, 28 (1964), 623-690.Halil Inalcik, Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi,Ankara, 1943.Devlet-i Osmaniye, Nezaret i Umur-u Ticaret veNafia, Istatistik-i Umumi Idaresi, Dcvlet-i Aliye-iOsmaniyenin Bin Vgyuz Onug Senesine MahsusIstatistik-i Umumisidir, Istanbul, 1316/1898.T. C. Devlet Istatistik Enstitiisu, Turkiye IstatistikYiUtgt.A. Juchereau de St. Denys, Histoire de VEmpire

xvi Abbreviations

Juchereau, Revolutions

Kamil Paa

Kansu

Karabekir

Karabekir, Enver Pasa

Karabekir, Esaslar

Karal, OT

Karpat, Social Change

Karpat, "Social Themes"

Karpat, Social Thought

Karpat, "Society"

Karpat, Turkey's Politics

Kaynar

Kili, ConstitutionalDevelopments

Kili, KemalismKihc, Ali, Istikldl Mahkemesi

Landau

Langer, Diplomacy ofImperialism

Levy

Lewis

Lewis, "Baladiyya"Liitfi

Ottoman dcpuis 1792 jusqu'en 1844, 4 vols., Paris,1844.A. Juchereau de St. Denys, Les Revolutions deConstantinople en 1807-1808, 2 vols., Paris, 1819.Kamil Paa, Tarih-i siyasi. Devlet-i Aliye-iOsmaniye, 3 vols., Istanbul, 1325-7/1907-9.Mazhar Miifit Kansu, Erzurum'dan bliimunekadar Atatiirk'le beraber, I, Ankara, 1966.Kazim Karabekir, Istikldl Harbimiz, I, Istanbul,1960.Kazim Karabekir, Istikldl Harbimizde EnverPasa ve Ittihat ve Terakki Erkdm, Istanbul, 1967.Kazim Karabekir, Istikldl Harbimizin esaslan,Istanbul, 1951.Enver Ziya Karal, Osmanh Tarihi, vols. V-VIII,Ankara, 1952-1962.Kemal Karpat, Social Change and Politics inTurkey: A Structural-Historical Analysis, Leiden,1973.Kemal Karpat, "Social Themes in ContemporaryTurkish Literature," Middle East Journal, 14(1960), 29-44, 153-168.Kemal Karpat, Political and Social Thought inthe Contemporary Middle East, London, 1968.Kemal Karpat, "Society, Economics and Politicsin Contemporary Turkey," World Politics, 17(1964), 50-74.Kemal Karpat, Turkey's Politics: The Transitionto a Multi-Party System, Princeton, N.J., 1959.Reat Kaynar, Mustafa Resit Pasa ve Tanzimat,Ankara, 1954.Suna Kili, Turkish Constitutional Developmentsand Assembly Debates on the Constitutions of1924 and 1961, Istanbul, 1971.Suna Kili, Kemalism, Istanbul, 1969.Kiliq Ali, Istikldl Mahkemesi hattralart, Istanbul,1955.Jacob M. Landau, Radical Politics in ModernTurkey, Leiden, 1974.William L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperial-ism, New York, 1956.Avigdor Levy, "The Military Policy of SultanMahmud II, 1808-1839," unpublished Ph.D. dis-sertation, Harvard University, 1968.Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Tur-key, London and New York, 1961, 2nd ed., 1968.Bernard Lewis, "Baladiyya," El2, I, 972-975.Ahmet Liitfi, Tarih-i Liitfi, vols. I-VIII, Istanbul,1290-1328/1873-1910; vols. IX-XIII, coveringthe years 1846-1876, are found only in manuscript

Mahmut Celaleddin,Mirat-% Hakikat

Mears

MEJ

Midhat, Mirat-% hayret

Midhat, Tabsira-i ibret

Miller

Mondros Mutarekesi

Muahedat Mecmuast

Mufassal Osmanlt Tarihi

Miihlmann

Muhtar, Rusya Seferi

Niyazi

Noradounghian

NUCNutuk

Orhonlu, "Kaldinmcilik"

Orhonlu, "Kayikqilik"

Abbreviations xviiform at the Turkish Historical Society, Ankara,MS 531/1-7, 5032-4, and 4812, and at the IstanbulArchaeological Museum, MS 1340-1345, 1349.Mahmut Celaleddin, Mirat-% Hakikat. Tarih-iMahmut Celaleddin Pasa, 3 vols. Istanbul,1326-7/1908.E. G. Mears, Modern Turkey: A Politico-Economic Interpretation with Selected Chaptersby Representative Authorities, New York, 1924.Middle East Journal, Washington, D.C., 1, (1947)to date.Midhat Paa, Mirat-% Hayret. Sultan AbdiilazizHan merhumunun esbab% hal'i, ed. Ali HaydarMidhat, Istanbul, 1325/1909 (vol. II of MidhatPaa's Memoirs).Midhat Paa, Tabsira-i ibret. Midhat Pasa. hayat%siyasiyesi, hidematx, menfa hayatx, ed. Ali HaydarPaa, Istanbul, 1325/1909 (vol. I of MidhatPaa's Memoirs).William Miller, The Ottoman Empire and ItsSuccessors, 1801-1927, London, repr. 1966.Tevfik Biyikhoglu, Turk Istiklal Harbi, Cilt I.Mondros Mutarekesi ve tatbikat%, Ankara, 1962.Muahedat Mecmuasx, 5 vols., Istanbul, 1294-98/1877-81.[Midhat Sertoglu], Resimli-Haritah MufassalOsmanli Tarihi, vol. V, Istanbul, 1962, andvol. VI, Istanbul, 1963.C. Miihlmann, Deutschland und die Tiirkei, 1913-1914, Berlin, 1929.Ahmet Muhtar Paa, 1244 (1828) Turkiye RusyaSeferi ve Edirne Muahedesi, 2 vols., Ankara,1928.Ahmet Niyazi, Hat%rat-% Niyazi yahut tarihqe-iInkildb-% kebir-i Osmaniyeden bir sahife, Istanbul,1326/1910.Gabriel Noradounghian, Recueil d'actes interna-tionaux de Vempire ottoman, 4 vols., Paris, 1897-1903.National Union Committee (for text discussion,refer to Index).Mustafa Kemal Atattirk, Nutuk, 3 vols., Ankara,1960-1961.Cengiz Orhonlu, "Mesleki bir teekkiil olarakkaldinmcilik ve Osmanli ehir yollari hakkmdabazi duiinceler," Guney-Dogu Avrupa Arast%r-malar% Dergisi, 1, (1972), 93-138.Cengiz Orhonlu, "Osmanli Turkleri devrindeIstanbulda kayikqihk ve kayik isjetmeciligi,"Tarih Dergisi, 16 (1966), 109-134.

xviii AbbreviationsOrhoniu, "Mimarlar"

Ozalp

Pakahn, Son Sadrdzamlar

Pakahn, Tanzimat Maliye

Pakahn, Tarih Deyimleri

Quataert

Reed

RG

Robinson, Developments

Robinson, Investment

Robinson, Republic

RPP

Sait Paa, Hdttrat

Salname

Schlechta-Wssehrd

Selek

Shaw, "ArchivalMaterials"

Shaw, Between Oldand New

Shaw, Empire ofthe Gazis

Shaw, "Established

Cengiz Orhoniu, "Osmanh tesjdlatinda hassamimarlar/' Tarih Arasttrmalart Dergisi, 1 (1963),157-202.Kazim Ozalp, Milli Mucadele, 1919-1922, 2 vols.,Ankara, 1971-1972.Mehmet Zeki Pakahn, Son Sadrdzamlar veBasvekiller, 5 vols., Istanbul, 1940-1948.Mehmet Zeki Pakahn, Tanzimat Maliye Naztrlan,2 vols., Istanbul, 1939-1940.Mehmet Zeki Pakahn, Osmanh tarih deyimleri veterimleri sozliigu, 3 vols., Istanbul, 1946-1955.Donald Quataert, "Ottoman Reform and Agri-culture in Anatolia, 1876-1908," unpublishedPh.D. dissertation, University of California, LosAngeles, 1973.Howard A. Reed, "The Destruction of the Janis-saries by Mahmud II in June 1826," unpublishedPh.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1951.Resmi Gazete. Official newspaper of the TurkishRepublic, Ankara, 1920 to date.Richard N. Robinson, Developments RespectingTurkey, 4 vols., New York, 1954-1957 (chro-nology of Turkish affairs, 1954-1957).(Richard N. Robinson), Investment in Turkey:Basic Information for United States Business-men, Washington, D.C. 1956.Richard N. Robinson, The First Turkish Re-public, Cambridge, Mass., 1963.Republican People's Party (for text discussion,refer to Index).Sait Paa, Sait Pasamn Hdttratt, Istanbul, 1328/1912.Salname-i Devlet-i Aliye-i Osmaniye, OfficialOttoman yearbooks.Ottokar von Schlechta-Wssehrd, Die Revolu-tionen in Constantino pel in den lahren 1807und 1808, Vienna, 1882.Sabahettin Selek, Milli Mucadele, AnadoluIhtildli, 2 vols., Ankara, 1963-1965.Stanford J. Shaw, "Ottoman Archival Materialsfor the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Cen-turies: The Archives of Istanbul," IJMES, 6(1975), 94-114.S. J. Shaw, Between Old and New: The Otto-man Empire Under Sultan Selim III, 1789-1807, Cambridge, Mass., 1971.S. J. Shaw, Empire of the Gazis: The Rise andDecline of the Ottoman Empire, 1280-1808, NewYork and London, 1976.S. J. Shaw, "The Established Ottoman Military

Corps"

Shaw, "Origins"

Shaw, "Origins ofRepresentative Government"

Shaw, "Ottoman LegislativeCouncils"

Shaw, "Ottoman Tax Reforms"

Shaw, "Promise of Reform"

Shaw, "Yildiz"

Shaw (E.K.), "Midhat Pasa"

Skendi

Soylemezoglu

Speech

Stavrianos

anizade

imir

Tanzimat

Tar, Ves.TBMM, Zabxt Ceridesi

Testa

A b breviations xixCorps Under Sultan Selim III," Der Islam, 40(1965), 142-184.S. J. Shaw, "The Origins of Ottoman MilitaryReform: The Nizam-i Cedid Army of SultanSelim III," Journal of Modern History, 37(1965), 291-306.S. J. Shaw, "The Origins of Representative Gov-ernment in the Ottoman Empire: An Introductionto the Provincial Councils, 1839-1876," NearEastern Round Table, 1967-1968, ed. R. B.Winder, New York, 1969, pp. 53-142.S. J. Shaw, "The Central Legislative Councils inthe Nineteenth Century Ottoman Reform Move-ment before 1876," IJMES, 1 (1970), 51-84.S. J. Shaw, "The Nineteenth Century OttomanTax Reforms and Revenue System," IJMES, 6(1975), 421-459.S. J. Shaw, "A Promise of Reform: Two Compli-mentary Documents," IJMES, 4 (1973), 359-365.S. J. Shaw, "The Yildiz Palace Archives ofAbdulhamit II," Archivum Ottomanicum, 3(1971), 211-237.Ezel Kural Shaw, "Midhat Paa, Reformer orRevolutionary?" unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,Harvard University, 1975.Stavro Skendi, The Albanian National Awaken-ing, 1878-1912, Princeton, 1967.Kemali Soylemezoglu, Basxmxza gelenler, Istanbul,1939.Mustafa Kemal, A Speech Delivered by GhaziMttstapha Kemal, President of the Turkish Re-public, October 1927, Leipzig, 1929.Leften Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, NewYork, 1958, 2nd ed., 1963.Mehmet Ataullah anizade,, Tarih-i anizade, 4vols., Istanbul, 1290-1/1873-4.Bilal N. imir, Ingiliz Belgelerinde Ataturk(1919-1938), Cilt I. Nisan 1919-Mart 1920. Ata-turk in British Documents (1919-1938), vol. I,April 1919-March 1920, Ankara, 1973.T. C. Maarif Vekaleti, Tanzimat, I (only volumepublished), Istanbul, 1940.Tarih Vesikalan, nos. 1-18, Ankara, 1943-1961.T. C. Tiirkiye Buyiik Millet Meclisi, Zabxt Ceri-desi, Ankara, 1921 to date.Baron Ignatz de Testa, et al., Recueil des traitesde la Porte ottoman avec les puissances etrangeresdepuis!536 . . . , 11 vols., Paris, 1864-1911.

xx AbbreviationsTevetoglu, Ataturkle

Samsuna QxkanlarTevetoglu, Tiirkiyede

SosyalistTKS

TOEM

Trumpener

TTEM

Tunaya

Turk Istikldl Harbi

TV

Uzunqarsjli, Alemdar

Uzunc,arih, Kapukulu

Uzunc,arih, Merkez

Uzunc,arih, Saray

Uzunc,arih, Yxldxz

Vakayi-i Enderun

Von Moltke, Bulgaria

Von Moltke, Zustdnde

Walsh, Residence

Weber

Webster

Weiker, PoliticalTutelage

Fethi Tevetoglu, Atatiirk'le Samsuna Qxkanlar,Ankara, 1971.Fethi Tevetoglu, Tiirkiye'de sosyalist ve komiinistfaaliyetleri, Ankara, 1967.Topkapi Saray 1 (Topkapi Palace) Archives andLibrary, Istanbul.Tarih-i Osmani Encumeni Mecmuast, 77 num-bers, Istanbul, 1326-38/1908-19.Ulrich Trumpener, Germany and the OttomanEmpire, 1914-1918, Princeton, N.J., 1968.Turk Tarih Encumeni Mecmuast (continuationof TOEM), nos. 78-101, Istanbul and Ankara,1921-1930.Tank Z. Tunaya, Tiirkiyede Siyasi Par tiler,1859-1952, Istanbul, 1952.Genelkurmay Bakanhgi Harp Tarihi Dairesi,Turk Istikldl Harbi, 6 vols., Ankara, 1962-1968.Takvim-i Vekayi, nos. 1-2119 (1831-1878), 1-283 (1890-1), 1-4608 (1908-1923).Ismail Hakki Uzunqarih, Meshur Rumeli Ayan-larxndan Tirsinikli Ismail, Ytltk oglu, SuleymanAgalar ve Alemdar Mustafa Pasa, Istanbul, 1942.Ismail Hakki Uzunqarih, Osmanlt DevletiTeskildtxndan Kapukulu Ocaklarx, 2 vols., An-kara, 1943-1944.Ismail Hakki Uzunqarih, Osmanlx DevletininMerkez ve Bahriye Teskildtx, Ankara, 1948.Ismail Hakki Uzunqarih, Osmanlx DevletininSaray Teskildtx, Ankara, 1945.Ismail Hakki Uzunc,arih, Midhat Pasa ve YxldxzMahkemesi, Ankara, 1967.Hizir Ilyas Efendi, Vakdyi-i Letdif-i Enderun,Istanbul, 1276/1859.Helmuth von Moltke, The Russians in Bulgariaand Rumelia in 1828 and 1829, London, 1854.Helmuth von Moltke, Briefe uber Zustdnde undBegebenheiten in der Tiirkei aus den lahren 1835bis 1839, Berlin, 1841.Robert Walsh, A Residence at Constantin-ople . . . , 2 vols., London, 1836.F. G. Weber, Eagles on the Crescent: Germany,Austria and the Diplomacy of the Turkish Alli-ance, 1914-1918, Ithaca, N.Y., 1970.D. E. Webster, The Turkey of Atatiirk: SocialProcess in The Turkish Reformation, Philadel-phia, Pa., 1939.Walter Weiker, Political Tutelage and Democ-racy in Turkey: The Free Party and Its After-math, Leiden, 1973.

Pronunciation xxiWeiker, Revolution Walter Weiker, The Turkish Revolution, 1960-

1961. Aspects of Military Politics, Washing-ton, D.C., 1963.

Yalman, Turkey Ahmet Emin Yalman, Turkey in My Time,Norman, Okla., 1956.

Yalman, World War Ahmet Emin (Yalman), Turkey in the WorldWar, New Haven and London, 1930.

Yalman, Yaktn Tarihte Ahmet Emin Yalman, Yakxn Tarihte Gordiiklerimve Geqirdiklerim, 4 vols., Istanbul, n.d.

Young George Young, Corps de droit ottoman; recueildes codes, lois, reglements, ordonnances et actesles plus importants du droit interieur et dyetudessur le droit coutumier de VEmpire ottoman,7 vols., Oxford, 1905-1906.

Zabtt Ceridesi Hakki Tank Us, Meclis-i Mebusan, 1293/1877Zabxt Ceridesi, 2 vols., Istanbul, 1940-1954.

NOTE ON PRONUNCIATION

The modern standard Turkish spelling system has been employed in this book withonly a few exceptions. The Latin letters used in this system are pronounced aboutthe same as their English equivalents, with the following exceptions:

Letterc

c.&I

j6

u

V

English pronunciationjchlengthens preceding vowel; thus aga is pronounced a-alike the a in serial or io in cushionzhlike the German 6shlike the German ulighter than English v

The modern Turkish tendency to change the final Ottoman letters d and b into tand p has been followed, thus Murat, Mahmut, and kitap, but these letters returnto d and b when followed by vowels, as Mahmudu and kitabt. Arabic terms used inOttoman Turkish have been given their Turkish pronunciations and spellings, thusmultezim and mutevelli rather than multazim and mutawalli.

QN TLvov(Lemberg)

^ Conquests of Siileymanthe Magnificent,nquests 1566-1683 1520"66

Ottoman Lands, 1359Ottoman Lands, 1451Conquests of Mehmet 11,1451-81 1521 Year of acquisitionConquests of Selim 1,1512-20 A Battle(including small gams ofBayezit ID Boundary of Ottoman Empire, 1683

THE RISE OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE.1280-1683 |3OE

SOl'ESQN

DALMATIto Venice 1699 -179to Austria 1797 41816lol 'a 'y '805-9

France 1809-16

C Y R E N A I C AOltoman Vassal unlil 1335Ottoman Province 1835-1912

I Losses 1683-I Losses 1700SLosses 17191 Losses 17753 Losses 1813-I Losses18303 Losses 1879'1 Losses 1916

99 (Treaty oIKarlonilz)18 (TreatyofPassarowitz)74 Treaty olKuqukKaynarca-1812 Treaty ol Bucharest29/30 Treaty ol Edirne-78 Treaty ol Berlin-1915 Treaties of London & (

Bucharest i-23 Treaty of Lausanne j

1 I Turkey in 1923l187ei Date or period of autonomyI U I Date of independence

Boundaries of spheres of influence inAnatolia after the 1914-18 WarBoundary after Treaty of Sevres 1920

- Boundary afterTreatyof Lausanne1923, miles , 300

1The Beginnings of Modern Ottoman Reform:The Era of Mahmut II, 1808-1839

On May 29, 1807, Sultan Selim III was deposed, the reformed Nizam-i Cedit armydisbanded, and his effort to modernize the Ottoman Empire momentarily blocked.Reaction again prevailed within the Ottoman Ruling Class. During the shortreign of his successor Mustafa IV (1807-1808), the Janissaries and their alliesattempted to eliminate all those who had dared oppose the old order. Yet this did nothappen. The supporters of Selim, those who had managed to survive, joined underthe leadership of the Danubian notable Bayraktar Mustafa Paa to rescue Selimand restore his reforms. Bayraktar brought his army to Istanbul, but before itcould break into the palace, Selim was assassinated. To realize their goal Bayrak-tar Mustafa and his supporters placed on the throne Selim's cousin Mahmut II(1808-1839), who had shared Selim's palace imprisonment and was known to holdmany of the same reforming ideas (July 28, 1808).*

Mahmut in time emerged as a far stronger and much more successful reformerthan Selim. But his was a very long reign, and it was only much later, in 1826, thathe was able to destroy the Janissary corps, thus depriving the conservatives oftheir military arm and setting Ottoman reform on a new course of destroying oldinstitutions and replacing them with new ones mainly imported from the West.

What made Mahmut II different from Selim III? They had been raised to-gether. They had received the same traditional palace education spiced with occa-sional information about the outside world and had had little opportunity to gainthe practical experience needed to transform their ideas into reality. But Mahmutwitnessed the results of Selim's weakness and indecision. He also saw how success-ful even the limited reforms instituted in the Nizam-i Cedit program had been.Early in his reign Mahmut seems to have realized that: (1) reforms, to be success-ful, had to encompass the entire scope of Ottoman institutions and society, not onlya few elements of the military; (2) the only way that reformed institutions couldoperate was through the destruction of the ones they were replacing, so that thelatter could not hinder their operation; and (3) the reforms had to be carefullyplanned and support assured before they were attempted. These considerationsemerge as the backbone of Mahmut's reform policy in subsequent years.

Bayraktar Mustafa Paa as Grand Vezir, July 28-November 15,1808Mahmut II started his reign under the domination of the man who had broughthim to power, Bayraktar Mustafa Paa, the first provincial notable ever to achievethe pinnacle of power in the Ottoman state. Bayraktar Mustafa himself was aproduct of the traditional Ottoman system, and his concept of reform was verymuch in the same mold. Although he had risen as a provincial notable, once in

1

2 The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975power he appears to have felt an identity of interests with the central government,at least to the extent of realizing that his own power in Bulgaria and that of hisfellows could continue only if the empire itself survived in the face of Russian ex-pansion. His first step was to eliminate the opponents of Selim's reforms. WithBayraktar Mustafa's army giving the reformers a kind of power that Selim neverhad, the rebellious soldiers were driven out and killed or sent into exile. Conserva-tives were removed from the institutions of the Ruling Class and replaced withmen willing to accept the new leadership and reforms.

The Document of AgreementBayraktar's rise demonstrated that the power of the provincial notables could notbe ignored. Their opposition had contributed to the destruction of the Ni2am-iCedit, and they might well have undermined reform again. Thus Bayraktar Mustafaattempted to use his prestige among them to get them to agree to reforms. Heinvited all the important notables to come to Istanbul for a general deliberation onthe problems of the empire. Perhaps no other leader at the time could have gottenthe highly independent and fractious notables to come, but he was able to do so.From Anatolia came the leaders of powerful dynasties such as the Karaosmanogluand Qapanoglu as well as Kadi Abdurrahman Paa, governor of Karaman and thestrongest notable supporter of Selim, who brought some 3000 soldiers trained in thenew way, perhaps as an example as well as a warning to all those assembled. Mostof the important notables of Rumeli also came. But there were exceptions. Ali Pas,aof Janina, who held much of Albania and northern Greece, sent only a small con-tingent of soldiers led by a representative. The smaller notables of Bulgaria, whowere Bayraktar Mustafa's rivals in that province, avoided a move that they fearedmight strengthen him at their expense. So also did Muhammad Ali, who was soonto make Egypt into the most powerful province of the empire and later to attackMahmut II on two occasions. The notables and governors of the more distant Araband Anatolian provinces were unable to travel the long distance to Istanbul in time,but they did in fact support any effort that would lessen the power of the provincialJanissary garrisons over them.2 After being received by the sultan at his summerresidence in Kagithane (September 29, 1808), the notables held a series of meet-ings to discuss Bayraktar Mustafa's proposed reforms, resulting finally in a Docu-ment of Agreement (Sened-i Ittifak) signed by all present on October 7, 1808.

The notables and provincial governors signing the document confirmed theirloyalty to the sultan and promised to recognize the grand vezir as his absoluterepresentative (articles 1 and 4). The Ottoman tax system was to be applied infull throughout the empire, in all their provinces, without any diversion of revenuesrightfully belonging to the sultan (article 3), and in return the sultan promised tolevy taxes justly and fairly (article 7). Because the empire's survival depended onthe strength of the army, the notables promised to cooperate in the recruitment ofmen in their provinces. The new army was to be organized "in accordance withthe system presented during the discussion" (article 2), of which no exact detailswere indicated. The notables were to rule justly in their own territories (article 5).They promised to respect each other's territory and autonomy, to act separatelyand collectively as guarantors for each other's fulfillment of the promises, and tosupport the central government against any opposition to its reforms, marchingto Istanbul whenever they heard of any uprising, without even wasting time tosecure the sultan's permission (article 6). The agreement thus included no specificprogram of military reform, but the entire drift of the discussion and the provisions

Beginnings of Modern Reform: The Era of Mahmut II, 1808-1839 3indicated that Selim's Nizam-% Cedit would be restored with the full support ofthose present. Some sources indicate that Bayraktar Mustafa also proposed reformsfor the older military corps, including an end to irregularities in appointments,requirements for unmarried members to live in the barracks and for all membersto accept discipline and training in order to receive their salaries, and even theuse of European-style weapons, but such plans did not appear in the documentitself.3

Some writers refer to the document as the "Magna Carta of the Ottomans," anagreement between the ruler and his notables that could serve as a written consti-tution. The attempts to delimit the powers of the sultan with respect to taxes andto establish a reciprocity of responsibilities and obligations as well as to make adistinction between the government and the sultan were, indeed, steps towardconstitutionalism. But the sultan, not wishing to limit his own sovereign power,avoided signing it, resenting in particular its confirmation of the rights andprivileges of the provincial notables and promises that he would govern justly. Andin the end only four of the notables signed. The remainder returned to theirhomes during the conference once they saw that they would have to limit their ownindependence by promising to help the government, to rule justly, and to keepeach other in line. Also, unlike the Magna Carta, the Document of Agreement was notsubsequently used to further the cause of constitutionalism in the Ottoman Empire.4Thus it had only a limited effect and significance.

The Segban-i Cedit ArmyWhether because he now felt assured of support from the notables, or perhapsbecause he feared they might soon act against him, immediately after the Docu-ment of Agreement Bayraktar Mustafa tried to restore the Nizam-% Cedit, thoughin a cautious and concealed manner so as not to alarm its opponents. The nucleusfor the new force was the 3000-man rapid-fire rifle force brought to the conferenceby Kadi Abdurrahman Paa, to which he added other Nizam-% Cedit survivors andsoldiers brought by the Karaosmanoglu and Capanoglu leaders. The old Nizam-%Cedit barracks at Levent Ciftligi and tjsktidar were repaired and turned over tothe new corps (October 3, 1808), about 5,000 volunteers were enrolled, and orderswere issued for recruitment around the empire as soon as possible. To avoidresistance from the Janissaries the new force was not called Nizam-% Cedit, butrather was made part of the old order, attached to the kapikulu army, after theextinct Segban (keepers of the hounds) corps, an affiliate of the Janissaries, becom-ing the New Segbans (Segban-% Cedit)? As its commander the grand vezir ap-pointed a former Nizam-% Cedit officer, Siileyman Aga, and Kadi AbdurrahmanPaa served as actual military leader. While it was not given a separate treasury,a new Ministry for Affairs of the Holy War (Umur-u Cihadiye Nezareti), aname with particular appeal to the ulema, was established to secure the necessaryrevenues. A force of some 160,000 men divided into 100 regiments (boliik) and 3divisions was envisaged, but for the moment the corps had about 10,000 men andofficers in all.

Other Military ReformsThe navy was reorganized under the command of Bayraktar Mustafa's tutor andclose adviser, Abdullah Ramiz Efendi, who dismissed incompetents, retired oldships, and began to build new ones. The barracks at Galata, which had become

4 The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975centers for riots and sedition, were closed and the sailors were required to live atthe dockyard or on their ships.6 Bayraktar Mustafa also tried to reform the Janis-sary corps. He issued orders that prohibited the sale of positions, restored the oldsystem of promotion by seniority, and required all members to accept training anddiscipline. He proposed that Janissary pay tickets held for income and not servicebe abolished, in the process saving money that could be used for the reformed armyand navy. But Mahmut II, ever the politician, feared that cutting off the incomesof thousands of persons so suddenly would stimulate a revolt. Thus he orderedthat such holdings be canceled in return for bulk payments equal to half theirvalue, while only those not surrendering them voluntarily would be subject toconfiscation without compensation.7

The Conservative ReactionThese measures stimulated the rise of conservative opposition to the sultan and hischief minister. Those called to serve in the new corps or to surrender their sinecurememberships in the old corps were indignant at the loss of their privileges. The oldcorps and the mass of the people were not deceived by the names attached to thenew army, and they resented its presence. And Bayraktar Mustafa and his men,unaccustomed to the power of office as well as to life in a great metropolis, soonbegan to act in such an arrogant and destructive manner as to alienate the sultanand those who had originally supported them. Bayraktar acted as though he werethe real ruler, issued orders without going through the formality of discussion andassent, and reacted to Mahmut's protests by contemplating his replacement withSelim Giray, claimant to the Crimean Hanate and then resident in Istanbul.8Bayraktar and his associates stimulated general hostility by using their positionsto amass wealth for themselves, confiscating many timars and the properties ofreligious foundations whose administrators could not produce deeds attesting totheir rights. The mass of the people of Istanbul became incensed by the swaggeringattitude of the grand vezir's soldiers who roamed through the streets, inflictingthemselves on the hapless shop- and homeowners. Finally, Bayraktar Mustafaseems to have alienated everyone by his boorishness and bluntness and his apparentdelight in frightening and insulting all who came near him.9

The Overthrow of Bayraktar Mustafa and the Triumph of ReactionBayraktar's army and personal guard and the Segban army-part of which wasstill in the process of mobilization and training - made him all powerful in Istanbul.His enemies therefore incited the notables of Bulgaria against him, securing anattack on Rusc.uk in mid-October. Bayraktar was forced to send most of his soldiersback to defend his position there and to replace them with unemployed mountaineershired from Rumeli. The grand vezir's new forces wandered in the streets of Istan-bul, sharing its delights and ravaging even more than had their predecessors, butfailed to provide adequate protection to their master.10 Finally, the first publicappearance of the Segban-% Cedit men at the -evening meal breaking the fast of thelast day of Ramazan, the most sacred night of the Muslim year (November 14,1808), precipitated a revolt against Bayraktar. The Janissaries present were sooutraged by this open flaunting of their enemies that they ran to their barracks andraised the entire corps in rebellion, helped by the spread of the (false) news that

Beginnings of Modern Reform: The Era of Mahmut II, 1808-1839 5the grand vezir intended to abolish their corps altogether. Early the next morningthe rebels broke into the Porte, where the gates were open because of the holiday,forcing Bayraktar and his personal guard to take refuge in a small stone powdermagazine nearby. Finally, when the Janissaries were about to break in throughthe roof, the powder barrels blew up, either accidentally or by the hand of Bayrak-tar Mustafa, who was killed along with his men and several hundred Janissariesoutside.11

Again Istanbul fell to the scourge of victorious military rebels, who demandedthat the sultan give them a new aga as well as a grand vezir more acceptable tothem. Mahmut thus was in a situation similar to that of Selim a short time before.But he had learned his lesson well. He knew that concessions would only encouragethe rebels to demand more and more until his throne would certainly have beenlost to the deposed Mustafa, who had many partisans in and out of the palace. In-stead of giving in, then, he temporized while ordering Ramiz Paa and KadiAbdurrahman to bring their troops to the palace (November 15). He then rejectedthe rebel demands, and when the Janissaries attacked, they were beaten back byits reinforced garrison. Mahmut further secured his position by ordering theexecution of Prince Mustafa, thus depriving the rebels of the alternative candidateto the throne.12

A full-scale conflict followed. The Janissaries obtained the support of the artisansand the city mob and mounted a general assault on the palace from the directionof Ay a Sofya, and cut off its water supply (November 16, 1808). The new Segbansresponded with sorties outside the walls, but they were not yet fully organized andtrained, and against the numerical superiority of the attackers they could notbreak out of the circle. The navy ships in the Golden Horn began bombarding theJanissary barracks as well as their lines around the palace, but this started hugefires that destroyed large sections of the Sultan Ahmet, Aya Sofya, and DivanYolu quarters, with thousands of innocent civilians being killed. The Janissaryleaders then decided that they could not win and that compromise was best, sign-ing a Document of Obedience (Sened-i Itaat) to the sultan in return for anamnesty. But the settlement was upset by the lower-ranking Janissaries, who stillopposed continuation of the Segbans, as well as by others who were shocked byMustafa's execution and demanded that Mahmut be deposed. Mahmut continuedto hold the palace with the support of the Segbans, however. The ulema finally gotthe rebellious soldiers to agree to new negotiations as the only alternative toeliminating the house of Osman altogether. The fate of the Segban corps wasthe most difficult issue to solve. Finally, after long discussions, on November 17 anagreement was reached by which the Segbans would be disbanded, but their mem-bers would be allowed to leave Istanbul without harm, and the sultan would not berequired to surrender any of his supporters who had taken refuge in the palace.Under the circumstances it was the best possible compromise to end the stale-mate.13 But the agreement was not kept by the rebels. As the Segbans left thepalace in accordance with the compromise, disarmed and without their uniforms,they were set upon by those waiting outside, while other mobs attacked anddestroyed their barracks, killing those inside. A number of notables who had sup-ported the reforms were killed, including Ramiz Paa and Kadi Abdurrahman. Itseemed, indeed, that reaction had won out again. But Mahmut remained on thethrone, firmly committed to reform, and now convinced that new corps could notbe effectively built unless the old ones whose interests were being threatened weredestroyed, that in fact reform could not be limited only to the military but had to

6 The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975span the whole spectrum of Ottoman institutions and society. The lessons were,indeed, to be applied during the years that followed.14

The Years of Preparation, 1808-1826The results of the momentous events of November 1808 were not as decisive asthose of the revolution that had overthrown Selim III the previous year. Warfarehad come to an end not through unconditional surrender but as the result of com-promise. Mahmut II, therefore, emerged in not quite as weak a position in relationto the rebel leaders as had Mustafa IV. But the basic elements of power certainlywere not in his hands. The provinces were under the domination of notables who,for all practical purposes, had repudiated their obligations to him. The new Segbancorps, established as an instrument of personal power as well as a first step towardmodernizing the army, was gone, and the sole military force was composed of thesame corps that had opposed reform all along. But Mahmut II had demonstratedgreat determination and perseverence during the crisis. He had demonstrated hiswillingness to fight, and fight well, for policies that he believed in, in stark contrastto Selim's vacillation and essential weakness. This reputation was to serve him ingood stead as he spent the next 18 years working to rebuild a cadre of devotedsoldiers and statesmen and waiting for the day when events would enable him toact once again in accordance with the lessons he had learned.

Restoration of the Military EstablishmentWith the loss of the Segbans, Mahmut's first step had to be to restore the traditionalcorps so that he would have some force strong enough to defend the empire againstits enemies, particularly Russia, with whom a war was still being waged. Onceagain, decrees were issued requiring the Janissaries and Sipahis to live up to theirtraditional regulations, to appoint and promote officers according to ability ratherthan bribery and politics, and to remove all those failing to train and serve withthe corps. But of course after the disbanding of the Segbans, these decrees couldnot be enforced effectively. The Janissaries remained at best an undisciplined, ill-trained, and poorly armed mob, far better able to act in defense of the old orderthan to compete with the new armies of Europe. The feudal Sipahis now dissolvedinto a rural aristocracy, with most of the timars falling into the hands of ownersof large estates, who in many cases were the autonomous provincial notables andtheir allies. The sultan was, however, more successful in reviving the other oldercorps that had already been the recipients of reforms and that were much morewilling to accept discipline and reinforcement now, particularly the Cannon andallied Cannon-Wagon corps (numbering 4,910 and 2,129 men respectively), whichhad been built into effective fighting forces by the end of Selim's reign.15 Mahmutsoon was able to appoint his own proteges to command them. He raised theirsalaries, provided them with new equipment and better barracks, and quietlydoubled their strength, so that by 1826 they numbered close to 10,000 cannoneersand 4,400 cannon-wagon men in all, forming a loyal and effective counterweightto the Janissaries.16 Mahmut also built a new force of mounted artillerymen ofsome 1,000 men, trained and organized in the Western style, and though it wasrouted and largely destroyed by the Russians in 1812, it subsequently was rebuiltand provided the sultan with a well-trained, well-paid, and loyal force as hispersonal guard against the machinations of his opponents.17

Beginnings of Modern Reform: The Era of Mahmut II, 1808-1839 7External threats to the empire necessitated continued emphasis on the military

system. Mahmut worked to rebuild and modernize the fleet, mostly under thedirection of Grand Admiral Mehmet Husrev Paa (last governor of Egypt beforeMuhammad Ali), who served 12 years in the post in two terms of duty (Decem-ber 22, 1811-March 2, 1818; December 9, 1822-February 9, 1827). New warshipswere built, particularly as part of the Porte's response to the Greek insurrection.To replace the Greek sailors from the Aegean Islands, Muslim sailors were re-cruited and given high salaries and favorable conditions of employment to get themen to accept the severe training and discipline required.18 After the Russian warwas ended, the Danube flotilla also was modernized along with its bases at Ibrail,Silistria, Rusquk, and Vidin.19 From the earliest years of Mahmut's reign the fortsalong the empire's boundaries were repaired and a new corps of frontier garrisonsable and willing to resist the enemy was created.20 The artillery and naval arsenalsand the gunpowder factory established by Selim at Azadh were reorganized andmodernized with help from foreign technicians. Mahmut's men made certain thatthe officers and men manning them were loyal and discreet.21 Finally, new cannons,muskets, and smaller arms were purchased in Europe and stored in the palace andelsewhere to prepare for the day when they might openly be used in the serviceof the sultan.22

As the sultan's personal guard gave him increased confidence, he moved to dowhat he could to reform the Janissaries and get his men into key positions of com-mand over them as well. Officers and men who openly defied his authority or pro-tested his other military measures were punished, sent into exile, and sometimessecretly executed. Senior corps officers were gradually replaced by juniors who weremore open to palace influence and thus more trustworthy insofar as the sultan wasconcerned.23 It was in this manner that Mahmut secured the assistance of HiiseyinAga, who rose to be aga of the entire corps (February 26, 1823). Rising throughthe patronage of Silahtar Ali Paa, Hiiseyin took advantage of the latter's serviceas grand vezir (March 10-December 13, 1823) to remove dissidents in the corpsby dismissal, forced retirement, and banishment, to such an extent that the sultanawarded him with the rank of vezir and title of pasa, after which he came to beknown as Aga Hiiseyin Paa or simply Aga Paa, becoming one of the leadingmilitary figures during the remainder of the reign.24 When these harsh policiesstirred opposition within the corps, Mahmut later removed Aga Paa as com-mander (October 1823) and sent him to serve as governor of Bursa and Izmit aswell as commander of the Bosporus forts to protect him from his enemies untilmore propitious times, all the while ensuring that these important forces near thecapital were commanded by a trustworthy and able officer.25

Aga Hiiseyin's departure from the Janissary corps did not mean an end toMahmut's efforts to gain the support of its officers. It even helped him by provid-ing another vacancy at the top and new opportunities to promote trusted men tokey positions throughout the corps. Among those who rose in this way wasCelaleddin Mehmet Aga, who, in September 1825, became the last commander ofthe corps and used that position to help the sultan to undermine and finally destroyit.26 There was also Pabuqqu Ahmet, an officer at the Naval Arsenal who organizeda force of boatmen and porters there and in the Golden Horn, put them at thesultan's disposal, and in return secured various naval appointments culminating inthat of grand admiral soon after the Janissaries were destroyed (October 24, 1828-January 13, 1830).27 These were, however, mainly political efforts, and they werenot transformed into policies to reform or discipline the corps. So it remained as

8 The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975incompetent as it had been earlier, failing again and again against the Greek rebelsand causing street disturbances in Istanbul at the least provocation, while its unitsstationed in the provinces continued to cause more trouble for the local officials andthe populace than for the enemy.28

The Struggle for Political PowerMahmut II was slow to extend his power and to introduce reforms because he wasfar from being master in his own house. Real power in the Ruling Class remainedin the hands of the leaders of the established institutions, who would have beenmost happy to dethrone the sultan had there been any other member of the Ottomanline available to replace him.

There were several foci of political strength in the Ottoman establishment duringthe first two decades of Mahmut's regime, with the seyhulislam representing andcontrolling the ulema, the agas of the Janissary and other corps and the regimentalcommanders leading the military factions, and the reis ul-kiittap representing theever more powerful scribes in the endemic struggles for power. The sultan playedthe game as best he could, shifting appointments between one faction and another,never leaving any of his opponents in power long enough to build bases of support,and gradually creating sufficient power of his own to undermine their overallstrength and establish his own supporters in positions of importance.

Most influential and long-lived among the conservative leaders of the time wasMehmet Sait Halet Efendi (1761-1823), a member of the ulema and closely at-tached to the Galip Dede mevlevi dervish lodge of Galata. Halet had served asOttoman ambassador to Paris as a result of court favor during Selim's reign, buthis long service (1802-1806) there had only strengthened his opposition toWestern-style innovations in the Ottoman Empire. Following his return to Istanbulhe participated in the conservative coalition that secured Selim's overthrow, butdue to his pro-British attitudes he was in exile in Kutahya during the overthrowof Mustafa IV and brief dominance of Bayraktar Mustafa. Hence he was in aposition to serve Mahmut II in his early years. His role in ending the long reignof the Baghdad Mamluk leader Siileyman Aga and establishing direct Ottomanrule in Iraq (1810) gained him the particular favor of the sultan, and his appoint-ment as steward of the sultan's court (kethiida-i rikab-% hiimayun) and then asnisanct of the Imperial Council (September 10, 1815), made him Mahmut's closepolitical and military adviser. Though Halet supported and helped organize Mah-mut's military campaigns against the notables as well as various foreign enemies,he opposed all efforts at modernization, particularly reform of the Janissary corps,and built a political coalition of conservative leaders. It appears that even his sup-port of Mahmut's desire to weaken the provincial notables was in fact an attempt tostrengthen his friends among the Janissaries and the ulema by eliminating theirmain rivals for power in the provinces.29

Halet's main opposition came from Grand Admiral Mehmet Husrev Paa, fromReis ul'kiittap Canip Mehmet Besim Efendi (1817-1821), who combined the bestelements of Western and Islamic cultures, and from Mehmet Sait Galip Paa(1763-1829), perhaps the greatest liberal of his time. Born in Istanbul, the youngGalip had risen as a career official in the scribal corporation, gaining distinctionas Selim's special ambassador to Paris for the negotiations that culminated in thePeace of Amiens (1802). Galip produced a report to the sultan that had a majorinfluence on Selim's reform efforts,30 and then he became the most influential leader

Beginnings of Modern Reform: The Era of Mahmut II, 1808-1839 9of the scribal corporation during the next decade, serving as reis three times (mid-October 1806-July 25, 1807; April 16, 1808-July 1811; and January 22-mid-July1814). He was an active member of the Rusc.uk Committee that put Mahmut onthe throne. He strongly supported Bayraktar Mustafa's reform efforts and wassaved from execution by the rebels due only to his reputation for honesty and,perhaps, also to a disinclination on the part of the rebels to alienate the scribes.31Galip finally used Halet's expedition against Ali Paa of Janina (1820), leadingto the death of the latter and also to the beginnings of the Greek Revolution(March 1821), as a pretext to secure his dismissal and exile (November 1822)and have him strangled there shortly afterward.32

Halet's removal gave Mahmut much more freedom to manipulate political groupsand individuals. Halet was replaced as grand vezir by a rival, Deli Abdullah Paa(November 10, 1822-March 10, 1823), who was given the task of rooting Halet'sfavorites out of government, after which he too was dismissed, ostensibly becauseof his failure to control the Janissary corps.33 Abdullah was replaced by the sultan'sformer sword bearer, Silahtar Ali Paa (March 10-December 13, 1823), whoseprincipal contribution was to further the placement of loyal men into key positionsof the Janissary corps while keeping the seyhulislam from reacting too strongly tothe sultan's moves.34 His replacement was Galip Paa, who was brought to powerin the hope that his experience in foreign affairs would enable him to resolve theproblems posed by the Greek Revolution and that he would help the sultan indeveloping plans to destroy the Janissary corps (December 13, 1823-September 14,1824).35 Galip devoted himself to both tasks, securing the intervention of Muham-mad Ali's army to stifle the Greeks and using the defeat inflicted previously onthe Janissaries by the latter to further discredit them, convincing most Ottomansand the mass of the people that this institution was by now too decrepit to savethe empire. Galip also placed the sultan's men into the other kapikulu corps, thuspreparing for the day when the Janissaries would finally be eliminated. Interminablecourt intrigues - and the consideration that as a scribe he would not be able to leadthe army when the time came to settle the score with the Janissaries - led toGalip's replacement by the able soldier Benderli Selim Mehmet Paa (Septem-ber 14, 1824-1828), who had gained military experience fighting against the Rus-sians as well as in Syria and Tripoli and who had previously served for a shorttime as grand vezir (March 28-April 30, 1821 ).36 Thus this parade of leadersgradually reflected the sultan's increasing domination of the political processes andhis determination to establish his own control as soon as the time was opportune.

The Reforms of Muhammad Ali in EgyptAlmost everything Mahmut II was hoping to do in Istanbul was already beingcarried out by a seemingly far more successful reform activity taking place in theprovince of Egypt, setting a precedent that served both as a model and an incentivefor much of what the sultan undertook after 1826. Leading these reforms was themost famous modernizer in nineteenth-century Middle Eastern history, MehmetAli, or, as he is called in Arabic, Muhammad Ali, Ottoman governor of Egypt from1805 to 1848 and founder of the dynasty that was to rule the country for over acentury. The problems facing Muhammad Ali were very similar to those ofMahmut II. Having shared the basic institutions of the Ottoman Empire for threecenturies, the problems they experienced were interrelated; and hence the solutionsattempted were similar. Yet while Mahmut II had to proceed cautiously, Muhammad

10 The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975Ali was able to carry out reforms far more rapidly and completely because theFrench expedition to Egypt (1798-1801), and the subsequent restoration of Otto-man rule there, had effectively removed the old Ruling Class and with it theopposition from vested interests that so frustrated Selim and Mahmut. The pres-ence of Mamluk, Ottoman, and British forces in Egypt following the Frenchwithdrawal enabled Muhammad Ali, who entered the country as leader of theAlbanian and Bosnian contingent in the Ottoman army, to pose as defender of theinterests of the people and the rights of the sultan against the various occupiers.He was proclaimed governor by popular acclaim (May 14, 1805) and then con-firmed by the sultan's emissary when he reached the country and saw the extentof his support.

Once Muhammad Ali became governor, his main problem was to establish hispredominance in a political spectrum where he was only one of a number of com-peting elements. His immediate solution was to rely on the support of the nativeulema and artisan and merchant guild leaders as well as the sultan and Ottomangarrison against his Mamluk opponents, who were led by Muhammad Elfi Bey, aMamluk protege of the British. The new governor fulfilled his financial obligationsto Istanbul and at the same time applied judicious bribery in the sultan's court tofrustrate the maneuvers of the British ambassador to have him transferred toSalonica (1806). Muhammad Ali then solidified his position by defeating theMamluks and scattering their armies in the name of both the sultan and the peopleof Egypt. At the renewal of the Ottoman war with Russia (1806-1808) Britainattempted to occupy Egypt once again, but Muhammad Ali united the country ingeneral opposition to the foreign threat. Later, most of the remaining Mamlukswere wiped out by massacre in the Citadel (March 1, 1811). His Albanian andBosnian soldiers, who had sought to use his victory for their own advantage, wereused to fulfill the sultan's request for help against the Wahhabis in Arabia (1811-1812), and their success against the latter earned Muhammad Ali additionalprestige in both Istanbul and Cairo. He conciliated the Egyptian ulema by restor-ing all their properties taken by the Mamluks and also by continuing the advisorycouncils introduced by the French to give them some voice in governmental policy.Large bribes caused them to overlook his gradual consolidation of authority in hisown hands until it was too late. Meanwhile, he continued to recognize Ottomansuzerainty and pay the regular tribute. He gave military support when needed,again in Arabia against the Wahhabis (1818-1820) and against the Greek rebels.

But even as Muhammad Ali built his power by conciliating or removing themain political elements in Egypt, he developed his own independent bases ofstrength, mainly by introducing the reforms that were to be pursued during theremaining years of his long tenure in office. These involved building a modern armyand centralized administration dependent on him alone, developing the economicwealth of the country to finance his reforms, promoting a quasi-dynastic idea, anddeveloping his family and followers into a new and permanent nobility to supporthim and his descendants.

His first step had to be the creation of an army to use against his military rivalsin the country. He attempted to do this by modernizing the Ottoman corps underhis command, putting a force of French deserters in command of a unit of blackslaves, using Mamluk and Greek officers to direct the operation, and bringing inFrench advisers to train the force in the use of European weapons and tactics(August 1815).37 But the reluctance of the Ottoman soldiers to accept the newways undermined this effort. Its failure left Muhammad Ali convinced that the

Beginnings of Modern Reform: The Era of Mahmtit II, 1808-1839 11only real means of gaining the strength and independence he wanted was to createan entirely new army. If his sole aim in creating it was to maintain his rule inEgypt, it would have been quite enough to organize and develop it according tohis own Ottoman experience. But it appears that he had larger ambitions, perhapsthe conquest of the entire Ottoman Empire and its revival under his leadership.

He chose, therefore, to build his new army on the model of the British andFrench forces he had witnessed in his early years in Egypt as well as of theNizam-% Cedit, calling it also the Nizamiye, or "ordered" army. To man theNizamiye he first tried to use white slaves from the Caucasus and blacks from theSudan and Central Africa, thus essentially reviving the old Mamluk system. Butthese soon proved unsuitable for the modern kind of army he had in mind. Startingin 1823, then, he turned to a source previously ignored by the Ottomans and Mam-luks, the peasants of Egypt, sending out press gangs and instituting a system offorced conscription. This freed him from outside control of the slave systems andgave him a substantial reserve of men, but it was accomplished at the cost of aharsh system of procurement that ultimately disrupted Egyptian agriculture andled to a series of uprisings. To command the new army he imported hundreds ofofficers and technical experts from Europe and established military and technicalschools to train Egyptians, some of whom were sent to Europe for advancedtraining. Factories were opened to make military equipment according to Europeanstandards. Within a short time Muhammad AH had a large and efficient infantryforce whose abilities were soon demonstrated in Greece, Arabia, Syria, and Ana-tolia as well as in Egypt itself. The success of the infantry led him to develop amodern artillery and sapper corps (1824-1828) and to open an engineering schoolwith a faculty of Europeans as well as some Ottomans trained earlier in Istanbulduring the reign of Selim III. A regiment was established to care for fortification,transportation, road building, and mining. A modern fleet was built in both theMediterranean and the Red Sea, and cavalry units on European lines were estab-lished in the early 1830s.

To finance the new army Muhammad AH needed a far more productive statethan that which he had taken over. To achieve efficient exploitation of resourcesthe scope of the state was enlarged beyond that traditionally accepted by the Otto-mans. Foreign agricultural experts were brought to improve methods of cultiva-tion and irrigation. New crops were introduced, such as cotton, sugar, rice, andindigo, to sell abroad and provide the foreign exchange needed to import expertsand weapons. Since the peasants lacked the capital and know-how to produce thesenew crops, the state became the capitalist in many cases, taking over large areas,providing the land and seed, and transforming many peasants into little more thanhired laborers. On the other hand, living conditions for many peasants improvedsomewhat because Muhammad AH built hospitals and clinics, introduced a quar-antine system to end the scourge of plague, and provided a system of medicalschools to train native doctors, mainly under the direction of a French doctornamed Clot Bey. He also created a new and modern tax system and built roads togive the collectors more direct access to the taxpayers than had been possible in thepast, carrying out a new cadastral survey to make certain that every source ofwealth and its tax obligation were recorded.

Muhammad AH developed new sources of revenue by building Egyptian industryand trade and establishing state factories when necessary. European merchants andindustrialists were invited to come and settle to provide the necessary capital andknow-how for private enterprise, thus establishing the powerful colony of foreign

12 The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975residents that, in conjunction with the new dynasty and aristocracy, monopolizedmuch of the political and economic life of the country until the revolution of 1952.He also built a merchant marine and entered into direct diplomatic and commercialcontact with the nations of Europe despite his ostensible subservience to the sultan.

This economic success was achieved at a price, however. The Western orienta-tion of Egypt's economy greatly increased its dependence on world markets andmade it vulnerable to European economic fluctuations. Foreigners controlled andmanipulated the Egyptian economy. The independence and the initiative of largesegments of the Subject Class were destroyed in both town and country, with nativeparticipation excluded except at the most menial levels.

To carry out these programs and to ensure that the new wealth was efficientlydiverted to the treasuries of the state as well as those of the ruler and his family,Muhammad AH built a modern administrative system. His aim was efficient, auto-cratic, and centralized government, mainly on French lines. To this end he replacedthe partially autonomous tax farmers with salaried officials paid by the treasuryand, thus, under its direct control (1806-1814). To secure efficient farm manage-ment he encouraged the creation of large estates by members of his own family andother members of the Ruling Class, forming a Turko-Circassian aristocracy thatremained a powerful support of the dynasty and shared control of the country withthe foreign merchants and bankers. To train men for the new salaried bureaucracyMuhammad Ali built a substantial system of secular schools and imported Europeanteachers. He also issued a system of law codes to build up the power of thebureaucracy, which, under his direct control, extended its authority throughout thecountry.

In all these efforts he went ahead with a disregard for tradition and with aseverity far in excess of other Ottoman reformers. Those who dared to oppose hisreforms were suppressed without mercy. The peasants and urban workers soonfound that an efficient government was able to force them to pay far more in taxesthan they had paid under the old inefficient systems. And when they resisted taxes,conscription, and government controls, they were rapidly dealt with by the newarmy. When the ulema and guild leaders finally awoke to their loss of power, theyalaO were put in their places, from which they had emerged only briefly during andafter the French expedition. Direct governmental control over the institutions ofIslam were imposed in the guise of reforms introduced into the Azhar University(1820-1830). The result was a relatively efficient state and army, but at a terriblecost that was to sap the strength of the country during the last half of the nine-teenth century.

Conclusion of the War with Russia and EnglandMahmut II certainly was impressed by the spectacular successes of his Egyptiangovernor, but he was restricted not only by his internal political difficulties but alsoby the urgent need to act against foreign enemies as well as the provincial notableswho had gained control of much of the empire. One of the most remarkable aspectsof early nineteenth-century Ottoman history was his successful resolution of theseforeign and domestic problems before any of the major reforms were introducedor carried out.

Following the Franco-Russian agreement at Tilsit (June 14, 1807) to settle theproblems of Europe at least partially by dividing the Ottoman Empire, England,and later France, became convinced that Russia could not be allowed to gain con-

Beginnings of Modern Reform: The Era of MaJimut II, 1808-1839 13trol of Istanbul and the Straits if Europe's balance of power was to be preserved.Bonaparte felt so strongly about this that he abandoned his plan to strike overlandagainst the British in India so as to devote full attention to Europe. Early inOctober 1808 he imposed his views on Czar Alexander at Erfurt. He stipulated thathe would live up to his Tilsit Treaty obligations to support Russia in its war withthe Ottoman Empire, which had been going on since 1806, only if the Ottomanswere supported by Austria or some other European power, and that if Russiagained control of the Principalities, then both powers would guarantee the integrityof the remaining parts of the empire, including Istanbul and the Straits. Relationsbetween the allies deteriorated after that, leading eventually to Bonaparte's famousRussian campaign beginning late in 1812. England's reaction to Tilsit and its after-math was to bring its own war with the Ottomans to a rapid conclusion, forcingMahmut to accept peace by blockading both the Dardanelles and Izmir. In thePeace of Kala-i Sultaniye (the Dardanelles) (January 5, 1809), Britain promisedto evacuate all occupied Ottoman territories, including Egypt, in return for peace,and the sultan restored the old British Capitulatory privileges in his empire. Britainagreed to the Ottoman stipulation that the Straits be closed to all foreign warshipsin time of peace, making this part of international law for the first time. In manyways even more important were the secret agreements that provided that if therewas a French attack on the Ottoman Empire, the British fleet would give the sultanall necessary assistance to defend the coasts of the Aegean and Adriatic as well ashis frontiers against Austria and Russia. Britain also agreed that if it made peacewith Russia, it would work to obtain an Ottoman-Russian peace that would guar-antee the continued integrity of the sultan's territories.38 Thus rivalries among theEuropean powers neutralized Mahmut's enemies and put him at an advantage.

Britain's direct intrusion into the diplomatic affairs of the Middle East wasresented by both France and Russia, especially since it was followed by Britishoccupation of the Ionian Islands, previously held by France, and also by efforts tosecure an Anglo-Austrian-Ottoman alliance against Russia. Meanwhile, the Russo-Turkish war dragged on. The Russians avoided fulfillment of their previouspromise to leave the Principalities and tried to get French help in return forpromises to attack Austria if it showed any hostility to Bonaparte. In negotiationswith the Ottomans at Jassy, the czar's agents also demanded Bessarabia and majorforts in the Caucasus. The sultan ended the negotiations, and the strain betweenRussia and France increased. Despite Ottoman resistance, the Russians were ableto take the remaining Danubian forts of Ismail (December 1809) and Ibrail(January 1810), push through Bulgaria, take Rusquk, Nicopolis, and Giurgevo(August-September), and cross the Balkan Mountains. Russian assistance en-couraged the Serbian nationalists, led by Kara George, to rebuff Ottoman offersto provide autonomy, thus transforming what had started as a revolt againstJanissary tyranny in Belgrade into a war for independence from Ottoman rule, eventhough both the Russians and the French subsequently withheld major assistance infear of endangering their future position in other parts of the Ottoman Empire.

Ottoman-Russian negotiations and hostilities dragged on, with the Russians hop-ing for peace to face the threat o

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