outline in-class experiment on a coordination game test of equilibrium selection i :van huyck,...
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OutlineIn-Class Experiment on a Coordination Game
Test of Equilibrium Selection I :Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil (1990)
Test of Equilibrium Selection II :Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil (1991)
Test of Equilibrium Selection III : Copper, DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross (1990)
The Median Action Game
eemedianM
cbaceMbMa,M)(en
ii},...,{
0,, ;][1
2
}e,...,,{e(e,...,e)mequilibriuNash a is
21 with tuple-nAny
n (odd) players
Strategy space =
e,...,, }21{
Hypotheses: Deductive vs. Inductive Principles
Payoff Dominance
Security (Maximin}
History DependentFor t > 1, Median (t) =
eemedianM n )}1(),...,1({)1( 1
Hypotheses: Deductive vs. Inductive Principles
gamein {4,...,4} and gamein }3,...,3{
and gamesin {7,...,7}Payoff Dominance:
Security (Maximin}:
For t > 1, median (t)
eemedian n )}1(),...,1({ 1
Hypotheses: Deductive vs. Inductive Principles
gamein {4,...,4} and gamein }3,...,3{
and gamesin {7,...,7}Payoff Dominance:
Security (Maximin}:
For t > 1, median (t)
eemedian n )}1(),...,1({ 1
Observations
In game , neither payoff-dominance or security is salient: 15% chose 7 and 15% chose 3.
In game , payoff-dominance is salient: 52% chose 7
In game , security is salient: 44% chose 4Seven times as many subjects played above 4 than below 4