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The Korean Journal of Defense AnalysisVol. 24, No. 3, September 2012, 373–390

Outlook on Chinese Foreign Policy in the Coming Era of Xi Jinping from China’s Perspective

Lee Jung-nam*

Asiatic Research Institute of Korea University, Seoul, Korea

With regard to the direction of Chinese foreign policy, there coexist two opposingviews—one that supports assertive great power diplomacy and one that supportsprudent policy to aspire to be a great power, based on China’s identity as a developingcountry. Currently the Chinese government supports the latter direction. What thenwill be the kind of foreign policy that the new administration of Xi Jinping willpursue, appearing at a time when the international order is changing with therapid emergence of China as a world power? Will he pursue a foreign policybefitting China’s new status in the global community? Or will he continue theexisting policy without changing course? These questions can decisively influencethe international order and East Asian peace. Thus, they are of keen interest notonly to East Asian countries but also to the global community. This paper examinesthe direction of Chinese foreign policy based on opinion polls of the Chinesepublic.

Keywords: Chinese foreign policy, the era of Xi Jinping, great power diplomacy,rise of China, role of China

Introduction

Though many Chinese scholars are critical of the viewpoint regarding China as oneof the Group of 2 (G2),1 China has emerged as the economic hub of East Asia following the global financial crisis, and it has firmly strengthened its position as aG2 country, at least in East Asia.2 In this situation, the so-called “China Threat” theoryis re-emerging, while the United States tries to check China’s influence in the region,3proclaiming an Asia-centered diplomacy since 2009.4 As China rapidly enhances itsposition in the global community, the development of Chinese foreign policy hasbecome a major concern for other nations in East Asia.

In particular, the foreign policy of the regime of Xi Jinping, who is likely to leadChina for more than 10 years after he becomes the new political leader at the 18thCommunist Party Congress scheduled for October 2012, is of special interest toother nations. The circumstances of Xi Jinping’s ascent to the Chinese leadership are

*E-mail: [email protected]**This work was supported by the Korea Research Foundation Grant funded by the Republicof Korea government (MEST) (KRF-2008-362-A00001).

ISSN 1016-3271 print, ISSN 1941-4641 online© 2012 Korea Institute for Defense Analyseshttp://www.kida.re.kr/kjda

different from those of his predecessor, Hu Jintao. Xi Jinping is emerging as Chineseleader at a time of pervasive change, in which China’s international status is greatlyenhanced, while that of the United States is declining. Whether the Xi Jinpingregime will pursue a new foreign policy different from that of Hu Jintao is a subjectof keen interest.

In discussing the direction of Chinese foreign policy after Xi Jinping’s ascensionto power, two viewpoints must be noted. One is in line with the Chinese officialposition, represented by Wang Jisi, dean of the School of International Studies atPeking University, and Dai Bingguo, state councilor of the People’s Republic of China.In this view, China assumes an identity as a developing country aspiring to be a greatpower. In China, a debate kicked into high gear on the direction of foreign policyconcerning core interests following the Cheonan naval corvette incident in March2010 between North and South Korea.5 In this situation, Dai Bingguo proclaimed onthe homepage of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that China would stick to its existingpeaceful-development policy. He aimed at abolishing debates in the inner circleswho insisted on the expansion of core interests amid concerns outside China regardingChinese assertive foreign policy. He pointed out that Chinese core interests includethe socialist system, national security, territorial integrity, unification, and economicdevelopment, and therefore China should continue its existing peaceful-developmentpolicy as a developing country aspiring to peaceful development in harmony with the world.6 This seems to be a return to Deng Xiaoping’s policy of Taoguangyanghui( ), which supports a submissive posture in international affairs and assumesa passive response. But it is somewhat different from Taoguangyanghui. Wang Jisiasserted that Taoguangyanghui diplomacy is not suitable for the current era, whenChinese national strength has been greatly enhanced, and criticized it as too weak aresponse to solve security problems.7 He stated that China should pursue a foreignpolicy geared toward building the foundations for a great power by combining economicdevelopment and security with traditional military and economic interests, as well aspursing multilateral diplomacy, economic policy stimulating domestic consumption,and soft-power diplomacy, making full use of Chinese values and culture.8 Takinginto consideration all of these factors, it can be interpreted that China’s current foreignpolicy is to aspire to a great-power-oriented policy as well as to promote its identityas a socialist, developing country.9

The opposing view holds that China inevitably faces competition against theUnited States, and thus China should recognize that it is an emerging power and actaccordingly.10 According to this viewpoint, following the Olympics in China and theglobal economic crisis, Sino-U.S. relations became the most important bilateral relationsin the world. In this situation, Chinese adherence to the Taoguangyanghui policycould elicit suspicion and distrust in the United States and China’s neighbors, and itis inappropriate for Chinese national strength, which has been enhanced, and thus itsforeign policy should change. Economic interests that emphasize domestic developmentshould not be a major driver of China’s behavior on the international scene, andChina should participate in various issues in the global community, and play its role asa great power.11 In particular, this view asserts that Chinese constructive participationand assumption of a responsible role on the international scene will lead to enhancingits soft power. The gap in national strength between China and the United States isshrinking, but the gap in soft power (persuasive appeal) between the two remainsstable. Therefore, a core purpose of Chinese foreign policy should be to enhance its

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Outlook on Chinese Foreign Policy in the Coming Era 375

soft power. China, as the second-strongest nation in the world, should assume itsresponsibility and increase contributions to the International Monetary Fund and theWorld Bank. In addition, it should engage constructively in international disputesand various international issues and play a leading role in tackling global problems,such as control of the financial crisis, climate change, and United Nations reform, aswell as problems in Asia.12

Within China, there are two contrasting views on future directions of Chinese foreignpolicy. One view supports an assertive great power diplomacy, while the other advocatesa prudent policy to aspire to a great power based on China’s identity as a developingcountry. The Chinese government now supports the latter. What kind of foreign policywill the regime of Xi Jinping pursue at a time when China’s emergence is changingthe international order? Will he pursue a foreign policy befitting China’s new statusin the global community? Or will he continue the existing policy without changingcourse? These questions can decisively influence the international order and EastAsian peace. Thus, they are of keen interest not only to East Asian countries but alsoto the international society. This paper examines the direction of Chinese foreignpolicy based on opinion polls of the Chinese public.

Theoretical Discussion and Method of Study

For foreign policy issues, in which policymakers have extensive discretionary powerwhile the general population lacks interest and professional knowledge, the role ofpublic opinion has been a key issue. In a democracy, in which elections serve as ameans for the public to control the government, no policymakers can neglect publicopinion. Based on this, recent studies on the subject have generally recognized thatpublic opinion is an important factor in deciding foreign policy. For example, RichardSobel showed, through case studies, that though public opinion has only limitedinfluence on foreign policymaking, it can constrain the scope of options and makesure policies do not stray beyond certain boundaries.13

In a highly centralized authoritarian system like China, it is generally recognizedthat the role of organizations or individuals in foreign policy is far more limited.14

However, the social diversification and growth of civil society based on the rapideconomic growth in China has promoted changes in the foreign policy decision-makingprocess. First, the supreme leader is often the decision-maker on foreign policy, and heappears on the frontline of diplomacy, pronouncing important foreign policy decisionsor carrying out the policy himself. The best example is frequent and brisk summitdiplomacy. Secondly, diplomatic duties as well as the types of actors are being diversi-fied. Diplomatic duties are being expanded to include diverse domains such as politics,economics, science and technology, and culture and security. Related branch of govern-ment, think-tank institutions and experts are interfering with and taking part in foreignpolicy decision-making and administration. So the Foreign Ministry is required not onlyto perform the role of the foreign policy administration agency but also to assume therole of facilitator, coordinator, and gatekeeper. Thirdly, people’s interests in foreignaffairs and increased participation have become major factors in Chinese diplomacysince the end of the Cold War.15

Today, think tanks consisting of experts of government-sponsored research institutes,university scholars, and bureaucrats are submitting reports on specific diplomatic

issues through official channels or providing diplomatic consultations through unofficialmonitoring channels. They influence government policy more indirectly, by swayingpublic opinion.16 The experts’ importance was highlighted when the leading foreignaffairs council of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China invited scholars andsought advice, and Jiang Zemin formed an organization consisting of 25 ex-ambassadorsand sought their advice on foreign policy in 1998.17 As the Chinese leadership structurebecame less-authoritarian and more collective, the leaders gradually depended moreon experts. Thus, Chinese foreign policy experts can now use diverse channels toenhance their influence and their role.18 Experts’ participation in official discussionshas become part of the foreign policy decision-making process.19

Public opinion is also an important factor in foreign policy. Although China isstill under an authoritarian regime, leaders must inevitably consider public opinionin deciding policies. Regular elections play an important role in this regard, thoughthey are held only in counties and other regional administrative units smaller thancounties. Frequent public rallies also have become a major way to influence policydecision-making.20 Therefore, the Chinese government is conducting public opinionpolls, though this started with the intention of preserving political stability, and isspending considerable sums of money to do so. Chinese leaders also try to speakdirectly with the public via the Internet. Since General Secretary Hu Jintao had adirect talk with Netizens in 2008,21 the “strong nation forum ( )” on theInternet has become a commonplace way for high-ranking officials to survey publicopinion. A study pointed out that since the Internet site “HunanRednet ( )”was started in Hunan province in 2001 as a channel of communication between thegovernment and the people, it has become commonplace for high-ranking officialsand bureaucrats to survey public opinion through communication with the public.22

Chinese leaders also respect public opinion when formulating diplomatic policies.As China’s influence rises and the confidence of the Chinese people increases, people’sinterest in foreign policy and expressing opinions has also increased. The Chineseleaders have started to listen to the voices of the general public in foreign policymaking. We know this from the speech of Li Zhaoxing, a former foreign minister.He said in a talk with a Netizen in 2003, “Diplomats are part of the people. It is theChinese government’s view to take in nutrition from the civil opinion and serve thepeople and the nation.” He said, “The Foreign Ministry wants to receive supervisionand support. We cannot complete our mission without people’s cooperation and support.” He added, “What we learned from Netizens through exchange with themon the Internet is to know what is for the people in our duties.”23

With the development of the Internet, the influence of public opinion on foreignpolicy is increasing. One example is the spurring of nationalism through the Internetand its impact on foreign policy.24 For example, China has never expressed objectionsto Japan’s permanent membership in the UN Security Council, taking into considera-tion the overall Sino-Japan relations. However, the Chinese people protested againstJapanese membership through petitions on the Internet and mass rallies. The movementinfluenced China’s leaders. Premier Wen Jiabao said during his visit to India on April13, 2005, that in some countries neighboring Japan, including China, people opposedJapan’s membership of the Security Council. He said that Japan could play a biggerrole in international affairs only if it respected history, assumed responsibility for it,and regained the trust of the people of Asia and the world.25

Of course, the influence of public opinion concerning national core interests is

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limited in China. However, we cannot deny that public opinion is a major factor inforeign policy decision-making. Accordingly, this study investigates public opinionon foreign affairs and uses it as a barometer to predict the direction of foreign policyduring the coming Xi Jinping regime. For this, we first surveyed the Chinese people’sview of the rise of China in the international order and then their conception of therole of China in the changing international order. Based on the above analysis, wetry to foresee the future direction of Chinese foreign policy.

For this purpose, this study utilizes the results of a public opinion poll jointly

Table 1. Distribution Chart of Respondents

TotalNumber Ratio

TotalNumber Ratio

(persons) (%) (persons) (%)

GenderMale 617 60.0 Beijing 145 14.1

Female 412 40.0 Shanghai 161 15.6

20–29 494 48.0 Chungtu 71 6.9

30–39 207 20.1 Shenyang 64 6.2

Age40–49 140 13.6 Xian 71 6.9

Over 50 181 17.6 City of Guangzhou 80 7.8

Don’t know/7 0.7

residenceWuhan 67 6.5

No response

General 459 44.6 Chungqing 195 19.0

workers/Farmers

Public servants/46 4.5 Tianjin 104 10.1

White-collar workers

Self-employed/148 14.4 Nanjing 71 6.9

Service industry

Occupation High school 247 24.0 Under 1,000 39 3.8

College 235 22.8 1,001–3,000 209 20.3

University 316 30.7 3,001–5,000 209 20.3

Graduate school 54 5.2 5,001–7,000 130 12.6

and over

Don’t know/9 0.9 7,001–9,000 82 8.0

No response Household

Upper class 14 1.4 income 9,001–13,000 95 9.2

Upper-middle class 93 9.0(yuan)

13,001–15,000 32 3.1

Middle class 497 48.3 15,001–30,000 70 6.8

Class Lower-middle class 304 29.5 Over 30,001 35 3.4

Lower class 113 11.0Don’t know/

Don’t know/8 0.8 No response 128 12.4

No response

Source: A Survey conducted by the Asiatic Research Institute (ARI) and the East Asian Institute (EAI)between August and September 2011. A Survey on the Perceptions of Koreans and Chinese (Seoul: ARIand EAI, 2011).

conducted by the Asiatic Research Institute (ARI) and the East Asian Institute (EAI)between August and September 2011. Using this survey, we conducted an analysistargeting 1,029 people selected through random sampling after allocation by cityaccording to population ratio in 10 cities—Beijing, Shanghai, Qingdao, Chengdu,Shenyang, Xian, Guangzhou, Wuhan, Chongqing, Tianjin, and Nanjing in which21.3 percent of the Chinese urban population live. The survey method was fixed-lineand mobile phone method based on RDD (random digit dialing) utilizing the CATIprogram; the survey period was 15 days from August 26 to September 9, 2011. Thissurvey had a 95 percent confidence level and a sampling error of 3.1 percent.

The people surveyed are believed to represent public opinion in Chinese urbanareas. By age group, those in their 20s to 40s accounted for 81.7 percent of thosesurveyed, they can be regarded as the age group who will lead public opinion overthe next 10 years. By occupation, ordinary workers, farmers, public officials, white-collar workers and private business owners, service members, and students accountedfor over 73 percent of those surveyed. By educational background, graduates of highschool or higher institution accounted for 82.5 percent of those surveyed, and byclass, people who regard themselves as middle-class accounted for 86.8 percent.Therefore, most of the people surveyed are middle-class, in their 20s to 40s, withsome educational background, and living in urban areas (see Table 1).

Rise of China and View of the International Order

The rise of China and the comparative decline of the United States in the interna-tional order have become a matter of concern in academic circles of both countries.In the United States, there is an overwhelming belief that, although China may riseand the international position of the United States may be weakened, the UnitedStates will still lead the international order in terms of military, economic, and softpower during the twenty-first century, or at least the first half of the century.26 How-ever, some circles claim that, with the rise of a new great power, a multipolar worldwill appear. For example, Roger C. Altman, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of theTreasury, said that the global prominence of the United States will decrease in themid-term, and other countries, particularly China, will ascend rapidly. Under these circumstances, he asserts that the United States should cast aside the dream of aunipolar world and accept the emerging multipolar world, embracing the rising newpower.27

In Chinese academic circles, a fierce dispute is underway over the shift in theinternational order. First of all, some experts believe that the unipolar power systemled by the United States will be maintained. This view acknowledges that the globalfinancial crisis brought about a decline in U.S. influence but denies that there hasbeen a fundamental decline of the United States’ superpower status28 However, mostscholars stress that though there has been no fundamental change in the unipolar system, structural changes toward a multipolar system are underway.29 Some expertsassert that the international order currently consists of several big powers facing onedominant power.30 Moreover, they agree that unless the one dominant power, theUnited States, cooperates with China, global problems cannot be solved.31

According to the results of the public opinion survey, the Chinese public takes

378 Lee Jung-nam


a very different view on the current international order than mainstream academicsdo. The Chinese public believes that fundamental change has been made in theinternational order that used to be led by the United States. Of those surveyed, 49.9percent responded that various countries lead the international order together, 13.7percent said the United States and China lead the world, and 4.4 percent said Chinaleads the world. Thus, 68 percent of the respondents believe the international orderis not led by the United States, is already a multipolar system, or is ruled by the G2structure (see Table 2).

In addition, the Chinese public believes that China will become the world leader,soon overtaking the United States. As shown in the following Table 3, 60.7 percent(2011) and 71.8 percent (2010) of the public answered this question affirmatively.

In particular, the Chinese public overwhelmingly agrees that Chinese influencein Asia has risen. As Table 4 indicates, 91 percent of those responding said that Chinese influence in Asia has increased for the last 10 years. On the other hand, 58.5percent (2011) and 44.6 percent (2008) said U.S. influence has increased, and 25.9percent (2011) and 28.35 percent (2008) said U.S. influence has decreased. Reflectingthe public evaluation of the Asia-centered diplomacy of the United States since2009, the percentage in 2011 who claims U.S. influence has increased was higherthan the percentage in 2008. Nevertheless, compared with the percentage that saidChinese influence has increased, a high gap of 32.5 percent is revealed. In all, 39.1percent said Japanese influence has increased, while 32.9 percent said Japaneseinfluence has decreased, revealing that people see a sharp decline of Japanese influencein Asia.

Table 2. What do you think of the Current International Order? (%)

Multiple countries, U.S. and Don’t know/

U.S. leads. China leads. not one or two China lead. No response

countries, lead.

2011 29.4 4.4 49.9 13.7 2.6

Source: A Survey on the Perceptions of Koreans and Chinese.

Table 3. Do you think China will Supersede the U.S. in Leading the World in the Near Future? (%)

Very Somewhat SomewhatNot at all

Don’t know/affirmative affirmative negative No response

2011 24.4 36.3 28.2 9.9 1.2

2010*32 32.2 39.6 18.3 8.8 1.1

Source: A Survey on the Perceptions of Koreans and Chinese.*A survey conducted by the National Research Council for Economics, Humanities and SocialSciences (NRCS) and EAI in July, 2010. Survey on How to Reinforce the Public Diplomacytoward China (Seoul: EAI and NRCS, 2010).

As indicated in Table 5, the rise of China reinforces the pride of the Chinesepeople. Table 5 below indicates that the ratio of ordinary Chinese people who takepride in being Chinese was rather high—84.9 percent in 2011 and 83.5 percent in2010 and as the ratio of 2011 is 1.4 percent points higher than that of 2010, the ratiohas an increasing trend.

What factors have given the Chinese people a sense of pride? As seen in Figure1, the strong pride of the general public in China comes from their strong trust in thesectors of military, economy, science and technology, social stability, and culture.Among China’s achievements, 77 percent of the Chinese public took pride in themilitary, 66 percent in the economic 70.5 percent in science and technology, 73 percent

380 Lee Jung-nam

Table 4. Do you think the Influence of the Following Countries has Increased or Decreasedin the Past 10 Years? (%)

Increased Not changed Decreased Don’t know/No response

U.S. 2011 58.5 13.6 25.9 1.92008* 44.6 23.9 28.3 3.1

Japan 2011 39.1 25.9 32.9 2.1

China 2011 91.0 6.0 2.1 0.9

Source: A Survey on the Perceptions of Koreans and Chinese.*A 2008 Chicago Council on Global Affairs (CCGA)-EAI Joint Survey. Soft Power in EastAsia (EAI and CCGA, 2008).

Table 5. How Proud Are You of Being Chinese? (%)

Very proud Proud Not proud Not at all Don’t know/No response

2011 44.7 40.2 10.3 3.5 1.3

2010* 40.4 43.1 9.5 4.9 2.1

Source: A Survey on the Perceptions of Koreans and Chinese.*Soft Power in East Asia (EAI and CCGA, 2008).

Figure 1. How Proud are you of the Following Achievements of China? (2011) (%)Source: A Survey on the Perceptions of Koreans and Chinese.


in culture, and 76.6 percent in social stability maintenance. On the other hand, only18.9 percent expressed pride in rooting out corruption, 27.3 percent in solving thegap between rich and poor, 43.6 percent in solving unemployment, 49 percent indemocratization, and 51.7 percent in the political system, showing relatively highdiscontent in these sectors.

Given China’s increased national power, the Chinese public generally agreesthat China is not fairly treated in the global community. Table 6 shows that 59.6 per-cent of the Chinese public responded that China is not fairly treated in the globalcommunity, and 38.7 percent said they believe otherwise. If this prevailing sense ofunfairness leads to Chinese discontent regarding the global community, publicnationalism may develop.

As shown in Figure 2, the general public believes that the United States (34.1percent), India (46.4 percent), and Vietnam (40.7 percent) respect China, while Russia(76 percent), North Korea (76.8 percent), and South Korea (54.8 percent in 2011 and65.5 percent in 2010) respect China. Thus, we see that the Chinese public believesthat China is not duly respected by its strategic competitors-United States, Japan, andIndia as well as Vietnam, with which China has a conflict over the control of the SouthChina Sea Islands. Furthermore, the Chinese public believes that China is relativelywell respected by North Korea and Russia, with whom friendly relations have been

Figure 2. To What Extent do you Agree in Your Daily about the Statement that the FollowingCountries Respect China? (2011) (%)Source: A Survey on the Perceptions of Koreans and Chinese.*Survey on How to Reinforce the Public Diplomacy toward China (Seoul: EAI and NRCS, 2010).

Table 6. China is not Fairly Treated in the International Arena (%)

Very MostlyNot so much Not at all

Don’t know/affirmative affirmative No response

2011 17.8 41.8 24.8 13.9 1.7


strengthened since the United States announced an Asia-centered diplomacy.33

Judging from the above, the Chinese public believes that China has risen interms of its military power, economic power, culture, science and technology, andsocial stability and that the international order has thus become a multipolar systemor G2 structure. In addition, since China’s influence has grown steadfastly for thelast 10 years, the Chinese public believes China will overtake the United States asthe global leader in the near future. Nevertheless, as the Chinese public believes thatChina is not fairly treated in the global community, particularly by those countriesthat are strategic competitors and have a special interest in China, if any internationalincident harms China’s national interests, the Chinese public may turn more nationalist.

Change in the International Order and the Role of China

China’s status in the global community and the international order has changed as aresult of its rise in the world. How does the Chinese public’s pride in this achievementaffect the role of China in the global community?

It is very important to analyze not only the structural standard, which thechanges in power relationships among nations, but also nations’ attributes to predicta certain country’s action in the global community.34 According to this perception,the power transition theory claims that the possibility of war will decrease if a newlyrising country is satisfied with the system driven by the superpower country, thoughthe likelihood of war may increase if the two countries, a newly rising country and ahegemon, have a balance of power.35 Based on this logic, the more satisfactionChina, a newly rising country, has with the U.S.-led order, the less possibility therewill be of war. Additionally, power transition theory requires that China, a risingcountry, learn international norms and must become more internationally socialized.

Prior to the global financial crisis, a majority of Chinese scholars emphasizedthat China should enter the U.S.-led international system. They believed this was theonly way China could continue not only its current economic growth but also itspeaceful rise. In particular, a majority of Chinese scholars called for the strengtheningof the U.S.-China relations, convinced that the improvement of bilateral relations isclosely linked to China’s entry to the global community such as its accession to theWTO in 2001.36

Since the 2008 financial crisis, however, a number of scholars have stressed thatChina should participate in the U.S.-led international system and at the same timepeaceful rise as increasing its influence on the international system. They said thatChina’s rise as a great power is inevitable, but it is better to rise peacefully ratherthan to wage a war against the great powers. For this, China should concentrate onenhancing its soft power through the control of rules and norms and promotion ofChina’s values.37

The result of the public poll revealed the Chinese people’s support for a peacefulrise and for participating in and influencing the international system. Above all, amajority of the Chinese public holds that China’s role in the global communityrequires it to be a mediator of conflicts, not a creator or leader of an alternativeworld order. As Table 7 shows, 52.4 percent of the Chinese public answered thatChina should serve as a mediator in disagreements or conflicts occurring betweenthe advanced countries and developing countries, Western and non-Western countries;

382 Lee Jung-nam


26.6 percent answered that China should seek to change the present world order;only 15.3 percent answered that China should build and lead a new alternative order.These aspects can be explained as an expression of public belief that China will risepeacefully by taking the role of innovator and mediator through participation in thepresent international order.

It is believed that China will rise while participating in the present system as amediator and reformer rather than as a creator of a new alternative world order; this hasbeen shown by China’s open and various ways of participating in international affairs.As shown in Table 8, 89.9 percent of the general public believe active participationin international issues will benefit China in the future, thus giving this approachstrong support from public opinion.

Table 7. What do you think is the Appropriate Role for China in the Global Community? (%)

Example

The role led by China as a creator making an alternative world 2011 15.3

order and system

The role as a mediator managing different views and conflicts between the advanced countries and developing countries, and Western and non 2011 52.4Western countries

The role as a reformer correcting the present world order and system, 2011 26.6

which have been led by advanced Western countries

Don’t know/No response 2011 5.7


Table 8. Do you think that China’s Active Intervention in International Issues will WorkPositively for China in the Future? (%)

Yes No Don’t know/No response

2011 89.9 8.6 1.6


Table 9. What do you think of the Following Questions Respectively? Zero means “do notagree at all,” and 10 means “fully agree.” Please write your score.

Do not agree Agree Fully agree

Don’t know/at all no response

I am a Chinese. 2011 2.3 18.5 78.3 1.02008* 1.0 9 89 2.0

I am an Asian. 2011 4.6 25.6 68.3 1.62008* 5 17.0 75 5.0

I am a global citizen. 2011 7.3 25.7 63.4 3.7

Source: A Survey on the Perceptions of Koreans and Chinese.*Soft Power in East Asia.

In addition, the will of the Chinese to rise up by participating in the present systemcan be evinced by the fact that the Chinese people maintain an open identity not onlyas Chinese but also as Asians and global citizens. Identity is an awareness as a memberof a group such as a nation or a country, and the process of forming such awarenessis very political and is frequently assumed to be antagonistic.38 Table 9 below showshow the Chinese people think about their identities; according to their responses, theysee themselves as Chinese (78.3 percent), Asians (68.3 percent), and global citizens(63.4 percent).

In addition, as shown in Table 10 and Table 11, respectively, Chinese peoplehave relatively positive attitudes in giving Chinese nationality to foreigners (56.9percent), foreign culture (82.8 percent), large foreign firms (58.2 percent), the decisionsof international organizations (46.6 percent), and free trade agreement. Thus, Chinesepeople are relatively open to participating in and accepting the global community.

The high approval for building multilateral and regional cooperation is further

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Table 10. Please State your Opinion about the Following Suggestions

Very Somewhat Somewhat Not Don’t know/affirmative affirmative negative at all no response

Foreigners should be able to get Chinese nationality 2011 10.3 46.6 31.0 10.5 1.7more easily.

China should actively accept foreign culture.

2011 32.3 50.5 12.1 3.7 1.4

Large foreign firms are increasingly harming the 2011 9.5 29.7 45.0 13.2 2.5Chinese economy.

If the Chinese position differs from the decision of an international 2011 7.9 38.7 34.3 14.0 5.2organization, China should follow the decision.


Table 11. Do you think China should Join the Free-trade Agreement with the FollowingCountries to Lower the Barriers of Trade such as Customs?

Yes No Don’t know/No response

United States2011 69.8 24.1 6.12008* 84.4 2011.1 4.5

Japan2011 66.5 27.7 5.82008* 78.9 16.0 5.2

Korea2011 63.7 31.1 5.22008* 82.1 12.2 5.7



evidence of the fact that the Chinese public is highly interested in solving interna-tional issues by cooperation in the present international order. As shown in Table 12,71.4 percent of the Chinese public in 2011 and 67.8 percent in 2008 support buildinga regional community in East Asia.

As shown above, the Chinese public believes China should rise peacefully, notby establishing a new order but by participating actively in the global community.The Chinese public sees the Chinese role as that of a great power responsible forsolving international issues. This is not quite different from the assertion of the Chinese government stressing that China should rise peacefully in the present system maintaining harmonized relationships with neighboring countries. However,as the Chinese public believes that China should actively intervene in internationalaffairs and carry out a responsible role as a great power in the global community,they have a different view from the Chinese government’s belief that China, as adeveloping country, should follow a cautious foreign policy centering on domesticeconomic development while aiming to be a great power.

However, the Chinese public does not rule out the possibility of conflict withother countries. The Chinese public has serious concerns about potential security

Table 12. What do you think of East Asian Countries including China, Korea, and JapanForming a Regional Community?

Fully Somewhat Somewhat Absolutely Don’t know/agree agree disagree disagree No response

2011 17.7 53.7 17.0 8.6 3.0

2008* Agree=67.8 Disagree=26.7 5.5


Figure 3. The Above Table Presents Possible Factors that May Harm the National Interests ofChina in the Next 10 Years. What is Your Opinion on Each Item? (2011) (%)Source: A Survey on the Perceptions of Koreans and Chinese.

threats, both traditional and nontraditional, such as economic competition among Asiancountries (65.9 percent), U.S. armed forces in Asia (73.7 percent), the unilateralismof the United States (74.3 percent), the militarization of Japan (77.7 percent), militaryconflict between North and South Korea (68.5 percent), terrorism (73.8 percent),energy (91.1 percent), infectious diseases (87 percent), and climate issues (87.9 percent)(See Figure 3).

Thus China recognizes the need for cooperation with neighboring countries tosolve global problems. At the same time, China is concerned about the high securityrisks originating not only from neighboring countries but also from the United Statesand Japan. Therefore, if any confrontations occur with neighboring countries, aneruption of strong nationalism in China is a distinct possibility.

Evaluation and Prospects

Negative evaluation has demonstrated its power upon the influence of public opinionthat worked in the process of foreign-policy decision-making in an authoritariancountry like China. However, along with economic development, civil society hasimproved, and the voice of the general public has become an important factor ingovernment policy decision-making. In particular, the general public, filled withpride in China’s rise, is taking great interest in, and actively expressing its opinionon diplomatic issues. These formations and expressions of the general public opinionhave exerted great influence thanks to the development of the Internet. Therefore,political leaders have begun to take public opinion as an important variable in foreignpolicy decision-making. Accordingly, it is very important to predict what policy XiJinping is likely to take based on the survey of the general public’s views of theinternational order and the Chinese role in the global community.

According to the survey results, the Chinese public believes that the status andinfluence of the United States in the global community have decreased, particularlyin Asia, while those of China have increased, changing the international order into amultipolar system or a G2 system. In addition, they believe that China will become aworld leader in the near future. They have strong pride in their emerging China,especially in its economic growth, military buildup, stable political system and culturalcapabilities. At the same time, the Chinese public believes that China has not beentreated fairly in the global community or by its neighboring countries. Therefore,there is a distinct possibility that China may erupt with an exclusive nationalism.

Significantly, the Chinese public believes that China does not have to build anew international order but instead should participate in the current internationalorder and rise up peacefully. Of course, as about 15 percent of the general publicresponded that China should create a new alternative order driven by China, theremight be a concern about the danger of the so-called “China hegemony.” However,most of the general public asserts that China should function as a mediator of disputesand conflicts between the advanced countries and developing countries, Western andnon-Western countries in the current international order, thus showing that Chinesepeople think China should participate in the global community. These facts meanthat the Chinese public supports the Chinese government’s position that China willactively participate in the international order and rise up as a great power peacefully.

Furthermore, the Chinese public believes that China should implement an

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assertive foreign policy while carrying out a responsible role as a great power. Tothis end, the Chinese public recognizes that China should actively intervene in variousinternational affairs, join various international organizations, and also actively par-ticipate in the organization of multinational communities. The Chinese public has an open attitude about the global community, foreigners, foreign enterprises, foreigncultures, and free-trade agreements. The public also see themselves as Asian and asglobal citizens as well as being Chinese. At the same time, they recognize that energyproblems, economic competition with neighboring countries, the unilateralism of theUnited States and the presence of U.S. forces in Asia, the military expansion ofJapan, and the possibility of conflict between North and South Korea may threatenthe national interests of China. Therefore, if any conflict occurs over these problems,China might turn to strong nationalism.

Analyzing the results of the above surveys, the foreign policy of the Xi Jinpingera can be predicted as follows: First, there is a low possibility that China will pursuea new international order, aiming to attain a supreme status in the global communitythrough aggressive foreign policy. More likely, China, participating in the globalcommunity, will try to change the current international order in a way beneficial toitself through its role as a mediator or a reformer. In short, a peaceful rise and anattempt to establish a new international order through reform will be pursued with along-term view.

Secondly, in order to rise peacefully, China will make more efforts to promoteits soft power by participating more actively in the international system, not justcompeting in the hard-power area of economic power or military expansion. To dothis, China is expected to promote its own norms and values in the internationalarena. In addition, China is expected to participate in international and multilateralorganizations, take a more open posture toward the global community by acceptingfree-trade agreements and foreign cultures, and more actively participate in discussionsand meetings to form regional communities.

Thirdly, diverging from the prudent policies of the present Hu Jintao government,moving toward being a great power by promoting China as a country developingsocialism, in the short and mid-term, a more assertive and powerful foreign policywill be pursued. Naturally, Xi Jinping’s regime will initially focus on consolidatingits domestic power base, while maintaining the existing foreign policy, but after acertain period of time, the new administration is expected to participate more activelyin the global community and implement responsible great power diplomacy for China.The Chinese public strongly believes that China must intervene in and participate invarious international issues and carry out certain duties as a great power. This beliefwill factor into the new administration’s foreign policy decision-making processes.

Fourthly, the Chinese public has a strong pride in China and its new place on theinternational stage; some even express a desire for China to form and lead a newinternational order. Therefore, in the event that any international situation threatensChina’s national interests, the general public’s pride in China, combined with discontentover unfair treatment of China by the global community, may cause an aggressiveand exclusive nationalism to erupt among the population. In particular, Japan, theUnited States, India, Vietnam, U.S.-Japan relations, and Korea-U.S. relations areregarded as major factors that threaten the national interests of China. If a conflict inAsia occurs in the short term with, for example, the United States or Japan, despiteof its basic policy of peaceful development and rise, the Chinese public is likely to

support, and the Chinese government likely to adopt, an aggressive foreign policy. Inparticular, as the United States has started to check Chinese influence by reorientingits strategic focus on Asia, there is a high possibility that China may temporarilytake a strong position against the United States.

Notes

1. Li Chunyuan and Fan Jianzhong, “Analysis of ‘the ‘Decline of the U.S’” [in Chinese],Contemporary International Relations [Xiandai guoji guanxi], no. 8 (2008): 30–36; NiuXinchun, “‘As China Married the U.S.,’ They Are One” [in Chinese], Global Times[Huanqiu shibao], December 16, 2008; “Wen Jiabao Met Obama and Did Not Agree toG2 Expression Law” [in Chinese], Xinhuanet.com [XinHuaWang], November 18, 2009;Liu Jianfei, “China is to Deal with ‘the G2 Theory’ Rationally” [in Chinese], Cadres Tribune, no. 5 (2009): 37; Liu Weidong, “Realistic Establishment of Relationship betweenG2, ‘Chimerica’ and the relation between U.S. and China” [in Chinese], Red Flag Manuscript[Hongqiwengao], no. 13 (2009): 8; and Liu Weidong, “G2: Beautiful Killing” [in Chinese],Friend, no. 5 (2009): 38–39.

2. Kim Sung-han, “Asia-Pacific Policy of Obama Administration in the U.S.: Return toAsia?,” Studies on International Relations 16, no. 2 (Fall 2011): 105. Prof. Sun Xuefengof Qinghua University asserts a bipolar trend in which China and the U.S. ally system jointlydominates East Asia. Sun Xuefeng, Dilemma of China’s Rise: Theoretical Reflections andStrategic Options [in Chinese] (Beijing: Social Science Academic Press, 2011), 155–63.

3. Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy (November 2011): 57–63.4. “U.S. Grand Turn of Foreign Policy ‘Asia All In’” and “U.S. Extensive Pressure upon

China Even Using Vietnam, which Staged a War for 10 Years, as a Base,” Chosun Ilbo,November 19, 2011; Feng Guangqian, “The U.S. Currently Plans to Build up an OppressiveStrategy against China Comprehensively” [in Chinese], chinanews.com.cn [Zhongguoxinwen wang], December 20, 2011, http://www.chinaelections.org/printnews.asp?newsid=219985 (accessed on December 20, 2011).

5. Michael D. Swaine, “China’s Assertive Behavior, Part One; On ‘Core Interests’,” ChinaLeadership Monitor, no. 34 (2011): 1–11.

6. Dai Bingguo, “Let’s Keep on the Path toward Peaceful Progress” [in Chinese], December6, 2010, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/gxh/tyb/zyxw/t774662.htm (accessed on December8, 2010).

7. Wang Jisi, “China’s Search for a Grand Strategy: A Rising Great Power Finds Its Way,”Foreign Affairs (March/April 2011): 73.

8. Ibid., 74–77.9. Lee, Dong-ryul, “China Vision 2020: Mission for Superpower Strategy,” in The Future

of China: Possibility and Prospects for Global Super-power (Seoul: East Asia Institute,2011), 35–38.

10. Yan Xuetong, “How China Can Defeat America,” New York Times, November 20, 2011;and Wu Xinbo, “Obama’s Strategic Consideration on the Asia-Pacific Region” [in Chinese],dfdaily.com [Dongfang zaobao], November 22, 2011.

11. Fan Qinghua, “China-U.S. Relations: How to Develop Them in a Healthy Way-DirectorYan Xuetong of International Relations Research Institute, Tsinghua University, Answers”[in Chinese], World Affairs [Shijiazhishi] (June, 2011): 24–26.

12. Sun, Dilemma of China’s Rise, 120–29; Yan Xuetong and Wu Wenbing, How Can ChinaRise? [Zhongguo jueqi kao shenme] (Changsha: Hunan renmin chubanshe, 2010), 15–17.

13. Richard Sobel, The Impact of Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy Since Vietnam(Oxford University Press, 2001), chapter 1.

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14. Wang Yizhou, “Civil Society and China Foreign Policy” [in Chinese], Social Science inChina [Zhongguo shehui kexue], no. 3 (2000): 36.

15. Zhang Qingmin, “Analysis of China’s Decision-Making of Foreign Policy Due to SocialChanges” [in Chinese], International Politics Quarterly [Guoji zhengzhi yanjiu], no. 1(2006): 55–56; Zhang Tasheng, “China’s Foreign Policy Opportunities and ChallengesDue to Social Changes” [in Chinese], International Politics Quarterly [Guoji zhengzhiyanjiu], no. 1 (2006): 12–13.

16. Liao Xuanli, Chinese Foreign Policy Think Tanks and China’s Policy towards Japan (HongKong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006), 53–65.

17. Joseph Fewsmith and Stanley Rosen, “The Domestic Context of Chinese Foreign Policy:Does ‘Public Opinion’ Matter?,” in The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy inthe Era of Reform, 1978–2000, ed. David M. Lampton (Stanford, CA: Stanford UniversityPress, 2001), 153–54.

18. Liao, Chinese Foreign Policy Think Tanks, 73.19. Fewsmith and Rosen, “The Domestic Context of Chinese Foreign Policy,” 153–54.20. Wenfang Tang, Public Opinion and Political Change in China (Stanford, CA: Stanford

University Press, 2005), 196–98.21. Zhou Qing, ed., Facing Public Opinion- New Direction of Internet-Politics [Yu minyi mian

dui mian-wangluo wenzheng xin fangxiang] (Beijing: Research Press, 2011), 6–8.22. Qing, Facing Public Opinion, 254–64.23. “Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing communicates with the Public through the Internet” [in

Chinese], http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/zxxx/t56830.htm (accessed on December 30,2003).

24. Wang Jun, Internet Nationalism and Chinese Foreign Policy [in Chinese] (Beijing: ChineseSocial Science Press, 2011).

25. “Wen Jiabao Meets With Foreign Reporters” [in Chinese], People’s Daily [Renminribao],April 13, 2005.

26. John G. Ikenberry, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 1(Jan/Feb 2008): 23; and Joseph S. Nye Jr., “China’s Rise Doesn’t Mean War,” ForeignPolicy, no. 184 (Jan/Feb 2011): 66.

27. Roger C. Altman, “The Great Crash, 2008: A Geopolitical Setback for the West,” ForeignAffairs 88, no. 1 (2009): 14.

28. Shang Hong, “Shock from the U.S. Hegemony in Financial Crisis” [in Chinese], ContemporaryInternational Relations [Xiandai guoji guanxi], no. 4 (2009): 32–33; Zhu Feng, “FinancialCrisis and Changes in Contemporary International Order” [in Chinese], ContemporaryInternational Relations [Xiandai guoji guanxi], no. 4 (2009): 24–26; and Lin Limin, “TheRise of G20 is the Starting Point of Change in the International System Only the StartingPoint G20” [in Chinese], Contemporary International Relations [Xiandai guoji guanxi],no. 11 (2009): 36–37.

29. Chui Liru, “Rise of G20 and Great International Emergency G20” [in Chinese], ContemporaryInternational Relations [Xiandai guoji guanxi], no. 11 (2009): 1–3; Men Honghua, “Shift ofWorld Systems and Strategic Direction of China” [in Chinese], Contemporary InternationalRelations [Xiandai guoji guanxi], no. 11 (2009): 35–36; Feng Guangqian, “Influence ofGlobal Financial Crisis upon International Status” [in Chinese], Contemporary InternationalRelations [Xiandai guoji guanxi], no.4, (2009): 26–27; Qin Yaqing, “Shift of InternationalSystems and Continuation of Strategic Opportunities of China” [in Chinese], ContemporaryInternational Relations [Xiandai guoji guanxi], no. 4 (2009): 35–37; Liu Jiangyong, “The Riseof Developing China Has Changed the Era and World Order” [in Chinese], ContemporaryInternational Relations [Xiandai guoji guanxi], no. 11 (2009): 23; Jin Canrong, “Influenceof Financial Crisis upon World Geopolitics” [in Chinese], Contemporary InternationalRelations [Xiandai guoji guanxi], no. 4 (2009): 15–17.

30. Yuan Peng, “Shift in International Systems and China’s Strategic Choice” [in Chinese],

Contemporary International Relations [Xiandai guoji guanxi], no. 4 (2009): 39–40; andLi, Xing, “Thoughts on New Changes in International Order and China’s Policies” [inChinese], Contemporary International Relations [Xiandai guoji guanxi], no. 11 (2009):29–30.

31. Yuan, “Shift in International Systems,” 41; Cai Tuo, “China Is to Take a Role in ChangingInternational Order” [in Chinese], Contemporary International Relations [Xiandai guojiguanxi], no. 11 (2009): 30–32; Lin Hongyu, “International Financial Crisis, Rise of G20and China [in Chinese],” Contemporary International Relations [Xiandai guoji guanxi],no. 11 (2009): 27–28.

32. In the 2010 survey, the question was “Will China be equivalent to the U.S.?”33. Wang Jisi, “New Trends in U.S. Relations with China and the Impact on Security in

Northeast Asia” [in Chinese], International Politics Quarterly [Guoji zhengzhi yanjiu] 1(2011): 1–5.

34. Alex Callinicos, History and Behavior, Making History: Agency, Structure and Changein Social Theory, trans. by Kim Yong-hak (Seoul: Kyobo Book Store, 1992).

35. A.F.K. Organski, World Politics, 2nd ed. (New York: Knopf, 1968), 333.36. Wu Xinbo, “Re-establishment of Strategic Base in China U.S. Relations with Internationalization:

With Focus on Economy and Trade Cooperation between China and the U.S. and theirGlobal Impacts” [in Chinese], World Economics and Politics [Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi],no. 9 (2002); Lu Yuzhong, “China-U.S. Relations and Re-establishment of China’sImage in the Context of Globalization of the Economy” [in Chinese], World [Shijie], no. 6(2006); and Feng Feng, “China’s Rising and Relations between China and U.S.” [in Chinese],Academic Exploration [Xueshutansuo], no. 1 (2006).

37. Zhu Feng, “China’s Rise Will Be Peaceful,” in China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and theFuture of International Politics, eds. Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng (Ithaca, NY: CornellUniversity Press, 2008), 34–94; Pu Xiaoyu, “Review on China and International Order:From a Socio political Viewpoint” [in Chinese], World Economics and Politics [Shijiejingji yu zhengzhi], no. 1 (2010): 27–34; Yan, Xuetong, “How China Can Defeat America,”New York Times, November 20, 2011.

38. Lee Suk-jong, “Global Identity and Foreign Relations of Korea,” in Koreans, Who AreWe?, eds. Gang Won-taek and Lee Nae-young (Seoul: East Asia Institute, 2011), 81.

Notes on Contributor

Lee Jung-nam is associate professor of Asiatic Research Institute at Korea University, Seoul,Korea. Her research interests include contemporary Chinese politics, and focus especially onpolitical transformation and China’s foreign policy. Her published works include: Democracyand China (ed.) Seoul: Asiatic Research Institute Press, 2012; “China’s idea of East Asian Order:A Comparative Study of ‘Harmonious World Theory’ and Sino-centric Tributary System,” inThe Korean Journal of International Relations 50, no. 1 (Spring 2010),” A Critical Analysisof the theory of Chinese-Style Democracy” International Area Review 13, no. 2 (Spring2010), “China’s soft power in East Asia: an estimation based on the outcome of surveys of sixcountries” in The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 21, no. 2 (June 2009), and a number ofother articles in academic journals.

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outlook on chinese foreign policy in the coming era of xi jinping …kida.re.kr/data/kjda/06_lee...

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