oversight book

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Governing the

PhilippineBureaucracy:Issues and Challenges of

Legislative Oversight

Congressional Planning and Budget Department House of Representatives, Quezon City

February 2006


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TTTTThis material is copyright-free. It may bequoted in part or in full, reprinted orreproduced in any medium, withoutrestrictions. However, the CongressionalPlanning and Budget Department and theHouse of Representatives would appreciatereceiving copies of articles and publicationsthat refer to or use this report.

Printed in the Philippines.


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It is the proper duty of a representative to look diligently into every affair of government and to talk much about what it sees. It is meant to be the eyes and the voice, and to embody the wisdom and will of its constituents.Unless Congress have and use very means of acquainting itself with the acts and disposition of the administrative agents of government, the country must

be helpless to learn how it is being served. The informing function of Congress should be preferred even to its legislative function.

Woodrow Wilson. 1885

Virtually every democratic legislature and parliament has the authority to undertake and conduct oversight in almost every area of government activityThe House (of Representatives) can exercise competent,effective oversight to prod the Executive into more timely, proper and correct action.Information is critical to legislative oversightCongressional oversight is about accountability and rule of law.

Rep. Roilo Golez. 2005

The present legislative oversight lacks the necessary logist ical support. Municipal councilors have adequate staff, computers and office equipment, while legislators with limited staff are equipped with outdated and obsolete office machines in carrying out their daily tasks. Congress should therefore work closely with COA in its oversight function. A memorandum of agreement between Congress and COA would be a good starting point to ensure an effective legislative oversight.

Rep. Jesus Crispin Remulla.2005

Congressional oversight is an integral part of a democratic system of government. The exercise by the legislature of this power is essential if transparency, integrity and efficiency in the performance of the functions of the other branches of government are to be maintained.

Rep. Joseph Emilio A. Abaya, Jr. 2005


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TA BLE OF CON TEN TS

11111 IntroductionIntroductionIntroductionIntroductionIntroduction 1

22222 What is Legislative Oversight What is Legislative Oversight What is Legislative Oversight What is Legislative Oversight What is Legislative Oversight 5 Objectives of Legislative Oversight 7

Other Motivations 10

33333 Legislative Oversight: A Simplified Framework Legislative Oversight: A Simplified Framework Legislative Oversight: A Simplified Framework Legislative Oversight: A Simplified Framework Legislative Oversight: A Simplified Framework 13

44444 Techniques of Legislative OversightTechniques of Legislative OversightTechniques of Legislative OversightTechniques of Legislative OversightTechniques of Legislative Oversight 17 Oversight Reviews 17

Common Oversight Review Practices 19Legislative Perspective in Oversight Work 12Approaches to Legislative Oversight 23Oversight Tools and Administrative Controls 26

55555 Evaluating Performance: Need for IndicatorsEvaluating Performance: Need for IndicatorsEvaluating Performance: Need for IndicatorsEvaluating Performance: Need for IndicatorsEvaluating Performance: Need for Indicators 28 The Three Es 30

Carrot and Stick 31Negotiating Performance Contracts 33

66666 The Other Government Oversight AgenciesThe Other Government Oversight AgenciesThe Other Government Oversight AgenciesThe Other Government Oversight AgenciesThe Other Government Oversight Agencies 34

77777 The Peoples Role in Legislative OversightThe Peoples Role in Legislative OversightThe Peoples Role in Legislative OversightThe Peoples Role in Legislative OversightThe Peoples Role in Legislative Oversight 40

88888 Customer Feedback: A Potent Tool for OversightCustomer Feedback: A Potent Tool for OversightCustomer Feedback: A Potent Tool for OversightCustomer Feedback: A Potent Tool for OversightCustomer Feedback: A Potent Tool for Oversight 45Institutionalizing the Filipino Report Cardas a Legislative Oversight Tool 47

9 .9 .9 .9 .9 . Proposal for a Congress-COA PartnershipProposal for a Congress-COA PartnershipProposal for a Congress-COA PartnershipProposal for a Congress-COA PartnershipProposal for a Congress-COA PartnershipCooperation for OversightCooperation for OversightCooperation for OversightCooperation for OversightCooperation for Oversight 50 Establishing the Congress-Audit Link 51

Initial Steps 53


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1 01 01 01 01 0 The Use of ICT in Legislative OversightThe Use of ICT in Legislative OversightThe Use of ICT in Legislative OversightThe Use of ICT in Legislative OversightThe Use of ICT in Legislative Oversight 55Improving Oversight Function through ICT 56

1 11 11 11 11 1 Factors Affecting Legislative OversightFactors Affecting Legislative OversightFactors Affecting Legislative OversightFactors Affecting Legislative OversightFactors Affecting Legislative Oversight 59

1 21 21 21 21 2 Major Challenges and RecommendationsMajor Challenges and RecommendationsMajor Challenges and RecommendationsMajor Challenges and RecommendationsMajor Challenges and Recommendations 64Information is Key 64Executive Order 464 65In-House Oversight Reports and Studies 66Logistics Problems 67Knowledge Sharing 68What is to be done? 68A National Policy Research Network 71Conclusion 72

L ist of A nnexesL ist of A nnexesL ist of A nnexesL ist of A nnexesL ist of A nnexes

ANNEX 1 - Questions that can b asked during the Budget Authorization Phase 74

ANNEX 2 -Framework for Assessing the Performance of Legislative Oversight Bodies 78

ANNEX 3 - Community Based Monitoring System 79

L ist of B oxed A rt iclesL ist of B oxed A rt iclesL ist of B oxed A rt iclesL ist of B oxed A rt iclesL ist of B oxed A rt icles

Box 1 - Why Does the Bureaucracy Need to be Governed? 4Box 2 - Some of the most frequently stated goals of legislative

Oversight 12

L ist of TablesL ist of TablesL ist of TablesL ist of TablesL ist of Tables

Table 1. A Simplified Framework on the Oversight Process 15Table 2. Common Oversight Practices 19Table 3. Effectiveness Scores of Administrative Controls

in Rank Order 27Table 4. Formal venue and Information Sources for the

Conduct of Legislative Oversight 35


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T his monograph was prepared as part of the World Bank-administered Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) Grant No. TF052163Strengthening Institutions for Sustainable Poverty Reduction and Good Governance, which was provided from the ASEM-EU Asian Financial CrisisResponse Fund through the Department of Finance. It seeks to highlight andintegrate the major lessons and insights gained from the various componentprojects that were implemented by the Congressional Planning and BudgetDepartment (CPBD), which included: (1) A Diagnostic Study of LegislativeOversight Process in Congress; (2) Workshops with the Oversight Agenciesin the Executive to Strengthen Coordination; (3) Technical Consultations with

Local Government Units, civil society and non-government organizations;(4) Customized training for CPBD and Committee Affairs personnel of thePhilippine House of Representatives.

The main articles/sections in this publication were contributed byDr. Clarita Carlos, who was tasked to sum up the reports of Dr. Divina Edralinand Mr. Miguel Guioguio, project consultants on the above items (1) and (2).Additional write ups were prepared by Director General Rodolfo Vicerra, Dr.Romulo Emmanuel Miral, Ms. Dina Pasagui, and Mr. Novel Bangsal allwith the CPBD. Mr. Vicerra edited and coordinated the production of this

volume, with assistance from Mr. Rommel V. Asuncion, Ms. Portia HazelCarlos and Ms. Ellen G. Mangiliman. Cover photo was courtesy of DeputySecretary-General Emmanuel Albano and Director Ferdinand Bolislis of thePublic Relations and Information Department. Mr. Vicerra was Chairman of the House Task Force on Grant Implementation, with Dr. Miral and Dr. RamonRicado Roque as members.

The CPBD wishes to thank Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr. and membersof the House of Representatives, particularly Rep. Roilo Golez, Rep. JosephEmilio Abaya, Rep. Gilbert Remulla, Rep. Jesus Crispin Remulla, Rep.Josefina M. Joson and Rep. Teodoro Locsin, whose support and participationcontributed to the completion of this project. We acknowledge with thanksthe invaluable assistance of the Finance Department of the House of Representatives headed by Deputy Secretary General Rhodora Sevilla, andalso the House Printing Service. Likewise, we wish to express our gratitudeto the many participants in the above-cited workshops and consultations wheremany inputs and meaningful insights were gathered and adopted in varioussections of this book. The views expressed herein, however, are exclusivelythose of the writers and do not represent the official position of the House of Representatives


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MESSAGEMESSAGEMESSAGEMESSAGEMESSAGE

We, at the House of Representatives, carry the immenseresponsibility of making sure that Government policies andprograms would lead to marked improvements in the lives and wellbeing of our people. We share a deep sense of urgency inpushing for various social, political and economic reforms evenas we seek affirmative action to assist the poorest segments of

our population.

Still, legislative oversight is a power that the Congressneeds to exhaust and maximize. The proposals and ideas thatthis material suggests should help in improving the quality andregularity of oversight activity in Congress.

The exercise of legislative oversight is among of the mostcritical functions of the House of Representatives. It is one of

the greatest expressions of our system of democraticrepresentation. It is a duty and commitment that should becarried out by every responsible legislator in behalf of his/herconstituents.

This publication was prepared as part of a World Bank- ASEM supported project of the Congressional Planning andBudget Department (CPBD) to help enhance the generalunderstanding on the nature and importance of legislativeoversight. It aims to condense and highlight in one readablemonograph the insights and lessons from almost one year of study and technical consultations that the CPBD conducted in2005.

I would like to commend the CPBD for this good work.

SPEAKER JOSE C. DEVENECIA


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ForewordForewordForewordForewordForeword

No sooner is a law begotten than it is forgotten. Hence, theremarkable similarity between the proliferation of laws and the highincidence of fatherless children born into poverty. And yet lawmaking,unlike procreation, isnt anywhere near as much fun even if both arecontact sports. Anyone who has seen how hard lawmakers actually work on legislative measures and how difficult it is to get them passed by just one, let alone both houses of Congress, would be amazed at the

sudden indifference that overcomes Congress as soon as its legislativeproducts leave its hands and passes into that of the bureaucracy.

Once in a while, when a bureaucrat crosses a lawmaker, thelatter may threaten to inflict the congressional oversight function onhim and his department. Which is to say, check up on how he isimplementing a law.

But this threat is rarely carried out, either because thelawmaker is quickly appeased or he is unsure about how much more work he will have put into carrying out his threat. For oversight, asthis slim but weighty volume shows, its hard, time-consuming,manpower intensive and at the best of times tedious work.

And yet it is critical. It needs to be done. It is very seldom thatanything is ever gotten right the first or even the second time around.

This shows up when a legislative measure is returned tocommittee or to Congress as a whole just for textual defects. A goodexample is the first Anti-Money Laundering Law, which had to beredone.

But the defects that still lurk in the words measure show upeven more and in more critical areas when the bureaucracy attemptsto implement a law. Either the law itself is defective, is just plain wrongfor its avowed purpose or for the bureaucracy that must run with it.Laws should be written not just to work well on paper but in fact out inthe real world. It should be crafted with a profound understanding onits subject, and equally the strengths and weaknesses of those tasked

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The proof of the pudding is indeed in the eating more thananything else. A good example is the second Anti-Money LaunderingLaw, which was so carefully crafted to avoid abuse that it is turningout inutile, although it appears to have impressed the internationalanti-money laundering authority abroad enough to remove thePhilippines from its blacklist of uncooperative countries.

Congressional oversight committees created in the laws they are meant to monitor do a good job sometimes, but even then only fitfully. They lack the long, sustained and consistent commitment of aprofessionally staffed oversight body of the Congress itself.

Laws are like cars and lawmaking is sometimes like throwinggood money after bad. First resources are spent making a law that turnsout bad and then more money is spent trying to make it work, when animproved measure wouldnt cost nearly as much to get the work doneright.

This book shows how to stop throwing good money after badand how the legislature can continue to care effectively for its children,as one might call its enactments, even after they have gone out into

the world to be tried and tested.

Rep.Teodoro L. Locsin, Jr.1st District of Makati.


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xiiiAbbreviations and Acronyms

AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines

ASEM Asia Europe Meeting

CBMS Community Based Monitoring System

COA Commission on Audit

CPBD Congressional Planning and Budget Department

CSC Civil Service Commission

DBM Department of Budget and Management

DBCC Development Budget Coordination CommitteeEO Executive Order

GAO Government Accountability Office

GOCC Government Owned and Controlled Corporation

ICT Information and Communication Technology

IDRC International development Research Center

KRA Key Result Area

LGU Local Government Unit

MFO Major Final Outputs

MIMAP Micro Impacts of Macroeconomic Adjustment Policies

MTPIP Medium-Term Public Investment Plan

MTPDP Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan

NAPC National Anti-Poverty Commission

NEDA National Economic and Development Authority NEP National Expenditure Program

PEM Public Expenditure Management

PMS Poverty Monitoring System

PNP Philippine National Police

SWS Social Weather Station

VFM Value for Money

VPN Virtual Private Network


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Governing the Philippine Bureaucracy:I ssu es a n d Ch a l l en ges of

Legi sl a t i ve Over si gh t 1

INTRODUCTION 1

ver the past few decades, the conduct of leg-islative oversight in the form of performanceauditing or evaluation has increasingly grownin frequency and in terms of relevancy. As gov-ernments expanded in scope, functions and ju-risdiction, so did their government bureaucracies.

It has been observed that the evolution andstructure of legislative oversight developed within the framework of financial auditingstandards and social methods of evaluation re-search. This may be explained by the fact thatlegislative oversight began as an effort to over-see how taxpayer monies were spent. 2

Essentially, oversight has been associated with the legislatures constitutionally mandated

1 Except where otherwise indicated, the major sections of this monograph werewritten by Prof. Clarita Carlos, Ph.D. based on consultants reports.2 http://reform.house.gov/UploadedFiles/grchistory.pdf


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work of appropriations a unique function in

the governmental budgeting process whereinCongress bestows legal authorization on the useof public funds. The national budget the finan-cial plan of the governmentformally comes outas a law designed to support the political, eco-nomic, and social objectives of the government,as well as to carry out its administrative poli-cies. This is the basis of Congress so-calledpower over the governments purse.

In order to ensure public accountability onthe laws it passes, including the yearly appropriation laws, Congress has customarily

summoned officials of concerned governmentagencies during budget hearings to report ontheir accomplishments and their future plans.In cases of known serious wrongdoing, blueribbon investigations and legislative inquiriesare often conducted after the fact. Thus,legislative oversight work can be seen asattempts to detect and remedy executive branch violations of legislative goals. 3

Since the 1990s, the Philippine Congresshas also enacted laws creating various oversight

3 Hamm, K. and Roby Robertson (1981), Factors Influencing the Adoption of NewMethods of Legislative Oversight in the U.S. States, Legislative Studies Quarterly ,VI, 1 (February): 133-150.


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bodies with the aim of achieving more effectivedirection in the implementation of specific laws by the executive branch of government.

Agency Rule-making Agency Rule-making Agency Rule-making Agency Rule-making Agency Rule-making . Nonetheless, overthe years, the bureaucracy has become skilledin exerting tremendous influence in theimplementation of the laws. The tremendous

growth of government activity also necessitatedand heightened the rule-making powers of amuch larger and more active bureaucracy.

What has been happening lately is that un-elected officials in the bureaucracy have alsoincreasingly become politicized so that they now bargain, compromise and advocate particularpolicy positions often breaching the thin line between public administration and legislation.Thus, the oversight role of Congress also grew hand in hand with the increasing concerns aboutthe extensive use of the rule making of the

executive agencies.Despite the reality of agency rule making,

however, it remains a legitimate purpose of legislative oversight to ensure that agencies havecorrectly defined the boundaries of their policy-making powers. Hence, legislative oversight

provides direct congressional role in theadministrative process as a counterpoise to


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executive power. In this context, legislativeoversight has, indeed, become fundamentally

the task of governing the bureaucracy.

Box 1: WHY DOES BUREAUCRACY NEED TOBE GOVERNED?

Public administration is supposedly a paragon of skill, rationality and

humaneness according to political scientist, Joseph La Palombara. And yet, many times, the bureaucracy that we encounter is arrogant, aloof,arbitrary and corrupt in its behavior.

Why, indeed, should we pay attention to governing the actions of bureaucracy? In the entire life of our nation, why have there been continuingattempts to reform the bureaucracy?

A Civil Service Study has reported that almost 50% of government expenditures is lost to corruption. The report of wastage of government

resources is legion. The CSC program started some years back called Mamamayan muna, hindi mamaya na is significant of the serious effort by the Civil Service to address the continuing challenge of inability of civilservants to render effective service to the citizens in a courteous, honest and efficient manner.

The empirical literature suggests that economic development cannot proceed unless we have a rational, merit based, effective and efficient bureaucracy.

Because of the crucial role that bureaucracy plays in the day to day runningof the government, any campaign to transform society must, indeed, involvethe effective governance of the bureaucracy.

Finally, bureaucracy is the handmaiden of government policies. Legislative oversight which consists of a review, evaluation and monitoringof how the bureaucracy implements the laws, rules and regulations set bythe Congress is in effect the process of governing the bureaucracy.

=========

Source: Carlos, Clarita. Towards Bureaucratic Reform: Issues and Challenges . 2004.


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WH AWHAWH AWHAWHA T IS LEGISLAT IS LEGISLAT IS LEGISLAT IS LEGISLAT IS LEGISLA T I V E T I V E T I V E T I V E T I V E

O O O O O VERSIGHT? VERSIGHT? VERSIGHT? VERSIGHT? VERSIGHT?

2

egislative oversight (also known as con-gressional oversight) is the congressionalreview of the actions of departments, agencies,and commissions, and of the programs and pol-icies they administer, including review that takesplace during program and policy implementa-tion as well as afterward. 4

Legislative oversight is the process by which Congress takes an active role in under-standing monitoring and evaluating theperformance of state bodies and instrumentali-ties and applies this knowledge to its three other

functions, namely, making laws and public pol-icy, setting budgets, and raising revenues.Oversight techniques also play a part in the var-ious stages of the legislative process.

Other definitions of legislative oversight

focus on congressional efforts to control the behavior of the executive branch. In this sense,4 Aberbach, J. (1990), Keeping a Watchful Eye: The Politics of Congressional Oversight.


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legislative oversight is also viewed as any behavior by legislators and their staffs,

individually or collectively, which results in animpact, intended or not, on bureaucratic behavior. 5

Legal Basis of Oversight in the Legal Basis of Oversight in the Legal Basis of Oversight in the Legal Basis of Oversight in the Legal Basis of Oversight in the Philippines.Philippines.Philippines.Philippines.Philippines. There is no specific provision in thePhilippine Constitution expressly grantingoversight powers to Congress. However, thepower of the purse of Congress or power toreview appropriations implies this oversightfunction. The constitutional power of Congressto create, abolish, and reorganize governmentagencies likewise presupposes the power of

legislative oversight.

Likewise, Congress power of impeachment and confirmation of executiveappointments are part of the overall oversightfunctions of the legislative. Further, the role of

Congress as fiscalizer under the check and balance principle has highlighted its oversightrole in curbing graft and corruption, promotingeconomy, efficiency and effectiveness in use of public resources, and in promoting transparency

5 Ogul, M. and Bert Rockman (1990), Overseeing Oversight: New Departuresand Old Problems, Legislative Studies Quarterly , VX, 1 (February): 5-24.


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and accountability in government operations.Legislative oversight provides a mechanism for

the early detection and institution of remedialmeasures against government waste, fraud andprogram mismanagement. 6

Since the 1990s, a number of new laws,including the revised internal revenue code,agricultural modernization law, and the powersector reform law, have adopted provisions forthe creation of Congressional oversightcommissions, to ensure the implementation of said laws according to the legislative intent.

Finally, legislative oversight may be taken

broadly as the legislatures ability to affectexecutive actions, engender accountability andeffect changes in the performance of its functionto ensure that the laws passed by the legislatureare properly executed.

Objectives of Legislative Oversight.Objectives of Legislative Oversight.Objectives of Legislative Oversight.Objectives of Legislative Oversight.Objectives of Legislative Oversight.Legislative oversight is ideally a way by whichlegislatures hold executive agencies accountablefor their actions, especially in implementing laws

6 Rep. Joey Salceda (2001), Lecture on oversight experience of the House of Representatives.


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passed by the legislative branch. 7 Legislativeoversight stems from the traditional notion that

politics and administration are two conceptually distinct and separate activities.

Politics involves accommodating andresponding to societys demands through thearticulation of policy while administration is an

instrumental process of implementing actionsthat can help fulfill policy objectives. 8

The factors motivating oversight and thegoals which legislative committees seek toachieve by reviewing executive activities arenumerous and diverse. Such goals also vary according to circumstances. Various problemsof executive agencies may also result in acomposite of goals for undertaking legislativeoversight.

Under the traditional model, Congress isprimarily responsible for setting policy by enacting statutes, while the executive branch, led by the President, is in-charge of administration.

7 World Bank (2002), Strengthening oversight by legislatures, The World Bank Premnotes , 74.8 West W. and Joseph Cooper (1989-90), Legislative Influence v. Presidential

Dominance: Competing Models of Bureaucratic Control, Political ScienceQuarterly, 104 (4), 581-606.


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The role of the President as chief execu-

tive consists of organizational structuring, re-cruitment, and supervision to ensure faithfulpolicy implementation, primarily in the inter-est of efficiency. Congress role, on the otherhand, consists of monitoring or supervision asopposed to direct control. Meanwhile, the judi-ciarys role under the traditional paradigm is toguarantee the integrity of the politics-adminis-tration divide.

The essential purpose of congressionaloversight is, therefore, to secure the informationneeded for the enactment of new statutes or the

amendment of existing ones, and to ensure thatgovernment agencies comply with the legisla-tive intent. Oversight also determines whetherresponsible parties are administering the lawsfairly.

It has been demonstrated that legislativeoversight can untangle the administrative network, affix responsibility and take correctiveaction.

Tight fiscal constraints make legislativeoversight and its focus on the effective and effi-cient utilization of public sector resources evenmore critical. O versight reviews can help Con-


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gress recognize and prevent inefficiency in gov-ernment, which includes the identification of

extravagance, fraud, and misuse of public funds.Deeper and more specialized oversight studiescan also aid in identifying agencies and func-tions that are duplicative, overlapping, or thoseneeding redefinition, redirection, redistributionand/or restructuring.

Other Motivations.Other Motivations.Other Motivations.Other Motivations.Other Motivations. It has been contendedthat legislative oversight is often undertaken notto correct administrative problems but toestablish support for or opposition to particularpolicies or individuals. Thus, oversight activity is seen as an engine for obtaining political

mileage.

The two Chambers of the PhilippineCongress have both been conducting inquiriesin aid of legislation into the activities of executiveagencies. Often, however, these congressionalinvestigations have been perceived by thepublic to be motivated more by politicalconsiderations rather than an honest-to-goodness desire to bring about greateraccountability and efficiency in the utilizationof public resources. 9

9 Miral, E.M. and Vilma Carnicosa (1999), Legislative Oversight: A ProposedConceptual Framework and Methodology, Policy Brief , 99-05, 1-7.Congressional Planning and Budget Office.


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In Chile, it was noted that investigativecommittees are often used as cajas de resonancia(sounding boards) to transmit personal orpolitical party messages of members.Opposition members there often seek simply toembarrass the government or enhance their ownnational political prominence through vocal and

public criticism rather than exercising oversight.


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Box 2: Some of the most frequently stated goals of Box 2: Some of the most frequently stated goals of Box 2: Some of the most frequently stated goals of Box 2: Some of the most frequently stated goals of Box 2: Some of the most frequently stated goals of legislative oversight:legislative oversight:legislative oversight:legislative oversight:legislative oversight:

! Clarify statutory and legislative intent ! ! ! ! ! Examine the implementation of particular laws! Evaluate the overall effectiveness of program

administration! Review of rules and regulations ! Investigate alleged discriminatory or arbitrary actions ! Disclose shortcomings, and illegal conduct ! Assess the quality, quantity, efficiency of agency

performance ! Improve the administrative direction and control ! Seek reallocation of expenditure priorities ! Reduce needless waste, delays, red tape ! Analyze audit reports on departments and agencies ! Study and upgrade personnel practice ! Minimize lack of national uniformity in government

programs ! Review the enforcement of criminal statutes ! Appraise the handling of intergovernmental relations ! Study the adequacy and effectiveness of diplomats abroad ! Probe the practices and procedures of independent

regulatory commissions ! Uncover violations of personal and civil rights ! Evaluate the awarding of Research & Development

contracts ! Approve specific executive actions or fund transfers !

Control of restricted future executive actions ! Secure information for future lawmaking decisions ! Act on and/or investigate and provide official notice of

constituent complaints ! Encourage consultations on policy implementation

problems ! Study the impact of national policies on local governments ! Establish specific criteria for evaluating agency programs

and performance

! Respond to issues of national interest


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LEGISLALEGISLALEGISLALEGISLALEGISLA TIVE O TIVE O TIVE O TIVE O TIVE O VERSIGHT VERSIGHT VERSIGHT VERSIGHT VERSIGHT : : : : :

A SIMPLIFIED FRAMEW A SIMPLIFIED FRAMEW A SIMPLIFIED FRAMEW A SIMPLIFIED FRAMEW A SIMPLIFIED FRAMEW ORK ORK ORK ORK ORK 10

t may not be very apparent but the centralconcern of a conscientious legislative oversighteffort is really the implementation of the will of Congress as the highest policy making body of the government.

Legislative representation is premised onthe idea that lawmakers represent the people.Their actions and decisions are expected to

promote the interest of constituencies. Thus,legislators would have enormous interest in theexecutive departments implementation of thelaws and policies because these affect the peopleeither as the intended beneficiaries of government services or as politicalconstituencies of the elected leaders.

Essentially, the focus of oversight attention would center on immediate outputs of theagencies in terms of efficiency, economy, andeffectiveness and the strategic outcomes of aparticular legislation and policy decisions and

3

10 This section was written by Rodolfo V. Vicerra Director-General,Congressional Planning and Budget Department.


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how these impact on the quality of life of theordinary citizen.

In this sense, legislative oversight could bethought of as a complex of political processesthat permeate the affairs of, on the one hand,the government with Congress providing thepolicy direction and political justifications,together with the actions of bureaucracy that itlater oversees.

On the other side of the equation are thepeople, who should not only be seen as beneficiaries of government services they include the taxpayers providing the resources

needed to run the government. They are animportant part of the electorate that chooses theleaders who would then run Congress and thegovernment.

The Congress taking into account theplans and political platform of the Chief Executive and the political parties in power sets the policies, programs, and provides theresources and the mandate for the Executiveagencies to carry out the intended governmentservices and actions.

Oversight review activities are normally carried out through legislative study/inquiries,


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the congressional budget authorization process,or as part of the crafting of a new law, or as the

result of a House/Senate blue ribbon-typeinvestigation.

Table 1. A SIM PLIFIED FRAM EWORK ON THE OVERSIGHTPROCESS 11

11 This framework was the result of separate discussions between the writer and Exec.Director Romulo Miral, Dr. Claire Carlos, Dr. Divina Edralin, and Mr. Miguel Guioguio.The light arrows indicate the cycle/flow of oversight information,

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Progress updates and annual reports can be gathered from the agencies on the immediate

results of their operations and can be compared with agreed outputs and performanceindicators. Reports from other parties andinstitutions, including the state audit body, andthe oversight agencies in the Executive such asthe Department of Budget and Management andthe National Economic and Development Authority, can also provide a different view.

Oversight information should not only focus on the agency itself or its actions, though.Its clientele and the status of the sector that theagency is supposed to serve should be of utmost

concern. Their clients own views and feedback should provide the legislative and governmentin general the essential leads in evaluating themain thrusts of policies and programs.

Still and all, the ability of the general public

to articulate their views and sentiments dependsgreatly on the presence of servant leadership,an active media, and/or a dynamic civil society that can take the cudgels on specific campaignsand community issues. To a limited extent inthe Philippines, policy research institutescontribute to a deeper understanding of what isat stake with respect to the policy issues.


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TECHNIQ TECHNIQ TECHNIQ TECHNIQ TECHNIQ UES OF LEGISLAUES OF LEGISLAUES OF LEGISLAUES OF LEGISLAUES OF LEGISLA T I V E TIVE T I V E TIVE TIVE

O O O O O VERSIGHT VERSIGHT VERSIGHT VERSIGHT VERSIGHT

here are two major areas of concern forlegislative oversight. The first relates theregulatory function and the implementation of

laws by the executive, which includes theissuance of administrative guidelines andimplementing rules and regulations. Congressis duty bound to see to it that the rules andregulations prepared by the executive agencies,and their implementation are faithful to thepolicy intent of the laws. 12

The second major area for legislativeoversight is the management and delivery of government programs and services, whichrequire expenditure of public funds. Since allgovernment expenditures require prior

authorization by Congress, an oversightinterface would help ensure that the money itappropriates is judiciously spent.

Oversight Reviews.Oversight Reviews.Oversight Reviews.Oversight Reviews.Oversight Reviews. Oversight action may beconducted with or without the committee orplenary sitting. Oversight reviews may be

4

12 Oleszek, Walter J (1984), Congressional Procedures and the PolicyProcess, USA: Congressional Quarterly Inc .


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undertaken as formal hearing or non-hearingactivities, which may be classified into any of

the following 3 types depending on the clusterof activities that are conducted, to wit: 13

A. A. A. A. A. Comprehensive review uses programevaluations and reports prepared by non-committee personnel. This is the leastfrequently employed oversight practicemainly because findings of non-committeepersonnel may not be within the control of the legislative committees and may sometimes be leaked or released to thedetriment of the intended results that thelegislative committee wants.

B.B.B.B.B. Committee staff review involves effortslike investigations and program analysesconducted by the staffs of committee unitsto review agency programs and policies. Staff reviews are, on average, used much morefrequently because they give committeesmaximum control over the timing of thestudies as well as getting them done in thetime frame desired by the committee andreleased or leaked to the committeesadvantage.

13 Pelizzo, R. and Rick Stapenhurst (2004), Tools for Legislative Oversight:An Empirical Investigation, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper3388, September 2004.


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C.C.C.C.C. Piecemeal review techniques involve usual

congressional approach to oversight, whichis generally piece-by-piece, unsystematic,and often seen to be superficial scanning of information about the agencies beingevaluated.

Table 2 . Comm on Overs igh t Rev iew Prac t i c es14

14 Aberbach, 1990.

euqinhceTthgisrevOdeknaR

otgnidroccAesUfoycneuqerF

deknaRotgnidroccAssenevitceffE

ycnegahtiwnoitacinummocffatSlennosrep 1 1

htiwnoitacinummoCrebmeMlennosrepycnega 9 2

sgniraehthgisrevO 3 4

sgniraehnoitazirohtuaermargorP 5 3

dnemaotsllibnosgniraeHsmargorpgniogno 7 5

krowesacfoweiveR 31 41

dleifdnasnoitagitsevniffatSrofnoitaraperpnahtrehto(seiduts

)sgniraeh4 6

dnaselurycilopfosisylanAsnoitaluger 8 01

ybenodsnoitaulavemargorPseicnegatroppuslanoissergnoC 2 8

ehtybenodsnoitaulavemargorPseicnega 11 31

ybenodsnoitaulavemargorPlatnemnrevognon(sredistuo

)lennosrep21 11

ybenodnoitaulavemargorPlennosrepffatseettimmoc 6 7

otevevitalsigeL 41 9


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Common Oversight Practices Common Oversight Practices Common Oversight Practices Common Oversight Practices Common Oversight Practices . Table 2

above describes some of the most commonoversight review techniques utilized by variouslegislatures and parliaments. 15 It was observedthat in many parliaments and legislatures, staff communications with the government agenciesand program evaluations done by legislative staff have been the most important source of oversight information. Oversight hearings andinvestigations were also seen as common.However, in terms of effectiveness, the directinvolvement of the legislator and his/her staff in oversight activities seems to be most helpfulin eliciting response from the Executive

agencies.The Legislative Perspective in Oversight The Legislative Perspective in Oversight The Legislative Perspective in Oversight The Legislative Perspective in Oversight The Legislative Perspective in Oversight

Work Work Work Work Work . As the legislative oversight function of Congress increasingly occupies its legislativeagenda, the practice of oversight has taken on various forms and approaches. The stancestancestancestancestance of the committee or body undertaking the effortshapes the way oversight is carried out. This may be affected by the significance of the issuespertaining to the agency concerned and/or theurgency of the situation that may have evokedthe oversight activity. Note that these forms

15 Aberbach, 1990.


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listed below are not exclusive of each other butmay be used as composites as may be required.

A. A. A. A. A. Manifest/Overt vs. Latent/Covert Oversight . Manifest or Overt oversightinvolves formal review activities done posthoc, i.e., after the implementation of thelaw has been done. Latent/Covertoversight includes both anticipatory andreview modes of intervention which areleast evident and usually seen as subtlesignals emitted by congressionaloverseers.

B.B.B.B.B. Police-patrol vs Fire-alarm oversight.

Police-patrol oversight is a fairly centralized, active, and direct action by acommittee to monitor the executive branch. Under a police patrol oversight,Congress examines a sample of executiveagency activities with the aim of detectingand remedying violations of legislativegoals and by its surveillance discouragessuch violations. An agencys activities may be surveyed by any number of means suchas poring through its documents,commissioning scientific studies,conducting field observations and holding

hearings to question officials and affectedcitizens.


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Fire alarm oversight is less centralizedand involves less active and less direct

intervention than police-patrol oversight.Under a fire-alarm oversight, Congressestablishes a system of rules, procedures,and informal practices. This would giveindividual citizens and organized interestgroups the ability to examineadministrative decisions and chargeexecutive agencies with violatingcongressional goals, and to seek remediesfrom agencies, courts, and Congressitself .

C.C.C.C.C. Advocacy Oversight vs Adversarial

Review ..... In an advocacy oversight, theoverseers seek to protect the programs inquestion even if they are often critical of the administrators. Such friendly oversightusually fits well with the notion that review committees use anticipatory mechanismsand give overt or covert signals to agenciesor to central monitoring organs. This ispreferred when it comes to heading off amore hostile review of the agencys work.

D.D.D.D.D. Ex ante vs Ex post / internal or external .....Ex Ante oversight occurs when legislative

oversight is performed before the


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government enacts a specific policy or becomes engaged in a specific activity. Ex-

Post oversight is when the legislativeoversight is performed after thegovernment has enacted a policy to check whether the policy is properly implemented. Hearings in committees,and deliberations in plenary sessions of thelegislature, along with requests of documentation, are often classified asinstruments of control ex-ante. Theconduct of the question hour,interpellations, and the creation of committees of inquiry are considered ex-post oversight actions.

Approaches to Legislative Oversight. Approaches to Legislative Oversight. Approaches to Legislative Oversight. Approaches to Legislative Oversight. Approaches to Legislative Oversight. Oversightprocedures may also be broadly classified basedon the nature of the Congressional intent: intolegislative, investigative, fiscal, evaluative,interpretative, supervisory, affirmative andprohibitive. Although some procedures are usedmore than the others, it is not unusual forlegislative oversight committees to utilize severalreview procedures for different purposes.

A. Legislative . The hearings conductedto propose legislation may often be a

conduit to inquire about governmentprograms and performance of government


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agencies. Investigations for this purposemay develop into some oversight of the

agencies involved. Committee reportsoften influence the way the laws to beenacted will be implemented, whichalready constitutes some form of oversight.

B. Fiscal . Review of the fiscal programand operations of various governmentagencies also constitutes oversight.Studies conducted by the CongressionalPlanning and Budget Department of theHouse of Representatives, for example,focus on expenditures of public funds andcan help guide discussions on the use by

the agencies of their appropriated funds.Fiscal reviews may also provideopportunities for agency accountability.

C. Investigative ..... Oversight committeesmay use various investigative tools.Information/data gathering by thesecommittees may come from interestgroups, non-government organizations,civic and trade associations, think tanks orexpert opinions. Regular investigativeprocedures may also be held to monitor the

implementation of particular laws withinthe committees jurisdiction. In some


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cases, unexpected emergencies may warrant such investigative oversight

activities.

D. Evaluative ..... A committee may obtainmaximum potential for oversight if it isable to harness the result of substantiveresearch and data analyses, departmentalreports, and results of investigations,testimonies during hearings and externaldepartmental evaluations. Utilization of social science methods of evaluation isimportant for this oversight function.

E. Interpretative ..... Oversight

committees, through their reports, may direct the government agencies concernedto the congressional interpretation of theagencys function as it carries out laws.

F. Supervisory ..... Oversight committeesmay also help guide government agenciesin the implementation of the laws throughstewardship of its programs and closescrutiny of its performance. Thissupervisory function may also be obtained by way of regular hearings in whichofficials of the agency concerned are

questioned.


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G. Affirmative . Oversight may consist of legislative powers over executive

appointments and advice and consentfor international treaties. Ratification of treaties may also involve review of foreignpolicy. Confirmation of executiveappointments may involve review of theagency function to which the official belongs.

H. Prohibitive . The use of the legislative veto is an important oversight function. Inmany cases though, advance legislativereview of proposed executive actions areresorted to by some government agenciesand legislative oversight may result in the withdrawal of such proposals before it evengoes into the formal legislative mill.

Oversight tools and administrative controls.Oversight tools and administrative controls.Oversight tools and administrative controls.Oversight tools and administrative controls.Oversight tools and administrative controls.The usefulness of oversight action is only as good

as the persuasive effect that it can have on theprograms, policies and priorities of theconcerned agencies. Legislators have a numberof administrative tools and techniques that canhelp them impose Congress political will overthe executive agencies.


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It has been observed that the creation of special oversight committees has been very

effective in pursuit of the oversight work.Inquiries, post-audit and the threat of programor agency sunset laws are likewise seen as valuable administrative controls.

Table 3 below shows some of thetechniques in terms of their effectiveness withadministrators, their agencies, and programs.

Table 3. Effectiveness Scores of AdministrativeControls in Rank Order

slortnoC serocS

seettimmocthgisrevoevitalsigeldezilaicepS.1 00.7

noitagitsevnievitalsigeL.2 19.6

tidua-tsopevitalsigeL.3 48.6

ssecorproswaltesnuS.4 46.6

gnitegdubmeti-eniL.5 26.6

otevevitalsigeL.6 95.6

gnitegdubesab-oreZ.7 85.6

stnemtnioppafonoitamrifnocevitalsigeL.8 58.5

noitazinagroerycnegA.9 48.5

weiverlaiciduJ.01 97.5

namsdubmonA.11 77.5

weiverevitartsinimdA.21 45.5

lavomerdnatnemtnioppaevitucexE.31 14.5

Effectiveness scores are averaged responses to a questionnaire item that asked state legislatorsto rate each administrative control device on an effectiveness scale from one (least effective)

to ten (most effective). (Source: Pearson and Wiggington, 1986).


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EV EV EV EV EV ALA LALA LA L U U U U U AAAAA TING PERFORMANCE: TING PERFORMANCE: TING PERFORMANCE: TING PERFORMANCE: TING PERFORMANCE:

THE NEED FOR INDICATHE NEED FOR INDICATHE NEED FOR INDICATHE NEED FOR INDICATHE NEED FOR INDICA T T T T T ORS ORS ORS ORS ORS 16

ffective oversight requires thedevelopment of performance indicators by which government agencies can be madeaccountable. The performance indicators should be measurable and at the very least provideevidence as to how a given function is beingperformed; whether a given service or programis getting better or worse in some specific sense .17

Performance indicators can be broadly classified into three major categories: 1) inputs,2) outputs, and 3) outcomes. Inputs consist of resources (e.g. capital, personnel, equipment)used to produce goods and services. Outputs arethe goods and services delivered or performed,ranging from policy advice to the enforcementof regulations and delivery of basic socialservices. The last category, outcomes, refers tothe impacts or results that the government want

5

16 This section was lifted from portions of Miral and Canicosa (1999).17 Ukeles, Jacob B (1982), Doing More with Less. New York: AMACOM.


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to achieve such as lower crime rate or reductionin poverty incidence. 18

Outcomes may be the most desirablemeasure of performance. However, they are notmeasured often enough -either because it iscostly to do so or they do not show significantmovements when measured frequently. 19

Another difficulty with the use of outcomes isthat they are usually the product or the result of several outputs or services provided by thedifferent agencies of the government. Hence, by themselves outcome indicators may not beenough to exact accountability from each agency and department of the government.

Input or output indicators are often used because they serve as intermediate or leadindicators presaging the outcome indicators. Tomaximize their usefulness in terms of monitoring performance and exacting

accountability, individual outputs may begrouped together into output class. An outputclass consists of a group of homogenous orclosely related outputs pertaining to a desired

18 New Zealand Treasury (1996), Putting it together: An exploratory guidethe New Zealand Public Sector Financial Management System.

19 Manasan, Rosario G, E.T. Gonzalez & R.B. Gaffud (1999), Towards bettergovernment: developing indicators of good governance for local government.Makati City : National Economic and Development Authority


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outcome or impact. Where possible, all threecategories of performance indicators should be

used as they complement each other.

The Three Es.The Three Es.The Three Es.The Three Es.The Three Es. Once the basic performanceindicator categories are defined, it is relatively easy to move on to other measures of performance like efficiency, effectiveness andeconomy 20 .

Efficiency is the relationship between thequantity and quality of the goods and servicesproduced and the resources used to producethem. An operation is efficient if fewer inputs were used to produce a given output, or a given

input resulted in increased output.

Effectiveness refers to the extent to whichintended outcomes are achieved. It addressesthe question of whether a particular programachieves its objectives and produces theexpected results.

Economy relates to the money value paidfor resources, that is, whether the money paidis excessive or not for the results produced. Forexample, it is not sufficient to know that the

20 Office of the provincial, Canada (1995), Value for Money (Performance)

Audit Volume I and II.


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purchased goods were received and paid for. Onemust also determine whether the goods were

really needed, and if so, whether they were of the quality required and of the most economicquantity and price.

Carrot and Stick Carrot and Stick Carrot and Stick Carrot and Stick Carrot and Stick . For legislative oversightto be an effective tool in bringing about greateraccountability and efficiency in the use of publicresources, it should be linked to a system of reward and punishment. Congress can issue aquarterly or semestral report card of agenciesperformance to promote transparency,accountability and competition amonggovernment agencies. On the basis of such

performance rating, good performers can berewarded and bad performers can be punished.

Rewarding good performance . Agencies, which have shown good performance, can be given greater flexibility in their budget.Their budget proposals can be assured inCongress, and they can be entitled to asimplified and faster release of funds.Good performance proves the capacity of agencies to manage government fundseffectively and efficiently.


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One way of rewarding good performance - which may require an amendment to

existing budget laws - is to allow goodperforming agencies to keep their savingsand use part of their savings for specialprojects. At present, there is no incentivefor the departments to save money becauseat the end of the year these savings go back to the general fund.

Punishing bad performance . Agencies thatare wanting in performance should facethe threat of budget cuts. Low performanceratings can also get the attention of thePresident who may directly deal with

concerned officials. In cases where fraudand corruption are uncovered, Congresscan direct its findings to the President, theDepartment of Justice, the PresidentialCommission Against Graft andCorruption, and the Office of theOmbudsman for the filing of appropriateadministrative and criminal charges.

Congress can continue to look into theprogress of these cases through the regularconduct of its oversight function. People losetheir trust in the government if they see thatnothing happens to the anomalies and scandalsuncovered by media and investigated by Congress.


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Negotiating Performance Contracts Negotiating Performance Contracts Negotiating Performance Contracts Negotiating Performance Contracts Negotiating Performance Contracts . As afirst step, Congress and the Executive should

agree on the set of performance indicators andtheir desired levels. Congress can ask thedifferent departments and government agencies,including LGUs and GOCCs to support theirproposed budget 21 with a performance plan which indicates:

! what they aim to achieve (goals/outcomes)! the goods/services they intend to produce! or deliver to achieve these aims (outputs)! the resources required to produce these! outputs and corresponding cost (inputs)

!other financial performance indicators

It is suggested that the performancecontract serve as justification for the budgetrequest by the departments in the Executive and basis for the budget approval by Congress. Insucceeding budget hearings, the departments

should then submit performance reports of theiraccomplishments based on the performancecontract, which would now serve as one of theconsiderations for the approval of the new budget proposals of the departments.21 See CPBO, Reforming the Budget Process for a discussion of the proposedbudget reforms which include greater involvement of the LGUs in the national

budget process, and the shift in budget focus from accountability over inputstowards accountability over outputs and outcomes, otherwise known asperformance budgeting.


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THE O THE O THE O THE O THE O THER O THER O THER O THER O THER O VERSIGHT VERSIGHT VERSIGHT VERSIGHT VERSIGHT

AAAAA GENCIES OF GO GENCIES OF GO

GENCIES OF GO GENCIES OF GO GENCIES OF GO VERNMENT VERNMENT

VERNMENT VERNMENT VERNMENT

versight is generally associated with theconduct of performance monitoring as part of the greater process of promoting good

governance. But by no means does the legislativedepartment possess a monopoly over this role.The President has the ultimate administrativeoversight responsibility over all governmentagencies, except for those under the Legislative,Judiciary and the Constitutional Commissions.Moreover, there are government agencies withinthe Executive department that performoversight and monitoring functions inherent intheir mandates and perhaps covering more than just one specific phase of the development cyclesof programs and projects.

For one, there is the Commission on Audit(COA), which conducts annual financial auditof all agencies and instrumentalities of thegovernment - both at the national and locallevels mostly at the post-implementation stageof the programs. The National Economic andDevelopment Authority (NEDA) tries to ensurethat plans and budgets coincide and are

6


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consistent with the development goals of thecountry. The Department of Budget andManagement (DBM) through the Developmentand Budget Coordination Committee (DBCC),receives the budget proposals of the differentgovernment agencies, reviews and revises theseaccording to set budget guidelines, and collatesthem as the Presidents Budget Proposal to

Congress. The DBM mandates all governmentoffices to submit their respective work andfinancial plans and monitors implementationthrough agency submission of progress reports.

Likewise, there is the Department of Finance, which, apart from overseeing revenue collection,regulates the borrowing activities of governmentagencies, so that the funding requirements aremet to facilitate the implementation of

.4elbaT ehtrofsecruosnoitamrofnidnaseunevlamroFthgisrevOevitalsigeLfotcudnoc

l a n r e t n I l a n r e t x E

gniraeheettimmoC !gnittisyranelpnigniraeH !

yriuqnifoeettimmoC !

ruohnoitseuQ !

snoitallepretnI !

namsdubmO !

ycnegAgninnalPlanoitaN !

noissimmoC / ycnegAtegduB !

ydoBgnitiduAlatnemnrevoG !snoitazinagrohcraeserycilopybseidutS !

snoitatlusnoCycneutitsnoC !


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government programs. The NEDA has a regularperiodic monitoring of big-ticket programs andprojects to ascertain their conformity with theMedium-Term Philippine Development Plan(MTPDP) and the Medium-Term PublicInvestment Plan (MTPIP). The National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC), on the other hand,monitors policy and major programs on the

sixteen (16) poorest provinces.

There may be inadequacies, on the part of many in the legislative department, in theirunderstanding of the budget preparation andoversight as practiced in the Executive i.e. what are their processes, procedures andinnovations.

Indeed, there are various approaches,techniques and methodologies used by thedifferent institutions to implement theirrespective versions of the oversight process. Forinstance, the COA conducts the so-called valuefor money audit or VFM an audit orevaluation of the agencys objectives which, areusually translated into implemented programs,projects and activities under the budget system.It is an audit of program results. COA also

conducts participatory audit with civil society organizations, private professionals and


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concerned citizens espousing good governmentsuch as the case in the audit of Abra projects.

On the other hand, the DBM developed anoutput-oriented approach to budgeting calledthe Public Expenditure Management (PEM) andinstituted this to ensure the sound, efficient andeffective management and utilization of

government resources. This would enhance theefficiency of public expenditures; furthersubstantiate the accountability of public officersand employees over government resources, andto promote client-orientation. Within thecontext of the PEM, all departments, bureaus,and offices would identify their Major Final and/or specific Outputs (MFOs) to be produced by their programs and services consistent withthe Medium-Term Philippine DevelopmentPlan.

Arguably, these different approaches lack synchronization and coordination, and may leadto duplication of activities among differentagencies. There is also the possibility that thesecan result in possible variations of interpretations, and/or, worse, contradictions inassessment conclusions. However, there is also

the view that different oversight groups havedistinct objectives and that these should not


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hamper or preclude the others own assessmentand evaluation of an agencys accomplishments.

As part of the CPBDs WB-ASEM project,representatives from the above-cited oversightoffices were brought together in a series of workshops in 2005 with some of theircounterparts in the legislative. This was to

identify problems common to all and problemsthat are unique to their respective oversightfunctions, share innovative procedures andtools, and develop greater understanding andappreciation of how each agency implementtheir respective oversight activities. It has become apparent that:

There is no strongly coordinated and consciouseffort among the major oversight agencies andCongress in monitoring specific programs andprojects in education, health, livelihood, andenvironment at present;

The major oversight agencies in the Executivethemselves have no regular and deliberatemonitoring of pro-poor programs and projects;

Both Houses of Congress, while having theconstitutional mandate to do oversight, have nocurrent and focused effort in oversight andmonitoring of pro-poor programs and projects.


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In short, most have greatly depended onself-reports submitted by the monitored

agencies. This defeats the very purpose of oversight which should result fromindependent unbiased work.

Still, there maybe a need for the variousoversight agencies to develop agency performance indicators and correspondingtargets based on a cooperative effort to establisha common language and understanding of thegoals and issues faced by the monitoredagencies.

As an initial step, it is suggested that the

oversight institutions establish communicationlines for greater information and knowledgesharing for updates on current developments,new reports, and new findings. The conduct of regular exchange of information through inter-agency oversight conferences would be a helpfulmechanism for this. Meanwhile, it has beensuggested that a web portal where oversightliterature, agency updates and informationfeeds can be posted by the concerned oversightagencies and accessed by legislators and thecitizens at large would be a valuable mechanismfor a more transparent exercise of oversight

activities.


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T H E PEOPLES ROLE I N LEGISLATIVE OVERSIG HT H T HT H T H T 22

he business of government does nothappen in a vacuum. The policies chosen andprograms undertaken by government agencies,

good or bad, would affect particular interestsand constituencies, if not society at large. Thesecan either hasten or delay economicdevelopment and advance or retard socialmobility. Governments courses of action caneither limit productivity or unleash the potentialof the community to generate value.

The bureaucracy itself is not a monolithicentity. It is composed of dozens of organizationstackling a huge variety of societal concerns,including health, education, housing, currency,security, law and order, environment, andassistance to or regulation of industry and otherproduction sectors. The people manning as wellas those managing these organizations have various levels of efficiency, moral standards, and work ethic. It is but natural to expect that not all

7

22 This section was written by Rodolfo V. Vicerra Director-General,Congressional Planning and Budget Department.


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interests and constituencies will be satisfied withgovernment services at all times.

The idea of peoples involvement ingovernment affairs is a principle enshrined inthe Constitution. As taxpayers, they underwritethe logistical requirements of governmentoperations and the salaries of the civil service. As the electorate, they collectively choose thepolitical leaders who would run the bureaucracy.Electoral choices are made in the hope that thesaid leaders will direct the bureaucracy towardsthe appropriate reforms and strategies to bringabout faster growth and development that wouldenhance the peoples overall wellbeing.

Nevertheless, while elections perform auseful role in expressing the democratic voiceof the majority, the challenge of knowing andunderstanding the actions and decisions of theelected official remains. It is a given that theiroptions may at times be limited by lack of community consultations and/or be biased by the dominant political and economic interestsin their locality. Some observers would claimthat there is the risk of moral hazard which,in economics, refers to the possibility that oneparty to a loan transaction (in this case, the

election) would engage in activities undesirableand inimical to the interest the other party (the


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electorate) after the loan (grant of politicalpower) has been made.

What has been happening, however, is thatcitizens often feel short-changed by theseemingly unending series of failed governmentprograms and reported incidents of corruption.The state of governance itself seems to be at thecore of the problem and side-by-side with thisis the unhealthy image of politics in the country. Another concern is the growing ethos of dependence and mendicancy, which can only thrive under conditions of considerable poverty,ignorance and mis-education. This feeds into theculture of patronage that politicians can easily

take advantage of.This very situation, of course, is part of the

complex of problems that government itself andreform-minded political leaders wish to solve.Societal outcomes have to be guided towardsincreased peoples well-being and participation

to enhance social cohesion.But the role of the citizenry must now go

beyond merely paying taxes and voting inelections. Legislative oversight, through theelected representatives of the people inCongress, offers perhaps another venue through

which the people can participate in governance.Congress needs to inter-act with those affected


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by the government policies and programs. Agency actions and policies must be compared

against expectations, agreed outputs andperformance indicators.

To a limited extent, the legislators have been taking the initiative to consult theircongressional constituencies on mostly localissues. But there have been little effort, if any,

to engage said constituencies in regular officialtown-hall meetings to validate and assess thegovernment agencies self-reports.

Constituents and private sector groupspossess great potential in providing the neededinformation for Congress to reliably assess theresults of government policies and programs.This role can take various forms and may include:

##### Responding to governance surveys##### Giving feedback on government projects where

this is solicited

##### Initiating Citizen-assessments and reviews of government programs and projects

##### Lodging complaints against abusive andinefficient government agencies

##### Providing leads and evidences to oversight andanti-corruption agencies on wrong-doingscommitted by civil servants and persons inauthority


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However, the most challenging obstacle todemocratic consultative efforts has always beenthe ubiquity and vagueness of the notion of thecitizenry or the people. As a starting point,oversight information can be gathered from thepeople through government censuses, regularsurveys (such as those of SWS and Pulse Asia),the use of third party reporting systems such as

the Community Based Monitoring System23

(CBMS) and technical consultations by theCongress staff, among others. Again, a webportal that can accept direct inputs (letters, whitepapers, complaints, and Text Messages) fromthe general public would be of great value.

Also, the Philippines has no shortage of civilsociety groups, non-government organizationsand, even local government units. Perhaps, it isthese organized groups who can initially providethe organized feedback on the outputs andperformance of government agencies.

Indeed, the people can and must beengaged in the process of oversight andgovernance. The people must have a voice indecisions that affect their lives. Broadpartnerships for good governance can and,therefore, should be encouraged and forged.

23 Please see Annex III


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CUST CUST CUST CUST CUST OMER FEEDB OMER FEEDB OMER FEEDB OMER FEEDB OMER FEEDB AAAAA CK : CK : CK : CK : CK : A PO A PO A PO A PO A PO TENT TENT TENT TENT TENT

T T T T T OOL FOR O OOL FOR O OOL FOR O OOL FOR O OOL FOR O VERSIGHT VERSIGHT VERSIGHT VERSIGHT VERSIGHT 2424242424

eeking feedback from customers is anestablished practice among firms in the businesssector in order to strengthen market share or

competitive edge over their rivals. While theforce of competition is lacking in the publicsector, the practice of seeking user feedback inthe delivery of government services isnonetheless gaining grounds along efforts tostrengthen government accountability andimprove public expenditure management.

It has been shown in a number of countriesthat user feedback conducted through scientificsurveys can be a cost-effective means of findingout whether government services are reachingthe people, at what quantity and quality.

It provides information on the degree of peoples satisfaction over the services provided by the government as well as on the efficiency and responsiveness of government agencies tothe public they serve. Unlike anecdotes, itsresult can be generalized and thus, can galvanize

8

24 This section was written by Romulo Emmanuel Miral, Jr., Ph.D. -Executive Director, CPBD


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public opinion and exert pressure on the serviceprovider.

User feedback can also be instrumental inimproving the strategic allocation of thegovernments budget. It helps the governmentdetermine what public goods and services toproduce, at what quantities, and where these are

most needed.

At least two major factors should beobserved for customer or user feedback to beeffective. First, it is important that themethodology is scientific, and perceived to befair and non-partisan. Surveys are the mostcommonly used instrument for generating userfeedback since it is impossible to get the opinionof every individual. Surveys based on standardsampling procedures can generate results, whichcould be used for inferences on the generalpopulation. Second, it should be conducted with

regularity to allow tracking of progress or thelack of it.

By providing a sense of whether a givenservice or program is getting better or worse,user feedback can put pressure as well asincentive for service providers to initiate actionor reforms.


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Institutionalizing the Filipino Report Institutionalizing the Filipino Report Institutionalizing the Filipino Report Institutionalizing the Filipino Report Institutionalizing the Filipino Report

Card as a legislative oversight tool.Card as a legislative oversight tool.Card as a legislative oversight tool.Card as a legislative oversight tool.Card as a legislative oversight tool. In 2000,the World Bank in collaboration with the Social Weather Station (SWS) piloted a user feedback survey on five key pro-poor services in thePhilippines that was known as the FilipinoReport Card. The Filipino Report Card providedan appraisal of the quality and adequacy of thepro-poor services, the key constraints faced by the people in accessing them, and the treatmentthey received from the concerned governmentagencies.

The findings from the Filipino Report Card

were reportedly used in, among others, therevision of the Philippines Medium TermDevelopment Plan and the crafting of new poverty strategies and programs. However, thereal potency of the Filipino Report Card in termsof bringing about improvement in governmentservices and exacting accountability fromgovernment officials was lost, since it wasrelegated to a one-time exercise.

The Filipino Report Card could be a usefultool in legislative oversight in conjunction withthe annual budget review and approval process

by Congress.


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As Allen Schick, a noted budget expert,pointed out: the appropriation process as anoversight technique is comparable to the stick of spending reductions in case agencies cannotsatisfactorily defend their budget and pastperformance, and the carrot of more money if agencies produce convincing success stories orthe promise of future results.

The Filipino Report Card could be very useful in the annual budget hearings of Congress. It provides the direct views of theordinary citizens on the services funded by thegovernments budget and provides an avenue forpeople participation in crafting the budget.

Using the findings from the FilipinoReport Card, Congress through its power of thepurse can exact accountability from thegovernment service providers and effectconstructive budget realignments to correct

deficiencies and improve the strategic allocationand operational efficiency of public spending.

In the United States of America, all federalgovernment agencies are required to submittheir annual performance plans andaccomplishment reports to Congress pursuantto the Government Performance and Results Act


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of 1993. These annual agency performance plansare reviewed and studied by the General Accounting Office, a Congressional watchdogagency of the government, which then presentsits findings and recommendations to Congressduring the latters review of the federal agency budget submissions. Another U.S. governmentagency known as the General Services

Administration is tasked with conducting anindependent assessment of the performance of the federal agencies through the AmericanCustomer Satisfaction Index.

The US experience provides a good modelfor institutionalizing customer or user feedback in strengthening government accountability inthe Philippines. The Filipino Report Card could be expanded to cover other major and vitalservices of the government.

The Congressional Planning and Budget

Department could be tasked with managing andreporting the results of the report card survey.The design, conduct and analysis of the survey could be done jointly with the National StatisticsOffice and other policy research institutions inthe country.


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PROPOSAL FOR A CONGRESS-COACOOPERATION FOR OVERSIGHT 25

he Commission on Audit (COA) is vested with the power to examine and audit all receiptsand expenditures or uses of government funds

and property. It submits every year variousannual reports to the President and to Congresson the financial conditions and operation of government (including GOCCs and LGUs).

To Congress, these reports could be valuable sources of information for oversight,policy and funding decisions. They indicate andidentify accountable officials/agencies for any misuse of public funds or property, explain thecircumstance when violations are committed,and recommend corrective action.

Value-for-money (VFM) audits could alsoprovide Congress inputs as to how well certainprograms, activities, and agencies are beingmanaged based on economy, efficiency andeffectiveness criteria. In particular, agency performance reviews can help Congress make

9

25 This section was written by Ms. Dina Pasagui, Service Director -CPBD


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decisions whether to discontinue or provideadditional funding support, and propose forabolition or organizational adjustments asnecessary.

COA produces audit reports on a regular basis but they have not been fully utilized by Congress. This may be due to a number of reasons: (a) absence of working relationship between COA and Congress; (b) lack of Congressional involvement in determining auditfocus; (c) audit reports are usually filled withtechnical jargon addressed mainly toaccountants; (d) reports are lengthy and time-consuming for busy Congress Members to

process; and (e) orientation of reports are basically financial and may be difficult to relateto the set of legislative goals being examined by oversight.

Establishing the Congress-Audit Link.Establishing the Congress-Audit Link.Establishing the Congress-Audit Link.Establishing the Congress-Audit Link.Establishing the Congress-Audit Link.The Commission on Audit is a constitutional body working independently of the PhilippineLegislature. It sets its own audit focus that may not be entirely relevant to issues and prioritiesof Congress. By comparison, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in the United Statesreports directly to the US Congresshence, their

greater congressional involvement in theselection of topics for performance audits.


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The International Peer Review of thePerformance Audit Practice of the United StatesGAO (April 2005) cites a number of goodpractices which can be considered whenestablishing a working relationship between thePhilippine Congress and COA:

(a) They have a six-year strategic planthat is updated periodically inconsultation with Congress. Initially,the planning process involves theidentification of key themes and high-risk areasi.e., government programsthat pose significant risks of fraud,waste, abuse and mismanagement

which will help ensure that requests for work are aligned with the strategic plan.

(b) Before any audit is started,engagement acceptance meetings areheld to determine the risk levels (high,medium and low) of each engagement based on cost, complexity, controversy of the work, and potential access to records. This practice helps ensure thatGAO undertakes engagements that are within its scope of authority andcompetence, and that it preserves its

independence to do future audit work.


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(c) The GAO has developed writtenprotocols that provide clearly definedpolicies and practices to ensureobjectivity and consistency inapproaches when dealing with auditentities and all committees/Members of Congress. For example, the protocolsdefine GAOs priority for initiating work

and the factors it considers beforeaccepting any congressional request.

(d) Reports are designed for theconvenience of readers by providing aHighlight Section (one-page summary of key points) which will help themdecide whether to read the details insucceeding sections, a letter to therequester which serves as an executivesummary (includes the context,approach and results), and appendices which presents the objectives, scope

and methodology.Initial Steps Initial Steps Initial Steps Initial Steps Initial Steps ..... There have been attempts to

utilize COA reports to support policy making andoversight functions of Congress. TheCongressional Planning and Budget Department(CPBD) has been preparing digests of selected

COA Findings/Recommendations to provide


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House Members with inputs during thedeliberation of agency budgets.

COA reports and institutional annualfinancial reports, particularly on governmentcorporations and local government units have been valuable sources of data in support of CPBDs research function for oversight and

other policy studies.To further maximize the use of audit

information by Congress, the followingmeasures may be taken:

! CPBD digest of Audit Findings andRecommendations should cover moreagencies, and publication should beharmonized with the schedule of budgethearings in Congress.

! COA is urged to hold regular briefings uponpublication of audit reports. This will giveCongress Members better appreciation of the

findings, opportunity to interact and clarify issues with auditors, and suggestimprovements on audit design and focus.

! There is need to initiate the formulation of aprotocol (similar to that of the US Congressand GAO) that will clearly define the policiesfor interaction between Congress and theCommission on Audit.


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TH E USE OF ICT IN LEGISLATI VE OVERSIGHT 26

ew ways of handling and communicatinginformation now make it possible for publicsector institutions to enhance their quality of service even when existing public resources areseverely constrained. More importantly, new channels of interaction are changing traditionalimages of governmentfrom a rigid andcentralized monolith to an organization thatrelates to individual constituents with a new depth and frequency. Indeed, Information and

Communication Technology (ICT) can add anentirely new dimension to governmentrelationship to its stakeholders.

Various ICT applications in governmenttransactions can also empower ordinary citizensto take greater control of their own agenda for

deliberation. Among the many possibilities,electronic discussion boards may be set up, evenin local dialects, so that specific proposals orgrievances may be taken up for collectiveimprovements in design and scope. Thiseffectively overcomes barriers of language,literacy and localism that usually hinder people

1 0

26 This section was written by Mr. Novel Bangsal, Service Director -CPBD


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from participating in the policy process. Inaddition, such innovations can be used to

provide organized feedback on the quality of government services and investment projects.

Improving oversight function through ICT Improving oversight function through ICT Improving oversight function through ICT Improving oversight function through ICT Improving oversight function through ICT .Oversight is generally associated withperformance audit/monitoring as part of thelarger process of public expendituremanagement. Specifically, it entails extensivereporting and information generating activitiesto gather feedback on the outcome of specificpolicy actions of a given national governmentagency.

Like most government functions, theeffective conduct of legislative oversight isconstrained by lack of resources and propercoordination. It is apparent that a number of oversight activities are being performed in bothexecutive and legislative departments.

But the mixed results of the impact of theprograms and projects, particularly on pro-poorprojects, show symptoms that the oversightprocesses in the country are inadequate. Thedisparate oversight activities by differentgovernment institutions strongly suggest lack of synchronization and coordination, which often


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leads to duplication of activities and, worse,conflicting in impact assessments.

But what is a more glaring handicap, isthe inadequacy of citizen feedback mechanisms.Congress must ensure that its constituency isknowledgeable on the conduct and affairs of thegovernment. This aspect requires interaction with the constituents. One important elementis the mechanism through which people can toconvey their expectations of governmentsperformance. Without such system, it would bedifficult to secure meaningful participation inpursuit of effective oversight.

ICT can offer some solutions to theseinstitutional challenges. One of the innovations being considered is the development of atransactional and inter-active web portal 27 thatthe CPBD of the House of Representatives hopesto establish and manage together with partnerinstitutions, colleagues within Congress, andcivil society organizations and local governmentunits. The proposed web portal will provide aplatform to spur community and networkingactivities like collaboration, knowledgeexchange and conducting virtual meetings andconferences.

27 Based on a project proposal submitted by CPBD to World Bank in 2005.


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Other important services of the web- based portal are the provision of a specialized

database for tracking pro-poor policy andgovernment programs and recently approvedlaws, and establishment of a Virtual PrivateNetwork (VPN) servicea special digitalcommunication tunnel that will allow directexclusive links between CPBD and its partners.

But the success of this innovation willdepend on the grassroots partnerships that will be developed. There is a crying need on the partof the grassrootslocal citizens, community groups and non-government organizations;national and local government agencies;

business enterprise, and others to get involved.

Equally important, while there is need todevelop community infrastructure, Internetfacilities and other ICT services have become very common even in far-flung provinces of thecountry. Still, the effort to create such anoversight w

oversight book

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