overview of the cert/cc and the survivable systems initiative

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1 Carnegie Mellon University Overview of the CERT/CC and the Survivable Systems Initiative Andrew P. Moore [email protected] CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213 Sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense

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Overview of the CERT/CC and the Survivable Systems Initiative. Andrew P. Moore [email protected] CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213 Sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Overview of the CERT/CC and the Survivable Systems Initiative

1 Carnegie Mellon University

Overview of the CERT/CC and the Survivable Systems Initiative

Andrew P. Moore [email protected]

CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering InstituteCarnegie Mellon UniversityPittsburgh, PA 15213

Sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense

Page 2: Overview of the CERT/CC and the Survivable Systems Initiative

2 Carnegie Mellon University

*FFRDC - Federally Funded Research and Development Center

Networked SystemsSurvivability Program

(FFRDC*)

U.S. DoD -Office of the Under

Secretary(Research andEngineering)

sponsor

SurvivableNetwork

Management

SurvivableNetwork

Technology

Page 3: Overview of the CERT/CC and the Survivable Systems Initiative

3 Carnegie Mellon University

Talk Overview

• CERT Coordination Center

• Survivable Systems Initiative

• Intrusion-Aware Design and Analysis

Page 4: Overview of the CERT/CC and the Survivable Systems Initiative

4 Carnegie Mellon University

CERT Coordination Center

Page 5: Overview of the CERT/CC and the Survivable Systems Initiative

The Beginning of the CERT/CC

postmortem

wormattack

CERT/CCcreated

MorrisWorm

November 1988

Page 6: Overview of the CERT/CC and the Survivable Systems Initiative

6 Carnegie Mellon University

CERT/CC Mission

• Respond to security emergencies on the Internet

• Serve as a focal point for reporting security vulnerabilities and incidents

• Raise awareness of security issues• Serve as a model to help others establish incident response teams

Page 7: Overview of the CERT/CC and the Survivable Systems Initiative

7 Carnegie Mellon University

CERT/CC Principles

• Provide valued services- proactive as well as reactive

• Ensure confidentiality and impartiality- we do not identify victims but can pass

information anonymously and describe activity without attribution

- unbiased source of trusted information

• Coordinate with other organisations and experts- academic, government, corporate- distributed model for incident response teams

(coordination and cooperation, not control)

Principles

Page 8: Overview of the CERT/CC and the Survivable Systems Initiative

8 Carnegie Mellon University

CERT Coordination Center Teams

CERT/CC

IncidentHandling

VulnerabilityHandling

CSIRTDevelopment

ArtifactAnalysis

Page 9: Overview of the CERT/CC and the Survivable Systems Initiative

9 Carnegie Mellon University

CERT Vulnerability Handling & Analysis

• Receives vulnerability reports- forms, email, phone calls

• Verifies and analyzes reports/artifacts- veracity, scope, magnitude, exploitation

• Works with vulnerability reporters, vendors, experts - understanding and countermeasures

• Publicizes information about vulnerabilities and countermeasures- vulnerability notes, advisories

Page 10: Overview of the CERT/CC and the Survivable Systems Initiative

10 Carnegie Mellon University

CERT Incident Handling & Response

• Receives reports related to computer security from Internet sites - break-ins, service denial, probes, attempts

• Provides 24-hr. emergency incident response• Analyses report and provides feedback to reporting sites involved - attack method, scope, magnitude, correlation, response

• Informs Internet community - incident notes, summaries, advisories- assist formation and development of CSIRTs

Page 11: Overview of the CERT/CC and the Survivable Systems Initiative

11 Carnegie Mellon University

Recent CERT/CC Experiences

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Incidents Handled 3,2853,285 4,942 4,942 9,8599,859 21,756 52,658 21,756 52,658

Vulnerabilities reported 196196 262262 417 1,090 2,437 417 1,090 2,437

Email msgs processed 38,40638,406 31,93331,933 34,61234,612 56,365 118,907 56,365 118,907

CERT Advisories, Vendor Bulletins, and Vul Notes 4444 3434 2020 69 363 69 363

CERT Summaries and Incident Notes 66 1515 1313 14 19 14 19

Page 12: Overview of the CERT/CC and the Survivable Systems Initiative

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

hijackingsessions

sniffers

packetspoofing

GUIintruder

tools

automatedwidespread

attacks

widespreaddenial-of-

service attacks

"stealth"/advancedscanning

techniques

emailpropagationof maliciouscode

distributedattacktools

distributeddenial-of-

servicetools

executablecode attacks

(againstbrowsers)

Attack Sophistication vs. Required Intruder Knowledge

widespreadattacks on DNSinfrastructure

increase in wide-scale Trojanhorse distribution

automatedprobes/scans

Internetsocialengineeringattacks

techniques toanalyze code for

vuls without source

widespreadattacks usingNNTP todistribute attack

windows-basedremote controllable

Trojans (backorifice)

Sophistication ofattacks

Intruder knowledgeneeded to execute

attacks

dates indicate majorrelease of tools orwidespread use of a typeof attack