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FO

REIGN

POLICYIN

FCU

S

Indonesia is the worlds fourth-most-populous

nation. An archipelago of more than 17,000 islands,

of which 3,000 are inhabited, Indonesia has 360 trib-

al and ethno-linguistic groups, about 25 language

groups, and over 250 different dialect groups. The

Javanese (in central and eastern Java) constitute

about 40% of the population, the Sundanese (west-

ern Java) about 15%, with the remainder divided

among various outer island communities including

the Acehnese (1.4%), and the Melanesians and Sino-

Indonesians (3%). In religious terms, Indonesia is

about 90% Muslim, 8% Christian, 1-2% Hindu,

and 1% Buddhist.

In addition to conflicts over democratization and

class conflict, there are two major types of violent

conflicts in Indonesia:

Self determination conflicts

Communal conflicts

Self-determination conflicts involve conflicts where

major political organizations raise demands for inde-

pendence or significant autonomy. These include Aceh, West Papua and, previously, East Timor.

Communal conflicts involve violent conflict among

groups typically organized along ascriptive (ethnic,religious, or cultural) lines. The issues at stake in such

conflicts are not typically cultural, but may involve

struggle over economic, environmental, and politicalresources. Demands for autonomy or secession are

typically not central to such conflicts.

The human costs of these conflicts have been

severe. In addition to the dead and wounded, esti-

mates of the internally displaced due to these con-flicts range from 750,0001,300,000 nationwide.

Although the violence associated with the separatist

Self-Determination Conflict Profile

Indonesia:

An Archipelago of Self-Determination

& Communal ConflictsBy John Gershman

(We offer this analysis as part of FPIFs Self-Determination and Governance project. It does not necessarily reflect the views ofthe FPIF staff or the boards of either sponsoring organization. Comments are welcome. Please send to Tom Barry.)

Map of Indonesia.


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and communal conflicts have increased

since the collapse of the New Order

regime in 1998, the collapse of

Suhartos New Order regime and the

transition to a more democratic regime

did not cause the increase in violent

conflicts in Indonesia. Conflicts in

Aceh, West Papua, and East Timor hadearlier roots and the increase in political

violence associated with communal

conflicts dates back to the early 1990s

in some cases. Nevertheless, the change

in government, and the consequent

weakening of state authority has,

arguably, created conditions conducive

to increased conflict in the short term.

Both types of conflicts are embedded

in grievances over the distribution of

economic resources. This sense of eco-nomic injustice arises from perceptions

of Jakartas (or outsiders) control and

exploitation of regional economic

resources in such a way that local peo-

ple reap minuscule rewards compared

to outsiders, or suffer significant losses

to their livelihoods from the exploita-

tion of such resources by others. These

grievances have been shaped by a num-

ber of development policies: centralized

and elite ownership and control of nat-ural resources, transmigration, and the

displacement of indigenous inhabitants

from their sources of livelihood, typi-

cally land and forest resources.

Until recently, natural resources were

owned and controlled by the central

government, and access to resources

and the distribution of benefits from

their exploitation was determined by

alliances with the ruling elites in

Jakarta. Since 1999, local and regionalgovernments have more control over

regulating access to and sharing the

benefits from natural resources. In

many cases, however, local elites have

simply displaced national elites as the

beneficiaries, and the basic inequalities

have not been addressed. The decen-

tralization of control over local

resources has also raised the stakes of

competition for local office.

Transmigration began as a policy inthe 1930s under Dutch colonial rule asa strategy to depopulate Java by trans-ferring people to more sparsely popu-lated islands in the archipelago. Afterindependence it was continued (andexpanded to include other densely pop-

ulated islands such as Madura, Bali,and Lombok.) Under the New Order,transmigration was a central programwith a cabinet-level office, and the des-tination of transmigrants shifted fromSumatra to Sulawesi, Kalimantan, WestPapua (then Irian Jaya), and Maluku,all of which are areas where self-deter-mination or communal conflicts wereongoing or have subsequently emerged.The inter-island transmigration pro-gram was reportedly terminated in late

2000. In some areas, transmigrants anddevelopment activities such as com-mercial logging or plantations have dis-possessed indigenous communitiesfrom control over land and forestresources.

The Context for ConflictUnder the New Order, challenges to

the territorial integrity of Indonesia were dealt with primarily throug

repression. This, combined with adegree of shared economic growth, anideology of tolerance and multicultur-alism, and a form of corporatismthrough Golkar, enabled it to stay inpower. The New Orders veto on dis-cussion of racial, ethnic, and religiousissues (so-termed SARA issues) com-bined with pervasive administrativecontrol from the center maintained aveneer of national unity. (SARA refersto Suku, Agama, Ras, and Antar-golon-

ganbasically ethnicity, religion, race,and inter-group relations; public dis-cussion of any of which was taboo dur-ing the New Order.)

Self-determination Conflicts

There are two main types of self-determination conflicts in Indonesia:

Self-determination conflicts thatinclude independence movementsengaged in armed combat with

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Foreign Policy In Focus

Self-Determination

Regional Overview

October 2002

Foreign Policy in Focus is a joint project of theInterhemispheric Resource Center (IRC) and theInstitute for Policy Studies (IPS). The projectdepends on sales and subscription income,individual donors, and grants from foundationsand churches. In Focus internships areavailable, and we invite article queries andcomments.

Essay EditorJohn Gershman (IRC)

Project DirectorsTom Barry (IRC)Martha Honey (IPS)

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[email protected] Leaver (IPS)

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FPIFs network of advocates, organizations,activists, and scholars functions as a think tankwithout walls, reaching out to constituenciesand foreign policy actors to ensure that U.S.foreign policy represents a more broadly con-ceived understanding of U.S. national interests.

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the Indonesian military. Thisincludes Aceh and West Papua aswell as East Timors recent success-ful independence struggle.

Self-determination conflicts thatdo not include armed indepen-dence movements. This includescampaigns for independence inwhich there is no armed wing (ofwhich there is only one significantmovement, in the province ofRiau) as well as a larger set of con-flicts led by regional movementswhose interests and demands aremore diffuse, but share a desire forgreater autonomy from centralgovernment control. Some seek tocarve out their own province or

district from existing politicalunits, while others demand theright to choose their leaders with-out interference from Jakarta, amore generous share of nationalgovernment revenues, and moreauthority to determine howregional revenues are spent.

Among the many regions where eco-nomic grievances exist, two major con-ditions have shaped the degree to which

secessionist/autonomist movementshave resorted to violence to advancetheir claims. The first is an historicalone: violence has been more commonin regions that were not deeply inte-grated into the Netherlands East Indies,the colony that was the foundation forIndonesia. Since East Timor became acountry in May 2002, there are nowtwo major self-determination conflictsin Indonesia: Aceh and West Papua.Two of the three areas where armed

secessionist movements existed or cur-rently exist were not part of Indonesiaat the time of independence: EastTimor and West Papua. Aceh was onlyweakly integrated into the NetherlandsEast Indies during Dutch colonial ruleand engaged in a nine-year campaign toestablish an Islamic republic followingindependence.

The second factor shaping the degreeof violence in the conflicts is the degree

to which there is a legacy of severehuman right abuses committed by theIndonesian military. Armed secessionistgroups have emerged in those regionswhere Indonesian military violence hasbeen the most sustained and forceful.In all three cases (East Timor, Aceh,

and West Papua) Indonesian and inter-national human rights organizationsdocumented repeated and widespreadincidents in which Indonesian troopshave engaged in rape, arbitrary execu-tion, detentions without trial, andother gross violations of human rights.The fact that these abuses occurred overa long period of time, and are not asso-ciated with a single specific event, cre-ates a powerful legacy of conflictbetween the national government and a

very broad range of local society, notjust small, radical groups. Jakartas useof military coercion against rebel forcesin each case has produced more atroci-ties that have spurred even greateropposition to its rule. In the more openpolitical environment since the collapseof the New Order regime in 1998, thelegacy of human rights abuses hasbecome a powerful mobilizing force forself-determination activists.

The most dramatic case of separatistconflict that actually resulted in the cre-ation of a new state occurred in EastTimor. The success of the separatiststruggle in East Timor was not due to abattlefield victory or even a militarystalemate. Rather, it was in large partdue to the fact that a large number ofpowerful countries never recognizedthe legitimacy of Indonesias occupa-tion of East Timor (Australia being amajor exception). The combination of

Suhartos departure and the economiccrisis provided the political opportuni-ty and leverage for external actors todemand redress for the Timorese.

The referendum in East Timor hadripple effects in West Papua and Aceh,the other two main regions where sepa-ratist movements are active. Most advo-cates for self-determination in both West Papua and Aceh utilize nonvio-lent means to advance their objectives.

Some groups push for independencewhile others call for a greater degree ofautonomy.

Communal Conflicts

Communal violence includes vio-lence against the Sino-Indonesian com-

munity as well as violent communalconflicts in West and CentralKalimantan, Central Sulawesi, and theMalukus. Although violence directedagainst Sino-Indonesians has notinvolved issues of self-determination,violence in other areas has implicationsfor the emergence of more well-definedclaims for self-determination.

Sporadically since late 1996, Muslimimmigrants from the island of Madura

clashed with mostly Christian, Dayakpeople in the province of WestKalimantan. Most recently, violentattacks occurred in Central Kalimantanin March 2001. In December 1998,violence broke out in Poso in CentralSulawesi and sporadic violence contin-ues. In January 1999, conflicts betweenChristians and Muslims on the islandof Ambon in Maluku province beganand have continued through the pre-

sent. Smaller scale outbreaks of inter-religious or inter-ethnic violence haveoccurred in other parts of the country,giving rise to a sense that these conflictsmay be indicative of a broader deterio-ration in social cohesion throughoutthe country.

There are important differencesbetween the three sets of events. Thekillings in West Kalimantan precededthe economic crisis that began in 1997as well as the last general election of theSuharto era. In Ambon, the violencebegan only during the transitional gov-ernment of President Habibie. Anothercritical difference concerns the contri-bution of political and policy factors tothe violence. In West Kalimantan, therewere no serious allegations that politicalmaneuvering at either the national orlocal level had prompted the violence.(Although there are accusations thatthe military did not act quickly to stop


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the violence once it had broken out.) InWest Kalimantan, the conflicts primar-ily concern economic resources andpolitical power, layered over a commu-nal conflict. Although the conflict isoften presented as simply ethnic con-flict, the fact is that the Dayaks have

focused their anger against theMadurese and not other ethnic groupson the island, such as Javanese andChinese.

The communal conflict in theMalukus began in January 1999 witheconomic and ethnic as well as religiousundertones, and quickly polarized intoC h r i s t i a n - M u s l i m c o n f l i c t .Transmigration under Suharto wasresponsible for relocating Muslims to

the Malukus from other parts of thecountry, altering the religious balanceand displacing the Christian elite. Although there have been occasionallulls in the violence and weak attemptsat mediation by the central govern-ment, the clashes have always resumedand the situation has steadily deterio-rated. Some Christian leaders havecalled for UN and U.S. intervention,while many Muslim leaders have reject-ed such initiatives. The situation has

been exacerbated by the arrival of mem-bers of Laskar Jihad (Islamic militia),most of whom are from Java. There is awidespread belief that supporters of for-mer President Suharto are behind thecontinued conflict. Laskar Jihad hasalso been involved in the conflict inCentral Sulawesi.

These are often framed as ethnic orreligious conflicts, which disguises whatare often political and resource-based

conflicts. In Sulawesi and the Malukus,the conflicts have largely been betweenMuslims and Christians, while inKalimantan the conflicts are betweenDayaks (who may be Muslim orChristian) and the Madurese (who areMuslim), but not other ethnic groupsin the region. There is a history of pro-independence activity in the Malukus,where a small group of Christian-basedseparatists (but loyal to Dutch colonialrule) declared the South Maluku

Republ ic (RMS) in 1950. RMSactivists, most of them now living inthe Netherlands, have continued theircampaign for international recognition.The FKM is affiliated to the RMS.

In all these cases a combination of fac-tors contributed to the emergence ofthe violence. Common elements ineach include the breakdown of consoci-ational forms of governing (such asalternating leadership of local commu-nities between Muslims and Christianleaders), increased struggles over con-trol of local resources under the decen-tralization law, or dispossession of tradi-tional land and resource rights. In all ofthe locales where conflict emerged, thehistoric balance was altered due to the

state-sponsored program of transmigra-t ion. Development programs inSulawesi and Kalimantan have under-mined traditional land use systems anddeprived indigenous communities oflivelihood opportunities. In all cases,military and police forces contributedto the violence either directly (as in theMalukus), or indirectly by failing tohalt the violence quickly and holdingpeople on all sides accountable for com-mitting violent acts.

Efforts to forge peace agreementsamong representatives of the key actorsin each conflict have met with unevensuccess. The violence in Kalimantan haslargely ended as the Madurese popula-tion has fled. In Sulawesi there is recur-ring violence despite several efforts toforge peace agreements. In Sulawesi andthe Malukus, Islamist militias havebeen involved, the most prominentbeing the Laskar Jihad, which has com-

plicated conflict resolution efforts. Inthe Malukus there have been twoagreements (Malino I and II,reached December 2001 and February2002 respectively), which have not yetbeen successfully implemented.

In all the regions where communalconflict has taken place, there is significantvariation in the intensity of violence.The violence is concentrated in a fewareas, whereas neighboring areas may

experience much less or virtually noviolent conflict. This suggests that theremay be important lessons to be drawnfrom the leadership exercised by localpolitical and traditional leaders in someregions, as well as previously ignoredinstitutions and mechanisms of local

governance and conflict resolution.

Policy ResponsesFederalism would be one possible

response to both secessionist demandsas well as those for greater regionalautonomy and decentralization. Butfederalism in Indonesia has a negativeassociation with Dutch colonial rule.

Since the fall of Suharto, two sets oflaws have been passed that have tried to

address concerns regarding autonomyIn April 1999 President Habibie signedtwo laws, which went into effect in2001, to promote regional autonomyand fiscal balance between Jakarta andthe regions. Legislation granting greaterautonomy for Aceh and West Papuatook effect on Jan. 1, 2002. This legis-lation provides the legal basis for thetwo provinces to have greater controlover the regions economy, politics, andsecurity, as well as the cultural and reli-

gious life of its people. The laws coverrevenue sharing for the oil and gas sec-tor, where the regions are to receive70%, the freedom to set up a peoplescouncil, the freedom to have their ownanthem and flag along with theIndonesian national anthem and flag,and the implementation of shariah orIslamic law in Aceh. The passage of theautonomy legislation, however, hasfailed to dampen mobilization becauseit does not provide justice for the

victims of military repression, fails tocreate the conditions for effectivedemocratic control over local govern-ments, has strengthened unaccountableand often corrupt local elites, and wasdrafted by a small elite.

Role of the U.S.Numerous U.S. administrations have

stated that maintaining the territorialintegrity of Indonesia is in the national


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interest of the United States. Indonesiawas seen as a key ally under the NewOrder regime and U.S. military assis-tance to Indonesia was significant untilthe violence following the 1999 refer-endum in East Timor. Since the end ofthe cold war, Indonesias role as a mod-

erate Muslim-majority country wasimportant. Also increasing its impor-tance are its strategic location astridesea lanes in Southeast Asia, as the cen-terpiece of ASEAN, in its efforts tobuild an alliance to contain China, andas a key target in the war on terrorismafter the attacks of September 11th.

No administration has ever supportedany of the demands for independenceby movements in Aceh or West Papua.

Although it did not officially recognizethe annexation of East Timor byIndonesia, the U.S. government gave agreen light for the invasion when ithappened. The Indonesian governmenthas labeled both the GAM and theOPM as terrorist organizations, but theU.S. has not made any steps to addthose groups to its list of official terror-ist organizations and continues to sup-port negot ia t ions between theIndonesian government and these orga-

nizations.

The policy arena most open for rais-ing concerns about human rights viola-tions that is associated with self-deter-mination and communal conflicts inIndonesia has been through the U.S.Congress. Human rights advocates andsupporters of self-determination forEast Timor combined to support legis-lation that impose human rights condi-tions on U.S. military aid to Indonesia

that have limited U.S. military aid tothe Indonesian military. In the contextof the war on terrorism, Bush adminis-tration officials are seeking to lift thoserestrictions.

Both economic and strategic interestsloom large in shaping U.S. policytoward Indonesia. U.S. companies aremajor investors in extractive industriesand since the 1980s, large numbers ofU.S. companies have established manu-

facturing firms or contracting arrange-ments with firms in the footwear, tex-tile, and other light manufacturingindustrial base in Indonesia. U.S. cor-porations are notably active in Aceh(Exxon-Mobil) and West Papua(Freeport McMoran). Activists have

attempted to bring charges againstthese companies for complicity inhuman rights violations and for causingenvironmental destruction (in the caseof Freeport). The Bush administrationhas intervened to make it more difficultfor Indonesians to bring court casesagainst U.S. corporations operating inIndonesia (most notably ExxonMobilin Aceh), in part because it was believedthat such efforts could undermineefforts Indonesias potential role in the

war on terrorism.

The war on terrorism has given newlife to the Bush administrations effortsto restore ties with the Indonesian mil-itary. Those ties were severed because ofIndonesian military complicity in theviolent riots in East Timor in 1999.The efforts to restore those military tiesis driven by two concerns: thatIndonesia may be a major node in the Al Qaeda network (a concern that

many analysts believe is over-blown),and the objective of building a strongmilitary alliance in Southeast Asia thatcan be used to contain China. Theongoing self-determination and com-munal conflicts are seen as weakeningIndonesias ability to play such roles.

The danger of expanded U.S. supportfor the Indonesian military is that it isprecisely the military that has been aprincipal cause of much of the violence

associated with self-determination con-flicts. Any hope of a peaceful resolutionto these conflicts involves holding mili-tary personnel accountable for theircomplicity in human rights violationsin those regions. Such accountability isalso central to strengthening Indonesiasfragile civilian democratic institutions.In terms of communal conflicts, researchby the International Crisis Groupamong others has indicated that ele-ments of the military have ties to Laskar

Jihad, whose involvement in the Malukusand Central Sulawesi is correlated witha significant increase in violence inthose regions. In the absence of anysign of significant reform within themilitary with respect to a demonstratedcommitment to an end to impunity,

increasing support for the Indonesianmilitary would increase the likelihoodof violent conflict within Indonesia, weaken democratic institutions, anresult in continued instability.

(John Gershman is a

senior analyst at the Interhemispheric Resource

Center (IRC) (online at www.irc-online.org)

and Asia-Pacific Editor for Foreign Policy In

Focus.)

For More Information

Internet Links

Amnesty International Indonesia

http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/coun-

tries/indonesia

Human Rights Watch Indonesia

http://www.hrw.org/asia/indonesia.php

Indonesia Human Rights Networkhttp://www.indonesianetwork.org/

Indonesian Regional Information and

Promotion

http://www.infoproda.com/

Inside Indonesia

http://www.insideindonesia.org/

International Crisis Group

http://www.crisisweb.org/


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The Jakarta Post

http://www.thejakartapost.com/

Maluku News Portal

http://www.malra.org/

Norwegian Refugee Councils reports on internally displaced

people in Indonesia and East Timorhttp://www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/idpSurvey.nsf/wCountries/

Indonesia+&+East+Timor

Prevent Conflict.org: Building Human security in Indonesia

http://www.preventconflict.org/portal/main/

The SMERU Research Institute

http://www.smeru.or.id/

Social Sciences for the Study of Conflict in Indonesia

http://www.communalconflict.com/

TAPOL, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaignhttp://tapol.gn.apc.org/

United Nations Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery

http://www.unsfir.or.id/

Citations

M. Adriana Sri Adhiati and Armin Bobsien (ed.), Indonesias

Transmigration Programme - An Update, (July 2001).

http://dte.gn.apc.org/ctrans.htm

Benedict Anderson, Indonesian Nationalism Today and in

the Future, Indonesia 67 (April 1999).

Lorraine V. Aragon, Multiculturalism: Some Lessons from

Indonesia, Cultural Survival Quarterly18(2/3): 72-76

(1994). Special Double Issue on Ethnic Conflict: The New

World Order?

Lorraine V. Aragon, Communal Violence in Poso, Central

Sulawesi: Where People Eat Fish and Fish Eat People,

Indonesia 72 (October 2001): 45-80.

Council on Foreign Relations, The United States and Southeast

Asia: A Policy Agenda for the New Administration (NY: 2001).Donald K Emmerson (ed.). Indonesia beyond Suharto

(Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999).

John Gershman, Is Southeast Asia the Second Front?

Foreign Affairs(July/August 2002) 60-74.

Robert Hefner. Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in

Indonesia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

Donald L. Horowtiz. Ethnic Groups in Conflict(Berkeley:

University of California Press, 1985).

Sidney Jones, Causes of Conflict in Indonesia Excerpts

from Asia Society panel discussion, New York: October 24,

2000. http://www.asiasource.org/asip/sidneyjones.cfm

Michael Malley. Social Cohesion and Conflict Management

in Indonesia, in Anita Kelles-Viitanen, Nat J. Colletta, Teck

Gee Lim (eds.) Social Cohesion and Conflict Prevention in

Asia: Managing Diversity through Development(Washington,

DC and Manila: World Bank and Asian Development Bank,

2001).

Colin MacAndrews, (ed.). Central Government and Local

Development in Indonesia, (Singapore: Oxford University

Press, 1986).

Nancy Lee Peluso and Emily Harwell, Territory, Custom,

and the Cultural Politics of Ethnic War in West Kalimantan,

Indonesia, in Nancy Lee Peluso and Michael Watts eds.

Violent Environments(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001).

Tri Nuke Pudjiatuti, Migration and Conflict in Indonesia,

paper presented at the IUSSP Regional Population

Conference, June 10-13, 2002.

http://www.iussp.org/Bangkok2002/S15Pudjiastuti.pdf

Angel Rabasa, Peter Chalk, Indonesias Transformation and the

Stability of Southeast Asia (RAND Corporation 2001).

http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1344/

David Rhode, Indonesia Unraveling? Foreign Affairs, Vol.80 No. 4 (July/August 2001) 110-124.

Adam Schwarz and Jonathan Paris, (eds.) The Politics of Post-

Suharto Indonesia (Council on Foreign Relations, 1999).

Richard Sokolsky, Angel Rabasa, C.R. Neu, The Role of

Southeast Asia in U.S. Strategy Toward China, (RAND

Corporation, 2000).

http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1170/

Ashutosh Varshney, The Relevance of International Research on

Ethnic Conflict for Indonesia: Some Reflections, (Jakarta, June2002).

http://www.unsfir.or.id/publications/workingpaper/WP

%2002-05%20The%20Relevance%20of%20International

%20Research.pdf

World Bank. World Bank Transmigration Sector Review.

(Washington DC: World Bank 1986).

(For links and citations on specific self-determination con-

flicts, please see the FPIF Conflict Profiles for Aceh, East

Timor, and West Papua at www.selfdetermine.org.)

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