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The Social Psychology of Creativity:A Componential Conceptualization

Teresa M. AmabileBrandeis University

Despite the clear importance of social and environmental' influences on creativeperformance, a social psychology of creativity is yet to be developed. Theory andresearch have focused almost exclusively on a personality approach to creativityand, to a lesser extent, a cognitive-abilities approach. Following a considerationof the definition and assessment of creativity, a componential framework forconceptualizing creativity is presented here. Including domain-relevant skills,creativity-relevant skills, and task motivation as a set of necessary and sufficientcomponents of creativity, the framework describes the way in which cognitiveabilities, personality characteristics, and social factors might contribute to dif-ferent stages of the creative process. The discussion emphasizes the previouslyneglected social factors and highlights the contributions that a social psychologyof creativity can make to a comprehensive view of creative performance.

A striking feature of many phenomeno-logical accounts of creativity is the degree towhich outstandingly creative individuals feelinfluenced by social and environmental fac-tors. In many cases, these factors are quiteordinary, mundane events; it appears thateven seemingly insignificant features of theenvironment can be detrimental or condu-cive to creativity in some individuals. Forexample, in a letter to a friend, Tchaikovsky(1906) described the devastating effect that

This work was supported in part by predoctoral fel-lowship F531 MHO5232-02 from the National Instituteof Mental Health and by a Biomedical Research SupportGrant awarded through Brandeis University by the Na-tional Institutes of Health.

The author gratefully acknowledges the help of severalcolleagues who offered valuable comments on an earlierdraft of this manuscript: William DeJong, Reid Hastie,Maurice Hershenson, Robert Kidd, Ellen Langer, MarkLepper, Leslie McArthur, Ricardo Morant, Harvey Pines,David Schneider, Mark Snyder, and Margaret Stubbs. Inaddition, students enrolled in the seminar The Psychol-ogy of Creativity at Brandeis University in the fall of1980 were instrumental in modifying several of the ideaspresented here; Leah Kaufman was particularly helpfulin this regard.

Requests for reprints should be sent to Teresa M.Amabile, Department of Psychology, Brandeis Univer-sity, Waltham, Massachusetts 02254.

simple interruptions could have on his work.The poet Stephen Spender reports (1952) thatto write well, Auden had to drink tea con-stantly, de la Mare had to smoke, and Schillerliked to have the scent of rotten applesnearby.

In other accounts, somewhat more signif-icant features of the environment, particu-larly the social environment, have been cited.Einstein (1949), for example, described thedetrimental effect that external constraintsimposed by formal education had on his sci-entific creativity: "The hitch in this was. . . the fact that one had to cram all thisstuff into one's mind for the examinations,whether one liked it or not. This coercionhad such a deterring effect upon me that,after I had passed the final examination, Ifound the consideration of any scientificproblem distasteful for an entire year"(p. 17).

Despite the apparent importance of socialand environmental influences on creativity,however, there is virtually no research on thesocial psychology of creativity: the interac-tion of social/environmental factors with per-sonality characteristics and cognitive abilitiesand the effects of such factors on observablecreativity. Indeed, of nearly 7,000 citations

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1983, Vol. 45, No. 2, 357-376Copyright 1983 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.

357

358 TERESA M. AMABILE

included in a bibliography of studies of cre-ativity dating from 1566 to 1974 (Rothenberg& Greenberg, 1976), only 138 were con-cerned with social or environmental influ-ences, and in many of those the "social vari-able" was simply social class. Between 1975and 1980, there were barely half a dozen ar-ticles in the Journal of Personality and SocialPsychology and the Journal of ExperimentalSocial Psychology that dealt in some way withthe social psychology of creativity. Althoughthere has been some rather sophisticated ar-chival research in this area (e.g., Simonton,1975, 1977a, 1977b, 1979), experimentalstudies of social influences on creativity areexceedingly rare.

Perhaps a social psychology of creativityhas failed to develop in part because empir-ical creativity research has long been domi-nated by a trait approach, an attempt to pre-cisely identify the personality differences be-tween creative and noncreative individuals(Nicholls, 1972). As a result, some potentiallyimportant areas of inquiry have been virtu-ally ignored. There has been a concentrationon the creative person to the neglect of "cre-ative situations," that is, circumstances con-ducive to creativity; there has been a narrowfocus on intrapersonal determinants of cre-ativity to the neglect of external determi-nants; and, within studies of intrapersonaldeterminants, there has been an implicit con-cern with "genetic" factors to the neglect ofcontributions from learning and the socialenvironment.

It will be argued here that the trait ap-proach is incomplete, that creativity is bestconceptualized not as a personality trait ora general ability but as a behavior resultingfrom particular constellations of personalcharacteristics, cognitive abilities, and socialenvironments. This behavior, which is evi-denced in products or responses, can only becompletely explained by a model that encom-passes all three sets of factors.

A social psychology of creativity, then, can-not be proposed as an answer to all questionsof creativity any more than a personality ap-proach or a cognitive approach can be pro-posed as a complete answer. It can be argued,though, that social-psychological issues havebeen ignored in the study of creativity andthat those must be integrated into a general

framework that includes personality and cog-nition. This article presents such a generalframework of creativity, illustrating the placeof social psychology in that framework andoutlining the contributions that social-psy-chological research can make to a compre-hensive understanding of the creative process.

The Definition and Assessmentof Creativity

Psychologists have a long history of dis-agreement over the definition of creativity,variously defining it in terms of the creativeprocess, the creative person, and the creativeproduct. For this reason, any discussion ofthe psychology of creativity must begin witha consideration of the criterion problem.

Many of the earliest definitions of creativ-ity focused on process. Typical of early viewsof the creative process was the Gestalt posi-tion proposed by Wertheimer (1945), whosuggested that insight and productive think-ing arise when the thinker grasps the essentialfeatures of a problem and their relationshipto a final solution. More recently, Koestler(1964) proposed that creativity involves a"bisociative process"—the connecting of twopreviously unrelated "matrices of thought"to produce a new insight or invention. Also,in their list of criteria by which problem solv-ing can be called creative, Newell, Shaw, andSimon (1962) include several characteristicsof the problem-solving process.

In a 1949 presidential address to theAmerican Psychological Association that haslong been considered a stimulus to moderncreativity research, J. P. Guilford defined cre-ativity in terms of the person. Guilford's fo-cus on personality characteristics almost cer-tainly contributed to the long-standing prom-inence of the trait approach: "In its narrowsense, creativity refers to the abilities that aremost characteristic of creative people" (Guil-ford, 1950, p. 444).

Most contemporary definitions, however,use characteristics of the creative product asthe distinguishing signs of creativity. (It shouldbe noted that,,typically, product is broadlydefined to include any observable outcomeor response.) For example, Bruner (1962)sees the creative product as anything thatproduces "effective surprise" in the observer,in addition to a "shock of recognition" that

COMPONENTIAL CONCEPTUALIZATION OF CREATIVITY 359

the product or response, although novel, isentirely appropriate. Barron (1955) stressestwo criteria by which acts may be judged asoriginal: The response "should have a certainstated uncommonness in the particular groupbeing studied," and it must be "to some ex-tent adaptive to reality" (pp. 274-275). Theproduct criteria of novelty and appropriate-ness or value are common in most definitionsof creativity (e.g., Newell et al., 1962; Stein,1974).

Currently, the product definitions arewidely regarded as the most useful for cre-ativity research, even among those who at-tempt to study the creative process or thecreative personality (Gamble, 1959). How-ever, assessment methods are seldom directlytied to these definitions. In fact, in most cre-ativity studies performance on creativity testsis used as the criterion product; this perfor-mance is rated, ultimately, according to thetest constructor's or scorer's subjective viewof what is creative and not according to anyobjective criteria of novelty, appropriateness,value, and so on. Even in studies that directlyuse subjective ratings of products or personsas creative (e.g., Domino, 1974; Helson &Crutchfield, 1970; MacKinnon, 1962), op-erational definitions of creativity are rarelymade explicit.

It appears, then, that current definitionsof creativity are conceptual rather than op-erational; their conceptualizations have notbeen translated into actual assessment cri-teria. Perhaps a solution to this criterionproblem can be achieved by the adoption oftwo complementary definitions of creativity:an operational definition that is readily ap-plicable to empirical research and an under-lying conceptual definition that can be usedin building theoretical formulations of thecreative process.

An Operational Definition

For several reasons, an operational defi-nition of creativity based on the product ap-pears to be most appropriate. First, given thecurrent state of psychological theory and re-search, a definition based on process wouldnot be feasible. Although some progress hasbeen made in this regard (e.g., Newell et al.,1962), a clear and sufficiently detailed artic-

ulation of the process is not yet possible. Sec-ond, and more importantly, identification ofa thought process (or subprocess) as "cre-ative" must finally depend on the fruit of thatprocess: a product or response. Likewise,even if it was possible to specify clearly a con-stellation of personality traits that marks out-standingly creative individuals, the identifi-cation of individuals on whom such person-ality research would be validated must dependin some way on the quality of their work.Thus, the definition that is most likely to beuseful for empirical research is one groundedin an examination of products.

Although some theorists (e.g., Ghiselin,1963) suggest that it is possible to articulatecriteria of creativity that are clearly statedand readily translated into assessment, thehope of delineating clear objective criteria isstill to be met. Indeed, it can be argued thatobjective ultimate criteria for identifyingproducts as creative will never be articulated.Just as the judgment of attitude statementsas more or less favorable (Thurstone &Chave, 1929) or the identification of individ-uals as physically attractive (Walster, Aron-son, Abrahams, & Rottman, 1966) dependson social judgments, so too does the assess-ment of creativity ultimately require consen-sual judgment. Surely there are particularcharacteristics^ of attitude statements or per-sons or products that observers look to inrating them on scales of favorability or phys-ical attractiveness or creativity, but in the fi-nal analysis, the choice of those characteris-tics is a subjective one. Thus, for the purposesof empirical research, it seems appropriateto abandon the hope of finding objective ul-timate criteria for creativity and, instead, toadopt a definition that relies on clearly sub-jective criteria. This is the basis of the con-sensual definition of creativity (Amabile,1982):A product or response is creative to the extent that ap-propriate observers independently agree it is creative.Appropriate observers are those familiar with the do-main in which the product was created or the responsearticulated. Thus, creativity can be regarded as the qual-ity of products or responses judged to be creative byappropriate observers, and it can also be regarded as theprocess by which something so judged is produced, (p.1001)

In an application of this operational defi-nition, several important assumptions are


made about the nature of creativity and cre-ativity judgment. As stated earlier, it is as-sumed that products or observable responsesmust ultimately be the hallmark of creativityand that it is hot possible a priori to specifyobjective features of new products that areto be considered creative. Rather, criteria forcreativity require a historically bound socialcontext. Furthermore, it is assumed that, al-though creativity in a product may be diffi-cult to characterize in terms of features andalthough it is difficult to clearly characterizethe nature of observers' responses to creativeproducts (Feldman, 1980), creativity issomething that people can recognize and of-ten agree on, even when they are not givena guiding definition (Amabile, 1982; Barron,1965). In addition, it is proposed that thereis one basic form of creativity, one basic qual-ity of products that observers are respondingto when they call something creative, whetherthey are working in science or the arts. Fi-nally, it is assumed that there are degrees ofcreativity, that observers can say with an ac-ceptable level of agreement that some prod-ucts are more creative or less creative thanothers. Although this assumption of a con-tinuous underlying dimension is fairly com-mon in psychological theorizing on creativity(e.g., Nicholls, 1972; Thurstone, Note 1), thepopular assumption that creativity is a di-chotomous trait—that people and things areeither creative or not creative—is implicit inmuch of the creativity literature.

A Conceptual Definition

Despite the present empirical necessity foran operational definition of creativity thatrelies solely on subjective criteria, such a def-inition is not, by itself, sufficient for use ina theory of creativity. Although empiricalstudies of human creativity cannot at thistime fruitfully attempt to apply specific cri-teria for the identification of the creativeproduct or the creative process, any theoret-ical formulation of creativity must make as-sumptions about these criteria and their char-acteristics. To articulate a theoretical modelof creativity, it is necessary to make someassumptions about the nature of observers'responses when they call something creative.

The theoretical framework to be presentedhere is based in a conceptual definition ofcreativity that comprises two essential ele-ments:

A product or response will be judged as creative to theextent that (a) it is both a novel and appropriate, useful,correct, or valuable response to the task at hand and (b)the task is heuristic rather than algorithmic.

Clearly, this conceptual definition is closelyaligned with most of the product definitionsdescribed earlier in its inclusion of noveltyand appropriateness as two hallmark char-acteristics of creativity. In addition, however,this definition specifies that the task must beheuristic rather than algorithmic (cf. Mc-Graw, 1978; Taylor, 1960). As typically de-fined (e.g., Hilgard & Bower, 1975), algo-rithmic tasks are those for which the path tothe solution is clear and straightforward—tasks for which an algorithm exists. By con-trast, heuristic tasks are those not having aclear and readily identifiable path to solu-tion—tasks for which algorithms must bedeveloped.1 In this terminology, path to so-lution is taken in its most general sense; itrefers to that set of cognitive and motor op-erations that lead to an acceptable responseor product in the domain of endeavor.

If a chemist applied, step by step, well-known synthesis chains for producing a newhydrocarbon complex, that synthesis wouldnot be considered creative according to thepresent definition, even if it led to a productthat was novel (had not been synthesized be-fore) and appropriate (had the properties re-quired by the problem). Only if this chemisthad to develop an algorithm for the synthesiscould the result be called creative. Similarly,an artist who followed the algorithm "paintpictures of different sorts of children withlarge sad eyes and use dark-toned back-grounds" would not be producing creativepaintings, even if each painting was uniqueand technically perfect

1 By definition, algorithmic tasks have a clearly iden-tified goal. In contrast, although some heuristic tasksmight have a clearly identified goal, for others the prob-lem solver must define the goal itself (and attendantsubgoals). Thus, as many theorists have noted (e.g.,Campbell, 1960; Oetzels & Csikszentmihalyi, 1976;Souriau, 1881), problem discovery is an important partof much creative activity.


Clearly, there is a large class of tasks thatmay be considered either algorithmic or heu-ristic, depending on the goal and the level ofknowledge of the individual in question. Forexample, if the goal of a task is simply tobake a cake, a recipe can be followed exactly,and the task would be considered algo-rithmic. If the goal is to bake a new kind ofcake, a recipe has to be invented, and the taskwould be considered heuristic. Certainly,some tasks may only be algorithmic—for ex-ample, the task of solving an addition prob-lem. Other tasks can only be considered heu-ristic—for example, finding a cure for leu-kemia—since no one knows the path to thesolution. Most tasks, however, can be consid-ered one or the other.

The determination of the label "algo-rithmic" or "heuristic," then, depends on theindividual performer's knowledge about thetask. If an algorithm for task solution existsbut the individual has no knowledge of it, thetask can be considered heuristic for that in-dividual. For example, a student who inde-pendently proves a well-known theorem ingeometry would certainly be said to havesolved a heuristic task. In most studies, as-sumptions can usually be made about thelevel of knowledge that most subjects bringto the task, thus allowing a determination ofwhether a task is algorithmic or heuristic.Thus, an experimenter who wishes to presentsubjects with a creativity task must use a taskfor which there is no widely familiar algo-rithm.

It is important to specify the relation be-tween the operational and conceptual defi-nitions. The conceptual definition articulatesthe notion of creativity that underlies thetheoretical framework to be presented here,because a useful conceptualization of cre-ativity must explain how the crucial char-acteristics of creative products evolve in theprocess of task engagement. In essence, theconceptual definition is a best guess as towhat appropriate observers are looking forwhen they assign ratings of creativity to prod-ucts. Clearly, though, the characteristics pro-posed in that definition cannot be directlytranslated into an empirically useful defini-tion, because it is not yet possible to specifynovelty or appropriateness or straightfor-

wardness in an objective manner. Thus, al-though it is necessary to articulate a concep-tual definition, a satisfactory operational def-inition must return to the final criterion forcreativity assessment—a reliable subjectivejudgment.

Preliminary Assumptions and Observations

The conceptualization of creativity to bepresented here relies on a number of as-sumptions about creative production, as-sumptions based in both formal and informalobservation. Most fundamentally, this con-ceptualization includes some assumptionsabout the nature of creativity. It is assumedthat there is a continuum of creativity fromthe lower levels of "garden variety" creativityobserved in everyday life to historically sig-nificant advances in literature, the arts, andscience. In contrast to popular views of cre-ativity as an all-or-nothing entity, this per-spective proposes that it is at least theoreti-cally possible for anyone with normal cog-nitive abilities to be creative to some degreein some domain of endeavor. In addition, itis assumed that there can be degrees of cre-ativity within a particular individual's work;a particular scientist, for example, may pro-duce both more creative and less creative sci-entific work. Furthermore, it is acknowledgedthat although different individuals may bequite distinct in their potential for creativeperformance in a given domain, it does ap-pear to be possible to increase creativity tosome extent (Stein, 1974, 1975).

These assumptions are accompanied by aset of related observations about the factorsthat appear to be necessary for creative be-havior: First, at least for high levels of cre-ativity, there often seems to be a "match"between individuals and domains (Feldman,1980). There appears to be a particularlygood fit, for example, between one individualand chess playing and between another in-dividual and musical composition. Second,education and training in cognitive skills areessential, but for high levels of creativity theydo not appear to be sufficient by themselves.Third, particular clusters of personality traitsmay correlate fairly well with consistent cre-ativity in individuals (see Stein, 1974), but


IDOMAIN-RELEVANT SKILLS

- KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE DOMAIN- TECHNICAL SKILLS REQUIRED- SPECIAL DOMAIN-RELEVANT

"TALENT"

DEPENDS ON;

- INNATE COGNITIVE ABILITIES- INNATE PERCEPTUAL AND

MOTOR SKILLS- FORMAL AND INFORMAL

EDUCATION

CREATIVITY- RELEVANT SKILLS

INCLUDES:

- APPROPRIATE COGNITIVE STYLE- IMPLICIT OR EXPLICIT

KNOWLEDGE OF HEURISTICS FORGENERATING NOVEL IDEAS

- CONDUCIVE WORK STYLE

DEPENDS ON;

- TRAINING- EXPERIENCE IN IDEA GENERATION- PERSONALITY CHARACTERISTICS

TASK MOTIVATION

INCLUDES:

- ATTITUDES TOWARD THE TASK- PERCEPTIONS OF OWN MOTIVATION

FOR UNDERTAKING THE TASK

DEPENDS ON;

- INITIAL LEVEL OF INTRINSICMOTIVATION TOWARD THE TASK

- PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OFSALIENT EXTRINSIC CONSTRAINTSIN THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT

- INDIVIDUAL ABILITY TOCOGNITIVELY MINIMIZE EXTRINSICCONSTRAINTS

Figure 1. Components of creative performance.

again, they are not sufficient in and of them-selves. Certainly, a given individual—des-cribable, perhaps, by a particular personality-trait constellation—is not creative at all timesor in all domains, even if he or she does pro-duce notably creative work in some. Fourth,innate abilities ("talents") in a given domaindo appear to be important for noteworthylevels of creativity, but education seems es-sential in most outstanding creative achieve-ments (Feldman, 1980). Fifth, although aneagerness to work diligently appears to be anessential component of high levels of creativ-ity (Golann, 1963) and although a numberof introspective accounts describe the phe-nomenology of creativity as marked by deepinvolvement in the activity at hand, theseaccounts also stress the importance of intel-lectual playfulness and freedom from exter-nal constraints (e.g., Einstein, 1949).

The componential framework of creativityoutlined here attempts to account for thesefairly well-established creativity phenomena:the importance of talents, education, cogni-tive skills, innate interests, and personalitydispositions, all functioning interactively toinfluence creative behavior, as well as the ap-parently contradictory importance of both"work" and "play" in the motivation for cre-ative behavior.

The Components of Creative Production

The proposed componential framework ofcreativity includes three major components,as outlined in Figure 1. In keeping with theconsensual definition of creativity offeredearlier, creativity, as used herein, refers to the

production of responses or works that arereliably assessed as creative by appropriatejudges. These three components, then, arepresented as factors essential for the produc-tion of such responses and works.2 Althoughit is proposed that the three main compo-nents constitute a complete set of the generalfactors necessary for creativity, the listing ofelements within each component can only becompleted gradually, as progress is made increativity research. The elements included inFigure 1 within each of the components areproposed as examples of the kind of elementsthat each component contains.3

Within the framework, domain-relevantskills can be considered as the basis fromwhich any performance must proceed. Theyinclude factual knowledge, technical skills,and special talents in the domain in question.Creativity-relevant skills include cognitive

2 The term factor is used here in the colloquial senseof elements, circumstances, or conditions contributingto a process or outcome. This use is to be distinguishedfrom the more narrowly statistical use of the term in thepsychology of intelligence (e.g., Spearman, 1927).

3 Sternberg (1977a, 1977b, 1978, 1979) has used theterm componential extensively in his theory of humanreasoning. There is a basic commonality between his andthe present use of the term; in both conceptualizations,all of the components are seen as necessary, and the setis seen as essentially complete. Sternberg's conceptual-ization, however, is more highly developed; it is subdi-vided into hierarchical levels that include performancecomponents, acquisition components, transfer compo-nents, retention components, and metacomponents (pro-cesses controlling the lower components). Although inSternberg's model the components are processes, in thepresent conceptualization the components are sets ofelements that control, determine, and enter into pro-cesses.


style, application of heuristics for the explo-ration of new cognitive pathways, and work-ing style. Task motivation accounts for mo-tivational variables that determine an indi-vidual's approach to a given task. The threecomponents are proposed to operate at dif-ferent levels of specificity. Creativity-relevantskills operate at the most general level; theymay influence responses in any content do-main. Thus, some highly creative individualsmay indeed appear to be creative "types,"behaving in an eccentric and atypical mannerin many domains of behavior. Domain-rel-evant skills, on the other hand, operate at anintermediate level of specificity; this com-ponent includes all skills relevant to a generaldomain, such as verbal production, ratherthan skills relevant to only a specific taskwithin a domain, such as writing a Haikupoem on autumn. It is assumed that withina particular domain, skills relevant to anygiven specific task overlap with skills relevantto any other task. Finally, task motivationoperates at the most specific level; motivationmay be very specific to particular tasks withindomains and may even vary over time for aparticular task. Thus, for example, a childmay have a high level of motivation for de-veloping various statistics on baseball playersbut may have a very low level of motivationfor working mathematical puzzles in school.

Figure 1 includes several elements withineach of the three components. At this point,although all three components are seen asnecessary for creativity, it is not proposedthat each of the individual elements withina component is necessary for recognizablelevels of creativity. It might, for example, bepossible for a composer to produce a sym-phony that observers would agree was rathercreative without that composer's having anyparticular talent for hearing in imaginationall the instruments playing together. Of course,it could be that such talent is essential. Thepoint is that only future research can indicatewhich elements constitute a complete setwithin any one of the components and whichelements are indeed essential.

Domain-Relevant Skills

Domain-relevant skills compose the indi-vidual's complete set of response possibili-

ties—response possibilities from which thenew response is to be synthesized and infor-mation against which the new response is tobe judged.4 This component can be seen asthe set of cognitive pathways for solving agiven problem or doing a given task. Someof the pathways are more common, well-practiced, or obvious than others, and the setof pathways may be large or small. The largerthe set, the more numerous the alternativesavailable for producing something new, fordeveloping a new combination of steps. AsNewell and Simon (1972) poetically de-scribed it, this set can be considered the prob-lem solver's "network of possible wander-ings" (p. 82).

This component includes familiarity withand factual knowledge of the domain in ques-tion: facts, principles, opinions about variousquestions in the domain, knowledge of par-adigms, performance "scripts" (Schank &Abelson, 1977) for solving problems in thedomain, and aesthetic criteria. Certainly, itis imppssible to be creative in nuclear physicsunless one knows something (and probablya great deal) about nuclear physics. The com-ponent of domain-relevant skills also in-cludes technical skills that may be requiredby a given domain, such as laboratory tech-niques or techniques for making etchings,and special domain-relevant talents that maycontribute to creative productivity, such asa composer's ability to hear in imaginationall the instruments playing together. It is pro-posed that this set of components dependson innate cognitive, perceptual, and motorabilities as well as formal and informal ed-ucation in the domain of Endeavor.

4 Although there is a great deal of overlap between thepresent conceptualization of domain-relevant skills andNewell and Simon's (1972) conceptualization of "prob-lem space," there are some distinctions to be made. Theproblem space, as described by Newell and Simon, in-cludes not only what are here called domain-relevantskills (a "set of elements," a "set of operators," and the"total knowledge available to a problem solver"; p. 82)but also information specific to the task (an "initial stateof knowledge" and a "problem"; p. 82). Thus, the pres-ent conceptualization of domain-relevant skills is limitedto a particular individual's more or less permanent storeof information in the problem domain. An additionaldistinction is that Newell and Simon do not explicitlyinclude the technical motor skills or special talents thatare here seen as part of domain-relevant skills.


The nature of the domain-relevant infor-mation and the manner in which it is storedcan make an important difference in creativeproduction. Wickelgren (1979) has arguedthat "the more we concentrate on ...heavily contextualized (specific) concepts andpropositions, the less capacity we will haveavailable to learn general principles and ques-tions that crosscut different areas and per-spectives" (p. 382). In other words, knowl-edge organized according to general princi-ples is of greater utility than specific, narrowlyapplicable collections of facts. Likewise, per-formance information organized accordingto general approaches to problems ratherthan blind response algorithms should bemore likely to contribute to high levels ofcreativity. Thus, according to this compo-nential perspective, the popular notion thata great deal of knowledge in a given domaincan be detrimental to creativity is incorrect.In general, an increase in domain-relevantskills can only lead to an increase in creativ-ity, provided that the domain-relevant infor-mation is organized appropriately. This prop-osition fits well with the assertion of previoustheorists (e.g., Campbell, 1960) that largerstores of properly coded knowledge increasethe probability of outstanding responses. Inother words, although it is possible to havetoo many algorithms, it is not possible tohave too much knowledge.

There has been virtually no research di-rectly examining the role of domain-relevantskills in the production of creative work, al-though some indirect evidence may be foundin biographical and personality assessmentsof outstandingly creative persons (e.g., Cox,1926; MacKinnon, 1962; Roe, 1952). None-theless, notions similar to those presentedhere can be found in the work of several pre-vious theorists. In what is perhaps the mostwell-known intuitive description of the cre-ative process, Wallas (1926) suggested thatthe first step is the "preparation" stage, whichdepends on "the whole process of intellectualeducation" (p. 92). Similarly, Koestler (1964)referred to the importance of "ripeness" indetermining whether the "bisociation" of twodifferent "matrices of thought" takes place:"The statistical probability for a relevant dis-covery to be made is the greater the morefirmly established and well exercised each ofthe still separate skills, or thought-matrices,

are" (p. 108). Also, Newell et al. (1962) pro-posed that "there is a high correlation be-tween creativity (at least in the sciences) andproficiency in the more routine intellectivetasks that are commonly used to measureintelligence" (p. 145). To this the present con-ceptualization adds the qualification thatthere is a high correlation between creativityand proficiency in the more routine domain-relevant intellective tasks.

Creativity-Relevant Skills

For individuals with similar domain-rele-vant skills and task motivation who are work-ing on the same problem, differences in theircreativity-relevant skills determine the var-ious ways in which their problem-solving pro-ceeds. Herein lies the "something extra" ofcreative performance; assuming an appro-priate level of motivation, performance willbe "good" or "adequate" or "acceptable" ifthe requisite domain-relevant skills exist.However, even with these skills at an extraor-dinarily high level, an individual is incapableof producing work that is considered creativeif creativity-relevant skills are lacking.

This component includes, first, a cognitivestyle characterized by a facility in under-standing complexities and an ability to breakset during problem solving. Several specificaspects of cognitive style appear to be rele-vant to creativity; these include a number ofdistinct abilities: (a) breaking perceptual set(Boring, 1950; Katona, 1940): Duncker's(1945) studies in "functional fixedness" dem-onstrated that subjects who solved his prob-lem "creatively" were those who could seea thumbtack box as a platform for a candlerather than as just a container, (b) Breakingcognitive set, or exploring new cognitive path-ways: Newell et al. (1962) suggested thatproblem-solving can result in creative solu-tions when an old set of unsuccessful prob-lem-solving strategies is abandoned and thesearch, as a result, moves off in a new direc-tion, (c) Keeping response options open aslong as possible: In a study of student artists,Getzels and Csikszentmihalyi (1976) foundthat those who approached their canvas with-out a definite plan produced more creativepaintings than those who knew in advancewhat they were going to do. (d) Suspendingjudgment: This is the cardinal rule of Os-


horn's (1963) "brainstorming" program and,apparently, the one facet of that program thatis most responsible for positive results (Stein,1975). (e) Using "wide" categories: Individ-uals who categorize information in "wide"as opposed to "narrow" categories, who seerelations between apparently diverse bits ofinformation, may be more likely to producecreative works and responses (Cropley, 1967).(f) Remembering accurately: Those who cancode, retain, and recall large amounts of de-tailed information probably have an advan-tage in creative performance (Campbell,1960). (g) Breaking out of performance"scripts": It was proposed earlier that do-main-relevant skills include performance"scripts" (Schank & Abelson, 1977), set se-quences of steps for performing tasks or solv-ing problems in a given domain; these mayalso be called algorithms. It may be impor-tant for creativity to be able to break out ofwell-used scripts occasionally, or at least toexamine them actively, instead of proceedingthrough them uncritically (Langer, 1978;Langer & Imber, 1979).

The creativity-relevant-skills componentalso includes knowledge of heuristics for gen-erating novel ideas. A heuristic can be dennedas "any principle or device that contributesto a reduction in the average search to so-lution" (Newell, et al., 1962, p. 152); thus,a heuristic may be considered as a generalrule that can be of aid in approaching prob-lems or tasks. Several theorists and philoso-phers of science have proposed creativity heu-ristics: (a) "When all else fails, try somethingcounterintuitive" (Newell et al., 1962); (b)"Make the familiar strange" (Gordon, 1961);(c) generate hypotheses by analyzing casestudies, use analogies, account for excep-tions, and investigate paradoxical incidents(McGuire, 1973). Clearly, creative heuristicsare best considered as methods of approach-ing a problem that are most likely to lead toset-breaking and novel ideas rather than asstrict rules that are applied by rote. Althoughthese heuristics may be stated explicitly bythe person using them, they may also beknown at a more implicit level and used with-out direct awareness.

A work style conducive to creativity is anessential element of creativity-relevant skills.For example, an ability to concentrate effortfor long periods of time may be an important

facet of such a work style (Campbell, 1960;Hogarth, 1980), along with an ability to use"productive forgetting"—the ability to aban-don unproductive search strategies and tem-porarily put aside stubborn problems (Si-mon, 1966).

In an important way, creativity-relevantskills depend on personality characteristicsrelated to self-discipline, ability to delay grat-ification, perseverance in the face of frustra-tion, independence, and an absence of con-formity in thinking or dependence on socialapproval (Feldman, 1980; Golann, 1963;Hogarth, 1980; Stein, 1974). In addition,though, creativity-relevant skills also dependon training, through which they may be ex-plicitly taught, or simply on experience withidea generation, through which an individualmay devise his or her own strategies for cre-ative thinking. A great deal of previous re-search has investigated these elements, in-cluding work on creativity-training pro-grams, such as brainstorming (Osborn, 1963)and synectics (Gordon, 1961), and researchon the "creative personality" (e.g., Barron,1955; Cattell & Butcher, 1968; MacKinnon,1962; Wallach & Kogan, 1965).

Task Motivation

Few theorists have dealt at length with therole of motivational variables in creativity,but some have suggested the importance ofintrinsic motivation—a motivational stategenerated by the individual's reaction to in-trinsic properties of the task and not gener-ated by extrinsic factors. In essence, thesetheorists have proposed that freedom fromexternal pressures and controls is essential(e.g., Crutchfield, 1962; Osborn, 1963; Rog-ers, 1954). In this sense, intrinsic motivationcan be viewed as both a state and a trait (al-though this trait should not be thought of asgeneral and pervasive but as specific to par-ticular classes of activities). Individuals mayhave relatively enduring levels of interest inparticular activities, but levels of interest maybe importantly affected by social and envi-ronmental variables as well.

Within the present formulation, task mo-tivation includes two elements: the individ-ual's baseline attitude toward the task and theindividual's perceptions of his or her reasonsfor undertaking the task in a given instance.


A baseline attitude toward the task is formed,quite simply, when the individual performsa cognitive assessment of the task and of thedegree to which it matches his or her existingpreferences and interests. Perceptions of one'smotivation for undertaking the task in agiven instance, on the other hand, are pro-posed to depend largely on external socialand environmental factors—the presence orabsence of salient extrinsic constraints in thesocial environment. In this context, extrinsicconstraints are factors that are intended tocontrol or could be perceived as controllingthe individual's performance on the task ina particular instance. As such, the constraintis extrinsic to the task itself; it is not an es-sential feature of task performance but is in-troduced by the social environment. A salientextrinsic constraint is one whose controllingimplications are clear to the individual dur-ing task engagement.

In addition to external constraints, inter-nal factors, such as an individual's ability tominimize cognitively the salience of such ex-trinsic constraints, might also influence theself-perception of motivation. Thus, the finallevel of task motivation in a particular in-stance varies from the baseline level of in-trinsic motivation as a function of extrinsicconstraints that may be present in the situ-ation and the individual's strategies for deal-ing with these constraints. According to thisformulation, then, creative performance maybe seen as analogous to "latent learning": itoccurs primarily when task-irrelevant moti-vation (extrinsic motivation) is low (Kimble,1961).

The propositions on task motivation pre-sented in this framework derive primarilyfrom social-psychological notions of intrinsicmotivation. A person is said to be intrinsi-cally motivated to engage in an activity ifsuch engagement is viewed as an end in itselfand not as a means to some extrinsic goal.Several theorists (deCharms, 1968; Deci,1975; Lepper & Greene, 1978a) have pro-posed that intrinsic motivation can be af-fected by environmental factors. Certainly,intrinsic motivation to perform an activitycan, theoretically, be present or absent in theideal case in which no environmental factorsoperate. If an individual finds an activity un-pleasant or boring, there is no intrinsic mo-

tivation to engage in it; if he or she finds an-other activity stimulating or fun, intrinsicmotivation is present. Of greatest importancehere, however, are the ways in which envi-ronmental factors may alter the "native"state of intrinsic motivation that is presumedto be essential for creativity.

Most recent intrinsic-motivation researchhas been concerned with the "overjustifica-tion" hypothesis, derived from the attribu-tion theories of Bern (1972), Kelley (1967,1973), and deCharms (1968). These theoristspropose that under certain conditions, thereis an inverse relation between the salient ex-ternal constraints imposed on an individual'sengagement in an activity and that individ-ual's intrinsic motivation to perform thatactivity. Several studies, employing a varietyof intrinsic constraints—including tangiblereward for performance, surveillance, andexternally imposed deadlines—have sup-ported this hypothesis (e.g., Amabile, De-Jong, & Lepper, 1976; Condry, 1977; Deci,1971, 1972; Kruglanski, 1975; Lepper &Greene, 1975; Lepper, Greene, & Nisbett,1973; Ross, 1975).

Thus, it is proposed that any of a widevariety of extrinsic constraints will, by im-pairing intrinsic motivation, have detrimen-tal effects on creative performance. In otherwords, a primarily intrinsic motivation toengage in an activity will enhance creativity,and a primarily extrinsic motivation will un-dermine it. Task motivation can be seen inthis context as the most important determi-nant of the difference between what a personcan do and what he or she will do. The formeris determined by the level of domain-relevantand creativity-relevant skill; the latter is de-termined by these two in conjunction withan intrinsically motivated state.

A Componential Framework forConceptualizing Creativity

A listing and description of each of thecomponents necessary for creativity illus-trates the importance of each of the types offactors mentioned earlier: personality char-acteristics, cognitive skills, and social/envi-ronmental variables. To come to an under-standing of the ways in which each of thesefactors might contribute to creative perfor-


mance, it is important to consider how eachcomponent might enter into the creative pro-cess.

A Proposed Sequence for ResponseGeneration

Figure 2 presents a schematic representa-tion of a componential framework for thecreative process. This framework describesthe way in which an individual might assem-ble and use information in attempting to ar-rive at a solution, response, or product. Ininformation-processing terms, task motiva-tion is responsible for initiating and sustain-ing the process; it determines whether thesearch for a solution will begin and whetherit will continue, and it also determines someaspects of response generation. Domain-rel-evant skills are the material drawn on duringoperation; they determine what pathways willbe searched initially and what criteria will beused to assess the response possibilities thatare generated. Creativity-relevant skills act asan executive controller; they can influencethe way in which the search for responses willproceed.

The process outlined in Figure 2 is pro-posed to be the same for both high and lowlevels of creativity. In many ways, this frame-work resembles models of the creative pro-

cess proposed by previous theorists. For ex^ample, Wallas (1926) presented a fairly in-formal description of four stages of creativethinking: preparation, incubation, illumina-tion, and verification. Hogarth (1980), pro-posing a somewhat different set of four stages(preparation, production, evaluation, andimplementation), described sets of aids andbarriers to each of the stages. The presentframework is more detailed than these, how-ever, in its description of the role of each ofthe three components at each point in thesequence.

Moreover, it is proposed here that the levelof creativity of a product or response variesas a function of the levels of each of the threecomponents. Each component is necessary,and not one is sufficient for creativity in andof itself. Thus, although this framework can-not be considered to be a detailed mathe-matical model of the creative process, it is,in a general sense, a multiplicative model. Nocomponent may be absent if some recogniz-able level of creativity is to be produced, andthe level of each component for a given in-dividual's attempt at a given task determinesthat individual's overall level of creativitytherein.

The initial step in the proposed sequenceis the presentation of the task to be engagedin or the problem to be solved. Task moti-

PROBLEM ORTASK PRESENTATION PREPARATION

RESPONSEGENERATION

RESPONSEVALIDATION

5

OUTCOME -

BUILDING UP AND/ORREACTIVATINGSTORE OFRELEVANTINFORMATION ANDRESPONSEALGORITHMS

SEARCH MEMORYAND IMMEDIATEENVIRONMENTTO GENERATERESPONSEPOSSIBILITY

TEST RESPONSEPOSSIBILITYAGAINST FACTUALKNOWLEDGE ANDOTHER CRITERIA

COMPLETE ATTAINMENT OFGOAL

(SUCCESS!

OR

NO REASONABLE RESPONSEPOSSIBILITIES GENERATED

(FAILURE)

OR

SOME PROGRESS TOWARDGOAL

• END

• RETURN TO I

LEARNING

SET- BREAKING

INCREASE OR DECREASE

Figure 2. Componential framework of creativity. (Broken lines indicate the influence of particular factorson others. Solid lines indicate the sequence of steps in the process. Only direct and primary influencesare depicted here.)


vation has an important influence at thisstage; if the individual has a high level of in-trinsic interest in the task, this interest willbe sufficient to engage the process. Underthese circumstances the individual, in es-sence, poses the problem to her- or himself.In other situations, however, the problem ispresented by another individual. It is possi-ble, of course, for someone else to pose aproblem that the individual finds particularlyinteresting; however, it is likely that in manycases an externally posed problem is not in-trinsically interesting to the individual.

The second stage may be considered pre-paratory to actual generation of responses orsolutions. At this point, the individual buildsup or reactivates a store of information rel-evant to the problem or task, including aknowledge of response algorithms for work-ing problems in the domain in question. Inthe case in which domain-relevant skills arerather impoverished at the outset, this stagemay be quite a long one during which a greatdeal of learning takes place (Bain, 1874;Mach, 1896;Poincare, 1924;Souriau, 1881).On the other hand, if the domain-relevantskills are already sufficiently rich to afford anample set of possible pathways to exploreduring task engagement, the reactivation ofthis already-stored set of information andalgorithms may be almost instantaneous, oc-cupying very little real time.

It is in the third stage that the level of nov-elty of the product or response is determined.Here, the individual generates response pos-sibilities by searching through the availablepathways and exploring features of the en-vironment that are relevant to the task athand. During each "run" through the se-quence, the individual follows a particularcognitive pathway to a solution or response.Both creativity- relevant skills and task mo-tivation play an important role at this state.The existing repertoire of creativity-relevantskills determines the flexibility with whichcognitive pathways are explored, the atten-tion given to particular aspects of the task,and the extent to which a particular pathwayis followed in pursuit of a solution. In addi-tion, creativity-relevant skills can influencethe subgoals of the response-generation stageby determining whether a large number ofresponse possibilities will be generated

through a temporary suspension of criticaljudgment or a decision to keep response op-tions open. Task motivation, if it is intrinsicrather than extrinsic, can add to the existingrepertoire of skills a willingness to take riskswith this particular task and to attend to as-pects of the environment that might not beobviously relevant to attainment of a solu-tion.

When a task is heuristic, necessitating asearch of possible pathways, what determineswhich pathways are explored? It has beensuggested (e.g., Campbell, 1960) that possi-bilities are produced more or less by a blindor random process. Certainly, the search canbe narrowed down by various methods. How-ever, it is suggested that some amount ofblind search is always required with tasks ofthis nature. The more possibilities there areto be explored and the better the strategiesfor exploring them rapidly, the greater thelikelihood of producing a novel yet appro-priate response. Some degree of luck, how-ever, is always an element (Hogarth, 1980).

Domain-relevant skills again figure prom-inently in the fourth stage—the validation ofthe response possibility that has been chosenon a particular trial. Using domain-relevanttechniques of analysis, the response possibil-ity is tested for correctness or appropriatenessagainst the knowledge and the relevant cri-teria included within domain-relevant skills.Thus, it is this stage that determines whetherthe product or response will be appropriate,useful, correct, or valuable—the second re-sponse characteristic that, together with nov-elty, is essential for the product to be consid-ered creative according to the conceptualdefinition proposed earlier.

The fifth stage represents the decisionmaking that must be carried out on the basisof the test performed in Stage 4. If the testhas been passed perfectly—if there is com-plete attainment of the original goal—theprocess terminates. If there is complete fail-ure—if no reasonable response possibilityhas been generated—the process will also ter-minate. If there is some progress toward thegoal—if at least a reasonable response pos-sibility has been generated or if, in Simon's(1978) terms, there is some evidence of "get-ting warmer"—the process returns to the firststage, where the problem is once again posed.


In this case, as in any case, informationgained from the trial is added to the existingrepertoire of domain-relevant skills. If taskmotivation remains sufficiently high, anothertrial will be attempted, perhaps with infor-mation gained from the previous trial beingused to pose the problem in a somewhat dif-ferent form. If, however, task motivationdrops below some critical minimum, the pro-cess will terminate.

As tasks become more complex, the ap-plication of this outline to the production ofcreative responses to those tasks also becomesincreasingly more complex. Work on anygiven task or problem may involve a longseries of loops through the process, until suc-cess in a final product is achieved. Indeed,work on what seems to be a task may actuallyinvolve a series of rather different subtasks,each with its own separate solution. Thesesubtasks may be hierarchically arranged, andthe completion of any single subtask may initself involve several runs through the processuntil success is finally achieved. For example,the superordinate goal of writing a poem in-volves several subtasks, including finding atheme, deciding on a meter to use, choosingmajor and minor guiding images, inventingmetaphors and similes, and writing particularwords, phrases, and lines. Each of these canbe seen as a task or a subtask whose achieve-ment is necessary for successful completionof the poem-writing task. Thus, success ona task depends in part on the outcomes ofsubtasks and the number of runs necessaryto achieve success on those subtasks.

Feedback and Interaction Amongthe Components

The outcome of a given run through theprocess (success or failure or partial success)can directly influence task motivation, therebysetting up a feedback cycle through whichfuture engagement in the same or similartasks can be affected. If complete success hasbeen achieved, there will be no motivationto undertake exactly the same task again,because in a real sense the task has been com-pleted. However, with success intrinsic mo-tivation for similar tasks within the domainshould increase. If complete failure has beenencountered—if no reasonable responses were

generated—intrinsic motivation for the taskshould decrease. If partial success has beenmet, intrinsic motivation will increase whenthe problem solver has the sense of gettingwarmer in approaching the goal; however, itwill decrease when the outcome of the testreveals that the problem solver is essentiallyno closer to the goal than when he or shebegan.

This proposition that process outcome caninfluence task motivation is compatible withMatter's (1978) theory of "effectance" mo-tivation. Harter built on White's (1959) def-inition of the "urge toward competence," adefinition proposing a new motivational con-struct "which impels the organism towardcompetence and is satisfied by a feeling ofefficacy" (Harter, 1978, p. 34). According toHarter's theory, failure at mastery attemptsleads eventually to decreases in intrinsic mo-tivation and striving for competence. How-ever, success (which will be more probablethe higher the level of skills) leads to intrinsicgratification, feelings of efficacy, and in-creases in intrinsic motivation, which, inturn, lead to more mastery attempts. In es-sential agreement with Harter, a number ofsocial-psychological theorists (e.g., de-Charms, 1968; Deci, 1975; Lepper& Greene,1978b) have proposed that success (confir-mation of competence) leads to increased in-trinsic motivation.

Through this influence on task motivation,outcomes can also indirectly affect domain-relevant and creativity-relevant skills. A higherlevel of intrinsic task motivation may makeset breaking and cognitive risk taking moreprobable and more habitual, thereby increas-ing the permanent repertoire of creativityskills. Also, a higher level of motivation maymotivate learning about the task and relatedsubjects, thereby increasing domain-relevantskills.

Potential Contributions of a SocialPsychology of Creativity

The componential framework is a generaloutline of the creative process and a descrip-tion of the factors proposed to influence it.Perhaps the most important feature of thisframework is its inclusion of social-environ-mental variables and their interaction with


personality characteristics and cognitive skillsin producing creative responses. Such vari-ables have been largely ignored in previousformulations, even though a consideration ofthem can lead to important advances in un-derstanding many creativity phenomena. Asan example, one problem for which a social-psychological approach to creativity can beparticularly useful when combined with cog-nitive psychology and the traditional individ-ual-difference approach is the underminingof creativity by socially imposed constraints.

Detrimental Effects of Extrinsic Motivation

A major difference between the compo-nential framework of creativity and previousformulations is the prominence given to taskmotivation and the presentation of specificpropositions concerning the detrimental ef-fects of extrinsic motivation on creativity.These propositions derive from the social-psychological theories of motivation dis-cussed earlier. Although those theories haveprimarily been concerned with the way inwhich the imposition of salient extrinsic con-straints can undermine subsequent intrinsicinterest to perform an activity, some theoristshave recently begun to speculate about theeffects of extrinsic constraint on immediateperformance. The conceptualization thatmost directly deals with creative perfor-mance is that of McGraw (1978), who sug-gests that performance on algorithmic tasksshould be enhanced by increases in extrinsicmotivation but that performance on heuristictasks (creativity tasks) should be adverselyaffected. Lepper and Greene (1978b) pro-posed a "means-end" analysis of task moti-vation, predicting that a person will pay at-tention to those aspects of the task that arenecessary to attain the goal (such as simplyfinishing) but may neglect other aspects (suchas novelty of response).

Few studies have set out to determine di-rectly whether extrinsic constraints can ad-versely affect creative performance. However,there is some empirical evidence that sup-ports this hypothesis. In a study of theeffects of reward on "insight" in solvingDuncker's (1945) functional-fixedness prob-lem, Glucksberg (1964) found that subjectswho were offered monetary rewards for solv-

ing the problem displayed significantly greaterfunctional fixedness—inability to see that abox could be used as a platform—than didnonreward subjects. Similarly, McGraw andMcCullers (1979) found that rewarded sub-jects took significantly longer to break set insolving Luchins's (1942) water jar problemsthan did nonreward subjects. Also, in a pro-cedure in which subjects were asked to writestories and story titles, subjects promised areward produced responses that were judgedless creative than those of subjects who hadsimply volunteered (Kruglanski, Friedman,& Zeevi, 1971). There is, then, some con-vergent evidence from studies on set breakingand overjustification suggesting an inverserelation between extrinsic constraint (in theform of rewards) and creativity.

One recent study was explicitly designedto test the effects of extrinsic constraint oncreativity (Amabile, 1979). The constraintemployed in this study was the expectationof external evaluation, an extrinsic constraintthat is widely used in educational settings.Subjects made paper collages under one ofsix basic conditions. Experimental-groupsubjects were told beforehand that their col-lages would be evaluated by experts; control-group subjects were told nothing about eval-uation and were led to believe that the collagewas not the experimenter's main focus of in-terest. In addition, subjects were asked toconcentrate on either the creativity of theircollages or the technical goodness of theircollages or they were given no particular fo-cus in their instructions. The results clearlysupported the hypothesis that salient extrin-sic constraint is detrimental to creativity. Nomatter what focus they were given, experi-mental-group subjects produced collages thatwere judged significantly lower on creativitythan those produced by control-group sub-jects.

Thus, there is support for the propositionthat extrinsic constraints, by decreasing in-trinsic task motivation, undermine creativity.In attempting to understand the mechanismby which this social-psychological phenom-enon occurs, however, it is necessary to relyon conceptualizations of algorithms, heuris-tics, and attention from cognitive psychologyand on conceptualizations of individual dif-ferences from personality psychology.


Algorithms, heuristics, and attention. De-spite results supporting the intrinsic-moti-vation hypothesis of creativity, there is evi-dence from a small body of studies withinthe behavior-modification and token-econ-omy traditions suggesting a positive effect ofconstraint on creativity tasks. In one suchstudy (Glover & Gary, 1976), children workedon a standard verbal creativity task in whichpoints were awarded for fluency (number ofdifferent responses), flexibility (number ofverb forms), elaboration (number of wordsper response), or originality (statistical infre-quency of responses). Consistent with theexperimental hypotheses, all four aspects ofcreativity were "demonstrated to be underexperimental control" (p. 79); when fluencywas rewarded, the children were fluent; whenoriginality was rewarded, they were original;and so on. Under extinction, each aspect fellto baseline levels or below. Other studies havedemonstrated similar functional control overcreative performance (Halpin & Halpin,1973; Johnson, 1974; Raina, 1968; Ward,Kogan, & Pankove, 1972).

Although these results seem inconsistentwith those of studies showing detrimentaleffects of extrinsic constraints on creativity(e.g., Amabile, 1979; Kruglanski et al., 1971;McGraw & McCullers, 1979), they becomeconsistent when considered within the con-text of the algorithmic-heuristic distinction.In each of the studies showing positive effectsof reward, subjects were told rather explicitlywhat it was they were to do to produce acreative response; in essence, the tasks wererendered algorithmic. By contrast, thosestudies showing detrimental effects left thetask heuristic by failing to specify exactlywhat should be done. To test this explanationof the^ divergent results obtained, an addi-tional condition was included in the studyreported earlier on the effects of evaluationon creativity (Amabile, 1979). In this con-dition, the making of a paper collage, whichis normally heuristic, was transformed intoan algorithmic task by the instructions given.In pretesting, artist judges rated a set of col-lages on a large number of artistic dimensionsin addition to creativity. Those that corre-lated well with creativity (novelty of idea,novelty of materials use, evident effort, vari-ation in shapes used, detail, and complexity)

were used in the instructions given to subjectsin this "algorithmic" condition. Subjects inthis condition were told that their collagewould be evaluated on creativity and thatcreativity would be judged on the basis ofnovelty of idea, novelty of materials use, andso on.

In accord with the present theoretical for-mulation proposing that intrinsic constraintwould undermine creative performance butenhance performance on algorithmic tasks,subjects given this algorithm for making acreative collage showed increments in cre-ativity relative to nonevaluation controls; asdescribed earlier, evaluation-group subjectsnot given this algorithm showed significantdecrements. Of course, by the conceptualdefinition of creativity, the behavior of sub-jects in the algorithmic-instructions condi-tion would not be considered creative at all,because the task was not a heuristic one forthem.

Conceptualizations from cognitive psy-chology can be useful in understanding themechanism by which task motivation influ-ences the response-generation stage of thecreative process. Simon (1967) postulatedthat the most important function of moti-vation is the control of attention. He proposesthat motivation determines which goal hi-erarchy will be activated at any given timeand suggests that the more intense the mo-tivation to achieve an original goal, the lessattention will be paid to aspects of the en-vironment that are irrelevant (or seeminglyirrelevant) to achieving that goal. This prop-osition can explain the consistent finding thatincidental or latent learning is impaired bythe offer of reward for task performance (e.g.,Kimble, 1961; Spence, 1956). It can also ex-plain the detrimental effects of extrinsic con-straint on creativity.

Extrinsically motivated behavior can beseen as behavior that is narrowly directed to-ward achieving the extrinsic goal that hasbeen imposed, whether that goal be attaininga reward or meeting a deadline or achievingthe approval of an observer or obtaining apositive evaluation from an expert. For a cre-ative response to be produced, however, it isoften necessary to "step away" temporarilyfrom the perceived goal (Newell et al., 1962),to direct attention toward seemingly "inci-


dental" aspects of the task and the environ-ment. The more single-mindedly a goal ispursued, the less likely it may be that alter-native solution paths will be explored. In asense, then, the difference between extrinsicand intrinsic motivation—for the purposesof a conceptualization of creativity—can beseen as the difference between divided andundivided attention to the task itself and task-relevant information. An extrinsic motiva-tion will decrease the probability that the cre-ativity heuristics of exploration, set breaking,and risk taking will be applied. There will bea heavy reliance on response algorithms thatalready exist within the store of domain-rel-evant skills.

Individual differences in responses to con-traints. Certainly, there are nontrivial dif-ferences between individuals in the extent towhich the imposition of extrinsic constraintswill undermine creativity. Particular individ-uals might be more or less "immune" to suchconstraints in a wide range of activities or incertain narrowly specified activities; indeed,their observable creativity might actuallyseem to be enhanced by extrinsic constraints.For example, Watson and Crick (see Watson,1968) were certainly cognizant of the tangibleand social rewards that would accrue to any-one describing the structure of the DNAmolecule.

There are three conditions under whichthis seemingly paradoxical phenomenonmight be observed. First, it could occur if theextrinsic goal involves finding a creative so-lution or response and the individual is soexperienced in the domain that she or healready has algorithms for achieving a solu-tion that will be so judged. In this case, thedivided attention produced by the externalcontingency will not be detrimental, becausethe individual does not need to apply thecreativity heuristics. Second, the individualmay be able to reduce psychologically thesalience of the extrinsic goal while engagedin the task. She or he might, for example, beless dependent than most people on socialapproval and tangible rewards. Third, the in-dividual's intrinsic motivation may be sohigh that the extrinsic motivation is not pri-mary. Such passionate interest in an activity

is rather common in first-person accounts ofthe experience of creativity (see Ghiselin,1952).

Personality, Cognition, and SocialEnvironment: Toward a Comprehensive

Psychology of Creativity

The basic question in understanding cre-ativity is this: How is creative performancedifferent from ordinary performance? Theconceptualization presented here proposesthat the distinction between the two types ofperformance is not a sharp one. Instead ofa dichotomy, there is a continuum rangingfrom performances marked by reliance onentirely familiar algorithms applied by rote,at the one end, to performances marked bythe application of set-breaking heuristics andthe exploration of completely new cognitivepathways, at the other end. The factors con-tributing to the final level of creativity, ac-cording to this view, include individual-dif-ference variables, such as general cognitiveskills, special talents, and personality dispo-sitions related to independence and risk-tak-ing; cognitive variables, such as the applica-tion of set-breaking heuristics and the reten-tion of large stores of domain-relevantinformation; and social-psychological vari-ables, such as the presence or absence of ex-trinsic constraint in the social environment.

Clearly, the componential framework isnot a fully articulated theory; instead, itshould be considered as a general workingmodel of the dispositional, cognitive, and so-cial factors that determine creativity. Al-though it is articulated at a less detailed levelthan are most information-processing theo-ries of problem solving, this framework maybe considered more complete than many ofthese cognitive theories in its inclusion ofnoncognitive variables and its propositionof a specific set of factors that can differen-tiate creative problem solving from ordinaryproblem solving. Moreover, in its propositionthat the creativity components combine ina multiplicative fashion, this framework canaccount for "garden variety" levels of cre-ativity as well as the more outstanding casesof creative production. Finally, problem solv-ing, as understood in the present context, can


refer to virtually any sort of task in any do-main, including the arts. For these reasons,the componential framework can be seen asoffering a new and potentially fruitful ap-proach to the study of the creative process.

The componential framework suggests ananswer for the intelligence-creativity contro-versy that has, in the past, occupied a greatdeal of the creativity literature. A number ofstudies have shown a nonhomoscedasticityof variance in the bivariate distribution of IQand creativity scores (Barren, 1961; Getzels& Jackson, 1962; Wallach, 1971). At low lev-els of intelligence, there appears to be an al-most uniformly low level of creativity. How-ever, at high levels of intelligence, all levelsof creativity are found; here, the IQ-creativ-ity correlation is quite low. The perennialquestion has been, Are creativity and intel-ligence basically the same thing or are theynot? The present conceptualization suggests,simply, that intelligence (as typically con-ceived) is a component of creativity; it is anecessary, but not a sufficient, contributingfactor. Some minimum level of intelligenceis required for creative performance becauseintelligence is, presumably, directly relatedto the acquisition of domain-relevant skillsand the application of creativity heuristics.However, there are other components andelements of components that are necessaryfor creativity but would not be assessed bytraditional intelligence tests: intrinsic moti-vation toward the task, for example, and per-sonality dispositions conducive to deep levelsof concentration or unrestrained intellectualrisk taking.

A second major focus of creativity re-search over the past two decades has been thestimulation of creativity by various trainingprograms. With the wide variety of variablesit includes, the componential framework ofcreativity suggests that creativity can indeedbe altered (as many previous theorists haveproposed) and that it can perhaps be alteredby factors not previously considered. Mostcreativity-improvement programs in the pasthave concentrated solely on creativity heu-ristics—"tricks" that individuals can use inapproaching problems. The componentialframework, however, delineates a number of

different avenues that may be explored: theimprovement of domain-relevant skills, in-cluding both factual knowledge and technicalskills; training in productive work styles; theremoval or diminution of salient extrinsicconstraints in the social environment.

Although it is important to identify anyenduring personality dispositions that appearconsistently in persons who produce creativework, it can be argued that the strong em-phasis on personality in creativity researchhas fostered a set of restrictive conceptionsabout creativity and a neglect of some im-portant variables. An exclusively trait-ori-ented approach to creativity carries with itthe implicit assumption that creativity can-not be altered and, moreover, that creativepersons can produce creative work in virtu-ally any domain (cf. Feldman, 1980). If cre-ative behavior depends only on a general cen-tral core of personality dispositions, it shouldbe as difficult to modify as any other person-ality-dependent behavior, and it should beexpressed quite broadly. Moreover, we wouldnot expect much variability in the creativeproduction of people identified as creative;they should consistently produce creativework in a wide variety of domains.

Certainly, this narrow view is more ex-treme than that expressed by many person-ality theorists, but elements of this perspec-tive have long been implicitly or explicitlypresent in much of the creativity literature.An application of the componential frame-work to creativity research can serve tobroaden current conceptions of creativity. Itsuggests that, rather than focusing solely onthe characteristic personality traits of out-standingly creative individuals, researchersmight more profitably view creativity as aprocess (evidenced by products) that can beinfluenced by both internal and external fac-tors—by cognitive skills, work habits, andsocial-environmental variables—as well as bypersonality dispositions. In so doing, thisframework can facilitate both the develop-ment of an empirical social psychology ofcreativity and the integration of social-psy-chological conceptualizations with the in-sights of cognitive and personality psy-chology.


Reference Note

1. Thurstone, L. Creative talent (Reports From the Psy-chometric Laboratory,'No. 61). Unpublished manu-script, University of Chicago, 1950.

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Importance of physical attractiveness in dating be- Received March 8, 1982 •

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