page 1 3 of 100 documents emory international law review

3 of 100 DOCUMENTS

Copyright (c) 1996 Emory University School of Law

Emory International Law Review

Winter, 1996

10 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 779

LENGTH: 22690 words

COMMENT: HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN IRAN: THE UNIVERSALIST APPROACH AND THE

RELATIVIST RESPONSE

NAME: Kristin J. Miller *

BIO:

* Notes & Comments Editor, Emory International Law Review; Candidate for J.D., Emory University

School of Law (1997); B.A., Diplomacy and World Affairs, Occidental College (1991). The author would like

to express her sincere appreciation to everyone who helped with this Comment. Special thanks to Abdullahi An-

Na'im and Shahin Taheri, who gave generously of themselves.

SUMMARY:

... While the international community has attempted to hold Iran accountable under international law, those attempts

have failed. ... This acquiescence amounts to human rights abuse when the government does not intervene to prohibit

systemic violations. ... Iran's primary justification for eschewing the universal human rights standard is Islam. ... Islam,

a central part of Iranian culture, thus becomes an element of the government's cultural argument. ... These responses are

likely motivated more by the mullah's self-interest than by true concern for Iranian culture or the preservation of Islam.

... Treating women separately results in inequities that violate international human right standards. ... In addition to the

government's hollow arguments that Islam and Iranian culture justify shunning universalist ideals, its contention that

human rights are a Western political tool is also without merit. ... The relativist response rejects the notion of conform-

ing to universalist ideals because those allegedly politically motivated standards contradict the government's version of

Islam and Iranian culture. ... Universalism has had limited success due to its lack of cultural legitimacy, Iran's suspicion

of purely political motives, and a universalist refusal to respect Islam as the central force in Iran. ... The international

community has attempted to enforce compliance with universalist ideals that are embodied in international law, but has

not succeeded due to Iran's relativist response. ...

TEXT:

[*779]

Women in Iran suffer human rights abuses at the hands of their government every day. While the international

community has attempted to hold Iran accountable under international law, those attempts have failed. n1 The Iranian

government argues it is not bound by international law because its culture and religion permit Iran to treat women ac-

cording to its own standards. This Comment proposes a solution that incorporates aspects of both universalism and rela-

tivism to lessen Iran's violations of women's human rights. n2 This solution, the grass roots method, [*780] combines

universalist ideals with relativist strategies in order to give universalism cultural legitimacy in Iran. n3

Historically, international law did not protect citizens from human rights abuses committed by their own govern-

ment. n4 Questioning another state's treatment of its own citizens was seen as violating the very premise upon which

international law was based: the sanctity of state sovereignty. However, after witnessing horrible human rights viola-

tions during World War II, the international community responded by including human rights obligations in the U.N.

Charter n5 and the International Bill of Rights. n6 [*781]

10 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 779, *

Two competing schools of thought, universalism and relativism, have attempted to address the implementation of

international human rights law. On the one hand, universalists believe that the rights set forth by the international com-

munity are so fundamental that no departure is excusable. The universalists assert that customary international law, in-

ternational agreements, and the International Bill of Rights define the standard. n7 Relativists, on the other hand, be-

lieve local custom and tradition should define human rights standards. Consequently, relativists dismiss universalism as

an attempt to impose Western values on non-Western cultures. n8 While universalist and relativist theories apply to

human rights in general, this Comment focuses on women's rights because human rights literature has not given suffi-

cient consideration to women's rights. n9

The conflicting themes underlying the universalist and relativist doctrines have manifested themselves in Iran in

recent history. Mohammed Reza Shah n10 advocated bringing Iran in [*782] line with Western standards n11 and

tried to implement a plan that would have adapted Iranian culture to conform to Western ideals. n12 He believed that

for Iran to compete as a world player, the talents of all its citizens needed to be cultivated. As a result, many legal barri-

ers obstructing women's rights were dismantled. For example, the Shah's regime issued laws such as the Iranian Family

Protection Act of 1967 n13 and removed the prohibition on women voting. n14 In addition, Islamic law did not de-

termine criminal law and procedure. n15 Punishments such as stoning were illegal. n16

This progress on the legal front did not lead to true emancipation in the long run because Ayatollah Ruhollah

Khomeini's clerics simply overturned these laws after Khomeini's supporters deposed the Shah. n17 In fact, many

women themselves did not buy into the Shah's Westernization attempts because the women were poorly educated, eco-

nomically dependent on men, and deeply religious. n18 These factors contributed to the Shah's downfall because his

programs lacked the cultural legitimacy among the masses that they needed to succeed. Many people were suspicious of

the Shah because of his wealth, his allegiance to Western culture, and his secular reforms. n19 These conditions set the

[*783] stage for his overthrow.

Iran's legal system changed dramatically in 1979 when Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's supporters overthrew Mo-

hammed Reza Shah. Khomeini gained prominence during the 1960s by criticizing the Shah's Westernization policies.

The 1979 revolution that toppled the Shah marked the end of government efforts to Westernize. The official disposition

abruptly changed from conformity with the West to compliance with religious directives issued by the government.

n20

Ayatollah Khomeini destroyed almost all laws favoring women's rights, including the Family Protection Act. n21

After the 1979 revolution, Khomeini's clerical followers supervised the writing of the new constitution, which was is-

sued in December 1979. n22 The new constitution established Islam as the basis for the legal system. n23 This

change is significant because all laws consequently became subject to interpretation by religious leaders. In 1982,

Khomeini ordered judges to disregard all pre-revolution laws and instead rely on the 2,500 new laws that had been

passed since the revolution. If no law existed that would settle an issue at trial, the judges were to look to Khomeini

himself for guidance. n24 These new laws, guarded by religious doctrine, stifled the progress for women that had

grown during the Shah's regime.

Khomeini and his clerical followers gradually stripped women of their most basic rights. First, he ordered women

to wear Is- [*784] lamic dress at work. n25 Next, women were fired from jobs in which they might have contact with

men. n26 Government agents physically attacked women to enforce compliance with the new laws. n27 The govern-

ment carried out Khomeini's objectives with the most extreme measures, including mass summary executions. n28 As

this Comment will illustrate, international standards judge these and other practices to be violations of human rights.

When Khomeini died in 1989 he was replaced with Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who now governs alongside Presi-

dent Hojatoleslam Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. n29 While Khamenei, as the highest religious leader, could have

changed Khomeini's policies after his death, Khamenei has instead continued to rule Iran according to Khomeini's poli-

cies. Today, Iran's government denies women many human rights widely recognized as legally binding by the interna-

tional community. For example, women in Iran are flogged and fined for not covering themselves completely with the

chador n30 and are stoned to death for adultery. n31 These practices occur because under Ira- [*785] nian law, "Is-

lamic criteria" qualify human rights. n32

The universalist and relativist theories have not had the practical effect of improving women's human rights in

Iran. The traditional approach used by universalists will not succeed in a country like Iran because universalist values

lack cultural legitimacy. n33 Some relativists argue that a single universal standard will not take hold in cultures with

strong non-Western traditions. n34 Government officials who embrace relativist ideals reject the notion of allowing

institutions or individuals to define human rights because they believe that only God grants those rights. n35 This


Comment offers an alternate hybrid approach which would accomplish universalist objectives using relativist strategies.

This hybrid approach recognizes that elements of each theory have validity. Thus, by combining aspects of each theory,

the international community can improve human rights for women in Iran.

This Comment examines the dichotomy between the universalist and relativist positions and explores ways to

bring human rights to the women of Iran by reconciling these two theoretical frameworks. n36 After explaining the

two theories and discussing [*786] the status of Iranian women, this Comment examines the proffered justifications of

universalism and relativism. After assessing the effectiveness of attempts to improve human rights in Iran, this Com-

ment provides a strategy to reconcile some of the differences between the universalist and relativist positions. The strat-

egy proposes using grass roots methods to gain popular support for international human rights standards by ensuring

that those ideals will gain cultural legitimacy. This grass roots approach is essential because external attempts to imple-

ment universalist ideals without internal assistance will continue to fail.

I. Theoretical Framework

Universalist and relativist theories exist together on a spectrum. At one extreme is the radical form of universalism

that excludes relativism, and at the other extreme is the radical form of relativism that tolerates no universalism. n37

There are also more moderate formulations of each theory along the spectrum. n38 Each theory has been embodied in

different institutions in practice, has a different source, and has been criticized for different reasons.

A. Universalist Theory

Universalism, embodied in international human rights law, rests on the proposition that the human condition is

unique, and that all human beings possess certain inalienable rights. n39 The international community claims the right

to judge states by international standards. n40 The international community thus [*787] attempts to hold governments

to the human rights standards enumerated in the International Bill of Rights.

Theorists explain the concept of universal human rights by referring to the meanings of the term "universal" and by

examining the history behind universalist theory. Human rights theorist Jack Donnelly views human rights as "univer-

sal" in three meanings of the word. n41 First, all human beings hold human rights universally by virtue of their human-

ity. n42 Therefore, a person's rights cannot be conditioned on attributes such as gender or national origin. n43 Sec-

ond, human rights exist universally among all persons and institutions as the highest moral rights. n44 An individual's

rights cannot be subordinated to another person's, such as a husband, or to an institution, such as the state. Thus, a hus-

band or a religious leader cannot take a woman's rights from her because her rights as an individual are superior to any

rights a third party may claim. Third, human rights are becoming more universally accepted as ideal standards by the

international community. n45 International agreements and conferences facilitated by the United Nations show more

widespread recognition of human rights over time. n46 This growing acceptance means that universalism is not just a

fleeting idea soon to be extinguished. Generally, Donnelly interprets "universal" to mean that no institution or person

anywhere may take away another person's human rights. Enforcing those rights, however, is another matter.

In addition to looking at the meaning of "universalism," it is useful to examine the theory's foundations to better

understand the rationale of international standards. Universalists offer two [*788] very different bases for their doc-

trine. On the one hand, they look to natural law which uses nature, God, and reason to identify certain basic rights that

exist everywhere and apply to all human beings. n47 Under this formulation rights exist without any further action.

Therefore, rights are inherent and do not need to be granted separately by the international community or national legal

systems. Positivism, on the other hand, sets forth the principle that states, in choosing to become states, agree to be

bound by the set of rules that international law embodies. n48 The premise of positivism is that a state sovereign can-

not be bound against its will. The one exception to the inability to bind states against their will is customary interna-

tional law. n49 While these two bases differ, each establishes that certain rights are immutable by any state, institution,

or individual. While the theoretical foundation is important to explain the basis of universalism, in reality, theory means

very little without the protections of the rights claimed.

In addition to the different roots of universalism, universalism comes in several forms. In different countries, for

example, varying doses of relativist influence dilute universalism. Indeed, universalism actually comes in different

measures. Only by recognizing this can one accept that universalist ideals can be achieved when mixed with relativism.

The universalism/relativism spectrum illustrates the concept that elements of the two theories can co-exist in the middle

of the spectrum by adopting elements of each theory. Both radical universalism and radical relativism exclude useful

aspects of the other theory. Opponents of radical universalism point to the fact that nonWestern nations did not partici-


pate in drafting the International Bill of Rights as evidence that non-Western nations are being persecuted under the

pretext of human rights for the benefit of the imperialist West. n50 [*789]

Radical universalism ignores the value of self-determination for ethnic and religious minorities and rejects the ar-

gument that peoples should be able to live according to their own customs and traditions. n51 Because universalist

ideals are not part of all cultures, opponents argue that subjecting all groups to one set of standards would constitute

oppression by Western culture. n52 Furthermore, adversaries argue that universalism ignores cultural diversity and

lessens a person's choice of government, social institutions, and ethical norms. n53

B. Relativist Theory

In response to universalists, relativists argue that outsiders should not judge others' moral rules and social institu-

tions. n54 They argue that condemnation of one culture by members of another society is inherently invalid because

there are no legitimate cross-cultural standards. n55 Governments pressed by universalists to conform to universalist

notions of human rights have responded that their culture and religion are just as valid as universalist standards. n56

Cultural relativism is the core of the Iranian government's argument against allowing universalists to impose their defi-

nition of human rights on Iran. n57

Anthropology provides the basis for cultural relativism. n58 At its foundation are the dual premises that the ob-

server's knowledge of a culture is limited by the observer's own cultural upbringing, and that all cultures are "equally

valid." n59 Cultural relativism recognizes the value of different community practices and stresses tolerance of conven-

tions different from one's own. n60 [*790] This means that one state cannot judge another state's practices by the first

state's norms because all traditions are equally valid.

There is an inverse relationship between various forms of relativism and their compatibility with universalist think-

ing. At one end of the spectrum, radical relativism explains culture as the "sole source of the validity of a moral right or

rule." n61 This view completely excludes universalist theory. Near the middle of the spectrum, strong relativism ac-

knowledges universalism and explains culture as the "principal source of the validity of a moral right or rule." n62

Near the other end of the spectrum, weak relativism says that culture may be an "important source of the validity of a

moral right or rule." n63 This position has a greater amount of universalist thinking than the strong relativist positions.

Critics argue that relativism allows countries to violate international human rights standards by using culture to

justify their departure from universalist norms. n64 Generally, women have not taken a large part in defining the cul-

ture because, traditionally, male activities set the standard. n65 In fact, violence against women seems to be common

in many cultures. n66 Thus, in rejecting the aspirational character of universalism, relativism merely perpetuates tradi-

tional practice. Because all cultures, including Western cultures, are defined using a predominantly male standard, any

justification for treatment of women based on existing cultural practice rather than on a universalist ideal denies women

their basic rights as human beings. [*791]

In addition to the potentially static--rather than aspirational--nature of radical relativism, another worrisome impli-

cation for women is that their source of rights is dependent upon their membership in groups within a particular society.

Radical relativist theory does not automatically grant an individual rights which are equal to the rights of all other indi-

viduals, but acknowledges the validity of cultural differences between groups. n67 This has been used to justify prac-

tices, such as the caste system and slavery, that virtually all modern societies reject. n68

II. The Universalist View of Iran

Universalists claim that Iran has violated both customary international law and international agreements, namely

the UDHR, which is accepted as customary law, n69 and the ICCPR, which Iran signed. n70 Despite the standards

enumerated in these agreements, holding any state, including Iran, to customary law is difficult because of the amor-

phous nature of customary law. Arguably, women's rights have not yet reached the level of customary international law.

Nonetheless, Iran is clearly bound by the concept of nondiscrimination articulated in UDHR Article 2. n71 Iran did not

begin protesting the principle of nondiscrimina- [*792] tion until the 1980s, well after the principle became customary

law. Similarly, holding Iran to the terms of the ICCPR is complicated because the extent and nature of Iran's obligations

must be determined under the rules of the international law of treaties. n72 Furthermore, once the international com-

munity determines Iran's obligations under international law, it must resolve the manner by which they may enforce

those responsibilities. n73 Therefore, the ideals in the UDHR and ICCPR may be difficult to achieve even when viola-

tions are established. Despite these challenges, universalists believe human rights must be protected despite the com-

plexities of international law and its various enforcement mechanisms.


The Iranian government sanctions human rights abuses through its constitution, statutes, judicial decisions, and ac-

quiescence to common practices. Such actions necessarily violate international law when they deviate from the norms

established in the UDHR and ICCPR. The government incorporated its own policies into the Iranian Constitution, en-

acted in 1979 and amended in 1989. n74 Several provisions in the Iranian constitution illustrate the government's offi-

cial unequal treatment of women. For example, the section of the constitution that guarantees equality omits gender

equality. n75 Iran's Constitution provides equality to women only if Islamic law is observed. n76 By qualifying

women's equality, the government fails to grant its female citizens the right of equality pursuant to UDHR Article 2.

[*793]

Article 26 of the Iranian Constitution allows freedom of association unless that association violates "the criteria of

Islam, or the basis of the Islamic Republic." n77 The government interprets Islam as forbidding the social integration

of men and women. This restriction on freedom of association violates ICCPR, Article 22 n78 and UDHR, Article 20-

1. n79 For instance, in August 1994, the militia attacked women after a soccer match who socialized with men. n80

The government could argue that the restrictions it places on these freedoms are "necessary," thereby bringing them

within the protection of ICCPR Article 22-2, but "necessary restrictions" are defined using the standards of a democratic

society. Iran may claim it is a democratic society, but this proclamation alone does not set the standard by which a coun-

try is judged. The standard of what is deemed "necessary" in a democratic society is one which applies equally, so it is

unlikely that Iran's version of "democracy" would fall within this protection. n81

These two examples, the failure of Iran's Constitution to guarantee equality and restrictions on association, dispro-

portionately affect women. n82 This unequal effect is a result of "the criteria of Islam" requirement in Article 26 of the

Constitution as interpret- [*794] ed and applied by the government. To determine the "criteria of Islam," one must first

look at the Qur'an, then the Sunna (traditions of the Prophet), and finally ijma and qiyas (consensus and reasoning by

analogy, respectively). n83 While some argue that nothing in the Qur'an or Islamic law justifies any violation of hu-

man rights, n84 the government is able to use the Shari'ah n85 to accomplish its own objectives. n86 The Iranian

government, unlike many other governments of predominantly Muslim nations, adopted the Shi'i interpretation of Islam

rather than the mainstream Sunni law. n87 Because Iran has taken a separate course, its interpretation of the Shari'ah is

also different. The government justifies depriving women of equality and freedom of association by this interpretation

of the "criteria of Islam."

In addition to restricting gender equality in its Constitution, the Iranian government has enacted the Islamic Penal

Code and enforced its interpretation of the Shari'ah. The impact of these two sets of laws is that men and women are

treated differently, resulting in human rights abuses that disproportionately affect women. Under the Iranian Penal

Code, death by stoning is a method of punishment for adultery and other sexual offenses. n88 While men and women

are subject to the same punishments, this Penal Code provision discriminates against women because in Iran women are

more readily accused and convicted of adultery because of the patriarchal culture and sexist legal system. n89 [*795]

The patriarchal culture makes women more vulnerable to prosecution because women occupy fewer decision-making

positions than men. n90 Additionally, Islamic law itself makes women more likely to be convicted because evidentiary

rules decline to give weight to a woman's testimony. n91 This is particularly troubling since trials in Iran are often

deemed unfair by the standards set forth in Articles 6 and 14 of the ICCPR, n92 and Articles 10 and 11-1 of the

UDHR, n93 and even by standards set forth in the Iranian Constitution. n94 Thus, execution by stoning, especially

when carried out after an inadequate trial, offends basic human rights principles and the ideals espoused by the United

Nations Charter. n95 [*796]

A second example of human rights abuses against women under the Islamic Penal Code is the Code's valuation of

a woman's worth as only half that of a man's. n96 For example, a woman's testimony in court is given half the weight

of a man's testimony; n97 women inherit half of what men inherit; n98 and compensation paid to the family of a fe-

male murder victim is half of what a male murder victim's family would receive. n99 This unequal valuation of worth

violates UDHR Article 7, n100 which states that all people are equal before the law, and ICCPR Article 3, guarantee-

ing men and women equal civil and political rights. n101

In addition to valuing a woman's worth as half of a man's, the Penal Code provides punishments for women who

violate the dress code, a policy defined by the government. n102 Police units patrol the streets in search of violations.

n103 If an agent of the state observes a woman with a strand of hair showing, makeup, or clothes that do not conceal the

shape of her body, the state [*797] can arrest, fine, or flog the violating woman. n104 This enforcement of the dress

code violates UDHR and ICCPR provisions prohibiting degrading treatment, guaranteeing freedom of expression, and

upholding personal security. n105 Flogging, fining, or arresting a woman for having a strand of hair out of place

clearly degrades that woman. Similarly, forbidding women from choosing how to present themselves stifles their ability


to express themselves through their appearance. Likewise, arresting or flogging a woman for the drape of her clothes

seems to violate her personal security because a woman could leave her house believing she is in compliance with the

dress code, yet find herself stopped by the police if they view her appearance as violating the dress code. Further, appli-

cation of the dress code contributes to the disparate treatment of men and women because Iranian men are not subject to

similar restrictions.

The Shari'ah is also a source of contention in the universalist/relativist debate. The observance of the Shari'ah in

practice has been strongest in family law and inheritance. n106 Universalists claim that the Shari'ah family law as ap-

plied discriminates against women and justifies its human rights abuses against women. n107 Based on the idea of the

male as guardian over the female, n108 the Shari'ah provides the grounds for numerous laws that disable women eco-

nomically and socially via restrictions on women's activities and forms of expression. n109 For example, while a hus-

band may forbid his wife from working or traveling [*798] abroad, n110 no such permission is required for husbands

to work or travel. This restriction violates UHDR Article 13-2, which grants all individuals the right to leave the coun-

try, as well as UHDR Articles 23-1 and other international provisions that guarantee the right to work. n111

In addition to the Shari'ah principles, Iran has a unique principle: the Mut'a (temporary marriage). n112 Mut'a al-

lows a Muslim man to contract an unlimited number of temporary marriages. n113 These temporary marriages are in

addition to his permanent marriages, of which he is allowed up to four at one time. n114 Women may contract only

one marriage at one time. n115 Further, women must abstain from sexual activity for forty-five days after a temporary

marriage ends. n116 Men have no such requirements. This Mut'a provision violates UDHR Article 16-1 and ICCPR

Article 23-4. n117 Because Mut'a (and polygamy, a general Shari'ah principle) is a male prerogative, it de- [*799]

prives women of equal rights during marriage and at its dissolution.

Universalists argue that restrictions placed upon women by the Shari'ah and Iran's Penal Code are significant not

only because they are breaches of international human rights standards, but also because they are directed wholly at

women. The application of the Shari'ah in Iran points to the need to examine human rights abuses inflicted solely upon

women. The Iranian government sanctions human rights abuses against women not only in its Constitution and statutory

laws, but in its judicial system as well. The judiciary is problematic for women because judicial power is exclusively

under clerical control. n118 The state's interpretation of Islam influences the outcome of all disputes. n119 Since this

interpretation includes the Shari'ah, which is criticized for placing great importance on male sexual gratification, n120

one can expect judicial decisions to reflect these biases. The patriarchal system has more easily convicted women than

men, due in large part to skewed evidentiary rules n121 and the prohibition of women judges. n122 This prohibition

alone violates UDHR Article 23-1, which guarantees the free choice of employment. n123 Aside from the Article 23-1

violation, excluding women from the judiciary ensures that decisions are made from a male perspective. While this

alone is not a human rights violation, n124 these two factors combined ensure that women's views are excluded from

the judicial process, decreasing their chances for a fair trial. This violates UDHR Articles 10 and 11, which guarantee

the right to a fair hearing and the right to be presumed innocent. n125 [*800]

Not only does the government impede women's chances for a fair trial, it also acquiesces to widespread abusive

practices. This acquiescence amounts to human rights abuse when the government does not intervene to prohibit sys-

temic violations. n126 In some cases government practices contravene written laws. For example, Article 26 of the

Iranian Constitution allows for political associations not contrary to Islam, yet in practice the government punishes

those who speak against it n127 and refuses to register non-clerical political groups. n128 The government justifies

outlawing political opposition by equating the government position with Islam. ICCPR Article 3 guarantees that men

and women enjoy the same civil and political rights. n129 Because women are underrepresented in government and

systemic procedures prohibit women from participating in government on an equal basis, n130 state practice denies

women an adequate voice in their government and virtually guarantees a male-biased outcome.

These examples of human rights violations by the government of Iran in the form of constitutional provisions,

statutory laws, the judicial system, and acquiescence to common abrasive practices substantiate the universalist view

that Iran's treatment of women does not meet international human rights standards as set forth in the UDHR and ICCPR.

III. Relativist Responses

The Iranian government approaches universalist criticism in two ways. In some cases, Iran denies accusations that

it violated [*801] international human rights standards. In other cases, it justifies its actions as permissible under its

own culture and religion. When defending its actions, the government tends to offer three justifications for its treatment

of women. First, Iran justifies its separate treatment of women through its own interpretation of Islamic tenets. Second,


it rejects universalist arguments as based on notions of Western cultural supremacy. Finally, Iran characterizes interna-

tional attacks on its conduct as politically motivated.

Iran's primary justification for eschewing the universal human rights standard is Islam. n131 The government

draws upon Islam as an ideology and program for action in legal, political, and other fields, and proclaims a duty to

bring pure Islam to all Muslims. n132 In one instance, when a U.N. investigator reported alleged Iranian human rights

abuses, the government first called the report false but later called on the U.N. representative to study the issue further.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Mohammad Mohammadi stated that if the U.N. representative studied the issue of inequal-

ity between men and women thoroughly, "he would admit that the moral and material rights of women in iran sic are

being much better respected according to the islamic sic law than that of the west sic." n133

Iran's Constitution requires that Islamic principles govern all [*802] laws and regulations in the country. n134

The primary sources of Islamic law are the Qur'an and the Sunna as interpreted according to the Shi'a tradition in Iran.

n135 If the Qur'an gives no guidance on an issue, then secondary sources of law may be consulted. n136 The govern-

ment defends some specific violations of human rights standards with its Constitution. n137 For example, Article 26 of

the Constitution qualifies the ICCPR Article 22 right to freedom of association with a provision that such associations

may not contravene "the criteria of Islam or the basis of the Islamic Republic." n138 In Iran's view, because the Qur'an

is supreme, it must be followed, rather than international law. The Shari'ah, formulated primarily from the Qur'an and

the Sunna, details how to comply with Islamic laws. n139 For example, the Qur'an requires that women dress in a dig-

nified manner. n140 The Iranian government interprets the Shari'ah to mean that women must cover all but their hands

and face, wear thick stockings, show no hair, and wear no visible cosmetics. n141

In addition to specific domestic laws supporting Iran's treatment of women, Iran regards Islam as a legal system

separate from that of the West and Western claims to be the basis of universalism. n142 According to this view, Islam

provides immutable fundamental rights. n143 Human rights in Islam are granted by God. n144 Therefore, this ration-

ale provides that no individual [*803] or institution may revoke those divine rights. n145

Iran's cultural argument takes Islamic justifications one step further. While Iran cites Islam as creating separate

human rights standards, it relies on its unique culture to assert its right to self-determination, theorizing that Iranian citi-

zens should be able to live according to their own customs and traditions. Islam, a central part of Iranian culture, thus

becomes an element of the government's cultural argument. Furthermore, as a sovereign, the Iranian state claims the

right to rule however it sees fit, regardless of Western standards. It sees any attempt to impose universalist standards as

Western cultural supremacy.

One example of the government's position can be seen in its reaction to attempts by the United Nations to monitor

human rights in Iran. In anticipation of a fact-finding report by the United Nations, a government-endorsed commentary

decried the application of Western standards to Iranian actions. n146 In addition, the government has blocked inde-

pendent human rights monitors. n147 In a news conference, President Rafsanjani rejected the notion that Iran should

submit to another country's standards, arguing that "the West must respect the Islamic world's public opinion and leave

them alone so that they can choose their destiny on the basis of their own beliefs." n148 Rafsanjani's comments regard-

ing women's rights follow the same line of argument as the Iranian rejection of the universal standard. He describes

Iran's policy as one which "restores the dignity of our society's women and the extensive presence of women in educa-

tion and training and higher educational centres proves that very point. We want to remove any kind of injustice and

discrim- [*804] ination against the people of our society." n149 These statements are claims of sovereignty arguing

that, by establishing and enforcing Islamic ideals, Iran is furthering the human rights of women. n150

To accomplish its objective of being judged by Islamic human rights principles, rather than those of the West, the

government has established human rights committees in the Majlis (Parliament). n151 These committees are given the

task of ensuring that human rights are respected by Iran's law-making body. However, most observers believe that these

committees cannot effectively judge the government, even by Islamic standards, because they lack independence. n152

The human rights committees adhere to the same ideology as the President and the judiciary. Thus, while the govern-

ment appears to check itself through the separation of its powers, all branches are dominated by one ideology. n153

The definition of culture, then, is dominated by the clerks in control of the government. It is this group that defines and

monitors human rights.

In addition to justifying its deviation from international human rights norms through its culture and religion, Iran

discounts universalist claims of human rights abuses by labeling such claims as politically motivated attacks formulated

by "cultural imperialists." n154 Because only God can grant human rights privileges, n155 any Western attempts to


impose such standards are inherently divisive. The government thus believes that it is not accountable to the West.

[*805]

In countering negative human rights reports by Western governments and international organizations, Iranian gov-

ernment officials have referred to such reports as Western "political tools. n156 In an address to seminary and theo-

logical students in Iran, Khomeini stated that the superpowers use widespread propaganda disguised as human rights

reports to further their own objectives. n157 According to Khomeini, these Western objectives involve toppling the

Iranian regime or at least confining Islam to Iran. n158 In explaining the objectives of Western governments, Khome-

ini stated: "It is not a question of humanity as far as they are concerned. They intend to achieve their own ends. What

they intend to do is bring Iran into disrepute." n159 In another instance, government-owned Iranian radio described

Amnesty International ("Amnesty") and the International Human Rights Commission as "enemies of the revolution."

n160 The broadcast explained that Paris welcomes these organizations "so it can use them as a club with which to strike

at the destitute people of the world." n161

Arguably the United States unfairly condemns certain countries for their human rights practices while continuing

to support them economically. For example, while the United States condemns Iran on human rights grounds, n162

and advocates isolating Iran's economy from the world economy, n163 it remains Iran's largest trading partner. n164

The arbitrary enforcement of Western human rights standards lies at the core of Iran's reasons for rejecting these same

standards. After the United Nations Human Rights Commission condemned Iran for human rights abuses, [*806] in-

cluding its persecution of women, Foreign Ministry spokesman Mohammad Mohammadi said that the UDHR "must be

revised and used correctly" because it "no longer corresponds to the needs of people today . . . and is just used to further

political aims by putting pressure on countries." n165

To counter universalist attempts to implement international human rights standards, the Iranian government uses

the media to promote its own views and to exclude the views of others. The government controls most publications and

owns all broadcasting facilities. n166 Consequently, the media effectively constitutes the voice of the government,

rather than an independent source of information. n167 For example, while hundreds of executions occur annually,

n168 the domestic press stopped reporting most executions in 1992. n169

These examples of Iran's attempts to counter Western political views demonstrate Iran's relativist responses to uni-

versalist claims. Iran's three relativist responses to universalists claims--Islam, culture, and charges of politically-

motivated reports--each have merit from a relativist standpoint, but fail when considered from a universalist perspective.

The next section analyzes the thrust of universalist and relativist arguments in light of human rights in Iran.

IV. Evaluation of Universalist Claims and Relativist Responses

While the claims of both universalists and relativists have [*807] merit, neither side has been effective at improv-

ing human rights for women in Iran. Given the contradictory nature of the positions, some middle ground must be

reached to improve the human rights situation in Iran.

Universalism has failed the women of Iran because it has failed to hurdle two obstacles--government resistance

through its laws and practices and the dominance of popular views. Government opposition is not impossible to over-

come, as the following section will demonstrate. Similarly, ideals foreign to a culture can gain acceptance if presented

properly. Universalism, as any ideal, must gain cultural legitimacy before people will adopt it. n170 Because the uni-

versalists have attempted to implement universalist ideals using Western methods in a non-Western culture, their ideals

have not gained sufficient support among the masses to overcome government obstacles.

A. Universalist Approach Evaluated

Efforts to apply universalism in Iran have not rectified the situation for women. Outside nations, nongovernmental

organizations, the United Nations, social forces, and academics have all failed to improve the observance of the univer-

salist standard of human rights. This section illustrates that the international community's traditional methods of improv-

ing human rights have failed because they are opposed by the Iranian government and have not gained sufficient popu-

lar support.

1. Geo-Political Force

International economic pressure is commonly viewed as an effective tool to force governments to comply with in-

ternational human rights standards. n171 World powers have used economic [*808] and social pressure in an attempt

to curb human rights abuses in Iran. n172 For example, the United States has sought human rights improvements


through economic sanctions. n173 In a policy statement, John Kelly, Assistant Secretary of Affairs for Near Eastern

and South Asian Affairs, stated that the United States would only reduce economic sanctions when Iran changed its

conduct. n174 The strategy of applying sanctions to improve human rights has had limited success for two reasons.

First, women are often the first to suffer when the international community uses economic pressure to force govern-

ments to change their policies. Second, while the United States said it would loosen sanctions only after human rights

conditions for women improved, it authorized a World Bank loan to Iran in 1990, n175 released Iran's frozen assets

that same year, n176 and became Iran's largest trading partner by 1994. n177 While human rights improved in Iran,

the United States economic policy toward Iran during 1991 and 1992 correlated more closely with international events

and trade than with human rights concerns. n178 It is true [*809] that foreign policy often has competing, if not con-

flicting, objectives, but tying two possibly competing objectives together can weaken the effect of appeals to improve

human rights. If implemented in this way, sanctions are meaningless because they are a facade for economic goals. The

United States loses credibility by ignoring human rights violations by regimes they support while accusing other coun-

tries of breaching the very international standards ignored by the United States elsewhere.

In addition to exerting financial pressure on Iran, Western nations have attempted to organize agencies and official

organizations to address human rights abuses against women. For example, the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on

International Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights began holding hearings to address gender-based

abuses in 1990. n179 The House of Representatives and the Senate have placed special emphasis on human rights

abuses against women by proposing a new full-time position in the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs

to address women's issues. n180 At the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993, the U.S. delegation

worked with nongovernmental women's rights groups to develop the substantive plan of action that was adopted in the

Vienna Declaration. n181

Another step in enforcing human rights standards is for ICCPR signatories to take issue with Iran's treaty viola-

tions. Already, the U.S. government and the British government, among others, publish periodic reports of human rights

abuses in Iran. Great Britain issues the British Parliament Report annually, and the U.S. Department of State publishes

an annual country report on human rights abuses in Iran. n182 [*810]

While these government efforts are highly visible in the universalist realm outside Iran, they have not translated

into action within Iran. Governments espousing universal human rights standards must learn that sanctions, internal

government agency reorganization, hearings, and their presence at U.N. conferences may be perceived as mere rhetoric

unless those actions actually have an impact on human rights. The United States, in particular, fails in this regard. The

United States has one of the worst records of ratifying human rights treaties. n183 Nations such as the United States

need to improve their own human rights record to lend credibility to their efforts. Only then can efforts begin to focus

on internal reform in Iran.

In sum, efforts by Western governments such as the United States have not improved conditions in nations like

Iran where, allegedly, the worst violations occur. A large factor in the failure of the geo-political force strategy is that

statements and actions by Western powers lack credibility in Iran. As a result, Iran perceives the United States as apply-

ing a double standard and therefore is not compelled to adopt U.S. policies.

2. United Nations

By virtue of its international stature and resources, the United Nations remains a focal point of women's human

rights. n184 In [*811] order to facilitate implementation of universal human rights standards, the United Nations has

hosted several conventions and conferences, including the Vienna Human Rights Convention of 1993, the Cairo Popu-

lation Conference of 1994, and the 1995 International Women's Conference in Beijing. n185 The United Nations has

also drafted and adopted the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women

(CEDAW), an international agreement designed to improve the human rights of women. n186 Iran's role in these con-

ferences, while far short of universalist ideals, illustrates the possibility of bridging the universalist/relativist gap. Two

U.N. efforts, the UDHR and ICCPR, have resulted in binding international law [*812] concerning Iran, but their effec-

tiveness in Iran is constrained by the realities of international enforcement capabilities. Despite an ongoing commitment

to improve the human rights of women, many of the U.N. efforts have resulted in limited measurable improvement for

women in Iran.

The CEDAW provisions aspire to rectify specific wrongs against women, but they have not been implemented as

hoped. Three factors contributed to this limited success: frustrated monitoring efforts, n187 inadequate implementation

mechanisms, n188 and textual compromises made at the convention. n189 In the case of Iran, elements similar to

those hindering CEDAW's success have also interfered with human rights efforts at subsequent conferences.


Recent human rights conferences are marked by a pattern of limited impact. For example, the Declaration from the

Vienna Human Rights Convention of 1993 calls for integrating women's issues into human rights agendas, training

U.N. personnel about gender-based discrimination, and promoting women in U.N. organizations. n190 The first objec-

tive, which calls for human rights agendas to include women's concerns, illustrates the problems with implementation

enumerated in the previous paragraph. While Iran has incorporated women's issues into human rights agendas, it has

done so from an Islamic perspective. n191 Islamic fundamentalism is incompatible with the principles of the United

Nations. n192 The Islamic view holds that only God [*813] grants individual rights. Iran emphasizes women's rights,

but only within a religious context. It is unlikely that Iran will draft documents with universalist ideals given its relativ-

ist perspective in women's human rights issues. The second Vienna objectives relate to internal United Nations work-

ings, which does not touch the lives of Iranian women.

Despite the slim chance that the Vienna Declaration will improve human rights for women in Iran, Iran's role in the

Convention was encouraging. Iranian women attended the conference to expose the gender gap in the protection of hu-

man rights and fundamental freedoms, n193 and Iran chaired the drafting committee for the joint statement prepared

before the conference. Iran's role as chair may not help individual women in Iran immediately, but it indicates Iran's

willingness to participate in drafting human rights standards.

Iran's participation in the Cairo Population Conference of 1994 ("Cairo Conference") was encouraging for the

same reasons its role at the Vienna Convention was encouraging, yet it also illustrates an ideological conflict. While

other Muslim countries boycotted the Cairo Conference because they believed it to be "unIslamic," n194 Iran attended

the conference in an attempt to "adapt the final document to incorporate religious ethics." n195 Concerned that the

Western countries were trying to use human rights to impose their viewpoints on the rest of the world, n196 Mo-

hammad Ali Taskhiri, the Iranian delegation leader, called on other Islamic countries to "fulfill their historic duty and

propose religious and morale sic values." n197 Thus, Iran attempted to incorporate its relativist perspective into the

universalist docu- [*814] ment. This is analogous to Western nations that also attend in order to make certain their

agendas are addressed. In fact, representation, participation, and compromise combine to create a truly universal stan-

dard.

Another illustration of Iran's reaction to universalist ideals is the Beijing International Women's Conference of

1995 ("Beijing Conference"). Iran's role in the Beijing Conference is a positive sign for several reasons. First, Iran's

presence lessened the impact of earlier anti-U.N. statements by government leaders. Second, the fact that Iran negoti-

ated and signed a document setting forth women's rights standards shows that, while Iran rejects what it perceives as

Western universalist standards, it is willing to participate in defining and adopting truly universal human rights stan-

dards. However, Iran's participation at Beijing may have merely sidestepped human rights issues, thus undermining the

codification of women's human rights. n198 For example, Iran rejected the notion of equality for men and women as

defined in the Beijing Platform for Action. n199 Iran interpreted equality to mean that the different roles of women

underline the necessity for an equitable system of rights, where the particular priorities and requirements of the

woman in her multiple roles are accounted for. The Islamic Republic of Iran affirms its commitment to the implementa-

tion of the platform for action with full respect to Islam and ethical values of the society. n200

This statement illustrates the tension underlying the universalist/relativist debate because it takes the universalist

concept of equality and redefines it in religious terms. [*815]

CEDAW, the Vienna Convention, the Cairo Conference, and the Beijing Conference show that the United Nations

has made progress advancing human rights goals. However, women in Iran have not felt the impact of those efforts due

to the tension between the universalist position of the United Nations and the relativist position of Iran. While each con-

ference has taken the human rights of women one step further, n201 the sum of the U.N. efforts has resulted in much

sound and fury with little effect for women in Iran. While the difficulty in measuring human rights improvements can

be attributed in part to Iran's refusal to allow the U.N. Special Representative to visit Iran for the purpose of monitoring

compliance with international standards, n202 sources indicate that human rights abuses remain common in Iran.

n203 However, limited success should not discourage U.N. aspirations from improving the situation in Iran; rather, it

should evoke the question of how the United Nations should tailor its approach.

To overcome the difficulties encountered in drafting, monitoring, and implementing human rights, the United Na-

tions should focus on what has worked with respect to Iran. In particular, it needs to encourage Iran to continue partici-

pating in similar conferences by acknowledging the validity of some of Iran's relativist positions. Only with ongoing

participation can dialogue lead to progress on the human rights front. Absent dialogue, the two positions will remain on

opposite ends of the spectrum. [*816]


3. Nongovernmental Organizations

Nongovernmental organizations have played a major role in reducing human rights abuses worldwide. n204 Each

NGO has a unique composition, enabling different NGOs to appeal to different groups. For example, NGOs with inter-

national stature n205 would appeal more effectively to the government, while NGOs comprised of Muslim women

may prove more effective among women whose faith is central to their lives. Such specialization enables each NGO to

gain legitimacy. n206

NGOs can play a number of roles to reduce human rights abuses in Iran. First, NGOs can conduct independent as-

sessments of Iran's human rights compliance. Since these investigations would be independent of any particular gov-

ernment, they would be less likely to be perceived as political tools. Second, NGOs can publicize the results of their

investigations to the international community, enabling other governments to act based on those results. n207 Third,

NGOs can appeal directly to the Iranian government to refrain from certain activities. Finally, at U.N. conferences,

NGOs can push for human rights platforms that governments alone may be hesitant to advocate for fear of impacting

national policy concerns. n208 [*817]

Human Rights Watch and Amnesty are two groups that have persisted in advocating international human rights.

Since 1990, when Human Rights Watch/Middle East began monitoring human rights violations in Iran, efforts to com-

municate with the Iranian government to bring about compliance with the ICCPR have been frustrated. n209 In re-

sponse to appeals concerning specific cases, the Iranian government has repeated assurances that violations would not

occur. However, the government has refused to allow Human Rights Watch to conduct a long sought after onsite inves-

tigation in Iran. n210 Nevertheless, Human Rights Watch/Middle East has monitored conditions from abroad, n211

reported suspicious deaths, n212 protested imprisonment, n213 and maintained contact with activists and scholars

inside and outside Iran. n214 Although these actions further universalist ideals, it is unclear how these efforts have

affected women's lives in Iran.

The guiding principle of Amnesty states that "the protection of human rights is a universal responsibility, tran-

scending the boundaries of nation, race and belief." n215 Amnesty's reporting of women in Iran flogged for dress code

violations, n216 stoned to death after being convicted of adultery, n217 and discriminated against in court n218

helped bring the treatment of women in Iran to the attention of the international community.

Unfortunately, while the efforts of Human Rights Watch and Amnesty are visible to the international community,

it is nearly [*818] impossible to assess NGO influence within Iran because of government restraints on speech and free

association. The difficulty of gaining access to information regarding women's status in Iran illustrates the need to re-

vise attempts to improve human rights by taking into account cultural traditions. If NGOs had cultural legitimacy within

Iran, their efforts to secure ongoing monitoring rights might be successful. International organizations such as Amnesty

and Human Rights Watch are useful, but the lack of significant cooperation from Iran stiffles progress.

4. Social Forces Within Iran

Social groups located in Iran experience the same constraints that the government imposes on the United Nations.

Iran's Constitution forbids assemblies and marches that violate principles of Islam and prohibits groups that challenge

the principles of "independence, freedom, national unity, the criteria of Islam, or the basis of the Islamic Republic."

n219 This provision allows the government to label the actions of any group seeking to advance human rights in viola-

tion of the Constitution. Despite these restrictions, the government faces some opposition in Iran. Several groups are

attempting to undermine the government's hold, including the Organization of Human Rights and Basic Freedoms for

Iran, the Flag of Freedom Organization of Iran, and the League of Iranian Women. n220 These groups try to spread

their critical message in various ways, including coordinating with the international community to broadcast from

neighboring countries. They focus on government policies and actions in their attempts to improve human rights be-

cause it is the government that commits the majority of abuses. The serious consequences of stepping out of govern-

ment-prescribed roles force individuals in [*819] Iran to limit their antigovernment actions. n221

Groups within Iran need support from the international community to improve existing conditions. The role of the

international community ranges from offering asylum to individuals persecuted by the government, to creating condi-

tions for a revolution in order to overthrow the government and replace it with a secular government. Several scholars

have argued that fostering revolution is permissible within international law. n222 Some even interpret the UDHR as

implicitly recognizing it as a tool. n223 Revolution, however, may be too extreme a measure. Reality forces human

rights advocates to work with the Iranian government, not against it, considering the possible repercussions of a revolu-

tion.


Groups located in Iran are critical in the implementation of universal human rights standards for women because

such groups have national legitimacy--a key characteristic that other Western universalist groups lack. To succeed at

improving human rights for women in Iran, universalists must engage Islamic culture through cross-cultural discourse

in order to form an effective approach. This can be accomplished by utilizing culturally accepted mechanisms for im-

proving the human rights of women in Iran.

5. Academics

The Iranian government has also frustrated attempts by academics to further universalist ideals in Iran. The pri-

mary problem encountered by academics is censorship. Even though restrictions on academic freedom have lessened

since the 1979 Revolution, academic censorship persists, both within schools and throughout society. n224 On univer-

sity campuses, thoughts [*820] perceived as un-Islamic by government informants are punished. n225 To be admitted

to a university an applicant must pass a "character test" to ensure that the applicant supports government ideology.

n226 For a tenure award, a professor must cooperate with the government for several years. n227 This systemic relig-

ious indoctrination means that students will not learn that universalist views exist, thus ensuring that universalism will

not grow within Iran.

The work of other Iranian scholars is also censored. Intellectuals risk persecution if they express views that do not

conform with Islam. n228 This oppression is particularly difficult for those who believe that universalism and Islam

are compatible. n229 Because of the government's stranglehold on scholars in Iran, academics outside the country are

the only advocates who can provide further discourse on the issue without risking their lives. While the government can

attempt to keep out divergent views, it is impossible to exclude all ideas.

The Khamenei regime recognizes that Iran needs the technical expertise of intellectuals in order to compete eco-

nomically. Therefore, the government tolerates the views of necessary experts. n230 Legal scholars' attempts to iden-

tify legally-sanctioned inequalities help raise consciousness and point to areas in which the introduction of new laws can

be beneficial. n231 The role of Muslim academics in interpreting the Qur'an and Shari'ah from a female perspective is

crucial since non-Islamic sources are rejected by authorities and much of the population. n232 If human [*821] rights

scholars gain influence in Iran, perhaps other interpretations of Islam may become more acceptable. Scholars can influ-

ence public opinion by appealing to the population through valued cultural and religious institutions. For example, one

factor that contributed to the Shah's downfall and Khomeini's success was the difference in their approach to devout

Muslims. n233 The Shah was irreverent while Khomeini showed great respect towards the faithful. Scholars can use

this lesson and emphasize, by using accepted methods of persuasion and argument, that their goal is to become better

Muslims. n234 Muslim scholars, who can gain legitimacy in Iran more easily than Western scholars, can serve as a

foundation for the alternate grass roots approach to improving human rights for women in Iran.

The attempts by universalists, in the form of the United Nations, NGOs, groups within Iran, and academia, to im-

plement human rights standards as set forth in the UDHR and ICCPR have had limited success because they have not

appealed to Iranians or their government through culturally legitimate means. Each of these universalist methods of

improving human rights is curtailed by the Iranian government because of the impasse between universalist claims and

the states relativist response. Only by bridging the two sides can the deadlock be broken and human rights for women be

improved.

B. Relativist Responses Evaluated

One of the main reasons the universalist approach has been ineffective in Iran is the relativist response evoked.

Iran's three main responses to universalist criticism--separate Islamic standards, Iran's unique culture, and human rights

as a Western political tool--serve as obstacles to the human rights of women in Iran. These responses are likely moti-

vated more by the mullah's self-interest than by true concern for Iranian culture or [*822] the preservation of Islam. If

this were not the case, the government would not need to rule by force nor stifle non-conforming views. Instead, people

would, on their own, dismiss Western ideas and live according to their own cultural and religious norms without the

need of government intervention.

Islam is not as monolithic as the Iranian government would have people believe. n235 There is no single Muslim

view of women's position in society. n236 The Iranian government claims that Islam creates a "separate" standard for

women which takes precedence over the status of "equal," guaranteed by international law. n237 Rather than creating a

separate standard for women, the "Islamic" justification given by the government oppresses women by virtue of its sex-

ist interpretation. This sexism is seen in Iran's Constitution, Penal Code, judicial interpretation of the Shari'ah, and ac-


quiescence to common practices. Treating women separately results in inequities that violate international human right

standards.

In a speech to the seventh conference of Islamic ideology, Khamenei explained why the official comments of the

government are so extreme. He stated, "Islam considers propaganda a reflection of thoughts" and "propaganda is like

war." n238 With fundamentalism guiding its official position, the government would have trouble making any con-

ciliatory statements without offending Islam or sacrificing sovereignty. If the government acknowledged a nonsecular

alternative to fundamentalism, perhaps it could accept some of the universalist points without appearing to repudiate

Islam. If the government were concerned with improving compliance with Islam, it would seem appropriate to welcome

scholarly debate and attempt to reinterpret the laws to better comply with Islamic principles. However, it is unlikely

[*823] that the government will accept an alternative to fundamentalism so long as quashing dissent best serves its in-

terest. If Islam really dictated the government's treatment of women, the government would not need to use authoritar-

ian measures to force its citizens, many of whom are devout Muslims, to comply.

In addition to their argument that Islam justifies the separate treatment of women, the government argues that cul-

ture in Iran is different from the Western culture. Therefore, disparate treatment of women is justified by culture. While

it is true that the culture in Iran is different from Western culture, oppression of women does not dominate Iranian his-

tory. Under the Shah, the law guaranteed women's rights. n239 For most of the twentieth century generations of citi-

zens in Iran have seen their culture progressively Westernized. The definition of culture offered by the undemocratic

government of Iran ignores aspects of the actual culture that do not correspond to that proffered by the elite male jurists.

n240 If the state definition of culture actually represented the authentic cultural variations, then the means used by the

government to enforce the status quo would not be necessary. n241 If the status quo were really as the government

claims, women would voluntarily follow the cultural norms without the government needing to enforce these norms

through laws and punishments. n242

Resistance to extending human rights ideals to women is not unique to Middle Eastern culture. n243 Western cul-

tures resisted these objectives initially, but over time adapted their cultures to reflect modern human rights norms.

n244 Culture is not static. It changes to reflect modern norms. n245 To accept the notion that [*824] culture in Iran

cannot adapt to incorporate women's equality is to affirm that those citizens cannot aspire to see their human rights

evolve in Iran. This repudiation of the aspirational characteristic of human rights contradicts notions of human rights in

the Qur'an. n246 It is unlikely that the concept of aspirational human rights is truly foreign to a culture heavily influ-

enced by the Qur'an.

In addition to the government's hollow arguments that Islam and Iranian culture justify shunning universalist ide-

als, its contention that human rights are a Western political tool is also without merit. This argument fails by virtue of

the fact that Iran voted for the UDHR, which is customary international law generally accepted by all nations of the

world. In addition, Iran ratified the ICCPR. Since these documents are so widely accepted, it cannot be said that the

standards are invented by the West just to force Iran to submit. Iran, in fact, reaffirmed its commitment to international

human rights ideals in 1990. n247 Iran's argument that the International Bill of Rights is biased because Westerners

drafted it is without merit. While it is true that Westerners drafted those documents, Muslim governments' approach to

international human rights principles is virtually the same as the Western approach. n248 Furthermore, Iran has had

opportunities to contribute to the development of human rights standards. For these reasons Iran is precluded from as-

serting that universalists are imposing their standards without giving Iran any opportunity to develop the standards it

will follow. [*825]

By taking such an absolute relativist position, the government puts itself in a defensive stance, thereby inviting at-

tack by universalists. The Iranian government could improve its treatment of women without sacrificing Iran's religion

or culture. Because current laws do not reflect actual Iranian culture, there is a possibility of a return to more authentic

cultural norms that the government is suppressing. Suppression would not be needed if people were allowed to live ac-

cording to their cultural traditions. The thrust of the universalist criticism would be blunted if the government allowed

authentic norms to surface.

Thus, neither the universalist approach nor the relativist response has improved human rights of women in Iran.

The universalist approach uses methods which lack cultural legitimacy in Iran, and is unlikely to succeed. The relativist

response rejects the notion of conforming to universalist ideals because those allegedly politically motivated standards

contradict the government's version of Islam and Iranian culture. To succeed, universalists must present their ideas in

ways that do not appear to be politically motivated and do not offend Iranian culture and Islamic ideals.

V. A Strategy


Despite claims that a universal human rights standard should not or cannot be implemented, the efforts of univer-

salists appear to have succeeded in improving human rights in some non-Western cultures. n249 To avoid the rejection

of universalism by a culture, universalists should appeal to the same authority upon which that culture bases its laws.

n250 Universalists must recognize that while one standard for human rights exists, various cultures express those rights

differently. n251 The universalist approach needs to focus on the commonalties of human experience [*826] rather

than the differences. n252 While the human rights contributions of governments, the United Nations, NGOs, and aca-

demics are important, their impact for women in Iran is limited because they lack legitimacy and sufficient influence

over Iran's internal policies. Human Rights groups need to assist groups within Iran to accomplish their goals.

Some successful models for persuading a culture to adopt foreign concepts using indigenous methods include those

used by the Peace Corps, Christian missionaries, and human rights groups in Muslim countries such as Tunisia. The

missionaries and the Peace Corps have influenced peoples within diverse cultures by addressing those peoples' basic

needs and not directly challenging their belief system. In addition, Islam itself encourages persuasion and argument.

n253 Because of the importance of cultural legitimacy, the Islamic model is relevant to this discussion. Tunisia provides

an Islamic model with parallels to Iran.

A. A Grass Roots Model

Tunisia and Iran are both Muslim countries, yet human rights for women have improved in Tunisia. n254 This

success proves that Iran cannot validly reject the improvement of women's rights solely because it is a Muslim country.

n255 Legal reform combined with NGO activity enabled the status of women in [*827] Tunisia to improve, while the

status of women in Iran has not. n256 Women's rights groups in Tunisia worked at a grass roots level to change atti-

tudes about women, n257 enabling legal reform to occur and to be effective once enacted. The interplay between hu-

man rights groups and an authoritarian government is illustrated in Tunisia's history.

Under Tunisia's former President, Habib Bourghiba, the Personal Status Code gave women greater rights than pre-

vious Islamic laws. n258 According to these laws women had several rights: couples had to consent to marriage, po-

lygamy was prohibited, men had to follow a civil procedure to obtain divorce, women could initiate divorce proceed-

ings, adoption was made legal, women obtained the right to work, and inheritance rights improved for women. n259

When Ben Ali took over in 1987, he also made a verbal commitment to human rights. n260 While Tunisia does not

have a perfect human rights record, it has initiated reforms that many other nations, including Iran, have not undertaken.

n261 Success in Tunisia is due, in part, to groups organized by the general population.

The manner by which these groups gained enough strength to lead movements for human rights despite govern-

ment obstacles is worth examining. n262 The organizational method used by a [*828] Tunisian women's group dedi-

cated to addressing human rights violations against women could be applied to Iran. These women first met as an in-

formal nonpolitical women's club. n263 As membership increased, the group organized more formally and began de-

bating serious issues. n264 The group eventually focused on studying the conditions of women. n265 They organized

colloquia and invited women from other countries. n266 They demonstrated against the government practices. n267

Finally, as part of the strategy to bring women together, the group published a journal addressing methods for improv-

ing the plight of women. n268 The evolution of this group illustrates how a force for social change through collective

actions can emerge from nothing more than private discussions of women's issues. n269 Women in Iran can use this

strategy to begin addressing human rights abuses against women. The international community's role in facilitating this

type of grass roots organization can be as simple as raising individual women's awareness of human rights issues.

Tunisia is an important example for several reasons. First, it shows that even in the presence of state domination,

groups within a country can make strides for human rights. Second, by looking at how these groups organized their ef-

forts, individuals can apply similar techniques in Iran. Finally, the shortcomings of the human rights movement in Tuni-

sia can be noted and corrected in Iran. The case of Tunisia illustrates that achieving universalist ideals using relativist

methods is possible. This grass roots approach succeeds because it rejects both radical universalism and radical relativ-

ism. As the previous sections assess- [*829] ing the claims of each group indicate, neither approach has been effective

at improving the condition of women in Iran. Universalism has had limited success due to its lack of cultural legitimacy,

Iran's suspicion of purely political motives, and a universalist refusal to respect Islam as the central force in Iran. Be-

cause in Iran it is believed that only God grants human rights, other groups' and individuals' definitions of rights are

irrelevant. Consequently, when judged by international standards, relativism has not improved human rights.

The grass roots method does, however, incorporate essential elements of both universalism and relativism. It re-

tains the ideal of a single set of human rights standards while valuing the rights of groups to self-determination and to

live according to their own values and practices. This method's premise is that Iranian values and practices are not re-


flected in current Iranian laws and state practice. If current law were actually a norm no oppression would be needed to

induce compliance. The grass roots approach can serve as a catalyst for incremental domestic change through education

and response to people's needs. Universalist ideals will gain legitimacy by working within the culture, rather than

against it.

The grass roots method is likely to encounter difficulties of its own. Even if the grass roots method is accepted by

intellectuals as a workable theory, it will need to be applied by enough people to make it effective. Implementing the

grass roots method will be a long process, and will require people from different cultures to respect each others' posi-

tions. Despite these and other potential obstacles, the grass roots method provides a framework for addressing the prob-

lems that challenge current approaches.

B. Conclusion

Iran is not meeting its international legal obligations in its treatment of women. While the status of women in Iran

has fluctuated throughout history, women were at least guaranteed some legal rights under the Shah. Currently women

do not even have similar "official" legal rights because the government inter- [*830] prets Islam as creating a separate

standard for women. The international community has attempted to enforce compliance with universalist ideals that are

embodied in international law, but has not succeeded due to Iran's relativist response. Despite these failed attempts, at-

taining universalist goals is possible. Indeed, universalist ideals have a constituency in Iran, but are suppressed by the

clerics.

Iran has been ruled by leaders advocating elements of each theory. The Shah emphasized conformity with Western

standards, whereas Khomeini dictated religious compliance. Thus, it is possible that sympathizers for each view exist in

Iran today. Groups advocating conformity with Western standards, if further educated along universalist ideals, can be

the catalyst to improve human rights for women in Iran. Because such a group comprises part of the general population

in Iran, it can lend legitimacy to universalist ideals. Just as the Shah fell because his ideas never gained cultural legiti-

macy, efforts to implement universalism will fail if the theory lacks support from the general population in Iran.

Universalism and relativism exist together on a spectrum. The radical versions of each theory, holding respective

ends of the spectrum, have only interfered with the realization of human rights for women in Iran. Only by diluting each

theory with a measure of the other can this theoretical framework succeed in practice. Each theory has valid points. The

universalist principle that all individuals have certain immutable human rights must not be sacrificed. Similarly, the

relativist perspective recognizing the validity of all cultures is equally important. By adopting a hybrid version of the

two theories, it is possible to preserve the essential elements of each, both in theory and in practice.

The status of women in Iran has deteriorated since the 1979 Revolution. The revolution, in part, was possible be-

cause many supposed legal guarantees, such as those concerned with women's rights, were seen by the population as

lacking legitimacy and never fully adopted. Lack of secure popular support for ideals helped Khomeini topple the Shah.

The current requirement that all rights conform to Islamic criteria enables the gov- [*831] ernment to limit fundamen-

tal human rights through its interpretation of Islam. Universalists claim that the government's qualifications of women's

human rights violates international law. Iran is bound by the UDHR and ICCPR, yet its Constitution, statutes, interpre-

tation of the Shari'ah, judicial system, and acquiescence to common practices all contravene these universal standards.

Iran's position is that its laws do not breach its international legal obligations. According to the government in Iran,

Islam requires a separate standard for women. Furthermore, Iran's unique culture entitles its people to live according to

their own customs and traditions. Finally, the government labels efforts to induce compliance with international law as

politically motivated attacks. Unfortunately, the universalist approach, in the form of the United Nations, NGO activity,

internal social forces, and academia, has failed to bring human rights to women in Iran because these methods incite

government opposition and have not gained popular support.

Iran's relativist responses to universalist accusations seem hollow and possibly motivated by government leaders'

self interest. The government alone defines the "criteria of Islam" used to justify state practices. Islam, however, is not

monolithic and is subject to varying interpretations. Similar to its treatment of Islam, the government enforces its ver-

sion of culture. If the culture really were as monolithic as the government claims, women would follow such norms

without government oppression. In addition to using Islam and culture as justifications for its treatment of women, the

government claims international human rights standards are products of Western imperialism. However, Iran signed the

UDHR, bound itself to the ICCPR, then re-affirmed its international obligations in 1990. Government resistance has

frustrated universalist efforts to improve the status of women in Iran.


The grass roots method proposed in this Comment resolves the difficulties experienced by universalists in enforc-

ing Iran's compliance with international human rights standards. By combining elements of both universalism and rela-

tivism in a hybrid [*832] theoretical model, necessary aspects of each are preserved. Universalist ideals can survive

while respecting the relativist claim to self-determination. To improve the status of women, both the laws and the belief

system in Iran must embrace universalist ideals. The grass roots method meets these requirements by accepting Iran's

culture and religion, while separating politics from ideology by appealing to the Iranian government through NGOs

rather than through Western political channels. It applies lessons from women's human rights improvements in Tunisia

to Iran. To gain popular acceptance by the government and population, the grass roots method emphasizes the common-

alities of human experience, rather than confrontation.

The hybrid theoretical model, upon which the grass roots approach is based, does not compromise universalist ide-

als even though it embraces aspects of the relativist argument. Rather, it tailors the universalist approach to the people

and government of Iran. It gives universalist ideals a chance to take root in Iran. Universalists can help improve the

status of women in Iran only by employing a theory that actually works in the real world.

Legal Topics:

For related research and practice materials, see the following legal topics:

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LawTrade AgreementsIntellectual Property Provisions

FOOTNOTES:

n1 A country's obligations under international law can arise from three sources: international conventions,

international custom, and general principles that the major legal systems of the world recognize. Restatement

(Third) of Foreign Relations ß 102 (1987); Statute of the I.C.J., art. 38, reprinted in International Law (Louis

Henkin et al. eds., 3d ed. 1993) 51, 51-52. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), which decides international

disputes once parties have consented to its jurisdiction, also looks to judicial decisions and teachings as a sub-

sidiary source of international law. Id. at 52. If the parties agree, the ICJ can decide a case according to princi-

ples based on equity and conscience. Id. There are several problems with making international law binding on

Iran. First, of the international treaties to which Iran is a party, Iran has entered reservations to many human

rights provisions. For those treaties, the extent and nature of its obligations must still be interpreted. Abdullahi

Ahmed An-Na'im, State Responsibility Under International Human Rights Law to Change Religious and Cus-

tomary Laws, in Human Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives 167, 168 (Rebecca J. Cook

ed., 1994). Second, customary international law is vague and difficult to establish. Id. Even if customary interna-

tional law were easily defined, it would be difficult to identify any principle prohibiting all forms of gender dis-

crimination. Id. Third, the principles of law and equity are based on universalist principles. After establishing

that Iran violated international human rights law, the international community must then enforce Iran's confor-

mity with international law. An-Na'im, supra at 170. However, the problem of enforcement has not been re-

solved by the international community, in large part because states are reluctant to submit to individual com-

plaints. Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics, Values, and Functions, in International Law, supra at 640.

The international community has dealt with the enforcement problem in a couple of ways. First, the United Na-

tions created the ICJ. Second, each treaty provides for its own enforcement mechanism, and such enforcement

mechanisms include the ICJ and committees. For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political

Rights established a committee to address disputes. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec.

16, 1966, art. 41, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16 at 57, U.N. Doc.

A/6316 (1967) [hereinafter ICCPR].

n2 Because many laws and practices in Iran subordinate women to men, applying international standards to

Iranian law would have an enormous impact on the legal system. See Ann E. Mayer, Cultural Particularism as a

Bar to Women's Rights: Reflections on the Middle Eastern Experience, in Women's Rights, Human Rights 176,

177 (Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper eds., 1995).


n3 It is difficult to verify reports of facts in Iran due to the government's refusal to cooperate with non-

governmental groups. Because the facts relied on in this Comment could change, the grass roots theoretical

model is a hypothesis which can conform to further factual findings. In addition to verification problems, trans-

lation can be problematic. This Comment seeks consistency in its translations, but it does not adopt one particu-

lar style nor claim to be technically correct. While citing to the original Iranian Penal Code would be ideal,

original Iranian sources are difficult to acquire due to government censorship. Additionally, even if such sources

were available, translation problems exist. Therefore, this Comment relies on credible secondary sources when

necessary.

n4 Louis Henkin, The Internationalization of Human Rights, 6 Proc. Gen. Educ. Seminar 1 (1977), reprinted

in International Law, supra note 1, at 596.

n5 Id. at 597.

n6 The International Bill of Rights is comprised of three instruments: the ICCPR, the Universal Declaration

of Human Rights, art. 2, U.N. GAOR 217A (III) (1948) [hereinafter UDHR], and the International Covenant on

Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 41, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR,

Supp. 16 at 57, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1987) [hereinafter ICESCR]. International Law, supra note 1, at 599. The

ICCPR and the ICESCR are only binding upon signatories. Since Iran ratified the ICCPR, it is bound. The

UDHR is binding as customary law, but customary law is vague and difficult to prove. An-Na'im, supra note 1,

at 168. Consistent state conduct forms customary international law; however, that conduct must be borne out of

sense of obligation rather than political expediency. See Asylum Case (Colum. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266 (Nov.

20). Furthermore, a state can exempt itself from a law of custom by consistently protesting the principle before it

becomes accepted as customary law. See North Sea Continental Cases (F.R.G. v. Den.) (F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969

I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20). However, once the law has become custom, a state's protest will not exempt that state from the

law. Despite the problems associated with customary law, this Comment will treat the UDHR as binding.

n7 International Law, supra note 1, at 599.

n8 For a discussion of the two theories, see Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Problems of Universal Cultural

Legitimacy for Human Rights, in Human Rights in Africa: CrossCultural Perspectives 339-45 (Abdullahi A. An-

Na'im & Francis M. Deng eds., 1990); See also Ann E. Mayer, Universal Versus Islamic Human Rights, 15

Mich. J. Int'l L. 307, 315 (1994).

n9 Although feminist writers address the issue of women's rights, other writers examining human rights

from a traditional approach have failed to focus enough attention on the particular suffering experienced by

women. Feminist legal theory has added a sense of urgency and a new perspective to existing human rights prin-

ciples. Hilary Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 Am. J. Int'l L. 613 (1991).

Feminist legal theorists argue that the international community fails to incorporate women's needs into its laws,

resulting in disparate treatment of women. Id. at 614. Feminists argue that international human rights law does

not protect women because it focuses on the male public sphere. The public sphere is comprised of state actors.

The private sphere, to which women are relegated, encompasses nonstate action. Feminist theory proposes to

expand human rights to address the violations against women which occur primarily in the private sphere by

abolishing the public/private sphere distinction. Nancy Kim, Toward a Feminist Theory of Human Rights:

Straddling the Fence Between Western Imperialism and Uncritical Absolutism, 25 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev.

49, 49 (1993). However, because abuses against women in Iran occur in both the public and private spheres, this

Comment focuses on state action.

n10 Mohammad Reza Shah ruled Iran until 1978. Michael M. J. Fischer, Legal Postulates in Flux: Justice,

Wit, and Hierarchy in Iran, in Law and Islam in the Middle East, 115, 115 (Daisy Hilse Dwyer ed., 1990).


n11 Amir Arjomand, Shi'ite Jurisprudence and Constitution Making in the Islamic Republic of Iran, in Fun-

damentalisms and the State: Remaking Polities, Economies, and Militance 88, 88 (Martin E. Marty & R. Scott

Appleby eds., 1993).

n12 Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, The Justice System of the Islamic Republic of Iran 5 (1993)

[hereinafter Law. Committee].

n13 Ann E. Mayer, The Fundamentalist Impact on Law, Politics, and Constitutions in Iran, Pakistan, and the

Sudan, in Fundamentalisms and the state, Remaking Polities, Economies, and Militance, supra note 11, at 116.

n14 Id.

n15 Law. Committee, supra note 12, at 5.

n16 Id.

n17 Id.

n18 Homa Nategh, Women: The Damned of the Iranian Revolution, in Women in Political Conflict: Por-

traits of struggle in Times of Crises 45, 47-48 (Rosemary Ridd & Helen Callaway eds., 1987).

n19 Women who pushed for the Shah's fall did so because they saw the family as being corrupt, and be-

cause the Shah's attempts to break the Islamic tradition by rewriting history to connect modern-day Iran with its

Persian roots threatened many fundamental beliefs. Interview with Shahin Taheri, President of Women for So-

cial Justice, in Atlanta, Ga. (Oct. 31, 1995) [hereinafter Taheri Interview]. Because of the difficulty of gathering

Iranian women's opinions, their views are represented in this Comment only by Iranian women living outside the

country and by anecdotal evidence. See, e.g., Martha Shelley, My Sister Ended Her Life as an Act of Protest, On

the Issues, Fall 1994, at 15-16; Lamis Andoni, Iran's New Activists Seek Life for Women Beyond the Veil,

Christian Sci. Monitor, Mar. 28, 1995 at 1, 7 [hereinafter Iran's New Activists]; Lamis Andoni, President's

Daughter Rallies For Women's Sports in Iran, Christian Sci. Monitor, Mar. 28, 1995 at 7.


n21 Mayer, supra note 13, at 120.


n23 Id.

n24 Id.

n25 Mayer, supra note 13, at 116-17.

n26 Taheri Interview, supra note 19.

n27 Id.; Iran, Human Rights Developments, Human Rts. Watch World Rep., 1990, (Human Rights Watch,

New York, N.Y.), 1990, at 437, 441 [hereinafter Hum. Rts. Watch 1990]. The majority of Iranian men did not


protest Khomeini's sexist policies. Instead, they pressured female family members to comply with the new laws

for fear of embarrassment of having a relative in the Morality Squad's custody. Mahin Hassibi, Sexual Apartheid

In Iran, On The Issues, Fall 1994, at 17.

n28 Sisterhood is Global: The International Women's Movement Anthology 329 (Robyn Morgan ed., 1984).

The government shot 50 schoolgirls and arrested thousands of other girls and women without trials for "anti-

Islamic" activity. By 1983, 20,000 women had been executed, including girls, pregnant women, and elderly

women. Id. at 329.


n30 Penal Code ß 2 (Iran). The chador is Islamic dress worn by women. It must cover the woman's entire

body, including all of her hair, except for her hands and face.

n31 Iran Human Rights Practices, Dispatch (U.S. Dep't of State/Bureau of Public Affairs, Wash., D.C.),

Mar. 1995, available in LEXIS, GENFED Library, DSTATE File [hereinafter U.S. Dep't of State]. Although this

periodical is published by the U.S. government and therefore is regarded as biased by some, independent human

rights organizations regard it as a credible source. See Charles Humana, World Human Rights Guide 3 (3d ed.

1992); see also Jack Tobin, Guide to Human Rights Research 12 (1994). For additional reports of stoning

women, see Jacquie Miller, Feminist Refugee Can Stay: Strong Message to Decision Makers, The Ottowa Citi-

zen, Jan. 30, 1993, available in LEXIS, MDEAFR Library, ALLMDE File; Dianne Rinehart, Canadian Femi-

nists Blast Canada's Record, Calgary Herald, Sept. 5, 1995, available in LEXIS, MDEAFR Library, ALLMDE

File. See also Nategh, supra note 18, at 52; Amnesty International, Iran, Amnesty Int'l Rep. 120 (1991), micro-

formed on Amnesty International Country Dossiers 1991, Fiche 685 (Egypt-Iraq E61 Middle East No. 76) 1, 2.

While both men and women are theoretically subject to the punishment of stoning for adultery, in practice

women suffer disproportionately because decision makers in the patriarchal legal system more often believe

women's male accusers.


n33 See generally An-Na'im, supra note 1, at 167-85.

n34 James C. N. Paul, Islam and the State: The Problems of Establishing Legitimacy and Human Rights, 12

Cardozo L. Rev. 1057, 1069 (1991).

n35 See, e.g., International Human Rights Incompatible with Iran's Legal System, Agence France Presse,

Nov. 27, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, NON-US File (reporting Chief Justice Ayatollah Mohammad

Yazdi's comments); Iran's Khamene'i Addresses Islamic Ideology Conference (BBC Summary of World Broad-

casts, Jan. 31, 1989), available in LEXIS, News Library, NON-US File; Rafsanjani News Conference: Relations

with USA, Arab State, Defence Budget (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Feb. 2, 1993), available in

LEXIS, News Library, NON-US File.

n36 Other theorists and human rights advocates debate the impact of government practices on the rights of

women. Those theorists and advocates may not label themselves "universalists" or "relativists," but they are

concerned with similar issues. This Comment focuses on the universalist and relativist theories, but acknowl-

edges that other views exist.

n37 Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice 109-10 (1989).


n38 Id.

n39 Kim, supra note 9, at 63-64.


n41 Donnelly, supra note 37, at 1.

n42 Id.

n43 See UDHR, supra note 6, art. 2.


n45 Id. at 1-2.

n46 See, e.g., International Law, supra note 1, at 611-15 (listing international agreements and covenants). It

is important to note that despite widespread recognition of human rights, many nations (including the United

States) have rejected such standards, either by refusing to sign human rights agreements or by ratifing them with

numerous reservations.

n47 Kim, supra note 9, at 64.

n48 Id.

n49 See International Law, supra note 1, at 617.

n50 See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 8, at 315-16.

n51 See Donnelly, supra note 37, at 110-11.

n52 Id. at 109-11.

n53 Id.

n54 Id. at 109.


n56 Mayer, supra note 8, at 315 (quoting Iran's U.N. Ambassador in 1983).

n57 See id.



n59 Id.

n60 Melville J. Herskovits, Man and His Works: The Science of Cultural Anthropology, in Human Rights

in Africa: Cross-Cultural Perspectives, supra note 8, at 340.

n61 Donnelly, supra note 37, at 109-10.

n62 Id. at 109.

n63 Id. at 110.



n66 Hearings on International Human Rights Abuses Against Women: Before the Subcomm. on Human

Rights and International Organization of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1990)

(statement of Rep. Pat Schroeder); Amina Wadud-Muhsin, Sisters in Islam: Effective Against All Odds, in Si-

lent Voices 117, 120 (Doug A. Newsom & Bob J. Carrell eds., 1995).


n68 Id.

n69 Id. at 24-25. Iran voted for the UDHR in the General Assembly in 1948. Human Rights in Iran: Testi-

mony on behalf of Amnesty International by Brian Wrobel: Before the Subcommittee on International Organiza-

tions of the Committee on International Relations 12 (1978) [hereinafter Wrobel Testimony], microformed on

Iran, Amnesty International Country Reports 1991, Fiche 686 (H-2612 v. 1 Iran 1878, no. 1).

n70 Wrobel Testimony, supra note 69, at 12. In addition, Iran acknowledged its commitment to interna-

tional human rights standards in December 1990 when it committed itself to a U.N. resolution calling on Iran

to intensify its efforts to investigate and rectify the human rights issues raised by the Special Representative

in his observations, in particular as regards the administration of justice and due process of law in order to com-

ply with international instruments on human rights, . . . and to ensure that all individuals within its territory and

subject to its jurisdiction, including religious groups, enjoy the rights recognized in these instruments.

Hum. Rts. Watch 1990, supra note 27, at 442-43.

n71 UDHR Article 2 states that "everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declara-

tion, without discrimination of any kind, such as race, colour, sex . . . ."

n72 An-Na'im, supra note 1, at 168-69.

n73 Who will take up the issue of Iran's failure to comply with its ICCPR obligations? The Vienna Conven-

tion on the Law of Treaties has been interpreted to mean that only treaty members may challenge another party's

treaty obligations. Therefore, a woman or a NGO must find another state signatory to take up the cause. This

makes the enforcement issue difficult because state self-interest normally does not encompass human rights is-

sues in other states. Id. at 169.



n75 Iran Const. art. 19, translated in 9 Constitutions of the Countries of the World 25 (Gisbert H. Flanz ed.,

Oceana Publications, Inc. 1992).

n76 Id.


n78 ICCPR, Article 22-1 states that "everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others."

ICCPR, Article 22-2 provides that "no restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those

which are prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security

or public safety, public order . . . the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and

freedoms of others." ICCPR, supra note 1.

n79 UDHR, Article 20-1 guarantees that "everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and asso-

ciation." UDHR, supra note 6.

n80 Iran, Human Rights Developments, Human Rts. Watch World Rep., 1995 (Human Rights Watch, New

York, N.Y.), 1995, at 269, 271 [hereinafter Hum. Rts. Watch 1995]. The Revolutionary Guards were officially

merged into the army or municipal police forces, but maintain some autonomy in practice. Iran, Human Rights

Developments, Human Rts. Watch World Rep., 1991 (Human Rights Watch, New York, N.Y.), 1991, at 622

[hereinafter Hum. Rts. Watch 1991]. While it can be argued that the militia's autonomy allows the government

to disclaim responsibility for their actions, that the government condones their behavior makes the government

ultimately responsible.

n81 See ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 22-2.

n82 For additional examples of practices that disproportionately affect women, see Women's Rights Project

& Asia Watch, Double Jeopardy: Police Abuse of Women in Pakistan 47-56 (1992).

n83 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Toward an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human Rights, and In-

ternational Law 19 (1990).

n84 See, e.g., S. H. Amin, Middle East Legal Systems 106 (1985).

n85 The Shari'ah is the canon law of Islam. Asghar Ali Engineer, The Rights of Women in Islam 6 (1992).

The Shari'ah delineates personal law, family law, ritual, and religious observance.

n86 See An-Na'im, supra note 83, at 67-68 (pointing to the need for overcoming the "heresy" barrier in de-

bating the Shari'ah in order to formulate a nonsecular alternative). See also Mayer, supra note 13, at 117 (de-

scribing the state as treating political opposition as anti-Islamic).

n87 David Pearl, A Textbook on Muslim Personal Law 17 (2d ed. 1987).


n88 Penal Code (Iran); Hum. Rts. Watch 1990, supra note 27, at 440-41 (reporting stoning for prohibited

sexual acts); Hum. Rts. Watch 1991, supra note 80, at 621 (reporting stoning as method of execution); Hum. Rts.

Watch 1995, supra note 80, at 273 (listing corporal punishment of women for adultery and prostitution).

n89 This is also true in Pakistan. For example, in order to prove rape, a woman must have the testimony of

four men. Her testimony is not sufficient. If she alleges rape but cannot prove it was nonconsensual, she can be

convicted of the capital crime of Zina (fornication or adultery) under the Islamic penal law Hudood. The pun-

ishment, which cannot be altered, is death by stoning. The burden of proof also works against women. While a

woman must prove rape beyond a reasonable doubt, a woman's rape allegation, once disproved, serves as prima

facie evidence of adultery or fornication. Men, however, are given the benefit of the doubt when accused of

rape. Women's Rights Project & Asia Watch, supra note 82, at 47-56.

n90 An-Na'im, supra note 83, at 123.

n91 Id.

n92 ICCPR, Article 6-1 states that "no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life." Section 2 establishes

that the "sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes . . . . This penalty can only be car-

ried out pursuant to a final judgement rendered by a competent court." Article 14-1 provides that "all persons

shall be equal before the courts and tribunals . . . . Everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a

competent, independent and impartial tribunal . . . ." Article 14-2 states that "everyone charged with a criminal

offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty . . . ." Article 14-3(b) provides that after

being charged with a crime, the accused shall be entitled "to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation

of his defence and to communicate with counsel of his own choosing." Article 14-3 guarantees the right to ex-

amine adverse witnesses. Article 14-5 establishes the right to review by a higher court. ICCPR, supra note 1.

n93 UDHR, Article 10 guarantees that "everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by

an independent and impartial tribunal . . . ." Article 11-1 states that "everyone charged with a penal offence has

the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the

guarantees necessary for his defence." UDHR, supra note 6.

n94 Iran Const. (1979) art. 14, 34, 35, 37, translated in 9 Constitutions of the Countries of the World, 22-30

(Gisbert H. Flanz ed., Oceana Publications, Inc. 1992). Many trials are not held in public, the accused are not

given the opportunity to consult with a defense attorney prior to trial, and in practice the accused are not pre-

sumed innocent. Law. Committee, supra note 12, at 40-41.

n95 The Preamble states one of the purposes of establishing the United Nations is "to reaffirm faith in fun-

damental human rights . . . ." U. N. Charter pmbl.

n96 Akram Mirhosseini, After the Revolution: Violations of Women's Human Rights in Iran, in Women's

Rights, Human Rights 72, 72 (1995). The law that declares a woman to be "half a man" is the lex talionis.

Nategh, supra note 18, at 51.

n97 Sisterhood is Global, supra note 28, at 324.

n98 Mahin Hassibi, Sexual Apartheid in Iran, On the Issues, Fall 1994, at 17-19; Mirhosseini, supra note 96,

at 72; Sisterhood is Global, supra note 28, at 325.

n99 Mirhosseini, supra note 96, at 72.


n100 UDHR Article 7 states that "all are equal before the law . . . ." UDHR, supra note 6. A similar provi-

sion in the ICCPR is Article 26. ICCPR, supra note 1.

n101 ICCPR, supra note 1.

n102 Iran, Human Rights Development, Human Rts. Watch World Rep., 1992, (Human Rights Watch, New

York, N.Y.) 1992, at 300-01 [hereinafter Hum. Rts. Watch 1992]; Amnesty International, supra note 31. See

also Mirhosseini, supra note 96, at 74-75 (giving examples of violations and enforcement of the dress code); Ri-

naldo Galindo Pohl, Special Representative of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in the Islamic

Republic of Iran, Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, at U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1992/34 (1992) [hereinafter

Special Representative Report] (citing allegations of women's human rights violations); Hum. Rts. Watch 1995,

supra note 80, at 271 (discussing zero tolerance of dress code violations and reporting fines and flogging for vio-

lating dress code); Hum. Rts. Watch 1992, supra at 301 (reporting more stringent dress code standards with im-

prisonment, fines, or flogging on the street for violations).

n103 Hum. Rts. Watch 1992, supra note 102, at 301.

n104 Id.

n105 UDHR Article 5 and ICCPR Article 7 prohibit "degrading treatment." UDHR Article 19 and ICCPR

Article 19-2 guarantee the right to freedom of expression. ICCPR Article 9-1 and UDHR Article 3 uphold the

right to "security of person." UDHR, supra note 6; ICCPR, supra note 1.


n107 Debbie J. Gerner, Roles in Transition: The Evolving Position of Women in ArabIslamic Countries, in

Muslim Women 71, 74 (Freda Hussain ed., 1984) (arguing that the Shari'ah makes it difficult for women to

move constructively toward changing their situation).

n108 An-Na'im, supra note 1, at 181. See also Abul A'La Maududi, Purdah and the Status of Women in Is-

lam (Al-Ash'Ari trans., Islamic Publications 4th ed. 1979).

n109 See Jamal Nasir, The Islamic Law of Personal Status (2d ed. 1990) (describing personal status laws).

n110 Mirhosseini, supra note 96, at 73.

n111 UDHR Article 23-1 reads, "everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment . . . ."

UDHR, supra note 6. A similar provision is Article 6-1 of the International Convention on Economic, Social,

and Cultural Rights: "The States Parties to the present covenant recognize the right to work, which includes the

right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely chooses or accepts, and will take

appropriate steps to safeguard this right." ICESCR, supra note 6, at 50. The government also interferes with

women's right to work. For example, before the Revolution 13% of women were employed; after the Revolution

only half of these women were employed. Mirhosseini, supra note 96, at 73. The government fired many women

because their supposed physical and mental weakness made them incapable of performing certain jobs. Id. See

also Special Representative Report, supra note 102.


n112 Shahla Haeri, Divorce in Contemporary Iran: A Male Prerogative in Self-Will, in Islamic Family Law

55, 60 (Chibli Mallet & Jane Conners eds., 1990). Mut'a literally means "enjoyment, use." Asef A.A. Fyzee,

Outlines of Muhammadan Law 177 (4th ed. 1974).

n113 Haeri, supra note 112, at 60.

n114 Id.

n115 Id.

n116 Id.

n117 UDHR Article 16-1 reads "men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality,

or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during

marriage, and at its dissolution." UDHR, supra note 6. ICCPR provides "state parties to the present Covenant

shall take appropriate steps to ensure equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, during

marriage, and at its dissolution." ICCPR, supra note 1.

n118 Arjomand, supra note 11, at 94.

n119 Id. at 93.

n120 Haeri, supra note 112, at 69.

n121 See Women's Rights Project, supra note 82, at 47-56.

n122 Iran's New Activists, supra note 19, at 7.

n123 UHDR Article 23-1 reads "everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment . . . ." UDHR,

supra note 6.

n124 Underrepresentation of women in decision-making positions is common even in the countries espous-

ing universalism. The difference is that Iran has no means of giving women's voices equal weight.

n125 Article 10 states that "everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independ-

ent and impartial tribunal . . . ." Article 11 guarantees "everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be

presumed innocent until proved guilty . . . ." UDHR, supra note 6.


n127 See, e.g., Amnesty International, supra note 31, at 120 (reporting that approximately 100 women al-

legedly connected with two left-wing political parties have been imprisoned for terms over seven years, some

without charge or trial).

n128 Human Rights Watch, Guardians of Thought: Limits of Freedom of Expression in Iran 113 (1993).


n129 ICCPR, supra note 1.

n130 Hassibi, supra note 27, at 18; Hum. Rts. Watch 1995, supra note 80, at 270-71.

n131 Amin, supra note 84, at 105-06.

n132 Iran's Khamene'i Addresses Islamic Ideology Conference (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Jan.

31, 1989), available in LEXIS, News Library, NON-US File.

n133 Iran Denies Indirect Talks With Israel, Xinhua News Agency, Feb. 22, 1995, available in LEXIS,

MDEAFR Library, ALLMDE File. While the Iranian government uses Islam to justify its actions, some schools

of jurisprudence interpret the Shari'ah differently from the government. This is partly because the Shari'ah

evolved over the course of several centuries and was never static. Engineer, supra note 85, at 6-17. Some schol-

ars argue that because the Shari'ah is transcendental law, it must be applied differently as circumstances change.

Id. at 9. Thus, while the Qur'an contains discriminatory passages that do not change over time, the Shari'ah's in-

terpretations may change according to the culture of the time. The Qur'an, too, has been examined for guidance

on women's human rights. Scholars have pointed to sections of the Qur'an that indicate men and women have

equal status. Id. at 10. However, since official interpretations are done by government religious leaders, the in-

terpretations point to those sections that support discrimination. Id.

n134 Iran Const. art. 4 (1979) translated in Constitutions of the Countries of the World, 18 (Gisbert H. Flanz

ed., Oceana Publications, Inc. 1992); Law. Committee, supra note 12, at 8.

n135 Law. Committee, supra note 12, at 8. See Maududi, supra note 108, at 23-24 (detailing rights of citi-

zens in an Islamic state as emanating from the Qur'an).


n137 See id.

n138 Id.

n139 Engineer, supra note 85, at 13. The judiciary derives its authority from the Shari'ah. Abul A'La

Mawdudi, Human Rights in Islam 13 (1986).

n140 Qur'an 24:31; Engineer, supra note 85, at 14.

n141 See Hum. Rts. Watch 1990, supra note 27, at 441.

n142 See generally Mohammad Talaat al Ghunaimi, The Muslim Conception of International Law and the

Western Approach 1-5 (1968).

n143 Mawdudi, supra note 139, at 11.

n144 Id. at 15.

n145 Id.




n148 Rafsanjani News Conference (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Feb. 2, 1993), available in

LEXIS, News Library, NON-US File. While "Western" and "universal" are not necessarily synonymous, they

are used interchangeably by the Iranian government since the government sees universalism as a Western con-

cept. See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 13, at 117-18 (depicting Iranian characterization of the United States as an en-

emy of Islam).

n149 Rafsanjani News Conference, supra note 148.

n150 Mawdudi, supra note 139, at 11-12.

n151 U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 31. While Iran's Constitution calls for the separation of governmental

powers, President Rafsanjani controlled the process of selecting candidates for the most recent Majlis election.

Hum. Rts. Watch 1992, supra note 102, at 300.

n152 U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 31.

n153 The Council of Guardians, composed of Shi'a clerics who enforce compliance with the Constitution,

ensures that the government consistently applies one ideology. Arjomand, supra note 11, at 91.


n155 Kim, supra note 9, at 58-59.

n156 Iran Says Team in Geneva to Refute U.N. Report (Reuters World Service, Feb. 21, 1994), available in

LEXIS, MDEAFR Library, ALLMDE File.

n157 Khomeyni on the Objectives of the Superpowers (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Sept. 8, 1983),

available in LEXIS, MDEAFR Library, BBCSWB File.

n158 Id.

n159 Id.

n160 French Socialism "Responsible for Crimes Committed in Iran" (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,

March 3, 1982), available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File.

n161 Id.

n162 Wrobel Testimony, supra note 69.



n164 Id.

n165 U.N. Commission Accuses Iran of Flagrant Human Rights Abuses, Agence France Presse, March 9,

1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, NON-US File.


n167 While the "Voice of America," for example, is also a mouthpiece of the West, Iran forbids other opin-

ions, unlike the West. Interview with Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Professor of Law at Emory University

School of Law, Atlanta, Ga. (Jan. 30, 1996) [hereinafter An-Na'im Interview].

n168 Amnesty International, supra note 31, at 120; Wrobel Testimony, supra note 69, at 11.



n171 Melanie Oliviero, Human Needs and Human Rights: Which Are More Fundamental?, 40 Emory L.J.

911, 923 (1991). For example, it is commonly accepted that sanctions worked in South Africa. It is important

that the international community draw lessons from South Africa to determine what factors enable sanctions to

work. Two differences between South Africa and Iran may help explain why they worked in South Africa but

not in Iran. First, the abuses in South Africa were visible and heinous enough that the international community

unanimously condemned them. International opinion changed from accepting racism to rejecting it, but the in-

ternational community apparently does not yet feel as strongly about women's rights. This may be attributable to

the fact that many African states had black male leaders who could advocate their position, while countries that

deny women human rights do not have female government leaders. Second, several African states were vocal

enough in decrying racism that Western governments could not ignore the situation. The African states made the

political stakes high enough that Western states were forced to act. Apparently, the political stakes are not high

enough to force Western governments to eradicate human rights abuses against women. While these are possible

reasons why sanctions worked for South Africa but not Iran, the issue warrants further study. An-Na'im Inter-

view, supra note 167. See also International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals 365-69, 811-84

(Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston eds., 1996).



n174 Id. at 444-45.

n175 Id. at 444. This loan coincided with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, when Iran's potential as a U.S. ally

against Iraq became apparent. Id.

n176 Id.



n178 The one year improvement in human rights roughly coincided with Ayatollah Khomeini's death and

President Rafsanjani's Presidency, and ended with the results of the Parliamentary elections. Hum. Rts. Watch

1992, supra note 102, at 300-01.

n179 Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs John Shattuck, Violations of

Women's Human Rights, Statement Before the Subcommittee on International Security, International Organiza-

tions, and Human Rights of the House Foreign Affairs Committee (Sept. 29, 1993), in Dispatch (U.S. Dep't of

State/Bureau of Public Affairs, Wash., D.C.), Oct. 11, 1993, at 708-10 [hereinafter Shattuck Remarks].

n180 Id. at 708.

n181 Id.

n182 See U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 31. While the Department of State report includes a section that fo-

cuses exclusively on women's rights, its other sections fail to analyze thoroughly the effect of human rights

abuses on women. For example, the report includes a section on freedom of movement in Iran, but it only dis-

cusses the impact on men and religious minorities with no mention of women's severe travel restrictions. How-

ever, the section addressing human rights abuses against women is more thorough in the 1995 report than in pre-

vious reports. See id.

n183 Humana, supra note 31, at 350. The United States failure to ratify more human rights treaties can only

be seen as a poor human rights record. Because the United States has not ratified more treaties, its actual human

rights record cannot be verified; it can only claim to have a good record. Furthermore, the United States sees

economic and social rights as a product of civil and political rights, and claims it is not bound by international

human rights standards. Thus, if the United States assumes a relativist standpoint with regard to economic and

social rights because of its capitalist ideology, then Iran can use its Islamic ideology to justify its relativist

standpoint with regard to the rights of women.

n184 The United Nations began a separate women's rights agenda with the U.N. Decade for Women (1976-

1985). Hilkka Peitila & Jeanne Vickers, Making Women Matter: The Role of the United Nations 94 (1990). This

effort corresponds with the inclusion of women's human rights in government and NGO agendas. Within the

United Nations, there are several intergovernmental organs designed to implement the universal human rights

standard, which includes women's human rights. Id. at 96. For example, the U.N. Commission on the Status of

Women ("Women's Commission") monitors and facilitates the implementation of international agreements on

women's rights. Kim, supra note 9, at 77. The Human Rights Commission investigates and acts on complaints of

human rights abuses. Id. The Women's Commission is not as effective as it could be because of limited access to

information obtained from governments and because of weak and non-specific resolutions. Id. The Human

Rights Commission, on the other hand, is more effective because of NGO assistance in issuing specific recom-

mendations. Id. at 78. The United Nations needs to give the Women's Commission the tools necessary to be

more effective, and it needs to hold human rights abuses specifically against women in the same regard as it

does human rights abuses in general. Id. at 79.

n185 The first International Women's Conference was the Mexico City Conference in 1975, and the second

was the Nairobi Conference in 1985.

n186 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 180, U.N.

GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1980) [hereinafter CEDAW]. Since Iran has not

ratified the CEDAW, and the laws expressed within CEDAW are not accepted as customary law, Iran is not

bound by the agreement's terms. For more information about the CEDAW, see Peitila, supra note 184, at 123-25.

For a discussion on the impact of reservations to the CEDAW, see International Law, supra note 1, at 457-59.

See also Rebecca J. Cook, Reservations to the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination


Against Women, 30 Va. J. Int'l L. 643 (1990). The CEDAW is arguably the most important conference concern-

ing the status of women. Pietila, supra note 184, at 123. The CEDAW includes provisions from previous con-

ventions aimed at eliminating discrimination against women, as well as provisions addressing issues not covered

in other conventions. For example, it includes the principle enunciated in the U.N. Charter preamble reaffirming

"faith in fundamental human rights . . . in the equal rights of men and women."

n187 Monitoring has been frustrated in CEDAW member nations. Since Iran is not bound by the CEDAW,

the international community has no authority to monitor Iran's compliance with CEDAW provisions. However,

monitoring other human rights abuses remains a large obstacle in Iran. Hum. Rts. Watch 1995, supra note 80, at

273.


n189 The CEDAW was diluted in order to obtain the requisite number of state ratifications for it to enter

into force. Critics argue that the CEDAW proponents should have pushed harder for a consensus on a conven-

tion. Professor J. D. van der Vyver, Lecture at Emory University School of Law (Sept. 15, 1995).

n190 Shattuck Remarks, supra note 179, at 710.

n191 Critics describe the Iranian government's human rights committee as merely an arm of the govern-

ment. U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 31, at 13. Therefore, it is not likely that human rights issues resolutions will

conform to universalist ideals.

n192 Charles Clover, Battle to Curb Global Baby Boom: World Population Conference, The Daily Tele-

graph, Sept. 5, 1994, at 4, available in LEXIS, MDEAFR Library, ALLMDE File.

n193 U.N. Rights Conference, The Ottowa Citizen, June 29, 1993, available in LEXIS, MDEAFR Library,

ALLMDE File; See Ours By Right: Women's Rights as Human Rights (Joanna Kerr ed., 1993).

n194 Clover, supra note 192.

n195 Id.

n196 Id.

n197 Iran Urges to Consolidate Islamic Positions at ICPD, Xinhua News Agency, Sept. 3, 1994, available in

LEXIS, News Library, NON-US File.

n198 Evelyn Leopold, U.N. Expert Warns Women's Conference on Human Rights, Reuters World Service,

July 29, 1995, available in LEXIS, MDEAFR Library, ALLMDE File.

n199 Islamic Issues; Iranian Delegation Makes Waves, Repels Negative Notions (BBC Summary of World

Broadcasts, Sept. 18, 1995), available in LEXIS, News Library, NONUS File.

n200 Id.


n201 Since the United Nations began the International Women's Conferences in 1975, it has resisted allow-

ing governments to dictate its position. This has been accomplished by incorporating the work of NGOs into

each document. Karin Ryan, Panel Discussion on the Fourth U.N. Conference on Women at Emory University

Law School (Oct. 30, 1995) [hereinafter Ryan Comments]. Documents from the Beijing Conference contain the

product of dialogue started at the Cairo Conference. Dazon Dixon, Panel Discussion on the Fourth U.N. Confer-

ence on Women at Emory University Law School (Oct. 30, 1995) [hereinafter Dixon Comments]. Karin Ryan is

the Assistant Director of the Human Rights Project at The Carter Center in Atlanta, Georgia. Dazon Dixon is the

founder and president of Sisterlove, Atlanta Women's AIDS Project. Karin Ryan and Dazon Dixon attended the

Beijing Conference.


n203 Numerous newspaper and NGO reports indicate continuing widespread human rights abuses in Iran.

See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 31.

n204 Ryan Comments, supra note 201. Some of the most vocal and well-respected NGOs fighting to abolish

human rights abuses against women in Iran include Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Other

NGOs that focus on human rights abuses against women in Iran include the League of Iranian Women, the Or-

ganization of Human Rights and Basic Freedoms in Iran, the Foundation for Iranian Studies, the Organization of

Iranian Women for the Defence of Human Rights and Democracy, Women Living Under Muslim Laws, and the

Sisterhood is Global Institute.

n205 For example, the reports of Amnesty and Human Rights Watch are referenced by members of the in-

ternational community because these organizations are considered NGOs with international stature. See infra

text accompanying notes 209-17.

n206 One example of specialization amongst NGOs is Sisters in Islam, a NGO with a strategic pro-faith

agenda. Amina Wadud-Muhsin, Sisters in Islam: Effective Against All Odds, in Silent Voices 117, 118 (Doug

A. Newsom & Bob J. Carrell eds., 1995).

n207 For example, organizations such as Amnesty and Human Rights Watch make their statistics available

to governments. Since these are reputable organizations, governments can rely on their information in deciding

policy. See infra text accompanying notes 209-17.

n208 For example, at the Beijing Conference, NGOs from the United States advocated progress on issues in

which the U.S. government has declined to take an active role. Dixon Comments, supra note 201.

n209 Hum. Rts. Watch 1990, supra note 27, at 447; Hum. Rts. Watch 1995, supra note 80, at 274-75.


n211 Id.


n213 Id.

n214 Id. at 275.


n215 Amnesty International, Iran: Amnesty International Briefing, cover (1990). Amnesty bases its work on

the UDHR. Id.

n216 Id. at 11.

n217 Id. at 2-3.

n218 Id. at 8.

n219 Iran Const. art. 26, translated in 9 Constitutions of the Countries of the World, 27 (Gisbert H. Flanz

ed., Oceana Publications, Inc. 1992); U. S. Dep't of State, supra note 31.

n220 Voice of Human Rights and Freedom For Iran: Pro-Western Opposition Radio Closes Down (BBC

Summary of World Broadcasts, Oct. 6, 1995), available in LEXIS, News Library, NON-US File.

n221 Wadud-Muhsin, supra note 206, at 132.

n222 See International Law, supra note 1, at 945-62 (presenting positions by legal scholars).

n223 Id. at 950.

n224 Hum. Rts. Watch 1995, supra note 80, at 621-22; Hum. Rts. Watch 1992, supra note 102, at 301; U.S.

Dep't of State, supra note 31; Humana, supra note 31, at 148.

n225 Human Rights Watch, supra note 128, at 120; U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 31.

n226 Human Rights Watch, supra note 128, at 118; U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 31.


n228 The penalty for apostasy is death. Salman Rushdie, who wrote The Satanic Verses, has been in hiding

for seven years since Iran issued a fatwa (death threat). For a reflection on his views of the Iranian government

and his faith since the fatwa, see Salman Rushdie, Trapped Inside a Metaphone, The Gazette (Montreal), Dec.

16, 1991, at B3.

n229 See Paul, supra note 34, at 1057.

n230 See Country's Elite (Org. for Hum. Rts. and Fundamental Freedoms for Iran, Paris, France) Feb. 10,

1995. These academics can seed the grass roots approach.

n231 Hassibi, supra note 98, at 18.

n232 Wadud-Muhsin, supra note 206, at 121.


n233 See supra text accompanying notes 17-19.

n234 See An-Na'im, supra note 83, at 67, 186 (advocating the value of debating ideas to Muslims).


n236 Id.

n237 This is reminiscent of the "separate but equal" argument used by segregationists in response to the

American civil rights movement. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). This argument has been discred-

ited in American civil rights jurisprudence. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

n238 Iran's Khamene'i Addresses Islamic Ideology Conference, supra note 35.

n239 While guaranteed by law, human rights for women were not fully implemented under the Shah. This

indicates that legal reform in Iran is possible because it already happened within Iran's religious and cultural

construct, but the laws must be accompanied by state practice in order to comply with international human rights

standards.


n241 Id.

n242 Id.

n243 Id. at 183.

n244 Id. at 182-83.

n245 Id.

n246 Examples of aspirational human provisions in the Qur'an include the right to life (5:32), taking of life

only through due process of the law (6:151), safety of life (5:32), a basic standard of life (51:12), the right to jus-

tice (5:8), equality of human beings (49:13), protection of honor (49:11, 49:12), and security of private life

(49:12, 24:27). Abul A'la Mawdudi, supra note 139, at 17-25. While Mawdudi is not a shi'i interpreter of the

Qur'an, this interpretation illustrates that the Qur'an can be interpreted to incorporate human rights. Id. It is im-

portant to recognize, however, that these provisions do not necessarily correspond to international human rights

documents. They illustrate that the Qur'an is mindful of aspirational human rights, and that interpretation of a

holy text to further government objectives can be problematic.

n247 Hum. Rts. Watch 1990, supra note 27, at 442-43.

n248 Ann E. Mayer, Islam and Human Rights: Tradition and Politics 13 (1991).

n249 Paul, supra note 34, at 1069.



n251 Oliviero, supra note 171, at 930.

n252 Id.

n253 Qur'an 16:1-5, 18:28; An-Na'im, supra note 83, at 53-54.

n254 See generally Norma Salem, Islam and the Status of Women in Tunisia, in Muslim Women 141, 141-

68 (Freda Hussain ed., 1984). Unfortunately, the overall human rights situation is not as good as universalists

had hoped after Ben Ali persecuted some human rights organizations, despite his verbal commitment to improve

human rights. This Comment does not claim Tunisia is a human rights paradise, but simply shows that the com-

bination of legal reform and NGO activity that this Comment advocates for Iran has improved the situation for

women elsewhere.

n255 In fact, several other Muslim countries have improved their human rights record towards women.

These countries include Somalia, Syria, Morocco, and Iraq. J. Anderson, Law Reform in the Muslim World 34-

85 (1993). While these countries still have serious problems complying with many human rights norms, they

have undertaken reforms with respect to the issues addressed in this Comment. Id.

n256 Kevin Dwyer, Arab Voices: The Human Rights Debate in the Middle East 151, 193 (1991). While the

government cannot claim credit for the work of human rights organizations in Tunisia, it is important to illus-

trate that it is possible to improve human rights without government leadership. This is crucial to understanding

how the hybrid approach to the universalist/relativist debate can succeed in Iran. These groups succeeded in ac-

complishing universalist aims using relativist strategies in order to achieve legitimacy.

n257 Id. at 192-93.

n258 Id. at 154.

n259 Id.; see also An-Na'im, supra note 83, at 44-45 (describing Muslim countries' reinterpretation of the

Shari'ah as an effort to reform Shari'ah inheritance and family law).

n260 Dwyer, supra note 256, at 154.

n261 For example, the Tunisian Law of 1956 that forbade polygamy in any form was a more drastic meas-

ure than similar laws in other countries. An-Na'im, supra note 83, at 45. In addition, Tunisia ratified the

CEDAW, unlike many other nations. It did, however, register many reservations. Mayer, supra note 2, at 178.

n262 See generally Wadud-Muhsin, supra note 206, at 117-38 (describing the methods used by a Malaysian

women's group).

n263 Dwyer, supra note 256, at 194.

n264 Id. at 195-96.

n265 Id. at 196-97.


n266 Id. at 198.

n267 Id. at 200.

n268 Id. at 201. However, the journal is no longer published because of problems faced by the group, many

of which were the result of women's role in society. Id. at 206.

n269 See generally Helen Callaway, Survival and Support: Women's Forms of Political Action, in Women

and Political Conflict 214-30 (Rosemary Ridd & Helen Callaway eds., 1987) (discussing how women as a group

can gain strength in political conflicts).