pakistan’s nuclear future worries beyond war pub832

8/7/2019 PAKISTANS NUCLEAR FUTURE WORRIES BEYOND WAR pub832

1/384

PAKISTANS NUCLEAR FUTURE:WORRIES BEYOND WAR

Henry D. SokolskiEditor

January 2008

This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as denedin Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. As such, it is in the

public domain, and under the provisions of Title 17, UnitedStates Code, Section 105, it may not be copyrighted.

Visit our website for other free publicationdownloadshttp://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/

To rate this publication click here.
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=832http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=832http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/


2/384

ii

*****

The views expressed in this report are those of the authorsand do not necessarily reect the ofcial policy or position of theDepartment of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S.Government. This report is cleared for public release; distributionis unlimited.

*****

Chapter 6 was originally prepared as a report for theInternational Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM). The authors aregrateful to IPFM for allowing a revised version to be submitted tothe journal, Science & Global Security. It appeared in Vol. 14, Nos.2-3, 2006. The authors are happy to acknowledge discussions withFrank von Hippel and Harold Feiveson, and close collaborationwith Alexander Glaser. They wish to thank the Program on Scienceand Global Security for its generous support and hospitality andto note useful comments by the reviewers for Science & GlobalSecurity.

Chapter 7 was originally commissioned by the Henry L.Stimson Center. The views expressed in this chapter do notnecessarily reect those of the Pakistan Nuclear RegulatoryAuthority, the Government of Pakistan, or any organizationunder whose auspices this manuscript was prepared.

*****

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and shouldbe forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. ArmyWar College, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244.

*****

All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications are availableon the SSI homepage for electronic dissemination. Hard copies

of this report also may be ordered from our homepage. SSIshomepage address is: www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.


3/384

iii

*****

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mailnewsletter to update the national security community on theresearch of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, andupcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletteralso provides a strategic commentary by one of our researchanalysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, pleasesubscribe on our homepage at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/newsletter/.

ISBN 1-58487-333-7


4/384


5/384

v

CONTENTS

Foreword......................................................................vii

1. Pakistans Nuclear Woes Henry D. Sokolski ...............................................1

I: ISLAMABADS PROLIFERATINGPAST .........................................................................11

2. Kahns Nuclear Exports: Was Therea State Strategy?

Bruno Tertrais....................................................13

3. Could Anything Be Done to Stop Them?Lessons from Pakistans Proliferating Past

George Perkovich................................................59

II: MAINTAINING SOUTHWEST ASIANDETERRENCE ......................................................85

4. Pakistans Minimum Deterrent NuclearForce Requirements

Gregory S. Jones.................................................87

5. Islamabads Nuclear Posture: Its Premisesand Implementation

Peter R. Lavoy..................................................129

6. Fissile Materials in South Asiaand the Implicationsof the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal

Zia Mian, A. H. Nayyar, R. Rajaraman,and M. V. Ramana...........................................167


6/384


7/384

vii

FOREWORD

This volume was completed just before PakistaniPresident Musharraf imposed a state of emergency inNovember 2007. The political turmoil that followedraised concerns that Pakistans nuclear assets might bevulnerable to diversion or misuse. This book, whichconsists of research that the Nonproliferation PolicyEducation Center (NPEC) commissioned and vettedin 2006 and 2007, details precisely what these worriesmight be.

Dr. Ashley Tellis of the Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace and Dr. Peter Lavoy, now theNational Intelligence Ofcer for Southwest Asia at theNational Intelligence Council, were instrumental inthe selection of authors as well as producing originalresearch. Thanks is also due to Ali Naqvi and Tamara

Mitchell of NPECs staff who helped organize theworkshop at which the books contents were discussedand who helped prepare the book manuscript. Finally,special thanks is due to Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., Ms. Marianne Cowling, and Ms. Rita Rummel ofthe Strategic Studies Institute (SSI). This is the ninthin a series of edited volumes NPEC has produced withSSI. To the books authors and all who made this bookpossible, NPEC is indebted.

Henry SokolskiExecutive Director

The Nonproliferation PolicyEducation Center


8/384

1

CHAPTER 1

PAKISTANS NUCLEAR WOES

Henry D. Sokolski

Raise the issue of Pakistans nuclear program beforealmost any group of Western security analysts, andthey are likely to throw up their hands. What mighthappen if the current Pakistani government is takenover by radicalized political forces sympathetic to theTaliban? Such a government, they fear, might sharePakistans nuclear weapons materials and know-howwith others, including terrorist organizations. Thenthere is the possibility that a more radical governmentmight pick a war again with India. Could Pakistanprevail against Indias superior conventional forces

without threatening to resort to nuclear arms? If not,what, if anything, might persuade Pakistan to standits nuclear forces down? There are no good answers tothese questions and even fewer near or mid-term xesagainst such contingencies. This, in turn, encourages akind of policy fatalism with regard to Pakistan.

This book, which reects research that theNonproliferation Policy Education Center commis-sioned over the last 2 years, takes a different tack.Instead of asking questions that have few or no goodanswers, this volume tries to characterize specicnuclear problems that the ruling Pakistani governmentfaces with the aim of establishing a base line set ofchallenges for remedial action. Its point of departure isto consider what nuclear challenges Pakistan will face

if moderate forces remain in control of the governmentand no hot war breaks out against India. A secondvolume of commissioned research planned for


9/384

2

publication in 2008 will consider how best to addressthese challenges.

What proliferation risks might the current gov-ernment still be tempted to take? What is requiredof Pakistan to maintain nuclear deterrence withIndia? What new vulnerabilities will the expansion ofPakistans civilian nuclear sector require Islamabadto attend to? Finally, how daunting a task might it beto keep Pakistans nuclear weapons assets from beingseized or to take them back after having been seized?Each of these questions is tackled in the chapters thatfollow.

Along the way, a number of interesting discoveriesare made. First, from the historical analyses done byBruno Tetrais and George Perkovich, we learn thatdespite the signicant nuclear export control effortsof the current Pakistani government, it might well

proliferate again. Why? The same reasons that previousPakistani governments tolerated and, at times, evensanctioned the nuclear-rocket export-import activitiesof Dr. A. Q. Khan: Perceived strategic abandonmentby the United States, lack of nancing for its ownstrategic competition against India, insufcient civilianoversight of a politically inuential military andintelligence services, and a perceived need to deectnegative international attention from Pakistan to thirdcountries. (See Table 1 at the end of this chapter for ahistorical review.)

One or more of these factors were in play throughoutthe last 3 decades. Two still are. Certainly, the UnitedStates has done all it can to reassure Pakistani ofcialsabout Washingtons commitment to Pakistans

security. Yet, there still is Pakistani cause for concern.Might Washington tie future security and economicassistance to Pakistani progress toward democraticelections and cracking down more severely against


10/384

3

radical Islamic groups in Pakistan? As for the matter ofbeing isolated, Pakistan now has to be concerned not

just about maintaining good relations with Washington,but somehow fending off the encircling efforts ofIndia. Most recently, these activities included formalmilitary-to-military ties with Iran; the construction ofa major naval port at Chahbahar near Pakistans ownnew naval base at Gwador; the joint construction withIran of roads to Afghanistan (and Indian aid effortsto Afghanistan); the stationing of Indian intelligenceofcers at Zahedan, Iran close to Baluchistan rebelactivities in Pakistan; the creation of an Indian air basein Tajikistan; Indian energy investments and commercewith Iran and countries in the Gulf; and continuedIndian military, nuclear, and rocket enhancements. Allof these developments have put Pakistans militaryand political ofcials on edge.

As for oversight of the military and intelligenceservices, this remains an open question. The electionsmay give some indication of things to come, but for nowthe military and intelligence arms of the governmentare still in clear control of much of Pakistans political,military, and economic activities. A new presidentmay try to reduce the amount of power the militaryand intelligence sectors have over Pakistan but this is along-term undertaking.

This, then, brings us to an enduring nuclearchallenge Pakistan faces no matter who is runningthe government: What must Pakistans military doto deter nuclear war against India? Greg Jones ofRAND, Peter Lavoy, and Zia Mian and his coauthorsall have different takes on what will be required. Mr.

Jones takes a somewhat optimistic view. Pakistan andIndia currently have roughly the right level of forcesand are unlikely to increase them dramatically for the


11/384

4

next 20 years. Pakistans nuclear force requirementswould have to grow dramatically, Mr. Jones notes,

merely to destroy just 5 percent of Indias population(This would require a ve-fold increase in Pakistanscurrent nuclear force.) or only a relatively smallportion of Indias conventional forces (a task whichwould require a doubling of Pakistans current nuclearforces). Enlarging Pakistans forces to these levels, heargues, would be quite costly. Using history as a guide,Mr. Jones argues that India, meanwhile, seems unlikelyto press Pakistan by building up its nuclear forces.

Perhaps, but others are not so certain. In hischapter, Islamabads Nuclear Posture: Its Premisesand Implementation, Dr. Peter Lavoy notes that theprospect of the U.S. and Indian strategic partnershipshifting the strategic balance announced in 2005set off a series of nuclear alarms in Islamabad. The rst

of these fears is that India, with U.S. high-technologytargeting and intelligence assistance, might knockout Pakistans nuclear assets in a preventativeattack. This, in turn, has already prompted PakistansNational Command Authority to announce that if thenuclear deal alters the nuclear balance, the commandwould have to reevaluate Pakistans commitment tominimum deterrence and to review its nuclear forcerequirements. This, in turn, will require making Pakis-tans nuclear weapons assets even more survivablethrough increased mobility, hardening, and numbers.The second Pakistani worry is much more basic: TheU.S.-India nuclear deal could enable India to outstripPakistans capacity to make nuclear weapons.

How likely is this? The short answer is very. A much

more detailed analysis can be found in the chapterby Zia Mian, A. H. Nayyar, R. Rajaraman, and M. V.Ramana entitled, Fissile Materials in South Asia and


12/384

5

the Implications of the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal. Herethe authors detail how critical the import of additional

uranium fuel might be to expand Indias ability to makemore nuclear weapons while expanding its nuclearpower industry. The authors also cite one Indian expertwho suggests that India will attempt to build roughly400 nuclear warheadsat least four times what thePakistanis currently possess. Matching this numberand controlling the nuclear system deployments thatmight be made would demand a good deal of Pakistansgovernment and nuclear establishment. So far, thePakistani government has hedged its bets againstthis contingency by beginning construction of a newplutonium production reactor and a new reprocessingplant.

Beyond this, Pakistan has announced plans toexpand its own civilian nuclear power sector roughly

20-fold by the year 2030 to 8.8 gigawatts generatingcapacity. The idea would be to have a nuclear weapons-making mobilization base that could be used to makepower if India did not make more weapons. Thishedging strategy seems to be reasonably cautious. It,however, cannot be implemented without runningseveral important attendant risks.

Besides being uncompetitive against non-nuclearenergy alternatives, such a nuclear buildup is likely toincrease the vulnerability of Pakistans civilian reactorsector to sabotage and attack. The good news is thatthe Pakistani government understands this point. Inhis detailed analysis, Preventing Nuclear Terrorismin Pakistan, Abdul Mannan, a senior ofcial servingin Pakistans nuclear regulatory agency, details the

ramications of a terrorist attack against Pakistanscivilian nuclear sector. Mr. Mannan believes attacksagainst Pakistans nuclear facilities are far less likely


13/384

6

to inict damage than a possible attack against spentfuel that is likely to be shipped from Pakistans power

reactors to Pakistans reprocessing plant. Fortunately,such attacks, even in or near Karachi, are unlikely toproduce many fatalities. Unfortunately, they couldcontaminate a considerable amount of property, andwill require the decontamination and quarantiningof large numbers of people. To cope with thesecontingencies, Mr. Mannan calls for the establishmentof an extensive list of civil defense measures to be taken.He is optimistic that Pakistan can take these steps toassure nuclear powers safe expansion.

Dr. Chaim Braun of Stanfords Center forInternational Security and Cooperation, though, isnot so sure. In his analysis, Security Issues Relatedto Pakistans Future Nuclear Power Program, Dr.Braun examines Pakistans nuclear reactor operating

history, its ability to license new reactors and regulatetheir operation properly, to train sufcient numbersof new qualied nuclear operators and regulators forthe planned expansion of Pakistans nuclear powersector, and to screen this new staff to assure nonehave terrorist organization ties. His nal assessment istroubling. Pakistan, he fears, will have great difcultyavoiding a major nuclear accident or terrorist-inducedsabotage, as well as defending the planned number ofcivilian facilities against military attacks. Among hiskey concerns is Pakistans current lack of qualied andsecurity-screened nuclear personnel. To staff up forthe planned nuclear reactor expansion, he estimatesthat Pakistan will need to nd and train 1,000 qualiednuclear regulators and operators per year over the next

20 years. Dr. Braun also believes that Pakistans nuclearexpansion will create a large number of temptingterrorist targetsspent fuel pondsall of which couldbe vulnerable to terrorist or military attacks.
http://www.npec-web.org/Essays/20060605-Braun-SecurityIssuesPakistan.pdfhttp://www.npec-web.org/Essays/20060605-Braun-SecurityIssuesPakistan.pdfhttp://www.npec-web.org/Essays/20060605-Braun-SecurityIssuesPakistan.pdfhttp://www.npec-web.org/Essays/20060605-Braun-SecurityIssuesPakistan.pdf


14/384

7

This, then, suggests one of the most sensitivechallenges an expanded nuclear program in Pakistan

presentsthe possible seizure of the plants bysubnational groups and the need to take them backby force, if necessary. Thomas Donnelly examines thisissue in his analysis, Bad Options. What we learn isthat even in the case where the Pakistani governmentinvites U.S. forces to help it to retake the most sensitivePakistani nuclear facilities at Kahuta, the logistics andmilitary challenges facing U.S. and Pakistani forces areextremely daunting. Besides the logistical challengesof landing a large enough force to retake the city-sizedcomplex at Kahuta, the expeditionary force wouldhave to be prepared to ght its way through a singleaccess road and move quickly enough to assure nomaterial was passed off to terrorist organizations orother opposing groups. Assuming success and taking

control of the facility, many questions would remain.Is all the nuclear material that could be fashioned intobombs accounted for? How could we know? Wouldthe United States hand the material it had secured backto the Pakistani government immediately or hold intrust until the dust of civil disorder had settled? If so,would we render it safe and what might this mean?To get the answers to these questions, Mr. Donnellystrongly recommends that the government of Pakistanand the United States work together closely on theseissues now.

What is the upshot of all of this analysis? Onebottom line is that the government of Pakistan hasits hands full with more than enough nuclear issueseven if it never goes to war against India, is attacked

by Indian forces, or is overthrown by radical Islamicparties. Certainly, to deal with all of the nuclear issuesthese analyses have raised, one would need to have a


15/384

8

fairly robust and active national government capableof mastering nuclear regulation, nuclear physical

security, emergency preparedness, peacetime militarystrategic planning, energy research and development,and electrical system planning. It is most unlikely thatsuch a government would be the kind that could beoverthrown or destabilized very easily.

This insight brings us to the second series of studiesto be commissioned on Pakistans nuclear future. Thesewill focus on what can be done to reduce Pakistansneed to expand its civilian nuclear sector. On the onehand, what can be done with India and China to reducePakistans justied fears that India will expand its ownnuclear stockpile? Could more be done to addressPakistans energy needs in a more cost effective mannerwithout building additional nuclear generators? Howmight India and Pakistan cooperate in promoting less

nuclear powered futures for both their countries andone in which the nuclear physical security threats arekept to a minimum for both countries? More generally,what can be done to reduce Pakistani fears of beingencircled or overwhelmed by Indian conventionalforces (the key propellants for possible futureproliferation, nuclear buildups, and war)? What mightbe done to reduce the most likely escalation threats?Finally, what might be done to pacify Pakistani politicsso that greater mutual condence could be built withIndia? These questions will serve as the basis for thenext volume.


16/384

9

Pres

iden

t

Prime

Minister

Chiefo

fArmy

Staff

PAEC

/

KRL

Even

ts

1987

Ziaul-Haq

MuhammadKhanJunejo

Ziaul-Haq

(MABegasVCoAS)

MAKhan

/AQKhan

AQKhanvisittoIran(Jan.)

Iran-PakistanmeetinginDubai

Iran-Pakistancooperationagreement

1988

Ziaul-Haq(J

anuary1toAugust17)

GhulamIshaqKhan(August17to

December31)

MuhammadKhanJunejo(January1toMay29)

Ziaul-Haq(June9toAugust17)

BenazirBhutto(December2toDecember31)

Ziaul-Haq(January1toAugust17)

MirzaAslamBeg(August17to

December31)

MAKhan

/AQKhan

1989

GhulamIshaqKhan

BenazirBhutto

MirzaAslamBeg

MAKhan

/AQKhan

1990

GhulamIshaqKhan

BenazirBhuttto(January1toAugust6)

GhulamMu

stafaJatoi(August6toNovember6)

NawazSha

rif(November6toDecember31)

MirzaAslamBeg

MAKhan

/AQKhan

AQKhanoffertoIraq

Presslersanctions(Oct.)

1991

GhulamIshaqKhan

NawazSha

rif

MirzaAslamBeg(Januray1toAugust

16)AsifNawazJanjua(August16to

December31)

Iran-Pakistanmeeting

AQKhanvisittoIran

1992

GhulamIshaqKhan

NawazSha

rif

AsifNawazJanjua

AQKhanvisittoIran

1993

GhulamIshaqKhan(January1to

July17)

WasimSajjad(July17toNovember14)

FarooqLeghari(November14to

December31)

NawazSha

rif(January1toApril18)

BalakhShe

r(April18toMay26)

NawazSha

rif(May26toJuly18)

MoinQures

hi(July18toOctober19)

BenazirBhutto(October19toDecember31)

AsifNawazJanjua(January1to

January8)

AbdulWahidKakar(January8to

December31)

SecondroundofIran-Pakistannegotiations(Fall)

BhuttodealwithNorthKorea(Dec.)

1994

FarooqLeghari

BenazirBhutto

AbdulWahidKakar

SecondnegotiationbetweenIranandtheAQKhan

network

1995

FarooqLeghari

BenazirBhutto

AbdulWahidKakar

FirstAQKhanmeetingwithLibya

1996

FarooqLeghari

BenazirBhutto(January1toNovember5)

MirajKhalid

(November5toDecember31)

AbdulWahidKakar(January1to

December1)

JehangirKaramat(December1to

December31)

Possiblenukesformissile

sdealwithNorthKorea

Ta

ble1

.Pa

kistan

iLea

ders

hipan

dNuc

lear

Exports

,1987

-2002

.


17/384

10

Pres

iden

t

Pr

ime

Minister

Chiefo

fArmy

Staff

PAEC

/

KRL

Even

ts

1997

FarooqLeghari(January1to

December2)

WasimSajjad(December2to

December31)

MirajKhalid

(January1toFebruary17)

NawazSha

rif(February17toOctober12)

JehangirKaramat

Libya-PakistanmeetinginIstanbul

AQKhanvisittoLibya

ShipmenttoLibya

KaramatvisittoDPRK

1998

MuhammadRafqTarar

NawazSha

rif

JehangirKaramat(January1to

October7)

PervezMusharraf(October7to

December31)

1999

MuhammadRafqTarar

NawazSha

rif(January1toOctober12)

PervezMusharraf(October12toDecember31as

ChiefExecutive)

PervezMusharraf

AQKhanvisittoNorthKorea

2000

PervezMusharraf

PervezMusharraf

FinaldealwithLibya

ShipmenttoLibya

2001

ShipmenttoLibya

2002

ShipmenttoLibya(includin

gweapondesign?)

AQKhanvisittoNorthKorea

Ta

ble1

.Pa

kistan

iLea

ders

hipan

dNuc

lear

Exports

,1987

-2002(conc

lude

d).


18/384

11

PART I:

ISLAMABADS PROLIFERATING PAST


19/384


20/384


21/384

14

with each other. It was a real family business. Thoseincluded:

1. Buhary Syed Abu Tahir, a Sri Lankan national.He was, so to say, the chief operating ofcer of theexports network. His involvement started in the secondpart of the 1980s.4 His headquarters was the Dubai-based rm, SMB Computers.

2. S. M. Farouq, an India-born businessman basedin Dubai (and Tahirs uncle), who made the initialcontacts with Iran and was also involved in the Libyadeal.5

3. Heinz Mebus, a German businessman and collegeclassmate of Khan, who was also involved in the earlydeals with Iran.6

4. Peter Grifn, a British national who designed theLibyan Machine Shop 1001. He imported machinesfrom Spain and other European countries for that

project.7

5. Paul Grifn, Peters son, who operated GulfTechnical Industries, one of the main Dubai-basedfront companies.8

6. Urs Tinner, a Swiss national and long-timeassociate of Khan, who oversaw the production ofcentrifuge parts in Malaysia as a consultant until2003.

7. Friedrich Tinner (Urss father, president of theSwiss rm CETEC).

8. Marco Tinner (Urss brother, president of theSwiss rm Traco). Both Friedrich and Marco wereinvolved in the Iran and Libya enterprises. Their rolewas essentially to buy components from Europe.

9. Gotthard Lerch, another long-time associate, a

German national who has been described as Tahirsmain contractor.Involved in both the Iran and Libyacases, he was, in particular, in charge of the SouthAfrican node.9


22/384

15

10. Gerhard Wisser, a German mechanical engineerand an old acquaintance of Lerch, who involved him in

the Libya operation. Wisser in turned involved DanielGeiges (a Swiss mechanical engineer who worked inhis company, Krisch Engineering) and Johan Meyer (aSouth African engineer).10

11. Mohammed Farooq, a KRL ofcial in charge ofprocurement and sales abroad.11

The main companies reportedly involved incentrifuge exports were Khan Research Laboratories(Pakistan), which provided ring magnets, aluminiumand maraging steel, ow-forming and balancingequipment, vacuum pumps, noncorrosive pipes andvalves, end-caps and bafes, and power supply; ScomiPrecision Engineering (Malaysia), which providedaluminium and maraging steel, end-caps and bafes;SMB Computers (UAE) which provided noncorrosive

pipes and valves, end-caps and bafes, and powersupply; ETI Elektroteknik (Turkey), which providedaluminium and maraging steel, power supply; andTrade Fin (South Africa) which provided ow-formingand balancing equipment, vacuum pumps, non-corrosive pipes and valves.12 Other companies involvedincluded Bikar Mettale Asia (Singapore), HanbandoBalance Inc. (South Korea), Krisch Engineering (SouthAfrica), CETEC (Switzerland), Traco (Switzerland), andEKA (Turkey).13 Equipment for Libya was imported bythe Tinner family from Spain (vacuum pumps, ow-forming machines), Italy (special furnaces), France, theUnited Kingdom and Taiwan (machine-tools), as wellas Japan (a 3-D measuring tool).14

As will be seen, however, there is evidence that

high-level political and military leaders were alsoinvolved in nuclear exports. This occurred despite thewritten assurances given twice to the United States(rst by Zia ul-Haq in November 1984, then in October


23/384

16

1990 by president Ghulam Ishaq Khan) and countlessofcial statements testifying to the immaculate state of

Pakistans proliferation record.Thus, the network was not a Wal-Mart, as

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) DirectorGeneral Mohammed El-Baradei wrongly characterizedit. Rather, it was an Import-Export Enterprise. Fromthe initial import-oriented network under the directionof M. A. Khan, a separate, export-oriented branchdeveloped under the direction of A. Q. Khan startingin the mid-1980s. In the late 1990s, it became moredecentralized as A. Q. Khan realized he was undersurveillance. It became a privatized subsidiary of theimports network.

The story cannot be reduced to the simple reversalof the ow described by some. However, there wereclear links between the import and export networks.

Some of the components that A. Q. Khan exported werealso components he needed for the national program;thus, starting in the mid-1980s, he reportedly began toorder more components than necessary for the nationalprogram.15

Also, several key individuals involved in Pakistaniexports were also involved in the imports. MohammedFarooq, A. Q. Khans principal deputy, was reportedlyin charge of overseas procurement for KRL.16 Otherswere long-time associates, whom he had met in the1960s and 1970s. They included Peter Grifn (who wasinvolved in early imports of inverters from the UK);Gotthard Lerch (who used to work at Leybold Heraeus,which was to become a key contractor of Pakistan); OttoHeilingbrunner (same); Henk Slebos (who studied with

A. Q. Khan, used to work at Explosive Metal WorksHolland, and sold various equipment to Pakistan overthe years, including bottom bearings in 2001 which


24/384

17

were probably meant for Iran or Libya); FriedrichTinner (who used to work at Vacuum Apparate

Technik, a rm which sold equipment to Pakistan inthe 1970s); and Heinz Mebus (who was involved in therst centrifuge transfers to Iran in the mid-1980s).

Other elements of commonality exist betweenthe two networks. Tactics designed to fool Westernexports controls were learned for imports and used forexports. States such as the UAE and Turkey were majorplatforms for both imports and exports. And the Bankof Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) was, itseems, one of the conduits used (until its demise in1991) for payments made to Pakistani ofcials.17

Iran.

The issue of transfers to Iran is complex. To this day,

it remains difcult to tell the exact degree of implicationof the various Pakistani centres of power in decisionsrelated to the sharing of nuclear technologies withTehran. One individual played a central role: MirzaAslam Beg, Vice Chief of Army Staff (VCoAS, 1987-88), then CoAS from August 1988 until August 1991.18There seem to have been three different phases.

Phase 1: 1986-88. First, beginning in 1986 there wasa period of limited cooperation probably approvedby general Zia-ul-Haq himself. In November 1986,the Pakistani press reported that Zia had answeredfavorably to an Iranian request for nuclear cooperation.19A secret bilateral agreement was signed between thePakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) and itsIranian counterpart in 1987, which provided inter alia

for the training of Iranian scientists.20 A. Q. Khansdealings with Iran started at the same time. He mayhave visited Iran as early as January 1987.21 Later


25/384


26/384

19

Beg and President Khan when they abruptly came topower after Zias death in August 1988. According

to a Pakistani account, A. Q. Khans rst move whenBenazir Bhutto came to power (December 1988) was toask her to make him PAEC director; when she refused,he chose to place his loyalty with Beg and G. I. Khan.27

General Beg came back from a February 1990 visitto Iran with assurances from Tehran regarding supportfor Pakistan about Kashmir.28 He has mentioned anIranian request for the bomb made in Islamabadthat same year.29 He has consistently denied havingapproved such transfers, but has conrmed the scopeof nuclear discussions between Tehran and Islamabadat the time. According to him, the contacts had beenmade at Irans initiative; he and Benazir Bhutto(who remained Prime minister until August 1990)were playing ping-pong with their interlocutors,

constantly telling them to go and see the other party.30

A former U.S. administration ofcial, Henry Rowen,says that Beg threatened in January 1990 to transfermilitary usage nuclear technology should Washingtonstop arms sales to Pakistan.31 A. Q. Khan himself saysthat the transfers were explicitly authorized by Beg. 32

There is evidence that Benazir Bhuttos governmentknew about this cooperation. She was told in 1989 byHashemi Rafsandjani that the Pakistani military hadoffered nuclear technology to Iran, and that Rafsandjaniwanted her approvalwhich she says she did not give.33(According to Beg, she told him that the Iranians hadoffered four billion dollars for nuclear technology.34) A.Q. Khan says that the transfers were in fact encouragedby the military adviser to Mrs. Bhutto, General Imtiaz

Ali.35 And one meeting in Karachi between Khan andthe Iranians reportedly took place at the request ofanother Bhutto adviser.36 Mrs. Bhutto says that by 1989


27/384

20

she had made her way into the inner circle of nucleardecisionmaking.37 She had been extensively briefed on

her own countrys program by the U.S. administrationduring her June 1989 visit to Washington.38 (FormerU.S. Ambassador Dennis Kux conrms that she wasprobably in the loop until early 1990.39) In fact, herknowledge of nuclear transfers may also have been afactor in her dismissal. She was pressed hard by theUnited States about Pakistans nuclear program. In thesummer of 1990, she became seen as a problem, and A.Q. Khan reportedly asked Beg for her sacking.40 Thus,even though there is no evidence that Mrs. Bhuttoapproved any transfer, she was aware of Iran-Pakistandiscussions; and some of her advisers may have giventhe nod to Beg and Khan.

Phase three: 1991-95. In a third phase, the twocountries seem to have begun a closer cooperation, in

line with a growing convergence of interests.Two events changed Pakistani perspective. One was

the invasion of Kuwait. The other was the impositionof U.S. sanctions under the Pressler amendment, whichbecame inevitable on October 1, as U.S. PresidentGeorge Bush refused to certify that Pakistan did nothave a military program.

An Iranian-Pakistani nuclear cooperation wascoherent with General Begs strategic choices. Beginitially approved Pakistans participation in thecoalition against Iraq; but by the end of 1990, hechanged his mind and made it public in late January1991.41 He actively sought a partnertship with Iranin order to protect both countries against the UnitedStates.42 (He ended up grudgingly accepting Pakistani

participation in the coalition as long as it was limitedto the defense of Saudi Arabia.) Political reasons werenot the only ones at play. General Beg and others


28/384

21

thought it was a good way to nance the defensebudget and Interservice Intelligence (ISI) operations in

Afghanistan and Kashmir, especially in light of comingU.S. sanctions. Several former ofcials of NawazSharifs rst government (November 1990-July 1993)have separately conrmed that in 1991, General Begtried to convince Mr. Sharif to undertake large-scalenuclear cooperation with Iran.43

There were indeed high-level contacts to that effectbetween the two governments during 1991. Envoys ofHashemi Rafsanjani (including Mohsen Rezai, headof the Pasdarans from 1981 until 1987) visited Sharifin February and July 1991. Pakistani authorities haveconrmed that Beg was involved in transfers to Iranin 1991.44 In November 1991, general Asif Nawaz (whohad succeeded Beg in August) went himself to Tehran;meanwhile, Beijing reportedly gave its blessing to

Iran-Pakistan cooperation.45

General Beg himself hasconrmed that contacts with Iran continued afterBenazir Bhuttos departure in August 1990.46

It is difcult to know with certainty what becameof these projects. Some claim that Pakistan and Irandid agree on nuclear cooperation and discussed thepossibility of a mutual defense treaty.47 Accordingto Beg, an agreement was indeed reached in 1991for nuclear cooperation in return for conventionalweapons and oil.48 However, several sources havestated that the Pakistani political authorities refused togo ahead. One claims that president G. I. Khan soughtSharifs approval for the deal; when he refused, thedeal was abandoned.49 According to U.S. AmbassadorRobert Oakley, Nawaz Sharif and G. I. Khan told

Rafsanjani that Pakistan would not implement the 1991agreement.50


29/384


30/384

23

network?57 Given the similarities between the PakistaniKhushab reactor and the planned Iranian Arak reactor,

was there any Pakistani help involved?

Iraq.

Available sources indicate that the initial contactwith Iraq was made just a few weeks after the invasionof Kuwait. A note from the Iraqi intelligence services,dated October 6, reports that A. Q. Khan was ready tohelp Baghdad to establish a project to enrich uraniumand manufacture a nuclear weapon. It reported thatA. Q. Khan was prepared to give Iraq project designsfor a nuclear bomb. Equipment was to be transferredfrom European companies to Iraq via a Dubai-basedcompany.58 The Iraqi government, however, fearedthat it was a sting operation.59

Such a gesture would have been consistent withGeneral M. A. Begs opposition to Pakistani participationin the international coalition (an opposition he beganto express at the end of 1990). At the same time,however, if Beg was keen to help Iran, it would havebeen illogical for him to support the development of anIraqi bomb at the same time. Helping Saddam Hussein,Irans mortal enemy, to get nuclear weapons mighthave been consistent with Begs political preferences (astaunch opponent of U.S. inuence in the region), butcompletely at odds with his personal culture (a Shiawith strong admiration for Iran).

North Korea.

The Pakistan-North Korea strategic connectionwas established as early as in 1971, when Z. A. Bhuttomade Pyongyang a major source of conventional


31/384

24

arms procurement. The Iraq-Iran war cementedthe partnership between the two countries, both of

which aided Tehrans missile program.60

Accordingto Indian sources, Pakistan and North Korea begantheir missile and nuclear cooperation in 1988.61 Mostsources agree, however, that the nuclear side of thebilateral cooperation began only around 1993. Adefense cooperation package was agreed upon at theoccasion of Benazir Bhuttos December 1993 visit toPyongyang.62 A. Q. Khan seems to have paved theway for Bhuttos visit. He and the military involvedBenazir Bhutto for the missile deal, because of the goodrelations of her father with North Korea.63 A. Q. Khantravelled extensively to North Korea. He was given atour of Pyongyangs nuclear facilities in 1999.64 Thatsame year, Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea(DPRK) experts were seen visiting the Khan Research

Laboratories (KRL).65

But the extent of his personalinitiative in the matter of nuclear transfers remainsopen to question. It is possible that he felt that he wascovered by the military authorities because of the Iranprecedent. In any case, it seems likely that the militaryknew about the nuclear exports. General JehangirKaramat (CoAS from 1996 to 1998, and ambassadorto the United States until 2006) seem to have played asignicant role in the DPRK-Pakistan connection.66 It isalso possible that the DPRK sometimes would serve asa conduit for Chinese assistance to Pakistan.

The usual explanation of what happened with NorthKorea is that it was a quid pro quo. This is what theU.S. Government believed in the late 1990s.67 However,the story seems to be more complex. Nuclear exports

seem to have begun much later than missile imports.Benazir Bhutto insists that the North Korean missileswere bought, not exchanged for nuclear technology.68


32/384

25

(Some well-informed analysts insist that the latter werenanced by money and rice.69) Later, the Pakistani

reserve crunch might have prompted Pakistan toturn from cash to nuclear technology in return formissile technology.70 A former aide to Kim Il-Sungstates that this deal was concluded in the summer of1996.71 Centrifuges went to North Korea between 1997and 1999, but other transfers took place until aroundJuly 2002.72 According to an early Musharraf account,probably a dozen centrifuges were sold.73 Mostavailable sources refer to P1 technology, but some havesuggested they may have included P2 centrifuges.74The transfer of P2s was later conrmed by Musharraf,who mentions in his memoirs a total of nearly twodozen centrifuges.75 There are also allegations of abroader cooperation in the nuclear area.76

The missile imports were discovered by the

United States around 1997-98.77

In April 1998, theState Department applied sanctions against KRL. Atabout the same time, Washington also discovered thatIslamabad exported nuclear technology to Pyongyang.78It asked Nawaz Sharif to cease transfers; Sharif madea commitment not to transfer nuclear weapons toPyongyang, but refused to go further.79

Whatever the reality, the most detailed studies aboutthe DPRK-Pakistan ballistic and nuclear relationshiphave refrained from drawing denitive conclusionsabout its nature, especially given the uncertaintiesabout the exact scope of the nuclear relationship.80

Libya.

The nuclear relationship with Libya began in themid-1970s. It is likely that Tripoli nanced Pakistansnuclear program up to several hundred millions of


33/384

26

dollars. During an internal Department of State (DoS)meeting in 1976, one of the participants mentioned an

intelligence report that Libya has agreed to nancethe Pakistani reprocessing project in return for someunspecied future nuclear cooperation.81 However,initial transfers to Libya were limited to knowledgeand expertise through training. This rst phase endedwith the deposition of Z. A. Bhutto. Concrete transferstook place only after the reinvigoration of Libyasprogram in 1995. Contact was made with A. Q. Khanat that time.82

In 1997, Libya received 20 complete L1 centrifuges,and most of the components for another 200. In 2000,it received two complete but second-hand L2centrifuges, as well as two small cylinders of UF6. Inearly 2001, it received one larger cylinder containing 1.7tons of UF6. In late 2001 or early 2002, documentation

on nuclear weapons design, including the Chineseblueprint, was transferred. A. Q. Khan was still directlyin touch with the ofcials in charge of Libyas nuclearprogram in 2002.83 In late 2002, components for a largenumber of L2s began to arrive.84 Libya is probably theonly documented case of Pakistani nuclear exportswhere the expression Wal-Mart (used by IAEADirector El-Baradei) could apply.

There is little evidence of direct involvement ofPakistani authorities in the Libya deal. Some haveeven pointed out that Khan himself was not alwaysinvolved in all transactions. The network, it seems, hadthen taken on a life of its own.85

Saudi Arabia.

There is no hard evidence of Pakistani-Saudicooperation on nuclear issues in the public domain. The


34/384

27

hypothesis of such cooperation rests on a combinationof ample anecdotal evidence and strong political

logic.Saudi nancial support for Pakistans nuclear

program in the 1970s is well-documented (see above).U.S., Israeli, and Saudi sources (including Mohammadal-Khilawi, a diplomat who defected to the United Statesin 1994) reported in the early 1980s that Saudi nancialsupport for the Pakistani program was continuing.86The BCCI may have been one of the conduits used.87This would make the banks a key institution, bothinvolved in imports and exports. Khalid Hassan, aformer adviser to Ali Bhutto, conrmed that SaudiArabia was indeed an essential foreign fundgiver tothe Pakistani program. Nawaz Sharif called PrinceAbdallah for his opinion before giving the go-ahead tothe 1998 tests.88

In 1990, Saudi Arabia was reportedly tempted toget Pakistani nuclear weapons for its CSS-2 missiles.89Islamabad is said to have refused because of thepolitical risks involved.90 In May 1999, Prince Sultan(then defence minister) was the rst-ever foreign leaderto visit Kahuta. A. Q. Khan, for his part, visited SaudiArabia at least twice (November 1999, September2000).91 Saudi leaders have attended Pakistani Ghauritest launches (2002 and 2004).

The nuclear question seems to have been raised anewafter 2001, including in discussions with Islamabad.92Prince Sultan was reportedly given a tour of Pakistaninuclear installations in August 2002.93 President Bushhimself is reported to have included Saudi Arabia ina list of countries of proliferation concerns in January

2003, and Ryad may have begun direct nancing ofKRL around that time.94 According to U.S. ambassadorChas Freeman, in 2003 King Fahd asked for a nuclear


35/384

28

guarantee in case Iran produced the bomb.95 Whateverwas said by Washington, it is doubtful that in the post-

September 11, 2001 (9/11) context Ryad believes it willalways be protected by the United States. (The 2003U.S. military withdrawal from Saudi Arabia may havebeen another incentive.) According to the Guardian,three options for the Saudi nuclear future wereconsidered that year by Ryad: a nuclear deterrent; asecurity guarantee; or a nuclear-weapons free zonein the region.96 (Prince Turki implicitly conrmed theexistence of the document by stating it was not followedby action.97) A visit by Prince Abdallah in October 2003was reportedly the next occasion for Islamabad andRyad to discuss nuclear cooperation. Several sourceshave asserted that a nukes for oil barter was agreedupon on this occasion. Ryad may have formally askedfor nuclear warheads to equip its CSS-2.98 Other

sources say that several Saudi C-130s made return tripsto Pakistan between October 2003 and October 2004,followed by visits of nuclear experts in 2004-05 undercover of the Hajj.99 (The same sources say that Ryadsdecision to recall 80 diplomats in January 2004, andgeneral Musharrafs unexpected trip to Saudi Arabiain late June 2005, were caused by the windfall of theAbdul Qadeer Khan affair.100) In April 2006, a Frenchmedia outlet stated that Prince Khaled, vice-ministerfor defense, visited KRL in October 2004. It afrmedthat nuclear cooperation between the two countrieswas now well underway. It stated that an agreementon nuclear cooperation was made on the occasionof King Abdallahs visit to Islamabad in February2006, followed by a visit to KRL by Prince Sultan bin

Abdulaziz, defense minister, in April.101 A few weekslater, a German report stated that the Al-Sulayyil base,where CSS-2s are believed to be hosted, now housesPakistani Ghauri missiles.102


36/384

29

Most of these elements are unconrmed reports,but they are extraordinarily persistent. The doubts

about Ryads intentions have been further raised bythe countrys decision in April 2005 to ask the IAEAfor a Small Quantities Protocol (SQP), exemptingthe Kingdom from intrusive monitoring of nuclearactivities.

Other Countries.

It was reported in 1999 by a Pakistani newspaperthat the UAE made a request for nuclear assistance toA. Q. Khan during a visit of minister of informationShaykh Abdullah Bin Zayid Al Nahyyan; A. Q. Khanreportedly said that he would not give nuclear weaponsto the UAE on a platter, but would consider nucleartraining and education.103 There are good reasons to

believe that the UAE could have expressed an interestin nuclear weapons: (1) its central role in the foundationof the BCCI, which was probably used as a conduitfor Pakistani imports and exports; (2) its pivotal roleas a node in Khans exports network; (3) its uneaseabout the development of Irans nuclear program; (4)its possession of Black Shaheen cruise missiles (as wellas a few ageing Scud B ballistic missiles), which couldprobably host a small-size nuclear warhead.

It was reported in 2004 that an offer for nucleartechnology and hardware was made by A. Q. Khan toSyria.104 A. Q. Khan gave several lectures in Damascusin late 1997 and early 1998.105 But he is also suspectedof having met a top Syrian ofcial in Beirut to offerassistance with a centrifuge enrichment facility.106

After 2001, A. Q. Khans meetings with Syrians werereportedly held in Iran.107 Not much is known aboutthe Syria case. Some intelligence sources reportedly


37/384

30

believe that the country has imported centrifuges fromthe network.108 However, other sources have stated

that the offer was declined.109

Other countries have been mentioned. It wasreported in 2004 that A. Q. Khan offered nuclearassistance to Egypt, which is said to have turned downthe offer.110 Some suspect that A. Q. Khan may havetransferred centrifugation technology to Brazil.111 Therehave also been throughout the 1980s and 1990s severalmentions of Turkey as a possible recipient of Pakistaninuclear technology.112 Finally, several sources claimthat Pakistan exported its URENCO centrifugationtechnology to China, which had a relatively weakcentrifuge enrichment program.113

PAKISTANI NUCLEAR EXPORTS: WAS THERE ASTATE POLICY?

An Individual Initiative?

Most knowledgeable observers of the Pakistaniscene agree that A. Q. Khan had an important degreeof autonomy. If nuclear weapons exports had been aconsistent State policy, then it would have been logicalthat PAEC had a role in it too, which does not seem tohave been the case. This does not exonerate Pakistaniauthorities, but as an informed observer put it, Khanlikely exceeded whatever mandate he received fromthe Pakistani leadership.114 He may have felt thathe was covered for whatever he did by the largeamount of trust and autonomy he was enticed with.115It seems, in fact, that A. Q. Khan was able to manipulate

the government, and the Pakistani authorities did notwant to know what was going on. For instance, hewould tell the Prime minister that he needed to go to


38/384

31

Iran for reasons of national security, and that wouldbe enough.116 As long as Khans group delivered the

goods, no state authority questioned his tactics.117

That Pakistani Air Force planes were chartered doesnot necessarily indicate a government implicationin nuclear transfers: In the case of North Korea, alegitimate explanation was the missile and other armstransfers (such as air defense systems); in the case ofLibya, the explanation would have been the export ofconventional weapons.

The networks actions were made easy by the se-crecy and compartmentalization of Pakistans programuntil the late 1990s, which did not create the best condi-tions for oversight. Security precautions were made toprotect KRL from the outside world, not to protectthe outside world from KRLand security ofcersreported to Khan.118 Another reason was that KRL had

become, by the late 1980s, a large weapons manufacturerembedded in Pakistans military-industrial complex;many ofcials did not have an interest in rocking theboat. An Army investigation for details about KRL andPAEC procurements went nowhere.119

However, at some point, it became not goodenough. Three events changed the picture: the 1998tests, the 1999 coup, and the 2001 attacks and theiraftermath. There was a progressive reorganization ofPakistans nuclear program between 1998 and 2001.The nuclear laboratories, which for a long time had alarge operational and nancial autonomy, were reinedin. A. Q. Khan was forced to retire from KRL in March2001.

Several explanations exist as the reasons for this

decision. Some U.S. administration ofcials have saidthat this was an American request.120 It may also havebeen Musharrafs own initiativeor a combination of


39/384

32

both. After the 1998 tests, Pakistan was under strongpressure from the United States to show responsible

behavior, and it was in dire need of Western assistance.There was an ISI investigation of Khans nances in1998-99.121 Another inquiry by the newly-createdNational Accountancy Bureau at the request ofMusharraf revealed unapproved nancial transactions;it was not pursued due to the sensitivity of the matter.122Then came reports of North Korean experts visitingKRL. Although the visits were even then denied by A.Q. Khan, according to Musharraf the event triggeredsurveillance of his activities.123 According to severalsources, the ISIwhich since 1999 reported directly toMusharraffollowed A. Q. Khan to Dubai in the fallof 2000. When asked for an explanation by Musharraf,who was concerned about nancial improprieties, hecomplained about the surveillance, gave false excuses,

and continued his travels.124

The same thing happenedwhen he was asked by Musharraf to explain an aircraftlanding in Zahedan, Iran.125 But A. Q. Khan probablyfelt invulnerable. He was clearly reluctant to abideby the new rules, which included a better oversightof nuclear ofcials. He was making it known that hedisapproved of the reorganization of Pakistani nuclearpolicy.126

The ofcial version, which includes in particularthe report that Pakistani authorities only discoveredA. Q. Khans unsanctioned activities after the ISIraided a cargo plane leaving for North Korea in 2000,is not convincing.127 But there was denitely a personalelement in his activities.

Why, then, given that extensive transfer of nuclear

technology to North Korea and Libya could have takenplace from 2001 to 2003, at the exact time of Pakistansconsolidation of nuclear policymaking, and well after


40/384

33

Khans dismissal in March 2001, was he allowed tocontinue his travels?128 The reason may be that he

had the keys to the imports network, still vital for thePakistani nuclear program.129 Note that A. Q. Khanremained Special Adviser to the Chief Executive onStrategic and KRL Affairs after his dismissal, until aNuclear Command Authority (NCA) decision strippedhim of this title on January 31, 2004.

Khans motivations were complex and evolvedover time. They cannot be reduced to a single factor.According to David Sanger, to understand A. Q. Khan,you have to understand ego, greed, nationalism, andIslamic identity.130 A rst motivation was to ensurehis personal role and legitimacy in Pakistans nuclearprogram: Transfers were the counterpart of importsmade for the sake of the Pakistani program, or ofnancial assistance given to Pakistan by countries such

as Libya or Saudi Arabia. A. Q. Khan also reportedlywanted to deect attention from Pakistan.131 He saidin his debrieng sessions that he thought that theemergence of more nuclear states would ease Westernattention on Pakistan.132 A second motivation, whichseems to have gained in importance over time, waspure and simple greed. Supply created demand: Excessinventories of centrifuges and spare parts (notably P1centrifuges, since they were being replaced by P2s)were looking for customers. A third element waspure and simple hubris. A. Q. Khan was a man whoenjoyed defying authority and norms. He talked aboutcentrifugation technology as if it was his own property.This is where the Islamic dimension comes into play:He may have been willing to be recognized as the one

who gave the Bomb to the Umma. He reportedly saidthat his transfers would help the Muslim cause.133That said, some of those who know him say A. Q. Khan


41/384

34

is not an Islamist, and that he emphasized his faith tobolster his support in the country. A. Q. Khan may

simply have wanted to defy the Westgiven that allknown customers were on unfriendly terms with theUnited States and Europe.

A State Policy?

Most known exports happened between 1988(the death of Zia) and 1999 (the Musharraf takeover).In August 1988, the program came into the hands ofSenate chairman G. I. Khan (who immediately becamePresident according to succession rules) and CoASMirza Aslam Beg.

In the ensuing decade, the structure of Pakistanipower was complex, and divided among threeindividuals: the President, the Prime Minister, and

the CoAS. For this reason, it is obviously difcultto answer the question Who knew what? As twoknowledgeable observers put it, The diffusion ofauthority enabled national security organizations tomanipulate the system and become nearly autonomous.In this environment, Khan would have needed toconvince only one of the centers of power that sharingnuclear technology with foreign entities would be inPakistans interest.134

What seems clear is two-fold. First, the PrimeMinisters during that period (Benazir Bhutto andNawaz Sharif in particular) were not completely outof the loop. Indeed, the Pakistani government openlyacknowledges the role of two (conveniently dead)individuals close to the Bhutto family: General Imtiaz

Ali, military secretary to Z. A. Bhutto and defenseadviser to his daughter, Benazir; and family dentistZafar Niazi.135 Second, a handful of Pakistani leaders


42/384

35

seem to have played a key role. One was GeneralMirza Aslam Beg, vice-CoAS, then CoAS from August

1988 until August 1991. There is ample evidence of hisinvolvement in Iranian-Pakistani nuclear cooperation.As stated above, his personal background (a Shia) andpolitical preferences led him to take a consistent pro-Iranian, anti-Western stance. Another key individualwas Ghulam Ishaq Khan. One quasi-ofcial statementreported G. I. Khan as being actually in charge of thenuclear program from 1975 until 1991.136 As defenseminister, he was involved in the decision to makeKahuta a separate entity under A. Q. Khan.137 Hewas a member of the three-man KRL oversight boardwhen it was created in 1976.138 As nance minister,he was present at the rst 1983 cold tests.139 He alsogave tax-free status to the BCCI, which was used as aconduit for Pakistani nuclear imports and exports.140

Being chairman of the Senate, he automatically becamepresident, at the same time as M. A. Beg became CoAS,after Zias death, and remained in that position until July 1993. He was close to Beg and broke with himonly when it became clear that he wanted to toppleNawaz Sharif. (G. I. Khan also opposed Begs preferredcandidate for his own succession, General Hamid Gul,a former ISI chief.) In 1990, A. Q. Khan acknowledgedthat G. I. Khan had been a key supporter of the nuclearprogram.141 He even described him as guarding theprogram like a rock.142 When he died, A. Q. Khanhad a mausoleum built for him in the G. I. KhanInstitute, for which he had been the project director.Finally, it is hardly conceivable that successors to M.A. Beg as chiefs of Army staff (Generals Azif Nawaz,

Abdul Wahid Kakar, Jehangir Karamat, and PervezMusharraf) were completely unaware of any transfersof nuclear technology. At the very least, they proved


43/384

36

unwilling to ensure that Khan was not able to proceedwith unsanctioned exports. General Jehangir Karamat

in particular may have been a key player in his capacityof CoAS from December 1996 until his resignation inOctober 1998. He was on good terms with A. Q. Khan.He reportedly ensured KRL participation in the 1998tests.143 (He was nominated ambassador to the UnitedStates in November 2004: but in March 2006, thePakistani press announced his early departure fromhis position, for unknown reasons.) A. Q. Khan hasreportedly admitted that both Kakar and Karamat knewand approved of his dealings with North Korea.144

During 1987 to 1999, A. Q. Khan, who was certainlygood at manipulating the system, may have been him-self manipulated so as to ensure plausible deniability.A. Q. Khans personal prots were reportedly knownby the ISI since 1988, but Pakistans military authorities

refused to act.145

In 1989, the ISI reported suspiciousactivities to President G. I. Khan, but, as the protectorof A. Q. Khan, he just told Khan that he neededto be careful.146 Knowledgeable observers suggestthat a combination of factors in the year 1987 led tothe emergence of the network: the shift towards P2centrifuges, creating a large excess inventory of P1s;the arrival of M. A. Beg as VCoAS; the Brasstackscrisis with India; and the dress-down given by Zia toA. Q. Khan for having boasted about Pakistans nuclearcapability in an interview.

So, were nuclear exports a personal initiative or aState policy? The answer is: a little bit of both, in variousproportions, according to the circumstances. Differenttransfers probably reected different situations. There

are, rst, the three cases where the network was notdirectly involved: China, North Korea, and possiblySaudi Arabia. The possible quid pro quo with China


44/384

37

(centrifugation technology in return for UF6 or heavilyenriched uranium [HEU], as well as a weapon design)

would have been a state policy. Some claim that sucha deal was concluded in the mid-1980s. In any case,the scope of Pakistans nuclear cooperation withChina, which extends for more than a decade, stronglysuggests governmental approval. The transfers toNorth Korea may have been a State policy made withknowledge of some high-level Pakistani authorities(including perhaps Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif),although this point remains unclear. In any case, noelement of Islamic solidarity was present there. Rather,it was the need to ensure the continued developmentand reliability of the liquid-fuel (Ghauri-type) familyof Pakistani ballistic missiles. Finally, any nuclearcooperation discussions with Saudi Arabia wouldhave been, in all likelihood, sanctioned by the highest

political and military authorities.And then there are the cases where the network

was directly involved: Iran, Libya, Iraq, possiblySyria, and others. Iran is the most complex case. Thelaunching of a military-oriented nuclear cooperationwas probably not sanctioned by President Zia ul-Haq. However, during 1988 to 1995, exports to Iranwere known by most Pakistani leaders, includingPrime Ministers Bhutto and Sharif, and deliberatelyencouraged by some, such as M. A. Beg and G. I. Khan.The case of Libya was probably a Khan initiative. Tosome, including Khan himself, this may also have beenpayback time. When Tripoli agreed to give nancialsupport for the Pakistani program in the early 1970s, itasked for nuclear technology in return. (Z. A. Bhutto

never committed himself to go that far.147 But he mayhave created expectations in Ghaddas mind.) Finally,


45/384

38

offers to Iraq and possibly to Syria were probably A. Q.Khans own initiative.

It seems reasonable to say that there was no constantand consistent state policy governing the nuclearexports made, or sanctioned, by Pakistani ofcialsin the past 30 years. Concrete interests, personal andnational, seem to have been the primary driver behindthese exports. They were made possible by the largefreedom of manoeuvre given to A. Q. Khans activitiesuntil the end of the 1990s. But there has been, at leastin one instance, in the late 1980s, an attempt to makenuclear exports part of a broader national strategicorientation.

Some argue, however, that Pakistani nuclearexports do reected a consistent State policy. Accordingto Simon Henderson, there were two successivePakistani strategies. First was a strategy of exchanges

or barters: one with China (centrifuge technology forHEU and bomb design), and one with North Korea(centrifuge technology for ballistic missiles). Secondwas a strategy designed to blackmail the United States,through exports to Muslim States.148 Alternatively,different actors of the Pakistani leadership may havehad different strategies.

FUTURE RISKS

There is no reason to believe that the currentPakistani leadership would today deliberately transferexpertise and knowledge to other States or nonstateactors, at least in peacetime. The risk of furtherdeliberate transfers of nuclear technologies by the

Pakistani authorities appears much weaker todayatleast as long as there is an objective alliance betweenPakistan and the United States. And there are good


46/384

39

reasons to believe that Pakistan has put its nuclearhouse in order, as deduced from a series of decisions

and reorganizations made between 1998 and 2003.The Strategic Planning Directorate (SPD) is a seriousorganization manned by serious people.

The Risk of Further Unsanctioned Transfers.

However, risks have not disappeared. It is notcertain that the additional security procedures set upby Pakistan since 2001 make it impossible to havesignicant unsanctioned transfers of know-how andexpertise by lower-level scientists or engineers. No lessthan 10,000 to 16,000 people are employed by PAEC.149A total of 6,500 scientists and 45,000 people arereportedly involved in the whole nuclear program.150

Precedents are not reassuring. The full story of the

travels of Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood (a formerPAEC director), Chaudry Abdul Majid (a former NewLabs director), and Mirza Yusuf Baig (a PAEC engineer)to Afghanistan has yet to be written. The same forSuleiman Asad and Muhamed Ali Mukhtars allegedlinks with Al-Qaida.151 Some of these individuals werepreviously associated with A. Q. Khan, includingMahmood who had been his rst boss in 1975. The oldquestion of Who will guard the guardians? remainsrelevant in Pakistan.152

In the past, key government ofcials were knownfor their Islamist sympathies. This was apparently thecase for key scientists such as Abdul Qadeer Khanand Bashiruddin Mahmood, or military leaders suchas Mirza Aslam Beg and Hamid Gul (a former ISI

director).153 This was also the case of Muhammad AzizKhan (a former chairman of the joint chiefs of staff andas such responsible for nuclear procurement until 2004,


47/384

40

and known to consider the United States as the enemynumber one of the Muslim world). Some scientists and

engineers may have divided loyalties if approached bya nonstate Islamist actor. For a long time, this was notviewed as a problem by those overseeing the program:It was thought that piety was conducive to respect forauthority.154

Risks of transfers would also exist in a crisissituation: Pakistan could pre-delegate launchauthority for fear of preemption or decapitation.155Putting nuclear weapons systems on alert involvesthe relocation of several elements (physics packages,assembled warheads, and delivery systems), makingthem vulnerable during transit. Also, it should benoted that a pilot ying a nuclear-armed aircraft isreportedly given all necessary codes before takingoff.156 One former ofcial has even mused with the idea

of a deliberate transfer to a nonstate actor in wartimein order to ensure a capability to retaliate on Indiansoil; such a scenario would fall into the category ofsanctioned transfers.157

The lack of real checks and balances and democraticcontrols in todays Pakistan might make it still possiblein a post-Musharraf future for a Pakistani CoAS toorder, on his own, a direct transfer of key technologiesor equipments.

The Risk of Further Sanctioned Transfers.

If Iran encountered technical problems in theadvancement of its nuclear program, it surely wouldlike to benet again from Pakistans expertise. But it is

very unlikely that Islamabad would agree. At the sametime, two critical Iranian players of the Pakistan-Irandiscussions of the 1980s are still in power in Tehran:


48/384

41

Rafsanjani (head of the Expediency Council) andMohsen Rezai (secretary of the Expediency Council and

a former candidate in the 2005 elections whose viewson the United States are close to Ahmadinejads). Theirknowledge about the Pakistani system may put themin a position to approach certain players. In any case,new state-sponsored transfers would certainly supposea breakdown in U.S.-Pakistan relations. Note also thatIslamabad would have to make a choice between Ryadand Tehran.

As far as Saudi Arabia is concerned, three scenarioscan be conceived. A rst scenario is a Pakistani nuclearguarantee without deployments, such as the one givenby the United States to Japan. Ballistic missiles basedin south-western Pakistan would have the range tocover a signicant portion of the Saudi neighborhood,including U.S. bases (though not Israel).158 Some

Pakistani planners acknowledge that such an optionwould be conceivable.159 It would not question theexistence of U.S.-Saudi and U.S.-Pakistan alliances.160

A second scenario would be a security guaranteeinvolving nuclear deployments on Saudi soil, such asthe one given by the United States to Germany. It wouldnot be a violation of the Nuclear NonprolifeerationTreaty (NPT), and if Pakistan continues to build up itsarsenal, would not detract from immediate deterrenceneeds vis--vis India. It would be a win-win proposal,since Pakistan would gain in survivability againsta hypothetical Indian preemptive strike (althougheven Shaheen-2 missiles would not be able to threatenDelhi from Saudi territory). Being detectable, suchdeployments would only be conceivable if relations

were good between Washington on the one hand, andRyad and Islamabad on the other. However, Pakistaniplanners acknowledge that such deployments would


49/384

42

be unacceptable to Israel.161 One of them calls thescenario worse than the Cuban [missile] crisis.162

A third scenario would be a Saudi bomb, eitherwith the help of Pakistan or completely indigenous.Though highly unlikely, it is not completely farfetchedgiven the Kingdoms wealth. A Nuclear EnergyResearch Institute was inaugurated in 1988, and Saudipublications show an interest in nuclear physics andtechnology.163 The Saudi request for access to thesmall quantites protocol (SQP) in 2005 (immediatelyfollowed by an unexpected visit by Musharraf on June25 and 26) raised eyebrows. Some sources assert that asecond nuclear research center was created in 1975 atthe Al-Suyyalil base.164 This is where the CSS-2 missileswere stored in 1998the same year as the creation ofthe Nuclear Energy Research Institute. Washingtonreportedly told Islamabad that the sale of Pakistani

nuclear weapons to Saudi Arabia is a red line Pakistanshould not cross.165

*****

Since 1999, Pakistan has made considerableefforts to put its nuclear house in order, and a senseof responsibility on nuclear matters seems to pervadethe countrys leadership today. However, it will taketime before Pakistan can be considered as just anothernuclear country. Two conditions may have to be met:the establishment of a long-term alliance between theUnited States and Pakistan, based on the recognition ofenduring common interests, allowing the restorationof mutual trust; and the diffusion of a culture of

responsibility in the vast Pakistani nuclear complex,beyond the elites.


50/384

43

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2

1. There were a number of Pakistan-born and Iran-bornofcials and advisors in the entourage of M. M. Mandela et Mbeki,sometimes referred to as the Karachi connection. A. Q. Khanswife was a South African national.

2. Sudan was also a major platform of the network, at leastduring 1999 to 2001, in particular for materials destined to Iran.Ian Traynor and Ian Cobain, Clandestine Nuclear Deals Tracedto Sudan, The Guardian, January 5, 2006.

3. David Albright, A. Q. Khan Network: The Case Is NotClosed, Testimony to the Subcommittee on InternationalTerrorism and Nonproliferation, Committee on InternationalRelations, House of Representatives, U.S. Congress, May 25,2006.

4. Polis Dijara Malaysia, Press Release by Inspector Generalof Police In Relation to Investigation on the Alleged Production

of Components for Libyas Uranium Enrichment Program,February 20, 2004, accessed at www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Aug/tertraisAug07.asp..

5. Gordon Corera, Shopping for Bombs. Nuclear Proliferation,Global Insecurity and the Rise and Fall of the A. Q. Khan Network,London: Hurst & Co., 2006, pp. 59-60, p. 136.

6. Ibid., p. 65.

7. Polis Dijara Malaysia.

8. Some sources also claim the involvement of Noman Shah,former son-in-law of A. Q. Khan.

9. Details on the South Africa operation are contained in HighCourt of Transvaal, The State vs. 1. Daniel Geiges 2. GerhardWisser, (undated document, 2006), accessed at www.ccc.nps.

navy.mil/si/2007/Aug/tertraisAug07.asp. The operation has beenreferred to as Project A.F. (for Arab Fuckers [sic]); documentsdiscovered in the investigation are reported to have involved Iran,Pakistan, India, and South Africas own program. See Steve Coll,


51/384

44

Atomic Emporium, The New-Yorker, August 7 and 14, 2006, p.57.

10. Juergen Dahlkamp, Georg Mascolo, and Holger Stark,Network of Death on Trial, Der Spiegel, March 13, 2006.

11. Simon Henderson, Nuclear Spinning: The Iran-PakistanLink, National Review Online, December 11, 2003; John Lancasterand Kamran Khan, Pakistanis Say Nuclear Scientists Aided Iran,The Washington Post, January 24, 2004. Other ofcials arrested inDecember 2003 and January 2004 included Yassin Chauhan, NazirAhmed, and Islam ul-Haq, all KRL ofcials.

12. Special Report, The A. Q. Khan Network: Crime . . . AndPunishment? WMD Insights, Issue 3, March 2006.

13. Ibid.

14. David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, Uncoveringthe Nuclear Black Market: Working Toward Closing Gaps in theInternational Nonproliferation Regime, Washington, DC: Institute forScience and International Security, July 2, 2004, www.isis-online.org/publications/southasia/nuclear_black_market.html; Polis DijaraMalaysia; Nuke trail traced to Msia, Pakistan, Libya, The KoreaHerald, February 16, 2006.

15. William J. Broad, David E. Sanger, and Raymond Bonner,A Tale of Nuclear Proliferation, The New York Times, February12, 2004.

16. See Lancaster and Khan, Pakistanis Say Nuclear ScientistsAided Iran.

17. Stephen Fidler and Farhan Bokhari, Pakistan InvestigatesBCCI Role in Sale of Nuclear Know-How, The Financial Times,February 4, 2004.

18. A U.S. scholar says that M. A. Khan personally conrmedthis (interview with U.S. scholar, Washington, October 2005).

19. NTI Global Security Newswire, Iran Nuclear Chronology.


52/384

45

20. Ibid.; Corera, p. 64. Steve Coll, Atomic Emporium,The New-Yorker, August 7 and 14, 2006, pp. 56-57, reports thataccording to Leonard Weiss, the agreement was signed in 1985.

21. Yossef Bodansky, Pakistans Islamic Bomb, Houston:Freeman Center for Strategic Studies, July 1998; Rajesh KumarMishra, Pakistan as a Proliferator State: Blame it on Dr. A. Q. Khan,Paper n 567, India: South Asia Analysis Group, December 20,2002.

22. The IAEA was shown in January 2005 a copy of a documentreecting an offer said to have been made to Iran in 1987 by aforeign intermediary, involving the supply of a disassembledmachine (including drawings, descriptions and specicationsfor the production of centrifuges); drawings, specicationsand calculations for a complete plant; and materials for 2000centrifuges machines. Vienna, Austria: IAEA, Implementationof the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,GOV/2006/15, February 27, 2006, p. 3. An Iranian opponent fromthe NCRI stated in a press conference in Vienna in November 2004that Pakistan provided to Iran, in 2001, a small quantity of highlyenriched uranium (HEU). However, this statement was made inanswer to a question and was not subsequently used in NCRIpropaganda documents. See Press Conference By MohammadMohadessin, Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman, NationalCouncil of Resistance of Iran, November 17, 2004; and ElaineSciolino, Exiles Add to Claims on Iran Nuclear Arms, New YorkTimes, November 18, 2004.

23. Lancaster and Khan, Pakistanis Say Nuclear ScientistsAided Iran; and John Wilson, Iran, Pakistan and Nukes, NewDelhi, India: Observer Research Foundation, 2005.

24. Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000.Disenchanted Allies, Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson CenterPress, 2001, p.284.

25. See John Lancaster and Kamran Khan, Musharraf Namedin Nuclear Probe, Washington Post, February 3, 2004; MubashirZaidi, Scientist Claimed Nuclear Equipment Was Old, OfcialSays, Los Angeles Times, February 10, 2004.


53/384

46

26. Kathy Gannon, Iran Sought Advice in Pakistan onAttack, Associated Press, May 12, 2006.

27. M. A. Chaudhri, Pakistans Nuclear History: SeparatingMyth from Reality, Defence Journal, May 2006.

28. Seymour Hersch, On the Nuclear Edge, The New-Yorker,March 29, 1993.

29. Gannon, Iran Sought Advice in Pakistan on Attack.

30. Kathy Gannon, Explosive Secrets from Pakistan, LosAngeles Times , January 30, 2004. Gannon says she interviewed Beghimself on this subject in 2003.

31. Matt Kelley, Pakistan Threatened to Give Iran Nukes,Associated Press, February 27, 2004; and Douglas Frantz,Pakistans Role in Scientists Nuclear Trafcking Debated, LosAngeles Times, May 16, 2005.

32. David Rohde, Pakistanis Question Ofcial Ignorance ofAtom Transfers, New York Times, February 3, 2004; Lancaster andKhan, Musharraf Named in Nuclear Probe; David Armstrong,Khan Man, The New Republic, November 9, 2004.

33. Frantz, Pakistans Role . . .; Douglas Frantz, Iran Closesin on Ability to Build a Nuclear Bomb,Los Angeles Times, August3, 2003.

34. Gannon, Iran Sought Advice in Pakistan on Attack.

35. Rohde, Pakistanis Question . . .; Lancaster and Khan,Musharraf Named . . .; Armstrong, Khan Man.

36. Zaidi; Gaurav Kampani, The Military Coup: Implications forNuclear Stability in South Asia, CNS Report, CNS/MIIS, October1999.

37. Kux, p. 209.

38. Hersch.

39. Kux, p. 299.


54/384

47

40. Hassan Abbas, Pakistans Drift into Extremism. Allah, the Army,and Americas War on Terror, New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2005, p. 142.Mrs. Bhutto claims to have ordered, during her rst mandate,that no Pakistani nuclear scientist leaves the territory without herwritten permission (quoted in Rohde, Nuclear Inquiry . . . ).

41. Kux, p. 313.

42. See John Lancaster and Kamran Khan, Pakistanis SayNuclear Scientists Aided Iran, Washington Post, January 24,2004. Begs concept was called strategic deance. The moreprecise expression strategic depth is attributable to GeneralHamid Gul, then-chief of ISI.

43. See Lancaster and Khan, Pakistanis Say Nuclear ScientistsAided Iran; and Gaurav Kampani, Proliferation Unbound: NuclearTales from Pakistan, Monterey, CA: Center for NonproliferationStudies, Monterey Institute for International Affairs, February2004. One of the former ofcials, Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, saysthat Beg declared to him at the time: Iran is willing to give whateverit takes, $6 billion, $10 billion. We can sell the Bomb to Iran atany price. Wilson, Iran, Pakistan and Nukes; see also Gannon,Explosive Secrets from Pakistan. Ishaq Dar mentions 12 billiondollars, see Shaukat Piracha, Beg asked Nawaz to give nucleartechnology to a friend, says Ishaq Dar, Daily Times, September21, 2005. Still another one claims that Iran offered Beg around 8billion dollars in 1991 (quoted in Powell and McGirk.).

44. Lancaster and Khan, Musharraf Named in NuclearProbe.

45. Kenneth R. Timmerman, Countdown to Crisis. The ComingNuclear Showdown with Iran, New York: Crown Forum, 2005; andUdayan Namboodiri, Dr. Khans story: Thy Hand, Great Gen!,Pioneer, February 6, 2004.

46. Gannon, Explosive Secrets from Pakistan; DavidRohde, Nuclear Inquiry Skips Pakistan Army as MusharrafTries to Protect Its Club, New York Times, January 30, 2004; andNamboodiri.

47. Timmerman, pp. 101-107.


55/384

48

48. See Rohde, Nuclear Inquiry

49. Abbas, p. 148.

50. Lancaster and Khan, Pakistanis Say Nuclear ScientistsAided Iran.

51. Corera, p. 233.

52. Ibid., p. 69.

53. IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement inthe Islamic Republic of Iran, p. 5.

54. Bill Powell and Tim McGirk, The Man Who Sold TheBomb, Time Magazine, February 6, 2005.

55. William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, New Worry Risesafter Iran Claims Nuclear Steps, The International Herald Tribune,April 17, 2006.

56. See Corera, p. 76.

57. According to the IAEA, Iran had inquired into the deliveryof 900 ring magnets suitable for P2 machines from a foreign entityin mid-2003. IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreementin the Islamic Republic of Iran, p. 4.

58. Memo # 78m, Subject: Proposal, Iraqi intelligencedocument, October 6, 1990.

59. David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, The A. Q.Khan Illicit Nuclear Trade Network and Implications forNonproliferation Efforts, Strategic Insights, Vol. V, Issue 6, July2006.

60. Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., DPRK-Pakistan Ghauri MissileCooperation, Washington, DC: Federation of American Scientists,May 21, 1998.

61. George Wehrfritz and Richard Wolfe, How North KoreaGot the Bomb, Newsweek, October 27, 2003.


56/384

49

62. One source claims that the arrangement was agreed inDecember 1994, when Benazir Bhutto arranged it in Pyongyang atthe request of Abdul Waheed Kakar, the Army CoAS. This may bea mistake and in fact a reference to Bhuttos December 1993 visit.Lancaster and Khan, Musharraf Named in Nuclear Probe.

63. Corera, p. 87.

64. Powell and McGirk, The Man Who Sold The Bomb.

65. Pervez Musharraf, In The Line of Fire. A Memoir,. New-York : Free Press, 2006, pp. 288-289.

66. David Armstrong, Khan Man,The New Republic, November11, 2004; Lancaster and Khan, Musharraf Named . . . .

67. See Strobe Talbott, Engaging India. Diplomacy, Democracyand the Bomb, New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2004, p. 150.


69. Owen Bennett Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm, New Haven:Yale University Press, 2003, p. 206.

70. Congressional Research Service, Weapons of MassDestruction: Trade Between North Korea and Pakistan, Report forCongress, March 11, 2004; Douglas Frantz, Pakistans Rolein Scientists Nuclear Trafcking Debated, Los Angeles Times,16 May 2005.


72. Ibid., pp. 92-93.

73. Presidents Interview with New York Times,www.presidentofpakistan.gov.pk, September 12, 2005.

74. Mubashir Zaidi, Scientist Claimed Nuclear EquipmentWas Old, Ofcial Say, Los Angeles Times, February 10, 2004;William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, New Worry Rises afterIran Claims Nuclear Steps, The International Herald Tribune, April17, 2006; Corera, p. 94.


57/384

50

75. Musharraf, op. cit., p. 296.

76. See Christopher O. Clary, The A. Q. Khan Network: Causesand Implications, Monterey, CA: U.S. Naval Postgraduate School,December 2005, pp. 62-71.

77. See Koch, Pakistan Persists with Nuclear Procurement;and Kux, p. 343.

78. The existence of nuclear exports to Pyongyang wasreported in the 1998 Bermudez article.

79. Strobe Talbott, Engaging India. Diplomacy, Democracy andthe Bomb, New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2004, pp. 150-151.

80. See Clary, The A. Q. Khan Network . . .., pp. 62-71.

81. Department of State, Memorandum of conversation,Subject: Proposed Cable to Tehran on Pakistani NuclearReprocessing, Secret, May 12, 1976, p. 3.

82. Wyn Q. Bowen, Libya and Nuclear Proliferation. SteppingBack from the Brink, Adelphi Paper n 380, London: InternationalInstitute for Strategic Studies (IISS)/Routledge, 2006, pp. 30-43.

83. Corera, p. 190.

84. IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of theSocialist Peoples Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, GOV/2004/12, February20, 2004, p. 5.

85. See Corera.

86. Saudi Nuclear Pact, The Washington Post, January 19,1981; Marie Colvin and Peter Sawyer, How an Insider Lifted theVeil on Saudi Plot for an Islamic Bomb, Sunday Times, July 24,1994; Mohammed al-Khilewi: Saudi Arabia is Trying to Kill Me,The Middle East Quarterly, Vol. V, No. 3. Saudi Arabia was alsoreported to nance the Iraqi program.


58/384

51

87. A Blind Eye to the Islamic Bomb, Dateline, SpecialBroadcasting Service, June 23, 2004.

88. See Abbas, pp. 162-163. At this occasion, Saudi Arabiareportedly proposed to guarantee to Pakistan preferential pricesfor its oil deliveries in order to cushion the cost of expectedsanctions. Roula Khalaf, Farhan Bokhari, and Stephen Fidler,Saudi Cash Joins Forces With Nuclear Pakistan, The FinancialTimes, August 5, 2004.

89. President H. G. W. Bush was reportedly told about this byU.S. intelligence in late November 1990. Bergman.

90. Mansoor Ijaz, Pakistans Nuclear Metastasis: HowWidespread is the Cancer? The Weekly Standard, January 8, 2004.According to the author, another option was to set up a secretnuclear base on the territory of another Gulf monarchy.

91. After the November 1999 visit, a Saudi nuclear expertreportedly declared: Saudi Arabia must make plans aimedat making a quick response to face the possibilities of nuclearwarfare agents being used against the Saudi population, citiesor armed forces. Gopalaswami Parthasarathy, Pakistan PlaysNuclear Footsie; Does Anyone Care? Wall Street Journal, January2, 2004.

92. Saudi Arabia Takes Steps To Acquire Nuclear Weapons,Defense & Foreign Affairs, October 30, 2002. See also Saudi Lookingto Go Nuclear? Intel Analysts Say Royal Family Wants to KeepUp with Tehran, Geostrategy-Direct Intelligence Brief, June19, 2003.

93. Selig S. Harrison, U.S. Must Clamp Down on PakistanNuke Dealing, San Jos Mercury News, May 30, 2003.


95. Harrison.

96. Ewan MacAskill and

pakistan’s nuclear future worries beyond war pub832

Documents