pale_impres to coi

8/10/2019 Pale_impres to Coi

1/56

PALE | Imprescriptibility of Disbarment & Conflict o f Interest | 1

IMPRESCRIPTIBILITY OF DISBARMENT

EN BANCBOBIE ROSE V. FRIAS, A.C. No. 6656

Complainant, (formerly CBD-98-591)Present:PANGANIBAN,

C.J.PUNO,* QUISUMBING,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

CARPIO, AUSTRIA-

MARTINEZ,- v e r s u s - CORONA,CARPIO

MORALES,CALLEJO, SR.,

AZCUNA, TINGA,CHICO-

NAZARIO,GARCIA and

VELASCO,JJ. ATTY. CARMELITA S.BAUTISTA-LOZADA,**

Respondent.Promulgated:

May 4, 2006 x-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - x

R E S O L U T I O N

CORONA,J. :

Respondent Atty. Carmelita Bautista-Lozada seeksreconsideration of our December 13, 2005 resolution finding herguilty of violating Rules 15.03 and 16.04 of the Code ofProfessional Responsibility and of willfully disobeying a final andexecutory decision of the Court of Appeals and suspending herfrom the practice of law for two years.

Respondent contends that, pursuant to Rule VIII of theRules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD)of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), the complaintagainst her was already barred by prescription. She also assertsthat her December 7, 1990 loan agreement with complainantcomplied with Rule 16.04 because the interest of complainant

was fully protected.Respondents contentions have no merit.

Respondent anchors her defense of prescription on Rule VIII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the CBD-IBP whichprovides:

SECTION 1. Prescription . A complaint fordisbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneysprescribes in two (2) years from the date of theprofessional misconduct.

However, as early as 1967, we have held that thedefense of prescription does not lie in administrativeproceedings against lawyers. [1] And in the 2004 case of Heck v.Santos ,[2] we declared that an administrative complaint againsta member of the bar does not prescribe.


2/56


If the rule were otherwise, members ofthe bar would be emboldened to disregard thevery oath they took as lawyers, prescinding fromthe fact that as long as no private complainantwould immediately come forward, they stand achance of being completely exonerated fromwhatever administrative liability they ought toanswer for. It is the duty of this Court to protectthe integrity of the practice of law as well as theadministration of justice. No matter how muchtime has elapsed from the time of thecommission of the act complained of and the timeof the institution of the complaint, erringmembers of the bench and bar cannot escape thedisciplining arm of the Court. This categoricalpronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous

members of the bench and bar, to deter themfrom committing acts which violate the Code ofProfessional Responsibility, the Code of JudicialConduct, or the Lawyers Oath. x x x

Thus, even the lapse of considerable timefrom the commission of the offending act to theinstitution of the administrative complaint will noterase the administrative culpability of alawyer.[3] (emphasis supplied)

The CBD-IBP derives its authority to take cognizance ofadministrative complaints against lawyers from this Court whichhas the inherent power to regulate, supervise and control thepractice of law in the Philippines. Hence, in the exercise of itsdelegated power to entertain administrative complaints againstlawyers, the CBD-IBP should be guided by the doctrines andprinciples laid down by this Court.

Regrettably, Rule VIII, Section 1 of the Rules ofProcedure of the CBD-IBP which provides for a prescriptiveperiod for the filing of administrative complaints against lawyersruns afoul of the settled ruling of this Court. It should thereforebe struck down as void and of no legal effect for being ultravires .

Moreover, assuming that prescription is a valid defense,respondent raised it only at this late stage. We presume shewas familiar with that rule yet she failed to invoke it at theearliest opportunity. Instead she opted to insist on herinnocence.

On the other ground raised by respondent, we havesufficiently discussed the implications of her loan agreementwith complainant in relation to Rule 16.04 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility in our December 13, 2005 resolution.Considering the fiduciary character of respondents relationshipwith complainant, the nature of their agreement andcomplainants lack of independent advice when she entered intoit, there is neither sufficient ground nor compelling reason toreconsider our earlier resolution.

WHEREFORE, respondents motion for reconsidera tionis hereby DENIED WITH FINALITY .

Rule VIII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of theCommission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of thePhilippines is hereby declared null and void .

Let copies of this resolution be furnished the IntegratedBar of the Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant fortheir information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC


3/56


BOBIE ROSE V. FRIAS, A.C. No. 6656 Complainant, (formerly CBD-98-591)

Present:PANGANIBAN,

C.J.PUNO,* QUISUMBING,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

CARPIO, AUSTRIA-

MARTINEZ,- v e r s u s - CORONA,

CARPIO

MORALES,CALLEJO, SR., AZCUNA,

TINGA,CHICO-

NAZARIO,GARCIA and

VELASCO,JJ. ATTY. CARMELITA S.BAUTISTA-LOZADA,**

Respondent.Promulgated:

May 4, 2006 x-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - x

R E S O L U T I O NCORONA,J. :

Respondent Atty. Carmelita Bautista-Lozada seeksreconsideration of our December 13, 2005 resolution finding herguilty of violating Rules 15.03 and 16.04 of the Code ofProfessional Responsibility and of willfully disobeying a final andexecutory decision of the Court of Appeals and suspending herfrom the practice of law for two years.

Respondent contends that, pursuant to Rule VIII of theRules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD)of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), the complaintagainst her was already barred by prescription. She also assertsthat her December 7, 1990 loan agreement with complainantcomplied with Rule 16.04 because the interest of complainantwas fully protected.

Respondents contentions have no merit.

Respondent anchors her defense of prescription on Rule VIII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the CBD-IBP whichprovides:

SECTION 1. Prescription . A complaint fordisbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneysprescribes in two (2) years from the date of theprofessional misconduct.

However, as early as 1967, we have held that thedefense of prescription does not lie in administrativeproceedings against lawyers. [1] And in the 2004 case of Heck v.Santos ,[2] we declared that an administrative complaint againsta member of the bar does not prescribe.

If the rule were otherwise, members ofthe bar would be emboldened to disregard thevery oath they took as lawyers, prescinding from


4/56


the fact that as long as no private complainantwould immediately come forward, they stand achance of being completely exonerated fromwhatever administrative liability they ought toanswer for. It is the duty of this Court to protectthe integrity of the practice of law as well as theadministration of justice. No matter how muchtime has elapsed from the time of thecommission of the act complained of and the timeof the institution of the complaint, erringmembers of the bench and bar cannot escape thedisciplining arm of the Court. This categoricalpronouncement is aimed at unscrupulousmembers of the bench and bar, to deter themfrom committing acts which violate the Code ofProfessional Responsibility, the Code of Judicial

Conduct, or the Lawyers Oath. x x xThus, even the lapse of considerable time

from the commission of the offending act to theinstitution of the administrative complaint will noterase the administrative culpability of alawyer.[3] (emphasis supplied)

The CBD-IBP derives its authority to take cognizance ofadministrative complaints against lawyers from this Court whichhas the inherent power to regulate, supervise and control thepractice of law in the Philippines. Hence, in the exercise of itsdelegated power to entertain administrative complaints againstlawyers, the CBD-IBP should be guided by the doctrines andprinciples laid down by this Court.

Regrettably, Rule VIII, Section 1 of the Rules ofProcedure of the CBD-IBP which provides for a prescriptiveperiod for the filing of administrative complaints against lawyers

runs afoul of the settled ruling of this Court. It should therefore

be struck down as void and of no legal effect for being ultravires .

Moreover, assuming that prescription is a valid defense,respondent raised it only at this late stage. We presume shewas familiar with that rule yet she failed to invoke it at theearliest opportunity. Instead she opted to insist on herinnocence.

On the other ground raised by respondent, we havesufficiently discussed the implications of her loan agreementwith complainant in relation to Rule 16.04 of the Code ofProfessional Responsibility in our December 13, 2005 resolution.Considering the fiduciary character of respondents relationshipwith complainant, the nature of their agreement andcomplainants lack of independent advice when she entered into

it, there is neither sufficient ground nor compelling reason toreconsider our earlier resolution.

WHEREFORE, respondents motion for reconsidera tionis hereby DENIED WITH FINALITY .

Rule VIII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of theCommission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of thePhilippines is hereby declared null and void .

Let copies of this resolution be furnished the IntegratedBar of the Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant fortheir information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.


5/56


CONFLICT OF INTEREST

[Syllabus]

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 105938. September 20, 1996]

TEODORO R. REGALA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, AVELINO V.CRUZ, JOSE C. CONCEPCION, ROGELIO A. VINLUAN, VICTOR P. LAZATIN, and EDUARDO U.ESCUETA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLESANDIGANBAYAN, First Division, REPUBLIC OFTHE PHILIPPINES, ACTING THROUGH THEPRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOODGOVERNMENT, and RAUL S. ROCO,respondents .

[G.R. No. 108113. September 20, 1996]

PARAJA G. HAYUDINI, petitioner, vs. THESANDIGANBAYAN and THE REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES, respondents.

D E C I S I O NKAPUNAN,J .:

These cases touch the very cornerstone of every State's judicial system, upon which the workings of the contentious and

adversarial system in the Philippine legal process are based -

the sanctity of fiduciary duty in the client-lawyer relationship.The fiduciary duty of a counsel and advocate is also what makesthe law profession a unique position of trust and confidence,which distinguishes it from any other calling. In this instance,we have no recourse but to uphold and strengthen the mantleof protection accorded to the confidentiality that proceeds fromthe performance of the lawyer's duty to his client.

The facts of the case are undisputed.

The matters raised herein are an offshoot of the institutionof the Complaint on July 31, 1987 before the Sandiganbayan bythe Republic of the Philippines, through the PresidentialCommission on Good Government against Eduardo M.Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal defendants, for therecovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares ofstocks in the named corporations in PCGG Case No. 33 (Civil

Case No. 0033), entitled "Republic of the Philippines versusEduardo Cojuangco, et al." [1]

Among the defendants named in the case are hereinpetitioners Teodoro Regala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V. Cruz,Jose C. Concepcion, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin,Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja G. Hayudini, and herein privaterespondent Raul S. Roco, who all were then partners of the lawfirm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices(hereinafter referred to as the ACCRA Law Firm). ACCRA Law

Firm performed legal services for its clients, which included,among others, the organization and acquisition of businessassociations and/or organizations, with the correlative andincidental services where its members acted as incorporators, orsimply, as stockholders. More specifically, in the performanceof these services, the members of the law firm delivered to itsclient documents which substantiate the client's equity holdings,i.e., stock certificates endorsed in blank representing the sharesregistered in the client's name, and a blank deed of trust orassignment covering said shares. In the course of theirdealings with their clients, the members of the law firm acquire
http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/syllabus/sept/105938_syl.htmhttp://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/syllabus/sept/105938_syl.htmhttp://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/syllabus/sept/105938_syl.htm


6/56


information relative to the assets of clients as well as theirpersonal and business circumstances. As members of the

ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and private respondent Raul Rocoadmit that they assisted in the organization and acquisition ofthe companies included in Civil Case No. 0033, and in keepingwith the office practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of the said corporations involved in sequestrationproceedings. [2]

On August 20, 1991, respondent Presidential Commissionon Good Government (hereinafter referred to as respondentPCGG) filed a "Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint" and"Third Amended Complaint" which excluded private respondentRaul S. Roco from the complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 asparty-defendant. [3] Respondent PCGG based its exclusion ofprivate respondent Roco as party-defendant on his undertakingthat he will reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom heacted as nominee/stockholder in the companies involved inPCGG Case No. 33. [4]

Petitioners were included in the Third Amended Complainton the strength of the following allegations:

14. Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., EdgardoJ. Angara, Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro Regala,

Avelino V. Cruz, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Eduardo U.Escueta, Paraja G. Hayudini and Raul Roco of the

Angara Concepcion Cruz Regala and Abello lawoffices (ACCRA) plotted, devised, schemed.conspired and confederated with each other insetting up, through the use of the coconut levyfunds, the financial and corporate framework andstructures that led to the establishment of UCPB,UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC, and morethan twenty other coconut levy funded corporations,including the acquisition of San Miguel Corporationshares and its institutionalization through presidentialdirectives of the coconut monopoly. Through

insidious means and machinations, ACCRA, being thewholly-owned investment arm, ACCRA InvestmentsCorporation, became the holder of approximatelyfifteen million shares representing roughly 3.3% ofthe total outstanding capital stock of UCPB as of 31March 1987. This ranks ACCRA InvestmentsCorporation number 44 among the top 100 biggeststockholders of UCPB which has approximately1,400,000 shareholders. On the other hand,corporate books show the name Edgardo J. Angaraas holding approximately 3,744 shares as ofFebruary, 1984. [5]

In their answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint,petitioners ACCRA lawyers alleged that:

4.4. Defendants- ACCRA lawyers participation in

the acts with which their co-defendants are charged,was in furtherance of legitimate lawyering.

4.4.1. In the course of renderingprofessional and legal services to clients,defendants-ACCRA lawyers, Jose C.Concepcion, Teodoro D. Regala, Rogelio A.

Vinluan and Eduardo U. Escueta, becameholders of shares of stock in the corporationslisted under their respective names in Annex A

of the expanded Amended Complaint asincorporating or acquiring stockholders onlyand, as such, they do not claim any proprietaryinterest in the said shares of stock.

4.5. Defendant ACCRA-lawyer Avelino V. Cruz wasone of the incorporators in 1976 of Mermaid MarketingCorporation, which was organized for legitimatebusiness purposes not related to the allegations of theexpanded Amended Complaint. However, he has long

ago transferred any material interest therein and


7/56


therefore denies that the shares appearing in his namein Annex A of the expanded Amended Complaint arehis assets. [6]

Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who had separated from ACCRAlaw firm, filed a separate answer denying the allegations in thecomplaint implicating him in the alleged ill-gotten wealth. [7]

Petitioners ACCRA lawyers subsequently filed their"COMMENT AND/OR OPPOSITION" dated October 8, 1991 withCounter-Motion that respondent PCGG similarly grant the sametreatment to them (exclusion as parties-defendants) asaccorded private respondent Roco. [8] The Counter-Motion fordropping petitioners from the complaint was duly set for hearingon October 18, 1991 in accordance with the requirements ofRule 15 of the Rules of Court.

In its "Comment," respondent PCGG set the followingconditions precedent for the exclusion of petitioners, namely:(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) submission ofdocuments substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c)the submission of the deeds of assignments petitionersexecuted in favor of its clients covering their respectiveshareholdings. [9]

Consequently, respondent PCGG presented supposed proofto substantiate compliance by private respondent Roco of theconditions precedent to warrant the latter's exclusion as party-defendant in PCGG Case No. 33, to wit: (a) Letter to respondentPCGG of the counsel of respondent Roco dated May 24, 1989reiterating a previous request for reinvestigation by the PCGGin PCGG Case No. 33; (b) Affidavit dated March 8, 1989executed by private respondent Roco as Attachment to theletter aforestated in (a); and (c) Letter of the Roco, Bunag, andKapunan Law Offices dated September 21, 1988 to therespondent PCGG in behalf of private respondent Roco originallyrequesting the reinvestigation and/or re-examination of the

evidence of the PCGG against Roco in its Complaint in PCGG

Case No. 33. [10]

It is noteworthy that during said proceedings, privaterespondent Roco did not refute petitioners' contention that hedid actually not reveal the identity of the client involved in PCGGCase No. 33, nor had he undertaken to reveal the identity of theclient for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder. [11]

On March 18, 1992, respondent Sandiganbayanpromulgated the Resolution, herein questioned, denying theexclusion of petitioners in PCGG Case No. 33, for their refusal tocomply with the conditions required by respondent PCGG. Itheld:

x x x.

ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of notrevealing the identity of the client for whom they have

acted, i.e. their principal, and that will be their choice.But until they do identify their clients, considerations ofwhether or not the privilege claimed by the ACCRAlawyers exists cannot even begin to be debated. The

ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse themselves from theconsequences of their acts until they have begun toestablish the basis for recognizing the privilege; theexistence and identity of the client.

This is what appears to be the cause for which they

have been impleaded by the PCGG as defendantsherein.

5. The PCGG is satisfied that defendant Roco hasdemonstrated his agency and that Roco has apparentlyidentified his principal, which revelation could show thelack of cause against him. This in turn has allowed thePCGG to exercise its power both under the rules of

Agency and under Section 5 of E.O. No. 14-A in relationto the Supreme Court's ruling in Republic v.

Sandiganbayan (173 SCRA 72).


8/56


9/56


to the constitutional right of petitioners ACCRA lawyersto the equal protection of the law.

Petitioner Paraja G. Hayudini, likewise, filed his own motionfor reconsideration of the March 18, 1991 resolution which wasdenied by respondent Sandiganbayan. Thus, he filed a separatepetition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 108113, assailing

respondent Sandiganbayan's resolution on essentially the samegrounds averred by petitioners in G.R. No. 105938.

Petitioners contend that the exclusion of respondent Rocoas party-defendant in PCGG Case No. 33 grants him a favorabletreatment, on the pretext of his alleged undertaking to divulgethe identity of his client, giving him an advantage over themwho are in the same footing as partners in the ACCRA law firm.Petitioners further argue that even granting that such anundertaking has been assumed by private respondent Roco,

they are prohibited from revealing the identity of their principalunder their sworn mandate and fiduciary duty as lawyers touphold at all times the confidentiality of information obtainedduring such lawyer-client relationship.

Respondent PCGG, through its counsel, refutes petitioners'contention, alleging that the revelation of the identity of theclient is not within the ambit of the lawyer-client confidentialityprivilege, nor are the documents it required (deeds ofassignment) protected, because they are evidence of nominee

status.[13]

In his comment, respondent Roco asseverates that

respondent PCGG acted correctly in excluding him as party-defendant because he "(Roco) has not filed an Answer. PCGGhad therefore the right to dismiss Civil Case No. 0033 as toRoco `without an order of court by filing a notice ofdismissal,'" [14] and he has undertaken to identify his principal. [15]

Petitioners' contentions are impressed with merit.

I

It is quite apparent that petitioners were impleaded by thePCGG as co-defendants to force them to disclose the identity oftheir clients. Clearly, respondent PCGG is not after petitionersbut the bigger fish as they say in street parlance. This ploy isquite clear from the PCGGs willingness to cut a deal withpetitioners -- the names of their clients in exchange forexclusion from the complaint. The statement of theSandiganbayan in its questioned resolution dated March 18,1992 is explicit:

ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of notrevealing the identity of the client for whom they haveacted, i.e., their principal, and that will be their choice.But until they do identify their clients, considerations ofwhether or not the privilege claimed by the ACCRAlawyers exists cannot even begin to be debated. The

ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse themselves from theconsequences of their acts until they have begun toestablish the basis for recognizing the privilege; theexistence and identity of the client.

This is what appears to be the cause for which theyhave been impleaded by the PCGG as defendantsherein. (Underscoring ours)

In a closely related case, Civil Case No. 0110 of theSandiganbayan, Third Division, entitled Primavera Farms, Inc.,

et al . vs. Presidential Commission on Good Governmentrespondent PCGG, through counsel Mario Ongkiko, manifestedat the hearing on December 5, 1991 that the PCGG wanted toestablish through the ACCRA that their so called client is Mr.Eduardo Cojuangco; that it was Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco whofurnished all the monies to those subscription payments incorporations included in Annex A of the Third AmendedComplaint; that the ACCRA lawyers executed deeds of trust anddeeds of assignment, some in the name of particular persons,some in blank.


10/56

PALE | Imprescriptibility of Disbarment & Conflict of Interest | 10

We quote Atty. Ongkiko:

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

With the permission of this Hon. Court. I propose toestablish through these ACCRA lawyers that, one, theirso-called client is Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco. Second, itwas Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco who furnished all themonies to these subscription payments of thesecorporations who are now the petitioners in this case.Third, that these lawyers executed deeds of trust, somein the name of a particular person, some in blank.Now, these blank deeds are important to our claim thatsome of the shares are actually being held by thenominees for the late President Marcos. Fourth, theyalso executed deeds of assignment and some of theseassignments have also blank assignees. Again, this is

important to our claim that some of the shares are forMr. Cojuangco and some are for Mr. Marcos. Fifth, thatmost of these corporations are really just papercorporations. Why do we say that? One: There are noreally fixed sets of officers, no fixed sets of directors atthe time of incorporation and even up to 1986, which isthe crucial year. And not only that, they have nopermits from the municipal authorities in Makati. Next,actually all their addresses now are care of Villareal LawOffice. They really have no address on records. Theseare some of the principal things that we would ask ofthese nominees stockholders, as they calledthemselves. [16]

It would seem that petitioners are merely standing in fortheir clients as defendants in the complaint. Petitioners arebeing prosecuted solely on the basis of activities and servicesperformed in the course of their duties as lawyers. Quiteobviously, petitioners inclusion as co -defendants in thecomplaint is merely being used as leverage to compel them toname their clients and consequently to enable the PCGG to nail

these clients. Such being the case, respondent PCGG has novalid cause of action as against petitioners and should excludethem from the Third Amended Complaint.

IIThe nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised on the

Roman Law concepts of locatio conductio operarum (contract oflease of services) where one person lets his services andanother hires them without reference to the object of which theservices are to be performed, wherein lawyers' services may becompensated by honorarium or for hire, [17] and mandato (contract of agency) wherein a friend on whom reliance couldbe placed makes a contract in his name, but gives up all that hegained by the contract to the person who requested him. [18] Butthe lawyer-client relationship is more than that of the principal-agent and lessor-lessee.

In modern day perception of the lawyer-client relationship,an attorney is more than a mere agent or servant, because hepossesses special powers of trust and confidence reposed onhim by his client. [19] A lawyer is also as independent as the

judge of the court, thus his powers are entirely different fromand superior to those of an ordinary agent. [20] Moreover, anattorney also occupies what may be considered as a "quasi-

judicial office" since he is in fact an officer of the Court [21] andexercises his judgment in the choice of courses of action to be

taken favorable to his client.Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are

rules, ethical conduct and duties that breathe life into it, amongthose, the fiduciary duty to his client which is of a very delicate,exacting and confidential character, requiring a very highdegree of fidelity and good faith, [22] that is required by reasonof necessity and public interest [23] based on the hypothesis thatabstinence from seeking legal advice in a good cause is an evilwhich is fatal to the administration of justice. [24]

It is also the strict sense of fidelity of a lawyer to his client


11/56


that distinguishes him from any other professional in society.This conception is entrenched and embodies centuries ofestablished and stable tradition. [25] In Stockton v. Ford, [26] theU.S. Supreme Court held:

There are few of the business relations of lifeinvolving a higher trust and confidence than that of

attorney and client, or generally speaking, one morehonorably and faithfully discharged; few more anxiouslyguarded by the law, or governed by the sternerprinciples of morality and justice; and it is the duty ofthe court to administer them in a corresponding spirit,and to be watchful and industrious, to see thatconfidence thus reposed shall not be used to thedetriment or prejudice of the rights of the partybestowing it. [27]

In our jurisdiction, this privilege takes off from the old Codeof Civil Procedure enacted by the Philippine Commission on August 7, 1901. Section 383 of the Code specifically forbidscounsel, without authority of his client to reveal anycommunication made by the client to him or his advice giventhereon in the course of professional employment. [28] Passedon into various provisions of the Rules of Court, the attorney-client privilege, as currently worded provides:

Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged

communication. - The following persons cannot testifyas to matters learned in confidence in the followingcases:

x x x

An attorney cannot, without the consent of hisclient, be examined as to any communicationmade by the client to him, or his advice giventhereon in the course of, or with a view to,professional employment, can an attorneys

secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined,

without the consent of the client and hisemployer, concerning any fact the knowledge ofwhich has been acquired in such capacity. [29]

Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 20. It is the duty of an attorney:

(e) to maintain inviolate the confidence, and atevery peril to himself, to preserve the secrets ofhis client, and to accept no compensation inconnection with his cl ients business exceptfrom him or with his knowledge and approval.

This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the Code ofProfessional Responsibility which provides that:

Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause ofhis client and he shall be mindful of the trust andconfidence reposed in him.Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also demands

a lawyer's fidelity to client:

The lawyer owes "entire devotion to the interest ofthe client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense ofhis rights and the exertion of his utmost learning andability," to the end that nothing be taken or be withheldfrom him, save by the rules of law, legally applied. No

fear of judicial disfavor or public popularity shouldrestrain him from the full discharge of his duty. In the judicial forum the client is entitled to the benefit of anyand every remedy and defense that is authorized by thelaw of the land, and he may expect his lawyer to assertevery such remedy or defense. But it is steadfastly tobe borne in mind that the great trust of the lawyer is tobe performed within and not without the bounds of thelaw. The office of attorney does not permit, much lessdoes it demand of him for any client, violation of law or


12/56


any manner of fraud or chicanery. He must obey hisown conscience and not that of his client.

Considerations favoring confidentiality in lawyer-clientrelationships are many and serve several constitutional andpolicy concerns. In the constitutional sphere, the privilege givesflesh to one of the most sacrosanct rights available to the

accused, the right to counsel. If a client were made to choosebetween legal representation without effective communicationand disclosure and legal representation with all his secretsrevealed then he might be compelled, in some instances, toeither opt to stay away from the judicial system or to lose theright to counsel. If the price of disclosure is too high, or if itamounts to self incrimination, then the flow of informationwould be curtailed thereby rendering the right practicallynugatory. The threat this represents against another sacrosanctindividual right, the right to be presumed innocent is at onceself-evident.

Encouraging full disclosure to a lawyer by one seeking legalservices opens the door to a whole spectrum of legal optionswhich would otherwise be circumscribed by limited informationengendered by a fear of disclosure. An effective lawyer-clientrelationship is largely dependent upon the degree of confidencewhich exists between lawyer and client which in turn requires asituation which encourages a dynamic and fruitful exchange andflow of information. It necessarily follows that in order to attaineffective representation, the lawyer must invoke the privilegenot as a matter of option but as a matter of duty andprofessional responsibility.

The question now arises whether or not this duty may beasserted in refusing to disclose the name of petitioners' client(s)in the case at bar. Under the facts and circumstances obtainingin the instant case, the answer must be in the affirmative.

As a matter of public policy, a clients identity should not beshrouded in mystery. [30] Under this premise, the general rule in

our jurisdiction as well as in the United States is that a lawyermay not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name oridentity of his client. [31]

The reasons advanced for the general rule are wellestablished.

First, the court has a right to know that the client whoseprivileged information is sought to be protected is flesh andblood.

Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been established. The attorney-clientprivilege does not attach until there is a client.

Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matterof the relationship.

Finally, due process considerations require that theopposing party should, as a general rule, know his adversary.

A party suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponentis. [32] He cannot be obliged to grope in the dark againstunknown forces. [33]

Notwithstanding these considerations, the general rule ishowever qualified by some important exceptions.

1) Client identity is privileged where a strongprobability exists that revealing the clients name

would implicate that client in the very activity forwhich he sought the lawyers advice.

In Ex-Parte Enzor, [34] a state supreme court reversed alower court order requiring a lawyer to divulge the name of herclient on the ground that the subject matter of the relationshipwas so closely related to the issue of the clients identity thatthe privilege actually attached to both. In Enzor , theunidentified client, an election official, informed his attorney inconfidence that he had been offered a bribe to violate electionlaws or that he had accepted a bribe to that end. In her


13/56


testimony, the attorney revealed that she had advised her clientto count the votes correctly, but averred that she could notremember whether her client had been, in fact, bribed. Thelawyer was cited for contempt for her refusal to reveal hisclients identity before a grand jury. Reversing the lower courtscontempt orders, the state supreme court held that under thecircumstances of the case, and under the exceptions describedabove, even the name of the client was privileged.

U.S. v. Hodge and Zweig, [35] involved the same exception,i.e. that client identity is privileged in those instances where astrong probability exists that the disclosure of the client'sidentity would implicate the client in the very criminal activityfor which the lawyers legal adv ice was obtained.

The Hodge case involved federal grand jury proceedingsinquiring into the activities of the Sandino Gang, a gang

involved in the illegal importation of drugs in the United States.The respondents, law partners, represented key witnesses andsuspects including the leader of the gang, Joe Sandino.

In connection with a tax investigation in November of1973, the IRS issued summons to Hodge and Zweig, requiringthem to produce documents and information regarding paymentreceived by Sandino on behalf of any other person, and viceversa. The lawyers refused to divulge the names. The NinthCircuit of the United States Court of Appeals, upholding non-

disclosure under the facts and circumstances of the case, held: A clients identity and the nature of that clients fee

arrangements may be privileged where the person invoking theprivilege can show that a strong probability exists thatdisclosure of such information would implicate that client in thevery criminal activity for which legal advice was sought Baird v.Koerner , 279 F.2d at 680. While in Baird Owe enunciated thisrule as a matter of California law, the rule also reflects federallaw. Appellants contend that the Baird exception applies to thiscase.

The Baird exception is entirely consonant with the principalpolicy behind the attorney- client privilege. In order to promotefreedom of consultation of legal advisors by clients, theapprehension of compelled disclosure from the legal advisorsmust be removed; hence, the law must prohibit such disclosureexcept on the clients consent. 8 J. Wigmore, supra sec. 2291,at 545. In furtherance of this policy, the clients identity andthe nature of his fee arrangements are, in exceptional cases,protected as confidential communications. [36]

2) Where disclosure would open the client to civilliability, his identity is privileged. For instance, thepeculiar facts and circumstances of Neugass v.Terminal Cab Corporation, [37] prompted the New YorkSupreme Court to allow a lawyers claim t o theeffect that he could not reveal the name of his clientbecause this would expose the latter to civil litigation.

In the said case, Neugass , the plaintiff, suffered injury whenthe taxicab she was riding, owned by respondent corporation,collided with a second taxicab, whose owner was unknown.Plaintiff brought action both against defendant corporation andthe owner of the second cab, identified in the information onlyas John Doe. It turned out that when the attorney of defendantcorporation appeared on preliminary examination, the fact wassomehow revealed that the lawyer came to know the name ofthe owner of the second cab when a man, a client of theinsurance company, prior to the institution of legal action, cameto him and reported that he was involved in a car accident. Itwas apparent under the circumstances that the man was theowner of the second cab. The state supreme court held thatthe reports were clearly made to the lawyer in his professionalcapacity. The court said:

That his employment came about through the fact that theinsurance company had hired him to defend its policyholdersseems immaterial. The attorney in such cases is clearly theattorney for the policyholder when the policyholder goes to him


14/56


to report an occurrence contemplating that it would be used inan action or claim against him. [38]

x x x xxx xxx.

All communications made by a client to his counsel, for thepurpose of professional advice or assistance, are privileged,whether they relate to a suit pending or contemplated, or toany other matter proper for such advice or aid; x x x Andwhenever the communication made, relates to a matter soconnected with the employment as attorney or counsel as toafford presumption that it was the ground of the address by theclient, then it is privileged from disclosure. xxx.

It appears... that the name and address of the owner of thesecond cab came to the attorney in this case as a confidentialcommunication. His client is not seeking to use the courts, andhis address cannot be disclosed on that theory, nor is thepresent action pending against him as service of the summonson him has not been effected. The objections on which thecourt reserved decision are sustained. [39]

In the case of Matter of Shawmut Mining Company, [40] thelawyer involved was required by a lower court to disclosewhether he represented certain clients in a certain transaction.The purpose of the courts request was to determine whetherthe unnamed persons as interested parties were connected withthe purchase of properties involved in the action. The lawyerrefused and brought the question to the State Supreme Court.Upholding the lawyers refusal to divulge the names of hisclients the court held:

If it can compel the witness to state, as directed by theorder appealed from, that he represented certain persons in thepurchase or sale of these mines, it has made progress inestablishing by such evidence their version of the litigation. Asalready suggested, such testimony by the witness would compelhim to disclose not only that he was attorney for certain people,

but that, as the result of communications made to him in the

course of such employment as such attorney, he knew that theywere interested in certain transactions. We feel sure that undersuch conditions no case has ever gone to the length ofcompelling an attorney, at the instance of a hostile litigant, todisclose not only his retainer, but the nature of the transactionsto which it related, when such information could be made thebasis of a suit against his client. [41]

3) Where the governments lawyers have no case againstan attorneys client unless, by revealing the clients name, thesaid name would furnish the only link that would form the chainof testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, theclients name is privileged.

In Baird vs Korner, [42] a lawyer was consulted by theaccountants and the lawyer of certain undisclosed taxpayersregarding steps to be taken to place the undisclosed taxpayers

in a favorable position in case criminal charges were broughtagainst them by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS).

It appeared that the taxpayers returns of previous yearswere probably incorrect and the taxes understated. The clientsthemselves were unsure about whether or not they violated taxlaws and sought advice from Baird on the hypotheticalpossibility that they had. No investigation was then beingundertaken by the IRS of the taxpayers. Subsequently, theattorney of the taxpayers delivered to Baird the sum of

$12,706.85, which had been previously assessed as the tax due,and another amount of money representing his fee for theadvice given. Baird then sent a check for $12,706.85 to the IRSin Baltimore, Maryland, with a note explaining the payment, butwithout naming his clients. The IRS demanded that Bairdidentify the lawyers, accountants, and other clients involved.Baird refused on the ground that he did not know their names,and declined to name the attorney and accountants becausethis constituted privileged communication. A petition was filedfor the enforcement of the IRS summons. For Bairds repeated

refusal to name his clients he was found guilty of civil contempt.


15/56


The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that, a lawyer could notbe forced to reveal the names of clients who employed him topay sums of money to the government voluntarily in settlementof undetermined income taxes, unsued on, and with nogovernment audit or investigation into that clients income taxliability pending. The court emphasized the exception that aclients name is privileged when so much has been revealedconcerning the legal services rendered that the disclosure of theclients identity exposes him to possible investigation andsanction by government agencies. The Court held:

The facts of the instant case bring it squarely withinthat exception to the general rule. Here money wasreceived by the government, paid by persons whothereby admitted they had not paid a sufficient amountin income taxes some one or more years in the past.The names of the clients are useful to the governmentfor but one purpose - to ascertain which taxpayers thinkthey were delinquent, so that it may check the recordsfor that one year or several years. The voluntarynature of the payment indicates a belief by thetaxpayers that more taxes or interest or penalties aredue than the sum previously paid, if any. It indicates afeeling of guilt for nonpayment of taxes, thoughwhether it is criminal guilt is undisclosed. But it maywell be the link that could form the chain of testimony

necessary to convict an individual of a federal crime.Certainly the payment and the feeling of guilt are thereasons the attorney here involved was employed - toadvise his clients what, under the circumstances, shouldbe done. [43]

Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist othersituations which could qualify as exceptions to the general rule.

For example, the content of any client communication to alawyer lies within the privilege if it is relevant to the subject

matter of the legal problem on which the client seeks legal

assistance. [44] Moreover, where the nature of the attorney-clientrelationship has been previously disclosed and it is the identity which is intended to be confidential , the identity of the clienthas been held to be privileged, since such revelation wouldotherwise result in disclosure of the entire transaction. [45]

Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the

identity of a client may fall within the ambit of the privilegewhen the clients name itself has an independent significance,such that disclosure would then reveal client confidences. [46]

The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers inthe case at bench, therefore, clearly reveal that the instant casefalls under at least two exceptions to the general rule. First,disclosure of the alleged client's name would lead to establishsaid client's connection with the very fact in issue of the case,which is privileged information, because the privilege, as stated

earlier, protects the subject matter or the substance (withoutwhich there would be no attorney-client relationship).

The link between the alleged criminal offense and the legaladvice or legal service sought was duly established in the caseat bar, by no less than the PCGG itself. The key lies in the threespecific conditions laid down by the PCGG which constitutespetitioners ticket t o non-prosecution should they accedethereto:

(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;

(b) submission of documents substantiating thelawyer-client relationship; and

(c) the submission of the deeds of assignmentpetitioners executed in favor of their clients coveringtheir respective shareholdings.

From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readilydeduce that the clients indeed consulted the petitioners, in theircapacity as lawyers, regarding the financial and corporate

structure, framework and set-up of the corporations in question.


16/56


In turn, petitioners gave their professional advice in the form of,among others, the aforementioned deeds of assignmentcovering their clients shareholdings.

There is no question that the preparation of the aforestateddocuments was part and parcel of petitioners legal service totheir clients. More important, it constituted an integral part of

their duties as lawyers. Petitioners, therefore, have a legitimatefear that identifying their clients would implicate them in thevery activity for which legal advice had been sought, i.e., thealleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the aforementionedcorporations.

Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation ofthe client's name would obviously provide the necessary link forthe prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists.It is the link, in the words of Baird, that would inevitably form

the chain of testimony necessary to convict the (client) of a...crime." [47]

An important distinction must be made between a casewhere a client takes on the services of an attorney for illicitpurposes, seeking advice about how to go around the law forthe purpose of committing illegal activities and a case where aclient thinks he might have previously committed somethingillegal and consults his attorney about it. The first case clearlydoes not fall within the privilege because the same cannot be

invoked for purposes illegal. The second case falls within theexception because whether or not the act for which the adviceturns out to be illegal, his name cannot be used or disclosed ifthe disclosure leads to evidence, not yet in the hands of theprosecution, which might lead to possible action against him.

These cases may be readily distinguished, because theprivilege cannot be invoked or used as a shield for an illegal act,as in the first example; while the prosecution may not have acase against the client in the second example and cannot usethe attorney client relationship to build up a case against the

latter. The reason for the first rule is that it is not within theprofessional character of a lawyer to give advice on thecommission of a crime. [48] The reason for the second has beenstated in the cases above discussed and are founded on thesame policy grounds for which the attorney-client privilege, ingeneral, exists.

In Matter of Shawmut Mining Co., supra, the appellate courttherein stated that "under such conditions no case has ever yetgone to the length of compelling an attorney, at the instance ofa hostile litigant, to disclose not only his retainer, but the natureof the transactions to which it related, when such informationcould be made the basis of a suit against his client. [49] "Communications made to an attorney in the course of anypersonal employment, relating to the subject thereof ,and which may be supposed to be drawn out in consequence ofthe relation in which the parties stand to each other, are underthe seal of confidence and entitled to protection as privilegedcommunications." [50] Where the communicated information,which clearly falls within the privilege, would suggest possiblecriminal activity but there would be not much in the informationknown to the prosecution which would sustain a charge exceptthat revealing the name of the client would open up otherprivileged information which would substantiate theprosecutions suspicions, then the clients identity is soinextricably linked to the subject matter itself that it falls within

the protection. The Baird exception, applicable to the instantcase, is consonant with the principal policy behind the privilege,i.e., that for the purpose of promoting freedom of consultationof legal advisors by clients, apprehension of compelleddisclosure from attorneys must be eliminated. This exception has likewise been sustained in In re Grand Jury Proceedings [51] and Tillotson v. Boughner. [52] What these cases unanimouslyseek to avoid is the exploitation of the general rule in what mayamount to a fishing expedition by the prosecution.

There are, after all, alternative sources of information


17/56


available to the prosecutor which do not depend on utilizing adefendant's counsel as a convenient and readily availablesource of information in the building of a case against the latter.Compelling disclosure of the client's name in circumstances suchas the one which exists in the case at bench amounts tosanctioning fishing expeditions by lazy prosecutors and litigantswhich we cannot and will not countenance. When the nature ofthe transaction would be revealed by disclosure of an attorney'sretainer, such retainer is obviously protected by the privilege. [53] It follows that petitioner attorneys in the instant case owe theirclient(s) a duty and an obligation not to disclose the latter'sidentity which in turn requires them to invoke the privilege.

In fine, the crux of petitioners' objections ultimately hingeson their expectation that if the prosecution has a case againsttheir clients, the latter's case should be built upon evidencepainstakingly gathered by them from their own sources and notfrom compelled testimony requiring them to reveal the name oftheir clients, information which unavoidably reveals much aboutthe nature of the transaction which may or may not be illegal.The logical nexus between name and nature of transaction is sointimate in this case that it would be difficult to simplydissociate one from the other. In this sense, the name is asmuch "communication" as information revealed directly aboutthe transaction in question itself, a communication which isclearly and distinctly privileged. A lawyer cannot reveal such

communication without exposing himself to charges of violatinga principle which forms the bulwark of the entire attorney-clientrelationship.

The uberrimei fidei relationship between a lawyer and hisclient therefore imposes a strict liability for negligence on theformer. The ethical duties owing to the client, includingconfidentiality, loyalty, competence, diligence as well as theresponsibility to keep clients informed and protect their rights tomake decisions have been zealously sustained. In Milbank,Tweed, Hadley and McCloy v. Boon ,[54] the US Second District

Court rejected the plea of the petitioner law firm that itbreached its fiduciary duty to its client by helping the latter'sformer agent in closing a deal for the agent's benefit only afterits client hesitated in proceeding with the transaction, thuscausing no harm to its client. The Court instead ruled thatbreaches of a fiduciary relationship in any context comprise aspecial breed of cases that often loosen normally stringentrequirements of causation and damages, and found in favor ofthe client.

To the same effect is the ruling in Searcy, Denney, Scarola,Barnhart, and Shipley P.A. v. Scheller [55] requiring strictobligation of lawyers vis-a-vis clients. In this case, a contingentfee lawyer was fired shortly before the end of completion of hiswork, and sought payment quantum meruit of work done. Thecourt, however, found that the lawyer was fired for cause afterhe sought to pressure his client into signing a new feeagreement while settlement negotiations were at a criticalstage. While the client found a new lawyer during theinterregnum , events forced the client to settle for less thanwhat was originally offered. Reiterating the principle offiduciary duty of lawyers to clients in Meinhard v. Salmon [56] famously attributed to Justice Benjamin Cardozo that "Nothonesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive,is then the standard of behavior," the US Court found that thelawyer involved was fired for cause, thus deserved no attorney's

fees at all.The utmost zeal given by Courts to the protection of the

lawyer-client confidentiality privilege and lawyer's loyalty to hisclient is evident in the duration of the protection, which existsnot only during the relationship, but extends even after thetermination of the relationship. [57]

Such are the unrelenting duties required of lawyers vis-a-vis their clients because the law, which the lawyers are sworn touphold, in the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes, [58] "xxx is an

exacting goddess, demanding of her votaries in intellectual and


18/56


19/56


Amended Complaint, signed by counsel, claiming that their actswere made in furtherance of "legitimate lawyering. [60] Being"similarly situated" in this regard, public respondents must showthat there exist other conditions and circumstances which wouldwarrant their treating the private respondent differently frompetitioners in the case at bench in order to evade a violation ofthe equal protection clause of the Constitution.

To this end, public respondents contend that the primaryconsideration behind their decision to sustain the PCGG'sdropping of private respondent as a defendant was his promiseto disclose the identities of the clients in question. However,respondents failed to show - and absolutely nothing existsin the records of the case at bar - that private respondentactually revealed the identity of his client(s) to the PCGG. Sincethe undertaking happens to be the leitmotif of the entirearrangement between Mr. Roco and the PCGG, an undertakingwhich is so material as to have justified PCGG's specialtreatment exempting the private respondent from prosecution,respondent Sandiganbayan should have required proof of theundertaking more substantial than a "bare assertion" thatprivate respondent did indeed comply with the undertaking .Instead, as manifested by the PCGG, only three documentswere submitted for the purpose, two of which were mererequests for re-investigation and one simply disclosed certainclients which petitioners (ACCRA lawyers) were themselveswilling to reveal. These were clients to whom both petitionersand private respondent rendered legal services while all of themwere partners at ACCRA, and were not the clients which thePCGG wanted disclosed for the alleged questionedtransactions. [61]

To justify the dropping of the private respondent from thecase or the filing of the suit in the respondent court withouthim, therefore, the PCGG should conclusively show that Mr.Roco was treated as a species apart from the rest of the ACCRAlawyers on the basis of a classification which made substantial

distinctions based on real differences. No such substantialdistinctions exist from the records of the case at bench, inviolation of the equal protection clause.

The equal protection clause is a guarantee which provides awall of protection against uneven application of statutes andregulations. In the broader sense, the guarantee operates

against uneven application of legal norms so that all personsunder similar circumstances would be accorded the sametreatment. [62] Those who fall within a particular class ought tobe treated alike not only as to privileges granted but also as tothe liabilities imposed.

x x x. What is required under this constitutionalguarantee is the uniform operation of legal norms sothat all persons under similar circumstances would beaccorded the same treatment both in the privileges

conferred and the liabilities imposed. As was noted in arecent decision: Favoritism and undue preferencecannot be allowed. For the principle is that equalprotection and security shall be given to every personunder circumstances, which if not identical areanalogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden orcharges, those that fall within a class should be treatedin the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on somein the group equally binding the rest. [63]

We find that the condition precedent required by therespondent PCGG of the petitioners for their exclusion asparties-defendants in PCGG Case No. 33 violates the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege. The condition also constitutes atransgression by respondents Sandiganbayan and PCGG of theequal protection clause of the Constitution. [64] It is grossly unfairto exempt one similarly situated litigant from prosecutionwithout allowing the same exemption to the others. Moreover,the PCGGs demand not only touches upon the question of theidentity of their clients but also on documents related to the

suspected transactions, not only in violation of the attorney-


20/56


client privilege but also of the constitutional right against self-incrimination. Whichever way one looks at it, this is a fishingexpedition, a free ride at the expense of such rights.

An argument is advanced that the invocation by petitionersof the privilege of attorney-client confidentiality at this stage ofthe proceedings is premature and that they should wait until

they are called to testify and examine as witnesses as tomatters learned in confidence before they can raise theirobjections. But petitioners are not mere witnesses. They areco-principals in the case for recovery of alleged ill-gottenwealth. They have made their position clear from the verybeginning that they are not willing to testify and they cannot becompelled to testify in view of their constitutional right againstself-incrimination and of their fundamental legal right tomaintain inviolate the privilege of attorney-client confidentiality.

It is clear then that the case against petitioners shouldnever be allowed to take its full course in the Sandiganbayan.Petitioners should not be made to suffer the effects of furtherlitigation when it is obvious that their inclusion in the complaintarose from a privileged attorney-client relationship and as ameans of coercing them to disclose the identities of their clients.To allow the case to continue with respect to them when thisCourt could nip the problem in the bud at this early opportunitywould be to sanction an unjust situation which we should nothere countenance. The case hangs as a real and palpablethreat, a proverbial Sword of Damocles over petitioners' heads.It should not be allowed to continue a day longer.

While we are aware of respondent PCGGs legal mandate torecover ill-gotten wealth, we will not sanction acts which violatethe equal protection guarantee and the right against self-incrimination and subvert the lawyer-client confidentialityprivilege.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, theResolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan (First Division)

promulgated on March 18, 1992 and May 21, 1992 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Sandiganbayan isfurther ordered to exclude petitioners Teodoro D. Regala,Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion,*Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta andParaja G. Hayuduni as parties-defendants in SB Civil Case No.0033 entitled " Republic of the Philippines v. Eduardo Cojuangco,Jr., et al .".

SO ORDERED.


21/56


EN BANC

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, A.C. No.6632

INC., and BEN A. NICOLAS,

Complainants, Present:

DavideJr., CJ,

Puno,

Panganiban,

Quisumbing,

Ynares-Santiago,

Sandoval-Gutierrez,

- versus - Carpio,

Austria-Martinez,

Corona,*

CarpioMorales,

CallejoSr.,

Azcuna,

Tinga,

Chico-Nazario, and

Garcia,JJ

Promulgated:

Atty. MACARIO D. ARQUILLO,

Respondent. August 2, 2005

x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --- -- ---- -- -- x


22/56


DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J .:

epresenting conflicting interests is prohibited by the Code ofProfessional Responsibility. Unless all the affected

clients

__________________

* On official leave.

R


23/56


24/56


In a consolidation of NLRC Cases [Nos.] 1 -05-1086-97, 1-05-1087-97, 1-05-1088-97, 1-05-1091-97, 1-05-1092-97, 1-05-1097-97, 1-05-1109-97, 1-05-1096- 97 ( consolidated cases ), herein[r]espondent appeared as counsel forcomplainants therein , Teresita A. Velasco,Gervacio A. Velasco, Mariel S. Hernando, VirginioC. Rasos, Bonifacio S. Blas, Ronald A. Daoang,Luzviminda T. Urcio and Araceli Quimoyog. In thevery same consolidated case , [r]espondentwas also the counsel of one of the respondentstherein, Jose G. Castro.

Complainants, as their evidence, submittedthe Motion to Dismiss dated August 12, 1997 filed

by Jose G. Castro, represented by his counsel,herein [r]espondent filed before the NLRC of SanFernando, La Union. Sixteen (16) days later or on

August 28, 1997, [r]espondent filed aComplainants Consolidated Position Paper, thistime representing some of the complainants inthe very same consolidated case . [2] (Citationsomitted)

Respondent failed to file his Answer to the Complaintdespite a June 24 1998 Orde r[3] of the IBP-CBD directing him todo so. Even after receiving five notices, he failed to appear inany of the scheduled hearings. Consequently, he was deemedto have waived his right to participate in the proceedings.Thereafter, the complainants were ordered to submit their

verified position paper with supporting documents, after whichthe case was to be deemed submitted for decision . [4] In theirManifestation [5] dated August 30, 2004, they said that theywould no longer file a position paper. They agreed to submitthe case for decision on the basis of their Letter-Affidavit datedMarch 16, 1998, together with all the accompanyingdocuments.

Report and Recommendation of the IBP

In his Report ,[6] Commissioner Dennis B. Funa foundrespondent guilty of violating the conflict-of-interests rule underthe Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, the formerrecommended the latters suspensio n from the practice of lawfor a period of six (6) months.

In Resolution No. XVI-2004-415 dated October 7, 2004,the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted the Report andRecommendation of Commissioner Funa, with the modificationthat the period of suspension was increased to two (2) years.

On December 12, 2004, the Resolution and the recordsof the case were transmitted to this Court for final action,pursuant to Section 12(b) of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.On January 20, 2005, respondent filed a Motion forReconsideration to set aside Resolution No. XVI-2004-415. TheIBP denied the Motion.

The Courts Ruling
http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6632.htm#_ftn2#_ftn2http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6632.htm#_ftn2#_ftn2http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6632.htm#_ftn2#_ftn2http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6632.htm#_ftn3#_ftn3http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6632.htm#_ftn3#_ftn3http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6632.htm#_ftn3#_ftn3http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6632.htm#_ftn4#_ftn4http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6632.htm#_ftn4#_ftn4http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6632.htm#_ftn4#_ftn4http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6632.htm#_ftn5#_ftn5http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6632.htm#_ftn5#_ftn5http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6632.htm#_ftn6#_ftn6http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6632.htm#_ftn6#_ftn6http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6632.htm#_ftn6#_ftn6http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6632.htm#_ftn6#_ftn6http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6632.htm#_ftn5#_ftn5http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6632.htm#_ftn4#_ftn4http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6632.htm#_ftn3#_ftn3http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6632.htm#_ftn2#_ftn2


25/56


We agree with the findings of the IBP Board ofGovernors, but reduce the recommended period of suspensionto one year.

Administrative Liability of Respondent

The Code of Professional Responsibility requires lawyersto observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all their dealings andtransactions with their clients .[7] Corollary to this duty, lawyersshall not represent conflicting interests, except with all theconcerned clients written consent, given after a full disclosureof the facts .[8]

When a lawyer represents two or more opposing parties,there is a conflict of interests, the existence of which isdetermined by three separate tests: (1) when, inrepresentation of one client, a lawyer is required to fight for anissue or claim, but is also duty-bound to oppose it for anotherclient; (2) when the acceptance of the new retainer will requirean attorney to perform an act that may injuriously affect the

first client or, when called upon in a new relation, to use againstthe first one any knowledge acquired through their professionalconnection; or (3) when the acceptance of a new relation wouldprevent the full disch arge of an attorneys duty to giveundivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or would invitesuspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performanceof that duty .[9]

In the present case, Atty. Macario D. Arquillo, as counselfor Respondent Jose C. Castro in NLRC Case Nos. I-05-1083-97to I-05-1109-97, filed a Motion to Dismiss those cases. Shortlythereafter, a position paper was filed by Atty. Arquillo ascounsel for several complainants in consolidated NLRC CaseNos. I-05-1087-97, I-05-1088-97, I-05-1091-97, I-05-1092-97,I-05-1096-97, I-05-1097-97, and I-05-1109-97. All the cases inthe second set were included in the first one, for which he hadfiled the subject Motion to Dismiss. Furthermore, in his positionpaper for the complainants, Atty. Arquillo protected his otherclient, Respondent Jose C. Castro, in these words:

3. More than lack of valid cause for thedismissal of complainants, respondents, except Atty. Jose C. Castro and Atty. Ernesto B. Asuncion, should be made accountable for notaccording complainants their right to dueprocess. [10]

In his two-page Motion for Reconsideration, Atty. Arquilloclaims that there was no conflict of interest in his representationof both the respondent and the complainants in the sameconsolidated cases, because all of them were allegedly on thesame side. Attaching to the Motion the Decision of Labor

Arbiter Norma C. Olegario on the consolidated NLRC cases, Atty. Arquillo theorizes that her judgment absolved Castro of personalliability for the illegal dismissal of the complainants; this factallegedly showed that there was no conflict in the interests of allthe parties concerned.
http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6632.htm#_ftn7#_ftn7http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6632.htm#_ftn7#_ftn7http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6632.htm#_ftn7#_ftn7http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6632.htm#_ftn8#_ftn8http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6632.htm#_ftn8#_ftn8http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6632.htm#_ftn8#_ftn8http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6632.htm#_ftn9#_ftn9http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6632.htm#_ftn9#_ftn9http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6632.htm#_ftn9#_ftn9http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6632.htm#_ftn10#_ftn10http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6632.htm#_ftn10#_ftn10http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6632.htm#_ftn10#_ftn10http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6632.htm#_ftn9#_ftn9http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6632.htm#_ftn8#_ftn8http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6632.htm#_ftn7#_ftn7


26/56


This Court does not agree. Atty. Arquillos acts cannotbe justified by the fact that, in the end, Castro was proven to benot personally liable for the claims of the dismissed employees.Having agreed to represent one of the opposing parties first,the lawyer should have known that there was an obviousconflict of interests, regardless of his alleged belief that theywere all on the same side. It cannot be denied that thedismissed employees were the complainants in the same casesin which Castro was one of the respondents. Indeed,Commissioner Funa correctly enounced:

As counsel for complainants, [r]espondent had the duty to oppose the Motion to Dismissfiled by Jose G. Castro. But under thecircumstance, it would be impossible since

[r]espondent is also the counsel of Jose G.Castro. And it appears that it was [r]espondentwho prepared the Motion to Dismiss, which heshould be opposing [a]s counsel of Jose G. Castro,Respondent had the duty to prove theComplaint wrong . But Respondent cannot dothis because he is the counsel for thecomplainants. Here lies the inconsistency.The inconsistency of interests is very clear.

Thus it has been noted

The attorney in that situationwill not be able to pursue, withvigor and zeal, the clients claimagainst the other and to properlyrepresent the latter in the unrelated

action, or, if he can do so, hecannot avoid being suspected bythe defeated client of disloyalty orpartiality in favor of the successfulclient. The foregoing considerationswill strongly tend to deprive therelation of attorney and client ofthose special elements which makeit one of trust and confidence[.] (Legal Ethics, Agpalo, p. 230, 4thed.; In re De la Rosa, 21 Phil.258) [11]

An attorney cannot represent adverse interests. It is ahornbook doctrine grounded on public policy that a lawyersrepresentation of both sides of an issue is highly improper. Theproscription applies when the conflicting interests arise withrespect to the same general matter, however slight such conflictmay be. It applies even when the attorney acts from honestintentions or in good faith .[12]

The IBP Board of Governors recommended thatrespondent be suspended from the practice of law for twoyears. Considering, however, prior rulings in cases alsoinvolving attorneys representing conflicting interests, we reducethe suspension to one (1) year .[13]

WHEREFORE, Atty. Macario D. Arquillo is found GUILTYof misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice oflaw for a period of one (1) year effective upon his receipt of this
http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6632.htm#_ftn11#_ftn11http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6632.htm#_ftn11#_ftn11http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6632.htm#_ftn12#_ftn12http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6632.htm#_ftn12#_ftn12http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6632.htm#_ftn12#_ftn12http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6632.htm#_ftn13#_ftn13http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6632.htm#_ftn13#_ftn13http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6632.htm#_ftn13#_ftn13http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6632.htm#_ftn13#_ftn13http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6632.htm#_ftn12#_ftn12http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6632.htm#_ftn11#_ftn11


27/56


Decision, with a warning that a similar infraction shall be dealtwith more severely in the future.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[A.M. No. MTJ-95-1053. January 2, 1997]

SPOUSES MAKADAYA SADIK and USODAN SADIK,complainants, vs . JUDGE ABDALLAH CASAR,respondent .

D E C I S I O NPER CURIAM :

The case before us stemmed from a verified complaint filedby Spouses Makadaya and Usodan Sadik charging Judge

Abdallah Casar, Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Kolambugan-Tangcal, Lanao del Norte with misconduct and misappropriation.

Judge Casar filed his answer dated February 28, 1995averring that the complaint is merely for harassment andintended to ruin his reputation.

In the resolution of August 14, 1995, this Court referred thiscase to Executive Judge Valerio M. Salazar of the Regional TrialCourt of Iligan City and Lanao del Norte, Branch 6 forinvestigation, report and recommendation.

In his Report and Recommendation dated November 25,1995, the Investigating Judge made the following findings:

"The basic facts are not in dispute, to wit:

1. On February 14, 1985, one Lekiya Paitofiled an application for life insurance with theGreat Pacific Life Assurance Corporation(Grepalife) in Cotabato City, Exh. 5. Theapplication was approved and Policy No.


28/56


0503033 was issued in her name for theamount of P30,000.00 with an accidental deathbenefit rider. Named as beneficiaries were herdaughters, Linang Minalang and MakadayaSadik. She paid the initial premium of P 410.00.

2. On October 12, 1985, Lekiya Paito died

in Pagayawan, Tamparan, Lanao del Sur.3. The beneficiaries and/or through their

representatives sought for and obtained theassistance of respondent, who was then a trialattorney of the Bureau of Forest Development,Cotabato City, to pursue the approval of theirclaim for payment of the insurance benefitswith Grepalife. Respondent made the necessaryfollow-ups but in due course Grepalife deniedthe claim on the grounds of misrepresentationand concealment.

4. On October 10, 1986, respondent, ascounsel for the beneficiaries, filed a complaintin the Regional Trial Court, Br. 13, CotabatoCity which was docketed therein as Civil CaseNo. 2747 entitled: 'Makadaya L. Sadik andLinang Minalang, plaintiffs versus Great PacificLife Assurance Corporation, defendant' forSpecific Performance.

5. On November 17, 1989, the RegionalTrial Court rendered a decision in favor ofplaintiffs and against the defendant orderingthe latter to pay to the former the sum ofP30,000.00 as 'benefit due them underInsurance Policy No. 503033.' The court deniedplaintiffs' claim for double indemnity ofP60,000.00 under the accidental death rider. Atthis time, respondent was already the Presiding

Judge of the 5th Municipal Circuit Trial Court ofKolambugan-Maigo (now, MCTC ofKolambugan-Tangcal), having assumed suchoffice on September 1, 1989, Exh. 7.

6. Upon receipt of the decision, respondentas counsel for plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal

to the Court of Appeals even as defendantlikewise filed an appeal. Respondentrepresented the plaintiffs in the appeal. OnSeptember 22, 1992, the Court of Appealsaffirmed in toto the decision of the lower court.Defendant elevated the case on petition forreview to the Supreme Court which dismissedthe petition.

7. After the dismissal of its petition by theSupreme Court, Grepalife filed a Manifestationdated 6 July 1993 with the Regional Trial Court,Br. 13, Cotabato City declaring its willingness topay the judgment award and depositing withsaid court RCBC check No. 62837 in the amountof P30,000.00 payable to the plaintiffs. Copy ofthe manifestation was furnished to 'Atty.

Abdallah M. Casar, Counsel for the Plaintiffs,Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte' (pp. 44 & 55,Records).

8. On October 1, 1992, respondentcollected the check from the Clerk of Court ofthe Regional Trial Court, Br. 13, Cotabato Cityand thereafter cashed it.

9. Respondent did not deliver the saidmoney judgment to the plaintiffs.

10. On January 26, 1995, complainantsfiled their administrative complaint.


29/56


Respondent admitted that he retained the sum ofP30,000.00 representing the judgment award in Civil Case No.2747 and that he did not deliver it to the plaintiffs. Heinterposes the following defenses:

1. He is not guilty of any misconduct because heaccepted the case long before he became a judge;

2. He did not misappropriate the money he collectedfrom the court. It is intact but he has the right toretain the amount of P30,000.00 until he is paid hisexpenses pursuant to Section 137, Rule 138 onattorney's lien;

3. The complainant, Makadaya Sadik is not the realMakadaya Sadik, plaintiff in Civil Case No. 2747 andbeing an impostor she is not entitled to the money.

There is no dispute that when respondent agreed to file thecomplaint in behalf of Makadaya Sadik and Linang Minalang, hewas not yet a member of the judiciary. He was a trial attorneyof the Bureau of Forest Development. He claimed that he wasauthorized to engage in practice in behalf of relatives butpresented no documentary authority. He continued to representthe plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2747 when he joined the CitizensLegal Assistance Office in a private capacity. In fact he tookpains to emphasize that he handled the case not as a CLAOlawyer (tsn, p. 39; 11-13-95) although in his notices of change

of address, he gave his new addresses as follows: 'Atty. Abdallah M. Casar, CLAO, Capitol, Pigcarangan, Tubod, Lanaodel Norte' Exh. 10 and 'CLAO, Kabacan District Office, MunicipalHall Bldg., Kabacan, Province of Cotabato' Exh. 11. (pp. 119-120, Records). Similarly in his Memorandum dated 24 October1988, he signed as 'Attorney for Plaintiffs, CLAO, Kabacan,Cotabato,' Exh. B (pp. 89-96, Records). In those instances,while he was actually prosecuting the case in his privatecapacity, he gave the impression that he was handling the casefor the CLAO. By his own admission, he was engaged in a

private practice while employed as trial attorney with the BFDand citizen's attorney with the CLAO. He failed to produce proofof authority. But as he correctly states, those were actsperformed before he joined the judiciary. However, he failed tomention that even after he became a municipal judge, hecontinued to act as counsel for the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.2747 on appeal to the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.He assumed office on September 1, 1989. The decision of theRegional Trial Court was rendered on November 17, 1989. Hefiled an appeal in behalf of the plaintiffs even as Grepalife alsoappealed. He testified:

'Q. After that what happened?

A. The case' decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and eventually appealed again to theSupreme Court where I made severalmanifestations'. (tsn, p. 36; 11/13/95)

He actively handled the case on appeal. He violated Rule5:07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which states that 'A judgeshall not engage in the private practice of law.' He reasoned outthat he was forced to continue as counsel for the plaintiffsbecause he failed to get in touch with them after he receivedthe decision of the lower court. He even went to Davao to lookfor them but failed. A transparent and flimsy justification. Atthat time he was stationed in Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte. Heknew that plaintiffs are from Pagayawan, Tamparan, Lanao delSur. He is himself a native of Tatayawon, Tamparan. He couldhave easily went to his hometown or sent someone there to getin touch with plaintiffs. He did not have to go to Davao which ismuch further from Kolambugan than Tamparan. At any ratefailure to contact his clients is not reason enough to continue ascounsel for plaintiffs on appeal. The least which he should havedone was to secure permission from the Supreme Court beforeproceeding with the case on appeal.

He also denies having converted and misappropriated the


30/56


judgment award of P30,000.00. He claims the amount is intactbut he has the right to retain the same until he is paid for hisexpenses pursuant to Sec. 37, Rule 138 of the Rule of Court. Hedeclared:

'A. They failed to come and for all these, I estimatedmy expenses to be more than Thirty Thousand

(P30,000.00) Pesos.Q. What is your right in getting the amount of

P30,000.00?

A. Well, pursuant to Rule 138, Section 37 of the Rulesof Court known as attorney's liens by virtue of thatI have the right to retain the amount until paymentof my expenses was paid . . .' (sic) (tsn, pp. 38-39;11/13/95).

This is ridiculous. The judgment award is only P30,000.00but he spent more than P30,000.00 to recover it. Thus despitewinning the case, the client could not collect a single cent andwill still have to pay his lawyer. This may be one reason why theordinary layman holds an unflattering perception of lawyers.

His evidence fails to prove the amount of expenses claimedby him. He said that to follow-up the claim, he went to Manilasix times spending for fare alone P3000.00 for each trip. Whenthe case was on appeal to the Supreme Court, he went toManila to follow-up thrice (tsn, p. 38; 11/13/95). Except for hisuncorroborated testimony, there are only two documentsshowing he was indeed in Manila. Those are Exhs. 26 and 32indicating that he personally served those letters to Grepalife inManila. But there is no evidence that he went there for thispurpose alone. It is highly probable that the visit to Grepalifewas merely one of his purposes in going to Manila. On the otherhand, his claim that he went to Manila three times to follow-upthe case while it was pending with the Supreme Court isunworthy of credence. He was then already a municipal judge.

He could not have openly exposed himself to the Supreme

Court as being engaged in private practice. Besides there is noreason to follow-up in person any case with the Supreme Court.Similarly, his claims that he spent a lot of money in looking forwitnesses and trying to trace the whereabouts of his clients areself-serving, devoid of corroboration and unsupported bydocument evidence. Finally, he presented the receipts for thepayment of docket fees in the amount of P580.00, Exhs. 28 and29, which he alleges was paid by him out of his own pocket.Standing alone, those receipts do not prove his claim. Thenormal practice is for the client to advance to his lawyer theamount for the filing fees. It is the lawyer who pays the docketfees and he can easily procure the issuance of the receipts inhis own name. Complainant Makadaya Sadik declared that herhusband took care of the payment of the docket fees.Respondent did not cross-examine Usodan Sadik on this point.

In sum, respondent failed to show by clear and convincing

evidence that he did indeed spent more than P30,000.00 toprosecute the insurance claim. His various claims of expensesfor travels to Manila, to find witnesses and to look for his clientsare all designed to inflate his demand for reimbursement and

justify his withholding of the judgment award from his clients.To be generous, the sum of P6,000.00 corresponding to histrips to Manila in March and May, 1986 may be allowed. Addedto that may be his claim for attorney's fees, although to begenerous again, he is not really entitled to it. From thetestimonies of both Usodan Sadik and respondent, it appearsthat there was an agreement for the payment of P10,000.00 ifrespondent succeeds in recovering the sum of P 60,000.00 underthe accidental death rider. But this amount was not obtainedand only the basic claim of P30,000.00 was adjudged by thecourt. It is logical to assume that in such case, the amount ofattorney's fees should also be proportionally reduced toP5,000.00. Thus his total claim is not more than P11,000.00.Nonetheless, it appears that his reliance on Section 37, Rule138 of the Rules of Court is nothing more than an afterthought.

If indeed, he w

pale_impres to coi

Documents