pan american world airways, inc. vs. pan american employees association.pdf

2/3/16, 5:14 PMSUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 027

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1202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Pan American World Airways, Inc. vs. Pan AmericanEmployees Association

No. L-25094. April 29, 1969.

PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC., petitioner, vs.PAN AMERICAN EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, COURTOF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.

Labor laws; Court of Industrial Relations; Return-to-workorder; Court can order return of strikers pending resolution ofdispute; Order not grave abuse of discretion.Considering that thecase at bar was certified by the President, with respondent Courtexercising its broad authority of compulsory arbitration, thediscretion it possesses cannot be so restricted and emasculated thatthe mere f ailure to grant a plea to exclude f rom the returnto-workorder the union officials could be considered as tantamount to agrave abuse thereof. As f ar back as 1957, the Supreme Court,speaking through Justice Labrador, categorically stated: We agreewith counsel for the Philippine Marine Radio Off icers Associationthat upon certification by the President under section 10 ofRepublic Act 875, the case comes under the operation ofCommonwealth Act 103, which enforces compulsory arbitration incases of labor disputes in industries indispensable to the na-

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VOL. 27, APRIL 29, 1969 1203

Pan American World Airways, Inc. vs. Pan American EmployeesAssociation

tional interest when the President certif ies the case to the Court ofIndustrial Relations. The evident intention of the law is to empowerthe Court of Industrial Relations to act in such cases, not only in



the manner prescribed under Commonwealth Act 103, but with thesame broad powers and jurisdiction granted by that Act. If theCourt of Industrial Relations is granted authority to f ind a solutionin an industrial dispute and such solution consists in ordering ofemployees to return back to work, it cannot be contended that theCourt of Industrial Relations does not have the power orjurisdiction to carry that solution into effect. And of what use is itspower of conciliation and arbitration if it does not have the powerand jurisdiction to carry into ef fect the-, solution it has adopted.Lastly, if the said court has the power to fix the terms andconditions of employment, it certainly can order the return of theworkers with or without backpay as a term or condition of theemployment. (Phil. Marine Radio Officers Assn. vs. Court ofIndustrial Relations, 102 Phil. 374, 382383.)

Same; Same; Same; Refusal of company to accept employeesment. (Phil. Marine Radio Officers Assn. vs. Court of Industrialment displays what in the case at bar appears to be a grave butunwarranted distrust in the union officials discharging theirfunctions just because a strike was resorted to, then the integrity ofthe collective bargaining process itself is called into question. Itwould have been different if there were a rational basis for suchfears, purely speculative in character. The record is bereft of ,theslightest indication that any danger, much less one clear andpresent, is to be expected f rom their return to work. Necessarily,the union officials have the right to feel offended by the fact that,while they will be paid their salaries in the meanwhile, they wouldnot be considered as fit persons to perform the duties pertaining tothe positions held by them. Far from being generous, such an offercould rightfully be considered insulting.

Same; Same; Same; Right to form unions; Freedom would benugatory if employees cannot choose their own officials.Thegreater offense is to the labor movement itself, more specif ically tothe right of self-organization. There is both a constitutional andstatutory recognition that laborers have the right to form unions totake care of their interests vis-a-vis their employers. Their freedomto form organizations would be rendered nugatory if they could notchoose their own leaders to speak on their behalf and to bargain forthem.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.Certiorari.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

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Pan American World Airways, Inc. vs. Pan, AmericanEmployees Association

Ross, Selph. Salcedo, Del Rosario, Bito & Misa forpetitioner.

Jose C. Espinas & Associates for respondent PanAmerican Employees Association.

FERNANDO, J.:

The failure of the respondent Court of Industrial Relationsto indulge petitioner Pan American World Airways, Inc. inits plea to exclude from a return-to-work order five unionofficials of respondent Pan American EmployeesAssociation on the ground of having led an illegal strike, initself, according to petitioner, a sufficient cause fordismissal thus resulting in their losing their incentive andmotivation for doing their jobs properly with theconsequent fear that they could cause grave injury to it, ischallenged in this special civil action for certiorari asconstituting a grave abuse of discretion. Whatever may besaid against such order complained of respondent Court ofIndustrial Relations, the refusal to grant the prayer forsuch exclusion cannot be characterized as an abuse ofdiscretion, much less as one that possesses an element ofgravity.

So it must be unless we are prepared to restrict thebroad scope of authority possessed by respondent Court ofIndustrial Relations in discharging its power of compulsoryarbitration in cases certified to it by the President, andwhat is worse, unless an undeserved reflection on thequality of leadership in the labor movement, indicative ofmanagement refusal to accord to it the presumption ofresponsibility, is countenanced. The petition thus carries011 its face the seeds of its own infirmity. It cannot hope tosucceed.

It was set forth in the petition, after the usual allegationas to the personality of the parties, that on August 25,1965, respondent union filed a notice of strike with theDepartment of Labor and on August 28, 1965, the samerespondent union declared and maintained a strike against

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thequeenalexisHighlight







thequeenalexisSticky Noteunless prepared to restrict authority possessed by CIR in discharging its power of compulsory arbitration

unless an undeserved reflection on the quality of leadership in the labor movement, indicative of management refusal to accord to it the presumption of responsibility, is countenanced

petition is infirm and cannot hope to succeed




VOL. 27, APRIL 29, 1969 1205


the herein petitioner.1 Then, on September 17, 1965, the

President of the Philippines certif ied the strike to therespondent Court of Industrial Relations as being anindustrial dispute affecting the national interest, theparties being called to a conference on September 20, 1965.

2

Several conferences were held between petitioner andrespondent Union before the Honorable Amando C.Bugayong, Associate Judge of respondent Court onSeptember 20, 21, 23, 24 and 25, 1965. It was the positionof the Union that its members would not resume theperformance of their duties unless its officers were likewiseincluded in the return-to-work order. Petitioner was of adifferent mind. It was agreeable to having the workersreturn to work but not the five officials of respondentUnion. It alleged that the strike was illegal, being offensiveto a no-strike clause of an existing collective bargainingagreement the result being that the officials could, as theresponsible parties, be liable for dismissal. Consequently, itwas not agreeable to their being allowed to return to thepositions held by them prior to the strike as they would notbe only lacking in incentive and motivation for doing theirwork properly but would likewise have the opportunity tocause grave and irreparable injury to petitioner."

3

Management did offer, however, to deposit their salarieseven if they would not be working, with the further promisethat they would not even be required to refund any amountshould the right to remain in their positions be consideredas legally terminated by their calling the alleged illegalstrike.

Nonetheless, on September 28, 1965, Judge Bugayongissued an order requiring petitioner to accept the five unionofficers pending resolution on the merits of the disputeinvolved in the strike.

4 There was a motion for

reconsideration which was denied by the court on October

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1 Petition, par. 2.2 Ibid, par. 3.3 Ibid, par. 4.4 Ibid, par. 5.










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8, 1965.5 Hence, this petition, alleging a grave abuse of

discretion, consisting in the failure to grant petitionersrather unorthodox demand.

As already noted, the inherent weakness of the petitioncannot escape attention.

1. Considering that this is a case certified by thePresident, with respondent Court exercising its broadauthority of compulsory arbitration, the discretion itpossesses cannot be so restricted and emasculated that themere failure to grant a plea to exclude from the return-to-work order the union officials could be considered astantamount to a grave abuse thereof. The law is anythingbut that.

As far back as 1957, this Court, speaking throughJustice Labrador, categorically stated: We agree withcounsel for the Philippine Marine Radio OfficersAssociation that upon certification by the President underSection 10 of Republic Act 875, the case comes under theoperation of Commonwealth Act 103, which enforcescompulsory arbitration in cases of labor disputes inindustries indispensable to the national interest when thePresident certifies the case to the Court of IndustrialRelations. The evident intention of the law is to empowerthe Court of Industrial Relations to act in such cases, notonly in the manner prescribed under Commonwealth Act103, but with the same broad powers and jurisdictiongranted by that Act. If the Court of Industrial Relations isgranted authority to f ind a solution in an industrialdispute and such solution consists in ordering of employeesto return back to work, it cannot be contended that theCourt of Industrial Relations does not have the power orjurisdiction to carry that solution into effect. And of whatuse is its power of conciliation and arbitration if it does nothave the power and jurisdiction to carry into effect thesolution it has adopted. Lastly, if the said court has thepower to fix the terms and conditions of employment, itcertainly can










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5 Ibid, pars. 6, 7 and 8.

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VOL. 27, APRIL 29, 1969 1207


order the return of the workers with or without backpay asa term or condition of the employment."

6

Only recently this Court, speaking through JusticeSanchez, emphasized: The overwhelming implication fromthe quoted text of Section 10 is that CIR is granted greatbreadth of discretion in its quest for a solution to a laborproblem so certified."

7 Hence, as was announced at the

outset of this opinion, there can be no legal objection to themode of exercise of authority in such fashion by respondentCourt of Industrial Relations. The allegation as to thegrave abuse of discretion is clearly devoid of merit.

2. That should conclude the matter except for the factthat the question presented possesses an element ofnovelty which may require further reflection.

The situation thus presented is the validity of thereturnto-work order insofar as five union officers areaffected, petitioner airline firm rather insistent on theirbeing excluded, arguing that since the strike called bythem was illegal, and that in any event there was enoughground for dismissal, there was present a factor whichmight make them lose all their incentive and motivationfor doing their work properly and which would furnishthem the opportunity to cause grave and irreparableinjury to petitioner.

To be more specific, the apprehension entertained bypetitioner was in the petition expressed by it thus: Thefive officers of the union consist of three (3) PassengerTraffic Representatives and a reservation clerk who in thecourse of their duties could cause mix-ups in thereservation and accommodation of passengers which couldresult in very many suits for damages against petitionersuch as the case of Nicolas Cuenca vs. Northwest Airlines,G.R. No. L-22425 promulgated August 31, 1965 in whichthis Honorable Court required the airline to payP20,000.00 as







________________

6 The Phil. Marine Radio Officers Assn. v. Court of Industrial

Relations, 102 Phil. 374, 382383 (1957).7 Bachrach Transp. Co., Inc. v. Rural Transit Shop Employees

Association, L-26764, July 25, 1967.

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nominal damages alone. The other union officer who is inthe cargo department could underweigh or overweigh cargoto the great detriment of the service or even of the safety ofpetitioners aircraft."

8

Petitioner would attempt to remove the sting from itsobjection to have the union officers return to work byoffering to deposit the salaries of the five officers withrespondent Court to be paid to them, coupled with what itconsidered to be a generous concession that if their right toreturn to work be not recognized, there would be no needfor refund.

Petitioner, perhaps without so intending it, betrayed aninexcusable lack of confidence in the responsibility of unionofficials and ultimately in the validity of the collectivebargaining process itself. For it is the basic premise underwhich a regime of collective bargaining was instituted bythe Industrial Peace Act that through the process ofindustrial democracy, with both union and managementequally deserving of public trust, labor problems could besusceptible of the just solution and industrial peaceattained. Implicit in such a concept is the confidence thatmust be displayed by management in the sense ofresponsibility of union officials to assure that the twoindispensable elements in industry and production couldwork side by side, attending to the problems of eachwithout neglecting the common welfare that binds themtogether.

The moment management displays what in this caseappears to be grave but unwarranted distrust in the unionofficials discharging their functions just because a strikewas resorted to, then the integrity of the collectivebargaining process itself is called into question. It would









have been different if there were a rational basis for suchfears, purely speculative in character. The record is bereftof the slightest indication that any danger, much less oneclear and present, is to be expected from their return towork. Necessarily, the union officials have the right to feeloffended by the fact that, while they will be paid

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8 Petition, par. 4.

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VOL. 27, APRIL 29, 1969 1209


their salaries in the meanwhile, they would not beconsidered as fit persons to perform the duties pertainingto the positions held by them. Far from being generous,such an offer could rightfully be considered insulting.

The greater offense is to the labor movement itself, morespecifically to the right of self-organization. There is both aconstitutional and statutory recognition that laborers havethe right to f orm unions to take care of their interests vis-a-vis their employers. Their freedom to form organizationswould be rendered nugatory if they could not choose theirown leaders to speak on their behalf and to bargain forthem.

If petitioner were to succeed in their unprecedenteddemand, the laborers in this particular union would thusbe confronted with the sad spectacle of the leaders of theirchoice condemned as irresponsible, possibly evenconstituting a menace to the operations of the enterprise.That is an indictment of the gravest character, devoid ofany factual basis. What is worse, the result, even if notintended, would be to call into question their undeniableright to choose their leaders, who must be treated as suchwith all the respect to which they are legitimately entitled.The fact that they would be paid but not be allowed to workis, to repeat, to add to the infamy that would thus attach,to them necessarily, but to respondent union equally.

Apparently, respondent Court was alive to theimplication of such an unwarranted demand, the effect ofwhich would have been to deprive effectively the rank and












file of their freedom of choice as to who should representthem. For what use are leaders so undeserving of theminimum confidence. To that extent then, theirconstitutional and statutory right to freedom of associationsuffers an impairment hardly to be characterized asinconsequential.

Fortunately, respondent Court was of a different mind.It acted according to law. It had a realistic concept of whatwas in store for labor if its decision were otherwise. Nor didit in the.process disregard the rights of

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Caltex (Phil) Inc. vs. Caltex Dealers Asso. of the Phil., Inc,

management. There is no occasion then for the supervisoryauthority of this Court coming into play.

WHEREFORE, this petition for a writ of certiorari isdenied. With costs against petitioner.

Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar,Sanchez, Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J. and Castro, J., are on official leave. Dizon, J., concurs in the result.

Petition denied.

Note.See the annotation on Jurisdiction of the Courtof Industrial Relations, 19 SCRA 136146.

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pan american world airways, inc. vs. pan american employees association.pdf

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