panagiotou vlastos on 132a b

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Vlastos on Parmenides 132A1-B2: Some of His Text and LogicAuthor(s): Spiro PanagiotouSource: The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 84 (Jul., 1971), pp. 255-259Published by: Blackwell Publishing for The Philosophical QuarterlyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2218131

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255

VLASTOS ON PARMENIDES 132A1-B2: SOME OF HIS TEXTAND LOGICBY SPIRO PANAGIOTOU

In his recent paper on the Third Man Argument' (henceforth TMA),Professor G. Vlastos profferssome new insights on the text and logic of thememorable Parmenidean argument. One of these new insights-which iscrucial to his present formalization of the argument-is about the referenceof the expression r6oXX' roa syock in the first step of the argument (132A2).Professor Vlastos argues that the reference of this expression should beunderstood as being of " unrestricted generality ". By this it is meant that6roX' aroc s intended to cover both sensibles and Forms. In footnote 11Vlastos confesses that under pressurefrom Sellars he had come to realize asearly as 1963 that we must so understand the reference of 6oXX' Czro.n thesame footnote Vlastos produces a number of reasons in defence of his view.In what follows I shall attempt to show that Vlastos' evidence is notgood enough. In fact, some features of his evidence can be effectively em-ployed to refute his view. I shall contend that the overwhelming weight oftextual evidence supports the view that 76oXX'Croc ere refers exclusivelyto sensible particulars. The outcome of the present discussion does affectour general understanding of the TMA, but not to any considerable extent.What it does affect drastically, however, is Vlastos' formalization of theParmenidean argument. He himself tells us that the "advantage " inunderstanding 6rXX'&zar the way he does is that the text then warrantshis formalization of the first step of the argument (132A1-4) as the " generalprinciple (" 1 ") ".2 If I can make good my claim that Vlastos has no textualmandate for his interpretation of 6rXX'&-Coca,hen his formalization of thefirst step of the argumentis unwarranted. Consequently,his entire formalizedsystem, as I shall show in my conclusion, is thrown out of gear.Vlastos encounters the difficulty with 6rXX' -CTrochen he renders it as" several things " or "a plurality of things ", for he now has to decide onthe reference of " things ". He opts for the view that " things " here isintended to cover both sensible things and intelligible things (Forms). Herelegates the justification for his view to the important footnote 11 :There is no word for " things " in the Greek. I add it to complete the sense-a sense which I take to be as general as that of " thing " in anything, something,etc. ... In 19543 ... I had assumed uncritically that TcoXk'OCTTOere has thesame reference as does the expression &TOCcoXXwhen used by Plato to refer to

the sensible instances of a Form. .. . However, when I came to think about it,I realised that this assumption had no warrant from the text. . . . That Forms,no less than sensible particulars, are to count as large things is quite explicit inthe text of the TMA, e.g. in 132B1, " all these [i.e., the first set of large things,plus F-ness I plus F-ness II] will be large ... (cf. also 132A8, [eyo&kaof thefirst set plus F-ness I). This being the case, we have no mandate from the text1"Plato's "Third Man" Argument (Parm. 132A1-B2): Text and Logic", thisjournal, October 1969, pp. 289-301. I shall henceforth refer to this paper as " V 1969 ".2Cf. footnote 11 which I quote below.3Vlastos refers here to his paper " The Third Man Argument in the Parmenides ",


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256 SPIRO PANAGIOTOUto restrict the reference of ToXX'ocTocto sensible particulars. It goes withoutsaying that at this juncture of the argument Socrates would only think of sensibleparticulars if he were asked to form a set of large things on the spot. But Par-menides has used a form of words which does not require such a selection thoughit allows it. ... The advantage of so understanding To?X' OCTTOC[yy&cXas that(Q) [i.e. 132A2-3] then warrants the general principle (" 1 "), which I proceedto formulate.4Vlastos obviously attempts to support his interpretation of 6oXX' -r cby appealing to textual evidence. He cites 132A8 and 132B1 and he sug-gests that these passages make it " quite explicit " that Forms also " countas large things ". Now it seems to me that Vlastos' offeringsmay be comingfrom the wrong part of the argument. To argue that 132A8 and 132B1support his view on 7oXX'oToc at 132A2 is to pass over the fact that Par-menides has not been idle in the intervening lines. The truth of the matteris that Parmenides at 132A6-7 introduces the Form Largeness in the set of

large sensibles by the use of a conditional clause: T 89'ocU to [i6yaoxalrcXXa -aosy&Xa ?v o6Tc T" XuX, 'm ravrato . Vlastos may of courserejoin that the statements of 132A6-7 may only make explicit the fact thatParmenides was, after all, tacitly entertaining a " more general principle "in enunciating his noXX'cToaC t 132A2. That is fair enough. But Vlastoscannot reasonably maintain such a view unless he can and does show thatthe hypothetical or conditional clause, 132A6-7, is philosophically innoc-uous; unless he can show that it provides Parmenides with no principle orjustification (other than his tacit use of a " general principle " contained inhis 7oXXk' ca) for his apparent desire now to include the Form Largenessin the set of large sensibles. Vlastos, however, does nothing of the sort. Hesimply assumes that 132A6-7 is sitting there philosophically innocuous. Isuggest that the inclusion of the Form Largeness in the set of large sensiblescoincides with Parmenides' offer of a condition which enables him to do so.This condition is given in the protasis of the conditional clause and it amountsto our "viewing " the Form Largeness and the large sensibles " in the sameway " (.. . . aaT * 't).Apart from the above points, there is strong independent evidence tosupport the view that -toXX' Trrocefers exclusively to sensible particulars.First, that Parmenides introduces his second step with the constructionr 83'may be taken as indicative of the appearance of a completely newvariable into the discussion : the addition of a Form into the set of sensibles.More importantly still, Socrates is asked to "view" so ,eyaoc oalrk&X at132A6-7 in a special way, as opposed to the ordinary " view " of roXXa' rat 132A2-3.

At 132A6-7 Socrates is asked to " view " all these things with his soul'seye. The question of what precipitates this change in the Socratic " view-ing " may be important to the issue at hand. If one considers the relevantpassages, namely 132A2-3 and 132A6-7, he will discover that the onlyThe Philosophical Review LXIII (1954), pp. 319-49; it is reprinted in R. E. Allen'sStudies in Plato's Metaphysics (London, 1965). I shall refer to this paper as " V 1954 ",but all page references will be to the Allen book.4V 1969, p. 298. Emphasis on all terms is Vlastos'.


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VLASTOS ON PARMENIDES 132A1-B2 257difference between them, a difference which would necessitate a change inour " viewing ", is that 132A6-7 does, while 132A2-3 does not, introduce aForm into the set of things under "view ". Since it is Parmenides whorequests the change in our " viewing " at 132A6-7, and since it is Parmenidesagain who, according to Vlastos, is tacitly employing a "more generalprinciple" at 132A2-3, should he not ask Socrates to view the roX?X' raoof132A2-3 with his soul's eye also ? But he does not. He does not because hetoo, and not just Socrates as Vlastos suggests, is thinking of and talkingabout sensible things only, at this stage of his argument. The special" viewing " requested by Parmenides at 132A6-7 coincides with his think-ing, for the very first time, of including a Form in what has been up tothis point a set of sensible things only. Vlastos, however, does not offer usa diagnosis of Parmenides' state of mind. Instead he comments on hischoice of words: " Parmenides has used a form of words which does notrequire such a selection (selection of sensibles only) though it allows it".It is Parmenides' choice of words which constitutes the telling argumentagainst Vlastos' thesis.In the footnote quoted, Vlastos recants his earlier view on the referenceof roXX'O`zo. " In 1954 ", he says, "I had assumed uncritically thatroXX'`VTTocere has the same reference as does the expression r&aroXXowhen used by Plato to refer to the sensible instances of a Form ". It issafe to say that Vlastos looks to this recantation of his former view whenlater on he suggests that Parmenides' choice of words does not require aselection of particulars only. Well, what words does Parmenides use ? Hesays 6oXX'rToca seyoXat 132A2. Again, he refers to the very same thingsas rSXXokateysacko at 132A6. The question we have to answer is whetherParmenides uses r6oXX'nd raXoc here to refer exclusively to particulars orto both particulars and Forms. The best arbitrator to settle the issue is,as Vlastos would agree, the text of the dialogue itself. As it happens, wedo have several passages, both before and after the text of the TMA, inwhich Parmenides uses the expression rk&XX nd 7roXXO.Let us look atthese to see if they support, or conflict with, Vlastos' view:Parm. 130E5-6 " Do you think that . . . there are certain Forms and thatthese other things which partake of them . . . (elvo ?'187

aTTao, v Ts a& XXap?TXa avov To. . .)"Parm. 131A8-9 "Do you think that the whole Form, being one, is in eachof its participants . . . (6Xov xO s8o . . . esvat rv7oXXV. ..)"Parm. 131B1 " Then, while it is one and the same, the whole of it wouldbe in many separate individuals . . . (av poaov . . .vToXXo(H< Xop[.. . )"Parm. 131C12- ". .. if you divide Largeness itself and each of the many

D1 large things . . . (To [,uy?Oo [cptsdZ xaociexocov TOv7oXXk?vpLyd&Xov. )"


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258 SPIRo PANAGIOTOUParm. 131E3-4 "How will the other things partake of your ideas if ...

(-Rv ?slZv COL& cXaXo. .) 'Parm. 132D1-4 ". .. these ideas exist in nature as patterns and the otherthings resemble them . .. (r&a v ?'t] ira-a . . . T 8AXXaToT&oLq . .) and this participation between theseother things and the Forms . .. (xao p' 0eLs cauTn] ToZqaXXotL yiLyVsOL. . .)Parm. 133A5 " It is not then in terms of their similarity that the otherspartake of the Forms . . . (oux apao6oLo6TjL ra-aXXocv?iS~v. . .)"These passages leave no doubt that Parmenides uses the expressions

"( roXX0o and " CXXa to refer exclusively to sensible particulars. Butmore significant still is the fact that Parmenides, in so using these expressions,follows religiously Socrates' stipulation on the reference of roXX&oade quiteearly in the dialogue. Socrates introduces the stipulation in the course ofoutlining the theory (128E5 ff.) which will explain away Zeno's paradox(127D if.). After distinguishing the Forms of Likeness and Unlikeness,Socrates goes on to say: Tou'tOV83 3uOLV6VTOLVa'oc xcat a xocratXX a83 wroXXO&Xou V.sv. . . . Socrates tells us here in very clear terms that theexpression roXX'a s used-at least for the purposes of the philosophical dis-cussion which is about to ensue-to refer to human beings (xaol ?[Lxoa a?)and to other sensible things (r&aXX).5 This stipulation Parmenides paysclose attention to, as the cited evidence shows, throughout the first part ofthe Parmenides. This being the case, one may cite this part of Parmenidesas a prime instance of Plato's tendency to use the expressions roXX&andoaXo to refer exclusively to the sensible participants in a Form. Parmenides'own choice of words, far from supporting Vlastos' view, actually serves torefute it.

And yet Vlastos' understanding of roXX' arro ignores all this evidence.He demands that when we come to the text of the TMA we drop therestricted-to-particulars reference of roXX&and raXXa and replace it with areference of " unrestricted generality ". But the demandant in this caseoffers us no good grounds at all but only that our doing so will give him" the advantage " of a textually warranted formalization of the first stepof Parmenides' argument. We can grant him this " advantage ", but onlyin spite of, and not in accordance with, both the Socratic stipulation of129A and Parmenides' observance of it in the subsequent sections of thedialogue. But the cited evidence cannot be ignored, especially by Vlastoswho has made it his " business " to look to the text for the answers.6 For,on the strength of this evidence, one can confidently assert that the ex-pressions roXX'dirr and rAXXa n the TMA are most likely to refer to sensibleparticulars only.

5I take the word o to refer to ep', a6 and -cXao.6V 1969, p. 291.


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VLASTOS ON PARMENIDES132A1-B2 259To conclude this discussion, it seems that the overwhelming weight ofevidence favours the view that 7oXX'Czar sy&aaoct 132A2 refersexclusivelyto sensible particulars. This being the case, Vlastos' 1 has no mandate fromthe text. But notice the use that is made of 1 in his formalized system.The general hypothesis, 1, formulated by Vlastos as " if a certain set of

things share a given character there exists a Form . . .", where " things"covers both particulars and Forms, is used to warrant the transition fromthis, the first, step of the argument to the second one, formulated by Vlastosas " 2. If a, 6, c and F-ness are F, there exists . . .".7 Vlastos' 1 stands tohis 2 as a general statement stands to one of its many specific applications.That is, we can obtain 2 by replacing the " certain set of things " of 1 with" a, b, c and F-ness . . ". Similarly we can obtain, say, " 3. If a, b, c,F-ness I, F-ness II . . ." and so on. In other words, 1 succeeds in coveringall the subsequent steps of Parmenides' argument, each of which includesone or more Forms, without any questions asked! Significantly, this stateof affairs has prompted Vlastos to demote his Self-Predication Assumption(SP). In 1954 Vlastos saw a " discrepancy in reasoning" between the firstand the second steps of the argument,8 a discrepancy he sought to correctby supplying his (SP).9 Presently, however, there is no need for Vlastos toemploy (SP) in its " bridging " capacity; the general statement, 1, appar-ently covers the gap. As a result, we now find (SP) playing a role of reducedimportance to the argument. Instead of playing, as it did in 1954, a role ofcentral importance in connection with both the " validity " and the " sound-ness " of the " Third Man " as an argument against the theory of Forms,(SP) now plays a supportingrole in connection with its " soundness " only.10At any rate, if I am correct in saying that Vlastos' 1 has no mandate fromthe text, then his 2 (and all the subsequent steps) stands in need of somesort of justification. With 1 out of the way and with (SP) out of a full-timejob, Vlastos' formalized system is completely out of gear.If I may briefly suggest a remedy, it seems we have to re-introduce(SP), or something like it, in its full capacity, i.e., as a premiss essential forboth the " validity " and the " soundness " of the TMA. Moreover, I donot think one has to go looking for this premiss in Plato's other texts. ForParmenides supplies us with this premiss in the conditional clause 132A6-7.Parmenides there offers what I call a Univocity Condition (i.e., he asks thatwe view Largeness and the large sensibles in the same sense in point of" largeness "), which enables him to include Forms in the set of sensibleparticulars. An elaboration on this theme, however, is beyond the scope ofthe present discussion.University of St. Andrews.

7V 1969, p. 291. 8V 1954, pp. 233-6. 9V 1954, p. 236.10Vlastos uses (SP) only to account for the fact that Socrates agrees to the secondstep of the argument. " Socrates agrees. Assuming that he does not do so absent-mindedly, or just by caprice, but as the thoughtful spokesman of the theory under attack,we must try to figure out what assumptions he must be making. ." (SP) is one ofthese assumptions. Cf. V 1969, p. 291.

panagiotou vlastos on 132a b

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