INTRODUCTION

THEOPPOSINGSIDESMechanizationormotorization?Half-trackcomparisonMechanized-infantrytacticsCombatsustainmentCommandandcontrol

THEPANZER-LEHR-DIVISIONINNORMANDYJuly11–27,1944

RÉCHICOURT-LA-PETITESeptember26–29,1944

THEBATTLEFORRODTDecember20–23,1944

ANALYSIS&CONCLUSION

UNITORGANIZATIONS

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Introduction

Tanks revolutionized land combat inWorldWar II. Yet tanks had distinct tactical limitations,particularly when operating in wooded or urban areas, and during defensive missions. Tanksproved to bemost effectivewhen used in combinationwith the other combat arms, especiallyinfantryandartillery,butittookseveralyearsbeforecombined-armstacticsmatured.TheHeer(GermanArmy)wasthemosteffectivepractitionerofcombined-armstacticsintheBlitzkriegeraof 1939–41. EarlyPanzer-Division tactics involved the use of regiments of tanks andmobileinfantryinseparateskirmishesonthesamebattlefield.Bythemiddleofthewarin1942–43,thePanzer-Divisionen began to integrate tanks and infantrymore closely below regimental level,mixingtanksandinfantryatbattalionandcompanylevel.

TheiconicimageofthePanzergrenadierassociatedthemwiththeSdKfz251armoredhalf-track.Inreality,onlyasmallfractionofthePanzergrenadier-Regimenterwereinthemechanizedconfiguration.

Part of the problem in early small-unit combined-arms tacticswas the reliance on trucks tomotorizetheinfantry.Whiletruck-mobileinfantrycouldkeeppacewithtanksinthemovementtothebattlefieldwhenonroads,theydidnotpossessenoughcross-countrycapabilitytostaywithtanks when operating in the usual European terrain. Technical innovations, most notably thearmoredhalf-track,helpedtodeepentank–infantryintegrationbymechanizingtheinfantrysothattheycouldkeeppacewithtanksincross-countrytravel.FromtheGermanperspective,themainproblemwith infantrymechanization was the lack of financial or industrial resources fully to

mechanizetheinfantryinthePanzerdivisions.EvenaslateasApril1945,fewerthan40oftheroughly220PanzergrenadierbattalionsoftheHeer,Waffen-SS,andLuftwaffeweremechanizedandmorethan80percentstillreliedontrucksformobility.

ArmoredinfantrymenpicturedonanM3A1half-trackinBritainduringJune1944beforedepartingforNormandy.Thevehicleisfittedwithadeep-wadingair-intaketrunktopreventtheenginefromfloodingwithseawaterwhilelanding.Thepale-greencolorinsidetheAlliedair

recognitionstarisgas-alertingpaintthatwasdesignedtochangecolorinthepresenceofchemical-warfareagents.

The US Army began forming armored-infantry units in its armored divisions later than theWehrmacht and had the industrial resources to mechanize all of them. The US Army alsodeepened the integration of combined-arms tactics through the introduction of specialized“combatcommand”headquarterswithineacharmoreddivisionthatregularlyintegratedtanksandinfantryatsmall-unitlevel.Thisbookcompares theevolutionofGermanandAmericanmobile infantry inWorldWar II

and uses three examples from the Normandy, Lorraine, and Ardennes campaigns in 1944 toillustrate how these units performed in actual combat. The focus in this book is on thePanzergrenadierforcesoftheHeer,andtosharpenitsfocus,thePanzergrenadierforcesoftheWaffen-SS and Luftwaffe are deliberately excluded. This book follows an earlier title in theseriesonGermanversusAmericaninfantry,sothefocushereisonaspectsofPanzergrenadierandarmored-infantrytacticsandequipmentthatseparatedthemfromthenormalfootinfantry.1

1 StevenJ.Zaloga(2016).USInfantrymanvsGermanInfantryman:EuropeanTheaterofOperations1944.Combat15.Oxford:Osprey.

The7thArmoredDivisionoriginallypassedthroughSt.VithonSeptember13,1944duringtheliberationofBelgium.ThisisanM3A1commandhalf-trackofoneofitsarmored-infantrybattalions.

TheETO,June1944–May1945

MAPKEY1 June1944:ThefightfortheNormandybeachhead.

2 June–July1944:FightinginNormandy.

3 July–August1944:TheUSbreakout–OperationCobra.

4 July25–27, 1944:Panzergrenadiere of the Panzer-Lehr-Division and the 41st Armored Infantry Regiment fight oneanotherduringOperationCobra.

5 August–September1944:TheinvasionofsouthernFrance–OperationDragoon.

6 August–September1944:TheracetotheSeineRiver.

7 September1944:HeeresgruppeGretreats.

8 September26–29,1944:Panzergrenadiereof11.Panzer-Divisionclashwitharmoredinfantrymenofthe4thArmoredDivisionatRéchicourt-la-Petite.

9 October–November1944:Westwallbattles.

10 October–November1944:ClearingtheScheldtRiver.

11 November1944:OvertheVosgesMountains.

12 December1944–January1945:TheGermanArdennesoffensive–UnternehmenWachtamRhein.

13 December 19–24, 1944: Panzergrenadiere of the Führer-Begleit-Brigade fight the armored infantrymen of the 7thArmoredDivisionatRodt.

14 February–March1945:ClosingontheRhineRiver.

15 March–April1945:ThebreakoutfromtheRhinebridgeheads.

16 April1945:ClearingGermany’s“NationalRedoubt”(Alpenfestung).

17 April–May1945:TheadvancetotheElbeRiver.

TheOpposingSides

MECHANIZATIONORMOTORIZATION?

GermanTheiconicimageofthePanzergrenadierwasofateamofriflemenleapingfromtheirarmoredhalf-track.Yet for the entirewar,mechanizedPanzergrenadier units were a distinctminority;motorizedPanzergrenadierunitsusingordinarytruckswerethenorm.Atthestartofthewarin1939,theinfantryelementofthePanzer-DivisionwastheSchützen-

Brigade (Schützen = riflemen). This consisted of a truck-mobile Schützen-Regiment and amotorcycle-mobileKradschützen-Bataillon (Kradschützen =motorcycle riflemen).During theearly Blitzkrieg period, theHeer experimentedwith two other forms ofmobile divisions: theleichteDivision(lightdivision)andtheInfanterie-Division(motorisierte).TheleichteDivisionwasamechanized-cavalrydivisionandtheseshort-livedformationswereconvertedtoPanzer-Divisionenafterthe1939campaigninPolandduetotheirmediocrebattlefieldperformance.Fourmotorized-infantry divisionswere formed in the earlywar years and these eventually grew innumber, evolving into the Panzergrenadier-Divisionen in 1943. Germany had very limitedindustrialcapacityandachoicehad tobemadebetweenexpanding thePanzer forceandusingwhatindustrialresourcesthereweretoprovideagreaterdegreeofmotorizationintheinfantry.TheHeerchosetheformeroption,withthefivePanzer-Divisionenavailableduring thePolishcampaignexpandingtotenbythetimeofthecampaigninFrancein1940,andincreasingtomorethan20bythetimeoftheinvasionoftheSovietUnioninthesummerof1941.TheremainderoftheHeerremainedheavilydependentonhorsesthroughtheendofthewar(DiNardo:2008).EarlyPanzer-Divisiontacticswereshapedbythelimitedtacticalmobilityofthetrucksusedto

transporttheinfantry.TheSchützen-BrigadeandthePanzer-Regimenttendedtofightinseparateengagementson thesamebattlefield.2Thiscreated tacticalproblemssince tankswerenotwellsuitedtoholdingground,andatnighttheyoftenhadtowithdrawfromthefrontlineforre-supply.This required the infantry to take over portions of the front beyond those already under theircontrol. The technical solution to this tactical problem was the mechanization of the infantrythroughtheuseofanall-terrainpersonnelcarrier.

2 Foranexampleofthis,seethedescriptionofthebattleofHannutin:StevenJ.Zaloga(2014).PanzerIIIvsSomuaS35:Belgium1940.Duel63.Oxford:Osprey.

ThefirstHeer(GermanArmy)armoredriflecompanieswereformedin1939–40usingthenewSdKfz251.Thisisagep.Mannschafttransportwagen(MTW=armoredpersonnelcarrier)of9./Schützen-Brigade5(5.Panzer-Division),theonlycompanytohavereceivedthistypeofvehiclepriortotheFrenchcampaignin1940.ItisshownhereonexerciseattheBaumholdertraininggroundsinApril

1940.

As in many other armies, Germany began examining the potential of half-track vehicles toimprove the cross-country capabilities of trucks. The partially tracked suspension of the half-trackloweredtheoverallgroundpressureaboutthreefoldcomparedtothatofanormaltruckandtherebyimproveditsflotationinsoftterrainsuchasmudandsnow.Themainadvantageofhalf-track suspensions versus fully-tracked suspensions was cost. Since the half-track retainedsteerablefrontwheels,itdidnotrequireaspecializedtransmissionwithdifferentialbrakingforsteeringandsothepower-trainforthetrackedsuspensionwasnotmuchdifferentfromthatofaconventionalwheeledvehicle.InGermany,BorgwardandHanomagbegantodevelopalight1-tonnehalf-trackandmedium

3-tonnehalf-trackstartingin1936.Hanomagbeganmanufactureofanarmoredversionofthe3-tonne half-track inMay 1939 as the SdKfz 251. It was eventually designated as themittlereSchützenpanzerwagen, abbreviated as mSPW, but most commonly called an “SPW” by thePanzergrenadiere.A smaller armoredhalf-trackwasbuilton the1-tonnechassis as theSdKfz250, or leichter SPW (lightSPW).Althoughnominally designed to carry aHalbgruppe (half-squad),itwasnotgenerallyusedasaninfantrycarrierbutratherinarmored-reconnaissanceunitsorspecializedcommandroles.

Panzergrenadier-Regimenterremainedheavilydependentontrucksformotorizationthroughthewar.ThisisacolumnfromI./PzGrRgt69(10.Panzer-Division)knockedoutbyUSartilleryduringthebattleforElGuettar,TunisiainMarch1943.

The SPW was used in small numbers for troop trials during the campaign in Poland inSeptember 1939.Schützen-Regiment 1 (1. Panzer-Division) began conversion to amechanizedconfigurationinOctober1939withanobjectiveof155SPW.Otherdivisionswereassignedthenew SPW as it became available, but only 1. Panzer-Division had a significant number onstrengthatthetimeofthe1940battleofFrance.In1941,theSPWshortagemeantthatmostunitsonly received a single SPW company. The decision to dramatically increase the number ofPanzer-Divisionentoover20ledtoorganizationalchanges.SinceGermantankproductionwasnot sufficient to equip the new divisions, theKStN (Kriegsstärkenachweisungen; the Germanequivalentoftablesoforganizationandequipment/TO&E)wasreduced.Tocompensateforthediminished tank strength in the Panzer-Divisionen, the number of infantry regiments in thedivision was increased from one to two. This of course diluted the process of infantrymechanizationsincePanzerproductionstillhadgreaterprioritythanSPWproduction.Therewasa clear preference for SPW companies over truck-mobile companies because the former hadgreater battlefield effectiveness, especially on the Eastern Front where the road network waspoor.TheSPWunitsalsotendedtosufferfewercombatcasualtiessincethehalf-tracksofferedprotectionagainstsmall-armsfire.OneissuewaswhetheritwasbettertodistributeoneSPWcompanytoeachbattalionwithin

thePanzer-Division,ortoconsolidatethemintoasingleSPWbattalion.Theconsensusemergedthat a homogenous SPW battalion made more sense, it being awkward to employ a mixedtruck/SPW battalion in combat. Since therewere still significantmaintenance demands on thehalf-tracks,itwaseasiertomanagethisprocesswithinadedicatedSPWbattalionratherthanin

small company-sized units. As a result, therewas a trend toward consolidating the SPW in asinglebattalionwithinthePanzer-Divisionin1943–44,culminatinginthe1944KStNthatmadesuchaconfigurationstandard.Themechanizedbattalionsweredistinguishedfromthemotorizedbattalionsbythesuffixgepanzerte(gep.)insteadofmotorisierte(mot.)The terminologyfor themotorized infantrychangedin1942when, inJune,Hitlerdecided to

applythetermPanzergrenadier tothemotorizedandmechanizedinfantry.Thiswasintendedtobe an honorific, recalling the elite grenadier troops of Frederick the Great. In July 1942, theSchützen-Regiment became thePanzergrenadier-Regiment and the Infanterie-Division (mot.)became thePanzergrenadier-Division. This was part of the process for the absorption of themobile infantry into thePanzerwaffe. In the early years of thewar, variousmobile troops hadbeenunderthecontrolofthecavalry,infantry,andPanzerforce,undertakingtheirtrainingatthevariousbranchschools.

ThesmallerSdKfz250wasclassifiedasaleichteSchützenpanzerwagen(lightinfantryarmoredvehicle)andcouldcarryaHalbgruppe(half-squad).Inpractice,itwasmainlyusedinspecializedrolessuchasinreconnaissanceunitsratherthanasaninfantrytransporter.

ThePanzergrenadier forcewasanelite formation,butnot in theusualsense.SomespecificunitssuchasPanzergrenadier-DivisionGroßdeutschlanddidhavespecialpriorityforpersonnel,but the majority of Panzergrenadier units did not have such privileges. Rather, thePanzergrenadier force coulddependon a steady streamof regular recruits andnot themotleyselectionallottedtoregularinfantrydivisionsthattendedtoincludesub-standardrecruitssuchasVolksdeutsch,overagemen,andmedicallycompromisedmen.

Although thepropaganda imagedepicted thePanzergrenadier as amechanized rifleman, thedegreeofmechanization in theHeerremained low.ThereweremodestnumbersofSPWin thePanzergrenadier-Division, primarily in itsmechanizedAufklärungs-Abteilung (reconnaissancebattalion). The Panzergrenadier-Regimenter in the division were generally truck-mobile,however.In the case of thePanzer-Divisionen, the standardPanzergrenadier-Regiment configuration

underthenew1944KStNhadtwoPanzergrenadier-Batailloneplusaninfantry-guncompanyanda Pionier (combat engineer) company. Each Panzergrenadier-Bataillon had four companies:threegrenadiercompaniesandaschwere (heavy)company.Inpractice,mostdivisionshadonePanzergrenadier-Regiment that was entirely truck mobile while the other had a single SPWbattalion. The SPW Panzergrenadier nicknamed his truck-mobile counterpart the “GummiPanzergrenadier”(rubberPanzergrenadier).

AmericanAsintheGermancase,theUSArmyexperimentedwithbothmechanizedandmotorizedinfantryin 1940–41. Since the US Army was so small in 1940, it had the luxury of creating neworganizationsfromscratch,basedonthelessonsof the1939–40campaigns.TheUSArmywasvery impressedwith the performanceof theWehrmacht inFrance in 1940, and so theGermanpatternwasveryinfluentialinearlyUSArmyorganizations.Fromatechnicalstandpoint,theUSArmyhadbeenexperimentingwithhalf-tracksforlonger

thanGermany, largelydue to theFrenchconnection.TheCitroën-Kégressehalf-trackservedasthebasisfornumerousUSArmydesignsinthe1920sand1930s,primarilyasanall-terraintruckratherthanasanarmoredhalf-track.TheUSArmystudiedtheconductofoperationsinFrancein1940andnotedtheuseofinfantryhalf-trackssuchastheGermanSdKfz251andvariousFrenchtypes.Theother alternativewas theBritish andFrench approach,with a fully tracked infantryvehiclesuchtheBritishUniversalCarrierorFrenchChenilletteLorraine.TheUSArmyfavoredtheGermanapproachofanarmoredhalf-tracksinceitwaslargeenoughtocarryafull infantrysquadandpromisedtobelessexpensivethanafullytrackedvehicle.Forexample,anM3half-trackcostabout$10,000versusabout$35,000–40,000foralighttank.TheUSArmywasalreadywellonitswaytotheproductionofanarmoredhalf-trackby1940.

TheCavalryhadbeenworkingonahalf-trackversionofitsM3A1scoutcar.InDecember1939,the artillery began development of a similar vehicle as a prime mover for artillery. Bothrequirements were merged and this vehicle was accepted for service as Half Track CarM2.Infantryofficersexaminedthenewvehicleandconcludedthatwithmodestchanges,itwouldbesuitable as an armored-infantry vehicle. The body was lengthened and the center-mountedstowagebinsdeleted.ThisconfigurationwasstandardizedastheM3half-trackpersonnelcarrier.Ultimately,bothtypesofhalf-tracksweremanufacturedforthenewarmoreddivisions.TheM3half-track was used primarily for carrying infantry, while the M2 half-track car was used inarmored-infantryunitstocarrymachine-gunsquadsor(inmodifiedform)astheM481mmmortarcarrier. The seating capacity was ten in the M2 half-track car and 13 in the M3 half-trackpersonnelcarrier,andthesetypesroughlycorrespondedtotheGermanSdKfz250andSdKfz251.

ThenewUSArmyinfantryhalf-trackswereputthroughtheirpacesduringthe1941war-games,inthiscasetheFirstUSArmywar-gamesintheCarolinasduringNovember.Here,troopsofamachine-gunsquadinanM2half-trackcarofA/22ndInfantryhidebehindabarntoestablishanambushpositionneararoadjunction.The22ndInfantryRegimentwaspartofthe4thDivision(Motorized)whichbegan

experimentingwithvariousvehiclesduringthewar-games.

Ayoung“armoreddough”posesforaphotoatFortKnoxinJune1942.HewasattendingspecialistdrivertrainingattheArmoredForcesSchoolandiswearingaBritish-patternWorldWarIsteelhelmet.(LibraryofCongress)

USarmoredhalf-trackproduction*1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 Total5,242 9,846 21,585 2,581 0 39,254*Doesnotincludethe15,034mortar-andgun-armedhalf-tracks.

AsinthecaseofBlitzkrieg-eraPanzer-Division, the1942USarmoreddivisionswere tank-heavywithasmallerarmored-infantrycomponent:twotankregimentsandonearmored-infantryregiment.By 1943, therewas a general consensus that the 1942 armored divisionwas poorlybalancedwithtoomanytanksandnotenoughinfantry.ThiswasbasedinpartonexperiencesinTunisiainearly1943butalsoonwar-gamesconductedintheUnitedStatesin1941–43.TheheadoftheArmoredForce,LieutenantGeneralJacobDevers,wantedtoestablishabetterbalanceatcorpslevelbydeployingarmoredcorpswithtwoarmoreddivisionsandonemotorized-infantrydivision.Armoredofficerswithcombatexperience,suchasMajorGeneralErnestHarmonofthe2ndArmoredDivision, thoughtreorganizationwasprematureand that ifadopted, itshouldaddinfantry rather than subtract tanks. The head of the Army Ground Forces, Lieutenant GeneralLesley McNair, felt that the 1942-pattern division was too big and unwieldy, and was not

enthusiasticaboutarmoredcorpsanyway.DeverswastransferredfromcommandoftheArmoredForceonMay11,1943,becomingthe

commanderofUSforcesintheEuropeanTheaterofOperations(ETO).Hisreplacement,MajorGeneral Alvan Gillem, Jr., was an infantry officer, and less enthusiastic about sparring withMcNair and the Army Ground Forces’ bureaucracy. A new armored-division structure wasformallyadoptedonSeptember15,1943.Thetank-centeredarmoreddivisionof1940–42gaveway to a smaller, leaner,more balanced divisionwith three battalions each of tanks, armoredinfantry,andarmoredfieldartillery.Thearmoredregimentwasdroppedasaconsequenceofthischange. With the armored regiment and armored-infantry regiment headquarters gone, greateremphasiswasplacedonthecombatcommands.Thesewereincreasedinnumbertothree,usuallycalledCCA,CCB,andCCR(A,B,andReserve),andwereintendedtocementinplacetheUSArmy’s combined-armsdoctrine.Rather than fighting as an armored regiment and an armored-infantry regiment on the same battlefield, the combat commands would take battalions orcompaniesfromeachofthecombatarms,andusethemtogetherincombined-armsfashion.Therewereexceptionstothisreorganization.Bythetimethenewtablescameintoeffect,the

1stArmoredDivisionwasincombatinItaly,whilethe2ndand3rdArmoreddivisionswereinBritaininanticipationoftheinvasionofFrance.Devers,whohadadamantlyopposedMcNair’sreorganizationplanandbeenshifted tocommanderof theETOasaplace-holderuntilGeneralDwightD.Eisenhower’s selection, decided that itwas too late to change the twodivisions inEnglandtothenewconfiguration,sotheyremainedunderamodifiedMarch1942organization.Theyretainedthesixtankbattalionsofthe1942TO&Einsteadofthethreebattalionsunderthenewtables.Thisorganizationwasoftencalled“tankdivision(heavy).”Itlackedathirdcombatcommandonpaper,soinpractice,thedivisionsoftenorganizedtheheadquartersofthearmored-infantryregimentintothethirdcombatcommand.The1stArmoredDivisiondelayedconvertingtothenew1943patternuntilitwaspulledoutofthelineinJuly1944forrefittingaftertheAnzioandRomecampaigns.WithDevershavingbeen replacedbyEisenhower, inApril1944,ArmyGround Forces in Washington, DC again tried to have the two armored divisions in Britainreorganized.With the invasion ofFrance imminent,Eisenhower backed his armor officers andrefused to permit such a disruption. The consequence of this decision is examined in the firstcombatchapterhere.Theotherchangeintroducedin1943wastheabandonmentofthearmored-corpsconcept.Until

1943, the US Army had expected to form armored corps with two armored divisions and amotorizeddivision.ThefightinginTunisiaandlaterinItalyraisedquestionsabouttheneedforsuchaformation,however.Themotorizeddivisionwasdroppedinthesummerof1943infavorofapracticeofprovidingadditional truckcompanies tonormal infantrydivisionsasandwhenthe need arose. The motorized-infantry divisions were converted back to normal infantrydivisions.Inessence,anarmoredcorpscouldbeformedusinganormalcorpsheadquarterswhentheoccasiondemanded,evenifitdidnothavethedistincttitle.During the war, armored-infantry soldiers were nicknamed “armored doughs” or “blitz

doughs,”basedonthenickname“doughboys”forUSinfantryinWorldWarI.Lifeinthearmored-infantrybattalionswasdifferent than in“straight-leg” infantryunits.Owing to theirhalf-tracks,armored infantry could carry far more equipment with them into combat, and this tended toincludeaheavierassortmentofweaponsthanwasthecaseforregularinfantry.Armoredinfantrywere notorious for pilfering gear, since they could carry it with them in the half-tracks. The

standard TO&E forweaponswas often ignored,with half-tracksmounting supplementary .50-caliberand.30-calibermachineguns.Half-trackswereusuallyfestoonedwithadditional tarps,bags, stoves, brooms, wash basins, pails, and other amenities. Some divisional commanderscomplained that their armored-infantry columns resembled “gypsy caravans,” and one of thecommanders of the 2ndArmoredDivision actually tried to ban half-tracks in favor of normaltrucksduetotheir“un-military”appearance!

Panzergrenadier,Panzergrenadier-Lehr-Regiment901

Quibou,July27,1944

IncontrasttoWaffen-SSunitswhichwidelyusedcamouflagebattledressinNormandy,thePanzer-Lehr-DivisionremainedwiththestandardHeerFeldgrau(fieldgray)battledress,albeitwithmorediscretioninbattledressthannormalHeerinfantryorPanzergrenadierunits.Forexample,thesplinter-patternhelmetcovershownherewasmuchmorewidelyusedinthePanzer-Lehr-DivisionthanintypicalHeerformations.Anotherdistinctiveformofgarbthatwaswidelywornamongthedivision’sPanzergrenadierewastheSturmartilleriefield

blouse,buttonedtotherightside.Incontrast,mostotherHeerPanzergrenadierunitsworethenormalinfantryblousethatbuttonedupthecenter.Otherthanthesedistinctivetouches,thePanzer-Lehr-DivisionresembledmostHeerunitsinthecombatuniformsworn.

Weapons,dress,andequipmentThe illustrationheredepicts thePanzergrenadier in light tactical gearwithout theadditionalharness clipped to the rear toassist incarryingadditional equipment on theback.German infantry reliedon the7.92mmKar 98k (1), a short carbine version of the longer7.92mmGew98rifleusedinWorldWarI.OneofthefewdistinctiveitemsofgarbseenonmanyPanzergrenadiertroopsinNormandywastheSturmartilleriefieldblouse(2),originallyintendedforthecrewsoftheSturmgeschützassaultguns.Panzer-Lehr-Divisiontroopsoftenworeasplinter-patternhelmetcoverovertheirStahlhelmsteelhelmet(3)inNormandy.ThiswasinthesplinterpatternusedalsoontheZeltbahnponcho/shelterquarter.ThisPanzergrenadierwearstheusualblackleatherwebbing(4),typicalofallGermaninfantry.TheStielhandgranatestickgrenade(5)couldbecarriedinsidethefrontbeltifthebeltwaswornlooselyenough.ThiswasthedefensivegrenadeofthePanzergrenadier, intendedforusefromcoverduetoitsdangerousfragmentationradius.Thesetofthreeammunition

poucheshadsmallmetalloopinthecenterthatcouldbeusedtoattachtheEihandgranateegggrenade(6),asmalleroffensivegrenadeintendedtocomplementtheStielhandgranateforclose-quarterfightingwherethestickgrenadewastoopowerful.Typically,twosetsofammunitionholders(7)werewornonthefrontofthebelt,eachconsistingofthreeblackleatherpouches.Theleatherwebbingjoinedatthecenterofthebacktoforma“Y”(8).Itwasfittedwith“D”ringsfortheattachmentofaseparateleatherharness,notshownhere,thatwasusedtosuspendheavierequipmentwheninmarchingorder.ThecanvasZeltbahn(9)servedasbothaponchoforrainyweatherandalsoasaquarterofatent-shelter.Itcameinuniformcolororinacamouflagepattern.By1944,thearchetypal“hob-nailedboot”hadgivenwaytoalowbootwithcanvaslegging(10).Themesstin(11)andentrenchingtoolcouldalsobeattachedtothebeltattherear.Thecanteen(12)hadametaldrinkingcupattachedtothetopbymeansofaverticalleatherstrap.

HALF-TRACKCOMPARISONSince the armored half-trackwas the feature thatmost distinguished thePanzergrenadier andarmoredinfantryman,itisworthwhiletocomparethetwopredominanttypes:theSdKfz251andM3half-track.Intermsofarmoredprotection,theSdKfz251hadadecidedadvantagesinceitsbasearmorwas8mmthick,whichwasroughlyequivalent to12mmafter theeffectof itsanglewascalculated;M3armorwasmostlyverticalandsoitseffectivethicknesswasabouthalfthis.ThereweretwodisadvantagesfortheSdKfz251’sheavierarmor,however.First,theweightofthearmorinconcertwiththelowerpoweroftheMaybachengineresultedinpoorerautomotiveperformance with a lower power-to-weight ratio. Second, the angled sides of the SdKfz 251reducedinternalvolume,withtheresultthattheM3hadabout15percentgreaterinternalspacefortroops.GermancommandersregularlycomplainedthattheSdKfz251wastoosmallfora12-manGruppe inmounted combat. In terms of cross-countrymobility, both vehicles had similargroundpressure,buttherubber-bandtrackoftheM3hadpoorertractioninmudthanthepaddedtrackof theSdKfz251unless fittedwith chains.TheM3waseasier tohandle inpoorgroundconditionsthantheSdKfz251sinceithadapoweredfront-wheelsuspensionaswellasabetterpower-to-weight ratio.TheSdKfz251wasmoredemanding in termsofmaintenancedue to itsinterleavedwheelsandmulti-link trackandwasprone to shedding its trackasa resultofmudcloggingthesuspension.Overall,theM3half-trackwassimpler,morerugged,andmorereliable.

M3A1half-tracksofCo.D,41stArmoredInfantryRegiment(2ndArmoredDivision)passthroughthetownofCantignyonAugust31,1944,siteofthefamousUSArmybattleofWorldWarI.Theleadvehicle,numberedD-9,hasthename“Daring”onthesidedoor.

TechnicaldataSdKfz251 M3half-track

Crew 12 13Weight 8.0tonnes 5.7tonnesLength 5.98m 6.3mWidth 2.1m 2.0mHeight 1.75m 2.25mEngine 99hp 147hpPower-to-weight 12.3hp/T 25.8hp/TArmor 8–15mm 6.4–12.7mmGroundpressure 0.8kg/cm2 0.8kg/cm2

MECHANIZED-INFANTRYTACTICS

GermanThe vast majority ofPanzergrenadier troops in 1944 were truck-mobile, and so their tacticswere essentially similar to those of normal German infantrymen. The trucks moved thePanzergrenadier-Bataillon (mot.) into the combat area, but the battle was conducted on foot.There were two important differences between the two types of infantry: firepower andintegration with the Panzer force. The Panzergrenadier-Kompanie was better armed than anormalinfantrycompanywithtwolightmachinegunsperGruppe(squad)comparedtoonlyonein the normal infantry. Small-unit tactics revolved around the light machine guns, with thePanzergrenadier-Gruppeformingtwofireteamsthatweresupportedbytheriflemen.

GermanmedicsevacuateawoundedsoldierduringtheArdennesfighting,withanSdKfz251/3commandhalf-trackof116.Panzer-Divisionbehindthem.Thisunitwaspartofthe5.Panzer-ArmeeassaultpastSt.Vith.

OberstJohannesBayer,ridingintheSdKfz251/3commandhalf-trackofKampfgruppeBayer(116.Panzer-Division),consultswithayoungPanzergrenadierofPanzergrenadier-Regiment60duringthefightingintheArdennesinDecember1944.

ThedegreeofintegrationbetweenthePanzergrenadierandPanzerunitsincreasedduringthewar. As mentioned before, the tactics in the early Blitzkrieg era tended to see the Schützen-Regiment andPanzer-Regiment fight their own engagements next to one another on the samebattlefield,butwithlittleintermixturebelowregimentallevel.AsthewarcontinuedintheSovietUnion, small-unit combined-arms tactics improved. There was no dedicated headquarters forjoint missions, but thePanzer-Division used existing regimental headquarters to serve as thebasisforaKampfgruppe(battlegroup).Theusualpracticewastointermixunitsfromonetypeofregiment to thenext tofacilitatemissions.Soforexample,aPanzergrenadier-RegimentwouldformaKampfgruppethatincludedoneofitsPanzergrenadier-BataillonewhiletheneighboringPanzer-RegimentallottedoneofitsAbteilungen tothesamemission.Thiswasdoneonsucha

regularbasisthattheinfantryandtanksbecameaccustomedtoworkingwithoneanother.Infantrysupport was extremely valuable to the tanks since they could offer close-defense against RedArmyinfantryattacks,aswellasprovidingthedispersedcombatpowerneededinfine-grainedterrain such aswoods and townswhere tankswere not especially effective. Infantrywas alsoessentialfornightdefense,andPanzergrenadierunitsweremorecombateffectivethantanksfordefensivemissionswhereterrainhadtobeheld.

Theheavy-weaponscompanyinthePanzergrenadier-BataillonwasequippedwiththeSdKfz251/9assaultgun,armedwithashort7.5cminfantrygun.ThisonewasknockedoutinStavelotonDecember18duringthefightingbetweenKampfgruppeKnittel(1.SS-Panzer-Division

LeibstandarteAdolfHitler)andthe30thInfantryDivision.

SometacticsemergedthatbecameaspecialtyofthePanzergrenadierforce.Whencooperatingwithtanks,aportionofthePanzergrenadierforcewouldoftenrideonthetanksformobility.Thispractice varied from unit to unit, with some Panzer-Divisionen specifically forbidding thepracticeafterexperiencesinwhichtheinfantrydismountedtoolateandsufferedheavycasualtiesasaconsequence.By1944,suchtank-ridingpracticesbecamecommon,however,sincethetrucksavailableofferedpoormobilityincross-countrytravel.TheSPWcompaniesemployeddifferenttacticsthanthemotorizedcompanies.Fromtheoutset,

thepreferredtacticofSPWunitswasmountedcombat,andthiswasofficiallysanctionedinfieldmanualssuchastheMay25,1942manualHeeresDruckvorschriften(ArmyStaffRules)299/4a

AusbildungundEinsatzderSchützenkompanie(TrainingandDeploymentofRifleCompanies).The tactical doctrine did recognize that in some circumstances, especially in defensiveoperations, thePanzergrenadiere would fight from a dismounted position. However, mountedtacticswerepreferredsincetheSPWofferedshockvalue,concentratedmachine-gunfirepower,andprotectionagainstenemysmall-armsfire.TheSPWbattalionshadfirepoweradvantagesoverthemotorizedbattalionsbecausetheywere

allottedmoresupportweapons,andtheirheavyweaponscouldmoreeasilykeeppacewiththeriflecompanies.Thetwomosttypicalheavyweaponswereinfantrygunsandmortars.TheSPWbattalionhad127.5cminfantrygunsthatthemotorizedbattalionlacked.TheseweremountedontheSdKfz251/9,variouslynicknamed theKanonewagenorStummel (“stump”).TheSPWandmotorized battalions both had the same number of 8cm mortars, but in the case of the SPWbattalion, these weremounted on the SdKfz 251/2, and could be fired without first having todismount the mortar. Another important difference between the two types ofPanzergrenadierbattalionwasthedegreeofantiaircraftprotection.TheSPWbattalionhadanominalstrengthof212cmFlakgunsonvehiclemountswhile themotorizedbattalionhadonlysix towedguns. Inpractice,however,onlyasmallfractionofSPWunitshadtheirauthorizedallocationofvehicle-mountedFlak guns.Hitler had fixed upon theSdKfz 251/21 fittedwith a triple (Drilling)MG151/21mountastheidealPanzergrenadierweapon,butthesewereslowinbeingmanufacturedanddeployed,ascanbeseeninthechartbelow.

DeployedSPWbytype,October1944Type Weapon QuantitySdKfz251(allother) n/a 4,860SdKfz251/9 7.5cmIG 569SdKfz251/16 Flamethrower 258SdKfz251/17 2cmFlak 53SdKfz251/21 2cmDrilling 61

AswassooftenthecasewiththeWehrmachtinWorldWarII,therewerenumerousexceptionsto the rulewhen it came to specificPanzergrenadier organizational and equipment issues. Tobegin with, Waffen-SS Panzergrenadier units often had a different KStN than their Heerequivalents.(ThisbookonlyconsiderstheHeerunits,sothesedifferencesareoutsidethescopeofthediscussionhere.)ThereweretwomajorexceptionsinHeerPanzergrenadierunits,notablythetwoeliteformations:Panzergrenadier-DivisionGroßdeutschland(GD)andthePanzer-Lehr-Division.ThePanzergrenadier-DivisionGroßdeutschlandservedonlyontheEasternFrontandsodoesnotconcernushere.Someofitsspin-offunits,however,theFührer-Begleit-BrigadeandFührer-Grenadier-Brigade,servedintheArdennes,andtheFührer-Begleit-Brigadeiscoveredinmore detail in the third of the battles featured in this book. The Panzer-Lehr-Division wascomposed of training units from both the Panzer andPanzergrenadier training establishments.Asidefromhavingbetter-than-average troops, thePanzer-LehrDivisionstandsoutsince itwasthe onlyHeer division in the ETO in 1944 to have all four of itsPanzergrenadier battalionsequippedwithSPW.Thisunitisdetailedinthefirstofthebattlefieldscenariosfeaturedinthisbook.Another exceptionwas the improvisedPanzer-Brigade first formed in the summer of 1944.

These units were created under Hitler’s express instructions as specialized formations tocounterattackSoviet tankbreakthroughs.Thebrigadeswerecreated in twowaves.Brigadesof

the first wave, created in July 1944, were numbered 101–110; they were light in the Panzercomponentwithonly aweakbattalionof36Panther tanksbutwith a large andwell-equippedPanzergrenadier-Regimentwith a full complementofSPW.The secondwave,numbered111–119, had two tank battalions and two Panzergrenadier battalions each, but like othercontemporary Panzergrenadier formations, they had a very weak SPW content. In the event,sevenbrigadeswerehastilycommittedintheWest:onenearArnhemagainstOperationMarket-Garden,twoagainsttheFirstUSArmyintheAachencorridor,andfouragainstPatton’sThirdUSArmyaspartoftheVosgesPanzeroffensiveinLorraine.TheLorrainebrigadesperformedpoorlyandtowardtheendofSeptember,mostwereabsorbedintoneighboringPanzer-Divisionen.Oneexample of these is presented as part of 11. Panzer Division in the second of our battlefieldexamples.

Rifleman,41stArmoredInfantryRegiment

Quibou,July27,1944

TheUSArmy’sarmored-infantryunitsworethesamebattledressasregularinfantryunits.Oneofthefewexceptionswasthe2ndArmoredDivision,whichpartiallyequippedsomeofitsunitswithcamouflagebattledressinthedaysbeforethestartofOperationCobraonJuly25,1944.However,thisdidnotcoverallunits,andmanyoftheinfantryretainedtheirnormalgarbasshownhere.Infantryunitswhichlanded

overthebeachonD-Dayandthenextfewdaysworechemicallyimpregnatedclothingasaformofanti-gasprotection.Theseuniformsweresmellyanduncomfortable,andunitssuchasthe2ndArmoredDivisionwerereequippedwithnewbattledresswithindaysoflanding.

Weapons,dress,andequipmentThe rifleman depicted here is in light tactical dresswithout the entrenching tool and rucksack/musette bag thatwould beworn inmarchingorder.The .30-caliberM1Garand rifle (1)was the standard infantryweapon inbothnormal infantryunitsand inarmored-infantryunits.By1944,mostM1steelhelmets(2)wereissuedwithcamouflagenetswhichweresupposedtobefestoonedwithlocalfoliage;apracticenotregularlyusedbyUSinfantry.BythetimeoftheNormandylandings,thearmoredinfantryofthe2ndArmoredDivisionwereshiftingtothenewModel1943battledress(3),markingachangeinappearancefromthekhaki/field-drabcolorsofOliveDrabShadeNo.3tothedarkerandgreenerOliveDrabShadeNo.7.ThissubsequentlybecamethepredominantUSArmybattledressintheEuropeanTheaterofOperations.TheModel1943battledressmovedtoadarkershadeofgreeninpartduetoconcernsexpressedbyseniorcommandersthattheearlierandlighterkhakicolorstendedtolooksloppyandhighlightdirt.Asidefromtheshiftincolor,thenewbattledresshadamorepracticalselectionofpockets.Tobulkuponrifleammunitionquickly,the.30-caliberclipswereissuedinahandy,

disposableclothbandoleer(4)withsixmoreclips.Therifleman’sprimarysupplyof.30-caliberclipswascontainedincanvasammunitionpouches(5)attachedtothefrontofthebelt.Inthesummermonths,theUSinfantryreliedonlowboots(6)withcanvasleggings.Themetalcanteen(7)wascontainedinacanvascoverthatclippedtothebelt.TheswitchtoOliveDrabShadeNo.7affecteditemssuchasthisaswellasthebasicbattledress.TheM1GarandriflewasinvariablyaccompaniedbytheM1bayonet(8)thatwasnormallywornonthebeltsothatitcouldbereachedeasilyincombat.

AmericanIncontrast to theWehrmacht, theUSArmywas fullymotorizedanduseddraft animalsonly inlimited circumstances, for example in mountain operations. A major organizational differencewastheimpositionofrigiduniformityonUSArmyformations.IntheETO,allarmored-infantrybattalionswereorganizedandtrainedinthesamemanner,withsomeminorexceptionsinvolvingthetwo“heavy”armoreddivisions.Thebasictacticaldoctrineforthearmored-infantrybattalionwasspelledoutinFieldManualFM17-42whichwasissuedinseveraleditionsthroughthewar.TheNovember 1944 edition defined the characteristics of the armored-infantry battalion as “apowerful,mobile, lightlyarmoredunit that is tacticallyandadministratively self-containedandcapable,toalimitedextent,ofindependentaction.Thebattalionisspeciallyorganized,equipped,andtrainedforemploymentinmutuallysupportingtankandinfantryaction.”The most significant difference between US and German doctrine was that the US Army

expected the armored infantry to fight dismounted. FM17-42 noted that the battalion “movesforwardinvehiclesuntilitisforcedbyenemyfireorunfavorableterraintodismount.”Thehalf-trackswouldbeusedinsuchcombatonlyifdispersedandundercover.Thetacticaldoctrinedidacknowledge that armored infantry might fight from a mounted position when facing weakopposition, such as in a rapid exploitation of a broken enemy. Asmentioned earlier, GermandoctrinefavoredmountedcombatfromtheSPW.USArmydoctrinestressed theneed forcombined-arms tactics. Inpractice, thismeant thata

combatcommandwouldgenerallyoperateelementsfromthetank,armored-infantry,andarmoredfield-artillery battalions, supported by small armored-engineer and cavalry reconnaissanceformations.Therewasnoparticularsizeforacombatcommand;itcouldbeassmallasacoupleofbattalions,or asmanyas tenbattalions. Itwas tailored to themission.Norwas the combatcommandalwaysorganizedaroundthesamebattalions;assignmentscouldvaryonadailybasis.Inatypicalsituation,acombatcommandwouldconsistofatankbattalion,anarmored-infantry

battalion, an armored field-artillery battalion, an armored-engineer company, and one ormoretroops from themechanizedcavalry squadron.Tacticswere largelydrivenby thenatureof themission.Typically,acombatcommandwouldbebrokendownintotwoormoretaskforces.Oneofthesemightbetank-heavywithtwocompaniesoftanksandonecompanyofarmoredinfantry,whileanothermightbeinfantry-heavywithtwocompaniesofarmoredinfantryandacompanyoftanks. Each task forcewas usually headed by an element of one of the battalion headquarterscompanies,typicallytheexecutiveofficerofoneofthebattalions.

USArmyarmored-infantrytacticsstressedtheneedforcloseinfantry–tankcooperation.Here,anM3half-trackofthe14thArmoredDivisionpassesbyasmolderingM4A3(76mm)mediumtankknockedoutthepreviousdayduringfiercefightingagainstPanzer-Brigade106inthe

AlsatiantownofBarr.

Mountedarmored-infantrytacticsweremorecommonplaceinexploitationandpursuitagainstaweakenedenemy,asinthefinalweeksofthewarinGermany.ThisisanM3half-trackofCo.C,46thArmoredInfantryBattalion(5thArmoredDivision)nearWittenmoor,Germanyon

April12,1945.

The combat command structure permitted greater integration of combined arms on thebattlefield than the GermanKampfgruppe system. This was not because the Germans did notrecognize the advantages of this organization, but because of the general paucity of German

resourcesin1944.Therewasnotonlyadearthoftrainedstaffofficersbutalsoashortageofthecommunicationsandsupportequipmentneededfortheadditionalheadquarters.

COMBATSUSTAINMENTOneofthefundamentaldifferencesbetweentheUSandGermanarmiesintheETOin1944–45wascombatsustainment.Infantryunitsendureveryhighratesofcasualtieswhenincombatandthetwoarmieshaddifferentapproachestodealingwiththeissue.

GermanThe Heer recruited on a regional rather than national basis. Each regiment was raised in aspecificWehrkreis (military district) and the Ersatzheer (Replacement Army) maintained anAusbildungs-Ersatz-Abteilung (training and replacement unit) to replenish the parent unit. Theintentionwas to feed in replacementsacompanyormoreata time,giving theunitadegreeofcohesion from the outset. By 1944, this system had broken down. Since the replacementcompaniescouldnotbesuppliedinatimelyfashion,thedivisionsshrankastheysufferedcombatattrition. Surviving units were amalgamated into smaller and smallerKampfgruppen until thedivisionwasreducedtoa“torsodivision,”atwhichpointitwaspulledoutofthelineandsentback to the interior for rebuilding.Theywere called torsodivisions because theyhad lost themuscleoftheircombatarms,buthadretainedthecoreadministrativeandserviceelementsofthedivisionaswellassomecombatelementssuchasthefieldartillerythattendedtosufferlowerattrition rates than infantry, combat-engineer, and tank units. Two of the battlefield scenariospresentedheredealingwiththePanzer-Lehr-Divisionand11.Panzer-Divisionillustratetheeffectofthispolicy.

AclassicviewofaPanzergrenadier-Gruppeinaction,inthiscaseasquadfromPanzergrenadier-Lehr-Regiment902(Panzer-Lehr-Division)inNormandyduringJune1944.EachGruppewasequippedwithtwolightmachineguns,givingthemaboutdoublethefirepowerofan

ordinaryinfantrysquad.

TheGermanarmedforcesinNormandywerenothappyaboutreplacementpolicyandonJuly11, 1944, Heeresgruppe B requested that the Ersatzheer automatically send three replacementbattalions–mainlyPanzergrenadier troops– to eachPanzerdivision eachmonth to “create apipelinesystemsuchastheInvaderspossess.”Thisseldomprovedpossible.Followingtheheavylosses inNormandy, allWaffen-SS Panzer units and someHeerPanzer-Divisionen had to bepulledoutofactionforthreemonthsforrebuildingpriortotheArdennesoffensive.

AmericanTheUSArmyattemptedtomaintainitsarmoreddivisionsattheirTO&Elevelsbyfeedinginacontinualsupplyofreplacementstounitsincombat.Individualreplacementtroopsweresenttoreplacement depots in the theater, and then assigned to units as required. TheUS systemwasessentiallymodular. Every soldierwas trained for a particular occupational specialty such as“rifleman”andeachindividualwasregardedassimplyanotheranonymouscoginthesystemthatcouldbetransferredorreplacedasneeded.Thissystemhasbeenthesubjectofharshcriticismover theyearssince thenewreplacementswereoftendumped intoanewunitwith littleornoacclimatization, and often became casualties very quickly if they did not adapt. Some unitslearnedthatitwasbettertogivenewreplacementsacrashcourseintherealitiesofthebattlefieldbeforepluggingthemintothefrontlines,butthisvariedconsiderablyfromdivisiontodivision.Even though the half-track relieved the armored infantry from the footsloggingmiseryof the

normalinfantry,itwasnoteasyduty,andarmoredinfantrysufferedsomeofthehighestcasualtiesofanysinglecombatarmduringthewarinEurope.Theusualhighinfantrycasualtyratescouldbeexacerbatedsincethearmored-infantrybattalion’smobilityledcommanderstousetheminattacksmoreoften than the average foot-infantrybattalion.A formerly secretUSArmymedical reportconcludedthat

In armored divisions, with too few armored infantry, the infantry contributes from 80 to 90% of the combat exhaustioncasualties, rates becoming extremelyhigh after the third to fifth daysof action. Inhard, continued action, armored infantrycompaniesmay be down to 40–50men (out of a strength of 245),with [all] three company commanders casualties in theprocess.Oneunithad150–180%replacementsin200days;anotherhad100%turnoverin60–70days.

COMMANDANDCONTROLTacticalcommandandcontrolofmotorizedandmechanizedinfantryplacedagreaterdemandonradio assets than in normal infantry units since mobile units could not depend on traditionalmethods of communication such as field telephones while on the move. In general,Panzergrenadier and armored-infantry units had a greater level of radio assets for tacticalcommand-and-controlthanordinary“leg”infantry.

GermanThedistributionoftacticalradiosintheHeerin1944wasveryunevenduetoshortagesaswellas organizational differences. The objectivewas to treat the SPWas per every other armoredvehicle and thus to issue each with a Fusprech f transceiver, but these did not come intowidespreaduseuntil1942–43.TheFusprechfAMradiowasusuallymountedontherightsideoftheSPWdriver’s compartment and sowasoperatedby thevehicle commanderor anassignedmemberof theGruppe. Itwasacompactandveryadvancedradio for itsday,operating in the

20.0–21.5MHzrangewithaneffectiverangeof5kmwhenstationaryand2kmonthemove.ThereislittledataonwhatproportionoftheSdKfz251forceactuallyreceivedtheseradios.Thisradiopermitted command and control within the Panzergrenadier unit, but was not suitable forinteraction with accompanying Panzer units which operated radios in the 27–33MHz band.Likewise, it couldnot interactwithdismountable infantry tactical radioswhichoperated in the32–38MHz bands. Themajority ofPanzergrenadier battalions were truck-mobile and did nothavevehicularradios.

AdismountedradioteamofaPanzergrenadierheavyinfantry-guncompanyinactionintheRecht-PoteauareaatthestartoftheArdennesoffensiveinDecember1944.Thisteamconnectedtheself-propelledbatterytotheforwardobserver.

Thebasiccommandhalf-trackwastheSdKfz251/3whichcarrieddifferentradiofitsdependingonitsrole.ThisexamplewasthemountofOberstJohannesBayer,leaderofKampfgruppeBayer(Panzer-Regiment16,116.Panzer-Division)intheArdennesinmid-December1944.TheSdKfz251/3swereusuallyfittedwitha“crow’sfeet”antenna(SternantennaD)fortheassociatedFu8radio,visibletowardtherearof

thevehicle,aswellasasimple2mStabantennafortheFu5radio.

Forcommunicationabovetheplatoonandcompany,therewerededicatedcommandhalf-tracksof the SdKfz 251/3 series in the mechanized battalions. The radio fit in these vehicles wastailoredtotheirrole.Soforexample,theSdKfz251/3usedatbattalionlevelhadaFeldFuBforinter-vehicle communication, a Fu 8 for communications within the battalion headquarterscompany and to regimental staff, and a Fu 5 for communicating with supporting tank units.Command half-tracks at higher levels had a more elaborate radio fit. In the truck-mobilebattalions,similarradioswereprovided,butinspecializedradiotrucksratherthanhalf-tracks.

TheSdKfz251/6wasafamilyofcommandhalf-tracksfordivisionalandcorpsheadquarterswithmoreelaboratefeaturesthanthebasicSdKfz251/3.Itcarriedpowerful,long-rangeradiostationssuchastheFu12andFu19withtherequisitefixedexteriorframeantenna.This

isanexampleservingwithLVIII.PanzerkorpsduringOperationMargarethe,theoccupationofBudapest,inMarch1944.

When dismounted, thePanzergrenadier company in 1944 had a FeldFuSpr b to enable thecompanycommander tocommunicatewithhigherheadquarters, and fourFeldFuSpr fbackpackradios.Thelatterwereusuallydistributedonascaleofoneperplatoonwithoneremainingwiththecompanystaff.TheFeldFuSprfwasanAMradioweighing13kgwitha150mWoutputandaneffectiverangeofabout1km.Itoperatedinthe27.8–33.2MHzband,thusoverlappingtherangeoftheFu5Panzerradio,andtherebyabletocommunicatewithsupportingtanks.Althoughawell-designedtransceiver,byAmericanstandardsitwasveryold-fashioned,heavy,andbulkyforaninfantry-platoon radio. A variety of new, smaller tactical radios were entering service in late1944suchastheKleinfunksprecherd“Dorette,”whichenteredproductioninOctober1944.

Anessentialcomponentofcombined-armstacticswasartillerysupportfromthearmoreddivision’sself-propelledfield-artillerybattalions.ThisisLieutenantOdeOdens,aforwardobserverofthe440thArmoredFieldArtilleryBattaliononhistankduring7thArmoredDivision

operationsnearSt.VithonJanuary25,1945.Eachtankandarmored-infantrybattalionhadatleastoneforwardobserverattachedtothemduringoperations.

AmericanSince theUSarmored-infantrybattalionwasnotexpected to fight fromamountedposition, theemphasiswason radios fordismountedcombat.Thebattalion radionetwas composedofFMradios.The companyheadquartershalf-trackhad anSCR-528and twoof its jeepswere fittedwith SCR-510 radios. Each platoon leader’s half-track had an SCR-510 transceiver. Fordismountedcombat,theriflecompanyalsohadanSCR-300“walkie-talkie”backpackFMradio.ThebasicradioequipmentforthecompanycomprisedsevenSCR-536“handie-talkie”hand-heldAMradioswiththreeintheheadquarters(includingonefortheartilleryforwardobserver),plusoneineachoftheplatoons.TheSCR-536wasacompactradioweighingonly5lbwitha360mWoutput and an effective range of 1mile.Thiswas less than one-fifth theweight of itsGermancounterpartwithdoubletheoutput.

AnimportantstepforwardininfantrycommunicationswastheSCR-536“handie-talkie,”acompactAMtransceiverdeployedonascaleofoneperplatooninUSArmyarmored-infantrybattalions.Itwasusedfordismountedactionswhiletheplatoonhalf-trackwasfittedwitha

SCR-510FMtransceiver.

AlthoughtheSCR-536wasveryadvancedforitsday,itsmaindisadvantagewasthatitdidnotcommunicate in the same frequencies as those radios used in supporting tanks. As a result,communication was restricted to the company headquarters which had suitable radios. ThisshortcominghadbeenrecognizedpriortoD-DayandstepsweretakentoadapttheinfantrySCR-300radioforusefrominsideatank;aversionlatercalledtheAN/VRC-3radio.Thesewerenotavailable in the early summer of 1944, however.As a result, tank and infantry units began to

experimentwithavarietyof localsolutions,suchasprovidingadditional infantryradios to thetanksorviceversa.Theneed fora tank–infantry radiowasacknowledgedbya June15,1944TO&E changewhich authorized oneAN/VRC-3 for each tank-companyHQ and two per tankplatoon.TheseradiosbeganarrivinginSeptember1944,andweregraduallyintroducedintothetankbattalionsbyDecember1944.

ThestandardinfantrytransceiveratcompanylevelwastheSCR-300“walkie-talkie,”asshownhereininOberhoffeninAlsaceonFebruary6,1945wherean“armoreddough”radiomaniscommunicatingwithanM4mediumtankofthe25thTankBattalion(14thArmoredDivision).TheSCR-300operatedinadifferentbandwidththanthetankradios,andsoaseparateAN/VRC-3radiosetwasaddedtoaproportionof

thetankstopermitinfantry–tankcommunication.

Tofacilitateinfantry–tankcommunications,someunitsmountedSCR-509vehicleradiosalongwiththeirbatteriesonapack-board,likethisexamplewiththe41stArmoredInfantryRegiment(2ndArmoredDivision).

AnM3A1half-trackoftheheadquartersofCCB,7thArmoredDivision,namedLucille-B.Theextraradioantennastypicalofaheadquartersvehicleareevidenthere.

Another approach for even closer integration was to wire a field telephone into the tank’sintercommunicationsystem.TheUSArmyhadalreadybeguntoplanatankexternaltelephoneinMay1944,butdevelopmentwasnotcompletedintimefortheNormandycampaign.AdesignforwiringatankwithanEE-8fieldtelephonewasfinallydevelopedbytheFirstUSArmyinJuly1944,andaconversionprogramwasundertakenpriortothestartofOperationCobraattheendofJuly.Thefieldtelephonewasmountedinanempty.30-caliberammunitionboxweldedtothebackofthetank,thusallowinganinfantrymanwalkingbehindthetanktocommunicatewiththecrew,pointingouttargets.Thissolutionwasnotideal,sincetheinfantrymancouldnotaccompanythetankonceitbeganmovingatnormalspeeds,andofcoursetheinfantrymanwasvulnerabletoenemyfire;but itprovedtobebetter thannothing,andremainedinwidespreadusethroughtheEuropeancampaign.TheHeerneverfieldedasimilarsystem.

ThePanzer-Lehr-DivisioninNormandy

July11–27,1944

BACKGROUNDTOBATTLEThePanzer-Lehr-Divisionwasthebest-equippedPanzergrenadierforceofanyHeerdivisionintheETO,withall fourbattalionsmechanizedwithSPW.At thebeginningof June1944, itwasslightly over-strength in personnel and had a full complement of SPW. The divisionwas firstdeployed in theCaen sector afterD-Day, facingBritish andCanadian forces. It suffered veryheavyattritionduring thefirst fiveweeksof fighting, losing3,407men,50 tanks,82SPW,andover200trucksandothervehiclesinlessthanthreeweeksoffighting.Whilethe3,407casualtieswereonly23percentofoverallstrength,theyrepresented48percentofcombatstrength.Theselosses were particularly severe in the Panzergrenadier-Lehr-Regimenter, numbered 901 and902,whichfelltoonlyaboutone-thirdtheirauthorizedcombatstrength.Thedivisionwaspulledout of the line on June 26 and placed in Heeresgruppe B reserve. At this point in time, thereplacementsystemwasstillfunctioningandthedivisionreceived1,633replacementtroopsand191convalescents,leavingit1,362menshort.Thedivisionalsoreceived19replacementtanksbyearlyJuly.ItwascommittedtotheAmericansectoroftheNormandyfrontattheendofthefirstweekofJuly1944.

AnSdKfz251fromtheill-fatedBataillonPhilips(I./PzGrLeRgt901)knockedoutintheclashwiththe39thInfantryRegiment(9thInfantryDivision)aroundLaDézertonJuly11,1944.MostofthePanzergrenadiererodeintocombatonPanthermediumtanks,butafewSPWwere

usedintheattack.

Oneofthecriticalinnovationsintank–infantrycommunicationwastheadditionofafieldtelephonethatwaswiredintothetank’sintercomsystem.Thisisoneofthefirstexamples,mountedinanempty.30-caliberammunitionbox,ontherearofanM4A1(76mm)mediumtankof

the2ndArmoredDivisioninNormandyonJuly9,1944priortoOperationCobra.

ThePanzer-Lehr-Divisionmainlyfacedthe9thand30thInfantrydivisionsintheoriginalVireRiver battles of July 11–25. Itwas struck by the 2ndArmoredDivision on the second day ofOperationCobraonJuly26,1944.The2ndArmoredDivisionwasconfiguredunderthe“heavy”1942TO&E.ThedivisionhadlandedinNorthAfricaduringOperationTorchinNovember1942but sawonly limitedcombatactionafterward inTunisia in1943. Itwas theprincipalarmoredforceofPatton’sSeventhUSArmyonSicily inJuly1943andwassubsequently transferred toEngland for eventual deployment to France.At the start ofOperationCobra, it was about 15percent over-strength in troops, and also had additional replacement tanks beyond its TO&Eallotments.

ThePanzer-Lehr-DivisionwasfirstcommittedtothebattlesintheCaensectorinJune1944,sufferingheavylossesinthefightingnearTilly.ThisisanSdKfz251/9KanonewagenofKampfgruppeWelsch(PzGrLeRgt902)duringtheJune1944fighting.

OperationCobra,July24–28,1944

MAPKEY1 July24:ThetwoKampfgruppeofthePanzer-Lehr-DivisionarelocatednorthofthePériers–Saint-LôhighwayduringtheabortedUSbombattack.Later in theday,GeneralleutnantFritzBayerlein,commanderof thePanzer-Lehr-Division,orderstheforwardoutpostlineandthemainlineofresistancetobewithdrawnsouth,inadvertentlyplacingthemwithinthenextday’sbombzone.

2 Dawn,July25:TheCobraplanhingesontheuseofcarpetbombingtoclearapathfortheVIICorpsassault.TheareasouthofthePériers–Saint-Lôhighwayischosenduetoitsvisibilityfromtheair.Inspiteofthis,somebombsstillfallshort,especiallyinthe30thDivisionsector.

3 Morning, July 25: The three hours of bombardment and strafing largely destroy the Panzer-Lehr-Division as aneffective force.Nevertheless, theUS infantry divisions, assigned to execute the breakthrough, fail to do so. They areexhaustedfromthreeweeksoffightinginthe“HedgerowHell”andadvancewarilythroughthelunarlandscapeofthebombzone.

4 0300hrs,July26:Bayerleintriestoreinforcethemainlineofresistancebydispatchinghisfewremainingtanks,buttheybecomescatteredinthedarknessandtheireffectisdiluted.

5 0945hrs,July26:CCA,2ndArmoredDivisiondepartsthestartlineatHébécrevon.

6 1015hrs,July26:ThefirstmajorencounterforCCA,2ndArmoredDivisioniswithasmallKampfgruppeofKampfgruppeWelschinthevillageofSaint-Gilles.Afterafighter-bomberstrike,theAmericancolumnpushesthrough.

7 1900hrs,July26:CCA,2ndArmoredDivisionpenetratestheweakYellowLinedefensesandreachesthecrossroadsatCanisybylateafternoonandsecuresthetown.Patrolspushouttothesouthandsoutheast.

8 2200hrs,July26:GeneralleutnantDietrichvonCholtitzordersBayerleintocounterattacktheCCAspearheadandpushitbackovertheYellowLine.BayerleininstructshisPioniereandtheremnantsofthereconnaissancebattalion,butneitherhas themobility or force to reach the start line bymorning. The unitsmove north but an organized counterattack isimpossible.

9 0900hrs,July27:CCA,2ndArmoredDivisionspendsthemorningandmuchoftheafternoonclearingoutLeMesnil-Herman,whichhadbeenreinforcedduringthenightinanticipationoftheabortedGermancounterattack.

10 0900hrs,July27:CCB,2ndArmoredDivisionjoinstheoffensiveandmovesfarthertothesouthwest.ItrunsintothefirstGermanstrongpointatQuibou.

11 1600hrs,July27:CCB,2ndArmoredDivisionoverrunstheGermanRedLinedefensesinDangyandthenproceedstoPont-Brocard,narrowlymissingBayerlein’sheadquarterswhichisthrownintochaos.

12 July28:CCA,2ndArmoredDivisionreachestheLengronne–Villebaudonroad.Bythisstage,therearenolongeranyorganizeddefensesleftfromthePanzer-Lehr-Division.Nevertheless,the2ndArmoredDivisionceasesitsadvanceforthemoment,sincethereisafranticGermanefforttobreakoutofapocketnearRonceytothenorthwestthatwascreatedbytheUSadvanceofthepastthreedays.

Battlefieldenvironment

ThefightingbetweenthePanzerLehr-DivisionandtheUSVIICorpswasinthebocagecountryofLowerNormandy.BocageistheFrenchtermforcoastalhedgerowsbuiltupover thecenturies toprotect farmfields fromwinderosion.TheUSArmyreferred to itasanaturalinvertedtrenchsystem.Eachfarmfieldbecameasmallfortifiedzone,edgedwiththehighanddensehedgerows.Theruralroadnetworkintheareawastooconstrictedtopermitlarge-scalemechanizedoperations.

TheweatherinLowerNormandyinJuly1944wasmoderateanddidnothaveasignificantimpactoncombatoperations.Onefactorthatdidaffectoperationswastheextendeddaylighthoursofhighsummer,withdawnoccurringaround0430hrsandnightfallaround2300hrs(Britishdoublesummertime)thatcreatedalongdayforcampaigning.

TheSaint-Lôareawascharacterizedbydensebocagethatrequiredspecialtactics.Thisisasquadofthe41stArmoredInfantryRegiment(2ndArmoredDivision)stationedbehindahedgerowinthePont-BrocardareaonJuly29,1944whiletryingtoblockGermaninfiltrationoutof

theRonceypocket.

INTOCOMBATWhentheAmericanadvanceovertheVireRivernearSaint-Lôbecameagreaterthreatduringthesecond week of July, 7. Armee was allotted the Panzer-Lehr-Division with the intention ofcrushing the Vire bridgehead. It was assigned to LXXXIV. Armeekorps for a plannedcounterattacktopushbacktheUSVIICorpstotheVire-et-TauteCanal.Theintentionwastousethe Panzer-Lehr-Division as part of a counterattack force includingKampfgruppen of 2. SS-Panzer-DivisionDasReichonJuly9,1944.However,owingto thepresenceofAlliedfighter-bombers,transitofthedivisionwastime-consumingandtookplacemainlyatnight.Asaresult,thecounterattackwasdelayeduntilthenightofJune10/11.Thedivisionhadlittletimetopreparefortheattack,andwasunfamiliarwiththethickbocagethatwasfardenserinthisareathanintheTillyareawhere thedivisionwaspreviouslycommitted.The local7.Armeecommandershaddubbedthetacticsofbocagefightingas“bushwar,”andinlateJune1944hadpreparedareporton theuseofPanzers in this terrain.After studyingUS tank–infantry tactics they recommendedthat“wecannotdobetterthantoadopttheenemycombatmethodswithallhisrusesandtricks.”ThePanzer-Lehr-Divisioncommanderswerelargelyunawareoftheserecommendations.FacingthePanzer-Lehr-DivisionwastheUSVIICorpsconsistingofthe9thand30thInfantry

divisions, supported by elements of CCB, 3rd Armored Division. The Panzer-Lehr-Divisioncommander, Generalleutnant Fritz Bayerlein, complained to the corps headquarters about theexcessivelyhastypreparations,butwasorderedtostagetheattackasinstructed.3

3 Foramapofthisbattle,see:PierPaoloBattistelli(2009),PanzerDivisions1944–45.BattleOrders38:Oxford:Osprey,p.56.

TheJuly11attackbythePanzer-Lehr-Divisionwasanactofdesperation.Beforegivinguphiscommand of Army Group B to Generalfeldmarschall Günther von Kluge in July 1944,GeneralfeldmarschallErwinRommelhadwarnedthat“iftheVirebridgeheadcannotbecleanedout,thewhole[7.Armee]frontwillcollapse.”IftheoperationhadbeenconductedonJuly9asplanned,theattackmighthaveovercomethemodestAmericanforcestheninthebridgehead.ByJuly 11, however, the bridgehead had been substantially reinforced to two entire infantrydivisions and under such circumstances the attack had become foolhardy. The offensive wasconductedwithoutanymeaningfulreconnaissanceandwasbasedonaseriousunderestimationofUS forces. Therewas the presumption that a shocking blow in a sector that had never seen asignificantPanzerforcewouldbeenoughtooverwhelmtheAmericandefenses.Bythisstageofthecampaign,however,the9thand30thInfantrydivisionswerebothcombatexperiencedandfarmorefamiliarwiththeconditionsofbocagefightingthanthePanzer-Lehr-Division.Furthermore,theGermanattackwasbadlyplanned,withfourbattalionsoperatingalongseparateaxeswithnoabilitytosupportoneanotherintheconfinedterrain.The Panzer-Lehr-Division attack was conducted by two Kampfgruppen based on the two

Panzergrenadier-Regimenter, each consisting of roughly two Panzergrenadier battalions, acompany of Pioniere, and one or more companies of tanks of Panzer-Lehr-Regiment 130.Kampfgruppe901launcheditsattackontheleftflankfromtheareasouthoftheBoisduHommet,whileKampfgruppe902wason theright flankandpushedoutof the townsofHauts-VentsandPont-HébertwithboththrustsconvergingonSaint-Jean-de-Daye.Theterraindidnotfavortheuse

ofSPW,sothePanzergrenadieremounteduponthetanksandassaultguns.

TheSPWofKampfgruppeWelsch(PzGrLeRgt902)wereheavilycamouflagedduringtheNormandyfightinginthehopesofwardingoffAlliedfighter-bomberattacks.

Theattackbeganinthepre-dawnhours.BataillonPhilips(I./PzGrLeRgt901)ridingonPanthertanks made the deepest penetration of the day, crashing into the 39th Infantry Regiment (9thInfantryDivision)nearthevillageofLeDézert.However, twocompaniesofM103inGMCof

the899thTankDestroyerBattalionweresupportingtheinfantryregiment.KnowingtheterrainfarbetterthantheGermantankcrewsdid,theymaneuveredtheirtankdestroyersandbeganengagingthe Panthers in the dark. When the first Panther was hit and exploded, the resulting fireilluminated the column, making it vulnerable to attack by the other tank destroyers. BataillonPhilips,numbering250menandtenPanthertanks,wassurroundedandwipedout,losingallbut30men.Kampfgruppe 902 on the right flank penetrated about 1 mile but was less successful in

disrupting the 30th Division positions. One of its two attack groups, II./PzGrLeRgt 902, ranheadlongintoanoperationbyTaskForceYofCCB,3rdArmoredDivisionandwasimmediatelystopped.AlthoughtherewasconsiderablechaosintheAmericanpositionsbeforedaybreak,theUS units quickly rallied. As the US Army had learned in the previous weeks of fighting, thebocage terrain favored thedefenderover theattacker.Bynoon, itwasevident that thePanzer-Lehr-Division attack had failed. The attack did little more than delay the advance of the 9thInfantry Division by a day, but cost the Panzer-Lehr-Division about 500–700 casualties, tenPanther tanks, and eight PzKpfw IV medium tanks. The US troops were impressed by theaggressivenessofthePanzergrenadiersandareportlaterdescribedprisonersas“greatbig,huskyboys,andarrogant...notbeatenatall.”Followingthefailedattack,thePanzer-Lehr-Divisionwasgivenasectorofthefronttodefend,

roughly 5km wide. The defense was based on two Kampfgruppen organized around thePanzergrenadier-Regimenter, with Kampfgruppe Welsch (PzGrLeRgt 902) holding the rightsectorandKampfgruppeScholze(PzGrLeRgt901)holdingtheleftsector.SincethePanzer-Lehr-Division’sSPWhadnovalue inpositionalwarfare, theywereparked in a holding area about40kmsouthofthebattlefieldtokeepthemoutofharm’sway.OnlyasmallnumberofSPWwereused near the front lines,mainly by specialist units such as thePioniere. The heavy losses inPanzergrenadieresufferedintheJune–JulyfightingandtherelativelyweakallotmentofinfantrywithinthePanzerdivisionsforcedtheadditionofinexperiencedtroopstofleshouttheperimeter.These included a regiment from 5. Fallschirmjäger-Division and a Kampfgruppe from 275.Infanterie-Division,bringing thePanzer-Lehr-Division’s front-line strength to about ten infantrybattalions.

Panzergrenadierstrength,Panzer-Lehr-Division,Normandy1944PzGrLeRgt901 PzGrLeRgt902 Total

KStNoverallstrength(men) 2,600 2,600 5,200KStNcombatstrength(men) 1,800 1,800 3,600Combatstrength,June10,1944(men) 600 700 1,300Combatstrength,June24,1944(men) 250 300 550KStNstrength(SPW) 205 205 410Combatstrength,June10,1944(SPW) 140 160 300Combatstrength,June24,1944(SPW) 120 130 250

AnM4A1(76mm)ofCo.D,66thArmoredRegiment(CCA,2ndArmoredDivision)named“Duke”carriesriflemenfromthe22ndInfantryRegimentintoactionatthestartofOperationCobra.

ThedefensesusedtypicalGermantacticswithathinlymannedoutpostlinealongtheforwardedge of battle, followed by a string of strongpoints, and then the mobile reserves forcounterattacking. The Panzer-Lehr-Division’s defense was later described by one of thedivision’sofficers:

ThemainGerman combat line consisted of a row of strong points. Each strongpoint consisted of two or three Panzers orPanzerjägers.ThePanzergrenadiers entrenched around them in order to survive the constant artillery andmortar fire.Thewell-camouflagedtankscouldnotmoveorevenstarttheirengines,otherwisetheywouldhavebeendiscoveredbytheenemy.The Panzer crews were relieved every four days, and every relief would unleash a barrage that inflicted losses on thePanzergrenadiers...Behindthesestrongpointsstoodmobilereserves.(Ritgen1995:91)

The decision by 7. Armee to commit the Panzer-Lehr-Division to static defense was roundlycriticized by Heeresgruppe B headquarters. The Heeresgruppe B commander,GeneralfeldmarschallGünthervonKluge,wantedthePanzer-Lehr-Divisionandtheneighboring2. SS-PanzerDivisionDasReich to be kept in army reserve to act as amobile counterattackforce. However, the 7. Armee commander, Oberstgruppenführer der SS Paul Hausser, feltcompelledtousethesedivisionsinsuchawastefulfashionsincehisfieldarmylackedsufficientinfantry divisions to hold the front line and he had exhausted all his reserves. Kluge wasdistractedbytherelentlessBritishandCanadianattacksintheCaensector,andnevermadeanyserious effort to rectify this dangerousmisuse of thePanzer-Lehr-Division in costly positional

warfare.FacingthePanzer-Lehr-Division’stenbattalionsweretwoUSinfantrydivisionsamountingto

18infantrybattalions.ByJuly18,1944,afteraweekofbrutalfighting,theUSVIICorpspushedthePanzer-Lehr-DivisionbacktothePériers–Saint-Lôroad.TheAmericanintentionwastoweardowntheGermandefensesthroughattrition,atwhichpointanoffensivewouldbestagedtobreakoutof theNormandyhedgerowcountry.Thiswas largelydependenton thecaptureof the roadjunctionofSaint-Lô,whichwasfinallytakenonJuly19.Duringthetwoweeksoffightinginthissector, thePanzer-Lehr-Divisionlostabout1,200troopsplusadditionalmenwounded; thisdidnotincludethelossesoftheattachedregimentswhichbroughtthetotaltoover2,000.BayerleinlaterestimatedthathistwoPanzergrenadier-Regimenterhadonly450combateffectivesonJuly24atthestartoftheAmericanoffensive.Theattachmentsincreasedthisby1,550menincluding500 troops inFallschirmjäger-Regiment14, 450men inKampfgruppeHeintz, and 600men ofGrenadier-Regiment 985.One battalion of PzGrLeRgt 901was in the rear areas being rebuiltwithnewreplacements.OfthePanzer-Lehr-Division’sfivebattalions,threewereratedasweakandtwowereratedasexhausted.TheAmericanplanforOperationCobrawastocarpetbombtheGermanstrongpointssouthof

thePériers–Saint-Lôroad,blowingaholethroughtheGermandefenses,atwhichpoint the2ndand3rdArmoreddivisionswouldbeinsertedtoexploitthebreakthrough.Bothofthesearmoreddivisionswereinthe“heavy”1942configurationandsoweretank-heavyandweakininfantry.The solution to this imbalancewas to attach an infantry regiment from one of the neighboringinfantrydivisionstoanarmoreddivision,therebybringingthemixtosixtankbattalionsandsixinfantryregiments.To ensure tank–infantry cooperation, several days of training were conducted before the

operationbythe2ndArmoredDivisionandattachedunits.Forexample,the2/66thArmoredwasteamedwiththe1/22ndInfantry(4thInfantryDivision)intheassemblyareanearLaMine.Theplanwastocarryinfantryonthetanks“intheRussianmanner”witheightonanM4mediumtankandsixonaM5A1lighttank:

The first step taken was to “marry-up” one infantry company and one tank company in a common bivouac area wheremaximum personal contact between tank and doughboywas physically possible and highly encouraged. Infantrymenwerequicklyfamiliarizedwithasmanycharacteristicsandcapabilitiesofthetanksasthelimitedtrainingtimepermitted.Amongthemeans used to orient the attached infantry were scheduled, supervised practice rides on the back deck of tanks, tankperformancedemonstrations,andconferencesatwhichcompanyandplatoonleveltank–infantrytacticswerestressed.Attheendof theplanningphase, each infantrymanknew thenameof his tank commander andknew thenameof the tankuponwhichhewastorideandgivehissupportintheensuingaction,aswellaswhathecouldexpectinthewayofsupport,andjusthowtheteamwastofunction.(Long1948:7)

Troopsofthe2ndArmoredDivisionlookovertheGermanvehiclesknockedoutinthebombzonenearthePériers–Saint-Lôroad.Thehalf-trackintheforegroundisanSdKfz251/7ofPanzer-Lehr-Pionier-Bataillon130,aspecializedengineerversionfittedwithapairofassaultbridgestoassisthalf-tracksinpassingoverditchesorotherobstructions.Thedivision’scombat-engineerbattalionwasregularlyusedas

improvisedinfantry,andsooftenwascountedasafifthPanzergrenadier-Batailloninunitstrengthreports.

OperationCobrawas supposed to start on July 24, but the planwas changed due to overcastweatherthatobscuredthetargetareafortheUSbombers.However,somebombersdidnotgettherecallsignalandbombedanyway,someofthebombsfallinginsideUSlines.ThePanzer-Lehr-Divisionweatheredthispartialairattackwithmodestcasualtiesamountingtoabout350menandtenarmoredvehicles.Bayerleinmistakenlybelieved thathisdivisionhadrepulsedamajorUSattack.Inanticipationofmorefighting,heorderedhisforwardoutpostlinenorthofthePériers–Saint-LôroadtowithdrawsouthoftheroadwheretheywouldbelessvulnerabletoUSartillery.Thisinadvertentlyplacedthemimmediatelyinsidethemostintensesectorofthebombzonethenextday.Thefull-scaleairattackonJuly25startedat0935hrswithstrafingrunsbyP-47Thunderbolt

fighter-bombers followedby1,495B-17FlyingFortressandB-24Liberatorheavybombers inseveralwaves, dropping3,370 tonsofbombs into an area7,000yd longand2,500ydwide.A

further 380B-26Maraudermedium bombers completed the attack, bringing the grand total to4,700tonsofbombs.TheeffectontheGermandefenseswasdevastating.Ofthe3,600Germantroopsintheforwarddefensezone,about1,000werekilledorwoundedinthebombingattack,and at least as many severely dazed. Bayerlein later described the effects during a postwarinterrogation:

Eventhestronglyentrenchedinfantrywassmashedintheirfoxholesanddugoutsbytheheavybombs,orkilledandburiedbytheblasts.Thewholebombedsectorwastransformedintochurnedfieldsofcratersinwhichnohumanbeingsurvived...Theshockeffectwasnearlyasgreatasthephysicaleffect...Thebombinglastednearlythreehours.Someofthemenwentcrazyorwereparalyzedandunable to act. Iwas in thebombardment areaon24and25 Julyand sopersonally experienced thetremendousimpact.Ihadservedineverytheaterduringthewarat thefocalpointofcombatandthiswastheworstIeversaw...Thebombardmenthadadevastatingmoraleeffectontroopswhowerealreadyphysicallyandmorallyexhaustedby45daysofcontinualhardcombat.Thedurationofthebombing,withoutanypossibilityforescape,causeddespairandresignationtofate.Themoraleofthemenwhosurvivedthebombingwassohopelessthattheysurrenderedorescapedtotherear.Onlytheparticularlystrong-nervedandbravecouldendurethishorror.

The German communications network, which depended heavily on field telephones, wascompletelydisrupted.Seniorcommandershadlittleideaofwhathadhappenedtothemainlineofresistance,andsowereunabletorallytheirreserveforcestostagecounterattacks.Therewasnoidea where themain American thrusts had occurred. The bombing coverage was erratic. Thedamagewasworse in thecenterof thebombzonewhere theheavybombershadstruck,whilesomedefensivepositionsclosertotheAmericanlines,includingabouthalfthe16Panthertanksin the strongpoints, were unscathed. As a result, German resistance along the front line wasentirely unpredictable. There was strong resistance here and there, but no resistance at all inneighboringareas.TheVII Corps infantry attack began at 1100hrswith the immediate objective of seizing the

crossroad towns of Marigny and Saint-Gilles about 3 miles from the start line. The westernportionof theattackby the9th InfantryDivisionboggeddownquickly in thesectoreastof thePanzer-Lehr-Division,heldbyaKampfgruppeof5.Fallschirmjäger-Division thathadescapedthe bombardment. In the center, the 8th Infantry Regiment (4th Infantry Division) encounteredseveral strongpointsofPzGrLeRgt901.Theunlucky30th InfantryDivisionhadbeen struckbyboth the American preliminary bombardments, and suffered 152 casualties on July 24 and afurther 662 on July 25. The lead 120th Infantry Regiment ran into a surviving Panzer-Lehr-Division defensive strongpoint. The neighboring 119th Infantry Regiment encounteredKampfgruppeKentner (275. Infanterie-Division), aswell as a handful of dug-inGerman tanksaroundHébécrevonsupportingKampfgruppeHeintz.SomeGermanofficersoutsidethebombzonelaterarguedthatthebombingactuallydelayedthe

progressoftheAmericanattackduetothechaosanddevastationinthebombzone.ThiswasnottheopinionofBayerleinorthecommanderswhohadwitnessedthebombingfirst-hand.TheUSinfantryadvanceonJuly25didnotreachitsterrainobjectivesandhadnotsecureda

breakthrough.ItwasagainstUSArmydoctrinetostartatankexploitationuntilthebreakthroughhadbeensecuredbytheinfantry.However,theVIICorpscommander,MajorGeneral“LightningJoe” Collins, felt that the crust of theGerman defenses had been broken. Collins had ledVIICorps during the June fighting to seize Cherbourg and he knew that German units reflexivelystagedcounterattackstoregainlostground.YettheGermanresponsetotheAmericanattacksonthefirstdayof theoffensivehadbeenfeeble.Under thesecircumstances,Collinsusedhisownjudgment,ignoredthestricturesofdoctrine,andorderedtheexploitationphasetobegin.The2nd

ArmoredDivisionwas assigned to push through the Panzer-Lehr-Division defenses,while theneighboring 3rdArmoredDivisionwas assigned to push through theGerman defenses fartherwesttowardMarigny.

AnM4mediumtanknamed“Fury”ofCo.F,66thArmoredRegimentatthestartofOperationCobrawithaninfantryteamfromthe22ndInfantryRegimentonboard.

The 2nd Armored Division mission on July 26 committed only one of its three combatcommands.Collinsfeltthattheconstrictedterrainwouldleadtotrafficjamsifallthreecombatcommandswere pushed into the breach.This hadhappened twoweeks beforewhen a combatcommandofthe3rdArmoredDivisionhadbeenpushedintotheVirebridgehead.Insteadofusingtanks with the infantry in half-tracks which might aggravate the congestion, the 2nd ArmoredDivision decided to use tank-rider tactics for the spearhead Combat Command A during thebreakthrough,andthenusethemoretraditionaltank/half-trackmixinCombatCommandBduringtheexploitationphase.Asmentionedabove,CCAwasbasedaroundatankregimentfromthe2ndArmoredDivision,andthe22ndInfantryRegimentalCombatTeam(RCT).In the wake of the first day’s staggering losses, the Panzer-Lehr-Division had very limited

resourcestoreinforceitsshatteredfront.At0300hrsonJuly26,thedozensurvivingPzKpfwIVtanks of II./PzLeRgt 130 were sent forward to reinforce the Panzergrenadier and infantrystrongpointsofKampfgruppeWelschontheroadnorthofSaint-Gilles.Forexample,7./PzLeRgt

130,with fourPzKpfw IV tanks,was ordered forward to supportKampfgruppeScheele (275.Infanterie-Division) in the area north of Saint-Gilles. These reinforcementswere too paltry tostiffen the main line of resistance. What was desperately needed was more experiencedPanzergrenadiertroops,butthereservesimplydidnotexistinadequatestrength.On July 26, the assault by CCA, 2nd Armored Division started at 0945hrs with a line of

departurenearHébécrevon.Therewasscatteredresistancenearthestartline,butthemainfactorslowing the advance was the hedgerow terrain that took time to traverse. Once the initialresistancewasovercomenear the lineofdeparture, reconnaissanceunitswereunleashed,withcompaniesfromthedivision’s82ndArmoredReconnaissanceBattalionperformingdeepscoutingforthetaskforces.The first serious resistance was not met until the American columns reached a strongpoint

800ydnorthofSaint-Gillesconsistingofadug-inPanzergrenadierforcebackedbyfourPzKpfwIVtanksof5./PzLeRgt130andasingleassaultgun.TheleadcolumnscalledforairsupportandasquadronofP-47 fighter-bombersoncolumn-cover attacked the strongpointnear the roadwith500lbbombs.SurvivingPanzergrenadiereandGermantankswithdrewintoSaint-Gilles,butthehastydefenseofthevillagewasquicklyovercome.AsubsequentstrongpointwasbasedaroundafewPanthertanksof4./PzRgt6,buttheywerescatteredaboutwithnocohesivedefensescheme.The tank-rider tactic was later described by the commanding officer of the 22nd InfantryRegiment:

The first wave of tanks penetrated the enemy lines unaccompanied by infantry. Infantry on tanks in the second waveprotectedthemfromGermanbazookasandhandlaunchers.Whennecessary,theinfantrycouldgetoffthetanksandfightonfootwiththeregularinfantryfightcoveredbytankfire.Inthethirdwavethereweremoreinfantryontanksasmoppers-up.

The town of Canisy was weakly defended and was secured by CCA, 2nd Armored Divisionaround1900hrs.TheAmericancolumnscontinuedtoproceedsouthward,encounteringnumeroussmallGermanformationsinchaoticattemptstoeitherretreatormovetothebattle-front.Theleadtask force reached the LeMesnil-Herman road junction after midnight. CCA had advanced 9milesduringthecourseoftheday,underminingthePanzer-Lehr-Division’sbrittledefenses.Alaterassessmentofthetank-ridertacticsofCCA,2ndArmoredDivisionconcludedthatthere

wereatleastsevenadvantagestothetactics:

1.TheGermanmachinegunsarealwayssightedforgrazingfireabout twofeetoff theground.Ifyouhavethe infantryupbehindtheturret,theyareabovethisgrazingfireandareprotectedfromthefrontandpartiallyfromtheflanks.2.Menridingthetanksaremovingtargets.Theymoveatirregularandunpredictablespeedsandfollowachangingcourse.3. From any distance at all, it is difficult to silhouette infantry on tanks if branches and camouflage are on tanks. Infantrycannotbeseenfrom100yardssometimes.4.TheGermansaretrainedtogetintotheirholeswhentanksrolloverthemandshootatthefollowinginfantry.Instead,ourinfantryisridingontopofthemandcanevengetoffandintotheirholes.5.TheGermansdonotlaymortarfireontanksbuttheydointhefields.ThedoughboysareupabovethesprayoftheGermanmortargroundburst.6.Thedoughboysgetmuchbetterobservation.Theyareblindontheground,butcanseemuchmorewhenuponthetanks.7.Thereisapsychologicaleffectoflookingdownonyouradversary.(Creamer1947:42–43)

By dawn on July 27, the Panzer-Lehr-Divisionwas no longer an effective fighting force. Thedivision’s reconnaissance battalion, Panzer-Aufklärungs-Lehr-Abteilung 130, near Percy andPanzer-Lehr-Pionier-Bataillon130nearCarantillyhadbeenthedivision’ssolereserve,andthesetwo exhaustedunitswere hastilymoved forward to reinforce the “YellowLine.”This defensewassoweakanddilutedthatitwasquicklyoverrun.Thedivisionhadonlyninesurvivingtanks

andsixassaultguns.Late in theeveningofJuly26,BayerleinwasorderedbyGeneralleutnantDietrich von Choltitz, the commander of LXXXIV. Armeekorps in Normandy, to prepare acounterattackagainsttheCCAspearheadnearLeMesnil-Hermanthefollowingday.BythisstageBayerleinhadlearnedthatitwaspointlesstoarguewithCholtitzabouttheimpossibilityofsuchascheme.HewaspromisedabattalionofPanthertanksfrom2.SS-Panzer-DivisionDasReich.Infact,onlyacompanywassentanditonlyreachedasfarasQuiboubeforehalting.Theplannedcounterattackwasanimpossiblefantasyunderthecircumstances.

AnM2half-trackofthe41stArmoredInfantryRegiment(CCB,2ndArmoredDivision)duringOperationCobra.Thishalf-trackwasoneofseveralthatwerere-armedwithsurplus37mmantitankguns,thoughthegunislargelyobscuredinthisviewbythecrew.Thesquad

membersarewearingthedistinctiveandcontroversialcamouflagebattle-dress,whichwaslargelydiscontinuedafterAugust1944asittoooftenledtotroopsofthe41stArmoredInfantryRegimentbeingmisidentifiedasGermans.

The first task ofCCA, 2ndArmoredDivision on themorning of July 27was to secure thevillage of Le Mesnil-Herman, which had been reinforced by Bayerlein during the night inanticipation of the planned counterattack.While theGerman forces around LeMesnil-Hermanwere not strong enough to counterattack, they did provide for a stiffer defense than wasanticipated, with the result that the village and its surroundings were not fully secured until

1500hrs.Bymid-afternoon,with the crossroad secure,CCA formed two task forces to exploitfarther south, encountering numerous rearguards from remnants of the Panzer-Lehr-Divisionbeforehaltingatdusk.WiththeGermandefensesinastateofchaos,CCB,2ndArmoredDivisionwaspreparedfor

movement.ItsmissionwastoadvancethroughthegapbetweenCCA,2ndArmoredDivisionandthe1stInfantryDivision/3rdArmoredDivisionteamtothewest.Thiswasaclassicexploitationmission,and theM5A1 light tanksandM8armoredcarsof the82ndArmoredReconnaissanceBattaliontookthelead.Speedwasmoreessentialthanfirepower.CCBincludedtwobattalionsfromthe41stArmoredInfantryRegiment,mountedonhalf-tracks.Theoriginalplanwastousetwo task forces inparallel, but therewasonlya singleviable roadnetworkandcross-countrymovementwastooslowduetothebocagethatborderedthefieldsalongtheroad.Asaresult,themainCCBtask forceconsistingof the2/67thArmoredand the3/41stArmored Infantrymoveddowntheroadwhile twosmallergroupsconsistingofsingle tankcompanies teamedwithhalf-track infantry of the 41st Armored Infantry proceeded on either flank where the local roadnetworkpermitted.

Here,anM157mmantitankgunofthe41stArmoredInfantryRegimentissetuponthestreetsofPont-Brocard,centeroftheGermanRedLinedefenses.AnM4mediumtankpassesbyinthebackground.InthebackgroundisanabandonedSdKfz251/3armoredradiohalf-track

ofthePanzer-Lehr-Division.

The first roadblock was encountered at Quibou, part of the Panzer-Lehr-Division’s YellowLinedefenses.ThishadservedasacollectionpointforGermantroopswithdrawingthepreviousevening.ThetownwasdefendedbytwoPanthertanksandanassortmentofPanzer-Lehr-Divisiontroops.Afterovercoming this force, theAmericancolumnscontinued throughDangy.The town

wasdefendedbyaPanzergrenadiercompanyanda7.5cmantitankgunthatwasovercomewithtankfireanddismountedinfantry.Thenextmajortownontheroad,Pont-Brocard,waspartofthethirdRedLinedefensesonthe

SoullesRiverandwasdefendedbyaKampfgruppeconsistingoftwounderstrengthcompaniesofPanzergrenadier-Lehr-Regiment 901 and the remaining troops of Panzer-Lehr-Pionier-Bataillon130alongwithafewantitankgunsand8.8cmFlakguns.Thisdefenselinewasoverrunaround1630hrs.Bayerleinandthedivisionalcommandpostwerelocatednearoftheedgeofthewoodseast of Pont-Brocard using a bus as a mobile command post. The main headquarters wasbypassedbyM5A1 light tanksand the staff fled toaneighboringappleorchardwhere theHQradio sectionwas located. In exasperation,Bayerlein sent out a bitter radiomessage to corpsheadquarters: “After 49days of fierce combat, thePanzer-Lehr-Division is finally annihilated.Theenemyisnowrollingthroughallsectors,fromSt.Gillestothesouth.Allcallsforhelphavegoneunansweredbecausenoonebelievestheseriousnessofthesituation.”ThefightingonJuly25–27hadreducedthePanzer-Lehr-Divisiontoatorsodivisionwithfew

combat-effectivetroops.MuchofitscoreadministrativeandserviceelementssurvivedthebattleeventhoughitsPanzergrenadierandPanzertroopsdidnot.Itwasthiscombat-ineffective“torso”thatretreatedandwaslaterusedtoreconstructthedivisionforfurtheractionsalongtheGermanfrontier in September 1944.OperationCobra had successfully pushed aside themainGermandefense line, permitting a First US Army break-out from Normandy toward Paris. The 2ndArmoredDivisionwouldcrosstheFrenchfrontierintoBelgiumfourweekslater.

Réchicourt-la-Petite

September26–29,1944

BACKGROUNDTOBATTLEGeneralderPanzertruppeHassovonManteuffel’s5.Panzer-ArmeelaunchedacounteroffensiveagainstLieutenantGeneralGeorgeS.Patton’sThirdUSArmyinLorraineinmid-September1944inanattempttocutoffitsspearhead,the4thArmoredDivision,beforeitreachedtheSaarregiononGermany’swesternborder.ThisresultedinaseriesofintensetankbattlesaroundthetownofArracourt.ThebulkoftheseattackswereconductedbythenewlyformedPanzerbrigades,whichsufferedveryheavylossesintheprocess.BythethirdweekofSeptember,thesurvivingremnantsof the Panzer brigadeswere absorbed into the neighboring Panzer divisions. The tank fightingresulted in very heavy attrition in the Panzer strength of 5. Panzer-Armee, thoughPanzergrenadier strength was less adversely affected since there had been far less infantryaction.

Asinotherarmored-infantrybattalions,the4thArmoredDivisionmodifiedmanyoftheirM481mmmortarcarrierstopermitthemortartofireforwardratherthanintheoriginalrearwardconfiguration.

The 4th Armored Division halted its offensive actions toward the German frontier onSeptember22–23aspartofthegeneralconsolidationoftheThirdUSArmy.Bymid-September,the Allied armies had outrun their supply lines and there was a general shortage of fuel andammunition.Pattonhadinformedhiscorpsanddivisionalcommandersofthesituation,andplansweredrawnuptoestablishamaindefenselineonfavorableterrain.The4thArmoredDivisioncommander,MajorGeneralJohnWood,alongwiththeleadersofhiscombatcommands,selectedadefensiveperimetertothenorthandnortheastofArracourt.ThisdefenselineranalongthetopsofseveralhillsandplateausthatofferedgoodvisibilityoveropposingGermanpositions.IntheearlyeveningofSeptember25,LieutenantColonelBruceC.Clarke’sCCApulledbacksouthoftheMetz–Strasbourgroadtothenewdefensiveperimeter.Armoreddivisionswerenotidealfordefensivemissionssuchasthisduetotheirrelativelysmallnumbersofriflemencomparedtoaninfantrydivision:onlythreeriflebattalionsversusnine.Asaresult,somesectorsofthelinehadto be covered by an attached engineer battalion employed as infantry as well as divisionalcavalry.

LackingSPW,thePanzergrenadiererodeintobattleontheenginedecksofthesupportingtanksinmanyofthebattlesaroundArracourt.Here,thetroopsofPanzergrenadier-Regiment111mountuponthePanthertanksofI./PzAbt16inthevillageofBuresonthemorningof

September20fortheattacktowardArracourt.

By this stage of the fighting, 11. Panzer-Division had belatedly arrived on the scene. ThisdivisionhadbeenlocatedinsouthernFranceatthetimeoftheOperationDragoonlandingsthereonAugust15,1944,andithadservedasthemainrearguardforHeeresgruppeGduringitsretreatuptheRhôneValleytoAlsace.Itwasshiftedfrom19.Armeeto1.Armeeinmid-September1944to takepart in theLorraineoffensive,but arrived too late toplaya role in theoriginalPanzeroffensivearoundArracourt.ThedivisionhadoneSPWbattalion,I./PzGrRgt110,whiletheotherthree battalions in Panzergrenadier-Regiment 110 and Panzergrenadier-Regiment 111 weremotorized.AtthestartofSeptember1944,itstillhad164SPW,butonly25tanksfromitsstartingstrengthof139 tanksearlier in the summer.At the timeof theArracourt fighting, ithadaveryweakPanzerelement,butstillhadasubstantialPanzergrenadierforce.Itsmobilitywasratedat86 percent. In addition, it absorbed the tanks and troops of Panzer-Brigade 113, though theseremainedasaseparateformationwithinthedivision.TheGermanplansforthefinalweekofSeptember1944weretoeliminatethesalientheldby

the4thArmoredDivisionaroundArracourt.Thestagingareasfortheseattacksweremainlyfromthe wooded Fôret de Parroy to the southeast of the American salient, and from the areaimmediatelynorthofthesalient.

ThebattleforRéchicourt-la-Petite,September25–29,1944

MAPKEY1 Evening,September25:CCA,4thArmoredDivisionpullsbackfromitsdefensesalongtheMetz–StrasbourgroadaspartofanefforttoestablishmoresoliddefensesonthehillsaroundArracourt.

2 1300hrs,September26:ElementsofPanzergrenadier-Regiment111probethedefensesofthe10thArmoredInfantry

BattalioninthehillsoverBézange-la-Petite,buttheweatheristoopoorfortheattacktogainmuchtraction.

3 1000hrs,September27:Withalullintherain,II./PzGrRgt110stagesadiversionaryattackonHill318.

4 1000hrs,September27:TherestofPanzergrenadier-Regiment110continuesitsattackinthenorthernsectoragainstthe53rdArmoredInfantryBattalion,buttheattackisshatteredbyaconcentratedartilleryfire.

5 1100hrs,September27:FightingresumesinthePanzergrenadier-Regiment111sectorwithattemptstosecurethehillsoverRéchicourt.

6 1100hrs,September27: Themain attack by KampfgruppeHammon is staged against Co. C, 51st Armored InfantryBattalion on Hill 318, marking the start of several days of bitter fighting for the hill. After reinforcements arrive fromII./PzGrRgt110,thetopofthehillistaken,atleastforthemoment.

7 1430hrs, September 27: A small task force from the 35th Tank Battalion conducts a spoiling raid out of the 53rdArmoredInfantryBattalion’sdefenselinetosmashuptheGermaninfantryinthetownofXanrey.Itreturnsaround1630hrs.

8 Dawn,September28: The51stArmored InfantryBattalion retakes the forwardslopeofHill 318 fromKampfgruppeHammon.Thehillcrestislostlaterinthemorning,butisretakenagainbythe51stArmoredInfantryBattalionaroundnoon.

9 Nightfall,September28: KampfgruppeHammon secures the south face of Hill 318 and the 51st Armored InfantryBattalionwithdraws over the crest. After a concentrated artillery barrage on theGerman positions, the 51st ArmoredInfantryBattalionattacksoverthehillandsecuresthesouthfaceforthetimebeing.

10 1900hrs,September28:Afteradayoffighting,Panzergrenadier-Regiment111seemspoisedtopushthroughthe10thArmoredInfantryBattaliondefensesaboveRéchicourt,onlytobeslappeddownbyheavyartilleryconcentrations.

11 Dawn,September29:Co.C, 8thTankBattalionmoves forward in thedarkness toHill 318andarounddawnhearsheavyvehicularmovementontheGermanside.ThefogistoothicktospottheGermanmovement;thetanksremainonthereverseslopewaitingfortheweathertoclear.

12 1015hrs,September29:ThecombinedGermanforceinfiltratesupthesouthslopeofHill318underthecoveroffogandpushesthe51stArmoredInfantryBattalionbackoverthecrestby1015hrs.

13 Noon,September29:Thefogfinallyliftsandthe8thTankBattalioncallsinfighter-bomberstopummeltheGermansholdingHill318.Byearlyafternoon,theexhaustedGermanforcesmakeaheadlongretreatoffHill318.

14 Afternoon,September29:Panzergrenadier-Regiment11managestopushCo.A,10thArmoredInfantryBattalionoverthe reverse slopeandback into theCo.CdefensesonHill 265; but by this stage, theGerman forcesare tooweak tocontinueandthefightingfinallypetersout.

Battlefieldenvironment

TheArracourtbattlefieldconsistedmainlyoffarmlandinterruptedbyoccasionalsmallforestsandtowns.Althoughtheterrainwasrelativelyflat,therewerenumerousshallowhillsthatplayedanunusuallysignificantroleinthefightingsincetheyoverlookedthesurroundingterrain.The4thArmoredDivisiondeliberatelyselectedaseriesofhillsfortheirdefensiveperimeter.ThemostsignificantterrainfeatureduringthefightingduringSeptember26–29wasacamelbackhillformation(withHill265inthenorthoverlookingthevillageofBézange-la-Petite)thatextendedtothesouthwestpastthevillageofRéchicourt-la-PetitetoHill318.

TheweatherinlateSeptember1944wasespeciallyrainy,tothepointthatthefarmfieldsbecameamorassofglutinousmudsodeepthatitinterferedwithcombatoperations.Morningfogwasverycommon,especiallyinthelow-lyingareasatthebaseofthehills,whichrestrictedUSairsupport.

ThisisaviewofthereverseslopeofHill318fromtheperspectiveoftheAmericanside.Thetroopsofthe51stArmoredInfantryBattalionestablisheddefensivepositionsalongthetopofthishillline.

INTOCOMBATDuring theearly afternoonofMonday,September25 theHeeresgruppeGcommander,GeneralderPanzertruppeHermannBalck,sentoutinstructionsforacontinuationofattacksonSeptember26.Manteuffel’s5.Panzer-ArmeewasagaininstructedtoseizeBézange-la-Grande.Intheevent,fightingonSeptember26was limitedby thecontinuing rainyweatherandatrociousbattlefieldconditions.

Aclose-upofPanzergrenadiereontheenginedeckofaPanthertankofPanzer-Brigade111inBurespriortotheattackonthemorningofSeptember20.ThetwonearestsoldiersarearmedwithPanzerfaustantitankrockets.

The4thArmoredDivisionusedmost of theday to conclude its internal reorganization as itshifted to a defensive posture. The forward defense line was now held by the 4th ArmoredDivision’s three armored-infantry battalions.ColHolmesDager’sCCB took over the southernsector of defenses facing XLVII. Panzerkorps. Colonel Bruce Clarke’s CCA remainedconcentratedintheArracourtareaandthenorthernsector.Theyselecteddefensivepositionson

the hills that gave their units a good vantage point, looking down on neighboring Germanpositionsinthearea.Theafter-actionreportbythe51stArmoredInfantryBattalionsummarizedthesituationsuccinctly:“ItwasobviousthattheBattalion’spresentpositionmustbeheldatallcostssincethelossofanyofthefrontwouldgivetheenemyavantagepointfromwhichobservedartilleryfirecouldbeplacedonanypositionofCombatCommandB’sarea.”CCB,4thArmoredDivisionreportedthat“OneofthefewconfrontationsofthedayoccurredduringthemovementbyCCBtonewpositions.Whileonthemarch,elementsofCCBwereattackedbyanenemycolumnofhalf-tracksandothervehicles,butaccurateartilleryconcentrationsbrokeup theattackat itsinception,destroying3tanksand5armoredcars.”The 10th Armored Infantry Battalion in the hills overlooking Bézange-la-Petite saw more

actionthatdaythanintheothersectors.Theunit’safter-actionreportrecalledthat:

Itwasearlyafternoonwhentheenemystartedhisfirstcounterattackwithtankssupportedbydismountedtroops.Theenemywasdesperatelytryingtoseizeandestablishhimselfonthehighgroundandtherebymakeourpositionsuntenable.Ourlineswerecontinuouslycounterattackedbytheenemyfromallsides.Theseattackswererepulsedwithheavylosses inmenandmaterieltotheenemy.Theartilleryandthetankdestroyersattachedtothisunitmateriallyassistedinkeepingtheenemyback.Itwasafirmstrugglealldaylong.ShortlyafterCompanyBestablisheditsCP,enemyartilleryshelledthatpositionwithsuchferocitythatitwasnecessarytochangeposition.Whendarknessfell,theenemyartilleryquieteddown.Attemptsweremadetoinfiltrateourlines.

Oncetheweatherclearedandthemudbegantodry,theGermanattacksresumedonWednesday,September27.Duetothemuddyterrainconditions,thePanzergrenadierefoughtdismountedandfewSPWwereinuse.ManteuffelsoughttosecurethecamelbackplateauofHills318and293onthe southern flank of the 4thArmoredDivision positions that overlooked the 5. Panzer-Armeepositions around the Parroy forest. He ordered the commander of 11. Panzer-Division,Generalleutnant Wend von Wietersheim, to create an additional Kampfgruppe to attack fromBures toward Arracourt. KampfgruppeHammon consisted of the remaining Panzergrenadierunits of Panzer-Brigade 113 and the division’s reconnaissance battalion, Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung11,supportedbyabout25tanks.TheWednesdayattacksstartedwithadiversionaryadvancebyPanzergrenadier-Regiment110

on the northeastern end of the salient held by the 53rd Armored Infantry Battalion.Panzergrenadier-Regiment 111 supported by a few tanks occupied the village of Bézange-la-PetitebelowthepositionsofCo.C,10thArmoredInfantryBattaliononHill265.ThebruntoftheattackonSeptember27againfellonthepositionsofCo.A,10thArmoredInfantryBattalionnearRéchicourt, betweenHill 265 andHill 318. The companywas very depleted due to previouscombatand itsbattered3rdPlatoonwasdowntoonly15menfromastartingstrengthofmorethan40.Duringtheday’sfighting,LieutenantJamesH.Fieldof1stPlatoon,Co.A,10thArmoredInfantry Battalion, led a counterattack and persisted in the fighting in spite of severe facialwounds,finallyroutingthePanzergrenadiere.HewaslaterdecoratedwiththeMedalofHonor,the first awarded in Patton’sThirdUSArmy. Field eventually had to be evacuated due to theseverityofhiswoundsandanofficerfromtheneighboringCo.Ctookover1stPlatoon.AGerman tankmoved towithin 150ydof the 1stPlatoon trenches andbegan shelling them.

Americanmachine-gunandsmall-armsfirekilledtheexposedPanzercommander,andforcedthecrew to button up. The small-arms fire also killed or wounded the accompanyingPanzergrenadiere,andsothePanzermovedbacktoadefiladepositionfromwhereitcontinuedto shell the foxholes. Harried by German tank and artillery fire, US tank destroyers in theneighboring Co. C positions refused to move out of their entrenchments to relieve Co. A.

Eventually1stPlatoonwasobligedtowithdrawclosertothetownofRéchicourt.Thecompanycommander,CaptainThomasJ.McDonald,attemptedtocontractthedefensiveperimeterbecausethe original positions were under direct observation of German artillery observers from theMoncourtarea,thecompanyhadnomedicalsupportforthewounded,andtherewasalackofanyradioorfield-telephonelinkstohigherheadquarters.Co.Ahadgoneintothelinewith224menandwasreducedto116meninlessthan48hoursoffighting.OnSeptember27,WietersheimshiftedII./PzGrRgt110tosupporttheattack’ssouthernsector

againstthe51stArmoredInfantryBattalion.ThePanzergrenadiereinfiltratedpastthefarmatthebaseofHill318,andafterbitterfighting,KampfgruppeHammonreachedthetopofthehillandtheedgeoftheneighboringwoods.ThecrestofHill318becamethefocusofthefightingoverthenextfewdaysbetweenthe51stArmoredInfantryBattalionandKampfgruppeHammon.The51stArmoredInfantryBattalionafter-actionreportnotedonSeptember27that:

Thecompanycommandersreportedthatmoralewaslow.Themenhadbeentakingtoomuchofabeatingwithoutrest.Theyhadbeensubjectedtoagreatdealofheavyartilleryinthelastweekorsoanditwasbeginningtotellonthem.Therewere17battle fatigue cases today, and itwas feared that the numberwouldmount soon.Themenwere cold, damp, andgenerallymiserable,lyingintheirholesallday.

ThisisaviewofthevillageofRéchicourt-la-PetitefacingnorthwithHill265totheupperright.ThiswastheareaheldbyLieutenantJamesH.Field’s1stPlatoon,Co.A,10thArmoredInfantryBattalionduringthefightingonSeptember27,1944.

TheKampfgruppe of I./PzGrRgt 110 had been continuing its attacks in the northeastern sectoragainst the53rdArmoredInfantryBattalionwithanightattackonSeptember26/27.Theattackwasbeatenoff,buttheGermanattacksresumedaround1000hrsonSeptember27fromtheareaaroundXanrey.Themorningattackhadadvancedonly1,800ydtowardthepositionsofthe53rd

Armored InfantryBattalionwhen itwas stunned by a concentrated barrage from the six field-artillerybattalionssupportingClarke’sCCA.TheattackdisintegratedandthePanzerswithdrew.The35thTankBattalionformedasmalltaskforcewithafewtankcompaniesandtwoplatoonsofriflemento“burnXanreytotheground.”Intheraid,LieutenantColonelOdenestimatedabout135Germaninfantrywerekilled.TwoM4tankswerelostintheraidafterrunningovermines.Thetaskforcewithdrewbacktothestartpositionsaround1630hrs.Manteuffel’s orders for Thursday, September 28 were blunt: “take Hills 293 and 318, then

pressfarthertowardthenorthwestinthedirectionofArracourt.”AtdawnonSeptember28,the51st Armored Infantry Battalion retook the forward slope of Hill 318 from KampfgruppeHammon,but thefightingsurgedacross thecrest throughthedaywith theGermanstemporarilyregainingcontrol.Astheweatherbegantoclear,USfighter-bombersintervened.Therewere107fighter-bomber sorties, with the P-47s leveling the village of Bures and badly disrupting theconcentrationofGermanreinforcementsthere.AfterpushingbackthreemoreGermanattacks,theGIs of the 51st Armored Infantry Battalion again retook Hill 318 around noon. ThePanzergrenadiere received little artillery support that day as the artillery batteries hadmovedduringthenighttonewpositions,andtheirforwardobserverswerenotinplaceuntillateintheday.A finalGerman attackwas broken up byAmerican artillery fire before it could reach itsobjective.Afterdark,theGermanssentinanotherassaultforcesupportedbytankswhichsecuredthe southern faceofHill318.The51stArmored InfantryBattalionwithdrewover thenorthernslope,butwerehitbyaheavyGermanartillerybarrage.The4thArmoredDivision respondedwithafirestrikeagainstthesouthslopebyfourartillerybattalions,followedbya51stArmoredInfantry Battalion counterattack which secured the southern high ground around midnight.SporadicfightingonHill318continuedthroughthenightofSeptember28/29.The fighting on neighboringHill 265was nearly as intense.At 1900hrs, aGerman infantry

attackagainstCo.A,10thArmoredInfantryBattalionforcedoneofitsplatoonstopullback,butthe attackers were brought under intense American artillery fire. Wietersheim requested toManteuffel that his troops be allowed to break off the attacks to get some rest or theywouldsimplylosetheircombateffectiveness.DuetointensepressurefromBerlin,Manteuffelrefusedand insisted that the attacksmust continue.TheGermanattackaroundRéchicourt andHill 265falteredforavarietyofreasons.TheattacksagainstRéchicourtbyPanzergrenadier-Regiment111receivedlessartillerysupportthananticipatedsincethemajorityofthedivisionalartillerywasoutofrange.TheplantoreinforcetheattackonRéchicourtwithKampfgruppeHammon stalledwhentheexhaustedKampfgruppehaltedinCoincourt.On the American side, the relentless fighting led to a sharp rise in the number of combat-

exhaustion cases, especially among the riflemen of the armored-infantry battalions who werebearingthebruntofthefighting.“Thistrendisduetonumerouscauses,amongwhichare:lengthoftimeincombat,extensiverain,littlerest,lackofhotfood,andafeelingthattheyarenotfittedforaholdingmission.”BydawnonSeptember29,11.Panzer-Divisionhadreinforceditsunitsopposite theCCBpositionsonHill 265 andHill 318 fromother sectors,with the intentionofmakingoneconcertedpushoverthehills.MassingnearthesmolderingruinsofBures,itsforcesincluded thePanzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung11, a battalion fromPanzergrenadier-Regiment 110,an armored combat-engineer company, and the remaining tanks of Panzer-Brigade 111 andPanzer-Brigade113.Thearmoredstrengthinthesectorincluded18PzKpfwIV,20Panthers,and11FlakpanzerIVself-propelledantiaircraftguns.Theattackbeganshortlybeforedaylight.

In the pre-dawn hours, Captain Eugene Bush, commander of Co. C, 8th Tank Battalion,reportedthat“itsoundedasifenemyvehicleswerecomingrightintomyarea.”Thedensefoganddarkness limited visibility to a fewdozen yards.The initialGerman attack onHill 318 in theearly-morning hours pushed the 51st Armored Infantry Battalion back about 500yd and theGermanscontrolledtheforwardcrestofHill318by1015hrs.Giventheheavycasualtiessufferedby the51stArmored InfantryBattalion,ColDagerordered the8thTankBattalion to send twocompaniesoftankstoprovidedirectfiresupport.Thefogwasstillsothickthatmovementofthetanks in the featureless mud of the farm fields proved difficult. Dager told the tank-companycommanders towaituntil the fog liftedbeforemovingover thecrest.The tanksofCo.AwereunabletoreachthecrestduetostiffGermanresistance.Whenthefogliftedaround1100hrs,thetanks of Co. C discovered they were already on the crest, and they immediately came underintenseGermanmortarfire.CaptainBushrequestedairsupport.

Thefinalpush

AtdawnonSeptember29,11.Panzer-DivisionbeganitsfinalconcertedpushtooverruntheAmericandefensesonbothhills.Atfirst,thedensefoganddarknesslimitedvisibilitytoafewdozenyards,allowingtheGermanadvanceupthehilltogounhinderedbyairattackorpreciseartilleryfire.Whenthefogliftedaround1100hrs,however,thePanzergrenadierefacednotonlythe“armoreddoughs”ofthearmored-infantrybattalionsofthe4thArmoredDivision,butcompaniesofM4mediumtanksindirectsupport.TheclearingskiesalsobroughttheAmericanP-47Thunderboltfighter-bombers,whichlaunchedremorselessattacksagainsttheadvancingGermantroops.

Thearmoredinfantryofthe4thArmoredDivisionfoughtdismountedinthelate-Septemberbattles.Theseareriflemenofthe10thArmoredInfantryBattalionphotographedafewweeksaftertheArracourtbattles.

AtacticalairliaisonofficerwiththegroupdirectedP-47ThunderboltstrikesonthePanzersinthe fieldbelowwhere theyweremassingforanotherattack.Without the fog forprotection, theGermantroopswereexposed.Theinitialairattackswerelimitedtostrafingbecausethefighter-bombershadbeendivertedfromaplannedmissionoverMetzandtheirbombrackswerearmedwithnothingmore thanpropaganda leaflets;butduring thecourseof theday, the405thFighterGroup carried out several low-altitude air strikes against the German forces preparing toreinforcetheirpositionsonHill318.Besidesknockingouttankswithbombsandrocketfire,theair strikesmanaged todriveanumberofGerman tanksoutof thecoverofwoods,where theywerethenexposedandstruckbyartilleryfire.Bushlaterremarkedthat“theAirCorpsreallydidthetrick!”ThetanksofCo.CbeganfiringontheGermantanksatthebaseofthehill,claimingsixduringtheday’sfighting.The11.Panzer-Divisioncommanderlaterrecalled:

In a fewminutes, eighteenof our tanks and several armoredpersonnel carrierswereburning!Ourown infantry retreated,strangelyenoughnotpursuedbytheenemy...Asaresult,anychanceofwinningourfinalobjectivehadbeenfrustrated.Wehad suffered losses that could have been prevented if onlywe had been satisfiedwith the line already gainedwhichwassuitableforthedefense.

AsurvivoroftheArracourtbattles,thisSdKfz251AusfDhalf-trackfromPanzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung11(11.Panzer-Division)wasknockedoutbyCCB,6thArmoredDivisiononNovember19duringthefightingforGrostenquininLorraine.

The fighting by Panzergrenadier-Regiment 111 against the neighboring 10th Armored InfantryBattalion that day was mainly directed against the right flank held by Co. A, 10th ArmoredInfantryBattalionnearRéchicourtandCo.ConHill265.TheGIswerefinallypushedbacktothereverseslopeofthehill,butheldtheirpositions.BythemiddleoftheafternoononSeptember29,theGermantroopswereinfullretreatoffHill318.Afterthreedaysofintensefighting,withlittlesleep and heavy casualties, many of the German units disintegrated. The commander ofKampfgruppeBode (Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 11), Major Karl Bode, suffered a nervousbreakdown.TheGermanstagingareaatthebaseoftheplateauhadtheMarneCanalatitsback,andmanyofthetroopsfearedthattheAmericansmightchargedownofftheplateauandtrapthemagainstthewaterobstacle.Theneighboring15.Panzergrenadier-Divisionwasforcedtosetupastraggler line with tanks near Parroy in an attempt to restore some order. The survivingFlakpanzerswere positioned in Parroy andBures in an attempt toward off the continuing airattacks,buttheywerealmostcompletelyineffective.Thecorpscommander’sreporttoManteuffelwasblunt:“Hilltrianglelost.Troopsexhausted,needrest.”TheSeptember29attackrepresentedthelastmajorattemptby5.Panzer-Armeetocutoffthe

ThirdUSArmy’sspearheadnearArracourt.ThefinalfourdaysofattacksonCCA,4thArmoredDivision had already cost 5. Panzer-Armee about 700 killed and 300wounded.A total of 23tanks and several armored half-trackswere knocked out according toGerman accounts of thefighting.Onlyfourtanksremainedoperationalbytheendoftheday.On September 29, while the fighting was still raging on the hills east of Arracourt, Balck

visited the Western Front commander, Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt, at hisheadquarters inBadKreuznach.Balck told the fieldmarshal that if his forces did not receivereinforcements with at least 140 tanks and more artillery, it would be impossible to secureArracourt. Rundstedt replied that any reinforcements were out of the question, and tacitly

acceptedthat theLorraineoffensivewouldcometoanendwithoutfulfillingHitler’sobjective.At2300hrs,BalckinstructedManteuffeltocallofftheattack.Theexhausted11.Panzer-Divisionwaspulledoutofthelineanddefensivepositionsweresecured.

ThebattleforRodt

December20–23,1944

BACKGROUNDTOBATTLEOfthethreeGermanarmiesthatstagedtheArdennesoperation,theonlyonetogainasignificantbreakthrough was General der Panzertruppe Hasso von Manteuffel’s 5. Panzer-Armee in thecenter. After encircling the newly arrived and inexperienced 106th Infantry Division on theSchnee Eifel, the Germans created a substantial rupture in the American line. This rupturefacilitated the advance of the southern elements of SS-Oberstgruppenführer Josef “Sepp”Dietrich’s6.Panzer-Armee,notablyKampfgruppePeiperof1.SS-Panzer-Division,aswellaselements of 5. Panzer-Armee, especially the drive of 116. Panzer-Division towardHoufallize.ThefullexploitationofthissectorwashamperedbyanextendedAmericansalientaroundthekeyroadandrail junctionofSt.Vith,however,whichactedas“a thumbdowntheGermanthroat.”TheGermanplan had presumed that St.Vithwould serve as themajor rail hub to support theoffensive,soitscapturewasvital.St.Vithhadbeentheheadquartersofthehapless106thInfantryDivision.Twoofthedivision’s

three infantry regiments had been surrounded in the initial German attack and surrendered.Recognizing the importance of this sector,Eisenhower had ordered twoUS armoreddivisionsintotheareatostemtheGermanadvance.ByDecember17,BrigadierGeneralWilliamHoge’sCCB, 9th Armored Division had begun to arrive and began reinforcing the surviving 424thInfantry Regiment (106th Infantry Division). Brigadier General Bruce Clarke’s CCB, 7thArmoredDivisionbeganarrivinginSt.VithonthesamedayandClarketookoverallcommandoftheSt.Vithdefenses.GermantroopsbeganappearingontheeasternfringesofSt.VithbythelateafternoonofDecember17.TheinitialGermanattacksonSt.Vithwereuncoordinatedduetotherushtomovewestward.

ElementsofKampfgruppeHansenof1.SS-Panzer-DivisionbumpedintothewesternAmericandefenses near the Poteau crossroads, while infantry forces from 18. Volksgrenadier-Divisionprobed along the eastern edges of St. Vith. The bitterest fighting on December 18 took placearoundPoteauasCCA,7thArmoredDivisionattemptedtoseizethetown,whichwasessentialtokeep open supply lines to the rear.As further elements of the 7thArmoredDivision began toarrive, theywere deployed on the northern and eastern perimeters of St.VithwhileCCB, 9thArmoredDivisiontookupthepositionsonthesouthernflank.

TheFührer-Begleit-Brigade’ssisterunitwastheFührer-Grenadier-Brigadethatwasorganizedinasimilarfashion.ThebrigadewascommittedpiecemealtothefightingnearBastogne,andoneofitsKampfgruppenattackedthe80thDivisioninHeiderscheidonChristmasEve1944.Itsufferedsignificantlossesinthefighting,includingtheStuGIIIassaultguntotheleftandthisSdKfz251/17withashielded2cm

autocannoninaSchwebelafettepedestalmount.

Manteuffelhadexpectedhisunits tocaptureSt.Vithon thefirstdayof theoffensive.Onthenight of December 17/18, he discussed the problem with Heeresgruppe B commander,Generalfeldmarschall Walter Model, who suggested that the Führer-Begleit-Brigade (FBB:FührerEscortBrigade)becommittedtodestroyingtheSt.Vithpocket.The Führer-Begleit-Brigade was commanded by Oberst Otto Remer, a personal favorite of

HitlerafterheplayedacentralroleinsuppressingtheOperationValkyriecoupattemptinBerlinonJuly20,1944.ThebrigadehaditsoriginsearlyinthewarwhenHitler’soriginalbodyguardunit,theLeibstandarte-SSAdolfHitler,begantobecommittedtocombatoperations.Asaresult,Generalmajor Erwin Rommel was instructed to form a Heer defense battalion for Hitler’spersonal security. When the elite Infanterie-Regiment Großdeutschland was expanded to adivisioninMarch1942,theFührer-Begleit-Bataillonwasbroughtunderitspurviewandbecamea motorized formation as the Führer-Begleit-Abteilung. It was headquartered at Hitler’sWolfsschanze (Wolf’s Lair) forward headquarters in Rastenburg, East Prussia. In September1944,inthewakeoftheOperationMarket-GardenairbornelandingsintheNetherlands,Hitlerordered Remer to expand the unit into a brigade with a mission to protect theWolfsschanzeagainstapossibleairborneattack(Remer1947:1).WhenHitlermovedhisheadquartersbacktoBerlin inNovember1944, theFührer-Begleit-Brigadebecameredundantandwascommitted totheArdennesoffensiveastheprincipalmobilereserveforceofManteuffel’s5.Panzer-Armee.Owing to its unique origins, the Führer-Begleit-Brigade had a non-standard organization. It

somewhat resembled thesecond-wavePanzer-Brigadenorganized in the late summerof1944,butwaslarger,withanominalstrengthof7,177troopsandanactualstrengthof6,037atthestartof theArdennes campaign.Major Schnappauf’s Panzer-RegimentFührer-Begleit-Brigade was

supposedtoconsistofthreebattalions.TheformerII./PzRgtGDhad17PzKpfwIVmediumtanksand38PanzerIV/70tankdestroyersoperationalatthetimeoftheArdennesoffensive.II./PzRgtFBB, formerly StuGAbt 200, had 27 StuG III assault guns and 14 StuH 42 assault howitzersoperational.A battalion of Panther tanks from Panzergrenadier-DivisionGroßdeutschland hadbeenallotted,butitdidnotarriveintimefortheArdennesoperation.Panzergrenadier-Regiment Führer-Begleit-Brigade was unusual in its composition, with

MajorFabian’s I.(SPW)/PzGrRgtFBB inamechanizedconfigurationwithSdKfz251armoredhalf-tracks, Major Hubert Mickley’s II.(Schnelle)/PzGrRgt FBB in a motorized configurationusing trucks, and Hauptmann Gaum’s III.(Fahrrad)/PzGrRgt FBB in a bicycle-mobileconfiguration.Thethirdbattalionwasananomaly,formedaroundGrenadier-BataillonzbV928,formerly a Landesschützen (militia) unit on guard duty in France and manned primarily byoverage troops. In contrast, the other two battalions of Panzergrenadier-Regiment Führer-Begleit-BrigadewererecruitedoutoftheeliteGroßdeutschlandreplacementpools.OneofthemainshortcomingsofthePanzergrenadiercomponentwasthattherewas“noregimentalstaffforthe Panzergrenadier Regiment and for that reason, the brigade had to command three differentbattalionswhichhadbeenarmedandorganizedinverydifferentways”(Remer1947:5).Among the Panzergrenadier companies, one stood out: 11./PzGrRgt FBB. This had been

organized in August 1944 as a special “close-combat company” for the personal defense ofHitler.Amongits troopswerenofewerthansixmenwiththeKnight’sCrossandseveralmorewiththeGermanCrossinGold.AlthoughtheyworenormalPanzergrenadierinsignia,theywereissuedparatrooperhelmets and theparatrooper’s jacket and eachwas armedwith the7.92mmStG44assaultrifleanda9mmP38pistol.Anotheranomalywas3./PzGrRgtFBB,whichwasrecruitedfromtheWaffen-SS.Thebrigade’sartillerycomponentwasArtillerie-RegimentFührer-Begleit-Brigade, formerly

Artillerie-Regiment120,withtwobatteriesoftowed10.5cmhowitzersandonebatteryoftowed15cm howitzers. Remer later complained that the artillerywas obliged to use ordinary trucksrather than tracked vehicles,which limited theirmobility in themuddywinter conditions. ThebrigadealsohadanoversizedLuftwaffeFlak-Regiment,Flak-RegimentHermannGöring,withfourFlakbatteries(six8.8cmandthree2cmFlakguns)andthreesearchlightbatteries,aholdoverfromitsroleattheWolfsschanze.

ThemuddyconditionsontheruralroadsintheborderareaprovedtobeamajorimpedimenttotheGermanadvanceonthefirstdaysoftheArdennesoffensive.

ThebattleforRodt,December20–23,1944

MAPKEY1 Morning,December20:AKampfgruppebasedonI./PzGrRgtFBBheadsintoNieder-Emmelsafteritisabandonedbythe17thTankBattalion.

2 Dusk,December20:TheKampfgruppereachesOber-Emmelsaroundnightfall,butishitbyaheavyAmericanartilleryconcentrationandhaltsforthenight.

3 NightofDecember20/21:TheFührer-Begleit-BrigadedispatchesaraidingpartyunderMajorHubertMickleywhichinfiltratesthroughthewoodsnorthofRodt,reachingtheroadtoPoteau.TheysetupambushesandinterdictthePoteau–Rodtroadduringtheday.

4 2000hrs,December20:TheKampfgruppeMickleyraidingpartyexitsthewoodsandattemptstooverruntheforwardpositionsofthe275thFieldArtilleryBattalionoutsideHinderhausen.Theyarebeatenoffandsustainheavycasualties.

5 Dawn,December21:WhileMickley stages his raid, II./PzGrRgt FBBattempts to join upwith themain body of thebrigade,butisbadlydisruptedbyanartillerybarragewhilewaitingwestofNieder-Emmels.

6 December 21: As the 7th Armored Division pulls back from St. Vith, it leaves behind rearguards to cover thewithdrawal,includingTaskForceStinetothenortheastofRodt.

7 Beforedawn,December22:WhenPanzer-RegimentFührer-Begleit-BrigadeheadsdowntheroadfromOber-EmmelstoRodtinthepre-dawndarkness,scoutsdiscovertheTaskForceStineroadblock.Asaresult,OberstOttoRemerhashisforcemovetothewestandtrytobypassTaskForceStinethroughtheFrodervennwoods.

8 0440hrs,December22:ElementsofPanzer-RegimentFührer-Begleit-Brigademoveoutof thewoodsandreachtheoutskirtsofRodtwherefightingbegins.

9 0930hrs,December22:ThemainbodyofRemer’sforceexitsthewoodsandisbroughtunderheavyfirefromassortedUSunitsinthefieldstothewest.Asaresult,theattackonRodtisdelayed.

10 1030hrs,December22:AsRemer’sunitsmaketheirwayintoRodtfromthenorthernside,thefightinginsidethetownintensifies.

11 1200hrs,December22:CaptainDavenport,leadingtheUSforcesinsideRodt,ordershisdwindlingforcestopreparetoescapethetown.TheFührer-Begleit-Brigadesecuresthetownaround1200–1300hrs.

12 0800hrs,December23:TheFührer-Begleit-BrigademovesoutofRodtbutrunsintoarearguardsetupbyTaskForceBoylanwhichharassestheGermancolumnsasitwithdrawstothesouthwest.TaskForceBoylancrossestheSalmRiverafterdarkwiththeFührer-Begleit-Brigadeinpursuit.

Battlefieldenvironment

TheautumnweatherinBelgiumhadbeenwetterthanusualandthesoilwassaturatedandmuddy.Temperaturesforthefirstweekoftheoffensivewereslightlyabovefreezingduringtheday,thoughoftenbelowfreezingatnight.TherewasathawonDecember18,andthetemperatureswerenotcoldenoughuntilDecember22–23actuallytofreezethesoiltoanydepth.ThisseverelylimitedGermanmobilitysincevehicles,eventanks,becameboggeddownaftertheylefttheroads.ThemuddyfieldschanneledGermanattackforcesdownavailableroads,andmadetownsandroadjunctionssuchasSt.Vithespecially important.GermanschemestobypasscentersofresistancewereimpossibleforthePanzercolumnsandtheiressentialsupportvehicles.

AlthoughthepopularimageoftheBattleoftheBulgeisofsnow-coveredterrain,infact,snowcoverwasnotpredominantinthefirstweekofthefighting.ThefirstheavysnowsarrivedonDecember22,depositing2–3ftinsomeareas.Theweatherduringthefirstfewdaysofthefightingwascharacterizedbyclinginggroundfog–especiallyintheearly-morninghours–withfrequentspellsofrainorfreezingrain,andoccasionalsnowatnight.

St.Vithwaslocatedinanopenexpanseofflatfarmlandsurroundedbyforest.TothenortheastwerethepinebarrensoftheHoheVenn,includingtheSanktVitherWaldimmediatelyeastofthetown.OnthewesternsideofSt.VithwastheBoisd’Emmels.TheroadsfromtheGermanborderintoBelgiumweremostlygraveled.Whilethesewereadequateforinfantry,thetanksandtrackedvehicleschurnedthemintoglutinousmudtrenches,trappingsubsequentvehiclecolumns.

Apointworthmentioningisthatthetownsintheareahadmultiplenames.TheSt.VithareawasGermanspeakingandsotherewereGerman,French,andsometimesFlemishplacenamesforthevarioustowns;SanktVithinGerman,SaintVithinFrench.

TheBelgian–GermanborderintheSchneeEifelregionwasdominatedbypineforests,crisscrossedbynarrow,graveledroads.Whensubjectedtoheavyvehicletraffic,theseroadssoonturnedintomuddymorassesduetothewetearlywinterconditions.Thisparticularscene

wasphotographedbytheauthorinoneofthewoodsnorthofRodtnearPoteau.

INTOCOMBATThe7thArmoredDivisionbeganmovingfromÜbach,GermanyonDecember17toreinforcethe106th Infantry Division. Although the initial intention was to counterattack, the Germanbreakthrough in this sector led to an overwhelming flood of German units moving westward,including both 5. Panzer-Armee and 6. Panzer-Armee. As a result, Brigadier General BruceClarke’sCCB,7thArmoredDivisiondeployedfordefensiveactiononthenortheastsideofSt.Vith,whileCCB,9thArmoredDivisiondeployedon the southeast sideof the town.CCA,7thArmoredDivisionwaspositionedtothenorthwestofSt.VitharoundPoteauandRecht,securinglinesofcommunicationbacktoAmericanlines.At 1600hrs onDecember 18,Remerwas ordered tomove the Führer-Begleit-Brigade from

Daum to the front, a distance of about 30km. Remer traveled to the LXVI. Armeekorpsheadquarters outside of Prüm and met with corps commander General der Infanterie WaltherLucht to receive instructions. At the time, St. Vith was under attack by 18. Volksgrenadier-Divisionfromthenortheast,and62.Volksgrenadier-Divisionfromthesoutheast.LuchtinstructedRemerthathismissionwasnottoparticipatedirectlyinthesiegeofSt.Vith,butrathertoattempttoacceleratethepenetrationfartherwest.TheFührer-Begleit-Brigadesetoutonanighttimeroadmarchalongtheroad(nowN626)throughtheHohesVennalongtheEiterbachstream.Theroadwas bounded by woods and the stream on either side, which in combination with the mud,ensuredcongestedconditions.Remerarrivedat18.Volksgrenadier-DivisionheadquartersattheWallerodemillafterdawnonTuesday,December19andwarnedcorpsheadquartersthattheroadconditionsandcongestionweresobadthatthebrigadewouldbedelayed.The brigade’s advance detachment, consisting of a platoon of SdKfz 232 armored cars of

Panzer-Aufklärungs-Kompanie Führer-Begleit-Brigade and a motorized company fromII./PzGrRgt FBB riding on Volkswagen Kübelwagen and Schwimmwagen vehicles, finallyarrived at the mill around noon, and continued down the road on route reconnaissance. Thearmored cars in the leadwere hit by antitank fire on the bend of the road on the edge of thePrümerBergwoods,and thePanzergrenadier companywashitwithartillery fireandsufferedheavycasualties, stopping theiradvance.ThisprobeconvincedRemer thatanattackemanatingoutoftheEiterbachroadareawouldbedangerous,andthattheproposedassemblyinthefieldswest of the Auf der Höhe woods was too vulnerable. Remer claimed that he receivedcontradictoryinstructionsfromModel’s,Manteuffel’s,andLucht’sheadquartersastowhetherthemissionwastoseizeSt.Vithorheadfartherwest.The advance detachment headed to the village of Medell northeast of St. Vith while

Kampfgruppe Mickley, consisting of two dismounted Panzergrenadier companies fromII./PzGrRgtFBBandanassault-guncompany,headedtoWallerode.RemerorderedKampfgruppeMickley to support an attack by 18. Volksgrenadier-Division and about 200 dismountedPanzergrenadiereheadedwestoutofWallerode through thewoodedKninelsBerg.Theywerespotted around 1300hrs by an outpost nearHunningen underLieutenantLeeMestas of the 2ndPlatoon,TroopA,87thCavalryReconnaissanceSquadron.Mestascalledinmortarfirefromthesquadron’s heavy-weapons company and requested artillery support from a divisional forwardobserver. The ensuing barragewas estimated to have killed about 160 of the 200men of theGerman force, andMestas estimated that about 40 survivorswithdrew.A patrol byCCB, 7th

Armored Division later found some of the dead Panzergrenadiere in the area, wearingGroßdeutschland armbands. The insignia confused American intelligence, which correctlybelievedPanzergrenadier-DivisionGroßdeutschlandtobeontheEasternFront.

Fewimageshavesurvivedofthe7thArmoredDivisionduringtheDecemberfightingforSt.Vith.Thisshotofsomeriflemenofthe38thArmoredInfantryBattalioncomesfromashortfilm-cliptakenduringthebattle.

The failed attack out of the Kninels Berg woods convinced Remer that it would be moreprudent toskirtaroundSt.Vith,andhe instructed theremainderof thebrigade toheadnorth toBornbeforeturningwesttowardNieder-Emmels.Theassault-guncompanydepartedWallerodeforBornlaterinthedaytojoinI./PzGrRgtFBB,whichhadenteredthetownearlierintheday.OnTuesday,December19,Model’sHeeresgruppeBheadquarters instructedManteuffel that

St.Vithwasnottobebypassed,butcaptured.Forthetimebeing,thebruntofthismissionfellon18. Volksgrenadier-Division and 62. Volksgrenadier-Division, which were attacking CCB, 7thArmoredDivisionandCCB,9thArmoredDivisionontheeasternandsoutheasternsidesofthecity,respectively.Theinitialattackswerelargelyfruitless,innosmallmeasureduetothelackofartillerysupport.Thiswascausedbytheneighboring6.Panzer-Armeebargingintothe5.Panzer-ArmeeroadnetworkduetothepoorroaddisciplineoftheSS-Panzer-Divisionen,especially9.SS-Panzer-Division.Althoughstepsweretakentorectifythesituation,byDecember20it“haddegeneratedtoacatastrophicextent”accordingtothechief-of-staffof5.Panzer-Armee,resultinginenormoustrafficjams.

ArounddawnonDecember20,I./PzGrRgtFBB,supportedbyanassault-guncompany,pushedoutofthewoodsaroundBorn.OberfeldwebelLischak’s1./PzGrRgtFBBsentaplatoononSdKfz251half-tracks through thewoods, followedby the other twoplatoons on foot.On exiting thewoods, theycameunder intensefirefromUStanks,anoutpostofCCA,7thArmoredDivision,andsufferedheavycasualties.KampfgruppeFabian,consistingofelementsofI./PzGrRgtFBBsupportedbytanksandassault

guns,headedfromBorntothewestaroundRechtlaterinthemorning.Rechthadbeenheldbythe17thTankBattalion,but thatmorningtheAmericanunitwasorderedtowithdrawsouthwardtoRodt,leavingthetownat0900hrs.TheoutpostsheardthemovementofKampfgruppeFabianbuttheAmericantankshadalreadydepartedbeforeKampfgruppeFabianarrivedinRecht.That morning, other elements of I./PzGrRgt FBB headed down the road from Born to the

southwesttowardthevillageofNieder-Emmels,arrivingthereafterthe17thTankBattalionhadpassedthrough.TheonlyAmericanforcesremaininginthevillagewereanoutpostofM5A1lighttanksofthe2ndPlatoon,Co.F,87thCavalryReconnaissanceSquadron,whichwithdrewdownthe road to join a defensive line being established by Co. A, 17th Tank Battalion. TheKampfgruppe continued on into Ober-Emmels around sunset, again missing the 17th TankBattalion. Although Remer intended to continue the assault farther to the southwest into Rodt(Sart-lez-St.Vith), I./PzGrRgt FBB and its associated assault guns were hit by concentratedAmerican artillery fire south of the villages and forced to a standstill. Further actions onWednesday,December20werehamperedbythecontinuedentanglementofvariouselementsoftheFührer-Begleit-Brigadeintrafficjams,exacerbatedbyfuelshortages.Theprolongedidlingofthevehiclesandstop-gotrafficledtofuelconsumptionratesthreetimeshigherthannormal.

OttoRemer

OttoRemerwasbornonAugust18,1912andjoinedtheReichswehrasajuniorofficerin1932.HeservedinaSchützen-Bataillonduring the campaigns in Poland in 1939 andYugoslavia in 1941, and in February 1943 became a battalion commander, leadingI./PzGrRgtGD.HereceivedtheKnight’sCrossforthebattalion’srearguardactionsintheKharkovcampaignandtheOakLeavestotheKnight’sCrossinNovember1943.Afterbeingwounded,hewassenttocommandaGroßdeutschlandguardformationinBerlin.OnJuly20,1944during theOperationValkyrie coupattemptagainstHitler,Remer’s troopswere instrumental in regainingcontrolofBerlinandhearrestedmanyofthekeyplotters.HitlerelevatedhiminranktoOberstandsubsequentlyexpandedtheGroßdeutschlandguardunittoabrigade.AftertheFührer-Begleit-BrigadeservedintheArdennes,itwasexpandedtoadivision.Remer’sleadershipofthe Führer-Begleit-Brigade in theArdennes and the Führer-Begleit-Division attracted the criticismof other officers.After thewar,Remerwasoneofthefoundersoftheneo-NaziSocialistReichPartywhichwasbannedin1952.HefledtoEgypttoavoidprosecutionandsubsequentlybecame involvedasamilitaryadvisorandweaponsdealer tootherArabstates includingSyria.He returned toGermanyinthe1980s,foundinganotherneo-Naziparty,butfledtoSpainin1994afteranotherconviction.

On the evening of Wednesday, December 20, Lucht’s LXVI. Armeekorps headquartersinstructedRemertoattackdowntheNieder-Emmels–St.Vithroad(N621)thenextmorning.Luchthoped that thiswouldundermine thedefensesofCCB,7thArmoredDivision frombehindandaccelerate the retreat of the 7thArmoredDivision fromSt.Vith.Remer decided to ignore theinstructions, claiming that American forces would leave his flank vulnerable along the entire

route. Instead,Remerchoseamorecautiousplan toproceedsouthwest toRodt in thehopesofsecuringtheRodt–Vielsalmroad(N675).Remerlaterwrotethat“theroadandterrainconditionshad beenmyworst foe” and hewas determined to secure a solid and useful road for farthermovementwest.USartilleryhadbeenbombarding theFührer-Begleit-Brigadepositions inBornandNieder-

Emmels, and Remer was informed that the source of this fire was an artillery battalion nearHinderhausen.Whilewaitingforhisforcestoconsolidateforthemainattack,Remerdecidedtostage a raid in the hopes of silencing these guns. The raid was led by Major Mickley ofII./PzGrRgtFBBandwasmadeupof theeliteassault troopsofSchommer’s11./PzGrRgtFBBandanotherPanzergrenadiercompanyunderLeutnantvonRautenstrauch.Numberingabout300men, the group infiltrated along the edge of theBois d’Emmelswoods to the southwest. TheyreachedtheN675nearwhereitexitedtheBoisd’EmmelswoodswestofRodtandsetupahastyambushforanytraffic.TheycapturedseveraljeepsandtrucksmovingdowntheroadfromCCApositions north around Poteau toward Rodt. Several senior American officers including theexecutiveofficerofCCA,7thArmoredDivisionwerecapturedinthisfashion.CCAheadquartersnear Poteau caught wind of the roadblock from troops who had escaped the ambush. Theroadblockcutoffthe40thTankBattalioninthePoteauareafromitsbattalionaidstationinRodt,soaplatoonofM4tanksfromCo.Bwassentdowntheroadtoclearit.Bythetimetheyreachedthe area, KampfgruppeMickley had already abandoned the roadblock and continued farthersouthwest.TheactivityinthisareaalsopromptedCCAtodispatchCo.A,48thArmoredInfantryBattalionintothearealateinthedaytopreventanyfurtherinterferenceinlinksbetweenPoteauandRodt.

BruceC.Clarke

BruceC.ClarkewasbornonApril29,1901anddroppedoutofhighschooltoenlistintheUSArmyin1917.HeattendedtheUnitedStatesMilitary Academy and received his commission in the Corps of Engineers in 1925. He is credited with starting the Non-CommissionedOfficersAcademysystem.In1940,heledthe16thEngineerBattalion,theUSArmy’sfirstarmoredengineerunit,andwasinstrumentalinthedevelopmentofthetreadwaybridge,widelyusedinWorldWarII.Hebecamethechiefofstaffofthe4thArmoredDivisioninearly1942andwasassignedtoleadthedivision’sCombatCommandA(CCA)onNovember1,1943.HewasincommandofCCAduringtheArracourttankbattlesinSeptember1944,andhisoutstandingperformancetherepromptedLieutenantGeneral George S. Patton to push for his elevation to brigadier general in October 1944. Patton had been concerned about theleadershipofthe7thArmoredDivisionwhenitwasunderhiscommandinSeptember1944andthenewlypromotedClarkewassenttocommandCCB,7thArmoredDivisionaspartofabroader shakeupof its senior leadershipat theendofOctober1944.Clarkereturnedtothe4thArmoredDivisionattheendofthewarasitsnewdivisionalcommander.DuringtheColdWaryears,Clarkewent

ontoaseriesofhighercommandsatcorpsandarmylevelsandeventuallyledUSArmyEuropeandtheCentralArmyGroupofNATO.

KampfgruppeMickleyexitedthewoodsnorthwestofHinderhausentowardthepositionsofthe275thArmoredFieldArtilleryBattalionaround2000hrs.Emergingoutof the forestafterdark,they damaged the nearest M7 105mm HMC. Reacting quickly, the battalion commander,LieutenantColonelRoyClay,orderedonebatteryofM7HMCstoengagethePanzergrenadierewithdirecthowitzerfireandtheir.50-calibermachinegunswhilethetwootherbatterieskeptuptheirfire-supportmissions.AccordingtoanAmericanofficerwhowasaprisonerofMickley’sgroup,theGermanstookveryheavylosses.Alight-tankplatoonfromCo.D,17thTankBattalionwas dispatched to dealwith the attack and caughtmany of thePanzergrenadiere in the open,firingdeadlycanister roundsat them.About25–30grenadiersweredriven intoahouseon theedgeofthetown.Thelighttanksattackedthebuilding,startingafirethatburnedittotheground.In the meantime, the rest of Kampfgruppe Mickley had retreated back into the woods andeventuallyreturnedtotheFührer-Begleit-Brigade.ThefightingontheeasternsideofSt.VithonWednesday,December20wastheturningpointin

LXVI.Armeekorps’battlewiththe7thArmoredDivision.TheGermanfieldartilleryhadfinallyescaped from the traffic jams near the border and began tomake its presence felt.An intensebarrage of the town began at 1100hrs.Most of the German attacks were preceded by intenseartilleryfire,andthegrenadiersof18.Volksgrenadier-Divisionand62.Volksgrenadier-Divisionattackedwith little respite. For example, the positions of the 38thArmored Infantry Battalion(CCB,7thArmoredDivision)werehit in fiveattacks thatafternoonand threemoreduring thelate afternoon and early evening. The defensive line of CCB, 7th Armored Division waspenetrated in at least three places by evening, with no replacements available. By 2200hrs,Clarkerealizedthatthecurrentpositionswerenottenableanddecidedtopullhisforcesoutofthetown,tothehighgroundwestofSt.Vith,beginningintheearlyhoursofThursday,December21.Clarkeestimatedthathehadlostalmosthalfhisstrengthintheday’sfightingonDecember20.Heconsultedwiththe7thArmoredDivisionheadquartersandplansweremadetoensurethatanescape routewould be kept open to the southwest pastRodt.By this time, the 82ndAirborneDivisionhadarrivedandsetupanewdefensiveperimeter to thewestofRodtalong theSalmRivernearVielsalm.RemerplannedtopresstheattacktowardRodtonThursday,December21,butwasfrustrated

againbythedifficultyinmovinghisunitsforwardunderpoorroadconditions.II./PzGrRgtFBBhad been deployed in a depression immediately west of Nieder-Emmels and before dawn onThursday,itwashitbyAmericanfieldartilleryandsodisruptedthatthemainattackonRodthadtobepostponed.Thebrigadeartillerydidnotarriveuntil lateonThursday,andthenonlyafterdesperatemeasureshadbeen taken tohaul them through themud, including theuseof thehalf-trackprimemoversofFlak-RegimentHermannGöring.The revised plan for the Führer-Begleit-Brigade attack was for aKampfgruppe of Panzer-

Regiment Führer-Begleit-Brigade consisting of two Panzer companies and two assault-guncompanies to push down the road from Ober-Emmels toward Rodt while the newly arrivedIII./PzGrRgtFBBwouldpush through theFrodervennwoodsnearTommBergandattack fromnorthofRodt. III./PzGrRgtFBBhad left its bicyclesbehind inBorn after theyhadbecome somud-encrustedastobeuseless.Thecontinuingdelaysinassemblingtheattackforcemeantthatitdidnotgetunderwayuntiltheearly-morninghoursofFriday,December22.

TheAmericanwithdrawalfromSt.VithonthenightofDecember20/21wasaccompaniedbyotherdefensiveshiftsalongthe7thArmoredDivisionperimeter.CCA,whichhadbeendefendingthenorthwestsectoraroundPoteau,begantoshiftsomeofitsunitssouthwardandclosertoRodtas the neighboringCCB defenses contracted. This increased the defenses now facingRemer’sbrigade.Whenthe17thTankBattalionwithdrewfromitsnorthernpositionsaroundRechtonthemorningofDecember20,itleftbehindtwoplatoonsofM4mediumtanksonthesouthernsideoftheFrodervennwoodstothenortheastofRodttoformasecurityscreenwhiletheremainderofthe battalion took up concentric defensive positions aroundRodt.This defense linewas about1,000ydinlength,orroughlyonetankper100yd,andcouldnotbeadequatelypatrolledbytanksalone.Asaresult,aplatoonofinfantryfromCo.C,38thArmoredInfantryBattalionwasattachedwithtwotothreeriflemenassignedtoeachtanktosetupadefensiveperimeter.Sincetherewereplanstoeventuallywithdrawthe17thTankBattalionfartherdowntheroadtoHinderhausen,thetwo tank platoons and associated riflemen were attached to Task Force Stine, under CaptainHarlan Stine, the commander of Co. F, 87th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron. The originalcompositionofTaskForceStinewasaplatoonofinfantryandthreetofourM5A1lighttanks,sotheadditionssubstantiallyincreaseditsstrength.

KampfgruppeMickleyattemptedtosilencethe275thArmoredFieldArtilleryBattalionbystagingaraidnearHinderhausenonDecember20,buttheattackwasbeatoffwiththeassistanceofaplatoonofM5A1lighttanks.ThisshowsoneoftheM7105mmHMCofthebattalion’s

BatteryBaweeklaternearManhay.

TaskForceStinecoveredtheintersectionbetweenCCAandCCBintheRodtsector,butthere

waslittlecoordinationbetweenthetwocommandsduetothefluidandchaoticconditions.OntheleftwasasmallforcefromCCAconsistingofCo.A,48thArmoredInfantryBattalionontheedgeoftheBoisd’Emmelswoods,whiletotherightwereelementsofthe31stTankBattalion.Rodthad served as the rear area for a number of units from CCA and CCB including the ServiceCompany,48thArmoredInfantryBattalionunderCaptainDavenport,andthebattalionaidstationof the 40th Tank Battalion. The antitank platoon of Co. B, 48th Armored Infantry BattalionsupportedbyaplatoonofCo.A,33rdArmoredEngineerBattalionhadbeenlocatedsouthoftheCo.A,48thArmoredInfantryBattalionpositionssinceDecember18,butduringthefightingonDecember 22, they had moved to new positions on the southern fringe of Rodt, covering themotor-parkarea.TheyweresupportedbyfourM4tanksofCo.A,40thTankBattalion.Someofthe units in Rodt had already been instructed on the night of December 21 that they were towithdrawsouthwardthenextdaytoCrombach.Before dawn on Friday, December 22, Remer led the Kampfgruppe of Panzer-Regiment

Führer-Begleit-Brigade down the road toRodt.This consisted of 2.Kompanie, I./PzRgt FBBand the assault guns of 2. Batterie, II./PzRgt FBB. The spearhead reported that the road washeavilydefendedbyAmericanarmoredvehicleswheretheroadreachedtheFrodervennwoodsimmediatelyoutsideRodt.ThiswastheTaskForceStineroadblockconsistingofM4tanksofthe2nd Platoon, Co. A, 17th Tank Battalion. Remer ordered the column to attempt to skirt theroadblockbypassingthroughcutsintheFrodervennwoodsonthewesternsideoftheroad,butintheprocess,someoftheGermanarmoredvehiclesbecameboggeddownintheglutinousmud.Inthedark,progresswasveryslowsincethetanksandassaultgunshadtobeledthroughthewoodsby scouts on foot. To complicatematters further,mineswere discovered near the edge of thewoodswhichhad tobecleared.While thePanzercolumnshaltinglymoveddowntheroad, thePanzergrenadiereofGaum’sIII./PzGrRgtFBBmovedthroughthewoods.Snowhadbeenfallingsince the previous evening, and visibilitywas often nomore than 100yd. The planwas for acompanyofIII./PzGrRgtFBBtoinfiltratethetownfirst,atwhichpointtheothertwocompanieswouldaccompanythemainPanzerforceintothetown.The German attack began around 0400hrs on the western side of the town. According to

Americanaccounts,thePanzergrenadiere“shouted,whistled,andsang.”Theantitankplatoonofthe48thArmoredInfantryBattalionopenedfire, inflictingheavycasualties.The largerGermanforcewasabletofight itswayintothetown,however,capturingtheantitankplatooncommandpost and their headquarters half-track.The tanksofCo.A, 40thTankBattalion intervened andbeganshellingtheGermaninfantryinthehouses.OnetankwashitsixtimesbyPanzerfaust firewithoutbeingdisabled.Bydawn,theinitialGermancompanyhadnotbeenreinforced,andsomeof the Panzergrenadiere began to withdraw from the town. The American tanks begansystematicallyclearingthehouses,andalsopursuedtheGermaninfantrybacktothewoodsnorthofthetown.TaskForceStinesentsomeofitsriflemenfromtheroadblockbacktowardthetowntohelpwith theclean-up.TheGermanbattalioncommander,HauptmannGaum,wasapparentlycapturedduringthisinitialskirmish.Remer’sPanzercolumnfinallyexitedthewoodsinfrontofRodtaround0900hrsandbeganto

advance on the town along with the two other companies of Panzergrenadiere. LieutenantBorcher’splatoonfromCo.A,40thTankBattalionspottedthePanzergrenadiereemergingfromthe woods around 0930hrs and took them under fire. This tank platoon was reinforced byLieutenantFielder’splatoonfromCo.AandLieutenantRider’splatoonfromCo.B.Theflanking

firefromthesetankskeptRemer’stanksbottledupinthewoodsexceptforafewthathadalreadyreachedtheoutskirtsofRodt.ThefightinginsideRodtlastedforaboutthreehours,pittingthePanzersandPanzergrenadiere

against Davenport’s Service Company of the 48th Armored Infantry Battalion, the antitankplatoon, and assorted other troops.Most of the cooks and clerks on the American side werelightlyarmedwithcarbines,andtheylackedtheusualassortmentofheavierinfantryweapons.BeforethefightingintensifiedinRodtinmid-morning,CaptainStineandhisattachedriflemen

had already returned to the crossroads to find that theM4medium tanks of Co.A, 17th TankBattalionhadpulledouttojointherestoftheirbattalion.MountingupontheM5A1lighttanks,theytrailedbehind,butfoundthatafewoftheM4shadbecomeboggeddowninthedeepmudinthefieldssouthofRodt.TheywerelargelyunawareoftheactionsinsideRodtduetothefog.

TheroadtoRodt

Germanview:Inthepre-dawnlightonthemorningofFriday,December22,OberstOttoRemerledaKampfgruppeofPanzer-RegimentFührer-Begleit-BrigadedowntheroadtoRodt.Theweatherwassnowy,typicalofearlywinter,butthegroundwasstillnotfrozenandsoremained muddy in the farm fields. When the German troops exited the woods, there was considerable ground fog. ThePanzergrenadiere accompanied the Panzer IV/70 tank destroyers of Panzer-Regiment Führer-Begleit-Brigade,mostly on foot, thoughsome rode atop the vehicles. Themain body of Remer’s force exited from thewoods around 0900hrs and the German grenadiers“shouted,whistled,andsang”accordingtoAmericanaccountsofthefighting. ItwasatypicalGermaninfantrypracticeto instillunitcohesion.

USview:OntheAmericanside,LieutenantHerbertBorcher’splatoonoffourM4mediumtanksfromCo.A,40thTankBattalionspottedthegrenadiersemergingfromthewoodsaround0930hrsandtookthemunderfire.Theinfantryfromthe49thArmoredInfantryBattalionwereentrenchedinfoxholesdugintothefarmfields.TheyimmediatelycalledinartilleryfirewhichbegantostriketheGermancolumn.SomeofthePanzergrenadieremanagedtoescapethefirefightandreachthevillageofRodtwhereanotherPanzergrenadiercompanyhadinfiltratedearlierinthemorning.ThecollapseofthedefensesinsideRodtinthelatemorningledCombatCommandAtoordertheinfantry–tankdefensesoutsideRodttowithdraw,allowingtheremainderofRemer’sKampfgruppefinallytoreachthevillagebyearlyafternoon.

The fighting insideRodt continueduntil noon.Beforenoon,CaptainDavenport consolidatedthe numerous German prisoners and ordered the surviving American troops to withdrawsouthwardtoCrombach.Co.B,48thArmoredInfantryBattalionwasalsoinstructedtowithdrawsouthwardtowardCrombach,astheirassociatedcompaniesinthePoteauareatothenorthwereheavily engaged in a separate battle with German forces in the area. Other elements of CCAincluding the platoons of the 40th Tank Battalion were instructed to withdraw north back toPoteau.The Führer-Begleit-Brigade secured Rodt around 1200–1300hrs. Remer’s account indicates

thatabout50prisonersweretakenandthat20tankswereknockedoutorabandoned.Thelatterfigureisdoubtful;morelikely,thisnumberincludeshalf-tracksthatweredestroyedorleftbehindinthebattalionmotor-pool.RemermadenoefforttopursuetheretreatingAmericancolumns.Thelate-arriving II./PzGrRgt FBB was instructed to block the road to Vielsalm, and much of theafternoonwasspenttryingtorecoverthenumerousvehiclesthathadbecometrappedinthefrozenmudandsnowduringtheearly-morningadvance.News of the German capture of Rodt was very unwelcome at Clarke’s CCB headquarters

because this town and the neighboringHinderhausenwere vital junctions in a planned escaperoutetowardtheSalmRiver.Clarkehadbeenarguingwiththecorpscommander,MajorGeneralMatthewRidgway,thatimmediatewithdrawalwasimperativegiventhelossessufferedovertheprevious several days of fighting and the lack of reserves. Furthermore, the capture of RodtseparatedCCA fromCCB.Clarke had already ordered all non-essential vehicles to begin theevacuationeastearlier in theday.FieldMarshalBernardMontgomery,whohad recently takenover control of this sector from theFirstUSArmy, overruledRidgway and authorized the 7thArmoredDivisiontofallbackovertheSalmRiver.ClarkeassignedthetaskofreestablishingaconnectionbetweenCCAandCCBtoTaskForce

Boylan,ledbythecommanderofthe87thCavalryReconnaissanceSquadron,LieutenantColonelVincentBoylan.ClarkealsoshiftedCo.C,814thTankDestroyerBattaliontothissectorwithoneplatoondeployedinadefensiveperimeteroutsideofCrombachandtheotherplatoonsattachedtoTaskForceBoylan.Thetaskforceincluded50–60riflemenfromCo.C,23rdArmoredInfantryBattalionandCo.C,38thArmored InfantryBattalion, sevenM3690mmGMC tankdestroyersfromCo.C,814thTankDestroyerBattalion,twoplatoonsofM5A1lighttanksfromCo.F,87thCavalryReconnaissanceSquadronandCo.D,17thTankBattalion,and11–12M4mediumtanksfromCo.A,17thTankBattalion.Although the Führer-Begleit-Brigade remained largely idle on the evening ofDecember 22,

LXVI. Armeekorps continued its push west from St. Vith, sending infantry from 62.Volksgrenadier-Division along the rail-line toward Crombach. German infantry broke into thetownon thenightofDecember22/23, andClarkewasobliged toevacuatehisheadquarters toCommanster farther to the east. Clarke received permission to retreat over the SalmRiver at0530hrsonDecember23.Bythisstage,elementsofCCBintheHinderhausenareahadbeencutofffromthoseinCrombachandfarthersouth.TaskForceBoylanservedasarearguardtoblockRemer’s farther advance while the CCB units withdrew. Fortunately for the Americans, thetemperatures had dropped that night to below freezing, and themuddy and impassable countryroadtoCommansterbecamefrozenandpassable.

SeveralvehiclesofPanzer-RegimentFührer-Begleit-BrigadestilllitteredtheroadsnearRodtinJanuary1945.ThetwototheleftareStuGIIIassaultguns,probablyfromII./PzRgtFBB,withaStuH42assaulthowitzerfarthertotheleft.Theoverturnedvehicleappearstobea

Schwimmwagen.

TheFührer-Begleit-BrigaderestarteditsadvancedowntheroadtoHinderhausenat0800hrsonSaturday,December23.TheyranintotherearguardsofTaskForceBoylan.ThetankdestroyersclaimedtohaveknockedoutthreePzKpfwIVandonePanther;Remeracknowledgedthelossoftwo tanks. Task Force Boylan lost or abandoned twoM36 tank destroyers, threeM4mediumtanks, and a few M5A1 light tanks during the fight for the roadblock. Once the rearguardwithdrew,Remer reconfiguredhis spearhead, switching fromPanzer-RegimentFührer-Begleit-BrigadetoII./PzGrRgtFBBsupportedbyacompanyofStuGIIIassaultguns.ThisforceranintoTask Force Boylan again in Commanster, with the 2nd Platoon, Co. C, 814th Tank DestroyerBattalionclaimingtohaveknockedoutonePzKpfwIVandaPanther,whilelosingoneM36;twoM4swere also lost.Boylanattempted todelay theFührer-Begleit-Brigade as longaspossiblesincetheroadswestwardwerejammedwithretreatingAmericantraffic.Someartillerysupportwas received, and Boylan directed the fire against the swarms of German vehicles passingthroughHinderhausen.TheFührer-Begleit-BrigadecontinuedinpursuitofTaskForceBoylantoRogeryandfinallyhaltedafterencounteringanotherrearguardatCierreuxnearthebanksoftheSalmRiver.TaskForceBoylancrossed theSalmRiveratVielsalmafterdark,withLieutenantColonelBoylanthelastmanoverthebridgeat1926hrs.Withthechaseover,theFührer-Begleit-BrigadewasremovedfromcontrolofLXVI.Armeekorpsforreassignmenttoanewsectorof5.Panzer-Armeelateintheday.TheFührer-Begleit-Brigadehad little impacton thefightingforSt.Vith,and itsperformance

wasunexceptionalinviewofitsresources.TheAmericandefenseofSt.Vithhadbeenovercomeby the obstinate struggle of the two poorly equipped Volksgrenadier-Divisionen of LXVI.Armeekorps. Remer’s advance displayed none of the relentless dash of neighboring GermanPanzerunitswhichpressedoninspiteoftheterraindifficulties.TheFührer-Begleit-Brigadewas

stoppedtimeandagainbysmallimprovisedtaskforcesofCCB,7thArmoredDivision.

Analysis&Conclusion

Tactical innovationin theWehrmachtbegantodeclineafter the invasionof theSovietUnionin1941 due to the enormous demands of waging war on too many fronts. Mechanization of thePanzergrenadier forcenever reached its intendedgoalsand theWehrmachtneverachieved thesamedepthofinfantrymotorizationandmechanizationastheUSandBritisharmiesinWorldWarII.PanzergrenadierunitsinFranceinthesummerof1944werestillahighlyeffectiveforceinspite of the paucity of equipment due to the extensive combat experience of the NCOs andofficers. The performance of these units was undermined, however, by the overwhelmingweaknesses of theWehrmacht by 1944. Theywere frequently employed in hopeless defensivemissions, with the destruction of the Panzer-Lehr-Division in June–July 1944 being a primeexample.Theyneverfullyrecoveredfromthelossesinthesummerof1944.EvenafavoredunitsuchastheFührer-Begleit-BrigadewasstillusingbicyclesintheArdennescampaign.

USArmydoctrinefavoreddismountedtacticsforarmoredinfantryinmostcircumstances.Here,asquadfromCo.C,61stArmoredInfantryBattalion(CCA,10thArmoredDivision)moveforwardonfootafterhavingbeentakenunderfirenearBubenorbisontheapproachesto

SchwäbischHallonApril17,1945.

AUSinfantrypatrolpassesbyaStuGIIIassaultgunofII./PzRgtFBBnearNieder-EmmelsonJanuary23,1945duringtheUSdrivetorecapturetheSt.Vitharea.Thisassault-gunbattalionhadformerlybeenStuGAbt200beforebeingattachedtotheFührer-Begleit-Brigade.

The US Army was able to take advantage of its considerable industrial resources fully tomechanize its armored-infantry battalions. More importantly, doctrinal changes in 1942–43reinforced combined-arms integration through the use of combat commands. This tacticalinnovationprovedinstrumentalinenhancingtheoffensivecapabilitiesofUSarmoreddivisionsinthe1944–45campaignsintheETO.Panzergrenadierandarmored-infantrybattalionswerebettersuitedforoffensiveassignments

thandefensiveassignments,as isevidentfromthethreebattleexamplespresentedin thisbook.Therewasnothinginherentlywrongwiththeuseofmechanizedinfantryindefensiveassignmentsexcept that thePanzer-Division andUS armored division did not have enough riflemenwhencompared to conventional infantry formations. The success or failure of these units usuallydepended on whether the senior commands used them for missions appropriate to theircapabilities. In 1944–45, the Panzergrenadier force was often condemned to impossiblemissionsduetothedesperatecircumstancesfacingtheWehrmacht.Thehalf-trackdidnotsolvetheproblemofinfantrymechanization.Half-trackswerebetterthan

trucks in combined-arms battles, but they were still not as mobile as tanks in soft groundconditions.Mostarmiesabandonedthehalf-trackafterWorldWarIIinfavoroftrackedvehiclesthatwerecloser inmobility to tanks.TheUSArmybegan to adopt trackedarmoredpersonnelcarriers (APCs) in the late 1940s, though they did not become the predominant infantrytransporter until well into the 1950s. This trend was further reinforced by the advent of thenuclear battlefield which burdened the foot soldier with new and fearsome threats. The

Panzergrenadier forceof thepostwarBundeswehr followedmuch the samepath.The issueofinfantrymechanizationremainedcontroversialthroughthepresent.Shouldinfantryvehiclesbeasheavilyarmoredasthetankstheyaccompany?Cananyarmyaffordtoprocureandoperatesuchexpensivevehicles?Thesecontroversies areanechoofdebatesgoingback to theearly1940sandtheinfancyofinfantrymechanization.

UNITORGANIZATIONS

Panzergrenadier-Regiment*

* Forfurtherdetails,see:PierPaoloBattistelli(2009).PanzerDivisions1944–45.BattleOrders38.Oxford:Osprey.

ThePanzergrenadier-RegimentwasreorganizedundertheType1944KStN.Amongthemajorchangeswasthereductionfrom11totencompanies, disbandment of the Flak company and incorporation of Flak elements into the schwere-Kompanie (heavy company), andconsolidationofthesupplysectionwithineachcompanyintoaVersorgungs-Kompanie(SupplyCompany)underbattalioncommand.EachPanzergrenadier-Bataillonhad fourcompaniesconsistingof threePanzergrenadier companiesandaheavy-weaponscompany.Withinaregiment,thecompaniesofI.Bataillonwerenumbered1–4whilethoseofII.Bataillonwerenumbered5–8.Theregiment’s9.KompaniewasanInfanterie-Geschütz(infantrygun)company,while10.KompaniewasthePionier-Kompanie.

APanzergrenadier-Bataillon(gep.)hadaheaviercomplementofweaponsthanaPanzergrenadier-Bataillon(mot.) since thehalf-trackswereusuallyfittedwithanorganiclightmachinegunlackingontrucks.Thismeantthehalf-trackbattalionhad105lightmachinegunswhilethetruckbattalionhadonly60.Half-trackbattalionshad212cmFlakguns(SdKfz251/17or251/21)whilethetruckbattalionshadonlysixtowed 2cm Flak guns. Half-track battalions had 12 7.5cm infantry guns (SdKfz 251/9) while the truck battalions had none. ThePanzergrenadier-Bataillon(mot.)wasorganizedinthesamefashionasthehalf-trackbattalion,butsubstitutingtrucksforhalf-tracks.Thismeant a motorized battalion had 143 trucks and 25 motorcycles while the half-track battalion had 87 half-tracks, 71 trucks, and 24motorcycles.

ThePanzergrenadier-Bataillon(gep.)StabhadfiveSdKfz251half-tracks,threeofwhichwereradio-equippedKommandopanzerwagen.ThethreebasiccompanieshadaKompanie-Truppwithtworadio-equippedSdKfz251andone2cmFlakSdKfz251.Eachcompanyhadthreerifleplatoons(1.–3.Zug),eachwiththreeSdKfz251troopcarriersandone2cmFlakSdKfz251.4.(schwere)Zughadasinglecommandhalf-track,aFlakunds.MGGruppewiththree2cmFlakSdKfz251,aGranatwerfer(mortar)GruppewithtwoSdKfz251half-tracksand8cmmortars,andaKanonengruppewithtwoSdKfz251/9.Thevarious2cmFlakhalf-trackswerevariouslytheSdKfz251/17orthepreferred2cmDrilling SdKfz 251/21; in practice, many units did not have a full complement of these specialized vehicles. In total, the half-trackPanzergrenadier-Kompaniehad21half-tracks,fourtrucks,andtwomotorcycles.Intermsoftroopstrength,thehalf-trackbattalionhad26officers,168NCOs,and673troops(867total);themotorizedbattalionwasonlyslightlydifferentwith868personnelintotal.

USarmored-infantrybattalion*

* Forfurtherdetails,see:StevenJ.Zaloga(2004).USArmoredDivisions,TheEuropeanTheaterofOperations1944–45.BattleOrders3.Oxford:Osprey.

A US Army 1943-pattern armored-infantry battalion consisted of five companies: a HQ company, three rifle companies, and a servicecompany.ThebattalionHQ includedacompanyHQ, reconnaissanceplatoon, threeM875mmHMCassaultguns, threeM481mmself-propelledmortarsonhalftracks,aheavy-machine-gunplatoon,andamaintenancesection.

TheriflecompanyhadacompanyHQplatoon,threerifleplatoons,andanantitankplatoon.ThecompanyHQincludedtwojeeps,twosupplytrucks,andtwohalf-tracks.Eachrifleplatoonincludedfivehalf-tracks,threeofwhichcarriedriflesquads,oneofwhichcarriedthe60mmmortarsquad,andoneofwhichcarriedthelight-machine-gunsquadwithtwoadditional.30-calibermachineguns.Ingeneral,eachhalf-trackwasfittedwitha .30-calibermachinegun,except for theplatoon leader’shalf-trackwhichwasauthorizeda .50-caliberheavymachinegun;inpractice,manyhalf-trackssubstituted.50-calibermachineguns.The1942armored-infantrycompanyhadatowed37mmantitankgunineachrifleplatoon,butthenew1943-patterncompaniesmovedthesetoanantitankplatoonwiththree57mmantitankgunstowedbyhalf-tracks.Theinfantryplatoonswerestrengthenedbyraisingthesquadsizefrom11to12menandaddinganM12.36inrocketlauncher(bazooka)toeachsquad.Thismeanta1943companyhad251troopsand20half-trackswhilethe1941–42companyhad178menand17half-tracks.TheUSArmyarmored-infantrybattalionwassomewhatlargerthanitsGermancounterpartintermsofpersonnel,with1,062officersandmencomparedto867.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

There is a broad range of archival resources on these campaigns, though the US Army records are more detailed than theWehrmachtrecords. IusedtheUSArmyafter-action-reports(AAR), journals,andotherdocuments inRecordGroup407at theUS National Archives and Records Administration II (NARA II) in College Park,Maryland. In the case of the 7th ArmoredDivision,WesleyJohnstonhaspostedmanyoriginaldocumentsonthedivision’swebsite(www.7tharmddiv.org)andhasalsoself-published some collections covering the St.Vith campaign.Beside themain divisional records atNARA, the separate “CombatInterviews”collectionisanessentialreferencewhichamplifiesthedetailoftheAARs.Beyondthesedocumentcollections,therearealargenumberofUSArmyinternalreportsandpublications.Heer recordsatNARAIIcanbe found in theRecordGroup242microfilmcollection.These includeTagesmeldungen (daily

reports),Kriegstagebücher (KTB:war diaries), and other reports.The coverage of these documents is spotty,with someunitshavingmanysurvivingrecordsandotherunitshavingfewornone.IusedanassortmentoftheseincludingthosefromOBWest,GeneralinspekteurderPanzertruppen,GeneralderPanzertruppeOBWest,Panzer-AOK.5andLVIII.Panzerkorps.Thejournalofthe Panzerwaffe published in 1943–44, Nachrichtenblatt der Panzertruppen (News Sheets of Armored Troops), has manyinterestingarticlesonPanzergrenadiertacticsandisalsoavailableinRG242.TheUSArmy’sForeignMilitaryStudiescollectionwaspreparedafter thewarby seniorGermanofficersunder the sponsorshipof theUSArmyCenterofMilitaryHistory.Sincetheseofficerswereinmanycasesstill inprisoner-of-warcamps, theyhadlittleornoaccesstounitrecords.Theyareespeciallyvaluableingainingtheofficers’impressionsratherthaninobtainingdetailedday-to-dayaccounts.

USArmyForeignMilitaryStudiesBauer,Magna(1955).GermanTanksCommittedintheBattleforSt.Vithbetween16and21December1944.R-70.Krüger,GeneralderPanzertruppeWalter(1947).The58.PanzerKorpsintheBattlesWestoftheVosgesduringthePeriodfrom17September1944to4November1944.B-548.

Lucht,GeneralderArtillerieWalther(1946).The66.AKintheSchnee-Eifel.B-333.Manteuffel,GeneralderPanzertruppeHassovon(1945).DefenseoftheVosgesMountainsandCommitmentofthe5.Panzer-Armee1944–45.B-037.

Manteuffel,GeneralderPanzertruppeHassovon(1947).TheCommitmentoftheFifthPanzerArmywestoftheVosgeswithintheframeworkofArmyGroupGfromabout15Septemberto15October1944.B-757.

Remer,GeneralmajorOtto(1945).AnInterviewwithGen.Maj.Remer:TheFührerBegleitBrigadeintheArdennes.ETHINT80.

Remer,GeneralmajorOtto(1947).TheFührerBegleitBrigadeintheArdennesOffensive:16Dec44–26Jan45.B-592.Wagener,GeneralmajorCarl(1947).Commitmentofthe5.Panzer-ArmeeintheArdennesOffensiveWinter1944/45.B-235.Wietersheim,GeneralleutnantWendvon(1947a).Employmentofthe11.PanzerdivisioninLorraine.B-364&B-416.Wietersheim,GeneralleutnantWendvon(1947b).The11thPanzerDivisioninSouthernFrance:15August–14September1944.A-880.

USArmystudiesandpublicationsn/a(1944).FieldManualFM17-42ArmoredInfantryBattalion.November1944.n/a(1949).TheDefenseofSt.Vith,Belgium17–23December1944:AnHistoricalExampleofArmorintheDefense.FortKnox,KY:ArmoredSchool.

Barnes,MajorRichard(1982).Arracourt–September1944.FortLeavenworth,KS:CommandandGeneralStaffCollege.Creamer,Forrest(1947).EmploymentofArmorandInfantry,XIXCorps:14June–1August1944.FortKnox,KY:ArmoredSchool.

Koyen,CaptainKenneth(1946).TheFourthArmoredDivision:FromtheBeachtoBavaria.Munich:Herderdruck.Long,Herbert(1948).TheTankBattalioninOperationCobra:2ndBattalion,66thArmoredRegiment,2ndArmoredDivisioninthehistoricSt.LoBreakthroughinJuly1944.FortKnox,KY:ArmoredSchool.

Magruder,Lawson(1950).CompanyG,22ndInfantry(4thInfantryDivision)intheSt.LoBreakthrough31July–1August1944.FortBenning,GA:InfantrySchool.

Pillsbury,GlennT.,etal.(1950).Employmentofthe2ndArmoredDivisioninOperationCobra25July–1August1944.FortKnox,KY:ArmoredSchool.

Zeien,Henry(1947).Operationsofthe3rdBattalion,66thArmoredRegimentintheSt.LoBreakThru.FortLeavenworth,KS:CommandandStaffCollege.

BooksDiNardo,Richard(2008).MechanizedJuggernautorMilitaryAnachronism?HorsesandtheGermanArmyofWorldWarII.Mechanicsburg,PA:Stackpole.

Ellissen,Hans-Joachim(1991).DiedeutschenFunknachrichtenanlagen,Band3:Funk-undBordsprechanlageninPanzerfahrzeugen.Ulm:TelefunkenSystemtechnik.

HardingGanz,A.(2016).GhostDivision:The11th“Gespenster”PanzerDivisionandtheGermanArmoredForceinWorldWarII.Mechanicsburg,PA:Stackpole.

Jentz,Thomas&HilaryDoyle(2006).MittlereSchuetzenpanzerwagenSdKfz251.PanzerTractsnos15-2&15-3.Boyds,MD:PanzerTracts.

Ritgen,Helmut(1995).TheWesternFront1944:MemoirsofaPanzerLehrOfficer.Winnipeg:JJ.Federowicz.Spaeter,Helmuth(1995).TheHistoryofthePanzerkorpsGroßdeutschland,Vol.2.Winnipeg:JJ.Federowicz.Steinhardt,Frederick,ed.(2008).PanzerLehrDivision1944–45.Solihull:Helion.

AuthorSteven J. Zaloga received hisBA inHistory fromUnionCollege and hisMA fromColumbiaUniversity.He hasworked as ananalystintheaerospaceindustryforovertwodecades,coveringmissilesystemsandtheinternationalarmstrade,andhasservedwiththeInstituteforDefenseAnalyses,afederalthinktank.Heistheauthorofnumerousbooksonmilitarytechnologyandmilitaryhistory,withanaccentontheUSArmyinWorldWarIIaswellasRussiaandtheformerSovietUnion.

IllustratorJohnnyShumateworksasafreelanceillustratorlivinginNashville,Tennessee.Hebeganhiscareerin1987aftergraduatingfromAustinPeayStateUniversity.MostofhisworkisrenderedinAdobePhotoshopusingaCintiqmonitor.HisgreatestinfluencesareAngusMcBride,DonTroiani,andÉdouardDetaille.

Author’snoteUnlessotherwisenoted,allphotographsarefromtheauthor’sowncollection.Forbrevity,inthetextthetraditionalconventionshavebeenusedwhenreferringtounits.Inbotharmies,companiesweregivenidentifyingnumbersoflettersthatcontinuedthroughthesequenceofbattalionsinaregiment.

Editor’snoteInthisbookmeasurementsaregiveninamixtureofmetricandUScustomaryunitsofmeasurement,dependingonthecontext.Thefollowingdatawillhelpwhenconvertingbetweenimperialandmetricmeasurements:

1mile=1.61km1km=0.62miles1m=1.09yd1m=3.28ft1m=39.37in1yd=91.44cm1ft=30.48cm1in=2.54cm1cm=0.39in1mm=0.04in1kg=2.20lb1lb=0.45kg1oz=28.35g1g=0.04oz

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