paper asian swiss summer school thais bernardes
TRANSCRIPT
-
7/31/2019 Paper Asian Swiss Summer School Thais Bernardes
1/12
1
Asian-Swiss Public Administration Summer School
Beijing, July 2012
When corruption undermines emergency relief efforts:
how to combine transparency, accountability and flexibility
in governments emergency management
Thais Helena Semionato Bernardes - Masters student in Public Management and Policy
at the Swiss Graduate School of Public Administration (IDHEAP) Switzerland
1. IntroductionPublic Administrations worldwide have enjoyed a resurgence of values such as integrity, transparency and
accountability within the past few decades. Today, more than ever, sound public administration is
synonymous with public trust. Society expects public servants to act in accordance with public interests,
and to manage public resources properly. Good governance in all levels of public administrations is more
and more related to the promotion of integrity, transparency and accountability. On the other hand,
corruption and maladministration is regarded as an indication of weak governance1. Scandals involving
corruption and administrative failure cases have had a major negative impact in public decision-making,
especially when related to governments emergency management.
Emergency situations are a challenge for governments throughout the world. Public administrations are
then expected to act swiftly and efficiently in order to save human lives and provide aid to victims, under
the particularly difficult circumstances of a catastrophe, when time is of the essence. The need to be flexible
and make rapid purchases facilitates corruption and opportunistic behavior in many countries struck by
tragedy. The present work aims to investigate potential means of reducing such malfeasance, by
introducing measures that provide more transparency and accountability in governments emergency
management.
2. Defining corruptionIn order to better precise the object of the present analysis, it is important to define the term corruption.
To do so, we shall use the definition given by the World Bank2, by which corruption is the use of public
office for private gain. Transparency international, on the other hand, understands corruption as the
abuse of entrusted power for private gains. It is important to stress that in both definitions corruption may
include gain that is not limited to financial abuse, but can include the abuse of power to enhance personal
or organizational reputation or for political purposes and nepotism. Clearly, there are various forms of
1 Armstrong, E. (2005), pp.2-3.2 Huther, J. & Shah, A. (2000).
-
7/31/2019 Paper Asian Swiss Summer School Thais Bernardes
2/12
2
Asian-Swiss Public Administration Summer School
Beijing, July 2012
abuse that go well beyond financial fraud, although prevention and detection of fraud usually gets first
priority in corruption mitigation3.
In this paper, we shall restrict our analysis to emergency management conducted by governments rather
than ONGs and other private entities. Thus, the World Bank definition will serve as a guide for the present
investigation, which basically consists of a study of public sector corruption in emergency relief activities.
3. Corruption vs. InefficiencyCorruption and inefficiency are different things. As authors Schultz & Sreide (2008) put it, corruption
should be clearly distinguished from unintended waste. A simple example given by the authors helps
clarify the distinction: inefficiency can arise when procurement officers, unfamiliar with the local market,
ignorantly accept unjustifiably high offers; they may then purposefully fail to investigate prices sufficiently.
They are not, however, motivated by a desire to capitalize personally from undue benefits. With
corruption, on the other hand, someone has acted intentionally, often creatively, in order to profit
personally from the situation.
Bribery and favoritism are indicated by the authors as probably the most common forms of corruption in
the procurement process4. Corruption occurs, for instance, when a contract is directed to a firm with
connections to the procurement officers family, or when the officer selects a suboptimal bid in return for a
bribe. As we can perceive, the idea of obtaining some sort of private gain is embedded in the concept of
corruption. Nevertheless, there is a sense in which both corruption and ineffectiveness produce the samenet result, since both ultimately reduce the levels of aid that reach the people who need it5, making both
practices highly detrimental to a governments response to an emergency. Undoubtedly, both corruption
and inefficiency need to be eradicated, but since the latter is part of a wider issue, we shall restrict our
analysis to the first.
4. The effects of corruption on emergency reliefWhat is corruptions impact on emergency management? According to Armstrong (2005), the devastating
effects of the lack of integrity, transparency and accountability leading to corruption and misconduct
cannot be underestimated. The author indicates that unethical practices, such as bribery and fraud, have a
very real human cost. This cost in translated into the lives and health of people who are robbed of quality
health care and medicines, for instance.
3 Schultz & Sreide (2008)4 Schultz & Sreide (2008)5 Walker et al. (2008)
-
7/31/2019 Paper Asian Swiss Summer School Thais Bernardes
3/12
3
Asian-Swiss Public Administration Summer School
Beijing, July 2012
But not only the material costs of corruption can be astounding: corruption can also be particularly
negative in terms of social capital, and more specifically to the trust of citizens towards governments. As
the author puts it, a lack of political trust undermines and even destroys political stability6.
5. Corruptive behavior in emergency reliefAs a rule, an emergency response requires the purchase and delivery of a vast range of goods and services,
such as medical supplies and equipment, drinking water, food, sanitation equipment, transportation,
power, shelter and housing, non-food items, communication equipment, and more7. Since governments do
not usually produce such goods or services, they often resort to contracting out, through procurement
processes8.
Governments must then purchase large quantities of various items, while also considering the time-
sensitive nature of emergencies. Thus, in order to provide a timely response to a calamity, governments
must often forfeit competitive procedures that are conducted under normal circumstances. It is quite
unfortunate, though, that the need to be flexible and make rapid purchases facilitates corruption, in the
sense that it can be easier to steer a purchase to one specific supplier without attracting suspicion.
Furthermore, when bribery is involved, the contract is not necessarily awarded to the firm offering the best
price/quality combination, resulting in bad outcomes, such as poorly maintained vehicles, expired
medicine, or diluted cement9.
Another common problem is the distortion of prices. As the urgency of an emergency increases, bargainingpower is lost. Rapid procurement is thus particularly prone to inflated prices and expenditures. This can be
aggravated if a bribe is calculated as a percentage of the total contract then, the corrupt official is likely to
exaggerate investments in certain products or services, while real priorities lay elsewhere10. Likewise,
procurement officials can exaggerate an emergency, by emphasizing the continued threat to human life,
and then abuse fast-track emergency procedures as a cover for corruption.
Finally, some cases of corruption may take place when apparently no violation of procurement rules has
happened. These are often referred to as hidden violations, and they include: limited invitation; fake
competitors; matching of the evaluation criteria with unique qualities of the bribing firm; misusing
confidential information about other candidates bid, and many others.
6. The risk of corruption
6 Armstrong, E. (2005).7 Schultz & Sreide (2008).8 Procurement can be defined as the purchase by governments and state-owned firms of goods, services and works. It
is also referred to as bidding, or tender procedures.9 Schultz & Sreide (2008).10 Schultz & Sreide (2008).
-
7/31/2019 Paper Asian Swiss Summer School Thais Bernardes
4/12
4
Asian-Swiss Public Administration Summer School
Beijing, July 2012
The risk of corruption in emergency relief depends on a number of factors, such as the opportunity to
influence decisions; the existence of obtainable benefits; and the possibility of getting away with the
offense11. The table below illustrates factors that affect opportunities for corruption in emergency relief:
Table 1 - Factors that affect opportunities for corruption in emergency relief
Size and location of the
contract
Contracts that are managed at the regional level
(municipalities, for instance) have a greater risk of corruption
in comparison to contracts managed by a centralized
administration.
Complexity
The more technology involved in goods/services to be
provided, the easier it is to cover corruption.
Discretion
The more discretion a procurement officer has to determine
demand and preferences, the easier it is to cover improper
influence over his or her decision. In emergencies, procurement
officers normally exercise high levels of discretion in terms of
identifying beneficiary needs.
Reduced financial controls
Normal financial control procedures are often fast-tracked in
emergencies, to enable staff to respond flexibly and quickly to
needs as they arise.
Pressure to spend
Media and civil society tend to put a lot of pressure on
government to respond to emergencies. The greater the
pressure to spend, the more likely procedures are to be rushed
and the less scrutiny from control officers, opening
opportunities for corruptive behavior.
Country of emergency
Levels of corruption differ greatly between countries, meaning
that opportunities for corruption are contingent to a cultural
and institutional setting.
Source: based on Schultz & Sreide (2008)
7. Case analysis: KatrinaThe aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, which struck the American Gulf Coast in 2005, provides us with an
interesting case study. Considered by many to be the worst disaster on American soil, Katrina is also
recalled as a crisis ripe with opportunity for the well-placed corporation12. As it is usually the case in
emergency situations, there was no time to solicit and weigh bids. Adding to this, there was an immense
pressure from society and media for the government to act quickly, and a considerable amount of money
11 Schultz & Sreide (2008).12 King (2006).
-
7/31/2019 Paper Asian Swiss Summer School Thais Bernardes
5/12
5
Asian-Swiss Public Administration Summer School
Beijing, July 2012
was allocated for that purpose: US$ 85 billion in hurricane relief and US$100 million from donations of
foreign governments.
In a nutshell, the lack of a competitive bidding system made it nearly impossible to impose any meaningful
accountability on companies staking claim to the billions in federal recovery dollars. But in the particular
case of Katrina, three major problems could be identified, and shall be further explored in the following
subsections.
7.1No accountability for outcomesOne of the most distressing images recorded by the media in the weeks following hurricane Katrina, was
that of the floating bodies in the flooded streets of New Orleans. In order to give proper treatment to this
problem, the American Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) contracted Kenyon International
Services to collect more than one thousand bodies floating in public streets right after the hurricane. Eight
weeks later, the company had collected a little over five hundred bodies, and charged no less than US$ 6
million for that service, amounting to almost US$ 12,000 per body recovered.
Besides that, TV crews seemed to discover new bodies faster than Kenyon, raising criticism and anger in
public opinion after all, what had they paid millions of dollars for? Moreover, a year after the tragedy,
bodies continued to be found. Later on, an investigation found that Kenyons CEO was a close friend of the
Bush family, and a major donor of George W. Bushs presidential campaign, triggering what was then
called the FuneralGate13
.
7.2Inflated pricesThe next situation is a revolting example of how prices can be inflated in face of an emergency. A company
(Emergency Disaster Services) was awarded a 30-day no-bid contract to provide three meals per day for
200 to 400 emergency personnel, at a cost of US$ 3.6 million. This meant that the meals cost between US$
100 and US$ 270 each. The contract was later extended for another 30 days, although the price had dropped
to US$ 2.6 million for the same number of people and the same timeframe. By the time the contract was
extended for a third time, the price had dropped to US$ 1.6 million for the exact same service14.
As we can see, as the urgency diminished, the price went down accordingly. In the Katrina catastrophe, it
is estimated that contractors inflated their actual costs from 40 percent to 1,700 percent when billing the
government15.
13 King (2006).14 King (2006).15 King (2006).
-
7/31/2019 Paper Asian Swiss Summer School Thais Bernardes
6/12
6
Asian-Swiss Public Administration Summer School
Beijing, July 2012
7.3Layers of subcontractorsIn the Katrina disaster, there was an enormous political influence in awarding the contracts. A study has
shown that companies making campaign donations were approximately four times as likely to receive a
Katrina contract16. For the execution of the works, however, several companies were often subcontracted. In
fact, one can observe a truly labyrinthian layer of subcontractors on nearly every project. For example,
AshBritt, a Florida-based firm with close ties with Florida governor and presidential brother Jeb Bush and
major donor to state and federal government candidates, was awarded a US$ 500 million contract for
debris removal.
According to the contracts terms, AshBritt would be paid US$ 23 for every cubic yard (0.75 m3) of debris
removed. Ashbritt in turn hired C&B Enterprises, which was paid US$ 9 per cubic yard. That company
hired Amlee Transportation, which was paid US$ 8 per cubic yard. Amlee hired Chris Hessler Inc., for US$
7 per cubic yard. Hessler, in turn, hired Les Nirdlinger, a debris hauler from New Jersey, who was paid
US$ 3 per cubic yard. In this setting, accountability becomes next to impossible to enforce 17. Moreover, if a
service can be performed for US$ 3 per cubic yard and not for US$ 23 per cubic yard in the first place, it
makes one wonder what the extra US$ 20 per cubic yard are for.
These and many other scandals triggered a series of investigations by the American government, especially
in regards with FEMA, the federal agency responsible for most of the contracts and purchases for Katrinas
emergency relief18, and many charges of political corruption ensued.
8. Measures to improve accountability and transparency in emergency managementThe rationale behind government contracting is based on the notion that free markets create competition
that can promote the distribution of services more efficiently and effectively than the state19. However,
several problems can arise in the contracting system. For instance, as Maskin and Tirole (2008) clearly
suggest, political corruption is likely to occur in a contract system.
As a result, strict rules about competitive procurement have been designed to eliminate or prevent some of
these abuses. In the case of natural disasters, however, such rules are not likely to be effective, since the
government must act quickly and it does not have time to solicit proposals. As we have shown, in the case
of Hurricane Katrina, the government issued a substantial number of no-bid contracts. These no-bid
processes allowed contracts to be awarded without full and open competition under several conditions,
including unusual and compelling urgency, national security and the public interest20.
16 Hogan et al. (2010).17 King (2006).18 King (2006).19 Hogan et al. (2010).20 Hogan et al. (2010).
-
7/31/2019 Paper Asian Swiss Summer School Thais Bernardes
7/12
7
Asian-Swiss Public Administration Summer School
Beijing, July 2012
This is also the case in most emergency situations all over the world, when governments overthrow formal
competitive procedures in order to gain speed in purchasing goods and services. This, nonetheless, opens
the door to many possibilities of corruption. In view of that, the following question arises: how are we then
to determine the balance between flexibility, accountability and transparency, in order to reduce the risk of
corruption in emergency-related procurement?
Authors Schultz & Sreide (2008) point to possible solutions. For instance, incentives for corruptive
behavior can be dampened when the risk of sanctions is high. These sanctions may be social,
administrative, or judicial, and are altogether related to accountability mechanisms.
Another manner to prevent corruption lies on planning. Purchases which would be required in times of
turmoil could be anticipated. They can follow on from long-term agreements with specific firms, based on
sound pre-emergency tender procedures describing the cooperation to take place once an emergency
occurs. However, it is clear that many requirements cannot be anticipated, or organized in advance, and
rapid acquisitions will often be necessary. The solution is then to render emergency procedures more
accountable and transparent, allowing better ex post control.
Of course, since recovering resources can be quite difficult, it is also very important to prevent corruptive
behavior from happening in the first place. In order to do so, the necessary first step is to gain an
understanding of the underlying causes, loopholes and incentives which feed corrupt practices at any
level21. It is only then that public administrations will be able to provide measures for mitigating risks of
corruption. The table below lists four different categories of measures of that kind namelycoordination/internal procedures, beneficiary participation, monitoring and evaluation and sanctions.
Table 2 Measures for reducing corruption
Ex ante measures
Coordination/ internal procedures
Understand the risks: assess and address risks in existing
procedures.
Plan and foresee: organize advance procurement of commonly
used supplies and services the more relief procurement can
be organized before a disaster occurs, the less likely purchases
will be affected by the particular corruption risks inherent in
emergency contexts. To do so, organizations should establish
frame agreements that cover the most frequently purchased
relief items.
Standardize: use standard products when possible; technical
references for quality and price can serve as a shield against
21 Walker et al. (2008).
-
7/31/2019 Paper Asian Swiss Summer School Thais Bernardes
8/12
8
Asian-Swiss Public Administration Summer School
Beijing, July 2012
corruption where procuring personnel or their supervisors are
unfamiliar with the local context or under pressure from
manipulative suppliers.
Create institutional memory: use simple software solutions to
track suppliers and payments, compare bids and prices, and
keep records of suppliers, in order to mitigate risks from staff
turnover. New technologies include e-bidding, in particular
with the mandatory publication of procurement opportunities
and documentation on-line, allowing more transparency.
Re-enforce professional integrity: employees must be
reminded of what is ethically expected of them, through
administrative codes, complaints procedures and sanctions.
Clear reporting channels, defined sanctions, and an established
procedure for responding to complaints are necessary to
support the implementation of codes of conduct.
Improve the overall transparency of information: resource
flows, assessments, program elements, targeting criteria, aid
recipient lists, entitlements, etc are important in order to
document processes and to clarify procedures.
Strengthen downward accountability practices: to clearly
define responsible officials at every level as a way of
preventing and detecting corruption.
Establish specific guidelines on emergency exemptions to
normal policies: this can be done by requiring two quotes for
procurement, rather than the normal three, for instance, and by
giving shorter response deadlines. Further, allow hiring on
conditional contracts provided normal procedures, including
background checks, are carried out within three months.
Beneficiary participation
Facilitate beneficiary participation: beneficiaries should be
involved in the selection and monitoring of goods and services.
As far as is feasible, beneficiaries should be informed about
procurement processes and provide input to procurement
decisions.
Ex postmeasures
Strengthen internal procurement expertise: while nothing can
replace practical experience, building up a pool of trained
procurement staff can be an important tool for corruption
-
7/31/2019 Paper Asian Swiss Summer School Thais Bernardes
9/12
9
Asian-Swiss Public Administration Summer School
Beijing, July 2012
Monitoring & Evaluation
control.
Focus on outcome, not process, in audits and evaluations:
auditing units can ask beneficiaries directly whether they felt
value for money was achieved.
Ensure adequate budgeting for Monitoring & Evaluationand
facilitate effective monitoring by media and NGOs.
Deepen the scope of audits: they should go beyond the paper
trail to include forensic objectives and practices.
Increase the use of independent external evaluation.
Sanctions
Increase the costs to dishonest procurement officers and
suppliers with sanctions: firms that offer bribes should lose
their eligibility to participate in future tenders for a defined
period of time. The best systems in the world are likely to be
subverted is there is little possibility of being caught, and if
there are few penalties if you are.
Reinforce whistleblower policies: offer confidentiality and
protection to members of staff reporting corruption on the part
of anyone else in the agency.
Source: based on Schultz & Sreide (2008) and Walker et al. (2008).
Another option for reducing procurement-related corruption risks is to transfer those risks to beneficiaries
themselves by providing vouchers and cash. Beneficiaries have an obvious interest in securing the best
value for money when their own food or shelter is at stake (of course in some situations government
purchase is clearly preferable better exploit economies of scale the benefits and risks of cash transfer
should therefore be carefully considered on a case-by-case basis)22.
Finally, Russel & Leeson (2006) seem to have more liberal ideas in mind when it comes to solutions for
emergency management. The authors, referring to the scandals involved in New Orleans after hurricane
Katrina, propose a set of reforms that depoliticize the process of disaster relief, as a means to mitigate thepublic choice problems associated with government-directed disaster relief that were identified in their
study. Ultimately, this would mean putting more responsibility for these activities in the hands of the
private sector, which according to the authors, is a lot more efficient and does not suffer from the public
choice problems of government-provided disaster relief23. This view, of course, is far from undisputed.
22Schultz & Sreide (2008).
23 Leeson, P. T. & Sobel, R. S. (2008), p.69.
-
7/31/2019 Paper Asian Swiss Summer School Thais Bernardes
10/12
10
Asian-Swiss Public Administration Summer School
Beijing, July 2012
After all, the ultimate loyalty of the private sector is to shareholders, while government was designed as a
servant of the greater good24.
Lastly, it is impossible not to notice the pervasive influence of New Public Management theories in most of
these measures. For instance, NPM has certainly shifted the emphasis to explicit standards and measures of
performance, as well as on output controls, both of which are present among the proposed solutions to
emergency management.
9. A need to adapt measures according to circumstancesNaturally, not every measure can be applied to anywhere. It is important to consider the idiosyncrasies of
every country, since measures will be quite different depending on the quality of governance and other
factors25. What works in Switzerland is not necessarily useful for Brazilians. The strategy to increase
accountability and transparency in emergency management should take into consideration factors such as
bureaucratic culture and institutional environment.
A study conducted by Huther & Shah (2000) has presented empirical evidence relating corruption to
factors such as media independence, judicial independence and citizen participation. All of those are
negatively correlated to the level of corruption observed. The same study showed, nevertheless, a positive
correlation between command and control type of civil service and corruption. As can be seen in the table
below, priorities of anti-corruption efforts can change depending on the quality of governance.
Table 3 - Effective Anti-Corruption Programs Based on Governance Quality
Incidence of
Corruption
Governance
Quality
Priorities of Anti-Corruption Efforts
(Based on Drivers of Corruption)
High Poor Establish rule of law, strengthen institutions of participation and
accountability; limit government intervention to focus on core
mandate.
Medium Fair Decentralization and economic policy reforms; results-oriented
management and evaluation; introduction of incentives forcompetitive public service delivery.
Low Good Explicit anti-corruption programs such as anti-corruption
agencies; strengthen financial management; raising public and
officials awareness; no bribery pledges, fry big fish, etc.
Source: Huther, J. & Shah, A. (2000).p.12
A closer look to most of these propositions shows again a great familiarity between the proposed efforts
and New Public Management theories.
24 Words of David Walker, Controller-general of the USA, in: King (2006).25 Huther, J. & Shah, A. (2000).
-
7/31/2019 Paper Asian Swiss Summer School Thais Bernardes
11/12
11
Asian-Swiss Public Administration Summer School
Beijing, July 2012
10.Final considerationsThere are perverse effects related to corruption in emergency management. Corruption reduces the
resources available for life-saving operations, lowers the quality of products and services provided, and
diverts aid from those who need it most26. The purchase of goods and services, which comprises the biggest
line item in most emergency budgets, is certainly one of the most vulnerable processes in this matter.
Special difficulties arise from emergency procurement, including shifts in bargaining powers stemming
from the sudden rise in demand, as well as time pressures. In these situations, there must be a balance
between cost efficiency and flexible, speedy purchase.
In spite of the recent surge of interest in the matter of accountability and transparency in emergency relief,
crisis situations have always provided ripe ground for corruption. In these situations, financial controls are
reduced, funding levels can soar, and staff changes frequently27. Pressure to act and to be seen to be acting
by the media militates against accountable and cost-effective purchases. As a result, as was the case in
Katrinas emergency management, many of the purchases occur in an uncoordinated, hurried manner that
only amplifies the potential for fraud.
Not all, however, is lost. Several studies indicate that better accountability, transparency and quality of
programming can mitigate the risk of corruption. It is important, though, when designing policies to
reduce these risks, to identify the individual incentives, opportunities and mechanisms through which
corruption transactions take place. Only then will the public administration be able to efficiently implement
ex ante and ex post measures to prevent and fight corruption and render procedures more transparent andofficials more accountable.
26 Schultz & Sreide (2008).
-
7/31/2019 Paper Asian Swiss Summer School Thais Bernardes
12/12
12
Asian-Swiss Public Administration Summer School
Beijing, July 2012
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES
Ahrens, J. & Rudolph, P. M. (2006). The Importance of Governance in Risk Reduction and Disaster
Management. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, volume 14, issue 4, pp. 207220.
Armstrong, E. (2005). Integrity, Transparency and Accountability in Public Administration: Recent Trends,Regional and International Developments and Emerging Issues. United Nations.
Brin, D. (1998). The Transparent Society. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Hill, M. (2004). Holding to Account. In: The Public Policy Process, Longman.
Hiroko, K. (2004). Reform of Public Management Through ICT: Interface, Accountability and Transparency.
In: Lawrence Jones, Kuno Schedler, and Riccardo Mussari (ed.) Strategies for Public Management Reform
(Research in Public Policy Analysis and Management, Volume 13), Emerald Group Publishing Limited,
pp.153-174
Hogan, M. J., Long, M. A. & Stretesky, P.B. (2010). Campaign contributions, lobbying and post Katrina
contracts. Disasters, 34(3):593-607.
Hood, C. & Heald, D. (2006). Transparency: The Key to Better Governance. Oxford University Press.
Huther, J. & Shah, A. (2000). Anti-Corruption Policies and Programs: a Framework for Evaluation. The
World Bank.
King, J. Rita. (2006). Big, Easy Money: Disaster Profiteering on the American Gulf Coast . Corpwatch
Report.
Leeson, P. T. & Sobel, R. S. (2008). Weathering Corruption. Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 51, No. 4,
pp. 667-681.
Maxwell, D., Walker, P. & Church, Cheyanne. (1990). Preventing Corruption in Humanitarian Assistance.
Final Research Report of the Feinstein International Center, Tufts University.
McEntire, D. A. (1999). Issues in disaster relief: progress, perpetual problems and prospective solutions.
Disaster Prevention and Management, vol. 8, pp.351 361.
Russel S. S. & Leeson, P. T. (2006). Governments response to Hurricane Katrina: A public choice analysis.
In: Public Choice, Springer.
Raynard, Peter. (2000). Mapping Accountability in Humanitarian Assistance. ALNAP Publication,
Overseas. Development Institute London.
Schultz, J. & Sreide, T. (2008), Corruption in emergency procurement. Disasters, 32: 516536.
Tompkins, E. L., Lemos M. C., &, Boyd, E. (2008). A less disastrous disaster: Managing response toclimate-driven hazards in the Cayman Islands and NE Brazil. Global Environmental Change, Volume 18,
Issue 4, pages 736-745.
Walker, M. D., Church, P..C., Harvey, P, Savage, K, Bailey, S, Hees, R & Ahlendorf, M. L. (2008). Preventing
Corruption in Humanitarian Assistance. Berlin: Transparency International.
Willitts-King, B. & Harvey, P. (2005). Managing the risks of corruption in humanitarian relief operations: A
study for the UK Department for International Development. Overseas Development Institute.
Wolensky, R. & Wolensky, K. C. (2005). Local Government's Problem with Disaster Management: a
Literature Review and Structural Analysis. Review of Policy Research.