paper workshop zürich 2014 18 · 2015. 8. 26. · oakeshott revisited beyond nostalgia in 1992,...
TRANSCRIPT
OakeshottRevisited
Beyond nostalgia
In1992,almosttwoyearsafterMichaelOakeshott’sdeathandnearlyoneaftertheposthumous
publicationofanenlargededitionofhis1962collectionofessaysRationalisminPolitics,Perry
Anderson expressed his disconcertment and even surprise over how little public notice
Oakeshott’spassingreceived.Afterall,toAndersonOakeshotthadbeen“themostoriginalthinker
of post‐war conservatism” and “one of the quartet of outstanding European theorists of the
intransigentRightwhose ideasnowshape–howevermuch,or little, leadingpractitionersare
awareofit–alargepailofthementalworldofend‐of‐the‐centuryWesternpolitics.”1
TothosesympathetictothefirstpartofAnderson’ssentimentsitmusthaveseemeddisparaging
ifnotoutrightdegradingthatOakeshott’sconservatismshouldbeclassifiedasan“oddlyfearful
quasi‐hedonism”ameredecadeandahalflater.2Provewasbeingofferedinformoftheperhaps
mostwidelyquotedpassageofOakeshott’swork:
1PerryAnderson:TheIntransigentRightattheEndoftheCentury.In:LondonReviewofBooks,Vol.14,No.18(September24,1992),pp.7‐11.ComplementingthequartetareCarlSchmitt,LeoStraussandFriedrichvonHayek.Oakeshott’sobituariesintheGuardian,theDailyTelegraph,theTimesandtheIndependent,however,weregenerallylaudatorywiththeDailyTelegraphofDecember21,1990callingOakeshottthe“greatestpoliticalphilosopherintheAnglo‐SaxontraditionsinceMill–orevenBurke.”EventhoughPatrickT.Riley,aformerstudentofOakeshottatLSE,didnotagreewithanythingelseAndersonsaid,healsonotedtheinadequacyandinattentionofmostobituaries.PatrickRiley:MichaelOakeshott,PhilosopherofIndividuality.In:ReviewofPolitics,Vol.54.No.4(Fall1992),pp.649‐664.2Jan‐WernerMüller:ComprehendingConservatism:ANewFrameworkforAnalysis.In:JournalofPoliticalIdeologies,Vol.11,No.3(October2006),pp.359‐365,p.363.Inalatteressay,MüllerjuststopsshortofridiculingOakeshottbyportrayinghimasadandy‐philosopher“fondofcockingandcricketmetaphors[…]forwhompoliticsappearedvariouslyas‘vulgar’orasa‘necessaryevil’.”SeeRe‐imaginingLeviathan.In:CriticalReviewofInternationalSocialandPoliticalPhilosophy,Vol.13,Nos.2‐3(June‐September2010),pp.317‐336,directquoteatpp.317‐18.
Prepared for „Workshop on Conservatism“, 6‐7 November 2014, University of Zurich, Ethics Centre, Zollikerstr. 117 (ZOB‐E‐2), 8008
Zurich, Switzerland CONFERENCE DRAFT – Do not cite without permission of the author
Christoph M. Michael,
Martin‐Luther‐Universität Halle‐Wittenberg,
Philosophische Fakultät I,
Institut für Politikwissenschaft
06099 Halle (Saale)
Germany
[email protected]‐halle.de
“Tobeconservative,then,istopreferthefamiliartotheunknown,topreferthetriedtotheuntried,factto
mystery,theactualtothepossible,thelimitedtotheunbounded,theneartothedistant,thesufficientto
thesuperabundant,theconvenienttotheperfect,presentlaughtertoutopianbliss.”3
ItisthispassagethatledPrincetonpoliticalscientistJan‐WernerMüllertoclassifyOakeshottasa
proponentofwhatMüllercallsdispositionaloraestheticconservatism.Semanticallythismaybe
justified in so far as Oakeshott himself frequently talks of conservatism as a disposition. But
analyticallythisreductiontothelevelofpassivenostalgiainfavorofthepast(orapeculiarvision
of the present) seems hasty at best. ThoughDana Villa and others have also picked up on “a
palpable(Burkean)nostalgiaforestablishedwaysofdoingthings”4,justafewpagesfurtherinto
thesameessay,Oakeshottexpoundsontheconservativedisposition inrespecttogovernment
statingthatitisfoundin
“thepropensitytomakeourownchoicesandtofindhappinessindoingso,thevarietyofenterpriseseach
pursued with passion, the diversity of beliefs each held with the conviction of its exclusive truth; the
inventiveness,thechangefulnessandtheabsenceofanylargedesign;theexcess,theover‐activityandthe
informalcompromise.”5
Itisfromthisobservationoftheself‐governmentpracticedbymenandtheinformaladjustments
of interests to one another that Oakeshott’s understanding of the purpose of government
develops.Itisrootedin
“ritual,notinreligionorphilosophy;intheenjoymentoforderlyandpeaceablebehavior,notinthesearch
fortruthorperfection.[It]restsupontheacceptanceofthecurrentactivitiesandbeliefsofitssubjects,[and
that]theonlyappropriatemannerofrulingisbymakingandenforcingrulesofconduct.”6
Oakeshott,thus,regardstheexerciseofgovernmentasaveryspecificandlimitedactivity,as“the
ruleofthoseengagedinagreatdiversityofself‐chosenenterprises”7,notasthemanagementof
somebroadpoliticalvisionorsinglepurposeofhumanactivity,norastheexerciseofpreserving
present social and political arrangements, be it to undercut the rise to power of subordinate
classesorsimplyoutofaestheticpreferences.
3MichaelOakeshott:OnBeingConservative.In:RationalisminPoliticsandOtherEssays,forewordbyTimothyFuller,Indianapolis:LibertyFund,1991,pp.407‐437,p.408.“OnBeingConservative”wasoriginallyalecturegivenattheUniversityofSwanseain1956.4DanaVilla:OakeshottandtheColdWarCritiqueofPoliticalRationalism.In:TheCambridgeCompaniontoOakeshott,ed.byEfraimPodoksik,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2012,pp.319‐344,326.Villa,however,isclearthat,unlikeStraussorVoegelin,thereis“nolonginginOakeshottfor‘theworldwehavelost’”and,unlikeBurke,Oakeshottisnotanti‐modernbutan“idiosyncraticmodernist”.Ibid.5MichaelOakeshott:Onbeingconservative.In:RationalisminPoliticsandOtherEssays,forewordbyTimothyFuller,Indianapolis:LibertyFund,1991,pp.426‐27.6Ibid.,pp.428‐29.7Ibid.,p.429.
TheclassificationofOakeshott’sconservatismasaestheticisevenmoresurprisinginviewofthe
factthatintheintermediaryyearsbetweenAnderson’sessayandMüller’sresearchnotemore
thantwodozenmonographsandnumerousarticlesonOakeshott’sworkhadappearedonboth
sidesoftheAtlantic.8Thesehaverecentlybeencomplementedbytwocompanionsandabilingual
edited volumewhich – a few contributions aside –alsomerits the name.9All of these, though
addressingoftenquitediverseaspectsoftheOakeshottianoeuvre,showthatitdoesnotfitthe
clichés of political conservatism as reactionary, anti‐modern or instinctively traditionalist.
MeanwhileOakeshott’sreceptionhastranscendedAnglophoneacademiaandisbuildingacross
theContinent.10ThiswouldsuggestthatOakeshott–afteraninitialslumpininterest–isindeed
onthewaytobecomingaclassicoftwentiethcenturypoliticalphilosophy.Perhapsnotquiteas
iconic as Rawls or Habermas but certainly on parwith Friedrich A. v. Hayek, JohnDewey or
RichardRorty.ItalsoseemsthatOakeshott,inthegreaterperspectiveofthehistoryofphilosophy,
hassuccessfullysecuredaplace forhimself.AnnHartle, forexample,argues thatOakeshott is
joinedwithMicheldeMontaigneinwhatMontaignetermsaccidentalphilosophyfor“Oakeshott’s
accountoftheessayformandofthemeaningofphilosophyareidentical”andbothacknowledge
8AbibliographycompiledbyEfraimPodoksikbetween2003and2009canbeaccessedviatheMichaelOakeshottAssociationathttp://www.michael‐oakeshott‐association.com/index.php/bibliographyItincorporatesJohnLiddington’searlierbibliographywhichupuntil1993providedthemostcompleteoverviewofOakeshott’spublishedwork.SeeJohnH.Liddington:TheAchievementofMichaelOakeshott,ed.byJesseNorman,London:GeraldDuckworth,1993.9PaulFrancoandLeslieMarsh(Eds.):ACompaniontoMichaelOakeshott.UniversityPark:ThePennsylvaniaStateUniversityPress,2012;EfraimPodoksik(Ed.):TheCambridgeCompaniontoOakeshott.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2012;MichaelHenkelundOliverLembcke(Eds.):PolitikundPraxis–MichaelOakeshottimDialog.Tübingen:MohrSiebeck,2013.ThelatterincludestencontributionsinEnglishandseveninGerman.10RecenttranslationsincludeinItalian:Lapoliticamodernatrascetticismoefede,ed.byAgostinoCarrino,SoveriaManelli:Rubbettino,2013;inSpanish:Laactitudconservadora,prólogodeJesúsSilva‐HerzogMárquez,Madrid:EdicionesSequitur,2009;MoralypoliticaenlaEuropamoderna,traduccióndeCarmenOrsMarqués,prólogoalaediciónEspañolaGerardoLópezSastre,Madrid:EditorialSíntesis,2008;Lavozdelaprendizajeliberal,traduccióndeAnaBello,BuenosAiresyMadrid:Katzeditors,2009;Leccionesdehistoriadelpensamientpolitico,vol.I(DesdeGreciahastalaEdadMedia)yvol.II((ElcarácterdelestadomodernoEuropeo),introducción,traducciónyediciónalcuidadodeFranciscoJavierLópezAtanes,Madrid:UniónEditorial,2012/13;Sobrelahistoriayotrosensayos,traduccióndeMaríaVictoriaRodil,BuenosAiresyMadrid:Katzeditors,2013;inFrench:Moraleetpolitiquedansl'Europemodern,prefacedeOlivierSeyden,Paris:LesBellesLettres,2006;L'associationcivileselonHobbes(suividecinqessaissurHobbes),traductiondeDominiqueWeber,Paris:Vrin,2011;Duconservatism,traductiondeJean‐FrançoisSené,prefaced’AdrienGuillemin,Paris:EditionsduFélin,2012;inHungarian:Politikairacionalizmus,trans.byT.KállaiandT.Szentmiklósi,Budapest:ÚjMandátumKönyvkiadó,2001;inPortuguese:Serconservador,traduçãoporRafaelBorges,availableathttps://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/35133614/SerConservador_Oakeshott.pdf;andinRussian:RatsionalizmvPolitikeiDrugieStatii,ed.byL.B.Makeeva,A.B.TolstovaandM.F.Kosilova,trans.byI.I.Myuoberg,E.V.Kosilova,Y.A.NikiforovandO.V.Artemieva,Moscow:Ideia‐Press,2002.
the radical contingency of being and recognize the limits of politics.11Oakeshott’s 1929essay
ReligionandtheWorld,Hartleclaims,mightwellbereadasaportraitofMontaigne.12
However,scholarsofMontaigneasofOakeshotthavelongdebatedwhethertheyshouldbebest
thoughtofasconservativeorliberalthinkersandbothviewsseemcredibletosomeextendbut
neither satisfactory by itself.13 This is the case because, as Hartle suggests, the categories of
conservatismandliberalismdonotcapturebutratherobscurethedeeperdivisionbetweenthose
“who profess a faith in politics, and thus in human reason, to secure the human good (i.e.
perfection)andthosewhoareskepticalconcerningtheabilityofgovernmentandwhowantto
limititspower”.14Andbearinginmindthat“conceptsarenothermeticallysealedandallowfor
fluid, if controlled,movementacross theirvagueboundaries”15, suchquarrelsoverconceptual
branding might be entertaining in their own ways but more often than not converge on
tediousness.Theyalsosufferfromamisunderstandingoftheworkingsofpoliticalideologies.In
hispoliticalessaysOakeshotthimselfrecognizedthatpoliticalconceptsareinterrelated,mutually
interactingandoftencharacterizedbyfundamentalambiguityanditisthisambiguitywhich,as
HannaPitkinpointsout,givesthemtheirmeaningandmakestheirfunctioningpossible.16
Forthepoliticalscientist,whattakesprecedencethenisnotthequestionofhowtocoherently
integrate heterogeneous and often inconsistent elements of a particular ideology or distill a
11AnnHartle:MicheldeMontaigne:AccidentalPhilosopher.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2003,directquoteatp.37.ThankstolettertoPatrickT.RileyweknowthatOakeshottregardedMontaigne–alongwithSt.Augustine–asthe“twomostremarkablemenwhohaveeverlived”.SeePatrickRiley:MichaelOakeshott,PhilosopherofIndividuality.In:ReviewofPolitics,Vol.54.No.4(Fall1992),pp.649‐664,664.12Ibid.,p.167.SeeMichaelOakeshott:ReligionandtheWorld.In:Religion,PoliticsandtheMoralLife,ed.byTimothyFuller,NewHavenandLondon:YaleUniversityPress,1993,pp.27‐37.13OnMontaigneseetheoverviewinHartle:MicheldeMontaigne,p.278n14;onOakeshottsee,forexample,LeslieMarsh:OakeshottandHayek:SituatingtheMind.In:ACompaniontoMichaelOakeshott,ed.byPaulFrancoandLeslieMarsh,UniversityPark:ThePennsylvaniaStateUniversityPress,2012,p.261;AndrewGamble:Oakeshott’sIdeologicalPolitics:ConservativeorLiberal?andWilliamA.Galston:Oakeshott’sPoliticalTheory:RecapitulationandCriticisms.Bothin:TheCambridgeCompaniontoOakeshott,ed.byEfraimPodoksik,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2012,pp.153‐176and222‐244respectively,aswellasthereferencesgivenonp.242n1.EdmundFawcetthasfurtherarguedthatbothOakeshott’sandIsaiahBerlin’s“modestviewofwhatpoliticscouldaccomplish”exemplified“aspectsoftheconstraintsthatliberalsplaceonacceptablesocialorder.”EdmundFawcett:OakeshottandBerlin:LettingPoliticsAloneand‘Negative’Liberty.In:Liberalism:TheLifeofanIdea.Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress,2014,p.317.14Hartle:MicheldeMontaigne,p.220.TothesameeffectseealsoNoelMalcolm:OakeshottandHobbes.In:ACompaniontoMichaelOakeshott,ed.byPaulFrancoandLeslieMarsh,UniversityPark:ThePennsylvaniaStateUniversityPress,2012,p.224.15SeeMichaelFreeden:PoliticalConceptsandIdeologicalMorphology.In:TheJournalofPoliticalPhilosophy,Vol.2,No.2(June1994),pp.140‐164,directquoteat154‐55.Freedenarguesthatthespecificityofpoliticalconceptsistheresultofrespectivecombinationsoftwofactors,“thepresenceofanineliminablecomponent,albeitanundifferentiatedformratherthanhardandsubstantive;andanonrandom,evenifwidelyvariable,collectionofadditionalcomponentsthatarelockedintothatvacuous‘defacto’coreinalimitednumberofrecognizablepatterns”.Ibid.p.149.Seealsothein‐depthdiscussioninFreeden’sIdeologiesandPoliticalTheory:AConceptualApproach.Oxford:ClarendonPress,1996.16HannaFenichelPitkin:InhumanConductandUnpoliticalTheory.In:PoliticalTheory,Vol.4,No.3(August1976),pp.301‐320,317.
‘standardcase’butratherwhycertainviewsattainedadominantpoliticalpositionat thetime
they did. Liberalism and conservatism thus do not appear as mutually contradictory sets of
political ideas.Rathertheyneedtobesituatedwithinthebroaderpolitical,socialandcultural
shiftstowhichbothhadtofindnewwaystoaccommodate.17
Both,Montaigne aswell as Oakeshott, did not believe that politics can provide away for the
attainmentofthehumangoodanditisthisskepticismwhichmoderatesagainstrationalschemes
ofchangeandrationalidealsofperfection.Contrarytothemodernbeliefthat“therealizationof
theidealstateisinherentinreasonitself”,bothseemtothinkthatthetaskofpoliticalphilosophy
isnot tobe an instrumentof rulebut that of limiting thepretensionsofpolitics.Butperhaps
MontaignewasmoreawarethanOakeshottthatthereis“nopossibilityofrealinnocenceinthe
worldofpolitics.”Thatis,evenifoneconsciouslyshiedawayfromgettingone’sownhandsdirty
asOakeshott,notoutofasenseofaloofnessbutforgenuinemethodologicalreasons,seemsto
havedone.Politicalphilosophy,forhim,couldnotbeexpectedtoprovidesecurefoundations,nor
to“increaseourabilitytobesuccessfulinpoliticalactivity”,ithadnopowerto“guideortodirect
us in the enterprise of pursuing the intimations of our tradition” and thus, in a sense, it had
“nothingbutahistory.”18
ForMontaigne,thedefenseofprivatelife–whatOakeshottcalledtherichnessandpluralityofany
tradition–requiredresistanceto theever‐expandingclaimsof theuniversalandhomogenous
state.19Tobesure,thisisofmorethanjustincidentalconcern.InOakeshott’stimescarcelyanyone
needed reminding that the ethnic, religious and cultural homogeneity of the European nation
stateswastheresultofanageofextremesandOakeshott’smightinparthavewellbeena“callfor
quiet”20aswellasconstraintinthefaceoftotalitarianism’smid‐centurysuffocatinggriponthe
meaningofhumanexistence.Inourowntime,concernsmayseemoflessimmediacyandgreater
ambiguity such as the increasingdisenfranchising anddepoliticizingof thepublic sphere as a
forum of political deliberation, the effects of a global consumer culture or the increasing
17ForamoredetaileddiscussionseeHaraldBluhmundChristophM.Michael:Anglo‐AmericanConservatismsinceThatcherandReagan.In:NeuePolitischeLiteratur,Vol.58,No.3(2013).Itisespeciallyintermsofcomparativeresearchthatthecontextualizationofconservatismandliberalismwithinasharedconceptualfieldrecommendsitself.SeealsoparadigmaticallyDanielT.Rodgers:AgeofFracture.Cambridge,MA:BelknapPress,2011.18MichaelOakeshott:PoliticalEducation.In:RationalisminPoliticsandOtherEssays,forewordbyTimothyFuller,Indianapolis:LibertyFund,1991,pp.43‐69,directquotesatpp.65.19Hartle:MicheldeMontaigne,pp.223‐225.20EdmundFawcett:Liberalism:TheLifeofanIdea.Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress,2014,p.317.OakeshotthadexpressedagrowingdisdaintowardspoliticalideologiesinTheSocialandPoliticalDoctrinesofContemporaryEurope.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1939.
encroachment on private life bywhat to its critics seems like the realization of an Orwellian
surveillancesociety.21
Inwhat follows I cannot hope to comprehensively review the yields of almost a quarter of a
centuryofscholarshipsinceOakeshott’sdeath,nordistillhisvisionofpolitics–orforthatmatter
political philosophy – in any conclusive form. I will have very little, if anything, to say on
Oakeshott’sphilosophicalinheritanceofidealism,hisphilosophyofhistoryandreligion,noron
hiswritingsoneducationandaesthetics.Rather,Iwouldliketorevisittwoofhismostimportant
andwidelyreadcontributionstopoliticalphilosophyand,secondly,inpairingOakeshottwithSir
BernardWilliams,Iargue–perhapscounter‐intuitively–forthecontinuedrelevanceofhisstyle
ofthought.Assuch,I’mnotquitesurewhetherthismakesmeguiltyof JesseNorman’scharge
madeatlastyear’sOakeshottMemorialLectureatLSEthatmostofthosewho“invokeOakeshott
inandaroundpoliticshaveactually[not]readmuchofhim,sincetheyalmostalwaysignorehis
greatestworksExperienceanditsModesandOnHumanConduct.22
“Rationalism in Politics” and “Hobbes on Civil Association”
WhatOakeshottis,andverylikelywillcontinuetobe,bestknownforishiscritiqueofrationalism
andhisworkonthehistoryofpoliticalthought,inparticularhisreadingofHobbes.Asascholar
ofHobbesOakeshottarguedthatboththemechanistic‐materialistviewandthatofHobbesasa
defenderofdespotismwere in factmisconceived.Aswere theones that saw inHobbes’s civil
philosophythebeginningof“sociology,orascienceofpolitics”.Oakeshott,instead,readHobbes
as“themostradical”ofallsceptics(e.g.MontaigneorPascal)withadistinctlatescholasticlegacy
thatsethimapartfromSpinozaandDescartes,aphilosophicalrationalistandyetanti‐rationalist
whenitcametopolitics.23
WhatseemedtodrawOakeshotttoHobbeswasaparticularreadingofthehistoricaldevelopment
ofindividualityandtheformofpoliticalorder–civitas–itgaveriseto,andofLeviathanasan
21ExemplarilyseeHelenFenwick:CriminalisingPublicDisorderandAnti‐SocialBehaviour.In:CivilLibertiesandHumanRights.London:Cavendish,2007,pp.505‐517;andGraemeGerrardandRichardThompson:TwoMillionCamerasintheUK.In:CCTVImage,No.42(Winter2011),pp.11‐12.22JesseNorman:Burke,OakeshottandtheIntellectualRootsofModernConservatism.[OakeshottMemorialLecture],November,122013.ApodcastoftheLectureisavailableathttp://www.lse.ac.uk/newsAndMedia/videoAndAudio/channels/publicLecturesAndEvents/player.aspx?id=210623MichaelOakeshott:IntroductiontoLeviathan.In:HobbesonCivilAssociation.Indianapolis:LibertyFund,1975,pp.11,21,27,32.
explorationofthemoralityofindividualityof“separateandsovereignindividualsassociatedwith
oneanother”andintothecausesofsuchassociation.24Oakeshottarguedthatitledtoaparticular
formofmutualaccommodationinwhichmen“havenotsurrenderedtheirrighttopursuefelicity,
theyhavesurrenderedonlytheirrighteachtodothisunconditionally”and
“transferredtherightofeachtogovernhimselftoasovereignActor;theyhavecovenantedwithoneanother
toauthorizeallhisactions,eachtoavoucheverysuchactionashisown,tosubmittheirjudgementsand
willstohisjudgementandwillinallthatconcernstheirpeaceandsecurity,toobeyhiscommands,andto
pledgealltheirstrengthandpowertosupporttheexerciseofthisauthority”.25
Moreinterestingly,OakeshottinterpretsHobbestounderstandhumanlifeasatensionbetween
theprimarypassionsofpride(toberecognizedandhonoredbyothermenaspreeminent)and
fear(thedreadofviolentandshamefuldeathatthehandofanotherman)andheultimatelythinks
thatHobbesgaveprecedence topride,not fear, in theemancipationofmenmanifesting itself
withinacivitas.This,Oakeshottthinks,isthe“obscureheartofHobbes’smoraltheory”.Whereas
“those whose heads were [not] strong enough to withstand the giddiness provoked by his
scepticism”wouldonlygraspHobbesassayingthatprideisaviceandmankindmustpurgeitself
ofitsillusionsevenwhenitisnotvainglory;andthatitisfearwhichprovokes“reasontosuggest
the convenient articles of peace” (thus generating the morality of the tame man), Oakeshott
recognizedanother,esotericmeaninginHobbes’stheoryofcivilobligation.
Inthisimplicitlineofargument,emancipationfromthefearofshamefuldeathisstillsoughtbut
ittakesplacebya“moralizationofprideitself”,emancipationresultfromthecharacterofaman
“whosedispositionistoovercomefearnotbereason(thatis,byseekingasecureconditionof
externalhumancircumstances)butbyhisowncourage”,aman,“who(inMontaigne’sphrase)
‘knowshowtobelongtohimself,’andwho”[…]keepshisword“notmerelybecausehefearsthe
consequencesofbreakingit,butfrom‘agloryorprideinappearingnottoneedtobeakit’.”The
virtuoussideofprideisself‐lovefreefromdelusionsofomnipotence,aself‐lovewhich“appears
asself‐knowledgeandself‐respect,”andinwhich
“the delusions of power over others is replaced by the reality of self‐control, and the glory of the
invulnerabilitywhichcomesfromcouragegeneratesmagnanimity,peace.Thisisthevirtueofpridewhose
lineageistobetracedbacktothenymphHybris,thereputedmotherofPanbyZeus;thepridewhichis
reflectedinthemegalopsychosofAristotleandata lowerlevel inthewisemanoftheStoics;thesancta
superbia which had its place inmedievalmoral theology; andwhichwas recognized by Hobbes as an
24Oakeshott:TheMoralLifeintheWritingsofThomasHobbes.In:Ibid.,p.82.25Oakeshott:IntroductiontoLeviathan.In:Ibid.,p.44,47.
alternativemannertothatsuggestedbyfearandreasonofpreservingone’sownnatureandemancipating
oneselffrom…thestrifewhichthisfeargenerates.”26
Pride and self‐esteem thus do supply “an adequatemotive for endeavouring peace” and this
specificidiomofthemoralityofindividualityrescuesproudmanfromthelowsofthebourgeois
moralityofthetamemanwhohassettledforsafetyinsteadofthebrillianceoflife;andthuscan,
accordingtoOakeshott,justlybecalled“aristocratic”.27
Hobbesisportrayed,here,asastoutindividualistandperhapsthisismostclearinthediscussion
ofcivilobligationandthenon‐instrumentalityandnon‐purposivenessofthestate.AsOakeshott
putsit,
“Hobbes isnotanabsolutistpreciselybecausehe isanauthoritarian”and this separateshim from“the
rationalistdictatorsofhisoranyage.Indeed,Hobbes[…]hadinhimmoreofthephilosophyofliberalism
thanmostofitsprofesseddefenders.”28
Neither, Oakeshott argued, does Hobbes’s civitas compromise the individuality of the
covenanters,noristheSovereign’sabsolutismdestructiveofindividuality.Thisisthecasesince
thecovenanters“havenotsurrenderedtheirrighttopursuefelicity;theyhavesurrenderedonly
their right each todo this unconditionally”, evendespite this rightnot being retractable, and,
secondly,thoughascivestheyaresubjecttoartificialimpedimentstotheirconduct,namelycivil
laws, these impediments “have been authorized by themselves” and are thus a self‐inflicted
diminutionoffreedom.Themoralauthorityofthesovereign,that“MortallGod”,derivessolely
fromanactofwillofthoseobliged.
Whatismore,thereisandcanbenocommonorcommunalfelicitysince“neitherbeforenorafter
theestablishmentofcivilassociationisthereanysuchthingasthePeople,…Whatevercommunity
existsmust be generated by individual acts of will”, and there is in Hobbes’s association “no
concordofwills,nocommonwill,nocommongood;itsunityliessolelyinthesinglenessofthe
Representative, in the substitution of his onewill for themany conflictingwills.”29AsHobbes
famouslyputitinchapter17ofLeviathan:“ForbythisAuthoritie,givenhimbyeveryparticular
manintheCommon‐Wealth,hehaththeuseofsomuchPowerandStrengthconferredonhim,
thatby terror thereof,he is inabled to forme thewillsof themall”.There isadistinctechoof
Hobbes consistently present in Oakeshott’s work on questions of political obligation and
legitimateauthority. Ina1975essay, forexample,Oakeshott faultswhatheperceives tohave
26ThisandtheprecedingquotescomefromOakeshott:TheMoralLifeintheWritingsofThomasHobbes.In:Ibid.,pp.98,126‐133,italicsintheoriginal.27Ibid.,p.133.28Oakeshott:IntroductiontoLeviathan.In:HobbesonCivilAssociation.Indianapolis:LibertyFund,1975,p.67.29Ibid.,pp.40,44,65,italicsintheoriginal.
achieved anunwarrantedorthodoxy inpolitical discourse,namely a conceptionof rule as the
exerciseofpowerandthemodernstateasconstitutedbyanapparatusofpower.Thisdoctrinehe
dismissesas“ahalf‐bakedaffair[…]unabletorecognizethedifferencebetweenlegitimateand
illegitimatepower”.ForOakeshott,therelationshipoftheofficeofruleinamodernstateandits
subjectsisfirstofalloneofauthorityandobligation,andnotapowerrelationshipofcompulsion
andobedience.Theauthoritytoeffectivelyenforcethefulfilmentofobligationsderivesnotfrom
the power‐apparatus at hand, but from the authority to prescribe non‐instrumental rules of
conduct.Whatturnsapersonintoasubjectoftheapparatusofpower,andaninjuryintoapenalty,
isfailuretofulfilanobligation.Wherethislinkbetweenpowerandauthorityinanassociationis
severed,tyrannyreigns.30
InterestinglythoughalookattheCambridgeCompaniontoHobbes’sLeviathanpublishedin2007
maysuggest,quitetothecontraryofmuchoftheworkonOakeshott,thathisframingofHobbes
lost itsrelevance forcontemporaryscholarship.There,Oakeshott isonlymentionedtwiceand
thatmerelyinpassing,trailingbothLeoStraussandCarlSchmittbyaconsiderablemarginwhile
intheCambridgeCompaniontoHobbes,AlanRyanploughsalonelyfurrowinacknowledgingthat
his general perspective onHobbes is not “unlike that ofMichaelOakeshott inHobbesonCivil
Association”.31
Oakeshottunderstoodpoliticsas“attendingtothegeneralarrangementsofasociety”bywhich
hemeant firstofall those“hereditaryco‐operativegroups…awareofapast,apresent,anda
future, which we call ‘states’”. What he termed general arrangements included customs,
institutions,lawsordiplomaticdecisions.Acollectionofpeoplelacking“recognizedtraditionsof
behavior”andwhosearrangements“intimatednodirectionforchange”or“needednoattention”
weretohimclearly“incapableofpolitics”.32Thesetraditionsofbehaviorfromwhichpoliticsas
anactivity“springs”areunderstoodasdynamic,generatingtheneedoftheirownamendment
andOakeshottviewedthemas“atoncecoherentandincoherent”.Politicsisthusconcernedwith
theamendmentofexistingarrangementsofasociety,asanexplorationof“whatisintimatedin
them”or,asIwouldputitinamorecontemporaryidiom,asacontinuousprocessofcivilrepair.
Thisconceptionofpoliticsurgesustothoroughlyengagewithourowntraditionandmakeits
30MichaelOakeshott:TalkingPolitics.In:RationalisminPoliticsandOtherEssays,forewordbyTimothyFuller,Indianapolis:LibertyFund,1991,pp.438‐461,directquotesatpp.446,447.31AlanRyan:Hobbes’sPoliticalPhilosophy.In:TheCambridgeCompaniontoHobbes,ed.byTomSorell,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1996,pp.208‐245,directquoteonp.241.SeealsoAlanRyan:HobbesandIndividualism.In:PerspectivesonThomasHobbes,ed.byG.A.J.RogersandAlanRyan,Oxford:ClarendonPress,1988,pp.81‐105.32MichaelOakeshott:PoliticalEducation.In:RationalisminPoliticsandOtherEssays,forewordbyTimothyFuller,Indianapolis:LibertyFund,1991,pp.43‐69,directquotesatpp.44,56.
whole resources available to us – it is, at the academic level, primarily “anhistorical study…
concernedwiththedetailoftheconcrete”33–whileitmilitatesagainstthethreatofrationalism.
Thehead‐onattackonRationalistandnear‐RationalistpoliticsOakeshottlaunchedinhis1947
essayRationalisminPoliticsneedstoberead,Iwouldargue,aswedgedbetweenthetraumasof
Europeanempiressweptaway,rabidnationalism,bloodshedandgenocideonanunprecedented
scale, and the seeming ascendency of Fabian socialism to power with a postwar Labour
governmentaswellasthebeginningofblocconfrontationoftheColdWar.34Thisisofparticular
importance, forthecontemporaryreaderunfamiliarwithotherpartsofOakeshott’sworkmay
wellthinkhimtoputforthan(epistemologicallygrounded)versionofculturalcritique.
The“disease”ofRationalisminpolitics,heclaims,notonly“amountstoacorruptionofthemind”
butalso“driesuptheminditself”,“youcannotescapeitserrors”sinceitis“withoutthepowerto
correctitsownshortcomings”.Onceasocietyhasbeenthoroughlyinfected,there’snocureand
“howdeeplytherationalistdispositionofmindhasinvadedourpoliticalthoughtandpracticeis
illustrated by the extent towhich [unselfconsciously established] traditions of behavior have
givenplacetoideologies”.35Especiallyinviewofthepassagesinthebeginningofsection5,one
cannot butwonderwhetherOakeshott is not in fact being ironic here in the same sense that
MachiavellihimselfwasthoughttobebyRousseauinBookIII,Chapter6ofDuContractSocial:
thesecretagentofrepublicanism.Butalsosection4,whereOakeshottarguesthatnoneofthe
“new and inexperienced social classes which […] have risen to the exercise of political initiative and
authority[…]hadtimetoacquireapoliticaleducationbeforeitcametopower:eachneeded[…]apolitical
doctrine, to take theplaceof ahabit ofpolitical behavior […]but they are abridgementsof a tradition,
rationalizationspurportingtoelicitthe‘truth’ofatraditionandtoexhibititinasetofabstractprinciples,
butfromwhich,nevertheless,thefullsignificanceofthetraditioninevitableescapes”,36
isbound to raiseanumberof eyebrows. Suchknowledgeof thepolitical traditionsof society,
Oakeshott maintains, takes “two or three generations to acquire” in the most favorable of
circumstances.IfthisaloneweretobeOakeshott’sposition,itsurelyinvitesridicule,andwell‐
justifiedatthat.ButalthoughOakeshott’scritiqueofRationalismisprimarilyepistemological,it
becomesclearthathisreadingoftraditionaspracticeistiedtothemoralityofindividualityhe
exploredinHobbes.First,itstandsinoppositiontoamoralideology,“thedesiccatedrelicofwhat
oncewastheunselfconsciousmoraltraditionofanaristocracy”:aself‐consciouspursuitofmoral
33Ibid.,p.63.Thismightjustlybereadasasincerepleaforfull‐fledgedliberaleducation.Itisalsoatimelyreminderofitsvalueinthefaceofthelargescalecutsinhighereducationthathaveoccurredoverthelastdecadeortwo.34MichaelOakeshott:RationalisminPolitics.In:RationalisminPoliticsandOtherEssays,forewordbyTimothyFuller,Indianapolis:LibertyFund,1991,pp.5‐42.InthisessayIretainOakeshott’snotationofRationalismwithcapital‐R.35Ibid.,pp.26,37.36Ibid.,p.30.
ideasnolonger“suspendedinareligiousorsocialtradition”or“belongingtoareligiousorasocial
life”and,thus,withoutanyrealmoralsignificance.37
Themoresympatheticreader,familiarwithExperienceanditsModes,willundoubtedlygraspthe
similarityofconcernsdrivingOakeshott’sinquiryinRationalisminPolitics.AsStevenB.Smithput
it,hisentireworkcanbeconsideredasa“sustainedreflectiononasingleproblem:therelationof
reason and the moral life [… and] at the core of Oakeshott’s moral theory is the concept of
experience.”38Secondly,inOnBeingConservativeOakeshottdistanceshimselffromtheBurkean
needtoplaceabsolutevalueincertainsocialedificesandgeneralideassuchasthefreeplayof
humanchoiceorprivatepropertyintheguiseofanaturalright(andthussomewhatcontradicts
whathehadwrittennearlyadecadeearlier),whichhethinks isunnecessaryandpretentious.
Equallyimplausibleistheassumptionthat“thosewhoruleareendowedwithasuperiorwisdom
whichdisclosestothemabetterrangeofbeliefsandactivitiesandwhichgivesthemauthorityto
imposeupontheirsubjectsaquitedifferentmanneroflife.”39Oakeshottdoesnotsimplycriticize
theapplicationofabstractprinciplestohumanaffairbutthefailuretoappreciatethatscienceand
practice(butalsohistoryandaesthetics)aredistinctmodesofhumanexperienceandnoneof
these canbeprivilegedover theothers.Politics thusposesnotmerelyproblemsof technique
callingfortheadvancementofmanagerialsolutionsinformedbyscience.JesseNormanisrightto
pointoutthat,contrarytoBurke,Oakeshott’sisnotasocialconservatismofvaluebutaliberal
one of disposition. It is not the duty of those in public authority to preserve the social order
becauseitisareservoirofvaluebut“thetaskofgovernmentistogeneralisethatdispositionand
sopreserveman’sfreedomtopursuehisownprojectswithoutinterruptionoroppression.”40
ThisindividualismandtheparticularcastitreceivedbyOakeshott’sinterpretationofHobbes,I
believe,iskeytounderstandingwhatmightotherwiseappearasaristocraticdisdainforthenewly
enfranchisedmasses.Theuomo singolarewho emerged first in Italy and “whose conductwas
markedbyahighdegreeofself‐determinationandalargenumberofwhoseactivitiesexpressed
personalpreferences”infactturnedoutformostofthenewlycreatedmodernmenpluggedfrom
the “familiar anonymity of communal life” a burdensome enterprise since they could not
transform their personal identity into an individuality. The historical emergence of human
individualitythusdidnotonlycreatetheindividualbutalsothe“individualmanqué”,notasan
37Ibid.,p.41.38StevenB.Smith:PracticalLifeandtheCritiqueofRationalism.In:TheCambridgeCompaniontoOakeshott,ed.byEfraimPodoksik,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2012,p.131.39MichaelOakeshott:OnBeingConservative.In:RationalisminPoliticsandOtherEssays,forewordbyTimothyFuller,Indianapolis:LibertyFund,1991,pp.407‐437,p.427.40JesseNorman:Burke,OakeshottandtheIntellectualRootsofModernConservatism.[OakeshottMemorialLecture],November,122013.
relic of a past age in the individual’s tow but a modern character in his own right.41 As a
consequence, the masses as they appear in European history, Oakeshott claimed, were not
composed of individuals, “they are composed of ‘anti‐individuals’ united in a revulsion from
individuality.”Anti‐individualismthusestablisheditselfas“oneofthemajordispositionsofthe
modern European moral character” and the “mass man” had no disposition to become an
individual.42Andtodeliverthefinalblowinthefaceofallprogressives,hedrylyremarksthat
“what, in fact, prevented him [the anti‐individual] enjoying the rights of individuality (which were as
availabletohimastoanyoneelse)wasnothis‘circumstances’buthischaracter–his‘anti‐individuality’.
Therightsofindividualitywerenecessarilysuchthatthe ‘massman’couldhavenouseforthem.[…]In
short,therightheclaimed,therightappropriatetohischaracter,wastherighttoliveinasocialprotectorate
whichrelievedhimoftheburdenof‘self‐determination’.”43
If,forwhateverreasons,one’saimwastosplitwideopenOakeshott’slaterworkandadminister
ascaringcriticalreassessment,TheMassesinRepresentativeDemocracysurelymustbeseenasan
invitation.
I think itevident,however, that thekindofabstractprincipleswhichOakeshottdenouncesas
progeny of Rationalism – such as Locke’s 1690 SecondTreatiseofCivilGovernment, the 1776
DeclarationofIndependenceofthethirteenstateofAmericaorthe1789DeclarationoftheRights
ofManandoftheCitizen–havebecomeaconstitutivepartofhowweunderstandourselvesas
humanbeings, that is, an essential and irreducible part of our political tradition.His peculiar
argument for the recovery of our lost tradition becomes intelligible by understanding it as
hermeneutically inspiredby theStraussiandistinctionbetweenesoteric andexoteric teaching
whichOakeshotthadputtouseintheIntroductiontoLeviathanayearearlierinordertoclear
awayperceivedinconsistenciesinHobbes’smoralphilosophy.ThismightalsoexplainOakeshott’s
ownmisunderstandingregardingtheformsofknowledgeconstitutiveofthegenuineactivityof
politics, as he envisioned it. The practical knowledge destroyed by Rationalism cannot be
recoveredasthepotentialityofacquiringthisknowledgeandformingcorrespondingsetsofbelief
isno longeravailable topeopleand,even if it couldberecovered, itwouldno longerprovide
guidancethroughthosepeople’ssocialworld,norcouldhaveapartinformingit.
Morality and the Ethical Life
41MichaelOakeshott:TheMassesinRepresentativeDemocracy.In:RationalisminPoliticsandOtherEssays,forewordbyTimothyFuller,Indianapolis:LibertyFund,1991,pp.365,371.42 Ibid. , pp. 371, 373, 376‐377. 43 Ibid. , p. 378.
ItshouldhavebecomeclearfromtheprecedingsectionsthatOakeshottwasamoralparticularist
andthestandardformoralreasoning,asheunderstoodit,wasnotsomeabstractuniversalrule
butthedegreeofcoherencewiththeconcretetraditionwithinwhichthatreasoningoccurred.44
Hewas not expressing a conservatismof rootedness, unselfconscious traditional conduct and
hostilitytowardsreflection.Probingone’sowntraditionisakeyprerequisiteforanymeaningful
politicaleducation,notleastbecause,asBernardWilliamspointedout,itmattersagreatdealin
whatwaypastconceptionsofjusticeandlegitimationsofhierarchyinearliersocietiesareseenas
eitherdiscreditedorprovidinghistoricalcontinuity.
In this section I attempt to readOakeshott’s position through theparticular lensprovidedby
Williams in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy as well as a later essay on philosophy as a
humanisticdiscipline.45Thismightwellstrikesomeasacontradictionintermsbutgenerates,I
believe,relevantinsightsbeyondthequestionofwhatOakeshott’spositionreallywas.Although
there’sscantreferencetoOakeshottinWilliams’swork,inhis1972essayKnowledgeandReasons
Williamsrecognizesthedistinctionbetweenpropositionalandpracticalknowledgeas“genuine
andineliminable,neithersortofknowledgebeingreducibletotheother”.Butitdoesnotfollow
fromthisthatwhatisnotrootedinpractice,is“inthatsensetheory”andWilliamsthinksthatthis
ideahasgeneratedseriousconfusiononthepartofMichaelOakeshottinRationalisminPolitics.46
WhatBernardWilliamshascalledtheabsoluteconceptionoftheworldhelps to illuminate this
misunderstanding.47Sciencemightdescribetheworldasitisinitself,thatis,giveascientific–not
afactual–representationofit,onewhichistothelargestpossibleextentindependentofthelocal
perspectivesoridiosyncrasiesoftheenquirer.ArepresentationthatWilliamscalledtheabsolute
conception.Whethersuchconceptionisatallattainableorcoherentisofcourseepistemologically
muchdisputedandHilaryPutnamfindsithardtoseewhysciencewouldatallneedtoconverge
inthedirectionofanabsoluteconception,justonesingleexplanatorypictureoftheworld.48But
muchof thehistoryofWestern science, especially its inherentnotionofprogress, undeniably
44StevenB.SmithhasfurtherpointedoutthatOakeshott,ratherthanbeingarelativist,isaboveallamoralpluralistwhounderstandsmoraltraditionsascomplex,attachesvaluetodifferentmoralvoicesandrejectsthenotionthatspecificfeaturesofamoraltraditioncouldbeprivilegedoverothersasimposing“anintolerabledullnessanduniformityontherichnessandvarietyoflife.”SeeStevenB.Smith:PracticalLifeandtheCritiqueofRationalism.In:TheCambridgeCompaniontoOakeshott,ed.byEfraimPodoksik,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2012,pp.131‐152,here140‐141.45BernardWilliams:EthicsandtheLimitsofPhilosophy.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1985;andPhilosophyasaHumanisticDiscipline.In:Philosophy,75,October2000,pp.477‐496,reprintedinPhilosophyasaHumanisticDiscipline.PrincetonandOxford:PrincetonUniversityPress,2006,pp.180‐199.46BernardWilliams:KnowledgeandReasons.In:PhilosophyasaHumanisticDiscipline.PrincetonandOxford:PrincetonUniversityPress,2006,pp.47‐56,directquotesatp.47,italicsintheoriginal.47HereandinthefollowingIheavilydrawfromBernardWilliams:EthicsandtheLimitsofPhilosophy.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1985,esp.pp.133‐139,andBernardWilliams:PhilosophyasaHumanisticDiscipline.In:Philosophy,75,October2000,pp.477‐496.48HilaryPutnam:ObjectivityandtheScience/EthicsDistinction.In:RealismwithaHumanFace.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1992,p.170.
appearsasanexerciseinconvergence.Bethatasitmay,inthepresentcontexttheimportantpoint
isanother:
Whenreflectingonourconceptualisationoftheworld,itispossibletorecognisefrominsidethat
veryconceptualisationthatsomeoftheconceptsandrepresentationsoftheworldaretoagreater
degree dependent than others on our perspective and particularities of apprehending things.
Manyofoureverydayintellectual,social,politicalandotheractivitiesevolvefromandrequire
conceptsandexplanationswhicharedeeplyrootedinour localpractices,ourculture,andour
history.Conceptsthatcannotbereplacedbysuchminimallyperspectivalconceptionswemight
sharewithallofhumanity.Itisthuswrongtosupposethat,eventhoughourconceptionsofthe
worldareboundbyourhistory,practices,andculture,theyareallequallylocalorperspectival,
therebydisallowingtocontrasttheconceptsofphysicsandtheconceptsofpoliticsorethics.Itis
equallywrongtosupposethatifsuchdifferentiationcouldbeestablished,andonesetofthese
conceptscouldbeshowntobepotentiallyuniversal,thenitfollowsfromthisthatthosepotentially
universalconceptssomehowintrinsicallytrumpthemorelocallyandhistoricallygrounded.
Inbothcases,thescientificandtheethical,convergencemust–irrespectiveofwhetheritactually
occurs – be understood differently. Actual convergence in the sciences can at least ideally be
explainedashavingbeenguidedbyhowthingsanywayare,whereasintheareaoftheethicssuch
hopecannotbutremainfrustrated.Agreementonhowsatellitesarebestflownintospaceentails
adifferentsortofconsensusthantheapprovalordisapprovalofthedeathpenalty.Withinthe
ethicalsphere,anabsoluteconceptionoftheworldremainsasmucherroneousasinadequatein
attemptingtoconflatetwodistinctepistemologicalspheres.Thisis,ofcourse,notsynonymous
with Oakeshott’s distinction between technical knowledge and practice but correspondswell
enough.Formypurposehere I believe it sufficient tonote thatWilliams’distinctionbetween
ethicalandscientificconceptsamountstotherealizationthatourethicaldescriptions(especially
thatofonehumancommunityasopposedtoanother)areindeedparochial.Thisshouldbeboth
unsettling and relativize our confidence in our own ethical vocabulary49 and, hence, it cannot
remainwithouteffectonourfirst‐orderethicaljudgements.
Williamsneverthelessdoesnotmeantoimplybyitthatethicalstatementscannothaveatruth
valueor,onamoregenerallevel,thattherecannotbeethicalknowledge,evenifthosewhotryto
settlesuchepistemologicalquestionswouldthinkit littlebetterthanalayman’sconceptionor
indeedacaseofbadpragmatism,anallusionRonaldDworkinhasrepeatedlymadetotheviews
Rortyexpressedonthesubject.50Ethicalstatementscannotbecategoricallytrue,evenifitwould
makethelivesofpeople,politiciansandindeedmanyphilosopherseasier.Theyarecontingenton
49HereIfollowRichardRorty’suseofthatterminContingency,IronyandSolidarity.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1989.50SeeRonaldDworkin:JusticeinRobes.Cambridge,Mass.andLondon:BelknapPress,2006,pp.36‐41.
theacceptanceofacertainsetofbeliefs,socialpractices,andpublicinterpretationofthosebeliefs.
Thecentralquestionregardingtherelationofethicalknowledgeandpoliticalactivityis,thus,not
thephilosophically inspiredoneofhowethicalknowledge ispossible(aquestiontowhichwe
mighthopetofindakindofapriorianswerabsolvingusfromthemessinessofrealworldcontexts
and that allows to bypass the historical conditions that gave shape to them). Rather than
attempting such escape from history, thinking about the relation of ethical knowledge and
politicalactivityrequiresthehistoricizationofsocialpracticesandself‐imagesthatgiveriseto
thekindofbeliefsthatpeopleconsiderbothtrueandjustified.
Ethicalconceptscanprovidedecisivereasonsforaction–aswhengivingawaysparechangeto
thehomeless–ortheycanbeoutweighedbyotherreasonsthatpreventthemfrombecoming
action‐guiding.Atthesametime,actions,irrespectiveofthetypeorsetofreasonsthatmotivate
them,canimpactoneitherour,theother’s,orindeedbothourthickethicalconcepts.Becauseof
theway these are tied tomatters of identity, ofwhatwe understand ourselves to be, purely
economicallymotivatedactions,forexample,canseemtothreatenourbeliefsandthewayswe
makeourjudgements,indeedourwayoflife.Itisnothardtorecognizethepotentialforgroup
conflictinthis.ItisherethatWilliams’distinctionbetweentheethicalandthescientifichelpsus
seethatnotallpiecesofknowledgecanbecombinedintoalargerbodyofknowledge,thatitis
preciselythethickethicalconceptsthatsometimesevadetranslationorareincommensurable.51
Eventhemostsophisticatedofrationalchoiceaccountsofbehaviour,forexample,mustfallshort
ofincorporatingsuchdistinctionwithintheirmethodologicalapparatus.
People’sthickethicalconcepts(asopposedtoanothercommunity’sconceptswhetherdistantin
placeortime)oftenarecharacterizedbyanunwieldysingularityinmeaningineliminablytiedto
practicethatmightnotpermitanobservertoapplytheminthesamedeepandsubstantialsense.
Thecasefor“irreduciblysocialgoods”CharlesTaylormakesinhisPhilosophicalArgumentsaims
atthis“peculiarstrongrelation”thatpresupposesandrequiresaparticularbackgroundofshared
meanings and practices, but it is slightly off target.52 I cannot see how it follows form the
irreducibly social conditions in which thick ethical concepts historically develop that these
concepts,butnotonlythose,alsothewholecultureinwhichtheyhavedeveloped,isintrinsically
good:
“Tosaythatacertainkindofself‐givingheroismisgood,oracertainqualityofaestheticexperience,must
betojudgetheculturesinwhichthiskindofheroismandthatkindofexperienceareconceivableoptions
51BernardWilliams:EthicsandtheLimitsofPhilosophy.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1985,pp.142ff.52CharlesTaylor:IrreduciblySocialGoods.In:PhilosophicalArguments.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1995,pp.127‐145,132.
asgoodcultures.Ifsuchvirtueandexperienceareworthcultivating,thenthecultureshavetobeworth
fostering,notascontingentinstruments,butforthemselves.”53
Incaseofpeople’sthickethicalconceptsthereisaconditionthatneedstobesatisfiedinorderto
usethoseconcepts.Itisamatterofbelongingtothatculture,thatis,itisamatterofbelongingto
acertainpractice.ButtojudgethatcertainculturesaregoodculturesthewayTaylorhasinmind
involvesconceptson the levelof reflectivegenerality, conceptswhichOakeshottwouldsurely
judgeRationalist.54Sinceinallsocietiesthereissomedegreeofreflectivequestioningorcriticism
(and it is perhaps here that Williams located Oakeshott’s confusion, because this reflective
criticism is not synonymous with a self‐conscious deliberation over the principles of moral
behaviour,withwhatOakeshotttermed“reflectivemorality”55),therelationbetweenpracticeand
reflection raises a questionWilliams phrased as follows: “Does the practice of the society, in
particular the judgements that members of the society make, imply answers to reflective
questionsaboutthatpractice[...]?”56
Itseemssufficientlycleartomethatthegeneralanswertothisquestionmustbeinthenegative.
Itdependsonthemodelofethicalpracticeweareadopting–anobjectivistoranonobjectivistone
–andthis,inturn,willdeterminewhetherwegrantthemembersofaparticularethicalpractice
topossessethicalknowledgeorsimply thinktheirpracticeanunreflectivecontingentcultural
artefact. The ethical knowledge in question is knowledge involved in people’s making of
judgementsthatemploytheirthickethicalconcepts.
AsWilliams points out, it is the collective reference to the society that invites a comparative
perspective.Butcomparingtheethicalrepresentationsofdifferentsocieties(whetherdistantin
placeortime)isanexercisethatoccursonthereflectivelevel.LikewiseTaylor’sjudgementon
the intrinsical goodness of cultures is clearly located on the reflective level and reflection, as
Williamsnotes,characteristicallydisturbsandmightevendestroytheethicalknowledgethose
culturesunselfconsciouslyhave.Itisdifficulttoseehow,atthereflectivelevel,therecanbean
adequatebodyofethicalknowledgethatwouldallowustomakejudgementsaboutwhatisworth
53Ibid.,p.137.54Williamsgrantsthatgeneralandabstractethicalconceptswithintheperspectiveofpracticalreasonmightcometohaveasortofweakobjectivityinarrivingatthetruthabouttheethicalafterhavingconsideredallethicalexperience.Evenso,Williamscannotseehowreflectiveethicalthoughtcouldbeepistemologicallyconvincinglymodelledtoconvergeonethicalreality.Ithasbeenargued,though,thatthickandthinethicalconceptsmightnotbeasdifferentwithregardtoobjectivityasWilliamsthinks.SeeWarrenQuinn:ReflectionandtheLossofMoralKnowledge:WilliamsonObjectivity.In:PhilosophyandPublicAffairs,16,(Spring)1987,pp.195‐209.55Forthedistinctionbetweena‘moralityofaffectionandbehavior’anda‘moralityofreflection’seeOakeshott’s1948essayTheTowerofBabel,reprintedinRationalisminPoliticsandOtherEssays,forewordbyTimothyFuller,Indianapolis:LibertyFund,1991,pp.465‐487.56BernardWilliams:EthicsandtheLimitsofPhilosophy.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1985,p.146.
cultivating.57Onthecontrary,ifwesubscribetoanonobjectivistviewofethicalpractice,asTaylor
wouldsurelydo,itissimplynotpossibleatalltoadvancesuchaclaim.
Fosteringculturesandarguingfortheirmember’scontinuationoftheirpracticesisthereforea
ratherstrangeidea.Itwillremainone,evenifwereadilyacknowledgeboth,theirreduciblysocial
conditionsthatshapesuchpracticesandsubscribetothe“affirmationofordinarylife”inlocating
thegood life forhumanbeingsnot insomehigheractivitybut“at theverycenterofeveryday
existence,intheacquisitionthroughlabourofthemeanstoliveandthereproductionoflifeinthe
family.”58
Normativeethics,understoodasasetofrationallyacceptablemoraljudgementsorprinciplesof
conduct,sacrificetheintegrityofamoraltraditionandthewealthofmoralpraxisinfavourofthe
priorclassificationsofcertainandoftencompetingnormativeethicaltheoriesandwecanseethat
this is precisely one of the defects that Oakeshott criticized as the produce of Rationalism.59
Normativeethics,Oakeshottmayhaveagreed,islikeasoundknowledgeofthetechnicalworking
ofaninstrumentwithoutbeingabletoplayitwell;andneitheryetmakesamusician.Itisthus
importanttolookatthehistoryofourownethicalconceptsandviewtheircontentasanoften
contingenthistoricalphenomenon.AsWilliamspointedout,areflectivestancetowardsourown
ethicalconceptsmustinvolvesuchhistoricalunderstanding.Evenconceptualdescriptionisnot
self‐sufficientandattemptstoderiveourconceptsapriorifromuniversalconditionsofhuman
life are likely to leave unexplained many important features for understanding one’s own
concepts.60Thoughweareshapedbythem,wearenotchainedtothemandIthinkitissafetosay
thatwehavestoppedalongtimeagobelievingthatreasoncaninstructusbothastowhatour
trueendisandhowtoreachit,evenifsomeendeavoursofneurosciencestillseeminclinedto
upholdtheuniversalityandcategoricalcharacterofcertainrulesofreason.WhatOakeshottcalled
the morality of reflection, as much as the effects of Rationalism in politics he so adamantly
criticised,bothcarrywithinthemmuchmoreofthe“rhythmandcontinuity”ofsocietythanhe
waspreparedtoacknowledge.
Political choices and their justification must be viewed as social phenomena rather than
somethingthatdependsontherelationofourknowledgeclaimstoreality.Sincethatmessageis
ahistoricistone,politicalphilosophymustwinitsgameonabiggerfieldthantherealmofreason
provides.Onlythenwillitsinquiriesbeabletovoicemorethantheoryimmanentcriticismthatis
57SeeIbid.,p.148.58CharlesTaylor:IrreduciblySocialGoods.In:PhilosophicalArguments.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1995,pp.127‐145,144.59SeeAntonioS.Cua:ReflectionsonMoralTheoryandUnderstandingMoralTraditions.In:InterpretingAcrossBoundaries:NewEssaysinComparativePhilosophy,ed.byGeraldJamesLarsonandEliotDeutsch.Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,1988,280‐93.60BernardWilliams:PhilosophyasaHumanisticDiscipline.In:Philosophy,75,October2000,pp.477‐496.
ofrelevanceonlywithinthenarrowconfinesofouracademicdepartments,eventhoughsome
universitydepartmentsmaybemorespaciousthanothers.Butthisargumentmightreflecttoa
greaterextendmyownideasofadirectionworthtravelinginthanitiscoveredbybothWilliams
and Oakeshott. It shows – far too briefly – that, and why, certain forms of liberalism and
conservatismshouldbeviewedasequallymisguided in findingwaysofdealingwithcommon
challengesandwhyneitheroftheselabeldostickwellwiththeOakeshottianposition.
Neither Aesthetic nor Political
In 1976, nearly a decade afterOakeshott’s retirement fromhis chair at the London School of
Economics,HannaPitkinclaimedthat
“moreprofoundlythananyonesinceBurke,he[Oakeshott]developedforusavisionofsocietythatmight
todayproperlybe called "ecological" anawarenessof the complexity anddelicacyof interrelationships
among institutions, customs,andwaysof life. […]Hehassought toremindusof thenatureofahealthy
politicallifeandtodefenditagainstboththefragmentationofself‐interestedconflictandthesuffocationof
bureaucraticadministration.”61
Pitkinwithherusualacutenessstillprovidesoneof themost rewardingreadsonOakeshott’s
workandwecannowsee thatOakeshottwasneither the “quintessentiallyEnglishgentleman
scholar”62wellshieldedfromthemessyworldofpoliticsintheivorytowersofeliteuniversities
andlateronbytheserenityofrurallifewithitsstone‐walledfieldsandmeadowsanditsscenic
viewsoftheremnantsofavanishedwayoflifeturnedheritageside,norwashea“refusenikof
modernlife”assomecommentatorscontinuetoclaim.63Self‐administeredvillagepoliticswasnot
Oakeshott’simplicitidealandtoclassifyhispoliticalthoughtsimplyasthepoliticizationofrural
aestheticswouldbeagrossmisrepresentation.Onthecontrary,hehadanacuteawarenessofthe
deepshiftsintheideationalandpoliticalmake‐upofhisowncenturyandwouldhaveconcurred
withWilliamsinhisassessmentthatitwasnoparadoxthat“intheseverynewcircumstancesvery
oldphilosophiesmayhavemoretoofferthanmoderatelynewones,andahistoricalstorycould
betoldtoshowwhythisisso.”OakeshotthadMontaigne,Pascal,HobbesandHumehighonthe
listandnotjustforhimtheproblemlayin
61HannaFenichelPitkin:InhumanConductandUnpoliticalTheory:MichaelOakeshott'sOnHumanConduct.In:PoliticalTheory,Vol.4,No.3(Aug1976),pp.301‐320,301‐302.62Jan‐WernerMüller:Re‐imaginingLeviathan.In:CriticalReviewofInternationalSocialandPoliticalPhilosophy,Vol.13,Nos.2‐3(June‐September2010),p.317.63EdmundFawcett:Liberalism:TheLifeofanIdea.Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress,2014,p.317.
“afalseimageofhowreflectionisrelatedtopractice,animageoftheoriesintermsofwhichtheyuselessly
elaboratetheirdifferencesfromoneanother,[andbecause]mostofmodernmoralphilosophy…istoomuch
andtoounknowinglycaughtupin[themodernworld],unreflectivelyappealingtoadministrativeideasof
rationality.”64
Oakeshott,however,Pitkinpointsout,adds
“acurioustwisttoalineofpoliticaltheoryrunningfromAristotlethroughMachiavelliandTocqueville[…]
Butwheretheotherwritersinthistraditionseeself‐determinationintermsofcollectiveself‐government,
Oakeshott is interested not in self‐government but in obedience – obedience that is obligatory tough
unchosen”65,
andthusneverseriouslyconsideredthepossibilityof“freedomascollectiveself‐determination”.66
This, forPitkin, is connectedwithOakeshott’s failure to see that “procedure is substance” and
althoughthecivilconditionisbydefinitionwithoutpurpose,itspurelyformalrulesentailsocial
andeconomicconsequences.FromitresultsadilemmaPitkinphrasesasfollows:
“[H]eisdeterminedtoprotectmoralandpoliticalidealsagainstselfishnessandcynicism.Thissomehow
becomes equatedwithprotecting themagainst economic concerns, thepoor, socialism, radicalism, and
participatorypoliticalaction. […]The intent is toprotect the integrityof these realms, their capacity to
educateandennobleusandtogiveourlivesmeaning.Buttheresultistoemptymoralityandpoliticsofall
valueandmeaning,all significantconnectionwithouractual livesandthecaresandcommitments that
reallymoveus.[…]Oakeshotthasconfusedtheaimofmoralityandpoliticswiththeirsubstance.”67
Pitkin’scriticismnotwithstanding, itseemstomethatOakeshottindeedisconservativewhere
modesofgovernmentareconcerned,butarobustliberalwhenitcomestoquestionsofpolitical
authorityand(moral)obligationandforhimtherewasnoinconsistencyinbeingconservativein
respectofgovernmentand“radical inrespectofalmosteveryotheractivity.”68Hehadamuch
more sophisticated grasp on the workings of political ideologies than many contemporary
scholars of conservatism. A disposition to be conservative in politics, for Oakeshott, neither
presupposedcertainbeliefs,forexampleinnaturallaworaprovidentialorder,nordiditreflect
an organic theory of human society. He acknowledged that many people disposed toward a
conservativeattitudeinpoliticalactivityhaveactuallyheldsuchviewsbutwasadamantthat“a
dispositiontobeconservativeinpoliticsdoesnotentaileitherthatweshouldholdthesebeliefs
64BernardWilliams:PhilosophyasaHumanisticDiscipline,selected,edited,andwithanintrod.byA.W.Moore,PrincetonandOxford:PrincetonUniversityPress,2006,pp.197‐198.65 HannaFenichelPitkin:InhumanConductandUnpoliticalTheory:MichaelOakeshott'sOnHumanConduct.In:PoliticalTheory,Vol.4,No.3(Aug1976),pp.310‐311,66TheonlypassageIcanthinkofwhereOakeshottcomesclosetoacknowledgingapossiblenetgainoffreedominsucharrangementisonp.48ofHobbesonCivilAssociation.Indianapolis:LibertyFund,1975.67 Pitkin:InhumanConductandUnpoliticalTheory,pp.314‐316,italicsintheoriginal. 68MichaelOakeshott:OnBeingConservative.In:RationalisminPoliticsandOtherEssays,forewordbyTimothyFuller,Indianapolis:LibertyFund,1991,p.435.
tobetrueoreventhatweshouldsupposethemtobetrue.”69ForOakeshotttheseviewswere
quitedivorcedfrombeliefsaboutthepropertaskofgovernmentanditsinstruments.
As Christopher Ellis and James Stimson have recently shown in their excellent study of the
meaning of ideology in America, there is indeed no systematic correlation between social
conservativeattitudesandpoliticalpreferences.70Thereisinfactnosystematicrelationbetween
ideological self‐identifications of, for example, social, cultural or religious conservatives and
politicalchoices.Forideologicalunawarecitizens,“ideologicalidentificationisnotthecauseof
(nordoes itreflect)apoliticalworldvieworasetof issuebeliefs. Instead, totheextentthat it
reflects anything at all, it reflects identificationsquitedivorced from the realmofpolitics and
politicalpreferences,butstronglyreflectiveofpersonalorientationstoprivatelife”.71AsIhave
arguedelsewhere,thiscallsintoquestionthoseapproachesbendondistillingaunifyingcoreor
presentingconservatismasacoherentbodyoftheoryandpractice.72
InOnBeingConservative,Oakeshott argued thatadisposition tobe conservative in respect to
government, to think it inappropriate for government to be “conspicuously progressive”,was
preeminentlyadispositionofthosewho“havesomethingtodoandsomethingtothinkabouton
theirownaccount,whohaveaskilltopracticeoranintellectualfortunetomake,[appropriate]to
peoplewhosepassionsdonotneedtobeinflamed,whosedesiresdonotneedtobeprovokedand
whose dreams of a better world need no prompting.”73 I have a hunch that, from a more
sociologicalperspective,whatweshouldtakeOakeshotttobesayinghereisthatwhatpolitical
conservatism is often portrayed as – a reactionary, anti‐modern or socially and culturally
instinctivelytraditionalistdisposition–ismostlikelytobefoundinthelowermiddleclassesand
well‐educated strata of the working classes. Below that, politics as such takes on a different
relevanceandPeter(Pete)Doreyhaspointedtothechangingmodesofsocialstratificationinthis
regard.Theyarenolongerbasedondivisionsoflaborbutratherondivisionsofleisure:“Celebrity
imitation, not socialmobility, has seemingly become the goal ofmanypoorerpeople, and the
criterionbywhich they judge themselves (and eachother).”This is not simply an instanceof
culturalcritiquefromtheleftbutshowshowthedesireforsocialmobilitymightbebluntedand,
inconsequence,leadto“theblitheacceptanceofgrossinequality”withsuper‐richcelebritiesas
thenew“opiumofthemasses”.74
69 Ibid. , p. 423. 70ChristopherEllisandJamesA.Stimson:IdeologyinAmerica,Cambridge:CambridgeUP,2012.71Ibid.,p.142.72See,forexample,CoreyRobin:TheReactionaryMind.ConservatismfromEdmundBurketoSarahPalin.Oxford:OxfordUP,2012.73 MichaelOakeshott:OnBeingConservative.In:RationalisminPoliticsandOtherEssays,forewordbyTimothyFuller,Indianapolis:LibertyFund,1991,pp.434‐435. 74 Peter Dorey: British Conservatism: The Philosophy and Politics of Inequality. London: Tauris, 2011, direct quotes at pp. 170, 249.
Finally,Oakeshottisofcontinued(ifonlyperhapshistorical)interestduetothefactthat,asReba
Soffer argues, “[e]very issue that [British] conservatives championed [in the course of the
twentieth century] already existed in the rhetoric and policy endorsements of conservative
historians in the 1920s and 1930s”.75 This might move Oakeshott’s perspective – however
passionately denied byOakeshott himself – in direct vicinity to the socially and economically
accommodatingtypeof“romanticBurkeanToryism”76prominentlyadvocatedbyAnthonyEden
andHaroldMacmillan.Indeed,thecentralityofpracticeinOakeshott’sthoughtprovidesthebasis
forapowerfulconservativecritiqueofcapitalism,clearlymarkingthelimits,ifnotexhaustion,of
neoliberaldogma.
Inamoregeneralsense,Oakeshottwasnotapublicintellectualand,tosome,hewasnotevena
politicalphilosopherforhethoughtthattherewasnothingofimmediatepoliticalusefulnessin
politicalphilosophy,justthestudyofitshistory.Hewasconcernedtounderstandwhichedifice
of human life could be trusted to sustain a healthy balance in the forms of civil association
characteristicof themodern state.What couldbeexpectedof themodern statewasmerely a
“negativegift”,notacloselyintegratedmannerofliving,northeadvanceofmoralperfection,but
the“onlyconditionofhumanlifethatcanbepermanentlyestablished”:peace.77Whatisstrikingly
absentfromOakeshott’saccount–somuchsothatitisnotevenindexedinRationalisminPolitics
andOtherEssays – is thesocialedificeonwhichconservativesareoftendisposed toerect the
wholearchitectureofsociety,thefamily.Onceagain,thisillustratesboth,hisdistancefromBurke
andhisstrongcommitmenttoindividualism.
AndalthoughOakeshottwasregardedasavoiceofauthority,bothasateacherandascholar,and
noteventhoseindisagreementwiththepositionshetookthoughtofhimas“lookinglikeafatgirl
inaminiskirt.”78Hehimself,however,neverseemedentirelypersuadedoftheimportanceofhis
own voice in the conversation of mankind. Remaining ultimately doubtful in the
acknowledgementofthefallibilityandlimitationsofreasoningmayjustbethemostimportant
ingredientinwhatmakesforagreatteacher.Or,asOakeshottputit:“Theironyofalltheorizing
isitspropensitytogenerate,notanunderstanding,butanot‐yet‐understood.”79
75RebaN.Soffer:History,Historians,andConservatisminBritainandAmerica.FromtheGreatWartoThatcherandReagan.NewYorkandOxford:OxfordUP,2009p.292.76Ibid.,p.302.77MichaelOakeshott:IntroductiontoLeviathan.In:HobbesonCivilAssociation.Indianapolis:LibertyFund,1975,p.79.78Oakeshott,whenbeingpresentedwithafestschriftattheoccasionofhisretirement,commentedthathe“hadthetemperament,thewillandthepatience,but[…]lackedtheability.Andthat’sratherpathetic.Isucceededonlyinlookinglikeafatgirlinaminiskirt.Thespiritiswillingbutthefleshisweak.”QuotedfromtheOakeshottarchivesattheBritishLibraryofPoliticalandEconomicScienceatLSE,File1/3,inPaulFranco:MichaelOakeshott:AnIntroduction.NewHavenandLondon:YaleUniversityPress,2004,p.18.79MichaelOakeshott:OnHumanConduct.Oxford:ClarendonPress,1975,p.10.