.

410781

The United States conducted 66 atmospheric nuclear weaponstests in the Marshall Islands. Twenty-two years later the authorities continueto disagree on when the islands wIII be safe for resettlement.

GIFF JOHNSON

Paradise lostThe U.S. government is now at-tempting to prove at Enewetak whatit couldn’t at Bikini: that it is pos-sible for people to return safelyto an area devastated by nuclearweapons. Following completion of athree-year, $1W million nuclearcleanup of Enewetak Atoll in &heMarshall Islands—site of 43 nucleartests-the United States says it is safefor the pcople who were moved out toreturn to &rtain islands. But whilethe cleanup has been hailed in somequarters as a “remarkable success, ”controversy is developing overwhether or not people should returnto any part of the atoll.

The M&rshail Islands are part of aU.N. ‘-strategic”” Trust Territory ofthe Pac]fic, which has been ad-ministered by the United Statessince World War II. The nuclearweapons testing program ended in1958, after 12 years of 66 atmo-spheric tests.

The Defense Nuclear Agency,coordinator of the cleanup, has saidit would be impossible to lower atollradiation to pre-test levels. But thecleanup guidelines called for re-sidence islands to be cleaned to alevel of 40 picocunes of plutonium239/240 per gram of soil. agricultureislands to 80 picocuries per gram andfood gathering islands to 160. To ac-complish this, thousands of cubicyards of contaminated soil werescraped off the small islands, mixedwith cement and encased in a mas-sive concrete dome in an atomicbomb cmler at Runit Island.

The basis for the cleanup wasstrongly questioned in 1974 by a re-searcher who had been involved inthe 1950s weapons testing program

24

at Bikini and Enewetak. EdwardMane]]. of the National Center forAtmospheric Research. writing toMicronesia LegaJ Services, a U.S.government organization represent-ing the Enewetak people, expressedconcern over the

“highly questionable recom-mendations regarding acceptablelevels of plutonium in the soils andthe very doubtful merits ~f pro-ceeding with the resettlement ofEneweuk Atoll on the basis of therecommendations of a Task Groupassembled by the Atomic EnergyCommission and the Depa~ment ofDefense. . . . The recommendationthat plutonium soils, with levels notexceeding 40 pCi of plutonium 240241 per gram of soil averaged over 15cm depth. is suitable for humanhabitation, can be very seriouslyquestioned. . . . The resettlement ofsuch sites is extremely likely to havetragic consequences. particularly forthe younger members of the in-habitants. Progressively worse con-sequences are to be expected foreach successive generation in theaffected population group.”’

Marten’s questions and recom-m-ons were ignored and thecleanup itself was plagued by shoddysafety standards.

The Defense Nuclear Agencymaintained that “’the most importantconsidemtion in the cleanup opem-tions was the radiological safety ofthe individuals involved in the oper-ations. ”~ But Agency policies havebeen inconsistent. and infon-nationsupplied by soldiers involved in thecleanup and by independent report-

ers do not substantiate its clasms.One of many reports from

Enewetak was publicized in an ex-clusive television interview. inwhich a mechanic stated that he andothers had worked without protect-ive gear underneath dozens of txucksreturning from the plutonium–contaminated islands. He said ‘-thetires and underside of the vehicleswere usually covered with dust anddin, ” but the workers were given norespirators for protection.’ i

Press visitors to Enewetak in April1980 noticed similar flaws in WfenseNuclear Agency safety standards.“Standing on any part of Runit Is-land,” said a reporter, “you mustwear rubber bets and a paper re-spirator to prevent breathingplutonium particles. But standing onthe concrete dome (a mere 15 feetaway) you are not required to wearany protective clothing at all. “’4

Runit Island will be quarantined tothe Marshallese forever, because ofhigh concentrations of plutonium inthe soil. More than 100,000 cubicyards of radioactive soil and debrishave been encased in a massive ce-ment dome on Runit, to isolate thesehazardous materials from the envi-ronment for thousands of years.

Nevertheless. islands within threemiles of Runit have been designatedas safe for “picnics and foodgathering. ” This prompted a Mar-shallese observer to comment:““What will happen if birds. crabs. \

turtles and other animals that land onthe off limits island are eaten by thepeople?””

Despite this atmosphere of in-consistent safety measures. many ofthe 450 Enewetak people have

already moved back to the southernislands. which the Agency calls“relatively uncontaminated.’”Mean% hlle. the Depanment of En-ergy says the atoll-s northernislands-where the majority of the43 nucl~tir tests occurred-should beoff iimll~ for at least 30 years. sinceradiation levels are still high there.

Because of the Department ruling,millions of dollars have been spenton buildlng houses and communityfacilities and on replantingthousands of coconut trees in thesouthern islands: but no funds havebeen used to rehabilitate the north-ern islands. This has caused prob-lems among the Enewetak people as,traditionally. they are divided intotwo distinct groups: the Dri-Enjebi inthe notthem and Dri-Enew’etaL inthe south. Accustomed to their ownchiefs and land, the Dn-Enjebi arereluctant to live on another chiefsland.

In September 1979, the radiologi-cal information about Enewetak waspresented by the Department of En-ergy to the people. Michael Benderand Bertnnd Brill, two scientistshired by Micronesia Legal Servicesthen testified that their study showedall the Islands to be safe for habita-tion. including nofihem Enjebi is-land. The chances of adverse effectswere so small. they had concluded,that ‘‘cancer mortality in the lifetimeof the population IS estimated to txkss than a single case.”s They as-sened tia( the Deptiment of En-ergy overstated the risk: “’DOE tendsto exaggerate the problem,” said Mic-ronesmn Legal service Director TedMitchell.~

The Enewetak people have an in-tense desire 10 return home, after 33years on tiny Ujelang Atoll. And onthe basis of this information. theEnjebi people voted to return to theirisland in the north. But the objectiv-ity of the study conducted by Benderand Brill, whose base is thegovernment-funded BrookhavenNational Laboratory, has beenquestioned. Dr. Rosalie Bet-tell, aconsultant to the Division of Stan-dard Setting for the NLJQlW Regu-latory Commission, said of thestudy:

“‘The population of Eneweti hasthe right to know that a value judg-ment has been made for them,namely that induction of cancer istheir only concern. They may, if in-formed about hypothyroidism, apIastic anemia. premature aging. be-nign tumors and other such dis-orders, make a different judgment.. . .

They ‘reduced” the radiation doseof the inhabitants of Enjebi by av-eraging in the population less ex-posed. This is like telling onemember of a family his or her risk oflung cancer is lowered if the othernonsmoking members of the familyare included and an ‘average’ riskgiven. It is a scientifically ridiculousapproach to public health.

Basing a resettlement decision af-fecting the lives of 500 people on theBender and Brill inadequate healthassessment would be extremely im-pruden~.’”

Glen Alcalay, a former PeaceCorps Volunteer in the MarshaJls.said the problem is “‘the inherentconflict of interest in having

Brookhaven researchers assess U.S.government data. . . . The history ofthe U.S. testing progmm was one ofrepeated mistakes and mis-calculations.”” In his view, “non-government radiation experts”’should be included in all such sur-veys. s

A May 1979 General AccountingOffice repofl cautioned that “be-cause of uncertainty of the long termeffects of exposure to low level radi-ation. it is possible that the people ofEnewetak could receive doses in ex-cess of current standards. ” It alsourged an independent assessment ofEnewetak by “expefis who have nodirect connections with the nucleartesting program or the Enewetakcleanup project . . . &fore resettle-ment of the people begins. ”9 Thisrepofi was initially withheld from theMarshall Islands government forpolitical reasons.

Since deporting an independentteam of Japanese scientists invitedby Marshall Islands leaders to in-vestigate the radiation problems in1971. the United States has stead-fastly refused to allow independentmonitoring of the Marsh allesepeopie and their environment.

President Lyndon Johnson an-nounced in 1%8 that Bikin&site of23 bomb tests-would be returned toits people, who had been living inexile since 1946.

In 1%9. the Atomic Energy Com-mission Ad: “’[there is] vlfluall> noradiation left on Bikini”’ and ‘“theexposures to radiation of the Bikinipeople do not offer a significantthreat to their health and safety .“’0A small-scale cleanup and re-habilitation progtarn was begun and

December 1980 The Bulletin of the Atomic !kienttsts 25

Giff Johnson, a free-lamx writer who has traveled extensivelythroughout the Pacific, edits the Microncsio Bulietmpublished in Honolulu, Hawaii 96826.

by the early 1970s a few pople hacbegun moving back.

Many Bikinians tell of Atomic En.ergy Commission scientists takingthem to Bikini to demonstrate itssafety. When the BiLinians refusedto eat arty local foods. fearing tadia-tion exposure. the scientists wouldconsume conconuts, fish and otherfoods in front of the islanders toconvince them. t I In 1972, however,the B}klnians expressed doubtsabout the safety of their atoll andvoted not to return home. But thegovernment was committed to theresettlement and offered Marshal-Iese government employees freefood and housing if they would moveto Bihln].

During an Atomic Energy Com-mission sumey of the more than 100people iiving on the atoll in 1975, the“presence of low levels ofplutonium”’ in their urine was dis-covered. The Commission, and laterthe Depa~ment of Energy, did notconsider this ““radiologicallysignificant. ‘*I2 By 1977, tests showed

an 1l-fold increase in the people’sbody burdens ofcesium-137. Ratherthan remove the population from ahazardous environment, however.the Department of Energy suggestedthat the Trust Territory governmentinstitute a complete feeding pro-gram. !O reduce consumption oflocal foods. and thus exposure.

The Department seemed reluctantto give up what one” LawrenceLiverrrmre Laboratory study called“possibi} the best available sourceof data for evaluating the transfer ofplutonium across the gut wall afterbeing incorporated into biologicalSystem s.”’l J The situation de-tcriomted funher and by May 1978.a high percen~ge of the Marshallesebody levels were above themaximum permissible dose allowedin the Untted States. The Bikinlanswere evacuated again.

t I.

‘\. au &. i

W=., ...1

K*, ..-&b .. ,nfubu.~adhtmbma- .:‘. “. .. :1- H ~ua: 114,66 y -

u

—.,bkbkd uOaBd~um: In \, .“.-;omSB-@3.rla,wowm “,,-wuW7Wqwcman

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26

By May 1978, a high percentage of the Marshallesebody levels were above the maximum permissible dose

b and the Blkinians were evacuated again.—

(kft)Peopie*09tbeconcrete domeCOVtiq u 810MJc bombenter 0~ Rodt f..dAd,E~std. (Mow) .NocJafCfeu ,p OmRanlt tslmd. (HI) U.S. ArEIYpemmd imfdt protatiw ~r.(*M) AJmY Pefwwd Mixtatpiototim-fltaodlu(cd 90U wltb ~1to form L&-W co~ dome.

Robert Conard of BrookhavenNational Laboratory—which hascoordinated the Marshall Islandsmedical program since 1954-estimated the health risks of the ex-posure:

“Assuming that they [1;3 people]had all been there since 1970 and re-ceived the average estimated inte-grated total dose of 2.6 reins for theperiod, based on known radiation-induced risk data, one would expectonly about 0.005 total cases ofleukemia to develop in that popula-tion as a result of their tadiation ex-posure.

The need for further medicalexaminations is not indicated basedon possible radiation effects as-sociated with such low doses. ”l’

But Dr. Konrad Kotrady, a formerBrookhaven resident physician inthe MarshalIs. strongly disagreedwith this philosophy:

“The people fail to understandhow scientists can say they do notknow all the possible late effects theradiation can cause . . . and then tellthe people a medical progmm is un-necessary.

If in 40 or 50 years medicaI prob-lems do occur as a result of the ex-posure. it would be better if a welldesigned medical progsam wasalready in progress to detect theproblems. ” 1~

Conard and representatives of otherU.S. government agencies. inapologizing for the complicationswhich occurred, frequently say thatradiation measurement techniquesthen were not as sophisticated asthose available today: that the sur-veys of Bikini were far less extensivethan those subsequently tamed outat Enewetak atoll.’6 The facts. how-ever, suggest otherwise.

In 1972-1973, the United Statesconducted an “exhaustive mdiologi-cal survey of Eneweta.k. ” which in-cluded both ground and aerial sur-veys of the islands. according to theDepanment of Energy. It was notdone at Bikini. however. In fact, itwasn’t until the Bikinians filed a fed-eral law suit in 1975, asking for athorough radiological sutwey of Bi- S

kini and the northern Marshall Is-lands, that the government agreed todo it. But because of three years ofbureaucratic infighting among theDepartments of Energy. State andInterior, the radiological survey wasnot conducted untiI after the evacu-

ation of Bikini in late 1978.The United States did have

sophisticated techniques formeasuring radiation at the outset ofthe Bikini resettlement; it chose toemploy them only at Enewetak.

U.S. policies with respect to pro-tecting the health of the Marshallesehave been totally inconsistent. Forexample. in 1946. prior to the firstnuclear test series, Operation Cross-roads. the people from islands withina radius of 300 miles of Bikini—including the Rongelap—wereevacuated as a safety precaution. ”The yield of these bombs was ap-proximately 20 kilotons. But in 1954,there was no official warning of theBravo test. much less an evacuationof the populations. Yet Bmvo wasthe largest U.S. hydrogen bombtested—more than 15 megatons.More than 200 Marshailese on

December 1980 The Bulie[m of the Atomic Scientists 27

The fact that in the Marshall Islands thyroid canceris more prevalent in people exposed to lower than to higher levelsof radiation is not wi~ely known in the United States.

fl

nearby Rongelap and Utink atolls,were severely contaminated withash-like fallout.

For many years people have de-bated uhe(her or not the Marshal-lese were deliberately exposed. Theofficial position is that upper levelwinds changed suddenly after theblast. depositing fallout on the in-habited islands. Admiral LewisStrauss of the Atomic Energy Com-mission. at a press conference on hisreturn from Bikini in 1954, said ofBravo ““. . . at no time was the test-ing out of control. ” He added. ““Notest is made without a definite pur-pose and a careful determination thatis directed [o an end result of majorimportance. . . . “1’

Ne\er~heless. within hours oftheir exposure (at Rongelap. 175reins. and at Utirik. 14 reins) thepeople began to suffer from nauseaand se~ere itching of the skin: skinbums and loss of hair occurred in thefolloulng weeks. Since then. 19 outof 22 children exposed on Rongelaphave had surgery for removal of.thyroid nodules. In 1972 a youth.barely a year old at the time of hisexposure in 1954. died of myelogen-ous leukemia. A 1977 report byBrookhaven states: ‘.Recently about5(YZof the exposed Rongelap peopleshowed hypothyroidism withoutclinical evidence of thyroid disease.a finding that probabiy portendstrouble ahead .”ly

‘“For twenty two years. the people[of Utirii.] have heard Dr. Conardand other doctors tell them not towo~, that the dose of radiation re-ceived at the island was too low tocause any harmful effects.

However. i[ has become apparentthat the theory was wrong. . . .There IS as much thyroid cancer atUtirik as at Rongelap. ”2°

A 1976 Brookhaven annual reportconfirmed the finding that thyroid

28

cancer is actually more prevalent inthe people who received low levelexposure than in the high levelgroup,?’

A questionable decision by theAtomic Energy Commission allowedthe Utink people to return to theiratoll within six months of the Bravotest in 1954 and the Rongelap peopleafter three years. Little radiologicalcleanup was done on either atoll, butboth were declared safe despite“slight lingering radiation. ”zz

Some 20 years later, the Depart-ment of Energy has decided the is-lands were not safe. Shortly after thenonhero Marshalls radiological sur-vey was finished. Depatlptem of En-ergy scientists went to Rongelap inearly 1979 and told the people thatthe northern islands in their atoll.which for the past 20 years they haveused for food gathering, were tooradioactive to visit. Moreover, theDepartment of Energy surwey showsthat islands in Rongelap-otdy 125miles from Bikini—have radiationlevels at least equal to, and in somecases higher than. an island at Bikini.

Since the 1954 Bravo incident. theUnited States has stated unequivo-cally that only the atolls of Bikini,Enewetak, Rongelap and Utirik werecontaminated during the weaponstests. But in 1978, the Depanment ofEnergy suddendly reversed itselfand reported: “In addition toEnewetak. Bikini and RongeiapAtolls, there are eleven other atollsor single islands that received inter-mediate range fallout from one ormore of the megaton range tests. ”“23

One of these atolls in the northernMarshnlls is Likiep. According to acareful repofl in the Micronesia in-dependent, June 6, 1980:

“’Out of 406 people who live inLikiep. there are documented re-ports that list nine women who havegiven birth to babies with severemental retardation. one woman who

had three ‘strange’ still born babies.one ‘completely unrecognizable as ,human.’ Also reponed amongwomen on Likiep were ten otherbabies that were not normal. a quitehigh percentage of the popula-tion. ””z4

No medical progmm exists for thepeople from these islands. but thelist of miscarriages, deformedbabies. cancers, thyroid nodules andenvironmental problems from sup-posedly unexposed atolls is steadilygrowing. Because Brookhaven doesnot examine people from these otherislands, the government has beenable to deny that any health prob-lems exist on the grounds that there

tare no data. t

Even on Utirik and Rongelap,Brookhaven has taken an extremelynarrow view of the problems, ac-cording to Kotrady. In his 1977 cn- *

tique he said:

‘*The original purpose of the pro-gram was to be as broad as possibleto discover all possible effects. . . .C)ver the years. however, data fromvarious sources and opinions of ex-perts have assessed what long termeffects should be found in thepeople. Thus the progmm seems toopetate in a mode of looking forthose effects predicted by expens.. . . It tends to focus on specificareas, such as the thyroid and blood,where the scientists expect effects tooccur. ”~s

Much of the information con- “ ,ceming low level radiation in theMarshalls is relevant to the UnitedStates, in view of the uncertaintysumounding Three Mile Island, mil- t

itary personnel exposed to nucleartests. and so fomh. The fact that inthe Marshal]s thyroid cancer is moreprevalent in people exposed to lowerthan to higher levels of radiation isnot widely known in the United

., .

It is an irony of history that the U.N. Trust Agreement bindsthe United States both to ‘protect the health of the inhabitants’ and ‘protect

the inhabitants against the loss of their land or resources.’

,

States. Similarly, exposure throughconcentration of radiation in thefood chain is not well understood,yet this appears to have been a majorcontributor to the alarming rate ofproblems at Rongelap. Utirik andother islands. At Bikini it was thereason for evacuating the people in1978. und who can guarantee the fu-ture of che Enewetak people?

Moreover, in October 1980 theDepzwrnent of Energy stated that it isnow safe for the Bikinkts to returnto a certain island in Bikini Atoll. Itwas claimed that the people will notreceive doses above the federal radia-tion standards if they import 50 per-cent of their food and spend no morethan 10 percent of their time onBikini Island, approximately six milesaway.

It is an irony of history that the.United Nations Trust Agreementbinds the United States both to“protect the health of the in-habitants”’ and “’protect the in-habitants against the loss of theirland or resources. ”’zb

W’iIh medical examinations andenvironmental surveys by doctorsand scientists independent of theU.S. government, combined with athorough education program onradiation. at least the diagnosis andtreatment of the Marshallese willimpro~e. But unless the independentscientific community-in the UnitedSta~es becomes more involved in thehealth problems on these islands. itis Iihel} that [he inhabitants willserve primarily as a source for U.S.

b government research into the effectsof radiation on human populations.0

1. Edward ~anell to Thtodore Mitchell(Mlcroncs~an Legal Servtcc Corporation)Dec. 9. 1974

2. Dricnsc Nuclear Agency. ‘“FactSheet—Encwc!ak Operallon” (Washmgtori.D. C.. ONA. April 1980).

3. KHON T\’-2, mtemlcw with fbsl Udell.Honolu)u. ,March ]980.

4. Floyd Takcuchl, pacific and Asian Af-fairs Semmar. Honolulu, Jurre 18, 1980.

s. “Enewetak Islanders F’an Return, ”Honolulu Star Bulteun. Sept. 26.1979.

& “Problems Unresolved on EnewetakAtoll.”” Honolulu Star Bulletin. March 26.1980.

7. Rosalie Berrell to U.S. CongressmanSidney Yates. June 6.1960.

8. Glenn H. Alcalay to Congressman Sid-ney Yates. June 24. 1980.

9. GeneraJ Accounting Office. “’EnewetakAtolkClcanmg Up Nuckar Contarnmauon, ”?SAD79-54 (May 8. 1979).

10. Atomic Energy Commission. ‘“Reporfof Ad Hoc Commlllee to Evaluate theRadIolopcal Haxards of Resettlement of Bi-kim Atoll’” (1%91.

11. Ralph Waltz [o Giff John@n, Majuro.Marshall Islands, June 1979.

12. Robefi A. Conard. ““ThekiCttiiO@StStatus of the Bikim Peorde: A Summary Re-port”. (Upton. N. Y.: Brookhaven NattorudLlbonstow, Sept. 20. 1978).

13. Lawrence Llvermore Laboratory,“Dose Assessmen! at Blki@ Atoll.”” ucRL-51879 (June 8. 1977) pt. 5 “’Biklnt IslandersWant to Stay There.’” Washngton Post. Aprd3.1980.

14. Conard, “Radiological Status.””;5. Konrad P. Kotrady. “The Brookhaven

Medical Prosrsrn to Ck[ect RadialIon Effectsin MarshalJc se Peopie. A Com@rison of ihePeople’s vs. the Program’s Attmtdes’” (Jan. 1.1977), unpublished but available from Mic-rorresla Support Committee. 1212 UniversityAve.. Honolulu. HI 96826.

16. Conard. ““Radiological Status.””17. John Anjmn. Maglstmte of Rongeiap

Atoll 195&65 to Giff Johnson. Ebcyc. Mar-shall Islands. July 1979.

18. LCWIS Smsuss. taped press conference.1954 (Washington. D. C.: NauonaJ Archwcs,1954),

19. ROhII A. C& SIUJ o(fum. “sum.msry of Thvrold Findings in MarshaJlese 22Years after Exposure to Radioactlvc Fall-out.”’ No. 21924 (Upton. N.Y. BrookhavenNational IAwaIory. 1976).

20. Kotrady,’’ Brookhaven Medical pro-gmm. ”

21. Philsdelphui Inquirer. “Who KnowsHow Long They’ll Take To Show. ” April 20.1979.

22. Conard and others. “’A Twenty YearReview of MedlcaJ Findings in a MarshallesePopulation Accidentally Exposed to Radmac-tive FalJout” (Upton, NY.: Brookhaven Na-tional bborato~. 1975).

23. U.S. fkpartmcn[ of Energy. “North-ern Marshall Islands Aend Radation Sumey.September to November 1978.”

24. Microneslan Independent. “The 25.IXfOYear Question.”” June 6, 1980.

2S. Kotrady. ““Brookhaven Medical %-gram. ”

26. United Nations. ““Tmsleesfr@-e-rnent for the Trust Temtory of the Pacific is-lands (New York: U.N. Trusteeship Council.1947).

December 1980

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..

The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 29

.

.

The United States conducted 66 atmospheric nuclear weaponstests in the Marshall Islands. Twenty=two years later the authorities continueto disagree on when the islands will be safe for resettlement.

GIFF JOHNSOS

Paradise lostThe U.S. government is now at-tempting to prove at Enewctak what

it couldn’t at Bikini: that it is pos-sible for IMOplC to return safelyto an area devastated by nuclearweapons, Following completion of a

three-year, $100 million nuclearcleanup of Enewetak Atoll in theMarshall Islands—site of 43 nucleartests-the United States says it is safefor the people who were moved out toreturn to certain islands. But whilethe cleanup has been hailed in somequarters as a “remarkable success, ”controversy is developing overwhether or not people should returnto any part of the atoll.

The Marshal] Islands are pan of aU.N. “strategic’” Trust Territory ofthe Pacific. which has been ad-ministered by the United Statessince World War II. The nuclearweapons testing program ended in1958, after 12 years of 66 atmo-spheric tests.

The Defense Nuclear Agency,coordinator of the cleanup. has saidit would be impossible to lower atollradiation 10 pre-test levels. But [he

cleanup guidelines called for re-sidence islands to be clkaned to alevel of 40 pic~uries of plutonium239/240 per gram of soil, agricultureislands 1080 plcocunes pergtam andfood gathering islands to 160. To ac-complish this, thousands of cubicyards of contaminated soil werescraped off the small islands, mixedwith cement and encased in a mas-sive concrete dome in an atomicbomb ctater at Runit Island.

The basis for the cleanup wasstrongly questioned in 1974 by a re-searcher who had been involved inthe 1950s wea~ns testing progmm

24

at Bikini and Enewetak. EdwardMarten. of the Nationai Center forAtmospheric Research. writing toMicronesia Legal Set+Ces, a U.S.government organization represent-ing the Enewetak people, expressedconcern over the

“highly questionable recom-mendations regarding acceptablelevels of plutonium in the soils andthe very doubtful merits ef pro-ceeding with the resettlement ofEnewetak Atoll on the basis of therecommendations of a Task Groupassembled by the Atomic EnergyCommission and the Depanment ofDefense. . . . The recommendationthat plutonium soils, with levels notexceeding 40 pCi of plutonium 240/24 I per gram of soil averaged over 15cm depth, is suitable for humanhabitation, can be very seriouslyquestioned. . . . The resettlement ofsuch sites is extremely likely to havetragic consequences. particularly forthe younger members of the in-habitants. Progressively worse con-sequences are to be expected foreach successive genemtion in thetiected population group. ‘“’

Martell”s questions and recom-mendations were ignored and thecleanup itself was plagued by shoddysafety standards.

The Defense Nuclear Agencymaintained that ‘“the most importantconsidemtion in the cleanup opera-tions was the radiological safety ofthe individuals involved in the oper-ations. ”~ But Agency policies havebeen inconsistent. and informationsupplied by soldiers involved in thecleanup and by independent report-

ers do not substantiate its clzums.One of many reports from

Enewetak was publicized In an ex-clusive television interview, inwhich a mechanic staied that he andothers had worked without protect-ive gear underneath dozens of trucksreturning from the plutonium–contaminated islands. He said “thetires and underside of the vehicleswere usually covered with dust anddirt,” but the workers were given norespirators for protection.’ n

Press visitom to Enewemk in April1980 noticed similar flaws in DefenseNuclear Agency safety standards.“Standing on any part of Runit Is-land,” said a reporter, “you mustwear rubber boots and a paper re-spirator to prevent breathingplutonium particles. But standing onthe concrete dome (a mere 15 feetaway) you are not required to wearany protective clothing at all. ““’

Runit Island will be quimmtined tothe Marshallese forever, because ofhigh concentrations of plutonium inthe soil. More than 100,000 cubicyards of radioactive soil and debrishave been encased in a massive ce-ment dome on Runit, to isolate thesehazardous materials from the envi-ronment for thousands of years.

Nevertheless. islands within threemiles of Runit have been designatedas safe for “picnics and foodgathering. ” This prompted a Mar-shallese observer to comment:“What will happen if birds, cmbs.turtles and other animals that land onthe off limits island arc eaten by thepeople?’”

Despite this atmosphere of in-consistent safety measures. many ofthe 450 E“newetak people have

already moved back to the southernislands. which the Agency calls“relatively uncontaminated. ”Meanwhile. the Depanment of En-ergy says the atoll’s northernisland+ where the majority of the43 nuclear tests occurred-should beoff limlis for at least 30 years. sincetadiation levels are still high there.

Because of the Depanment ruling,millions of dollars have &en spenton buiidmg houses and communityfacilities and on replantingthousands of coconut trees in thesouthern islands: but no funds havebeen used to rehabilitate the north-ern islands. This has caused prob-lems among the Enewetak people as,traditionally. they are divided intotwo distinct groups: the Dri-Enjebi in

the nonhero and Dri-Enen’eraA inthe south. Accustomed to their ownchiefs and land. the Dri-Enjebi arereluctant to live on artother chiefsland.

In September 1979, the mdiologi-cal information about Enewetak waspresented by the Depanment of En-ergy to the people. Michael Benderand Bertrand Brill, two scientistshired by Micronesia I&al Servicesthen testified that their study showedall the islands to be safe for habita-tion. including nonhero Enjebi Is-land. The chances of adverse effectswere so smal, they had concluded,that “cancer mon,ality in the lifetimeof the population is estimated to beless than a single case. ”5 They as-serted that the Department of En-e~ overstated the risk: “OOE tendsto exaggerate tie problem,” said Mic-ronesmrt Lqal Wmice Director TedMitchell.e

The Enewetak people have an in-tense desire to return home, after 33years on tiny Ujelang Atoll. And onthe basis of this information, theEnjebi people voted to return to theirisland in the notlh. But the objectiv-ity of the study conducted by Benderand Brill, whose base is thegovernment-funded BrookhavenNational Laboratory, has beenquestioned. Dr. Rosalie Benell. aconsultant to the Division of Stan-dard Setting for the Nuclear Regu-latory Commission, said of thestudy:

“The population of Enewetak hasthe right to know that a value judg-ment has been made for them,namely that induction of cancer istheir only concern. They may, if in-formed about hypothyroidism. ap-Iastic anemia, premature aging, be-nign tumors and other such dis-orders, make a different judgment.. . .

They ‘reduced’ the radiation doseof the inhabitants of Enjebi by av-eraging in t!!e population less ex-posed. This is like telling onemember of a family his or her risk oflung cancer is lowered if the othernonsmoking members of the familyare included and art “average’ riskgiven. It is a scientifically ridiculousapproach to public health.

Basing a resettlement decision af-fecting the lives of !$00people on theBender and Brill inadequate healthassessment would be extremely im-pudent.’”

Glen Alcalay, a former PeaceCorps Volunteer in the MarshalIs.said the problem is “the inherentconflict of interest in having

December 1980

Brookhaven researchers assess U.S.government data. . . . The history ofthe U.S. testing progmm was one ofrepeated mistakes and mis-calculations.”” In his view’, “’non-government radiation experts”.

should be included in all such sur-veys.8

A May 1979 General AccountingOffice report cautioned that “be-cause of uncertainty of the long termeffects of exposure to low level radi-ation. it is possible that the people ofEnewetak could receive doses in ex-cess of current standards.”” It alsourged an independent assessment ofEnewetak by ‘“experts who have nodirect connections with the nucleartesting program or the Enewetakcleanup project . . . before resettle-ment of the people begins. ”‘q Thisreport was initially withheld from theMarshall Islands government forpolitical reasons.

Since deporting an independentteam of Japanese scientists invitedby Marshall Islands leaders to in-vestigate the mdiation problems in1971, the United States has stead-fastly refused to allow independentmonitoring of the Marsh allesepeople and their environment.

President Lyndon Johnson an-nounced in I%8 that Bikin+site of23 bomb tests-would be returned toits people. who had been living inexile since 1946.

In 1%9, the Atomic Energy Com-mission said: “’[there is] virtually noradiation left on Bikini’” and ““theexposures to radiation of the Bikinipeople do not offer a significantthreat to their health and safel} .’”’0A small-scale cleanup and re-habilitation progmrn was begun and

The Bulletin of the A[omic Scientists 25

l!-.-..-,~

(I?,.?~

9

>. .

<.

Giff Johnson, a free-lance writer who has traveled extensivelythroughout the PacI!ic, edits the Micromwa BuIielmpublished in Honolulu, Hawaii 96826.

by the early 1970s a few &ople hadbegun moving back.

Many Bikinians tell of Atomic En-ergy Commission scientists takingthem to Bikini to demonstrate itssafety. When the Biklnians refusedto eat any local foods. fearing radia-tion exposure. the scientists wouldconsume conconuts. fish and otherfoods In front of the islanders toconvince them.’ 1 In 1972, however,the Bikinians expressed doubtsabout the safety of their atoll andvoted not to return home, But the

government was committed to theresettlement and offered Marshal-lese government employees freefood and housing if they would moveto Bih:ni.

Durtng an Atomic Energy Com-mission sun’ey of the more than 100people living on the atoll in 1975, the“presence of low levels ofplutonium’” in their urine was dis-covered. The Commission, and laterthe Department of Energy, did notconsider this “radiologicallysignificant. ” 12By 1977, tests showedan 1l-fold increase in the people’sbody burdens ofcesium-137. Ratherthan remove the population from ahazardous environment, however.the Department of Energy suggested

that the Trust Territo~ government

institute a complete feedtng pro-gram. to reduce consumption oflocal foods. and thus exposure.

The Department seemed reluctantto give up what one- LawrenceLivermore Laboratory study called‘“~ssibly the best available sourceof data for evaluating the tmnsfer ofplutonium across the gut wall afterbeing incorporated into biologicalSyStems. ”’lj The situation de-tenomed fuflher and by May 1978,a high percentage of the Marshallesebody levels were above themaximum permissible dose allowedin the United States, The Bikinianswere evacuated again.

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26

By May 1978, a high percentage of the Marshallesebody levels were above the maximum permissible dose

t . and the Blkinians were evacuated again.—

(left) Peq+k waJkJoc00 themocmte doroe ccwcdog u atomic bombenter oa RnaIt blood, E~Btoit. (below) Nocku * ●? 09

Rmlt tslomd. (left) U.S. Army

petwooel h Ml projective gar.(R@) Army Pen4mod rnixhepiotoohmetorlhoted sod With Cemeotto form lbe -Ye coocretedome.

Robert Conard of BrookhavenNational Laboratory—which hascoordinated the Marshall islandsmedical program since 1954-estimated the health risks of the ex-posure:

‘“Assuming that they [1:3 people]had all been there since 1970 and re-ceived the ave~e estimated inte-grated total dose of 2.6 reins for theperiod, based on known radiation-induced risk data, one would expectonly about 0.005 total c=es ofleukemia to develop in that popula-tion as a result of their tadiation ex-posure.

The need for further medicalexaminations is not indicated basedon possible radiation effects as-sociated with such low doses.’’”

But Dr. Konrad Kotmdy, a formerBrookhaven resident physician inthe MarshalIs, strongly disagreedwith this philosophy:

“The people fail to understandhow scientists can say they do not

know all the possible late effects theradiation can cause . . . and then tellthe ~ople a medical program is un-necessary.

If in 40 or 50 years medical prob-lems do occur as a result of the ex-posure, it would be better if a welldesigned medical progmm wasalready in progress to detect theproblems.”’s

tinard and representatives of otherU.S. government agencies. inapologizing for the complicationswhich occurred, frequently say thatradiation measurement techniquesthen were not as sophisticated asthose available today; that the sur-veys of Bikini were far less extensivethan those subsequently carried outat Enewetak atoll. ‘b The facts. how-ever. suggest otherwise.

In 1972-!973, the United Statesconducted an “exhaustive radiologi-cal survey of Enewetak,’” which in-cluded both ground and aerial sur-veys of the islands. according to the~partment of Energy. It w= notdone at Bikini. however. In fact, itwasn’t until the Bikinians filed a fed-eral law suit in 1975, asking for a Ithorough radiological survey of Bi-kini and the nonhero Marshall Is-lands, that the government agreed todo it. But because of three years ofbureaucratic infighting among theDepartments of Energy. State andInterior, the radiological survey wasnot conducted until a~rer the evacu-

ation of Bikini in late 1978.The United States did have

sophisticated techniques formeasuring tadiation at the outset ofthe Bikini resettlement: it chose toemploy them only at Enewetak.

U.S. policies with respect to pro-tecting the health of the Marshallesehave been totally inconsistent. Forexample, in 1946. prior to the firstnuclear test series. Operation Cross-roads. the people from islands withina radius of 300 miles of Bikini—including the Rongelap—wereevacuated as a safety precaution.’7The yield of these bombs was ap-proximately 20 kilotons. But in 1954,there was no official warning of theBtavo test, much less an evacuationof the populations. Yet BIZIVOwasthe largest U.S. hydrogen bombtested—more than 15 megatons.More than 200 Marshallese on

December 1980 The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 27

.— ———

The fact that in the Marshall Islands thyroid canceris more prevalent in ~eople exposed to iower than to higher levelsof radiation is not Wideiy known In the United States.

nearby Rongelap and U(ink atolls,were severely contaminated withash-like fallout.

For many years people have de-bated whether or nol the Marshal-lese were deliberately exposed. Theofficial position is that upper levelwinds changed suddenly after theblast. depositing fallout on the in-habited islands. Admiral LewisStrauss of the Atomic Energy Com-mission. at a press conference on hisreturn from Bikini in 1954, said ofBmvo “. . . at no time was the test-ing out of control.’” He added. ‘.Notest is made without a definite pur-pose and a careful determination thatis directed to an end result of majorimponance. . . . ‘“t

Nevertheless. within hours oftheir exposure (at Rongelap, 175reins. and at Utirik. 14 reins) thepeople began to suffer from nauseaand sekere itching of the skin: skinbums and loss of hair occurred in thefollowing weeks. Since then. 19 outof 22 children exposed on Rongelaphave had surgery for removal of.thyroid nodules. In 1972 a youth.barely a year old at the time of hisexposure in 1954. died of myelogen-ous leukemia. A 1977 report byBrookhaven states: “Recently aboutSO%of the exposed Rongelap peopleshowed hypothyroidism withoutclinical evidence of thyroid disease,a finding that probably portendstrouble ahead .’’l$’

‘“For twenty two years. the people

[of Utirik] have heard Dr. Conardand other doctors tell them not towow. that the dose of radiation re-ceived at the island was too low tocause any harmful effects.

However. it has become apparentthat the theory was wrong. . . .There ts as much thyroid cancer atUtirik as at Rongelap. ”2°

A 1976 Brookhaven annual reportconfirmed the finding that thyroid

cancer is actually more prevalent inthe people who received low levelexposure than in the high levelgroup. ~’

A questionable decision by theAtomic Energy Commission allowedthe Utirik people to return to theiratoll within six months of the Btavotest in 1954 and the Rongelap peopleafter three years. Little radiologicalcieanup was done on either atoll, butboth were declared safe despite‘slight lingering tadiation.’o Z2

Some 20 years later. the Depart-ment of Energy has decided the is-lands were not safe. Shortly after thenorthern Marshalls radiological sur-vey was finished. Departlnent of En-ergy scientists went to Rongelap inearly i979 and told the people thatthe northern isiands in their atoil,which for the past 20 years they haveused for food gathering, were tooradioactive to visit. Moreover, theDepartment of Energy survey showsthat islands in Rongel~nly 125miles from Bikini—have radiationievels at least equal to, and in somecases higher than, an island at Bikini.

Since the 1954 Bravo incident, theUnited States has stated unequivo-cally that only the atolls of Bikini,Enewetak, Rongelap and Utirik werecontaminated during the weaponstests. But in 1978. the Depafiment ofEnergy suddendly reversed itselfand reported: “In addition toEnewetak. Bikini and RongeiapAtolls, there are eleven other atoilsor single islands that received inter-mediate range fallout from one ormore of the megaton range tests..’~’

One of these atolls in the northernMarshaiis is Likiep. According to acareful report in the Micronesia ln-dependen(, June 6, 1980:

“Out of 406 people who live inLikiep. there are documented re-ports that list nine women who havegiven birth to babies with severementai retardation. one woman who

had three ‘strange’ stiU born babies.one ‘completely unrecognizable ashuman.’ Also reported among

women on Likiep were ten otherbabies that were not normal, a quitehigh ~rcentage of the popula-tion. ””z.

No medical program exists for thepeople from these islands, but theiist of miscarriages, deformedbabies. cancers, thyroid noduies andenvironmental problems from sup-posedly unexposed atolls is steadilygrowing. Because Brookhaven doesnot examine people from these otherislands, the government has beenable to deny that any health prob-lems exist on the grounds that thereare no data.

Even on Utirik and Rongeiap,Brookhaven has taken an extremeiynarrow view of the probiems. ac-cording to Kotrady. In his 1977 cri-tique he said:

●*The original purpose of the pro-gram was to be as broad as possibleto discover all possibie effects. . . .over the years. however, data fromvarious sources and opinions of ex-perts have assessed what long term

effects should be found in thepeople. Thus the program seems toopemte in a mode of looking forthose effects predicted by experts.. . . It tends to focus on specificareas, such as the thyroid and biood.where the scientists expect effects tooccur. ”’~s

Much of the information con-cerning low level radiation in theMarshalls is reievant to the UnitedStates, in view of the uncertaintysurrounding Three Mile Island, mil-itary personnel exposed to nucleartests. and so fonh, The fact that Inthe Marshalls thyroid cancer is moreprevalent in people exposed to iowerthan to higher levels of radiation isnot widely known in the United

28

. . .. .

It is an irony of history that the U.N. Trust Agreement bindsthe United States both to ‘protect the heaith of the inhabitants’ and ‘protect

Ithe inhabitants against the loss of their land or resources.’

States. Similarly, exposure through

concentration of radiation in thefood chain is not well understood,yet this appears to have been a majorcontributor to the alarming t-me ofproblems at Rongelap. Utirik andother islands. At Bikini it was thereason for evacuating the people in1978. and who can guarantee the fu-ture of ihe Enewetak people?

Moreover, in October 1980 theDepartment of Energy stated that it isnow safe for the Bikinians to returnto a certain island in Bikini Atoll. Itwas claimed that the people will notreceive doses above the federal radia-tion standards if they import 50 per-cent of their food and spend no morethan 10 percent of their time on

G Bikini Island, approximately six milesaway.

It is an irony of history that theUnited Nations Trust Agreement

, binds the United States both to“’protect the health of the in-habitants’” and ‘“protect the in-

habitants against the loss of theirland or resources. ””zb

With medical examinations andenvironmental surveys by doctorsand scientists independent of theU.S. government. combined with athorough education program onradiation, at least the diagnosis andtreatment of the Marshallese willimproke. But unless the independentscientific community-in the UnitedStates becomes more involved in thehealth problems on these islands. itis likely that the inhabitants willseine primarily as a source for U.S.

4 government research into the effectsof radiation on human populations. O

1. Edward Mafiell to Theodore Mitchello (Mlcroneslan Legal Service Corpora:jon)

Dec. 9. 19742. Dcfcnsc Nuclear Agency. ‘“Fact

Sheet—Encwetak Opera!lon” (Washington.D. C.: DNA. April 1980).

3. KIioh TV-2, mterwtcw with PSUi Udcll,Honolulu. March 1980

4. Floyd Takeuchi. Pacific and Asian Af-fairs %mmar. Honolulu. June IL?,1980.

s. ‘“Enewctak Islanders Plan Return. ”Honolulu Star Butlctm. Sept. 26, 1979.

6. ““problems Unresolved on EnewetakAtoll .“” Honolulu SW Bullelin. March 26.1980.

7. Rosalie Bertell to U.S. CongressmanSldncy Yates. June 6, 1980.

8. Glenn H. Alcalay to Congressman Sid-ney Yates. June 24, 1980

9. Gencrd Accounting Oflice. ‘”EncwemkAtoli--Chrrmg Up Nuckar Contaminauon,”’PSAD 79-54 (!day 8. 1979).

10. Atomic Energy Commission. ‘“Reportof Ad Hoc Committee to E~aluate theR.dIOIOSSCd H-ds of tte~ttlerncnt of Bi-km Atoll” (1%9).

11. Ralph WaJU to Giff Johnson, Majuro.ManhaJl Islands, June 1979.

12. Roben A. cod. “Ttsc kldCSIO@Cd

.WSIUS of the Blkmi Peopk: A Summary Re-fmn” ( Upton. N. Y.: Brookhaven NatIonaJbbo17NOry, Sept.20. 19781.

13. Lawrence Llvermore Laboratory,“DOW Assessment at Bikini Atoll.’” UCRL-51879 (June 8. 1977t pt. 5 ‘“Bikm/ IslandersWant 10 Stay There.’” Washmgson Post. April3, 1980.

14. Coned. ““tladmlogicst Status.””15. Konrad P. Komcty, ‘The Brookhavcn

Medical Progmm to Detect Radianon Effectsin MarshalJese Peopic. A Comparison of thePeople’s vs. the Progtam’s Attitudes” (Jan. 1,1977), unpublished but available from Mic-ronesia Support Commntee. 1212 UniversityAve.. Honolulu. HI 96826,

16. Conard. ““Radiological Status. “’17. John AnJ~n. Magistrate of Rongelap

Atoll 195@65 to Giff Johnson, Ebcyc. Mar-shall Islands. July 1979.

18. Lewis Strauss. taped press conference.[954 (Washington. D.C.: NatsorraJ Archives.t954).

19. Roben A. Conard and others. ‘“Sum-mary of Thvroid Flndmgs In Marshatlese 22Years after Exposure to Radioactive Fall-out.”’ No. 21924 (Upton. N.Y. BrookhavenNationaJ Laboratow. 1976).

20. Kotrady,”” Brookhaven MedicaJ Pro-gram.””

21. Philadelphia Inquirer, ‘“Who KnowsHow Long They ‘II Tak.c To Show ,“ April 20.1979. - .

22. Conard and others. ‘“A Twemy Ye$rReview of MedlcaJ Findings in a MarshallcsePopulation AcctdentaJly E;posed to Radioac-tive FalJout” (Upton. NY.: Brookhsven Na-tional Laboratov. 19751.

23. U.S. Dcpartmen! of Energy. “Notth-em Marshefl Islands Aesxd Radtion sumey.September to November 1978.”’

X Microneslan Independent. “The 25.@30Year QuestIon.” June 6.1980.

2S. Kotmdy. ““Brookhaven MedA Pro-gsam ‘“

26. United Nations. ‘“Tnsstee*ip A$Tw-mcm for the Trust Tem(oW of the PacIfrc ls-Iands (New York: U.N. Trusteeship Council.1947).

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December 1980 The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 29