Parenting, Employment and Gender Roles in Russia and Sweden

Akvile Motiejunaite, Zhanna Kravchenko

Baltic and East European Graduate SchoolSouth Stockholm University College

SE-14189 Huddinge, Sweden

akvile.motiejunaite@sh.sezhanna.kravchenko@sh.se

Gender effects of family policyWomen’s decision to participate/or not on the labour

market is shaped by

a) institutional framework of social policy,

b) social norms on redistribution of work/care duties.

Research questionWhat are the patterns of relations between

a) family policy arrangements

b) normative gender relations

c) actual family practices?

Sweden and Russia

Similarities• Wide participation of women in the labour market

Female % of the labour force (2004, The World Bank data)Russian Federation 49%Sweden 47%

• Explicit family policy aimed at conciliation of waged work and care duties

and Differences• Sustainable democratic development in Sweden• Drastic transformation of social, political, economic order in Russia during the 1990s

Questions

• Do similarities in the approach and the instruments of family policy result in similar socio-economic practices of families?

• How does the change in vector of economic and political system influence the transformation of gender-role attitudes?

Gender contract

is a “compromise made about the gender division of labour, at work, and by implication, at home” (Gottfried 2000: 253)

•‘official’ contract

•‘everyday’ contract

•‘ideal’ contract

Gender contracts in the ’worlds of welfare’How the principles of structuring and design of policies allow both women and men access to public benefits and services?

• The strong male-breadwinner model

• The male-breadwinner /female carer model

• The modified male-breadwinner model

• The dual-earner/female part-time carer model

• The weak male-breadwinner model

(Lewis, 1992)

•The dual-earner/state carer model•The dual earner-mercerised carer model•The dual earner/dual carer model

(Crompton, 1999)

Data

• documents and statistical indicators related to the public authority’s policy as regards creation of conditions for women engaging in wage labour (and less thoroughly, for encouraging men to participate in care) ‘official’ contract

• survey data, obtained from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) on Family and Changing Gender Roles, modules II and III (for the years 1994 and 2002) ‘ideal’ and ‘everyday’ contracts

The ’Official’ Contract

• The weak male-breadwinner model • The state-carer model?• Woman – a worker and a carer• Transformation of the ‘official contract’ during

1994-2002

- Sweden: no drastic changes in the model - Russia: towards the modified male-breadwinner

model

The ’Ideal’ Contract

Factor analysis:Scale ‘Traditional Male Breadwinner Model’ (TMBM)

1. All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job.

2. A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works.

3. A man’s job is to earn money; a woman’s job is to look after the home and family.

4. A job is all right, but what most women really want is a home and children.

5. Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay.

Russia –4.39

Sweden 1.76

–2.36 Russia

2.67 Sweden 20021994

Conservatism (Strong TMBM) -10

Liberalism (Weak TMBM)

+10

Determinants of support for TMBM (standard errors within parentheses)

Notes: *=significant at 0.05 level, **=significant at 0.01 level.

1994 2002

Russia +Sweden Russia Sweden Russia +Sweden Russia Sweden

Russia -6.93 (0.16)** -5.18 (0.20)**

Sex 0.40 (0.15)** 0.04 (0.18) 0.69 (0.23)** 0.70 (0.16)** 0.27 (0.19) 1.13 (0.26)**

Age -0.01 (0.00)** -0.01 (0.01) -0.03 (0.01)** -0.02 (0.01)** -0.01 (0.01)* -0.05 (0.01)**

Married -0.29 (0.15) -0.13 (0.19) -0.42 (0.25) -0.54 (0.16)** -0.40 (0.19)* -0.22 (0.28)

Religious -0.69 (0.17)** -0.10 (0.20) -1.60 (0.30)** -0.81 (0.18)** -0.54 (0.22)** -1.21 (0.32)**

Mother working 1.50 (0.18)** 1.18 (0.28)** 1.22 (0.26)** 1.11 (0.21)** 0.56 (0.30) 0.83 (0.30)**

Education 5 groups 0.36 (0.05)** 0.08 (0.07) 0.71 (0.08)** 0.47 (0.06)** 0.13 (0.09) 0.83 (0.09)**

(Constant) 0.86 (0.34)** -5.36 (0.50) 0.93 (0.55) 1.61 (0.40)** -2.33 (0.58)** 1.86 (0.66)**

Adjusted R Square 0.458 0.011 0.161 0.348 0.014 0.231

Model fit (F; df) 306.21; 7** 3.76; 6** 35.64; 6** 178.91; 7** 4.63; 6** 42.81; 6**

Std. Error of the Estimate 3.47 3.15 3.76 3.69 3.58 3.73

N 2533 1442 1091 2339 1504 835

The ’Ideal’ vs. the ‘Everyday’ Contract

‘Ideal’: ‘Do you think that women should work outside the home full-time, part-time or not at all under these circumstances?’

‘Everyday’: ‘Did you work outside the home full-time, part-time, or not at all...?’ OR ‘What about your spouse/partner at that time - did he or she work outside the home full-time, part-time, or not at all...?’

1. After marrying and before there are children.

2. When there is a child under school age.

3. After the youngest child starts school.

4. After the children leave home.

Pearson Correlation Coefficients between the ‘ideal’ and ‘everyday’ contract

Notes: *=significant at 0.05 level, **=significant at 0.01 level.Pair-wise deletion of missing values, N varies.

1994 2002

Russia Sweden Russia Sweden

After marrying and before there are children. .127** .136** .167** .136**

When there is a child under school age. .076** .403** .148** .359**

After the youngest child starts school. .124** .357** .094** .318**

After the children leave home. .051 .288** .091* .254**

Conclusions

• ‘Official’ contract: the ‘dual-earner/state carer’ family model, but Sweden - emphasis on dual-caring and flexible work arrangements for women.

• ‘Ideal’ contract: • Sweden: strong support for liberal family roles

increased, closer to ‘official’• Russia: uniform agreement to TMBM decreased,

contradicts to ‘official’

• ‘Everyday’ contract: more consistent with ‘ideal’ and ‘official’ in Sweden, huge discrepancies in Russia no choice