part iv fall combat, north and south

PART IV

FALL COMBAT, NORTH AND SOUTH

CHAPTER 9

Continuing Operations Against the 2d NVA DivisionRaids and Rockets in Quang Nam — Operation Cochis e

Operation Swift—A Busy Calm Before the Storm

Raids and Rockets in Quang Na m

During June allied units intensified operationsagainst elements of the 2d NVA Division and VietCong units in the southern three provinces of ICorps . The enemy continued to pump replacementsinto the region in a determined effort to regain con-trol of the area, particularly the Que Son Basin . Theallied forces, in greater numbers and with increasedfirepower, thwarted each Communist move as i tdeveloped . As a result of continuing enemy defeats ,the pacification program began to show positiveresults as demonstrated by its expansion into virgi nterritory .

As July began, the 1st and 7th Marines, both fro mthe 1st Marine Division, which Major General Don nJ . Robertson still commanded, were operating in thedensely populated area around Da Nang . Two bat-talions of the 5th Marines continued operations

against elements of the 2d NVA Division in the Qu eSon Basin, while the other battalion of the 5thMarines, the 2d, provided security for the An Ho aindustrial complex and Nong Son coal mine ,southwest of Da Nang .

Further south, the nine U .S . Army battalions o fTask Force Oregon, now commanded by Majo rGeneral Richard T. Knowles, USA, continued theiroperations in southern I CTZ. Four of the Army bat-talions operated in and around Chu Lai, while th eremainder of the force expanded allied control ove rthe populated coastal plain of Quang Ngai Province .The Korean Marine Brigade of three battalions re-mained in its TAOR south of Chu Lai .

The combined efforts of these units forced NV Aand VC main force units to pull out of the populate dregions and move back into the mountains . Despitethis setback, the enemy tenaciously maintained a

Two battalions of the 5th Marines, the 1st and 3d, remained in the Que Son Basin afte rthe arrival at Chu Lai of Army units of Task Force Oregon . Marines of the 3d Battalio nmaneuver under fire on 21 July while in contact with units of the 2d NVA Division .

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A37021 6

107

108

FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

presence in the three provinces by cutting lines o fcommunication and attacking allied installations b yfire . The Communists targeted Revolutionar yDevelopment teams and isolated units for their mai n

efforts . These tactics enabled the enemy to limi tforce commitments and still gain moral andpropaganda victories while, at the same time ,reconstituting regular units . Communist actions inQuang Nam Province during July 1967 provide a n

excellent example of this modus operandi.The Communists chose the relatively isolate d

Marine outpost at Nong Son, the site of the onl y

producing coal mine in South Vietnam, as their firsttarget . First Lieutenant James B . Scuras' Company F ,5th Marines provided security for the mine . Thecompany manned two positions near the mine itselfand a third, with an attached 81mm mortar sectio nand two 4 .2-inch mortars, on top of the hil l

overlooking the mine . The enemy chose the mortarposition as his objective .

At 2327 on 3 July, a Marine listening post outsidethe upper position reported, "I have movement tomy front," and within seconds, "They're all aroun dme, " and then, "We've been overrun ."' Next, themain position came under mortar attack . One of th efirst rounds blew up the 4 .2-inch mortar ammuni-tion dump . Immediately following their mortar bar-rage, enemy sappers moved into the position, throw-ing grenades and satchel charges into the Marinebunkers . Simultaneously, other enemy units made amortar attack on the Marine artillery positions at AnHoa to neutralize their support of the Nong Son out -post . The Marines of Captain John Pipta ' s Battery E ,2d Battalion, 11th Marines, however, immediatel ybegan firing in support of the Company F Marines .

By the time Pipta's first artillery barrage lande daround the edge of the position, the enemy assaul thad already faltered . The attackers had not caughtall of the Marines in their bunkers . Private First ClassMelvin E . Newlin, an 18-year-old machine gunne rfrom Wellsville, Ohio, and four other Marines hadbeen manning a perimeter position when the attac kstarted . Although the initial attack killed his fourcampanions and wounded him, Newlin kept hi smachine gun in action . He fought off two additionalattempts to overrun his position before a grenadewounded him again and knocked him unconscious .

With Newlin temporarily silenced, the Viet Congmoved into the center of the outpost and destroyedboth 4 .2-inch mortars . As the enemy prepared to at-tack the Marines on the other side of the perimeter,

Newlin regained conciousness, remanned hi s

machine gun, and opened fire . His fire caused th eVC to break off their assault of the remaining Marin e

bunkers and once again they attacked him . Newlinwithstood two additional enemy attempts to silenc e

his gun before he died . *

When the attack started, Lieutenant Scuras too ktwo squads and moved to relieve the 1st Platoon in

the upper outpost . Arriving at the top of the hill a tabout midnight, the reinforcements, with th eassistance of the surviving defenders, drove theenemy out of the position . As the VC withdrew fromthe hill, the Marines remanned their 81mm mortar sand brought them to bear on the retreating force . Inaddition, they called in artillery on suspected escap eroutes .

At approximately 0100, the battalion' s Compan yE arrived at Nong Son and assumed responsibility fo r

the two lower positions . The remaining elements ofCompany F then moved to the top of the hill toreconsolidate their position and evacuate th e

casualties . The attack had killed 13 Marines and

wounded 43 .For the Viet Cong, the attack on the position was

expensive . They did not overrun the entire outpos tas they hoped, and the loss of 44 of their member smade the effort very costly, but they succeeded indestroying the two heavy mortars in the position . 2

The Communists executed two other attacks to in-fluence the people in Quang Nam Province . Both

mutually supporting actions took place on the nigh tof 14 July . The first attack occurred in the town ofHoi An at 2300 when an enemy force hit the U .S .advisors ' compound with mortar fire . At the sametime, two platoons of VC, dressed in ARVNuniforms, attacked the nearby provincial jail . Theenemy force broke into the jail and released 1,19 6military and political prisoners . During the confuse dfighting that followed, the ARVN recaptured 20 6prisoners and killed 30, but 960 escaped . Only 5 ofthe Viet Cong died in the attack; ARVN unit swounded another 29 . The return of almost 1,00 0cadre to the VC ranks increased their capacity to op -pose the September elections, but the psychologica lblow caused by the untimely "liberation" had a n

equally severe impact .The Communists chose their other target equall y

well : the Da Nang Airbase, center of America n

*For his actions Private First Class Newlin received aposthumous Medal of Honor . (See Appendix D for his citation .)

CONTINUING OPERATIONS AGAINST THE 2D NVA DIVISION

109

presence in the northern provinces . The home ofVietnamese Air Force (VNAF), Marine, and U .S . AirForce tactical squadrons, the Da Nang Airbase stoodas an undisputed symbol of U .S . and GVN strength .The Communists were aware that an attack on DaNang would be more difficult than their earlier at -tempts to strike the base . Since the first rocket attac kon the base in February, the Marines had intensifiedtheir defensive efforts, instituting as many as 80 0daily patrols and ambushes . Allied aircraft con-ducted overflights of the rocket belt itself to detec tany movement in the area, and artillery fired mor ethan 2,000 rounds every 24 hours to interdict likel yavenues of approach to the rocket belt .

Despite these impressive Marine countermeasures ,the Communists were confident they could attackthe base successfully . The reason was their new122mm rocket, a weapon which they had not use dsouth of the DMZ. This rocket was a high trajectoryweapon, capable of being emplaced virtuall yanywhere . A trained crew could prepare a 122mmrocket for firing in less than 30 minutes . Its range of12,000 meters, 2,000 meters greater than that of th e140mm rocket, allowed emplacement beyond wha tthe Marines had established as the rocket belt .

During the night of 14 July, enemy rocket unit smoved out of "Happy Valley," southwest of DaNang, and established six firing positions, divide dinto two clusters of three positions each . Each firingposition contained six individual launcher sites .Shortly after midnight the enemy fired their rocketsat the airfield; within five minutes 50 projectiles hi t

the base .

Marines responded swiftly to the first volley .Almost instantly, a number of friendly unit sreported the firing and three minutes after theenemy launched the rockets an Air Force plane at -tacked one of the sites . At the same time, artilleryunits plotted the launch site locations and commenc-ed firing at both the sites and the probable escaperoutes . This rapid reply by supporting arms was ex-emplary, but it was only a countermeasure and not asolution to the problem of defending the Da Nan gcomplex against the new, long-range threat . In theattack, the rockets destroyed 10 aircraft, 13 barracks ,and a bomb dump, and damaged 40 more aircraft .Eight Americans died and another 176 suffered

wounds .

The Communists had not only succeeded i ndestroying a large quantity of material, but theresulting fires provided visible evidence of a suc-

cessful attack to the 300,000 people living aroundDa Nang. That the VC carried out the attack suc-cessfully, while the Marines and ARVN forces ha dbeen actively trying to prevent it, vastly increased itspropaganda value .

The 14 July attack forced immediate adjustmentsof III MAF ' s defense of the airfield . III MAF extend-ed the rocket belt to include the space between tw oradii of 12,000 and 8,000 meters, the maximumranges from which the VC could launch both140mm and 122mm rockets . The new belt also in-cluded the most likely areas of penetration by enem ylaunching units . The Marines established a central-ized control system for all aspects of the counter -rocket effort and increased their patrols an doverflights . They also instituted a waterway contro lplan which included an 1800-0600 movemen tcurfew on all streams within the belt . Deep recon-naissance patrols along the enemy's approach route soutside the belt increased by 40 percent . In addi-tion, the 1st Marine Division developed an elaborat epsychological operations (PsyOps) campaign t ocounter the threat, including the offer of 10,000 -

piastre rewards for information on rockets, locatio n

of caches, and routes used to bring rockets into th eDa Nang area . On a day-to-day basis, the divisionallocated more than 90 percent of its PsyOps assets t othis program . 3

For the Marines operating in the rocket belt thewar was particularly frustrating . Each patrol con-tended with the probability of encountering mine sand booby traps . So called secure areas were neve rentirely free from these threats . Over 50 percent o fthe division's casualties during the first half of 196 7resulted from explosive devices encountered whil epatrolling in these dangerous though densel ypopulated areas . There was no easy solution, and inspite of the Marines' efforts rocket attacks continued .

Operation Cochise

While the Communist rocket gunners were an-noying the Da Nang TAOR, intelligence agenciesreported that the 3d NVA Regiment had moved intonorthern Quang Tin Province during late July . In-telligence also indicated the headquarters of the 1s t

VC Regimentalso had moved from Quang Ngai Pro-vince to a new location east of Hiep Duc in the Qu eSon Basin . Reacting to these reports, on 9 Augus tGeneral Robertson reactivated Task Force X-Ray ,again under the command of his assistant division

110

FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

commander, Brigadier General Foster C . LaHue .General LaHue received orders to strike the enem ywherever possible within the Que Son Basin and sur-rounding hills, with emphasis on the Hiep Duc areawhich intelligence officers believed contained the 2dNVA Division 's headquarters and logistic base . Forthis operation, code named Cochise, Genera lLaHue's Task Force X-Ray controlled the 1st and 3 dBattalions of Colonel Stanley Davis' 5th Marines an dLieutenant Colonel Alfred I . Thomas' BLT 1/3 fromSLF Alpha .

General LaHue's concept of operations for Cochiseconsisted of three phases . The first phase involvedthe insertion of the two 5th Marines battalions southof Nui Loc Son outpost between the tacticalelements of the 2d NVA Division and its suspectedlogistic base . The two battalions were to drive eas ttoward friendly blocking positions and eliminateCommunist tactical forces in the vicinity of th elogistic installations . Phase II called for a helilift o ftwo battalions into the suspected enemy base area ,and the third phase a two-battalion sweep from th eHiep Duc region northeast to Que Son .

South of the Cochise area of operation the 2dARVN Division was about to conduct companio noperation Lien Ket 112 ; its concept resembledCochise . Two ranger battalions were to be heliliftedinto landing zones southeast of Hiep Duc and sweepeastward, while three battalions of the 6th ARVNRegiment occupied blocking positions west of TamKy. Both operations began early on the morning of11 August .

_

The ARVN rangers made the first significant con -tact . On the morning of the 12th, three battalions o fthe 21st NVA Regiment attacked the rangers . Heav yfighting continued throughout the day and by 170 0the rangers reported heavy casualties . Dangerousl ylow on ammunition, with darkness approaching ,and with no sign of a letup on the part of the enemy ,the rangers requested an emergency resupply. At1730, a CH-46 from HMM-165, accompanied b ytwo UH-1E gunships from VMO-6 arrived overheadwith the badly needed ammunition . The gunshipsscouted the intended landing zone and reported tha tthe CH-46 could not land in the contested zone. Thepilot, Captain Jack H . McCracken, well aware . ofwhat would happen to the rangers without ammuni-tion decided to try to deliver his cargo anyway . Heordered his crew chief, Corporal James E . Bauer, t ostack the ammunition on the rear ramp. Captain Mc -Cracken nosed over his helicopter and raced for the

landing zone . McCracken then hovered 30 feet overthe zone, and Corporal Bauer lowered the ramp an dmost of the ammunition dropped into the zone .While repeated enemy small arms hits shook thehelicopter, Corporal Bauer kicked out the rest of theammunition . As the last box dropped, enem ybullets severely damaged the helicopter, but Mc-Cracken 's resupply permitted the rangers to continu ethe battle 4 . At 2300, the NVA units finally pulledback, leaving 197 bodies behind . The ranger losse salso had been heavy, 81 killed and 153 wounded .

During the next three days, there were numerousencounters with small VC elements . On the night of16 August, enemy units twice attempted to infiltrat eBLT 1/3's night positions, but turned back in th eface of small arms and artillery fire, leaving 36bodies behind . The next morning, Lieutenant Col-onel Joseph A. Nelson, commanding officer o fVMO-6, in a UH-1E gunship, was escorting resuppl yhelicopters when he sighted more than 50 VC inthe open . The VMO-6 commander expended all o fhis ordnance in the process of fixing the enem ygroup in place . He then directed a fixed-wing mis-sion against the target . Meanwhile, a company o fLieutenant Colonel Charles B . Webster's 3d Bat-talion, 5th Marines moved into assault positionsunder cover of the air strike . After Webster's attack ,


Col Stanley Davis, commanding the 5th Marines ,and the regimental operations officer, Maj Richard J.Alger (right), confer in the field on 16 August wit hLtCol Charles B . Webster of the 3d Battalion, 5thMarines during Cochise in the key Que Son Basin .


11 1

a sweep of the area located 40 VC bodies . TotalMarine casualties totaled only three wounded .

On the afternoon of the 18th, the first phase o fOperation Cochise ended and Task Force X-Ra ywithdrew Webster's battalion . The next morninghelicopters lifted the remaining two battalions int othe Hiep Duc area for Phase II . Though the Marinesanticipated a sizable enemy force in this region ,there was little contact and the operation turned int oa bush-beating effort . The final phase of Cochisebegan on the 25th and continued until 28 August .Enemy contact during the last three days consisted o fsniper fire and booby traps .

Final casualty results for Cochise included 15 6enemy killed and 13 captured . Marine casualtie swere light in comparison, 10 killed and 93 wounded .Vietnamese Operation Lien Kit 112 accounted fo r206 NVA killed, 12 prisoners, and 42 weapons seiz-ed. ARVN losses were more severe than Marin ecasualties during Cochise, 83 killed, 174 wounded ,and 3 missing .

Although these operations forced a major portionof the 2d NVA Division to withdraw, III MAF ha dno illusions of the enemy abandoning the densel ypopulated, rice-bearing lands of the Que Son Basin .Cochise and Lien Ket 112 had been tactical victories ,but the 2d NVA Division had suffered only areverse, not a defeat .

Operation Swift

As September neared, the Communists faced a nincreasing loss of control of the population in th e

coastal region south of Da Nang . The 2d NVA Divi-sion again moved into the Que Son Basin .

The Marines anticipated that the Communist swould try to increase their strength in this area dur-ing this period, since it corresponded with the tim eof the South Vietnamese national elections, as wel las preparations for the fall rice harvest . At the begin-ning of September, intelligence sources reportedthat elements of all three regiments of the NVA divi-sion had moved into the area . There were increasingindications that these enemy units planned offensiveactions to disrupt the elections in Que Son District .The Marines responded with numerous small uni toperations to screen the district polling places .Operation Swift was the outgrowth of one of theelection day screening sweeps near Dong Son (1 )village, eight miles to the southwest of Thang Binhalong Route 534 .


The second phase of Operation Cochise brought lit-tle enemy contact since the elements of the 2d NV ADivision had withdrawn from the Que Son Basin .This Marine moves down a narrow trail throughthick vegetation as Company D, 1st Battalion, 5thMarines searches for the elusive North Vietnamese .

The operation began when the enemy attackedCaptain Robert F . Morgan's Company D, 5thMarines just before dawn on 4 September . The ac-tion unfolded slowly . At 0430, the enemy forc estruck the Marine company with small arms fire an dmortar rounds from positions 100 meters northwes tand west of the company perimeter . The Marine sreturned fire and recalled the company outposts .Help arrived in the form of an armed UH-1E, bu twhen the Marines marked their position with astrobe light, the NVA soldiers saw it too . As soon a sthe light began flashing, the enemy hit the positio nwith even more accurate small arms and mortar fire .

A short time later, Marines discovered enemy in-filtrators inside the western segment of the compan yperimeter. Captain Morgan organized a force todrive the NVA out and by 0620 reestablished th eperimeter . As it reorganized, more NVA automati cweapons hit Company D, killing Captain Morgan .The executive officer, First Lieutenant William P .Vacca, called for air strikes, some within 50 meters of

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the company lines . The enemy pulled back . As th efire let up, Vacca completed the perimeterreorganization and requested helicopter evacuatio nfor his casualties . At the same time, he reported thathe faced at least an enemy company and neededhelp. His battalion commander, Lieutenant Colone lPeter L . Hilgartner, responded by ordering Captai nThomas D. Reese, Jr .'s Company B, then 4,00 0meters to the west and near the battalion CP on Hil l51, to move overland to Vacca's position .

Company B arrived in the vicinity of the battle b y0820, and within the hour it came under fire fromanother enemy force, apparently a company, entren-ched in the town of Dong Son (1) . Captain Rees easked for a tear gas drop on the dug-in NVA, an d"Hueys" from VMO-2 obliged by dropping 40 0pounds of the agent on the enemy lines. The Com-munists broke and ran north toward the Ly Ly River .Company B attacked, killing 26 of the enemy, an dsecured the eastern end of Dong Son (1) . Whil eCompany B fought in the east end of town ,HMM-363 helicopters arrived over the battle area t opick up Company D's casualties . The NVA forc egreeted the aircraft with heavy fire and decoy smokesignals . They hit two UH-34s and shot one downover Company D. They also shot down one ofVMO-2's UH-lEs, piloted by Major David L . Ross ,who managed to land in the Company D perimeter .Ross changed his "Deadlock" radio call sign to"Deadlock on the deck" and continued to help direc tair strikes on the enemy. He also provided ammuni-tion and machine guns from his aircraft to help i nthe defense of the perimeter . ,

At 0925, Lieutenant Colonel Webster's 3d Bat-talion, 5th Marines, based at the regimental com-mand post seven miles east of Que Son, received or-ders to prepare two companies for a helilift to th eDong Son area for attachment to Hilgartner's bat-talion . By 1245 both of the 3d Battalion companies ,K and M, and Hilgartner's 1st Battalion commandgroup had landed four kilometers east-northeast ofDong Son (1) and were preparing to move towar dCompanies B and D . Meanwhile, Company B foun danother enemy pocket in the west end of Dong So n(1) . After an air strike, the company moved in an dcleared the west end ; they killed nine more Com-munists in this action . Fighting in the tow ndiminished as Companies B and D consolidate dtheir positions in the western edge of the village ;Hilgartner's force was less fortunate .

At 1430, Hilgartner's Companies K and M were

advancing in column . Company K, accompanied byLieutenant Colonel Hilgartner's command group ,led the movement . "We were alerted to the impen-ding conflict," said Hilgartner, "when one of ourscouts brought in a Chinese-made, magazine-fed ,light machine gun which was found teetering bac kand forth on a large rock ." Hilgartner radioed thisinformation to Major Richard J . Alger, the regimen-tal operations officer . Alger replied that he had jus treceived an intelligence report that a large enem yforce was in the area . 6

These two events gave Hilgartner time to begin t ochange his tactical formation from a column to tw ocompanies on line . He ordered Company M to moveup on Company K's right . As Company M advanc-ed, both companies came under intense fire from alarge NVA force in what the Marines later found t obe an L-shaped, entrenched position . ?

Company M's 1st Platoon was crossing a rice pad-dy about 1430 when it first came under heavy fir efrom an estimated enemy company . First LieutenantJohn D . Murray, commanding Company M, sent his2d Platoon to assist the 1st Platoon . While crossing asmall knoll near the village of Chau Lam (1), the 2 dPlatoon ran head-on into still another entrenche dNVA company . The 1st Platoon's commander, Se-cond Lieutenant Edward L . Blecksmith, ordered hisMarines to pull back to the top of the knoll . Whilethe 2d Platoon fought the by now attacking Nort hVietnamese, Lieutenant Murray ordered the re-mainder of the company to move onto the knoll wit hthe 1st Platoon and set up a perimeter . The enem yquickly encircled Company M and pounded it wit hmore than 200 mortar rounds, as well as extremel yheavy automatic weapons fire . Murray requested atear gas drop on the enemy positions to help the 2 dPlatoon disengage . While the gas did slow up th eCommunist assaults, it did not help the man yMarines who had lost or discarded their gas mask sduring the action .

As the gas lifted, the NVA renewed their attac kand, on at least one occasion, succeeded inpenetrating the 2d Platoon's lines . Sergean tLawrence D . Peters, a squad leader, stood up t opoint out NVA positions until hit in the leg : Despitehis wound, he led his men until they drove theenemy from the position . Sergeant Peters died late rthat evening from a fragment wound . *

*Sergeant Peters received a posthumous Medal of Honor for hi sactions . See Appendix D for the citation .

114


The enemy attacks separated Hilgartner's twocompanies ; each had to fight independently. Cap-tain Joseph R. Tenny, commanding Company K ,fought and maneuvered his company against th eenemy in a 'firefight that lasted until nightfall . Final-ly, he had to back off and set up night positions withHilgartner's command group .

As darkness fell over the Que Son Valley, theMarines called for air strikes . Captain Robert J . Fitz-simmons and his aerial observer, First Lieutenan tRobert H . Whitlow, arrived over the battlefield in aCessna 0-1 Bird Dog to control the strike .* Napalmand 500-pound bombs exploded as close as 5 0meters to Company M's lines . To the west, Marineartillery from Que Son fired in support of Com-panies B and D . Early in the evening the fightin greached a crescendo when the North Vietnames eopened up against the attacking planes with heavymachine guns . Marine A-6A Intruders, directed b yWhitlow, attacked the main cluster of enemy an-tiaircraft positions on Hill 63 . After silencing thes eguns, the A-6As struck at Communist mortarswithin 60 meters of Company K . By 2000 the one -sided air-ground duel was over . Although scattere daction continued on the ground, the destruction ofthe NVA antiaircraft positions signaled the end o fmajor fighting . Corporal Joseph E . Fuller, a Com-pany M squad leader, was one of many infantryme nwho recognized the value of Marine close air suppor tduring the night of 4 September . Referring to th estrikes, Fuller later commented, "I'd like to than kthe FAC that called it in . . . I think that is what real-ly saved us . " e

Marine artillery fire from Que Son and Than gBinh continued to pound the North Vietnames eafter the heaviest fighting subsided . Under the coverof artillery fire, UH-34 helicopters from LieutenantColonel Robert Lewis, Jr .'s HMM-363 delivered sup-plies and evacuated casualties . At 0100, CaptainFrancis M . Burke's Company I, 5th Marines foughtits way to Hilgartner's positions . After its arrival, theenemy backed off and the rest of the night passedquietly .

While these events took place, Lieutenant Colone lWebster's 3d Battalion Command Group and Com-pany D, 1st Marines received orders to join Corn -

*The 0-1 observation aircraft were not part of VMO-2 at thi stime . Instead they had their own officer-in-charge who functioneddirectly under MAG-16 . Colonel Philip M . Crosswait, commentson draft ms, 14Jul81 (Vietnam comment files, MCHC ,Washington, D .C .) .

panies B and D to the west . Early on 5 September ,Webste r ' s force reached the two companies, at whic htime he assumed operational control .

The same morning, 5 September, Hilgartner' stroops searched the battle area and reported 13 0dead NVA soldiers and 37 captured weapons .Marine casualties were 54 killed and 104 wounded ;among those killed was the 3d Battalion ' s chaplain ,Lieutenant Vincent R. Capadonno, USNR . DuringCompany M's heavy fighting, Chaplain Capadonnomade repeated trips out of the perimeter to help 2 dPlatoon casualties. Wounded twice, he refusedmedical aid, continuing to help wounded until kill-ed by the enemy . Lieutenant Capadonno received aposthumous Medal of Honor for his gallantry ; hewas the first Navy chaplain killed in action in Viet-nam. *

Although the NVA broke contact with theMarines, they did not leave the basin area . The 5thMarines commander, Colonel Davis, ordered his 1s tand 3d Battalions to sweep toward the foothillsbordering the southern edge of the basin . The morn-ing of the 6th, the two battalion command group sexhanged operational control of their respectiv ecompanies and the 5th Marines continued the attac kto the southeast . At 1515 that afternoon Hilgartner' scompanies ran into two battalions of the 1st VC

Regiment near Vinh Huy (3) . Lead elements of th eMarine battalion came under fire from snipers and asthe Marines continued to advance, heavy automati cweapons fire stopped the lead platoon, the 3d Pla-toon of Company B, in an open rice paddy . CaptainReese sent his 2d Platoon around to the right of th estalemated platoon to provide covering fire so that i tcould withdraw, but the 2d Platoon also came unde rextremely heavy and accurate fire which stopped it sadvance . The Marines took cover behind some grave sand a hedgerow and once more tried to establish abase of fire to cover the 3d Platoon's withdrawal .Again, enemy fire superiority prevailed . Reese thensent the 1st Platoon further to the right in stil lanother attempt to outflank the NVA . As the 1stPlatoon moved, it found itself outflanked an dalmost surrounded . Forced to pull back almost im-mediately, the platoon had to leave some of its deadbehind, but managed to bring out all of the wound -ed. While the North Vietnamese concentrated o nthe 1st Platoon, there was a lull in the firing in front

*See Appendix D for Chaplain Capadonno 's citation .


11 5

of the 3d Platoon, so at last, it managed to pull bac kfrom the exposed paddy .

Next, the NVA hit the 2d Platoon position with afrontal assault, as well as an envelopment of theright flank . Lance Corporal Lonnie R . Henshawrecalled :

We looked up and saw many NVA in full uniforms ,packs, and cartridge belts running across the rice paddy atus . We started shooting and we could see them falling, bu tthey didn't stop and more and more of them kept coming .Nothing could stop them, it was like they were doped up . 9

The platoon commander, First Lieutenant John E .Brackeen, seeing the enemy's flanking attempt ,ordered the platoon to fall back 50 meters to a trenchline and set up a new perimeter . The NVA closedquickly and the enemy attack turned into a grenadeduel . One landed in the trench near LieutenantBrackeen and some of his men . The platoon guide ,Sergeant Rodney M . Davis, seeing the danger to hislieutenant and the others, jumped on the grenade ,taking the full impact of the explosion with hi sbody . For thus giving his life, Sergeant Davis receiv-ed the Medal of Honor . *

By now the enemy, in strength, was so close thatLieutenant Brackeen realized he could not hold theposition much longer . He requested tear gas to coverthe withdrawal of what was left of the platoon to th ebattalion perimeter . The tear gas worked and theMarines moved back to the battalion position withtheir wounded, but ,not their dead .

After the gas attack to support Brackeen'swithdrawal, enemy fire slackened, but as the gasdissipated the NVA renewed their assault . Artilleryfire from Lieutenant Colonel Robert E . Hunter, Jr .' s2d Battalion, 11th Marines landed within 50 meter sof the Marine lines, while air strikes hit as close a s100 meters from the position . The NVA assaultsstopped ; however, as night fell the battalion cameunder heavy mortar and rocket fire . NVA soldiers ,crawling as close as 15 meters to the perimeter ,began lobbing grenades into the lines, while othersattempted to slip through the defenses . The bat-talion's S-3, Major Charles H . Black, checking a sec-tor of Company D's lines, discovered some of the in-filtrators . Major Black killed several of them as h erallied nearby Marines to drive out the others . Theenemy attacked until about 0200, at which time the ywithdrew, leaving behind 61 bodies . The Marineshad lost 35 killed and 92 wounded in the action .

*See Appendix D for Sergeant Davis' citation .

Northeast of the 1st Battalion action, the 3d Bat-talion also became heavily engaged on the afternoo nof 6 September. By 1400, Lieutenant ColonelWebster's Marines had seized Hill 48, withou tmeeting significant resistance . Webster then ordere dCaptain Francis M . Burke's Company I to seize Hil l43, 1,100 meters southeast of Hill 48 . When Burke' scompany was about 200 meters from the base of th ehill, the lead elements saw two camouflaged NV Asoldiers and opened fire on them . Automaticweapons fire erupted from the left front, but initialCommunist resistance was light and the lead platooncontinued to push through . Resistance began to stif-fen and Captain Burke ordered his other two pla-toons up on either flank of the lead platoon . Allthree platoons continued to push on . At 1630, heavymachine gun fire hit Burke's left platoon . The ad-vance stopped . Burke ordered the other two platoon sto shift over to help the stalled platoon, but they alsobecame heavily engaged . Finally the companymanaged to consolidate its position . Lieutenant Col-onel Webster ordered Company K to go to Burke' sassistance . By the time that Company K had fough tits way to Burke's position, Company I had man ycasualties, some of whom were still forward of thecompany front . With' the arrival of the second com-pany, the Marines recovered most of their casualtie sand established a better perimeter .

While the Marines consolidated their position, aUH-1E gunship from Lieutenant Colonel Philip M .Crosswait's VMO-2 reported a large number of NV Aimmediately south of the perimeter . The pilot cu tshort his report, saying that the enemy was, " . . .swarming all over the' top of this hill and I've got t oget to work ." 10 The gunship killed 23 NVA before i thad to break off the attack to rearm and refuel .

Between 1900 and 2300, Companies I and Krepulsed two determined NVA assaults . Heavymachine guns supported both attacks and the secondbroke into the Marine positions before the Marine sthrew it back after furious hand-to-hand fighting .At 2300, Lieutenant Murray's Company M, the bat-talion reserve, joined Companies I and K . Theenemy pressed the position until just after midnightwhen the Marines used tear gas to drive them off .Only a few mortar rounds interrupted the rest of thenight . Dawn revealed 88 enemy bodies around theposition . Webster's losses were 34 killed and 10 9wounded .

At first light on 7 September, both battalion sbegan searching the enemy dead for items of in-

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11 7


Operation Swift's objective was to destroy elements of the 2d NVA Division and denythe enemy access to the food derived from the basin's extensive rice paddies, such asthese being crossed by Marines with the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines on 7 September .

telligence value . They found a map which reveale dthe defensive positions of a battalion of the 1st VCRegiment . It pinpointed company and commandpost locations, as well as mortar positions and am -munition storage sites . This information triggeredan attack to the east by Hilgartner's battalion . Sup -porting arms blasted the plotted enemy positionsand then the infantry swept through them . As th eoperation progressed, on the 9th, the 1st BattalionMarines found 91 cases of small arms ammunition ,27 cases of mortar rounds, hundreds of handgrenades, and 6 cases of 75mm recoilless rifle round sas well as a vast assortment of loose ordnance . Th eMarines saved samples for intelligence purposes, an dblew the rest in place . *

At this time, General Robertson again activate dTask Force X-Ray under the command of Brigadie rGeneral LaHue . X-Ray now included the U .S .Army's 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, commanded b yLieutenant Colonel Peter P . Petro, USA .Simultaneously, the Vietnamese started their com-panion Operation Lien Ket 116 .

*Lieutenant Colonel William K . Rockey arrived by helicopte raround noon that day, 7 September 1967, and assumed commandof the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines from Lieutenant Colone lWebster . Colonel William K . Rockey, Comments on draft ms ,28Jul81 (Vietnam Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D .C .)

There were two more significant encounters dur-ing the last days of Operation Swift . The first occur-red on 10 September during a patrol northeast o fHill 43 by Captain Gene W. Bowers' Company H ,2d Battalion, 5th Marines . *

Early in the afternoon, Company H searched asmall village and found it empty except for a fe wwomen and children . The Marines noted, however ,that the enemy had fortified the village withbunkers, interlocking trenches, and barbed wire .

Upon completion of its search of the village, Com-pany H continued its patrol . After moving another1,500 meters, the company established a defensiv eposition on a small hill at about 1400 and requeste dresupply by helicopter . To provide additional securi-ty, Captain Bowers ordered Second Lieutenant Alla nJ . Herman's 3d Platoon to patrol around the hill in acircle with about a one-mile radius . The 3d Platoondeparted the perimeter and a heavy rain began fall-ing .

The patrol route took the 3d Platoon back to th esmall village which Company H had recently search -ed. In the interim, however, a reinforced NorthVietnamese company had slipped back and reoc-

*Captain Bowers' company served under the operational con-trol of the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines at this time .

118



LCpI Patrick J. Ferguson, who had received a super-ficial gunshot wound in the left side in June, takes abreather on 7 September during Operation Swift .LCpI Ferguson, who is carrying an AN/PRC-4 7radio, was part of a forward air control team attache dto the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines for the operation .

cupied the well-constructed defensive positions .Herman's platoon reached the vicinity of the villag earound 1430 and began crossing the rice paddiesaround it . The North Vietnamese company remain-ed quiet until the lead squad of Marines was abou tto enter the village, then opened up with sudden ,intense, automatic weapons fire, includin g.50-caliber machine guns, and virtually eliminatedlead Marine squad . The heavy fire, supplemented by60mm mortars, gave the North Vietnamese firesuperiority over the rest of the Marine platoon and i tcould not move . The platoon was soon leaderless ;Lieutenant Herman died trying to rescue a woundedMarine in the rice paddy .

Company H had just received its supplies b yhelicopter when Captain Bowers heard the sound o fautomatic weapons and mortars from the directio nof the village . Since he could not contact the 3d Pla-toon by radio, Captain Bowers left a small con-tingent to guard the supplies and quickly moved th erest of his company toward the sound of the firing .Enroute, Bowers made radio contact with a wounded

corporal from the 3d Platoon who described thesituation, including the death of Lieutenant Her-man .

Captain Bowers sent the 2d Platoon around to theleft where it could provide a base of fire as well ascover by fire the enemy escape route from the rear o f

the village. The company headquarters and the 1stPlatoon continued toward the 3d Platoon and at -tempted to gain fire superiority over the NVA unit ."Mortar and artillery fire, " wrote Bowers, "was

brought to bear on the enemy . . . with fire landingwithin 50 meters of friendly positions . Helicopte rgunships arrived to rocket and strafe the NVA [posi -tions] while artillery sealed the rear of the village . "1 1

Company M, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, whichthe battalion commander sent to assist Company H ,arrived on the scene and joined the fight . Afte rseveral air strikes by fixed-wing aircraft armed wit h250-pound bombs, two A-4 aircraft dropped tear gas

on the enemy . The two rifle companies then made asuccessful, coordinated assault on the village . Only afew NVA soldiers escaped out the other side of thevillage .

After the assault, the Marines searched the villageand counted 40 dead NVA soldiers above ground .Others, Bowers reported, probably lay buried in thebunkers and trenches collapsed by the artillery an dair strikes .

Nine Marines died in the action, six of them in th erice paddies just in front of the enemy fortifications ."[They] were found," noted Bowers in 1981, "wit htheir M-16 rifles broken down in an attempt toremove cartridges jammed in the chambers . Theyhad powder-burned bullet holes in their heads ."1 2

The second engagement at the end of Operatio nSwift started at 0330 the morning of 12 September .Two NVA companies attacked Captain Burke' sCompany I patrol base . Burke's Marines repulsed th eattack, but as the enemy withdrew they bumped in -to one of Captain Tenney's Company K platoon out -posts and received a further battering . NVA losseswere 35 killed and four captured .

During the same period, an ARVN ranger grou poperating north of the Swift AO during Operatio nLien Ket 116 had two sizable contacts . The morningof 10 September, the 37th Ranger Battalion cam eunder heavy mortar attack, followed by a groun dassault by a NVA battalion . When the enemy finall ywithdrew, the rangers had lost 13 killed, 33 wound-ed, and 9 missing, but the NVA left 70 bodie sbehind .


11 9

Elements of two enemy battalions hit the rangersagain at 1700 on the 13th . The enemy closed togrenade range and heavy action continued unti labout 1900 . That night, more ARVN units arrivedin the area in helicopters to help the rangers . Boththe 1st and 3d Battalions, 5th Marines debarke dfrom helicopters in a secure LZ northeast of th eengaged ranger group . The Marine battalions attack-ed south-southeast to relieve the pressure on th erangers, and by dawn, the NVA broke contact leav-ing 49 bodies on the battlefield . The rangers suf-fered 69 wounded and 15 killed in the engagement .This action was the last sizable encounter of bothSwift and Lien Ket 116 .

Operation Swift ended on 15 September . Onc emore allied forces had driven the 2d NVA Divisio nfrom the basin . The enemy's 1967 dry season offen-sive in the southern part of I Corps had failed . By theend of September allied commands regarded the 1stVC and 3d NVA Regiments unfit for combat . Morethan 4,000 enemy troops reportedly died between 2 1April, when Union I began, and the last day o fSeptember . A prime reason for this turn of event swas the sudden arrival of a large U .S . Army force inSouthern I Corps, which allowed III MAF units tooperate in the Que Son Basin on a permanent basis ,thereby breaking the Communist stranglehold o nthe area .

Operation Swift's heavy, sustained combat create dpersonnel accounting problems which were unusua lin the kind of war most of the 1st Marine Divisio nfought in 1967 . The 5th Marines and the divisio nencountered many difficulties during Swift wit hcasualty reporting, recovery, evacuation, an ddisposition of the dead, as well as with what Colone lWilliam R. Earney termed "the big No-No," missingin action . "They [5th Marines] could tell you," com-mented Colonel Earney, "where the enemy v.-as andtheir body count [of enemy dead] but not a com-prehensive report as to what their own conditio nwas ." 13 The task of answering many of the personne lquestions fell to the division staff, including, accor-ding to Colonel Earney, determining which morgu eheld the corpse of Medal of Honor ,recipientCapadonno before his brother arrived in South Viet-nam to view the body . "

Other allied activity, both north and south of theQue Son Basin, also hurt Communist formations in ICorps . The enemy, buffeted between the alliedforces in the basin and those in contiguous areas, los tthe initiative . To the north, Colonel Herbert E . Ing's

1st Marines continued to prod the VC around Ho iAn. Operation Pike, conducted in early August, wa sone of the more significant operations in this area .Two Marine battalions, Lieutenant Colonel GeorgeE. Petro ' s 1st Battalion, 1st Marines and LieutenantColonel Webster's 3d Battalion, 5th Marines ex-ecuted a box and sweep maneuver that accounted fo r100 enemy dead and four captured . South of thebasin, General Knowles' Task Force Oregon con-ducted Operation Benton in the hills west of Chu La iduring the latter part of August . Army troops madea helicopter assault of a suspected enemy base cam pand then drove south and east, encountering enemyplatoons and companies . When Benton ended, on 1September, Task Force Oregon reported 397 NV Asoldiers killed and nine captured .

Much further south, between Quang Ngai an dDuc Pho, Task Force Oregon ' s Operation Malheurseries, lasting from 11 May through 2 August, pro-duced a total of 857 enemy troops killed. A moreimportant result was the opening of Route 1 fro mthe border of II Corps to Dong Ha, the last section o fthis vital artery to be cleared in I Corps .

Hood River followed Malheur II in a locale 2 5miles south of Quang Ngai City . Hood River occur-red in conjunction with the Korean Marine Brigade' sDragon Head V and the 2d ARVN Division's LienKet 110 . The soldiers on Hood River claimed credi tfor 78 enemy dead and 45 prisoners . Army casualtie swere only three killed .

All of these operations maintained constantpressure on the 2d NVA Division . Continual use ofthe search and destroy process in the basin and adja-cent areas from April through August by the 5thMarines, the Special Landing Force, and ARVNunits forced the enemy to move south . As the Com-munists tried to regroup in the hills west of Chu Lai ,Task Force Oregon pushed them back to the Qu eSon Basin to face the Marine and ARVN Swift-LienKet 116 operations . Once more the enemywithdrew, this time trying to escape to the hills nearTam Ky . There four U .S . Army battalions were onhand to meet the remnants of the 2d NVA Divisionduring Operation Wheeler . Task Force Oregonbecame the Americal Division on 22 September andby the end of that month the soldiers of the Arm ydivision had killed an additional 442 Communists .Once more they drove the NVA units back into th ebasin . A new opponent was waiting for the NorthVietnamese division .

120


A Busy Calm Before the Storm

Increased September activity in I Corps once mor ecaused General Westmoreland to send rein-forcements north . On 4 October, Colonel James D .McKenna's 3d Brigade, 1st U .S . Cavalry Division ,having been transferred to III MAF and, in turn, t othe Americal Division, began Operation Wallowa inthe Que Son Basin . With the arrival of this brigade ,the Americal Division took over responsibility fo rthe entire basin and the 5th Marines moved to HoiAn, relieving Colonel Ing's 1st Marines there .Operational control of the 1st Marines shifted fromthe 1st to 3d Marine Division and Colonel Ing thenmoved his headquarters and two battalions to th enorthern provinces of I Corps .' ,

Most operations in southern I Corps during th elast three months of 1967 reflected the enemy ' sdesire to avoid casualties, but even in this the enem ywas unsuccessful . The Americal Division, now com-manded by Major General Samuel W . Koster, USA ,continued to harry the 2d NVA Division in the QueSon Valley as the Communists frantically tried t ocollect rice and supplies there . During October, th eArmy units, engaged in Operation Wheeler andWallowa, were in almost constant contact with smal lNVA units . By the end of the month OperationWheeler had reported 498 enemy killed, whileWallowa recorded another 675 NVA dead .

During November, the Americal Division com-bined Operations Wheeler and Wallowa as Opera-tion Wheeler/Wallowa and a force of seven U .S . Ar-my battalions, more than twice the numberpreviously available, deployed in the area . The armybattalions systematically pursued NVA elements asthey tried to escape to the mountains in the west .Ancillary operations such as the 2d Battalion, 5t hMarines ' Essex in "Antenna Valley," six miles southof An Hoa, drove the enemy back against the Arm yunits in the basin .

There were two main engagements with NV Aforces in Antenna Valley during Operation Essex . *Both involved company-sized attacks on fortifie dvillages which the North Vietnamese chose to de -fend. Lieutenant Colonel George C . McNaughton ,commander of the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines ,described these fortified villages in his after-actio nreport :

*In Operation Mississippi in Antenna Valley during the fall of1966, the Marines evacuated more than 2,000 refugees . Less than600 civilians remained in the entire valley in 1967 .

In each instance, the village had a wire fence around theperimeter . . . concisting of three to six strands of cattlefence with woven wire running up and down through th ehorizontal strands . The wire fence line was either conceal-ed in bamboo tree lines or camouflaged with bamboo an dshrubs . Behind these perimeter fences, the enemy had duga communication trench . . . that was four to six feet deepwith firing positions and deep caves for protection agains tartillery and air attack . Some of these caves were fiftee nfeet deep . Spider holes, caves, and bunkers were found i ndepth through the village . Fortifications were carefull ylocated to achieve an interlocking and mutually suppor-ting series of defensive positions . Both [villages] werelocated such that attacking infantry had to cross strea mbarriers [to reach] the defensive positions . As attackingtroops emerged from the stream beds, they foun dthemselves to be within close range (50-150 meters) of th eenemy perimeter defenses with open rice paddy in be-tween . [Both villages were] situated on the sides of th evalley adjacent to high ground such that the enemy hadready routes of egress into the mountains . i6

Both Marine attacks took place during afternoo nhours and the enemy force successfully defended itspositions into the night . In each case, however, th eNVA defenders withdrew from the fortified posi-tions under cover of darkness in spite of continuou sartillery fire in and behind the village . " Insummary," wrote McNaughton, "when Marine unitsattacked the villages in the afternoon, the enem ydefended with vigor . When Marine units delayed anattack until dawn and conducted heavy preparatio nby air and artillery, the NVA units made thei rescape .' "

Company H, commanded by Captain Gene W .Bowers, conducted one of the fortified villag eassaults . Bowers used tactics similar to those that ha dsucceeded so well in a similar situation duringOperation Swift .

Company H had landed by helicopter in AntennaValley earlier in the day, as had the rest of the 2 dBattalion, 5th Marines .* The company then pro-ceeded toward its assigned objective, the village ofAp Bon (2) in the northeast portion of the valley . Asit approached the objective, Company H mad eheavy contact with a large enemy force within thevillage .

Captain Bowers ordered Second Lieutenan tDuane V. Sherin to maneuver his 2d Platoon to theleft of the village and then envelop the enemy . Theplatoon, however, ran into more NVA soldiers in the

*Company F, according to the original plan, was not schedule dto participate in Operation Essex . It was to remain in the bat-talion's primary TAOR as a rapid reaction force .


12 1


The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines boards helicopters in November for Operation Essex inAntenna Valley, six miles south of An Hoa . Essex drove the 2d NVA Division back intothe Que Son Basin where the America/ Division was conducting Wheeler/Wallowa .

heavy brush west of the village, sustained twoMarines killed and several wounded, and then, o nBowers' orders, withdrew with its casualties back tothe company . Upon its arrival at the company posi-tion, Bowers directed the 2d Platoon to move to th ecompany's right flank and establish a base of fire fo ran assault on the village by the 1st and 3d Platoons .The assault began after air and artillery strikes on A pBon(2) . Bowers recalled the subsequent action :

The assault was well-coordinated and executed, main-taining continuous fire superiority over the enemy unti lthe assault line reached the bamboo hedgerow on theperiphery of the village . Eight taut strands of U .S . [-type ]barbed wire were unexpectedly encountered woven amon gthe bamboo stalks . As the Marines fought to breakthrough the barrier, .50 caliber machine guns from 80 0meters on the right flank and 800 meters on the left flan kcommenced enfilading, grazing fire down the line of barb -ed wire, as 60mm, 82mm, and 4 .2-inch mortar roundsbegan impacting in the paddy before the village . One pla-toon commander, Second Lieutenant Robert W . Miller ,Jr ., was killed and both platoon sergeants were severel ywounded . The assault faltered and the Marines took cover ,protected by small inter-paddy dikes . 1,

Edward J . "Buck" Byer, Jr .'s Company F arrivedabout 1600 . With Company H acting as a base o ffire on the village, Company F made an assaul twhich the North Vietnamese repulsed .


Marine UH-34Ds land the 2d Battalion, 5th Marine sin abandoned rice paddies in Antenna Valley at th ebeginning of Operation Essex . Few civilians remain-ed in the area after the evacuation of the valley in th efall of 1966 by Marines in Operation Mississippi .

The fighting developed into an exchange of rifl efire and grenades as reported air strikes hit thevillage . Some bombs and napalm fell within 5 0meters of the exposed Marines in the paddies . Cap-tain Bowers requested reinforcements and Captain

122


At dusk, both companies moved back about 7 0meters, carrying all wounded Marines and equip-ment, and established night defensive positions .The North Vietnamese maintained pressure on thetwo companies until almost dawn despite flares andmachine gun fire from AC-130s, which fired ontargets within 10 meters of the Marines . Around0430, the North Vietnamese slipped away .

At dawn, the two Marine companies advancedand searched the village without resistance . Therewere no enemy bodies . All bunkers and trenches ha dcollapsed under the intensive artillery and air strikes .The Marine companies had suffered 53 seriou scasualties, including 16 dead, in the fighting of A pBon (2) .

The following days involved pursuit of smal lgroups of fleeing NVA soldiers . On 10 November ,the 2d Battalion captured an NVA aspirant (office rcadet) who claimed to have been in Ap Bon (2) on 6November . He said the village had contained a divi-sion headquarters battalion. A direct bomb hit onthe command post bunker killed the battalion com-mander; 60 enlisted men died in the fighting an dmany were severely wounded . Operation Essex end-ed a few days later, on the 17th .

By the end of December, cumulative reports for

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A37066 1A member of the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines' 81 m mMortar Platoon, chilled and wet from the monsoo nrains, takes a rest during Operation Pitt in De-cember. Pitt was one of several operations late in th eyear which the 1st Marine Division conducted to pro-tect the Da Nang air base from enemy rocket attacks .

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A37105 3LCpl C. M. Wolfe, clad in a rain suit as protection from the cold monsoon rains inDecember, takes a message over an AN/PR C-25 radio . He and other members of the 2dBattalion, 7th Marines on Operation Pitt have fashioned a "hooch" from ponchos as pro-tection from the weather. Air mattresses in the shelter keep the Marines out of the mud .


12 3

Wheeler/Wallowa cited 3,188 enemy killed, 87 cap-tured, and 743 weapons seized, while U .S . Armyunits listed their own losses as 258 killed and 1,19 0wounded . As 1967 ended there could be little ques-tion that control of the Que Son Basin was returnin gto the South Vietnamese Government .

North of the Que Son Valley, in the 1st MarineDivision ' s Quang Nam Province zone of action, thelevel of enemy contacts dropped during this period .Fifth Marines units executed Operations Onslow an dEssex, while elements of the 7th Marines conducte dKnox, Foster, Pitt, Citrus, and Auburn . All of theseoperations were designed to keep the enemy out ofthe Da Nang rocket belt . The most significant ofthese was Foster and a companion SLF operation ,Badger Hunt . *

Foster/Badger Hunt followed two savage VietCong attacks against the district headquarters an drefugee settlement at Duc Duc and Dai Loc, 15 milessouthwest of Da Nang . The attacks killed 34civilians, wounded 42, and another 51 were reporte dmissing . In addition, the enemy destroyed 559houses and left 625 families homeless .

*See Chapter 10 for the SLF participation in Badger Hunt .

The Marines retaliated with Operation Foster ,conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Roger H .Barnard's 3d Battalion, 7th Marines and OperationBadger Hunt utilizing SLF Bravo 's BLT 2/3, com-manded by Lieutenant Colonel Henry Englisch .Both were coordinated search and destroy endeavor sin the river complex of the Dai Loc District and inthe flatlands and foothills west of the An Hoa in-dustrial complex . Intelligence reports placed theViet Cong R-20 and V-25 Battalions and the Q-13Company in these areas .

The operation began at 0900 on 13 November .BLT 2/3 landed by helicopter west of An Hoa, an dtwo hours later Barnard's Marines landed northwes tof the complex near Dai Loc . Initially there wer enumerous contacts with small groups of VC trying t oescape . The Marines uncovered many VC bunker sand logistic areas . With the exception of on ecompany-size fight on 29 November, the enem yconcentrated on escaping. Marine reconnaissanceand air observers sighted numerous fleeing enemygroups ; artillery and air strikes directed against thesegroups caused the majority of enemy casualties in-flicted during Foster . For the Marine infantry units ,the operation was more successful in terms of

The rotor wash from a medevac helicopter, not to mention the proximity of the aircraftitself forces men of the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines to duck during Operation Foster, on eof the operations protecting the Da Nang air base complex from enemy rocket attacks .

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A371016

124 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A37065 9Patrols in the rugged interior of South Vietnam could encounter dangers other thanenemy soldiers . Three men of the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, wearing unorthodoxuniforms, proudly display the hide of a tiger they killed during a five-day patrol . Theyare, from left, LCpl James Ortega, LCpI Thomas L . Little, and Sgt James L. Griffith .

destruction of enemy supplies and installations tha nenemy killed . The Marines destroyed 6,000 enem ybuildings, bunkers, tunnels, and shelters and un-covered rice caches totaling 87 tons . By the end o fthe operation, 30 November, reported enem ycasualties totaled 125 killed and eight captured .More important than the personnel losses inflictedon the enemy, the Marines evacuated more than11,500 refugees from the Communist-dominatedarea .

The loss of a large, readily available labor andmanpower pool annoyed the local Communistleaders . Previously, the enemy, following the Com-munist guerrilla dictum that the good will of th epeople must be preserved, had been very selective intargeting acts of terror . During December, as th eMarines challenged their hold on the populace ,Communist terror attacks increased, demonstratin gthat the "liberating" Communists were not really

concerned about popular good will . Distrust of theCommunists spread in the refugee communities . In -tended to force the refugees to abandon thei rGovernment-sponsored settlements, the terror raid scaused grave doubts about the promises made by th eViet Cong .

The refugees from western Quang Nam Province ,like those from the Que Son Basin and the coasta lplains of Quang Ngai Province, demonstrated adesire not to be incorporated in the Communistsystem . Would they rally to the South Vietnames eGovernment and be loyal citizens? The next step wa sthe implementation of the pacification program towin the support of the mass of displaced, confused ,and often apathetic residents of Vietnam's food -producing regions . In I Corps it was III MAF's job t oprovide the physical security for the Vietnames eGovernment's pacification efforts . It would prove t obe a tough, unrewarding, tedious assignment .

CHAPTER 1 0

Fall Fighting in the NorthOperation Kingfisher—Medina/Bastion Hill/Lam Son 13 8

Adjustments Within the 3d Marine Division

Operation Kingfisher

After the conclusion of Operation Buffalo, II IMAF ordered a sweep of the southern half of theDMZ. The Marines intended for the operation ,Hickory II, to destroy enemy fortifications, mortar ,and artillery positions in the southern portion of thebuffer zone . The concept resembled that employedduring Operation Hickory, the Marines' initial entryinto the area on 18 May .

During Hickory II, two Marine battalions, onefrom SLF Alpha, attacked north to the Ben HaiRiver, wheeled about, and swept southward to th eCam Lo River . BLT 2/ 3 of SLF Bravo screened the in -land left flank, while to the east three ARVN bat-talions and an armored personnel carrier troop ad-vanced up Route 1 to the Ben Hai, then turned an dattacked southward . On the coast east of the ARVNthrust, Lieutenant Colonel Albert R . Bowman II' s1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion drove northwar dthrough the coastal sand dunes from Cua Viet .There was little resistance . The sharpest action occur -red on 15 July, when Bowman's battalion engage dan enemy unit four miles east of Gio Linh, killin g25 . Marine casualties, when the operation ended o n16 July, were four killed and 90 wounded . TotalNVA losses totaled 39 killed and 19 weapons cap-tured .

At the close of Hickory II, the two SLF battalions ,upon release by III MAF, returned to a ready statu soff the coast of I Corps, but the remaining five bat-talions which comprised the 3d and 9th Marinesbegan a new operation in the same general area .Called Operation Kingfisher, its mission, as i nprevious operations along the DMZ, was to bloc kNVA entry into Quang Tri Province . From the 16t hthrough the 27th there were only minor contacts .

On 28 July the 3d Marine Division sent Lieutenan tColonel William D . Kent's 2d Battalion, 9thMarines, reinforced with a platoon of tanks, thre eOntos, three LVTEs, and engineers, on a spoiling at -

tack into the DMZ. The main body, including th etracked vehicles, moved north on Provincial Rout e606 with Companies E and G providing security o nthe flanks. Company F remained in a landing zon esouth of Con Thien, ready to board helicopters an dexploit any heavy contact with the enemy .

There was no contact ; the armored column move dnorth without incident . The terrain, however ,restricted the tracked vehicles to the road and thic kvegetation made movement difficult for the flankin gcompanies . Further, the terrain canalized the col-umn into a relatively narrow "V" of land bounded bythe Ben Hai River on the west and north and atributary stream to the east . The reinforced battalio nwould have to return by the same route by which i tentered the DMZ.* The North Vietnamese werealready moving units into previously prepared posi-tions covering Route 606 .

The North Vietnamese did not molest the Marine sin their night defensive positions near the Ben HaiRiver . The following morning, the 2d Battalionscouted the objective area and destroyed severa lsmall abandoned fortification complexes .

Late in the morning the battalion began its move-ment south out of the DMZ . It would move in a col-umn led by Company E and followed by Comman dGroup A, H&S Company, Command Group B, andCompanies F, H, and G. An airborne forward ai rcontroller circled overhead ; he would soon be busy .

Company E began moving south at 1000 ; at 111 5the enemy detonated a 250-lb bomb buried in th eroad, wounding five Marines. Nearby, engineersfound a similar bomb, rigged as a command -detonated mine, and destroyed it .

Upon the second explosion, North Vietnames esoldiers near the road opened fire on the colum nwith machine guns, rifles, and 60mm and 82m m

*Major Willard H . Woodring, commanding the 3d Battalion ,9th Marines, raised these objections at a division briefing prior tothe operation . Colonel John C . Studt, Comments on draft ms ,9Jul81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C .)

125

126


3d MarDiv ComdC, July 196 7

The 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, supported by tanks from the 3d Tank Battalion, movesthrough the open terrain south of the Ben Hai River in Operation Hickory II in July .

An armored column, composed of tanks, Ontos, amphibian tractors, and infantrymenfrom the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines moves unopposed toward the Ben Hai River insidethe Demilitarized Zone on 28 July . NVA units, however, already were moving inbehind the column and it would have to fight its way south to safety the following day .


FALL FIGHTING IN THE NORTH

12 7

mortars, initiating a running battle that did not en duntil dark . The NVA units, using heavy fire fromprepared positions combined with the maneuver ofother units, quickly fragmented the armored colum ninto roughly company-sized segments . Each isolatedsegment fought its own way through the gauntlet o ffire .

The tracked vehicles became more of a liabilitythan a tactical asset . They were restricted to the roadbecause the thick brush provided excellent cover fo rNVA soldiers armed with antitank weapons . Insteadof providing support to the infantry Marines, th etracked vehicles required infantry protection . Usin gthem as ambulances to transport the wounded fur-ther reduced the vehicles' ability to fight .

Tracked vehicles suffered all along the column .An RPG round penetrated both sides of an LVT Emoving with Company E . Another RPG explosiondisabled the turret of a tank with Company F, woun-ding three crewmen . When Company H brought upan Ontos to suppress NVA fire that was holding upits movement, an RPG gunner hit the vehicle andwounded three crewmen . A second Ontos came for -ward, beat down the enemy fire with its machinegun, and permitted the company to move again .

The infantry's primary fire support came from theairborne controllers, one of whom was on statio nthroughout the day . The controller maintained con -tact with air representatives with each company an dwith the battalion air liaison officer . The airborn eforward air controller directed fixed-wing air strike swhenever needed. The Marine infantrymen neede dthem often .

The North Vietnamese units knew the dange rfrom American supporting arms and attempted t ostay close to the Marine column. Company F hadhardly cleared its night defensive position when i trealized an NVA unit had immediately occupied theposition . At another point, Marine engineers withCompany E spotted a 12 .7mm antiaircraft machinegun just off the road . They attacked, killed sevenNVA soldiers, and destroyed the weapon and its am -munition. At the rear of the column, Company Ghad problems with enemy units following in its trac eand maneuvering back and forth across the road .Company G killed 12 and wounded 10 of thes esoldiers ; an attached scout-sniper team kille danother 15 . Shortly afterward, an enemy assaul tfrom the flank almost cut the company in two, bu tthe attack failed .

Shortly after Company F took its place in the col -

umn, it received instructions to establish a helicopte rlanding zone for evacuating casualties from Com-pany E and H&S Company . When the tanks carryingthe dead and wounded reached the zone, the enemyopened up with RPGs, machine guns, and 60mmand 82mm mortars . The mortar fire walked acros sthe entire landing zone . In addition to the earlie rcasualties, the Marines now had anothr seven menkilled and 31 more Marines and Navy corpsme nwounded .

A gap then developed between the rear of H& SCompany and Company F . The latter company load-ed the casualties in the zone on the tanks and attack-ed to close the gap . It did so at the cost of a furthertwo dead and 12 wounded by NVA mortar fire . Thecompany resumed its fight south .

Late in the afternoon, Company E and CommandGroup A managed to break through the enemy t osafety . They left behind, however, two Company Esquads which could not move because of intenseenemy automatic weapons and rifle fire that killedtwo and wounded nine Marines . Company E and thecommand group continued on until they linked upat 1830 with Company M, 3d Battalion, 4th Marine swhich had moved up from Con Thien .

By this time the other companies of the 2d Bat-talion were no longer able to continue south ; therewere too many casualties to move . At 1930, Com-pany H drew back and established a defensive posi-tion on high ground at the edge of the clearin gthrough which Route 606 passed at that point . Join-ing Company H were Company F, two other squad sfrom Company E, two squads from Company G ,plus H&S Company . It was an all-infantry force ; thetracked vehicles, carrying some of the wounded, ha dbroken through to join the lead elements at the posi-tion of Company M, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines .

Company G's movement came to an end abou tthe same time . It could no longer both fight an dtransport its wounded . By 2100, the company was i na defensive position for the night .

The two isolated squads from Company E foun dthemselves rescued early in the evening . LieutenantColonel Kent had taken operational control of Com-pany M, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines and accompanie dthat unit back to the two squads . They accomplishe dthe mission by 1930 and Company M moved into agood defensive position for the night . To the south ,the bulk of Company E organized its defenses an dcalled in medevac helicopters for the casualties .

The remainder of the night was relatively quiet ;

128


the NVA units were pulling back . Company G andCompany F both heard much shouting west of thei rrespective positions and called in artillery missions .The final event of the fight occurred at 0330 whenan NVA soldier crept up to Company F's perimeterand killed one Marine and wounded three with aburst of automatic weapons fire . Other Marinesopened fire and the NVA soldier withdrew .

The following morning, the 30th, helicoptersevacuated all casualties located at Company G's posi -tion . Company M, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines an dLieutenant Colonel Kent moved north to link u pwith the rest of the 2d Battalion . The Marinesevacuated the remainder of the casualties by 090 0and all units were out of the DMZ by 1150 behind ascreen provided by the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines .

The gauntlet had been costly for Lieutenant Col-onel Kent's 2d Battalion. Twenty-three Marines diedand the wounded totaled 251, of whom 191 re-quired evacuation . There were 32 confirmed NV Adead but the battalion estimated another 175 pro-bably died .

While the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines ' battle quick-ly entered the division's folklore as "2/9's armoredthrust into the DMZ," t an earlier and relativelyminor action on Route 9 had a more lasting impacton the tactical situation in northern I Corps . It led to

an end to vehicle convoys to Khe Sanh ; thereafter ,the base relied upon aerial resupply .

III MAF supplied Khe Sanh at the time by aircraf tand "Rough Rider" vehicle convoys from Dong Ha .One of the largest of the convoys, composed of ove r85 vehicles and several U .S . Army 175mm guns, 2departed Dong Ha on 21 July . Part of its route pass-ed through the TAOR of Lieutenant Colonel RobertC. Needham ' s 3d Battalion, 3d Marines . This gavethe battalion the responsibility for securing that por-tion of Route 9 .

Lieutenant Colonel Needham ordered his Com-pany M to send a platoon out that morning to swee pRoute 9 from Ca Lu west to the boundary betwee nthe regimental TAORs of the 3d and 26th Marines .The convoy departed Dong Ha at about the sam etime as the 2d Platoon, Company M began its chec kof the road .

The 2d Platoon searched Route 9 without inciden tfor about five kilometers . Then the point surprisedan NVA soldier urinating beside the road . 3 Thepoint opened fire ; other NVA soldiers answered withrifle fire from high ground north of the road an dfrom a tree line south of it . The whole platoo nquickly became engaged with what the platoon com-mander first believed was an NVA platoon. He soo nchanged his estimate to an NVA battalion .

Infantrymen of the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines move into the safety of the perimeter ofthe 3d Battalion, 4th Marines on 30 July after a running battle the previous day withNVA units that fought to fragment the column and destroy the reinforced Marine bat-talion piecemeal as it came back south from the Ben Hai River and out of the DMZ .

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A 189064


12 9

The 3d Battalion, 3d Marines ordered the platoo nto disengage but the unit could not do so . The bat-talion staff at Ca Lu worked quicky to coordinate ai rand artillery support and alerted the rest of Com-pany M to prepare to move to the 2d Platoon ' srescue . In the midst of this activity, the Rough Ride rconvoy's arrival at Ca Lu created some confusion . 4The battalion requested and received permission t ohalt the convoy immediately since there was only on eplace between Ca Lu and the 2d Platoon's positionwhere the convoy could be turned around . ,

Company M moved toward the firefight with tw oU.S. Army vehicles in support. One of thesemounted dual 40mm cannon, the other carried aquad- .50 machine gun . As the force neared the 2 dPlatoon, the enemy fired approximately 200 round sfrom 82mm mortars at the road . Enemy rifleme nopened fire from the high ground north of the road .

Under the cover of fixed-wing aircraft strikes onthe high ground and heavy fire from the two Arm yvehicles, Company M reached its 2d Platoon and th eMarines disengaged . Two tanks came up from Ca Luand provided additional fire against the tree line t othe south . The combined force then returned to C aLu .

The Rough Rider convoy could not continue t oKhe Sanh until the road was secure . The divisionordered it to turn around and return to Camp Car -roll .

At noon the following day, the 22d, the 3d Bat-talion, 3d Marines, using its own Company L an dCompanies A and C of the 9th Marines, movedagainst the enemy positions north of Route 9 . Therewas only scattered contact with the enemy ; however ,the Marines found ample evidence the previous day' saction had prevented a major ambush of the Roug hRider convoy to Khe Sanh . They found 150 well-camouflaged fighting holes in the area where the 2dPlatoon had engaged the enemy . The North Viet-namese obviously had constructed the fighting hole sfor a horseshoe-shaped ambush whose killing zon ewas the open road . Nearby was a large, abandonedNVA base camp containing another 200 fightin gholes and 25 two- and four-man log bunkerscamouflaged with dirt and elephant grass . The cam palso contained several huts, some for sleeping an dothers for cooking .

The following day Company K, 3d Marines, sup -ported by tanks and Army M42 "Dusters" (the lattermounting dual 40mm cannon), joined the operatio nand attacked Hill 216 north of, and overlooking the

NVA ambush site on Route 9 . Company K ran int oheavy machine gun fire from a bunker complex o nthe hill's east slope which killed one Marine an dwounded two . The company called in an artillerymission and the supporting tracked vehicles openedfire on the enemy . Company K then pulled back t oallow fixed-wing aircraft plenty of room to bomb th ebunkers . At the completion of the strike, Compan yK attacked, but the NVA unit had gone . TheMarines continued to the crest of Hill 216 .

Later that afternoon, fixed-wing aircraft bombe dHill 247, located west of Hill 216 and which als ooverlooked Route 9 . Following the air strike, Com-pany L, 3d Marines moved west on Route 9 and link-ed up with Company B, 26th Marines which ha dcleared the road from the western edge of the 26t hMarines' TAOR .

During its move, Company L uncovered 3 0Chinese-made anti-personnel mines buried alongapproximately 2,000 meters of the southern margi nof Route 9. The enemy had rigged the mines wit htrip wires to catch the Marines and soldiers from th eRough Rider convoy as they sought cover from th eplanned ambush .

With Route 9 cleared, the Rough Rider convoy ,minus any 175mm guns, completed the trip to KheSanh on the 25th . The whole episode, however ,changed the thinking about resupply for Khe Sanh .There was one more large convoy to Khe Sanh and afew to the Lang Vei Special Forces camp, but thes eended in early August . There were no other convoysto Khe Sanh until Operation Pegasus opened Route9 at the end of the "siege" of Khe Sanh in 1968 . *

For the next few weeks only scattered, small-scal efighting took place. Intelligence analysts reporte dthe probability of a major enemy offensive in th eregion . They reported a large buildup of suppliesnorth of the DMZ, and estimated at least five Com-munist battalions were preparing for offensiveoperations . Sighting reports of vehicles north of th eBen Hai increased substantially, including, for th efirst time, reports of armored vehicles there .

The first outburst of renewed NVA ground activi-ty in the Kingfisher area happened in thesouthwestern portion of the TAOR on the mornin gof 21 August . A North Vietnamese battalion am -

*Robert Pisor' s The End of the Line : The Siege ofKhe Sanh

(New York : 1982), p . 94 says the convoy with the 175mm gunshad " . . . run into 'one horrendous ambush' and turnedback . . . . " The NVA's planned ambush literally might have bee n"horrendous" except for one NVA soldier's bladder discomfort .

130



CH-53 helicopters bring 105mm howitzers of Battery I, 12th Marines to Hill 881 Southnear Khe Sanh on 3 August following intelligence reports of an NVA buildup nearby .

bushed a small Marine convoy traveling south o nRoute 9 from the Rockpile to Ca Lu . In the firs tmoments of the attack, enemy antitank rockets hi tand put out of action two Marine trucks and twoArmy track-mounted, dual 40mm guns of the 1s tBattalion, 44th Artillery . The security force with theconvoy returned fire and radioed for air and artillerysupport . Company L of Lieutenant Colonel Rober tC. Needham's 3d Battalion, 3d Marines came dow nfrom the Rockpile, and a reinforced platoon fro mCompany M moved up from Ca Lu. Thesemaneuvers trapped the ambushers . The action lastedfor more than six hours as the Marine units, sup -ported by air and artillery, converged on the NVAbattalion . As night fell the enemy broke contact an dfled to the west . Confirmed Communist losses werelight, but 3 Marines and 3 Army artillerymen died ,with another 35 wounded .

The North Vietnamese tried again on 7September at almost the same location, but agai nthe enemy commander miscalculated the location o fMarine forces, their ability to maneuver, and th espeed with which the Marines could bring suppor-ting arms to bear . The NVA ambushed a convoy a t1010, and again Marine units converged on the sitefrom the north and south . This time the battle con-tinued for more than eight hours . The Marines killed92 of the enemy before the fight ended at dusk .American casualties in this encounter totaled fivekilled and 56 wounded .

Additional indications that the Communists re-mained determined to achieve a victory at ConThien became evident during late August . To gai nmaximum propaganda effect, the North Vietnames etimed their new offensive to coincide with the Sout hVietnamese elections scheduled for 3 September . Asthe date for the elections approached, the NVA fire dan increasing volume of artillery and rockets acrossthe DMZ at Cua Viet, Gio Linh, and Con Thien . On26 August these hit Dong Ha in three separate at -tacks ; 150 rocket and artillery rounds destroyed twohelicopters and damaged 24 others .

The most effective and spectacular of these attack stook place on election day . Forty-one artillery round sslammed into Dong Ha base that morning, destroy-ing the ammunition storage area and bulk fuel far mand damaged 17 helicopters of Major Horace A .Bruce's HMM-361 . Damage control teams fough tthe fire and explosions for four hours before the ycontrolled the situation . Miraculously, no one died ,but 77 suffered wounds, one seriously . Spectators asfar away as Phu Bai could see the billowing smokecloud that rose over the base . Because of this andsimilar attacks, III MAF moved the logistics base i n1968 from Dong Ha to Quang Tri, beyond the rang eof the enemy's 130mm guns . ,

The attack on 3 September ended the use of Don gHa as a permanent helicopter squadron base facility .HMM-361 personnel flew back to the Marble Moun-tain facility that day in the CH-53s of HMM-463 . All

3d MarDiv ComdC, August 1967


Firemen contain the fire at the Dong Ha combat A burned-out Marine cargo truck sits in the middle

base following a rocket attack on 26 August, just a

of the rubble of the ammunition storage area a t

week before NVA artillery destroyed the fuel facility .

Dong Ha after the 3 September artillery attack .

Marines fight to save the fuel storage area at Dong Ha after a rocket attack on 26 August .Some are trying to put out the fire while others cool down the remaining fuel bladders .

3d MarDiv ComdC, August 1967

132


of HMM-361 's aircraft caught on the ground suf-fered damage from blast, shrapnel, or both and theCH-53s had to lift them to Marble Mountain . Unti lIII MAF readied a new field at Quang Tri, helicopte rsupport for the DMZ area came from squadrons a tMarble Mountain and Phu Bai . 8

Brigadier General Metzger had good reasons forvividly remembering these attacks . He recalled :

When one of the attacks hit Dong Ha I was in a UH-1 Eon the pad getting ready to take off. The pilot lifted offthe ground and turned to the south, thereby flying righ tthrough the barrage of "incoming ." We felt the "bird "shudder and knew we were hit . After a futile attempt tospot the enemy firing batteries, we finally landed at Cam pEvans and examined the plane . There was a hole about 1 5inches in diameter in the tail . We were fortunate1 9

Con Thien was the primary NVA artillery target .During September, the North Vietnamese subjecte dthe Marines there to one of the heaviest shellings o fthe war . The hill itself, known to local missionarie sas "The Hill of Angels," was only big enough to ac-commodate a reinforced battalion . Almost daily Co nThien's defenders could expect at least 200 rounds o fenemy artillery fire, and on 25 September more than1,200 shells rained down upon the position . Thecompleted "Dye Marker" bunkers at Con Thien pro-vided some cover as the NVA artillery and rocket at -tacks escalated ." )

Under cover of the artillery and rocket attacks ,enemy ground activity increased . The NVA's mai nthrust was to the south and southeast of Con Thien .Since the beginning of Operation Kingfisher, th e9th Marines had been operating in that area with aforce varying between three and six battalions . Th elevel of combat was light, but enemy resistancebegan to stiffen at the end of August .

On 4 September, Lieutenant Colonel Bendell's 3 dBattalion, 4th Marines met strong opposition . At1100 that morning, the battalion's Company I, com-manded by Captain Richard K . Young, engaged anenemy force 1,500 meters south of Con Thien . Thecompany pressed the enemy unit, but by 1400 its ad-vance halted because of the volume of enemy fire .Company M and the battalion command grou pmoved to the left of Company I and, after extensiv eartillery preparatory fires, struck the NVA flank .Moving slowly, with two tanks in support, Compan yM pushed through the Communist position, reliev-ing the pressure on Company I . The maneuver trap-ped a group of enemy soldiers between the tw oMarine units, and Company I assaulted and overran


Artillerymen from the 2d Battalion, 12th Marinesload their 105mm howitzer at Con Thien fo rcounterbattery fire against North Vietnamese Armyunits. In the background are some of the bunkers inwhich Marines took refuge during the frequen tenemy artillery fire against the Marine combat base .

the entrapped NVA force . The count of the enem ycasualties at the end of the fight was 38 killed an done captured . As Bendell's units returned to theirperimeters near Con Thien," they endured haras-sing fires from NVA mortar and artillery . SixMarines died and 47 suffered wounds in the day's ac-tion .

Three days later, Company I of Lieutenant Col-onel Harry L. Alderman 's 3d Battalion, 26thMarines* found the enemy again three miles southof Con Thien . The fight lasted for five hours an dresembled the battle of the 4th, except this tim eMarine tanks reinforced the infantrymen . Fifty-on eNVA died in this encounter ; so did 14 Marines .

On 10 September, Alderman's Marines engagedwhat seemed to be the entire 812th NVA Regiment.The fight began in the early evening four mile ssouthwest of Con Thien . In this instance the patrol -ling Marines spoiled a major enemy attack in themaking . The battalion's command chronologyreflects the intensity of this four-hour battle :

*3/26 participated in Operation Kingfisher from 7-1 1September .


13 3

1615H—Co M and Co K received estimated 60 roundsof 140mm rockets followed by a coordinated attack b yNVA (reportedly) wearing USMC flak jackets and helmets .

1630H—Co I and Co L came under attack by NV Awearing USMC equipment and supported by mortars .

1637H—Co K and Co M were hit by 12 140mm rocketsfollowed by 12 more at 1645H .

1655H—Co I and Co L came under an extremely heavyassault from the north and west sides of their perimeter byan estimated NVA battalion . Fixed-wing air, which was onstation, began making strikes immediately, and napal mconsistently fell 50 to 75 meters from the friendly lines .The flame tank and gun took d irect hits from RPGs firedfrom approximately 75 meters . The flame tank wasdestroyed and burned the remainder of the night, and thegun tank was rendered useless and rolled into a draw . . . .The crews of both tanks withdrew into the perimeter .

1700H—The tank supporting Co K fired on 100 NV Ain front of their lines with unknown results .

From 1705H to 1754H—Each company reportednumerous sightings of NVA in various sized unitsmaneuvering around both defensive perimeters .

1825H—The [battalion] CP received heavy incomin gmortar fire and the NVA appeared to be massing for an at -tack .

1825H—M-1 [1st Platoon, Company M] was pinne ddown in a bomb crater 70 meters west of the CP .

1900H—Co M pulled back towards the CP to con-solidate the lines and was forced to abandon a disable dtank .

1905H—An emergency resupply was attempted to Co Iand Co L and although suppressive fires were delivered ,the enemy fire was too intense and the helicopter couldnot land .

1905H—A flareship arrived on station . Co K and Co Mhad formed perimeter around the CP and were boxed inwith well aimed artillery .

2030H—The enemy ground attack ceased althoug h60mm mortar [rounds] were still being received by Co Iand Co L .

The next morning the companies searched thebattlefield for casualties and abandoned equipment ,and evacauted all casualties by 1000 . The Marinesrecovered a large quantity of enemy material, in-cluding cartridge belts, packs, ammunition, andweapons ; 140 enemy bodies lay scattered throughoutthe area . The 3d Battalion's losses totaled 34 killedand 192 wounded . Alderman called it " . . . thehardest fighting [the battalion] encountered sinc earriving in Vietnam ."1 2

Following this fight, the 3d Battalion, 26t hMarines moved to near Phu Bai to refit . As it sreplacement in the DMZ area, the division pulle dLieutenant Colonel James W . Hammond, Jr .'s 2dBattalion, 4th Marines off an operation near Cam pEvans and sent it north . Hammond later wrote :

We stopped overnight at Cam Lo and then went north

to take the place of [the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines] whichhad been mortared [severely] in their position northwest ofCon Thien . We then became the roving battalion outsid eCon Thien . . . the battalion moved every day but still wasshelled as much, if not more than Con Thien . The dif-ference was that we had to dig new holes in every position. . . we were hit pretty hard during our month-plus alongthe DMZ .1 3

Both sides shed more blood around Con Thie nbefore the month ended . At 0325 on the 13th, aNorth Vietnamese company attacked the north -northeast sector of the perimeter of the outpost .Even though artillery, mortars, and heavy machin eguns supported the attacking force, the Communist sfailed to penetrate the wire . They gave up andwithdrew after a heavy pounding from the Marines 'supporting arms .

Following the attack of the 13th, Colonel RichardB . Smith,* the new commanding officer of the 9t hMarines, moved two battalions to a position behin dCon Thien from which they could react if the enem yattacked in force . Lieutenant Colonel John J .Peeler ' s** 2d Battalion, 9th Marines occupied th earea southeast of Con Thien while Lieutenant Colo-nel James W. Hammond, Jr .'s 2d Battalion, 4thMarines moved to the southwest of the hill . 14 At th esame time, Colonel Smith ordered the 3d Battalion ,9th Marines, now commanded by Major Gorton C .Cook, to move inside the main perimeter . The an-ticipated assault did not materialize ; instead theNVA bombarded all three battalions with savage ar-tillery and mortar attacks for the next seven days .

With the passing of the immediate threat to Co nThien, the Marines there went on the offensive . On21 September, Hammond's battalion started asearch and destroy operation 1,800 meters east o fCon Thien . The battalion front, Companies E and F ,moved out on line . Movement was cautious bu tsteady, but maintaining alinement proved difficul tin terraced terrain broken up by hedgerows . Thecommand group and Companies G and H had tostop, waiting for the rear elements to clear theirprevious position .

*Colonel Smith, an experienced combat commander an dveteran of two wars, assumed command of the 9th Marines fromColonel Jerue on 13 September, the day of the attack on the out -post .

**Lieutenant Colonel Peeler had the distinction of servingtwice as the commanding officer of the 2d Battalion, 9th Marinesduring 1967, from 1 January to 4 July and 13 September - 28 Oc-tober . He assumed command in September after enemy morta rfragments severely wounded Lieutenant Colonel William D . Ken tnear Con Thien .

134


3d MarDiv ComdC, October 1967

Company K, 3d Battalion, 26th Marines moves offathickly-wooded hill during a patrol near Camp

Evans . The battalion moved to the base to refit afte rheavy fighting with the 812th NVA Regiment fourmiles southwest of Con Thien on 10 September.

As the lead elements advanced, maintainin gvisual contact became impossible in the thick under -brush . At 0750, Company E encountered fire fro msnipers . Then, when the company pushed forward ,it came under heavy automatic weapons fire fro mthe front and left, which killed one Marine andwounded four . The tempo of the battle increased ;the Communists opened up with mortars . TheMarines, now close to the NVA force, heard shoutedorders and directions for a mortar crew, and the tw osides soon became involved in a deadly grenadeduel .* The battalion could not call in artillerybecause of the close contact, and Company F was inno position to help . Company E slowly withdrew to aposition which offered better cover and established alanding zone to evacuate casualties .

Shortly after the beginning of the engagement ,Lieutenant Colonel Hammond ordered Company Gto envelop the left flank of the NVA position, bu t150 meters of open ground faced the assaultin gtroops . The company advanced to within 30 meter sof the objective, but withdrew in the face of nearb y

*Lance Corporal Jedh C . Barker received a posthumous Meda lof Honor for his actions in this battle . See Appendix D for his cita-tion .

NVA small arms, automatic weapons, and mortar

fire . Meanwhile, Companies E and F linked up an dcovered Company G by fire as it disengaged .

The battle turned into a stalemate . The battalionneeded tanks, but after 96 hours of rain the ap-proaches to the area were impassable . At dusk thefighting died down and the Marines pulled back t othe main battalion perimeter . The NVA force hadkilled 16 Marines and wounded 118 ; 15 of thebodies remained on the battlefield until 10 Octobe rwhen the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines went back an dpicked up its dead in a later operation in the sam earea ." The battalion could not determine the tota lCommunist casualties but reported at least 39 NV Asoldiers killed .* Intelligence officers later identifiedthe enemy force as part of the 90th NVA Regiment .After the action of the 21st, the enemy withdre wacross the Ben Hai River .

The persistent enemy attacks during Septembe rappeared to be a desperate bid for a military victory ,with its attendant propaganda value, before the fal l

3d MarDiv ComdC, September 1967

A CH-53 delivers supplies destined for the 3d Bat-talion, 9th Marines to the muddy landing zone ofthe Con Thien combat base in September 1967.

*Colonel Hammond remembered in 1981 that Major GeneralHochmuth said that G-2 put the number of enemy casualties at

350 . Colonel James W. Hammond, Jr ., Comments on draft ms ,18May81 (Vietnam comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C .)


13 5

monsoon hit . Failing in attacks from three differentdirections, the NVA resorted to a massive attack b yfire against Con Thien . During the period 19-27September, more than 3,000 mortar, artillery, androcket rounds blasted the position .

The Americans retaliated by massing one of th egreatest concentrations of firepower in support of asingle division in the history of the Vietnam war . II IMAF artillery units fired 12,577 rounds at know nand suspected enemy positions in the region, whileships of the Seventh Fleet fired 6,148 rounds at th esame area . Marine and Air Force fighter pilots flewmore than 5,200 close air support sorties and B-5 2bombers of the Strategic Air Command droppedtons of ordnance on the enemy in and north of th eDMZ. The Con Thien garrison applauded th eresults ; North Vietnamese pressure on the outpostsubsided as September drew to a close .

Although enemy activity gradually diminished a tCon Thien ; defense of the base remained a continu-ing ordeal . Marine searching and patrolling activitydiscovered a multitude of bunker and trench com-plexes around the hill mass, most of which wereabout 1,500 meters from the main perimeter . TheMarines destroyed the bunkers, but often durin gsubsequent patrols they found them rebuilt again .During early October the Marines continued to fin dbunkers, but by then these were usually unoccupied .

Experiences of the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines dur-ing October typify the trend of activity around Co nThien during the fall . On 4 October the battalion ,still under the command of Lieutenant ColonelHammond, conducted a sweep southwest of Co nThien in conjunction with Lieutenant Colonel Henr yEnglisch's BLT 2/3 from SLF Bravo . Leaving the lineof departure at 0645, the battalion had found thre eNVA shelters by 0830 . An hour later and 1,000meters further, the Marines found several more am -bush sites and 16 bunkers . Shortly after that, Com-pany H came upon 13 more bunkers while skirtingthe southwest side of the Con Thien slope . Similarly ,Company G found abandoned mortar positions ,loose 82mm mortar rounds, and powder-charge in-crements . Just before 1500, the unmistakable odo rof decaying human flesh led the Marines to the par-tially covered graves of 20 North Vietnamese .Backtracking, Company G discovered fresh enem yfootprints around the previously destroyed bunkers .Tension heightened . The three companies move dback to the perimeter west of Con Thien, but whil epulling back Company G heard movement and call-

ed in artillery to cover their return march . TheMarines observed no NVA casualties, but had n odoubt the Communists were still active .

Several days later the 2d Battalion, 4th Marinesrelieved BLT 2/3 as the defense force for the recentl ybuilt bridge north of Strongpoint C-2 .* The con-struction of the bridge had permitted the reopeningof the vital road to Con Thien which the heav ySeptember rains washed out . The battalion defend-ed the bridge** because the 3d Marine Division wasconcerned that if the enemy destroyed it, they wouldcut the only supply line to Con Thien . i6

The defense of the bridge was no easy task fo rLieutenant Colonel Hammond's battalion . Since itsmove north from Camp Evans on 11 September, th econstant combat around Con Thien had worn thebattalion down from a "foxhole strength" of 952 toabout 462 . The 2d Battalion, 4th Marines had grea tdifficulty in manning all the defensive positionsprepared by the departed full-strength BLT-2 / 3 .1 7

The defensive position around the bridge wa sdivided into quadrants by virtue of the road, whichran roughly north and south, and the stream, whic hran east and west . Company G had the northwes tquadrant ; Company H was on the same side of theroad but across the stream in the southwestquadrant . Company F was in the northeast ; Com-pany E in the southeast . The battalion commandgroup set up beside the stream in Company G's are aand near the center of the position .

At 0125 on 14 October, 25 artillery rounds ,rockets, and 135-150 mortar rounds hit Company H .An ambush squad posted in front of the compan yreported an enemy force moving toward it, and im-mediately took the advancing enemy under fire . TheMarine squad leader notified his company that hehad three casualties and that the enemy seriousl youtnumbered his squad . The company commander ,Captain Arthur P . Brill, Jr ., ordered the squad topull back and, at the same time, called for nigh tdefensive fires to block the avenues of approach tohis position . The battalion requested flare ships to il-luminate the area . Using starlight scopes, snipe rteams watched the enemy as they massed only 5 0

*BLT 2/3 phased out of Operation Kingfisher to resume it sduties with the Special Landing Force .

In 1981, Lieutenant General Metzger described the defens eof this bridge as an " . . . illustration of how our forces were tied t odefending terrain and not free to operate ." Lieutenant Genera l

Louis Metzger, Comments on draft ms, n .d . (1981) (VietnamComment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C .)

136


meters in front of the company . The snipers and twotanks attached to the company opened fire, forcin gthe North Vietnamese to start their assaultprematurely . The rest of the company held fire unti lthe NVA troops reached a clearing 20 meters fromthe wire . Of the entire attacking unit, only two NVAsoldiers reached the wire and Marines killed both asthey tried to breach that obstacle .

The enemy withdrew, leaving bodies behind, bu tthey were far from finished . At 0230, enemy mortar sshelled Company G . Direct hits by RPGs destroyed amachine gun emplacement and several backup posi-tions on the primary avenue of approach into thecompany position .* The NVA force attacke dthrough this break, overran the company comman dpost, and killed the company commander, Captai nJack W. Phillips, and his forward observer . Threeplatoon leaders, two of whom had just arrived inVietnam that morning, also died . The battalion sentits S-3A, Captain James W . McCarter, Jr ., to replacePhillips, but enemy fire killed him before he reache dCompany G . 19 During the confused, hand-to-handcombat some of the North Vietnamese fought theirway within grenade range of the battalion comman dpost in the center of the position .

In the command post, although wounded by a

grenade, Sergeant Paul H . Foster, a member of thefire support coordination center, continued to directmortar and artillery fire upon the enemy . Anothergrenade landed among a group of six Marines .Sergeant Foster threw his flak jacket over the grenad e

and jumped on top of the jacket . The grenade blas tmortally wounded him, but this action saved hi sfellow Marines .** Before the melee ended, th eNorth Vietnamese killed or wounded the entire for -ward air control team . 20 The enemy also killed thebattalion medical chief, and wounded the fire sup -port coordinator, headquarters commandant, an dbattalion sergeant major . 2 1

Lieutenant Colonel Hammond moved what wasleft of his command group to a better locationwithin Company H's position . He ordered CompanyF to move to Company G's right flank and

*Lieutenant Colonel James E . Murphy commented in 1981 thatthe NVA force used tear gas in their attack . " Company G got thebrunt of it and it lasted only for a few minutes but [the gas) great-ly added to the confusion." Lieutenant Colonel James E . Murphy ,Comments on draft ms, 6Aug81(Vietnam comment file, MCHC ,Washington, D .C . )

**Sergeant Foster subsequently received a posthumous Medal

of Honor . See Appendix D for Sergeant Foster ' s citation .

counterattack to push the NVA forces out of th eperimeter . Illumination and automatic weapons fir efrom "Puff, " the AC-47 requested at the beginningof the fight and which arrived about 0330, aided th ecounterattack. By 0430, the enemy began retreatin gout of the position, pursued by Company E .

The next morning the battalion reconsolidate dand evacuated casualties . Twenty-one dead, in-cluding five officers, and 23 wounded were th enight's toll . The NVA lost at least 24 killed . Thatafternoon, Lieutenant General Cushman and Majo rGeneral Hochmuth visited the bridge site . The ygranted a request from Lieutenant Colonel Ham-mond that the new bridge be named Bastard' sBridge* to honor the 21 Marines of the 2d Battalio nwho gave their lives in its defense . At 1400, Ham-mond's battalion turned over the bridge to Lieute-nant Colonel Needham ' s 3d Battalion, 3d Marinesand then moved to Dong Ha where it assumed th emission of regimental reserve after 42 days of clos ecombat .21 .

The last major action of Kingfisher took place dur-ing a 9th Marines operation on 25-28 October . Bythis time Hammond ' s battalion (minus Company Gwhich was attached to the 3d Battalion, 4t hMarines), had moved to Cam Lo to take part in th eoperation . The 1st Battalion, 9th Marines was at ConThien and Needham ' s 3d Battalion, 3d Marines wasat C-2 Bridge . 23 The regimental frag order directe dHammond's Marines to sweep north on the west sid eof Route 561 while the other two battalions provide dblocking forces .

The 2d Battalion, 4th Marines began its sweep a t

0600 on the 25th . Lieutenant Colonel Hammon dplanned to move his understrength battalion all dayto reach the objective before dark . There was noenemy contact but heavy brush slowed the move . Asdarkness approached, the battalion was still abou t1,000 meters from the objective . Hammond decide dto halt the battalion and request additional am-munition before darkness .

Hammond's decision was prudent, given th enature of the enemy in the DMZ region and the re -

*The nickname "Magnificent Bastards" has been claimed by th e2d Battalion, 4th Marines for many years . Tradition traces thenickname to World War II ; however, the Marine Corps Historica lCenter has no evidence to substantiate the claim . It appears likelythat the battalion borrowed the phrase from the book, TheMagnificent Bastards by Lucy Herndon Crockett (New York :1953) which is a fictionalized account of Marines in the Sout h

Pacific in World War II .


13 7

cent combat losses that reduced his entire battalio nto just over 400 men . Additional ammunition coul dpartially compensate for the loss of firepowe rresulting from personnel shortages and the absenc eof Company G . He controlled, at the time, a "bat-talion" only a little larger than a standard reinforce drifle company . The resupply helicopters would giveaway the battalion's location, of course, but he too kthe risk that his command could receive its addi-tional ammunition and move on to the objectiv ebefore the enemy responded .

Helicopters were in short supply at this time ,following the grounding of all CH-46s after a seriesof accidents . III MAF by necessity reserved th eavailable helicopters for meeting emergency requestsfrom units in the field . Hammond ordered an"emergency resupply" of ammunition .

Lieutenant Colonel Hammond took a calculatedrisk and lost . The resupply helicopters did not bringeverything he ordered but, worse, also delivere dsignificant quantities and types of ammunition tha tthe battalion had not ordered, including thre epallets of tactical wire . There was more material thanthe battalion could use or move . Hammond'sMarines would have to spend the night in place andtry to get the excess ammunition flown out the nextmorning. Unfortunately, the helicopters had reveal-ed the Marines' position to the enemy .

The North Vietnamese hit the battalion' sperimeter about 2330 with 10 rocket rounds .* Thebattalion executive officer, Major John J . Lawen-dowski, died and Lieutenant Colonel Hammondand two others required evacuation for wounds .Lieutenant Colonel Frankie E . Allgood, the newlypromoted executive officer of HMM-363, landed hisUH-34D at the battalion command post and flewthe casualties to Dong Ha . Captain Arthur P . Brill ,Jr ., who had moved up the previous day from com-manding Company H to be the battalion operation sofficer, took command of the battalion .

Upon learning that Hammond and Lawendowsk iwere casualties, Colonel Richard B . Smith, comman-ding the 9th Marines, decided to send an officer t otake temporary command of the 2d Battalion, 4t hMarines . The obvious choice was right at hand .Lieutenant Colonel John C . Studt, the regimentaloperations officer, knew the details of the curren t

*The official reports describe these as rockets, however, Colone lHammond believes they were actually artillery rounds . ColonelJames W. Hammond, Jr., Comments on draft ms, 18May8 1(Vietnam comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C .)

operation ; he had drafted the regimental frag orde rimplementing the division's directive for the opera-tion . 24 Colonel Smith sent Studt to the Dong Ha air -field to catch a helicopter to the 2d Battalion .

Lieutenant Colonel Studt reached the airfiel dshortly after medical personnel removed the 2d Bat-talion's casualties from Lieutenant Colonel Allgood' shelicopter . Studt explained his mission and the twoofficers discussed the chances of succeeding i nreaching the 2d Battalion safely . Having had grea tdifficulty in evacuating the four casualties, Allgoo dadvised Studt that he wasn't sure he could make itinto the battalion's position . He also pointed outthat fog was increasing throughout the whole area .Both officers decided, however, that the situation re-quired that the flight be attempted . Studt climbedinto the passenger compartment of the helicopter ,which, he noted, still had fresh blood on the floor .2SAllgood lifted off from the airfield and managed t oland the UH-34D inside the battalion perimete raround 0300 on the 26th .

Studt immediately climbed into Captain Brill' sfoxhole to get an appraisal of the 2d Battalion' ssituation . The first thing that struck Studt were thegaps in the battalion staff. Each time Studt askedabout a key staff position, Brill reported that therespective officer was either a casualty in somehospital or a new officer was filling the position . 2 6The battalion had been ground down during amonth and a half of heavy fighting .

Company G, released back to the 2d Battalion' scontrol, arrived at the defensive perimeter th efollowing morning . The additional strength waswelcome since Lieutenant Colonel Studt had learne dhe would have to leave one company behind t oguard the pile of excess ammunition . Due to othercommitments, the regiment reported, there were n ohelicopters available to move it . "I could not helpbut note," wrote Studt, " that this , short-sighte dpolicy resulted in [III MAF] providing a number ofhelicopters for emergency medevacs, which migh tnot have been necessary had they been a little mor eflexible and appreciative of the tactical situation o nthis operation . " 27

Leaving Company F to guard the ammunition ,the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines moved toward its ob-jective and occupied it by 1300 . Shortly afterward ,enemy 60mm mortars hit the battalion as it organiz-ed its defenses . One hour later, the NVA struck witha heavy mortar barrage, followed by small arms fir efrom the west and northwest . The Marines began

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taking casualties and requested a helicopter

medevac .In an effort to pick up some of the casualties, Cap-

tain Ronald D . Bennett of HMM-363 attempted t oland his UH-34D within the 2d Battalion ' sperimeter . Those on the ground waved him offbecause of intense enemy fire . As Captain Bennettpulled away, enemy fire hit the rear of th e

helicopter, separating the tail pylon . The aircraftcrashed, rolled and began burning about 150 meter soutside the Marine lines . Bennett and a gunner ,Corporal Edward Clem, died in the crash. SecondLieutenant Vernon J . Sharpless and Lance CorporalHoward J . Cones, both seriously injured, managedto crawl from the burning wreckage .

A second helicopter from HMM-363, piloted b yCaptain Frank T . Grassi, tried to land to pick up th esurvivors but could not . Enemy fire hit Grassi in theleg and arm, damaged the helicopter, and slightlywounded one of the gunners and a Navy hospital

corpsman . The aircraft limped away as far as Stron gPoint C-2 where it made a forced landing .

Captain James E. Murphy, the 2d Battalion, 4th

Marines' air liaison officer, who had been calling i n

air strikes in front of Company E, saw Bennett ' s

helicopter go down . With his radio still on his back ,Murphy crawled out to the downed helicopter, mov-ing past NVA soldiers in his path . He found the twosurvivors near the burning helicopter . The thre e

Marines were surrounded and there was no way Mur-phy could get them back to Marine lines . Fortunate-ly, the enemy soldiers in the area either did notknow the three men were there or simply did no t

care . Captain Murphy could hear NVA soldiers near -by and see some movement, however, and called inair strikes within 50 meters of the crashed helicopte rwith the aid of an airborne observer in an 0-1C air -

craft overhead . The latter eventually managed todirect a Marine A-4 attack aircraft to deliver a line ofsmoke so that a UH-1 helicopter could land an drescue the three Marines . 28

The rescue helicopter was a UH-1C from the U .S .Army's 190th Helicopter Assault Company whosepilot volunteered to make the pickup . Enemy fire hi tthe aircraft twice during the rescue and the pilot suf-fered a minor wound in the arm . The UH-1C alsomanaged to reach Strong Point C-2 where it, too ,

made a forced landing .

Lieutenant Colonel Studt's observation during hi sshort period of command convinced him of the nee dfor reinforcements . At his request, the 9th Marines

ordered the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines at C-2 Bridgeto send two companies and a small command groupto the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines ' position . 2 9

Company F still occupied its exposed position an dStudt decided to move it within the battalio nperimeter . He directed the company to have its at-tached engineers blow up the excess ammunition ,but they were unable to do so .* After several hour sof fruitless attempts by the engineers, Studt told th ecompany to leave the ammunition and join the res tof the battalion . The battalion had direct observa-tion of the ammunition pile and would cover it b yfire . a °

Company F reached the perimeter near dusk . Thetwo companies from the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines ar-rived at about the same time . 31 With these rein-forcements, the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines was read yfor any NVA attacks that evening . Studt recounte dthe night's subsequent events :

From before dusk . . . until almost 0200 in the morning ,we were under almost continuous attacks by both direc tand indirect fire, and our perimeter was hit again and

again by ground attacks . . . . The wounded were being ac-cumulated in the vicinity of my CP, which consisted of

foxholes, and their suffering was a cause of anguish . Afterseveral attempts to medevac them by helicopter wer eaborted due to intense enemy fire, we came up with th eplan that on signal every man on the perimeter woul dopen fire on known or suspected enemy positions . . . for afew minutes with an intense volume of fire . During thi sbrief period, a volunteer pilot . . . succeeded in zipping in -to the zone and removing our emergency medevacs . The[trick] . . . probably would not have worked again . 3 3

The ground attacks ceased around 0200 in themorning of the 27th, but the Marines heard enem ymovement for the rest of the night as the Nort hVietnamese removed their dead and wounded .

Dawn revealed 19 enemy bodies within or in sight o fthe Marine positions . Lieutenant Colonel Stud tdecided not to send anyone to sweep the area sinc eany movement still drew enemy artillery and morta r

fire ."The enemy completed its departure by dawn . The

Marines soon did likewise ; on orders from the 9thMarines, the battalion made a tactical withdrawal .Still harrassed by enemy rocket and mortar fire an dcarrying the remainder of its dead and wounded, th e2d Battalion, 4th Marines moved by echelon to

*The reason for the failure to detonate the ammunition is no tclear from the records . Studt himself wrote in 1981 that he neverknew the reason . Col John C . Studt, Comments on draft ms ,9Jul81 (Vietnam comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C .)


13 9

Strong Point C-2 and then to Cam Lo . 34 During th eperiod 25-27 October, eight 2d Battalion Marine sdied and 45 suffered wounds giving the battalion a neffective strength of around 300 Marines . KnownNVA casualties were the 19 bodies counted by th ebattalion on 27 October .

The battalion moved back to Dong Ha on th e28th and resumed its role as the regimental reserve .Lieutenant Colonel William Wiese took comman dof the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines and Lieutenant Col-onel Studt returned to his duties at the 9th Marines 'command post .* That day a message from Lieu -tenant General Cushman arrived, the last line o fwhich read "2/4 has met and beaten the best th eenemy had to offer . Well done . "3 5

Kingfisher listed 1,117 enemy killed and five cap-tured ; Marine casualties totaled 340 killed and 1,46 1wounded. General Westmoreland described theoperation as a "crushing defeat" of the enemy .

The Con Thien area remained a grim place . Theconstant danger of artillery, rocket, and mortar fire ,and massed infantry assaults, and the depressingdrizzle and mud from which there was no escape ,combined to make it miserable for the Marine sthere . Neuropsychiatric or "shell shock" casualties ,relatively unheard of elsewhere in South Vietnam ,were not unusual . Duty on and around the drab hil lmass was referred to by all Marines as their "Turn inthe Barrel, " or "the Meatgrinder ." 3 6

Medina/Bastion Hill/Lam Son 13 8

On 5 October, in conjunction with the arrival of afourth U .S . Army brigade in southern I Corps, Col-onel Herbert E . Ing, Jr .'s 1st Marines, consisting o ftwo battalions, came under the operational contro lof the 3d Marine Division and moved north from th eDa Nang TAOR to the southern part of Quang Tr iProvince. On the 11th, the regiment, reinforced bySLF Alpha, started Operation Medina in the rugge dhills of the Hai Lang National Forest .** The opera-tion was part of III MAF's comprehensive program to

*Studt had hoped to retain command but Colonel Smith wasmore interested in keeping him as the regimental operations of-ficer . "Unfortunately, " wrote Smith, " I extolled [Studt' s] virtue sso much to General Tompkins that he was grabbed later to tak eover a battalion at Khe Sanh where he distinguished himself . "Colonel Richard B . Smith, Comments on draft ms, 21May8 1(Vietnam comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C . )

**SLF Alpha 's (BLT 1/ 3) move to its Medina blocking positionshad the code-name Operation Bastion Hill .

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A18939 3Marines and journalists wait on 2 October in thesafety of a trench beside Con Thien's landing zon euntil the arrival and touchdown of the helicopte rthat will take them from the base back to Dong Ha .

destroy enemy base areas previously left alonebecause of lack of forces . The Hai Lang forest areasouth of Quang Tri was the enemy's Base Area 101 ,the support area for the 5th and 6th NVARegiments . Northeast of the Medina AO, twoARVN airborne battalions conducted OperationLam Son 138 .

Medina started as Lieutenant Colonel Albert F .Belbusti's 1st Battalion, 1st Marines and Lieutenan tColonel Archie Van Winkle's 2d Battalion, 1s tMarines made a helicopter assault landing in theforest . After landing they cleared the area around LZDove and then swept in a northeasterly directio nwhile BLT 1/3 blocked to the east . At 0330 on the11th, Company C of BLT 1/3 came under morta rand small arms fire, followed by a ground assault .The company drove off the attackers and thefighting subsided .

The next day both of the 1st Marines' battalion scontinued searching to the southwest, while BLT 1/ 3remained in its blocking positions. At 1515, Com-pany C, 1st Marines was moving through thic kjungle when the point element engaged 10 NV Asoldiers . The exchange of fire wounded severalMarines . Company C pulled back to a small clearing

NI)

Clxi CtK. toU C

2 C4



14 1

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A421900Operation Medina begins early on 11 October as two battalions of the 1st Marines mak ea helicopter assault into Landing Zone Dove in a III MAF drive to clear enemy base areasin the thick Hai Lang forest, located approximately 12 miles south of Quang Tri City .

and established a perimeter before calling i nhelicopters to pick up wounded. Just after the evac-uation was completed, three NVA companies attack-ed Company C from two sides . The firefight con-tinued as darkness fell ; hand grenades figured heavi-ly in the exchange . The battle surged back and fort hacross the small clearing . At the height of the strug-gle a grenade landed in the company comman dpost . Corporal William T. Perkins, Jr ., a combatphotographer attached to the company, yelled ,"Grenade! " and threw himself on the deadly missile .The explosion killed him . *

Lieutenant Colonel Belbusti reinforced Compan yC with Company D and the two companies drove offthe attacking NVA force . Dawn on the 13th revealed40 enemy dead around the Marines' position . Theenemy attack had killed eight Marines and wounded39 .

After these two fights, the enemy avoided furthe rcontact ; Medina turned into a search for smallgroups of North Vietnamese in the nearly im-penetrable forests . The 1st Marines did find anumber of base camps, but the enemy hadevacuated the sites . The Marines captured more than

3d MarDiv ComdC, October 196 7An air observer with the 1st Battalion, 1st Marinesdirects an air strike early in Operation Medina onenemy positions located on an adjacent ridgeline .

*Corporal Perkins received a posthumous Medal of Honor ,becoming the first Marine combat photographer to receive the na -tion's highest award . See Appendix D for Corporal Perkin s' cita-tion .

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four tons of rice, 16 weapons, and a quantity ofsmall arms ammunition .

The enemy's efforts to elude the sweeping Marineunits resulted in the largest action of the companionOperation Lam Son 138 . On the morning of 20 Oc-tober, the 416th NVA Battalion, a subordinate uni tof the 5th NVA Regiment collided with one of th eARVN airborne companies involved in Operation

Lam Son 138 . The airborne company held and, afte rreinforcement, killed 197 North Vietnamese in th eday-long battle .

Operation Medina ended on the 20th . The SLFbattalion transferred to Colonel William L . Dick ' s4th Marines, which was conducting Operation Fre-mont to the south . The 1st Marines stayed in theformer Medina area and started Operation Osceol athe same day . Osceola was an unspectacular, butsystematic, search for enemy forces in the Hai Lan gforest .

Adjustments Within the 3d Marine Division

A new series of operations began in November .Only Osceola continued from October . The 3d

3d MarDiv ComdC, October 196 7

A Marine with the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines placesexplosives before blowing a helicopter landing zon ein the Hai Lang forest during Operation Medina.


An LVTP-5 carries members of the 1st AmphibianTractor Battalion, operating as infantrymen, on asweep of the shoreline north of the Cua Viet River inSeptember. The battalion continued these patrols inNovember and December in Operation Napoleon .

Marine Division split the Kingfisher TAOR in two :Kentucky, embracing the region including Gi oLinh, Con Thien, Cam Lo, and Dong Ha cameunder the control of Colonel Richard B . Smith's 9thMarines ; and Lancaster, to the west, covered Cam pCarroll, the Rockpile, and Ca Lu under ColonelJoseph E . LoPrete's 3d Marines . The division re -named Operation Ardmore at Khe Sanh to Scotlan dand continued it as a one-battalion operation underthe control of Colonel David E . Lownds' 26thMarines . On the coast, the 1st Amphibian TractorBattalion conducted Operation Napoleon north ofthe Cua Viet River . In Thua Thien Province, Colone lWilliam L. Dick's 4th Marines continued to cover ap-proaches to Hue City west of Route 1 as Operatio nNeosho replaced Fremont . The 3d Marine Divisio nhad tactical responsibility for all territory west o fHighway 1 in the northern two provinces of Quan gTri and Thua Thien, while the 1st ARVN Divisio nwas responsible for all terrain east of the road exceptfor the Napoleon operational area north of the CuaViet River .

Artillery support for all of these operations cam efrom Colonel Edwin S . Schick, Jr .'s 12th Marines .Composed of five Marine artillery battalions, thre eArmy artillery battalions, and two Marine separate


14 3

batteries, it was the largest artillery regiment in th ehistory of the Marine Corps . The reinforced regi-ment's 220 weapons 37 were located throughout th edivision TAOR . Each infantry regiment could cal lupon a direct support battalion of 105mm

howitzers . In addition, the artillery regiment' smedium 155mm howitzers and guns, and heav y8-inch howitzers and 175mm guns, provided rein-forcing or general support fires .

While the new operations were beginning, thedivision headquarters at Phu Bai prepared for a visi tfrom Vice President Hubert H . Humphrey on 1

November . After the stop at the division comman dpost, the Vice President flew over the division 's areaof operations ; Upon his return to Da Nang, h epresented the Presidential Unit Citation to the 3 dMarine Division for "extraordinary heroism an doutstanding performance of duty in action agains tNorth Vietnamese and insurgent Communist force sin the Republic of Vietnam from 8 March 1965 to 1 5September 1967 . "

After pinning the streamer on the division colors ,the Vice President warmly congratulated the divisioncommander, Major General Hochmuth . This wasthe last official ceremony that the general attended .

Major General Hochmuth died on 14 Novembe rwhen his UH-1E exploded and crashed five mile snorthwest of Hue .

Colonel William L . Dick, commanding the 4t hMarines at Phu Bai, learned of the crash around 140 0on 14 November . Since he had a helicopter sittin gon a pad at his headquarters, Dick, accompanied b yhis operations officer, Major James D . Beans, an dthe regimental sergeant major, quickly reached th ecrash scene . Colonel Dick described the rescue at -tempt :

After several passes, I spotted the Huey upside down i na rice paddy filled to the brim by the heavy rains whichhad been falling for several weeks . . . . I directed thehelicopter pilot to land on the paddy dike nearest the cras hsite from where the three of us walked through about 20 0yards of.paddy water until we reached the wreckage . Therewere flames on the water's surface around the aircraft .While the sergeant major attempted to extinguish these ,Major Beans and I commenced diving beneath the surface ,groping through the water for possible survivors . We hadno idea just how long it had been since the crash had oc-curred . This was a difficult task, as you can imagine, sinc ethe water was full of silt, not to mention leeches, and im-possible to see through . The three of us were joined by aVietnamese farmer who refused to identify himself andcould be distinguished only by a small gold crucifix around

A machine gun team from Company F, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines pauses during it smovement in November in Operation Lancaster in the 9th Marines' portion of th e

former Operation Kingfisher area. The team wears its ammunition bandolier-style .3d MarDiv ComdC, November 1967

144


Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A19023 5MajGen Bruno A. Hochmuth, the commanding general of the 3d Marine Division ,wearing a rainsuit as protection from the monsoon, sits in a UN-1E helicopter prior to aroutine inspection of the divisional area on 7 November, one week prior to his death .

his neck . The four of us, after getting rid of the aviatio nfuel flames, repeatedly went below the surface into thehelicopter cabin and by touch, finally found the bodies ,one by one, of the six who had died in the crash . Thehelicopter had turned upside down just before impactwhich made the situation even more difficult . The lastbody recovered was General Hochmuth . I found him inthe rear seat of the helicopter, the spot where he usuallytraveled when visiting the various command posts . 38

Major General Rathvon McC . Tompkins, aveteran of more than 32 years' Marine service an dholder of the Navy Cross as a battalion commande rat Saipan, received immediate orders as Genera lHochmuth's replacement . Brigadier General Loui sMetzger, the assistant division commander, assumedcommand until General Tompkins arrived from theUnited States on 28 November .

One of General Tompkins' first steps after his ar-rival was to discuss the overall situation with his divi -sion operations officer, Colonel James R . Stockman ,who had commanded an 81mm mortar platoo nunder Tompkins on Saipan . "Tell me, " said Tom-


pkins, "about the operational folklore in the divi-

MajGen Rathvon McC. Tompkins inspects an hono rsion's area of operations ." Stockman replied with,

guard on 28 November during the ceremony at Daamong other things, descriptions of the enemy and

Nang in which he assumed command of the 3dthe terrain and the frustrations of fighting under the

Marine Division after MajGen Hochmuth 's death .


14 5

restrictions imposed by MACV and Washington .Stockman recalled that Tompkins disliked th esystem which considered infantry battalions as inter -changeable parts to be shifted from one regimenta lheadquarters to another, depending upon the tac-tical situation . Tompkins accepted it, however, a s"temporary operational folklore, " which he wouldhave to live with . "He faced," wrote Stockman, " aworsening operational situation in the late part o f1967 with as much fortitude and optimism a shumanly possible ." 3 9

During November and December, the mos tsignificant activity in the 3d Marine Division ' s zoneof action was small unit fighting near the strong -point obstacle system around Con Thien and GioLinh . In November, platoon and company-size NV Aunits operated from well camouflaged bunkers inthe area, trying to ambush Marine patrols and t ohinder the system's construction . The Marinescountered with attacks that drove the NVA units ou tof their positions on four different occasions duringNovembet, killing 65 Communists . In addition ,Marine patrols found and destroyed three extensiv e


Company G, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines engages a nNVA unit on 3 December during the portion ofOperation Kentucky conducted to prevent enem yinterference with the construction of Strongpoin tA-3 of the barrier system south of the DMZ . The 3dMarine Division originally planned to call this pro-tective effort Operation Newton but decided on 28November to consider it as simply part of Kentucky .


A patrol from Company F, 9th Marines, part of th escreening effort during the construction of Strong -point A-3, moves out carefully after finding fres henemy footprints and bunkers on 22 December.

bunker systems. On 29 November, three Marine bat-talions and two ARVN battalions began clearin goperations within the Kentucky TAOR between Co nThien and Gio Linh, the planned site of StrongPoint A-3 of the proposed barrier plan, or"McNamara wall ." The Marine units swept south ofCon Thien eastward to Site A-3, while the ARV Nunits moved from near Gio Linh westward to clear aroad to the strong point location . The following day ,Lieutenant Colonel William M . Cryan's 2d Bat-talion, 9th Marines found a North Vietnamese com-pany in bunkers two and one-half miles northeast ofCon Thien . The battalion maneuvered to envelo pthe enemy and overran the position by 1800, killin g41 defenders . Marine casualties totaled 15 killed and53 wounded requiring evacuation .

Although the Marine and ARVN units continue dscreening operations north of A-3 during December ,the largest engagement during the month took plac esoutheast of Gio Linh in the Napoleon area of opera-tion . Lieutenant Colonel Edward R . Toner's 1st Am-phibian Tractor Battalion and Company F, 2d Bat-talion, 4th Marines were protecting the movement ofbuilding materials to Strongpoint C-4 on the coast ,two kilometers north of the Cua Viet River . Com-pany F, under the operational control of the tracto rbattalion, occupied Strongpoint C-4 . Platoon and

146


squad patrols routinely operated 2,000 meters nort hof C-4 as forward security for both the strongpoin tand the battalion ' s position at Cua Viet port facility .

Early in the afternoon of the 10th, two squad spatrolled near the fishing village of Ha Loi Tay .Their operational area was a sea of sand dunes, inter-rupted by a strip of scrub pine growth an dhedgerows dotting the coastline . As they approache da break in the coastal tree line south of the village ,sniper fire surprised them . The Marines fired back ,killing eight North Vietnamese . The enemy fire kill-ed one Marine and wounded three in this brief en -counter .

As the Marines checked the area, they discovere d20-25 NVA soldiers, some wearing Americanhelmets and flak jackets . The Marines opened fireand called for reinforcements . The company com-mander, First Lieutenant Michael H . Gavlick ,radioed the situation to the battalion CP, and thentook a platoon and the third squad of the engagedplatoon forward to join the battle .

Contact continued throughout the afternoon .Before dark, Lieutenant Colonel Toner ordered tw oprovisional rifle platoons from his Company B andtwo LVTH-6s to go to the scene of contact to assist .As darkness settled, Lieutenant Gavlick drew hi scomposite force into a tight perimeter . At 0630 onthe 11th, the composite unit moved out under alight drizzle toward the area of the previous day's ac-tion . At 0800, lead elements spotted 40 of theenemy trying to move south across the break in thetree line . The Marines observed 11 NVA soldiers dig-ging a mortar position and another 15 movin gbehind a sand dune to the north . While the Marine stook these enemy under fire with artillery and th eLVTH-6s, Lieutenant Colonel Toner moved hi sCompany A, organized as an infantry unit, and hi scommand group to Strong Point C-4 . At the sametime, the U.S . advisor with the ARVN battalion oc-cupying Strong Point A-1, 2,500 meters across th esand dunes west of the contact, asked if his battalio ncould help . Toner asked the ARVN battalion tomove a unit into a blocking position southwest o fthe action . The NVA force had moved around to th ewest of the Marines and were now attacking from th esouth . The advisor informed Toner that an ARVNcompany would move to the desired blocking posi-tion . Fifteen of the enemy had already attacked th eMarines and, although driven off, had fired 10 RP Gantitank rounds . One of these rounds hit a LVTH- 6on the bow, but the round glanced off without

damaging the tractor . The LVTH-6 destroyed th eantitank gunners' position with direct 105m mhowitzer fire .

The number of enemy troops involved in the bat-tle increased . A 30-minute firelight began ; Gavlick' scomposite company took heavy small arms fire fro mthree sides, then the Communists began hitting th eMarines with mortars . Throughout the action, thetwo LVTH-6s maneuvered back and forth to engagethe enemy, often firing at ranges between 50 to 15 0meters . The remaining four LVTH-6s at Cua Vie tand a detachment of 4 .2-inch mortars at C-4 adde dtheir fire to the battle .

As the Marines tightened their perimeter, th eNVA made a second assault . Fifty-five of the enem yattacked from the north, 12 more came in from thenortheast, and 20 others from the south . Again ,mortar fire supported their assault . The Marine sresponded with artillery, and used naval gunfire tohold back enemy reinforcements . The Communis tassault failed, but individual soldiers continued t opop up around the perimeter . One audacious NV Amortar crew, protected by infantry, went into actio non an exposed sand dune only 90 meters from th eMarine perimeter . They fired six rounds beforemachine guns and direct fire from one of theLVTH-6s killed them .

3d MarDiv ComdC, December 196 7

PFC F. N. Bunton carries a small Christmas tree o nhis pack while on Operation Kentucky with Com-pany C, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines in December .


14 7

By this time, the ARVN company had crossed th esand dunes and was moving into its blocking posi-tion. As it entered the position, the company spot-ted a mortar crew that had been giving the Marine strouble from the southwest . After a brief fire fightthe enemy mortar crew ran away to the north, leav-ing two bodies behind . After this, the fightin gdwindled to sniper fife .

Lieutenant Colonel Toner ordered Company A t osweep the area north of C-4 and clear it of any re-maining NVA soldiers . At the same time, heordered Lieutenant Gavlick to withdraw his com-posite company to C-4 . Artillery and naval gunfir econtinued to shell the tree line north of the battl eposition . As Lieutenant Gavlick's force moved south ,they found a supply dump bordered by communica-tions wire strung waist high from trees as a guide .The site contained many full storage bins, dug int othe sand dunes next to the trail . Live vegetation

camouflaged their trap-door entrances . The Marinesdestroyed the bins as they discovered them, afte rwhich they returned to Stongpoint C-4 . The day-long battle resulted in 54 enemy known killed ,while the composite Marine unit suffered 20 wound -ed .

As the year came to a close, all of the operationswhich had started in November remained in pro-gress . Although contact was light, there were signs ofrenewed enemy activity in the Scotland TAOR. In-telligence officers reported at least two NVA divi-sions, the 325C and 304th, moving into the KheSanh region . Because of these reports, General Tom-pkins strengthened Khe Sanh with an additionalbattalion during December and prepared to deplo ymore reinforcements on short notice . The year 1967ended as it had begun ; a major invasion of northernQuang Tri Province appeared to be the enemy's nex tmove .

PART V

SPECIAL EFFORTS

CHAPTER 1 1

The Special Landing ForceDoctrine Versus Expedient—Forming a Second SLF— Continuing Operations Throughout the Yea r

Doctrine Versus Expedient

In 1967 the Seventh Fleet's Special Landing Force(SLF) was the Pacific Command's strategic reserve fo rall of Southeast Asia, as well as Vietnam . The SL Fcontained a Marine command element of approx-imately the same organization as an infantr yregimental staff; a Marine battalion landing team ,consisting of a Marine infantry battalion reinforcedby artillery, a small logistics support unit, and othe relements to support independent operation ; and aMarine helicopter squadron . The Marine SLF com-mander reported directly to the Navy amphibiouscommander . Although under the overall operationa lcontrol of the Seventh Fleet, the SLF was readil yavailable for MACV use in Vietnam .

SLF operations in 1967 concentrated in I Corps .The reasons for this change in practice were not en-tirely the result of a national level strategy for th econduct of the war. Without considering the Com-munists' strategy, there were sufficient conflictin ginterests within the many command levels of th eU.S . Armed Forces to cause diverse opinions of th emost appropriate use of this unique striking force .

Opinions were divided even within the Marin eCorps . In III MAF, Marine division and wing com-manders wanted to control their own battalions an dsquadrons which were siphoned off to man the SLF .Continuing reappraisals of required troop strengthto "do the job" in I Corps amplified this desire .MACV and III MAF did not want troops floating of fthe coast when they could be "in country" and, mostprobably, in contact . However, the personnel in theSLF did not count against the "in-country" authoriz-ed troop strength ceilings and, as one operations of-ficer noted, the SLF at least served as a source ofemergency reinforcements following commitment o fa division's reserve .' Other Marine commanders ,primarily those outside Vietnam, such as BrigaiderGeneral Louis Metzger of the 9th Marine Am-phibious Brigade on Okinawa, advocated a closeadherence to approved amphibious doctrine .

General Metzger later wrote, "As Commandin gGeneral, 9th MAB, and at the direction of CG ,FMFPac, Lieutenant General Krulak, I was precise infollowing the established amphibious operationa lcommand relationships and logistic support . It was aconstant struggle, particularly with the Wing an dDivision commanders ."2

Compounding the problem was the Sevent hFleet's position, reinforced by approved doctrine ,that the Navy-Marine amphibious capability provid-ed by the Amphibious Ready Group/Special Lan -ding Force organization added great flexibility to th eallied strategic options, as well as the Vietnamesetactical situation . U.S. Air Force consideration sentered into the controversy because of air space con-trol requirements . A final, but certainly not over -riding, consideration in the III MAF stance was theMarine Corps' situation in I Corps . ' If additionalMACV, in this case U .S . Army, troops could bereleased to go into lower I Corps, the 1st Marin eDivision would be able to move north to cover DaNang, thereby allowing the 3d Marine Division t oconcentrate in northern I Corps . This would permitthe 1st and 2d ARVN Divisions to devote thei renergies to pacification . These moves, however ,could occur only if the Marine divisions could ac-complish their mission without the SLF battalion . InJanuary of 1967, all of the ramifications of this com-plex situation were not in evidence, but two basicquestions were starting to form . What Marine for-mations would provide the SLF with its landingforces and where should it be used ?

The Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) gained anadditional landing ship, tank (LST) in January 1967 ,bringing the ARG ship total to five . The other shipsin the group were : an amphibious assault ship(LPH), a dock landing ship (LSD), an attac ktransport (APA), and an amphibious transport doc k(LPD) .

Early in 1967, the Joint Chiefs of Staff made tw osignificant decisions . They authorized the formation

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THE SPECIAL LANDING FORCE

15 1

of a second SLF and directed CinCPac to commitboth SLFs to extended operations in Vietnam .Neither of these decisions were restrictive as far asthe location of SLF landings, but the provision of th erequired logistic support provided a major reaso nwhy SLF operations became a purely I Corps func-tion .

Under the heading of "Logistic Support for th eSpecial Landing Force" in April, FMFPac's report ofMarine operations in Vietnam revealed a majorreason for concentrating SLF operations in I Corps ;the support structure dictated operational location .The report stated :

With the decision by the Joint Chiefs of Staff` . . . tocommit the SLFs to extended operations in Vietnam, thenormal logistic support procedure required some changes .The CG, III MAF now provides logistic support when theSLF operates in areas contiguous to III MAF logistic in-stallations . When operating in areas isolated fro mestablished logistic support areas, ground units of the SLFutilize their own resources, with -stocks reconstituted a spracticable from the Force Logistic Command . Whileoperating from the LPH, aviation units of the SLF will besupported by the LPH but, when operating ashore in theIII MAF area of operations, support by the 1st Marine Air -craft Wing will augment that positioned by 9th MA Baboard ship . If the operations ashore extend beyond 1 5days, support of helicopters will become the responsibilityof CG, III MAF . When the SLF operates ashore in loca-tions other than I CTZ (after 15 days), CG, III MAF wil lprovide only aeronautical spares and special supportequipment . All other logistic support responsibilities wil lremain with CG, 9th MAB [on Okinawa] . *

A final determinant for SLF commitments whichreceived due consideration was the Communist planfor 1967 . As the year opened with the sour memoryof an uneasy and far from inviolate 48-hour Ne wYear's truce, there were continuing indications ofenemy buildups and unit movements in and northof the DMZ. As events proved, the Marine occupa-tion of the bases at Con Thien and remote, but vital ,Khe Sanh alarmed the Communists, but at this earl ystage of the year there were no clear indications ofCommunist intentions in northern I Corps .Elsewhere in the corps area, the enemy obviouslywould continue to exert as much pressure as possibl e

*"When the 9th MAB assumed responsibility for Marine avia-tion and ground units in the Western Pacific which were not i nVietnam, it became an important part of SLF operations . . . . Th eBrigade's aviation component, MAG-15, became a compositeMAG consisting of helicopters, KC-130s, and fixed-wing attac kand fighter aircraft, and, as such, was one of the largest air group swe have ever had ." Col David O . Takala, Comments on draft ms,2Jun81 (Vietnam comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C .)

on allied units in order to immobilize or at leas tdistract them . The year 1967 tested the validity o fthe SLF concept as the Communists forced the expe-dient of long and often unrewarding SLF com-mitments on the Marine commanders in I Corps .

Operation Deckhouse V

6 - 15 January 1967

The first SLF operation of 1967, Deckhouse V, wassignificant for two reasons . It was a sizable, combin-ed U.S . Marine and Vietnamese Marine amphibiousoperation . More ominously, for the proponents o fthe SLF concept, it was the last SLF landing to takeplace beyond the boundaries of I Corps .

The ARG, under Captain John D . Westervelt ,USN, with Colonel Harry D . Wortman's SLF em -barked, steamed south to the coast of Kien Ho aProvince in IV Corps for the landing . Deckhouse Vwas the only SLF operation for Major James L . Day'sBLT 1/9 and it marked the end of SLF duty for Lieu -tenant Colonel Marshall B . Armstrong's HMM-362 .

D-day for Deckhouse V was 6 January . Both BLT1/9 and elements of Vietnamese Marine Brigad eForce Bravo, primarily consisting of the 3d and 4t hVietnamese Marine Battalions, enjoyed supportthroughout the operation from HMM-362's mixe dforce of UH-34 and CH-46 helicopters operatingfrom the USS Iwo Jima (LPH 2) . The combinedseaborne and heliborne force assaulted an area o fsuspected Viet Cong concentrations on the coast be-tween the Co Chien and Ham Luong reaches of th eMekong River . Lasting until 15 January, the opera-tion produced unspectacular results . The combinedforce killed only 21 Viet Cong, destroyed two smal larms workshops, and captured 44 weapons and 4 2tons of rice . Seven U .S . Marines died and one Viet-namese Marine died accidentally .

Some participants attributed Deckhouse V'sfailure to information leaks . The Marines en -countered only local force VC in the operationalarea, but prisoners stated that larger VC units hadbeen there before the landings . Someone told Cap-tain Westervelt—he did not hear it himself—that aPhilippine radio station broadcast the news when th eARG departed Subic Bay that the Marines wereheaded for the Mekong Delta . 3

Many other difficulties marred the execution ofthe combined operation . Communications wer ebad, rough seas interfered, planning was hurried ,and on D plus 1 the 4th Battalion VNMC endured a



Two men of BLT 1 /9 look out over some of the flooded rice paddies that hampere dmobility in Vietnam's Delta region during Operation Deckhouse V in January 1967 .

near record-breaking ship-to-shore landing-craftmove of 23 miles, rivaled only by some of the U .S .shore-to-shore operations in the Pacific durin gWorld War II . Captain Westervelt recalled these dif-ficulties :

The Navy aspects of the Deckhouse V landings were for-midable . Normal operating depths of water for the LPH ,LPD and other deep draft ships in the Amphibious Read yGroup were about 8 to 10 miles to seaward off the coasta lareas of Kien Hoa between the Co Chien and Ham Loun gRivers . The 8-inch gun cruiser Canberra had a fire supportstation some eight miles, as I recall, from the impact area sfor her pre-assault bombardment . Water depths adequat efor LST and rocket ship passage over the shallow bar intopositions for the assault landings obtained only at hig htide . Because an early morning landing time was require dfor the Marine assault forces in the LVT5 vehicles, thi smeant that, to protect the surprise features of th elandings, the LSTs and rocket ships had to proceed ove rthe bar late in the preceding evening at high tide to be i nposition by dawn . . . .

The long distance off-shore required by the principa lARG ships plus the fact that some landing beaches wer ewell upstream from the seaward beaches accounted for thelong boat rides (up to 23 miles) required for some of thetroops .

The seas were very rough on the original D-Day (4 Jan )and again on 5 Jan, so the actual D-Day on 6 Jan was 2

days late . However, even on the 6th it was not possible t oload the [Vietnamese Marines] from the Henrico intoLCM6's alongside, so Henrico, Thomaston and Vancouverreturned to Vung Tau, transferred Henrico s troops to theLPD and LSD so loading could take place in the welldecks . The [Vietanamese Marines] actually landed on th e7th . 4 *

The operation encountered problems at an evenhigher level . Amphibious doctrine called for the am-phibious task force commander to control all aircraftin the amphibious operations area . Normally, theseaircraft would come from the Navy and Marin eCorps . The location of Deckhouse V created specia lcircumstances, however, that dictated that all ai rsupport come from the Seventh Air Force . AsBrigadier General John R . Chaisson later recalled ,the commander of Seventh Air Force, Major GeneralWilliam W. Momyer, agreed with Navy control o faircraft in a traditional amphibious assault against ahostile shore . In the Mekong Delta, however, wit hthe Air Force air control system already in place ,General Momyer saw no valid reason to change, theexisting system just because an amphibious force

*See Chapter 12 for the U .S . Marine advisors' accounts of th eVNMC participation in Deckhouse V .


15 3

temporarily was operating in the area . GeneralWestmoreland backed the Navy in this argument inthis case but all future SLF operations were to be inthe I Corps area where such complicated commandrelationships could be avoided . ,

Deckhouse VI/Desoto

16 February - 3 March 196 7

During late January the two main components o fthe SLF changed . Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth E .Huntington's HMM-363 relieved HMM-362 an dLieutenant Colonel Jack Westerman's BLT 1/ 4replaced BLT 1/9 . Sailing from the Philippines, thenewly constituted SLF arrived off the coast of Viet-nam on the 14th of February .

While the SLF underwent its transition, signifi-cant changes occurred in I Corps . To release mor eARVN troops for pacification work, U.S . MarineTask Force X-Ray, commanded by Brigadier Genera lWilliam A . Stiles, relieved Vietnamese troops ofcombat duties in southern Quang Ngai Province i nJanuary . General Stiles promptly initiated Operatio nDesoto, a search and destroy operation directe dagainst known Communist strongholds in th eregion . To augment Desoto, the SLF received order sto operate in an area south of Task Force X-Ray ' sAO. The SLF operation was Deckhouse VI . As inDeckhouse V, Colonel Wortman commanded theSLF and Captain Westervelt, the ARG . 6

The mission assigned to the SLF ground element ,BLT 1/4, called for it to disrupt enemy movement i nthe Sa Huynh salt flats, search northward in the Nui

Dau area, and, finally, link up with the 3d Bat-talion, 7th Marines, then operating around Nui Da uin Operation Desoto .

At 0800 on 16 February, two rocket-firing landin gships started the naval gunfire preparation for th eDeckhouse VI landings . Fifty-five minutes later, th efirst wave of HMM-363's helicopters lifted off th edeck of the Iwo Jima and headed inland with th eassault company, Company A . Company C lande din LVTs near Tach By and helicopters ferried the res tof the battalion inland . The landings were unoppos-ed .

Brigadier General Louis Metzger, the comman-ding general of the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigad ebased on Okinawa, was there to observe this landin gand commented later on the assault phase . Hewrote :

Because of the insistence of MACV a NOTAM [Notic eto Airmen] was published several days before each am-phibious operation, I suppose to protect any commercia lair in the area . It didn't take a very effective intelligencesystem for the Viet Cong and/or NVA to know just wher eand when a landing was going to take place . Secondly, Iwas concerned that even though this landing was takin gplace ina populated area, the amphibious force carried ou troutine naval gunfire and air strikes . . . . Civiliancasualties did result . Following the operation, I discussedthe matter with Commander 7th Fleet [Admiral John H .Hyland] and he supported my position . At least as long asI was CG 9th MAB the NGF and Air Strikes in futur elandings in populated areas were on call a

Captain Westervelt later commented on a numbe rof problems encountered during the assault landingin Deckhouse VI . He wrote :

Deckhouse VI was treated as a regular assault landin gcomplete with heavy pre-assault fires for the boat landings .In retrospect, because of the U.S . Army forces operatin gjust to the south and west and U .S . Marines operating t othe north and west of the assault area, the pre-assault fire sshould have been "on call ." There were weather problem sat Deckhouse VI when heavy fog and rain obscured thelanding zones on D-Day and caused a one-day postpone-ment . Surface landings could have been carried out . Thecruiser firing pre-assault fires commenced fire in spite ofD-Day cancellation and probably gave some indication toany VC in the area that something unusual might b escheduled . However, this was improbable because the areawas normally frequented by gunfire support destroyers .

The population of the villages just south of Sa Huynhcongregated on the eastern face of a ridge, which slopedup from the boat landing area, to watch the Marine lan-ding show . Originally, the pre-assault fires had includedthis area, but this had been changed on the advice of arepresentative from the Province Chiefs staff on board theflagship . He pointed with a dirty finger to the ridge an dforced out his interpretation of " Friend" in English . Wetook him at his word and put those particular fires "oncall ."8

The opening phase of Deckhouse VI was unevent-ful . The SLF planners had suspected this would b ethe case . True to form, local Communist units con-centrated on delaying and harassing tactics . The BLTconfirmed the Communist presence in the area b ydestroying 167 fortifications and capturing 20 ton sof assorted supplies during the 32 days of Phase I .Though there never were any major contacts, th eBLT claimed 201 VC killed during this period ; onlysix Marines died . Unfortunately, on 25 February, th eHMM-363 commander, Lieutenant Colone lHuntington, and his copilot received wounds durin ga troop lift ; the squadron executive officer, MajorMarvin E . Day, assumed command on the 28th an dcontinued in command for the duration of

154



Heavy monsoon rains flooded the wide expanse of rice paddies through which theseMarines are wading during Operation Deckhouse VI near the coast in February 1967 .

which hit eight of the 14 helicopters in the assaultlift ; and put six out of action . All other loadedhelicopters diverted to the beach area while suppor-ting Marine aircraft strafed and rocketed the VCdefenders . Fortunately for the isolated Marines ofthe assault element, the Communists pulled out andthat afternoon the rest of the battalion linked upwith its first wave . By dark the BLT had consolidate dnear LZ Bat and began preparations for the nex tday's search and destroy operation .

Other than the. opposed landing at LZ Bat, Phas e


A member of Company A, 1st Battalion, 4t hMarines hits the deck as his unit comes under fire inLanding Zone Bat during Deckhouse VI, the SLF 'scompanion piece to Operation Desoto in February .

Deckhouse VI . Phase I ended on 26 February whe nthe SLF Commander, Colonel Wortman, ordered atactical withdrawal of the SLF from the Sa Huyn harea to its ships to prepare for Phase II .

Only 14 and one-half hours after the last elemen tof the battalion left the Sa Huynh salt flats, the SL Flanded again, this time 10 kilometers north of SaHuynh. Phase II of Deckhouse VI, by now in-tegrated as part of the combined 7th Marines andARVN Operation Desoto, started at 0830 on 2 7February .

As the SLF helicopters approached LZ Bat, fiv emiles inland from the beach, they met heavy fire

Infantrymen from BLT 1 /4 rush a wounded Marin eto a waiting CH-34D helicopter from HMM-363 fora flight to the amphibious ship USS Iwo Jima on 23February 1967 during Operation Deckhouse VI .



15 5

II action almost repeated Phase I . Occasional contac tand intermittent sniper fire marked the only enemyreactions . In the six days required to accomplish th esecond phase, the battalion killed 78 more VC ,destroyed 145 fortifications, and captured an addi-tional five tons of supplies . Similarly, as in Phase I ,the price totaled six more Marines dead . DeckhouseVI concluded on 3 March and the SLF promptly sail-ed for the Philippines; it returned to Vietnam ,however, long before the month ended .

Beacon Hill I

20 March - 1 April 1967

In the spring of 1967, III MAF faced a growingCommunist capability to overrun the Marine base atGio Linh and its appealing prize of four 175m mguns . Units of the 3d Marine Division committed t oOperation Prairie remained thinly spread over an ex-tremely large area . Still more unsettling, intelligenc esources reported five NVA infantry battalions in o rnear the eastern portion of the DMZ .

In response to this threat, the SLF, offshore sinc e14 March, went into action once more on the 20th . *Lieutenant Colonel Westerman's BLT 1/4, an dHMM-363 commanded by newly-promoted Lieu -tenant Colonel Day, the former squadron executiv eofficer, landed on the coast north of the Cua Viet .Operation Beacon Hill had begun.

*The 1st Marine .Aircraft Wing reinforced HMM-363 with adetachment of UH-lEs and CH-53s .

A Navy hospital corpsman with Company D, 4thMarines treats a wounded Marine under fire inOperation Beacon Hill north of Cua Viet in March .

3d MarDiv ComdC, March 1967

3d MarDiv ComdC, March 196 7An unshaven Marine rifleman carefully remove senemy equipment from a bunker in the North Viet-namese defense line destroyed in Operation BeaconHill by BLT 1 /4 on 26 March after an intense two -day preliminary bombardment by air and artillery .

Contact was light until 21 March when the BL Tengaged about 80 NVA troops, killing 14 . The nex tday the battalion made contact again between Gi oLinh and Con Thien . After a stiff fight the enemy ,apparently a company, withdrew leaving 43 bodiesbehind. Progress during both days was slow becausethe NVA laced their positions with connecting tun-nels which required detailed search .

On the 26th, after a two-day air and artillerypreparation, the BLT broke through two well -prepared defensive trench lines . Again, the Marine sencountered interconnecting tunnels : Finding thetunnels required care because the enemy had con-cealed them skillfully among the hedgerows . As thebattalion cracked the position, the Communist sagain withdrew . Only sniper fire and minor rea rguard actions slowed the advancing Marines . On 28March, BLT 1/4 shifted to the operational control o fthe 3d Marines and occupied a blocking positio n1,300 meters south of the Con Thien perimeter i nsupport of a 3d Marines attack. This was the las tphase of Beacon Hill and the operation ended on 1April .

Beacon Hill results appeared promising . AlthoughBLT 1/4 had suffered 29 Marines killed and 23 0wounded, it reported 334 NVA dead even thoughthe Communists had fought from positions whichwere difficult to identify, much less exploit .

With the end of Beacon Hill, the 1st Battalion ,4th Marines transferred from the SLF to the 3 dMarine Division . The 3d Battalion, 4th Marines,



LCpI Claude Tucker stands guard while the commanders of the two Special Landing

Forces, Col Henry D . IVortman (center) of SLF Bravo and Col James A . Gallo of SLFAlpha look over a suspected Viet Cong on the first day of Operation Deckhouse VI .

commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Wendell N .Vest, a regular line battalion scheduled forrehabilitation on Okinawa, started loading on boar dthe empty ships of the ARG shipping on 2 April .The transports sailed on the 5th .

While this exchange of units, ships, and roles too kplace, Marines on Okinawa were implementing thetwin SLF concept . HMM-363 and the 1st Battalion ,3d Marines joined SLF Alpha (Task Group 79 .4) andthe 2d Battalion, 3d Marines and HMM-164 became

part of SLF Bravo (Task Group 79 .5) battalion . Task

Group 79 .5 had operated as the single SLF sinc e1965, but during the transitional period of March -

April 1967, TG 79 .5, now designated SLF Bravo ,went through a standdown phase . Neither of theSLFs were in an offshore ready position during earl yApril 1967 . SLF Alpha, on board the ARG ship swhich sailed on 10 April, arrived on station near th eDMZ on the 18th. The ships carrying SLF Brav ofollowed shortly thereafter, sailing on 17 April .

Beacon Star

22 April - 12 May 1967

Beacon Star was the first operation for newly

designated SLF Bravo. As Navy Captain Richard L .Cochrane's ARG steamed toward northern I CTZ ,Colonel Wortman, the SLF commander sinc eSeptember 1966, experienced normal prelandin g

doubts and anxieties . One reassuring factor was tha tboth of his major subordinate units were I Corp sveterans . The helicopter squadron, HMM-164, com-manded by Lieutenant Colonel Rodney D .McKitrick, had been in Vietnam since February1966, and Lieutenant Colonel Earl R . Delong ' s BLT2/3 originally arrived "in country" in May of 1965 .Additional confidence stemmed from the fact tha tthe BLT had just come from a one-month rehabilita-tion period on Okinawa . It was at full strength an dall equipment was ready for combat .

The target area for Beacon Star was a major V Cstronghold and supply area along the border o fQuang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces . The small 0Lau River is the natural terrain feature whic hdelineates the provincial borders in the coasta lregion. The center of the Beacon Star amphibiou sobjective area (AOA) was 27 kilometers northwest ofHue, on the edge of what French soldiers called "LaRue Sans foie," or "The Street Without Joy ." The

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A19388 0Col James A . Gallo briefs senior Marines on 7 May on SLF Alpha's progress in Operatio nBeacon Star near the border of Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces . Prominent amongthe officers present are (seated, left) LtGen Victor H. Krulak and MajGen Robert E .Cushman, Jr. MajGen Herman Nickerson, Jr . and BGen Foster C. Lahue stand at left.

AOA was known for its heavy concentration of Com-munists ; intelligence officers reported two battalion sof the 6th Regiment and two main force battalions ,the 810th and the 814th, were operating in th eregion .

The Beacon Star scheme of maneuver consisted o fa waterborne and heliborne BLT landing on th ecoast . The battalion was to move inland, generall yfollowing the 0 Lau River, while, at the same time ,gradually expanding its TAOR in a southwesterl ydirection .

Bad weather and poor visibility delayed operation son D-day, 22 April, but the first heliborne compan ylanded at 0809 . It met no opposition .* Beacon Sta rprogressed according to plan ; enemy resistance wa sminimal . On D plus four the battalion launche da combined helicopter and overland assault in thesouthwestern portion of the expanded TAOR to at -tack an estimated 250 VC spotted in the target area .Unfortunately, the BLT was not able to capitalize onthis intelligence .

Urgent orders from the Commander Task Grou p79 .5 interrupted Beacon Star . The Phase I casualties ,one killed and 10 wounded, would seem insignifi-cant in the face of what happened in the next 2 4

*BLT 2/3 suffered approximately 60 heat casualties withi nabout a three-hour period after landing . Colonel Rodney D .McKitrick later cited such incidents as part of the justification fo rthe placing of an acclimatization room in the new Tawara classLHAs. Colonel Rodney D . McKitrick, Comments on draft ms ,n .d . (1981) (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C .)

hours . The new SLF Bravo was about to undergo itsfirst real combat test . On 26 April, the name KheSanh was just another place name to many of Lieute-nant Colonel Delong's Marines ; by mid-March thos ewho survived would never forget it .

While Phase I of Beacon Star proceeded, th eMarines of the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines discoveredstrong Communist formations in the hills west ofKhe Sanh, 43 miles from the Beacon Star area .Realizing that one battalion could not carry the hil lmass, the 3d Marine Division commander, Majo rGeneral Hochmuth, ordered BLT 2/3 to break offoperations in the original Beacon Star AOA and pro-ceed to Khe Sanh .

The tactical move to Khe Sanh was a transporta-tion triumph . At 1200 on the 26th, the divisio nplaced BLT 2/3, in the field and in contact with th eenemy, under the operational control of the 3dMarines . By 1400, three of the BLT's companies an dthe command group were at Khe Sanh, and by 160 0the BLT effected a link-up with elements of the 3 dBattalion, 3d Marines northwest of the Khe Sanhperimeter . The BLT moved by helicopter from th eBeacon Star AOA to Phu Bai, and from Phu Bai t oKhe Sanh by Marine and U .S . Air Force KC-130 andC-130 Hercules transports . The total elapsed tim efrom receipt of the warning order until the link-u pnear Khe Sanh totaled less than seven hours .

The second phase of Beacon Star is more common-ly known as "The Khe Sanh Hill Fights" or the "Firs t

157

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Battle of Khe Sanh ."* The BLT's casualties duringthe period 27April-12 May gave evidence of th eviolence of the fighting for the Khe Sanh hills . Dur-ing these weeks the BLT lost 71 killed and 34 9wounded, more than a fourth of its strength . Of the78 Navy corpsmen assigned to the BLT, five die dand 15 suffered wounds .

The fighting at Khe Sanh tapered off in May an dSLF Bravo's BLT 2/3 transferred from the 3 dMarines' operational control back to the SLF . Thereturn to ARG ships started on 10 May and finishe don the 12th, signaling the official end of Beaco nStar .

Beaver Cage/Union I

28 April - 12 May 196 7

The other special landing force, SLF Alpha, form-ed on Okinawa on 1 March 1967 under the com-mand of Colonel James A . Gallo, Jr . The new SLFcontained BLT 1/3, commanded by Lieutenant Col-onel Peter A. "Pete" Wickwire, and HMM-263 ,commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Edward K . Kir-by . Both the helicopter squadron and the battalio n

*For a detailed account of the bitter contest for Hills 558, 861 ,881 North, and 881 South, see Chapter 4 .

A 60mm mortar crew with Company A, 1st Bat-talion, 3d Marines fires against a North Vietnames eArmy unit on 20 May during Operation Bea uCharger, the SLF's portion of Operation Hickorywhich cleared the southern portion of the DMZ.

3d MarDiv ComdC, May 1967


2dLt John V. Francis, wearing no shirt under his ar-mored vest because of the intense heat encounteredin Operation Beaver Cage, takes a short break on 1 2May as BLT 1 /3 concludes its initial SLF operation .

had just finished rehabilitation periods on Okinaw aand were at full strength . Departing from Okinawaon 10 April, the ARG, with SLF Alpha embarked ,headed for Vietnam and made its first landing onthe 28th .

The target for the first SLF Alpha landing, Opera-tion Beaver Cage, was the rich and populous QueSon Valley, 25 miles south of Da Nang, important tothe Communists as a source of both food and man-power . Beaver Cage started at 0700 28 April as th efirst heliborne elements of BLT 1/3 touched down .For the next four days heat caused more casualtie sthan the enemy as operations continued agains tnegligible opposition .

Moving to a more promising operational area fiv emiles to the north, the BLT made its first significan tcontact on 2 May . An enemy force, at least a pla-toon, attacked Company C as it dug in for the night .After dark, USAF AC-47 "Puff the Dragon" gun -ships and "Spooky" flare planes, Marine artillery ,and the BLT's own supporting arms pounded th esuspected Communist positions . The enemy fled .

The next morning the battalion resumed itssweeping operations . The enemy did not react unti l5 May . That night the VC struck back, hitting theBLT headquarters and support elements with morta rand small arms fire as they evacuated a landing zone .The Headquarters and Service Company troops and


15 9

the attached Marines of 4 .2-inch Mortar Battery, 1s tBattalion, 12th Marines, repulsed the Communists .Despite the intensity of the attack and reduce dvisibility caused by oncoming darkness, Lieutenan tColonel Kirby ' s helicopters successfully extracted 20 0men and more than 1 and one-half tons of ammuni-tion without loss .

To the north, while BLT 1/3 conducted BeaverCage, the 5th Marines engaged in Operation Unio nI . On 9 May the Beaver Cage scheme of maneuverreoriented to include an eastward sweep toward th ecoast coordinated with the 1st Battalion, 5th Marine son the BLT ' s right . In this manner the final stage ofBeaver Cage became a part of the Union I plan ,although the BLT designed its maneuver to place i tin position for an amphibious withdrawal .* Durin gthe last week of the operation, 6-12 May, the BLTendured continuous mortar attacks and sniper fire .

On 10 May, as the eastward sweep continued ,Companies B and C engaged in a day-long actio nwith a sizable VC force . After much maneuvering ,air strikes, mortar missions, and the insertion of a40-man Sparrow Hawk unit, the VC broke off th eaction, but only after the BLT killed 86 enem y

soldiers . Beaver Cage/Union I ended for the SLFAlpha units on 12 May as they returned to thei rrespective ships .

The first operation for SLF Alpha had been a cost-ly venture, but all units had demonstrated theirfighting qualities . Battalion casualties totaled 5 5Marines killed and 151 wounded, but in 16 days ofcontinuous operations the BLT claimed 181 enemydead and a . bag of 66 prisoners . The next test of SLFAlpha was only five days away .

Beau Charger/Belt Tight/Hickory

PrairielV/ Cimarro n

18 May - 10 June 1967

Because of the Communist rocket and artillerybuildup in the DMZ during the spring of 1967 ,General Westmoreland issued a directive authoriz-ing the entry of forces into the DMZ buffer zonesouth of the Ben Hai River, actually South Viet-namese territory . The authorization triggered plan-ning for a series of simultaneous operations to b econducted in the new manuever area, one by ARVNforces and three by the U .S . Marines . The codenames for these operations were Hickory for 3 d

*See Chapter 3 for the 5th Marines' account of Union I .

Marine Divison units, Beau Charger for SLF Alpha ,Belt Tight for SLF Bravo, and Lam Son 54 for theSouth Vietnamese task force.* The overall conceptenvisioned the movement of SLF Bravo into th eHickory Operation by means of Operation Bel tTight, while SLF Alpha was to operate east of th eHickory/Lam Son 54 operational areas under th eaegis of Beau Charger . The Beau Charger/BeltTight/Hickory plan was unique in that it called fo rthe employment of both SLFs in the same opera-tional area at the same time .

The opening scheme of maneuver called for th emovement of three separate assault forces to the Be nHai River where they were to face about and drivesouth on roughly parallel axes, destroying all enem yunits and installations in their paths . The plan in-cluded the establishment of a free-fire zone whic hwould require the evacuation of more than 10,00 0noncombatants from the buffer zone, a monumen-tal task assigned to the Vietnamese National Police .

D-day for Beau Charger, SLF Alpha ' s show, was18 May. Fifteen UH-34s of Lieutenant Colonel Kir-by's HMM-263 lifted from the flight deck of the US SOkinawa (LPH-3) and headed inland, each loade dwith five Marines from the assault element, Com-pany A, BLT 1/3 . L-hour was 0800 . The landingzone, Goose, was less than six kilometers from theNorth Vietnamese boundary of the DMZ, an dalmost within small arms range of the north bank o fthe Ben Hai River .

The SLF planners studied aerial photographs ofthe terrain before the operation, but conducted n oprelanding overflights to preserve secrecy . For thesame reason, they requested no air and naval gunfirepreparations of the LZ . Intelligence sources hadreported the presence of many enemy antiaircraf tmachine guns in the area .

Flying lead, Kirby led his 34s toward the poten-tially dangerous zone, flying at altitudes of less tha n50 feet to reduce the enemy gunners' effectiveness .A maximum speed approach, about 80 knots, lack o fprominent landmarks, and the tenseness of th esituation made navigation difficult at best . Kirb ylanded at the north end of the zone, but as he didmachine gun fire ripped into his helicopter . Theenemy bullets wrecked the helicopter's radio an dwounded the copilot, crew chief, gunner, and thre einfantrymen . Another infantryman, killed, fell ou tof the helicopter . The wounded gunner returned fire

*The non-SLF operations appeared in Chapter 1 .

160


and, as Kirby later related, " . . . saved [our ]bacon ."1 0

Kirby managed to get the helicopter back in th eair, but without a radio he had no contact with th erest of his flight or with the Okinawa . Four otherUH-34s in the assault wave and two escorting UH-1Es suffered damage from enemy fire, but the entir ewave unloaded its troops . As soon as Kirby got hi scrippled helicopter back to the Okinawa, he briefedthe SLF commander, Colonel Gallo, on the ba dsituation at LZ Goose . Colonel Gallo ordered thecancellation of all further lifts to Goose and thesubstitution of the alternate LZ, Owl, 800 meterssouth of Goose . The assault element of Company Aat Goose was very much alone and in trouble .

Second Lieutenant Dwight G . Faylor's 2d Platoon ,Company A spread over 800 yards at LZ Goose . Awell-organized enemy force pressed his thinly hel dposition from the northwest . The BLT naval gunfireliaison officer, Ensign John W . McCormick, vainlytried to call in naval gunfire . The ships denied his re -quests ; no one was certain of the exact location o ffriendly positions and in many cases the enemy wastoo close to use naval guns without endangering th eMarines . Rescue was on the way, but the Marines a tGoose were in desperate straits .

While the abortive assault at LZ Goose was takin gplace, Company D landed in LVTs at Green Beach ,900 meters southeast of LZ Owl . This landing wasunopposed . By 0855, the remainder of Company Ahad landed at Owl . Overland reinforcements arrive dat Owl in the form of one platoon from Company Dand a section of tanks . At 0930 the lead elements ofCompany B began landing . The force at Owl thenmoved out to rescue the beleaguered platoon at LZGoose .

By 1100 the rescue force had regained contact withFaylor's platoon, but the enemy showed no signs ofbreaking off the engagement . Company B joine dthe fighting at Goose and the tempo of battle in -creased . Stymied by a tenaciously held trenchline ,the Company A Marines tried another avenue of at -tack . Moving against the Communist position unde rthe cover of a tree line, the Marines engaged enemysoldiers in furious hand-to-hand fighting . CompanyA's advance bogged down again and the infan-trymen called in close air support to crack the toug hposition . Eleven jets blasted the entrenched Com-munists and finally both Companies A and B, sup -ported by tanks, moved forward . As the fighting

died down, the Marines counted 67 Communistbodies .

Belt Tight started on 20 May . The initial missio nof SLF Bravo was to land in the northeastern cornerof the 3d Division's Hickory operational area an dconduct search and destroy operations within adesignated TAOR .* At 0714 on the 20th, Com-panies F and H with a BLT 2/3 command grou pstarted landing at LZ Parrot . Companies E and Gfollowed with another command group landing a tLZ Mockingbird at 0850 . The initial enemy reactio nwas deceptive ; the Marines encountered only ligh tresistance .

The general trace of SLF Bravo's sweep in itsTAOR was in a southerly direction . The Hickoryplanners wanted the SLF to dislodge enemy units i nthe area, thereby driving them into 3d Division unit smoving up from the south . Neither the 3d Marin eDivision nor SLF Bravo ever determined how man yenemy troops Belt Tight displaced, but the SLF ex-perienced four days of close combat during th eoperation, certainly an indication that its presenc ehad a spoiling effect on enemy intentions .Throughout the Belt Tight period, BLT 2/3 en -countered well-trained enemy troops who fough twith skill and determination . The enemy's soundlyconstructed positions and excellent weapons employ -

*A description of 3d Marine Division participation in Opera-tion Hickory appears in Chapter 1 .

Two riflemen from BLT 1 /3 pass carefully through aVietnamese village while on Operation Beaver Cage .



16 1

ment caused severe problems for the battalion as i tfought its way south. During one of the many mor-tar attacks, Lieutenant Colonel Delong, the BLTcommander, aggravated an old back injury whic hnecessitated his evacuation . His experienced ex-ecutive officer, Major Wendell O . Beard, a forme rAmphibious Warfare School instructor who joine dthe battalion in February, took command .

Belt Tight ended at 1559, 23 May 1967 . At thi stime BLT 2/3 shifted to the operational control o fthe 9th Marines which assigned the BLT a new are aof operations as part of Operation Hickory, represen-ting a continuation of the Belt Tight sweep . UntilHickory ended at midnight on the 28th, the bat-talion continued its deliberate sweep operations .The highlight of this period was a sharp engagemen tbetween Company E, commanded by Captain Stuar tR . Vaughan, and a determined NVA force defend-ing the village of Xuan Hai . The battle started onthe afternoon of the 24th and did not end until th eMarines completed a detailed sweep of the villageruins at 2155 on the following day . The enemy forcehad built 40 defensive bunkers in and around th etown. Company E destroyed them and counted 2 7dead NVA soldiers on the site . SLF casualties werelight during the nine days of Belt Tight/Hickory ,considering the fact that the battalion was either i ncontact or under artillery attack during most of th eperiod . SLF Bravo had 17 Marines killed and 15 2wounded . North Vietnamese losses totaled a con-firmed 58 killed and one prisoner taken by th eMarines .

When Hickory finished on 28 May, BLT 2/3 re-mained in the field, still under the operational con-trol of the 9th Marines . During the next three daysthe battalion participated in Operation Prairie I Vwhich ended on the 31st . The BLT's assignment in-volved primarily a security operation in relief of bot hthe 2d Battalion, 9th Marines and the 1st Battalion ,4th Marines . BLT 2/3 protected artillery positionsimmediately north of the Cam Lo Bridge, the bridgeitself, and provided route security for both truckconvoys and engineer units on Route 61 from northof the Cam Lo Bridge to Con Thien, an air distanc eof slightly over 10 kilometers .

Although the Prairie IV assignment was of shortduation, the end of the operation did not eliminat ethe security requirements for Route 561 and nearb ypositions . As a consequence, SLF Bravo, still unde roperational control of the 9th Marines, retained it sPrairie IV mission as part of a new 3d Division plan,

Operation Cimarron . Cimarron lasted from 1 Jun euntil 2 July, though SLF Bravo ' s involvement lastedonly through 10 June .

The SLF participation in Cimarron succeeded, i nthe sense that there was no local enemy activity . Theenemy stayed away, the road remained open, an dCon Thien maintained its defensive integrity . TheBLT spent 9-10 June reorganizing and moving bac kto Dong Ha combat base . Reembarkation on th e11th marked the end of the longest SLF comba tdeployment ashore since its formation, 23 days o fcontinous operations . The shipboard respite woul dbe short ; SLF Bravo would land again in only aweek's time .

Day On, Stay On—SLF

Operational Tempo Increases

The spring and early summer of 1967 challenge dthe flexibility of the SLF concept in I Corps . Varia-tions ranged from SLF Bravo's April "fire brigade "action at Khe Sanh during Operation Beacon Star todull, but necessary, "housekeeping" duties assigne dto BLT 2/3 during its 10 days with Operation Cimar-ron. As the year progressed, SLF operational com-mitments increased, not only in frequency, but alsoin days ashore . During the first four months of 1967 ,the average number of days of monthly combat com-mitment for a SLF was only 12 .* SLF Alpha ' s Opera-tion Beaver Cage landing in April signaled a drasticincrease in operational tempo . The May combat-da yaverage jumped to 16 and one-half days per BLT ,while June operations resulted in a new high of 2 2days for SLF Alpha and 24 for SLF Bravo .

The remainder of the year reflected a muc hheavier reliance on the SLFs . Average commitmentsremained above the 20-days-per-month figure . Notonly did the number of combat days increase, bu tthe number of individual operations involving theSLFs more than doubled .

The reasons for the increase in tempo were notrelated to a single cause . The forthcoming Viet-namese National elections, continuing Communistunit moves in northern I Corps, and offensive sweep sto protect Marine fire support bases were only som eof the factors which demanded SLF participation .

*SLF Bravo provided the basis for this computation because of

SLF Alpha's late entry into RVN, in April 1967 . SLF Bravo's com-

bat days by month in early 1967 were : January, 10 ; February, 13 ;

March, 15 ; and April, 10 .

162


Even though many of the SLF operations were in -conclusive, their harried staffs deserve tribute . Inspite of the stepped-up operational tempo of 1967 ,the SLF planners kept abreast of the often confusing ,and always demanding, I Corps tactical situation .

Bear Bite/Colgate/Choctaw/Marylan d

2-SJune, 7- 11 June,

12 - 23 June, 23 - 27 June 1967

Bear Bite, a conventional LVT and helicopte rassault, was the first of SLF Alpha's June operations .It targeted the Viet Cong operating along the coas t40 kilometers southeast of the DMZ in the "TheStreet Without Joy" region. Starting at 0730 on 2June, BLT 1/3 spent the next 72 hours probing anddestroying unoccupied enemy positions . Enemysnipers and a troublesome Marine tank stuck in apaddy were the only hindrances to the operation .There were no SLF casualties, but the Marines kille donly two of the enemy and picked up nine suspects .On 5 June the BLT returned to the 4th Marines 'perimeter by helicopter .

Two days later, the battalion moved out again o nthe uneventful Operation Colgate . During the in-tervening day the new SLF Alpha commander, Col-onel John A . Conway, assumed command. Thesubsequent Operation Choctaw, southwest of th eBear Bite AOA, involved 11 days of tedious sweep swest of Route 1 along the Thac Ma River . About asproductive as Bear Bite, Choctaw netted only 1 5more detainees and nine enemy killed . NineteenMarines suffered wounds . At 1300 on 23 June th elast elements of the battalion returned from the fiel dto the 4th Marines' Camp Evans, 23 kilometersnorthwest of Hue .

When it started Operation Maryland on 25 June ,BLT 1/ 3 moved by helicopters into the same genera larea where it had been for Colgate . The battalion' szone of action included the southwestern edge of th egrave-covered Maryland area . Elements of a VC bat-talion operated in the region . The Marine battalio ndid not find them, but ARVN units advancing fromthe north encountered what probably were two V Ccompanies . The ARVN units killed 114 Com-munists . In its own zone, the BLT killed seven Com-munists, took 35 prisoners, and salvaged almost nin etons of rice at the cost of three Marines wounded . B ymid-morning on the 27th, the BLT departed th earea in helicopters as Maryland ended after fou rweeks of probing graves and tunnels . On 28 June,

HMM-362, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Nic kJ . Kapetan, relieved HMM-263 as the SLF Alphahelicopter squadron, and the next day the BLTreembarked . "

June was a trying time for SLF Alpha . Fourseparate operations, none of which achieved signifi-cant results, could only be called "good experience . "For the Marines of the SLF, the loss of three men andthe wounding of 51 others served as a terse reminde rof the price of experience . The SLF Alpha BLT no whad six operations to its credit, and, since its firs tlanding on 28 April, it had killed 307 Communists .

Beacon Torch/Calhou n

18June - 2 July, 25 June - 2 July 196 7

Operation Beacon Torch placed SLF Bravo sout hof Da Nang in the coastal region near the QuangNam and Quang Tin provinical border . A conven-tional search and destroy operation, Beacon Torchcovered an enemy-controlled area east of the Troun gGiang River and southeast of the city of Hoi An .

A companion operation, Calhoun, targetedagainst the "Pagoda Valley" west of the BeaconTorch AOA, started on 25 June . The area receivedthis name because of the many small pagodas on th evalley floor . III MAF suspected "Pagoda Valley" ofbeing a Communist forward logistic base . In essence ,BLT 2/3 phased into Calhoun and, when Calhounended, it withdrew as originally planned in Beaco nTorch .

Beacon Torch started at 0630 on 18 June as assaultelements of Company F, followed by Comman dGroup Alpha landed in what the helicopter pilot sthought was 12 Cardinal . Actually, the helibornetroops landed 2,000 meters south of Cardinal . Com-pany H landed at what the pilots believed was LZWren . It, too, landed in the wrong place and 2,00 0meters south of its planned starting position .

While the first heliborne companies untangle dtheir LZ problems, Company G landed on Re dBeach, followed by the 2d Platoon (Reinforced) ,Company A, 3d Tank Battalion . Once the squadronresolved the LZ location problems, it lifted Com-pany E into the correct LZ Cardinal .

Company H made the first contact at 0930 . Lightencounters continued throughout the day until 154 0when Company H engaged about 100 enemy troops .In the ensuing firefight, 43 of Company H's Marine ssuccumbed to nonbattle causes ; most were hea tcasualties . The enemy killed five Marines andwounded 14 while the Communists left 23 bodies


163

behind. The enemy disengaged at sunset .The BLT moved out again on the 19th . Small ac-

tions flared up throughout the day and the advanc-ing Marines began discovering hidden enemy foodstocks .

After another quiet night, the BLT renewed swee poperations at 0845 on the 20th when Company Ecrossed the Troung Giang River . That afternoon ,Company H had great difficulty fording the Troun gGiang, but by late afternoon the battalion beganmoving westward again . Scattered contact continue dwest of the river for the next three days . Thehighlight of this period was Company E's discoveryof three tons of rice and two tons of potatoes early o nthe morning of the 24th . At 0600, 25 June, Opera-tion Beacon Torch phased into Operation Calhoun .

By 1300, 25 June Company E had discoveredanother 1,000 pounds rice and at 1600 Company Guncovered a two-ton cache . The rice hunt continuedand on the 26th the Marines bagged and helilifte danother 7,600 pounds to the ARVN-controlled tow nof Dien Ban, nine kilometers west of Hoi An . Thelargest single find of the operation was a five-toncache discovered by Company F on the morning o fthe 27th. Complementing this discovery, CompanyG, assisted by ARVN troops, rounded up andevacuated 84 stray cattle .

Minor skirmishes and the detention of scattere dsuspects continued until Calhoun ended at 1200, 1July. Reverting to the Beacon Torch plan, the BLTbegan its retraction . As the last units returned t otheir respective ships, Beacon Torch ended at 1300 ,2 July .

Beacon Torch/Calhoun hurt the Communists i ncentral I Corps . The BLT captured more than 40 ton sof rice and other food stocks, over 31 of which the yevacuated for ARVN use . The rest they destroyed i nplace . The BLT's casualty ratio was favorable . Eighty -six enemy died in contrast to only 13 SLF Marines .The BLT suffered 123 nonbattle casualties .

Beacon Torch/Calhoun, however, had no lastin gimpact, as emphasized by the fact that the departin gMarines sighted enemy troops near the beach are aduring the retraction . The Communists could not af-ford to lose control of the population and im-mediately reoccupied the area to repair the damag ecaused by the operation .

SLF Alpha in Bear Claw/Buffalo/Hickory II

3 - 16 July 196 7

The first two days of July, SLF Alpha on board the

ships of TG 76 .4, prepared for Operation Bear Claw ,a proposed landing in eastern Quang Tri Province .The SLF cancelled Bear Claw at 0100 on the 3rdwhen it received orders alerting BLT 1/3 for im-mediate employment in the 9th Marines TAOR atCon Thien . The 9th Marines was in trouble .

Lieutenant Colonel Richard J . "Spike " Schening's1st Battalion, 9th Marines provided the security ofthe Con Thien perimeter . Two of the battalion'scompanies, A and B, on patrol a mile and a halfnortheast of Con Thien, had discovered a large NV Aforce, at least two battalions of the 90th NVA Regi-ment . The initial contact took place as the Marinecompanies were trying to link up . In this awkwardsituation, the North Vietnamese managed to punis heach company separately . Additionally, the Com-munists hit the Marines with massed artillery fir efrom north of the DMZ. Casualties mounted o nboth sides as the battle intensified . Company B lostmost of its officers ; the company commander, hisFO, the FAC, and two platoon commanders wer ecasualties . *

Responding to this serious situation, Lieutenan tColonel Schening committed Company C, 1st Bat-talion, 9th Marines, reinforced by tanks . The actionintensified as the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines arrive dfrom Dong Ha to help regain control of the situa-tion . At this stage, III MAF requested SLF Alpha .Similarly, SLF Bravo, also at sea, went on alert . Themission assigned to SLF Alpha during OperationBuffalo, the name given the continuing engagemen twith the 90th NVA Regiment, was to tie in to theright flank of the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines andsweep the battle area to recover 1st Battalion, 9t hMarines' casualties .

The original 0100 warning order for SLF Alph apreceded a regimental briefing at 0700 which se tL-hour at 1030 . After much frenzied action on th epart of the SLF, the launch took place on schedule .Throughout the late morning of 3 July, Lieutenan tColonel Kapetan's HMM-362 flew BLT 1/3 into thezone of action, supplemented by CH-46s from SLFBravo's HMM-164 . 12 Unfortunately, the lead assaul telements of the BLT landed 2,500 meters south o fthe designated landing zone, a mile southeast ofCon Thien . Readjusting the battalion cost valuabl etime . The first physical contact with the right flankof the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines occurred at 1315 .By the time all of BLT 1/3 had moved into the cor-

*See Chapter 5 for additional description of this action .

164


rect positions, however, the level of fighting ha dwaned, and only Communist gunners remained ac-tive . The night of 3-4 July was relatively quiet, as wa sthe next day . The 5th opened with an early morningenemy mortar attack against Companies A and C .Exchanges of artillery and mortar fire punctuate dmost of the day. The battalion continued its sweepoperation . On the 6th, enemy rockets knocked out aMarine tank . The fighting around the disabled tankbecame so savage that the BLT did not reach th eburnt-out hulk until 1000 on the 7th of July . TheMarines recovered the bodies of the crew early th enext morning .

At 1330, 8 July, the BLT received orders to makean immediate withdrawal . This was a challengingoperation even under ideal circumstances .Wickwire's battalion faced a dangerous situation .There were five complications : it was daylight ; thebattalion was in contact ; the withdrawal would occu rover 600 meters of open ground ; two of the attache dtanks were crippled; and the battalion had justreceived resupplies and had no organic transport t omove the vital, though cumbersome, material . Asixth factor added to the BLT's problems . Just as thewithdrawal began, the Communists opened up wit hsmall arms, mortars, and artillery . In spite of thes edifficuties, the battalion carried out this complexmaneuver with only light casualties .

The next four days of Buffalo involved patrollingthe Con Thien perimeter . Buffalo ended on themorning of 14 July . The Marines of BLT 1/3 hadrecovered the bodies of 11 fellow Marines from th e1st Battalion, 9th Marines, but their efforts wer ecostly ; the BLT's price was eight killed and 179wounded . Operation Buffalo produced a total of 42 4verified North Vietnamese dead for the BLT .

While Buffalo neared its terminal phase, Com -USMACV directed that a followup sweep be con -ducted of the area south of the DMZ and east of ConThien . In response, III MAF initiated OperationHickory II . The plan called for SLF Alpha's BLT 1/ 3to move out from its final Buffalo positions with th e1st Battalion, 4th Marines on the BLT's right . Thecombined force would sweep southward in a searchand destroy operation . Three other battalions wereto block north and south of the operational area . Al lHickory II battalions came under the operationa lcontrol of the 9th Marines, with the exception of SLFBravo which served the 3d Marines as a blockingforce on the western edge of the sweep zone .

The evening of the first day of Hickory II, BLT 1/ 3

received orders to move to a phase line approximate-ly 15,000 meters south of its position by 1700 th enext day . As a consequence, though the deploye dbattalion formations remained prepared to engag ethe enemy, the required speed of advance prevente dthe battalion from making a detailed search of itszone of action . During Hickory II, BLT 1/3 ex-perienced no enemy contact, and the net result wasthe capture of 17 suspects . There were no friendlycasualties . The operation ended at 1600 on 16 Jul yand the next day SLF Alpha returned to the TG 79 . 4ships .

SLF Bravo in Beaver Track/Buffalo/Hickory II

4 - 16 July 196 7

When SLF Alpha joined Buffalo on 3 July, SL FBravo went on standby, and it entered the Buffal oarea on 4 July on Operation Beaver Track . At 0640 ,Major Wendell O . Beard,* the BLT 2/3 com-mander, and Company H loaded in Lieutenant Col-onel Rodney D . McKitrick's Ch-46s and flew off th eUSS Tripoli (LPH 10); destination: Cam Lo .McKitrick's HMM-164 ferried the rest of the bat-talion to an assembly area north of Cam Lo wher ethe BLT prepared for employment as directed by th e3d Marine Division . At 1300, BLT 2/3, under opera-tional control of its parent regiment, gained the 1s tPlatoon of Company A, 3d Tank Battalion . The bat-talion spent the afternoon moving into position i npreparation for impending search and destroy opera-tions .

The Beaver Track operation order directed th ebattalion to move out at 0700 on 5 July and attacknorthward on a four-kilometer front to a point jus tsouth of the southern limit of the DMZ . There, thebattalion was to turn and move roughly threekilometers west . During Phase II, a return sweep ,the battalion was to maneuver south to the Cam LoRiver from its DMZ position, following an axi sparallel to but west of the Phase I axis of advance .Friendly units had occupied the area as recently a stwo days before the start of Beaver Track, but in-telligence sources reported that elements of the 29thNVA Regiment were making a reconnaissance of th eregion .

At 0700, 5 July, Major Beard's troops moved out .As in many similar operations, nothing happened a t

*Major Beard's nickname was "Moose," a reference to his size .LtGen Louis Metzger, Comments on draft ms, n .d . (1981) (Com-ment files, MCHC, Washington, D .C .)


16 5

Courtesy of Mrs . Wendell O . Beard

Company H, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines boards CH-46A helicopters from HMM-164 for aflight from the USS Tripoli to Cam Lo on 4 July as SLF Bravo begins Operation BeaverTrack, a subsidiary of the 3d Marine Division's Operation Buffalo south of the DMZ.

first . The Marines discovered and demolished aban-doned bunkers as the day progressed . By midafter-noon, Company E was enduring desultory snipe rfire, but no contact developed . That night remaine dquiet .

The enemy made the first move at 0535 on 6 Jul ywith a probe of Company E's perimeter . The Marinesmet the attack with skillful, coordinated machin egun and artillery fire . The Communists broke off th eengagement, leaving 14 bodies behind plus aban-doned weapons and equipment . Shortly after th ebeginning of the fight along the Company Eperimeter, 40 NVA mortar rounds hit the BLT com-mand group and Company G, located about fou rkilometers south of the DMZ . Return fires tem-porarily silenced the Communist gunners, but a t0800 a Company H patrol less than three kilometer sto the northeast also came under mortar fire . Sup -porting tanks and artillery again silenced the enemy ,but not before RPG rounds hit two of the supportin gMarine tanks .

At 0930, the enemy struck a Company F patro lwith a command-detonated claymore-type mine ,and half an hour later, Company G, operating eastof Company F, also encountered enemy claymores .A brief flurry of action occurred when the tank pia -

toon commander, 2d Lieutenant Edward P . B.O'Neil, spotted NVA troops in the vicinity of th edestroyed town of Nha An Hoa . The tankers ' 90mmguns and heavy machine guns accounted for 16 o fthem. The remainder of the 6th of July reverted t oduels between Communist mortars and U. S. ar-tillery .

As the sweep continued on the 7th, the SLF Brav oMarines confronted increasing numbers of enemybunkers, all deserted, but many showing signs of re -cent use . The search for the elusive 29th NVA Regi-ment continued .

July 8th was a day filled with the curious whims o fcombat . At 0800 a patrol from Company H found acompletely stripped UH-34D surrounded withassorted NVA equipment . While these Marines ex-amined their disquieting prize, another Company Hpatrol was busily engaged destroying capturedenemy equipment . Someone or something triggeredan unknown explosive device which killed eigh tMarines . A Company G patrol tripped a "Bouncin gBetty"* at 1030; two more Marines died and anothe rreceived wounds . The tempo of action picked up an

*A "Bouncing Betty" mine, projected upward by a smal lcharge, explodes its main charge at waist level .


Courtesy of Mrs . Wendell O . Beard

A division of CH-46A helicopters from Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 164 carrie selements of BLT 2/3 to shore from the USS Tripoli during Operation Beaver Track .

hour and a half later when Company G engaged in asharp action in one of the many Communist bunkercomplexes . Air and artillery smashed the enem yposition . The Company G Marines found 35 NVAbodies in the wreckage after the bombardment .

The fortunes of war smiled on the BLT that after -noon . As the battalion patrol actions continued ,Company F executed a classic example of fire an dmaneuver . One squad, immobilized by enem yautomatic weapons fire coming from a well -developed position, became a pivot for the rest o fthe company . The Marines fixed the Communists i ntheir dug-in positions and called in supporting arms .The Marines counted 73 NVA bodies in th efollowup sweep and captured three 82mm mortars .

During the following days, the BLT Marine sdiscovered and destroyed more bunkers, fightin gpositions, and shelters, but the Communists chos enot to fight . Meanwhile, at sea on board the USSTripoli, Lieutenant Colonel McKitrick's HMM-16 4turned over its SLF assignment on 12 July t oHMM-265, commanded by Lieutenant ColonelWilliam R . Beeler .

To capitalize on the results of Operation Buffalo ,which had paralleled Beaver Track, ComUSMAC Vordered that another sweep be made south of th eBen Hai River to destroy enemy weapons positions i nthe southern half of the DMZ . Known as OperationHickory II, the plan was similar in concept to th e13-battalion Hickory I sweep conducted in the sam earea during May . Hickory II was smaller in scale ; i temployed seven maneuver battalions and four block-

ing battalions . ** Since BLT 2/3 was already locate dnorthwest of Cam Lo, it became a blocking battalio non the western edge of the zone of action .

SLF Bravo received the Hickory II operation orde ron the morning of 13 July. At 0700 the next morn-ing the battalion moved out, securing designate dobjectives en route to its final blocking position . At1000, the battalion commander, Major Beard ,became a casualty and his executive officer, Majo rJohn H . Broujos, took over the battalion . By 1230the battalion reached the blocking positions an dsearched the surrounding terrain . During BLT 2/3' sbrief two-day involvement in Hickory II, Com-munist antipersonnel devices were the most seriou sthreat . Grenades rigged as booby traps killed twoMarines and wounded 13 . Other than mortar fire ,the 2d Battalion had no contact with the enemy dur-ing Hickory II .

The BLT reconstituted at 0600 on 16 July asHickory II ended . Reembarkation began immediate-ly . SLF Bravo's participation in the Beaver Track /Buffalo/Hickory II operations produced an im-pressive, verified kill ratio . Sixteen SLF BravoMarines gave their lives, while the battalion kille d148 NVA soldiers .

Bear Chain/Fremon t

20 - 26 July 196 7

At sea on 17 July 1967, Lieutenant Colonel Emi lW. Herich assumed command of BLT 2/3, relievin g

**See Chapter 6 for the account of other III MAF units ' par-ticipation in Hickory II .


16 7

Major Broujos, who reverted to battalion executiv eofficer . Lieutenant Colonel Herich had only a brie f"shakedown ;" SLF Bravo landed again on the 20th .The operation, Bear Chain, targeted the coastalregion between Quang Tri City and the city of Hue .The mission was to attack the exposed seaward flan kof the 806th VC Battalion and to destroy it, or a tleast drive it westward toward ARVN forces engagedin Operation Lam Son 87 .

Southwest of the Bear Chain operational area, th e4th Marines was conducting a search and destro yoperation named Fremont. As Bear Chain progress-ed, it phased into Fremont . At 1400 on 21 July, BLT2/ 3 switched to the operational control of the 4t hMarines for the rest of the operation .

Bear Chain/Fremont produced the desired results .The enemy reacted as the Bear Chain planners hadhoped. Communist units moved west toward Rout e1, directly into the Lam Son 87 ARVN forces . In thefollowing battle the South Vietnamese troop sdistinguished themselves . They held their position swith determination and 25,2 Viet Cong died . Asecondary gain of Bear Chain/Fremont was the cap-ture of an extremely large rice stock .

Late the afternoon of 24 July, BLT 2/3 Marines ,searching the village of Don Que, less than akilometer east of Route 555, captured a VC suspect ,the only male found in Don Que . Company F receiv-ed sniper fire from the village just before they cap-tured the suspect . A search of the town turned upenormous quantities of rice . Villagers stated that theViet Cong had told them to harvest their rice and b eready for the VC rice collectors who would arrive"within a few days ." The final tally of rice was over37 tons . The Marines bagged it and flew it out i nHMM-265's helicopters .

The BLT Marines had helped maul the 806th VCBattalion and confiscated its rice supply . Its purposesachieved, the Bear Chain portion of the operatio nended on 26 July and SLF Bravo went back to sea .Nine Marines and two corpsmen died on the opera-tion .

Beacon Guide

21 - 30 July 196 7

SLF Alpha's BLT 1/3 held a change of commandat sea on 16 July, the day after it returned fro mHickory II . Lieutenant Colonel Alfred I . Thomastook over from Lieutenant Colonel Wickwire .Lieutenant Colonel Thomas' first operation wa sBeacon Guide . Starting with a helicopter and surface


LtCol Alfred I. Thomas, the new commander ofBLT1/3, checks a fire plan diagram drawn on the back ofa cardboard C-rations case by one of his staff officer sduring Operation Beacon Guide below the DMZ.

assault, Beacon Guide was a search and destro yoperation in the coastal region 18 miles southeast o fHue . The BLT's sweep was part of III MAF's continu-ing plan to maintain pressure on Viet Cong units i ncoastal I Corps . Beacon Guide was uneventful fromits start on 21 July . Tangible results were negligible ,and SLF Alpha reembarked on the afternoon of 3 0July .

Kangaroo Kick/Fremont

1 - 3 August, 3 - 21 August 1967

August was a month of aggravating frustration fo rSLF Bravo and its new commander Colonel James G .Dionisopoulos .* Twenty-one operational day sresulted in the death of only three enemy, while th eSLF lost three killed and 44 wounded .

Operation Kangaroo Kick, 1-3 August, wasanother search and destroy sweep over the nowfamiliar sand dunes, graves, and rice paddies of th eViet Cong sanctuary region along the 0 Lau River ,

*Colonel Dionisopoulos replaced Colonel Wortman as the SL FBravo commander as of 1 August . Colonel Wortman had served asthe SLF commander since 1 September 1966 .

168


midway between Hue and Quang Tri . They hadoperated there on Operation Beacon Star in April -May and again in July on Bear Chain . Kangaro oKick, almost a carbon copy of the two previousoperations along the 0 Lau, precipitated the stan-dard VC reaction ; they fled, only to return after th e

BLT departed .

At 0800, 3 August, BLT 2/3 shifted to the 4thMarines' operational control and rejoined Operatio nFremont . Operation Fremont assumed almos tmarathon proportions ; it did not end until 31 Oc-tober . The BLT's mission during its second tou runder the 4th Marines required relieving the 2d Bat-talion, 4th Marines of its many and complicatedduties, including providing security for Camp Evans ,Hill 51, and Hill 674; interdicting enemy lines ofcommunications in the nearby Co Bi-Thanh TanValley ; detaching one rifle company to the 2d Bat-talion, 4th Marines for operational use by that bat-talion; providing security for road sweeps betweenthe 4th Marines' perimeter and Route 1; providin gone company for "Sparrow Hawk" rapid reactionmissions ; and being prepared to provide one com-pany for "rough rider" truck convoys between PhuBai and Dong Ha .

Respite from the Camp Evans routine came on 1 6August . The BLT, actually only Company F andCommand Group Alpha reinforced by Company E ,2d Battalion, 4th Marines, conducted a daylongsweep . The operation took place in the My Chanharea north of the 0 Lau River, the scene of recentl ycompleted Operation Kangaroo Kick . The sweepwas in conjunction with ARVN units operation i nthe same area .

BLT 2/3 lost one Marine killed and six woundedduring the day's sweep . Unfortunately, a supportin gtank returning to the 4th Marines command post ra nover a mine, believed to have been made from a dud500-pound bomb . The blast killed four Marines andwounded five . Later that afternoon a tank retrieverhit another mine six kilometers west of the disable dtank. The explosion wounded another six Marines .Tank problems continued ; while trying to destroythe tank lost on the 16th, an engineer tripped stil lanother exploding device ; one more Marine died .The engineers finally destroyed the tank by 1530 . *

*The term exploding device refers to all enemy jury-rigge dmines . The devices ranged from trip-wired grenades to pressure -detonated, re-fused dud bombs .

Another variation of the multiple duties shared b ythe BLT occurred on 18 August . Company F move dto Quang Tri to occupy the airfield there and to pro -vide a show of force . At 0930 19 August, LieutenantColonel Herich received authorization to start reem-barkation . The 2d Battalion, 4th Marines relievedBLT 2/3 of its Camp Evans duties and the SLF gladl ywent back to sea . III MAF released BLT 2/3 to CT G79.5 at 1600 22 August .

The BLT commander, Lieutenant Colonel Herich ,commenting on Kangaroo Kick and the 16 Augus tFremont sweep, expressed the growing frustrationwith operations along the 0 Lau :

Operation Kangaroo Kick was . . . in an area generall ycontrolled by the enemy . Although this operation prove dsuccessful in completing the assigned mission, as in th epast, the entire area . . . was reoccupied by the enemy asevidenced by his presence during the S&D [search an ddestroy] operation conducted by this BLT on 16 Augus t1967 on Operation Fremont . 1 3

Beacon Gate/Cochise7-11 August 1967, 11-27 August 1967

At 0700 on 7 August, SLF Alpha started Opera-tion Beacon Gate by landing southeast of Hoi Analong the coastal boundary of Quang Nam an dQuang Tin Provinces . Intelligence reports fixedelements of the V25 Local Force Battalion and othe r

A radioman from BLT 1 /3 pauses in OperationBeacon Gate to look over a cow and a calf in a she dduring a routine search of a Vietnamese village .

Denartment of Defense Photo (USMC) A650000


16 9

smaller VC units in the battalion's operational area .During the five-day southerly sweep, the Marine sendured continuous sniper fire . The infantrymenmade extensive use of armed UH-1E helicopters tosuppress the snipers . Operation Beacon Gate ende don 11 August at 0800; the Marines killed only 1 2enemy soldiers .

The same day, SLF Alpha shifted to the opera-tional control of Task Force X-Ray of the 1st Marin eDivision for the start of Operation Cochise . BLT 1/ 3made a heliborne assault from the Beacon Gat eAOA into a landing zone approximately seven mile seast of Que Son . There the battalion occupied block-ing positions to support elements of the 5th Marine swhich were attacking to the east .

On 16 August, BLT 1/3 started search and destroyoperations, also in an easterly direction, in conjunc-tion with the 5th Marines . The BLT made heavy con-tact with an enemy force late on the 16th, but th eenemy broke off the engagement during the night .The rest of the first phase of Cochise consisted o fsweep operations, still to the east, with contac tlimited to sniper fire .

Phase II of Cochise began on 19 August . BLT 1/ 3transferred to the operational control of the 5t hMarines . Enemy contact, as in Phase I, was negligi-ble, but the Marines uncovered several rice cache sand an ammunition dump. Phase III opened on 2 5August . The BLT continued search and destro yoperations northeast from Hiep Duc to Que Son .It encountered only snipers . When the battalon ar-rived at Que Son on 27 August Cochise ended .The next day the BLT moved by helicopters to ChuLai where it began reembarkation . BeaconGate/ Cochise produced good results for SLF Alpha ;the BLT claimed 59 VC/NVA killed and 65 detaine dat a cost of nine Marines dead and 51 wounded .

Belt Drive/Liberty

27 August - 5 September, 1 - 4 September 196 7

Major Beard returned from hospitalization an dreassumed command of BLT 2/3 on 23 August ,replacing Lieutenant Colonel Herich. The same day ,Major Gregory A . Corliss and his CH-46A squadron ,HMM-262, landed on board the USS Tripoli torelieve the departing SLF helicopter squadron ,HMM-265. Four days later, SLF Bravo was in actionagain . At 0545, 27 August, HMM-262 lifted the firs telements of Company H from, the Tripoli back to thefamiliar terrain of eastern Quang Tri Province .

The Belt Drive operation's objective area was the

densely vegetated high ground on both sides of thesmall Nhung River, less than nine kilometers southof Quang Tri City . The operation involved a spoilin gattack against Communist units that could have in-terfered with the voting in Quang Tri City durin gthe impending national elections . Small unit actionsflared up during the next five days as the battalio nencountered minor enemy formations, but no con -tact involved any determined enemy resistance .

The battalion commander, Major Beard, reportedtwo interesting enemy reactions :

The use of demolitions by the enemy when attacking adefensive position . . . is a tactic with which the battalionhad not yet been confronted . It is believed that it wasdefinitely designed to simulate mortar fire in order to keepthe defenders down deep in their positions . The explodingcharges were almost immediately followed by three or fou rprobers armed with automatic weapons who sought topenetrate the perimeter .

During this operation . . . the enemy failed to . . . leavea clean battlefield after an engagement . This situation isby all means contrary to their principle of battle and thefirst time in which the BLT was able to capture weapon sand equipment without an immediate physical pursuit .Enemy KIAs, one WIA, and weapons . . . lay undisturbedovernight in killing zones and were easily recovered at firs tlight on the morning following the encounter . On one oc-casion, two enemy KIAs and one weapon were recovere dalmost two days later by a patrol which swept an area i nwhich an air strike had been run . These instances ar ereflections of the combat discipline and training of theenemy which the BLT engaged in its operating area . "

At 0800 1 September, the BLT once more shifte dto the 4th Marines' operational control, this time toparticipate in Operation Liberty while holding Bel tDrive in abeyance . The Liberty operation orde rassigned BLT 2/3 to sweep operations in the HaiLang District of Quang Tri Province . The battalionwas to assist the 4th Marines in blocking enemy ap-proaches to Route 1, as well as Quang Tri City .Liberty simply was a minor reorientation of BeltDrive, with the provision of a command structur echange .

At midnight 4 September, SLF participation inLiberty ended and Belt Drive resumed immediately .The last operational day, 5 September, involvedmoving the battalion and its supporting units out o fthe TAOR. By 2000, SLF Bravo had complete dreembarkation .

Four dead Marines and 59 wounded representedthe price of Belt Drive and Liberty, but 19 Com-munists died . The BLT Marines captured one dazed ,wounded NVA soldier on the morning of 1September . Unfortunately the BLT did not fully ex-

170


ploit his knowledge and mistakenly evacuated hi mto Camp Evans rather than to the Tripoli . What h eknew of enemy locations might have changed theoutcome of Belt Drive .

Trouble of a different nature developed durin gBelt Drive, trouble which caused serious problemsnot only for the SLFs, but for all Marine activities in ICorps . On 31 August, during a medical evacuation ,the lead helicopter, a CH-46A, disintegrated i nflight while en route to the Tripoli. The crew andtheir passenger died . The next day, another CH-46Aexperienced a similar failure at Marble Mountain Ai rFacility . These two similar accidents forced III MA Fto restrict CH-46A missions to emergency categories .For all practical purposes, they were "down . " In amatter of hours, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing lost 5 0percent of its helicopter capability, and the LPH sbecame little more than troop transports .

A Change In Scenario — The 46s are Grounded

The grounding of the CH-46As was a severe blow

to the SLFs . SLF Bravo's CH-46A Squadron ,

HMM-262, was "down . " SLF Alpha fared better ,

since HMM-362 was a UH-34D squadron . However ,MAG-16 recalled HMM-362, though another UH -34D squadron, HMM-163, replaced it only 4 day s

later . The USS Tripoli, the amphibious assault shi p

carrying SLF Bravo 's helicopters, temporarilywithdrew from ARG duties to ferry faulty helicoptersto Okinawa for modification . The 1st Marine Air-craft Wing rescheduled all planned squadron rota-tions . Emergency requests prompted shipment of 1 0CH-53s and 23 more UH-34Ds from west coast U . S .ports, but they would not arrive until October . On31 August 1967, III MAF had 150 available transpor t

helicopters, and the SLF could muster 39 more . Thenext day, as the result of the grounding order, II I

MAF counted only 23 CH-53s and 73 UH-34Ds ,while SLF Alpha could provide another 17 UH-34s .Five squadrons of CH-46As could operate under ex-treme emergency conditions .

Initially, SLF operations suffered from th e

helicopter strength reduction . Both landing forces ,by necessity, operated as conventional ground unit suntil resolution of helicopter allocations . SLF Bravospent the rest of the year relying upon interim sup -port from HMM-463's CH-53s operating from Mar-ble Mountain . A detachment from HMM-262 re-mained on board the Tripoli to provide emergencyCH-46A support for SLF Bravo . This detachment ,known as the "Poor Devils," remained with SLF

Bravo until the end of the year, though the rest of

the squadron left in mid-October .Necessarily, SLF operations reflected the reduce d

flexibility and lift capability . To provide better sup -port for a landing force ashore, a new trend

developed . The SLF BLTs would land, conduct a

preliminary operation, and then shift to the opera-tional control of a Marine regiment operating in th e

same area . Though this represented a reasonablesolution under the circumstances, during the fall of

1967 SLF BLTs found themselves assigned to mis-sions ranging from fortification construction to roa dsecurity, a far cry from the stoutly defended SLF

tenets of early 1967 .

Beacon Point/Fremont/Ballistic Charge/Shelbyville

1 - 9 September 1967, 16 - 28 September 196 7

On 1 September SLF Alpha landed in Thua Thie n

Province on Operation Beacon Point for a southerl ysweep of the by-now all too familiar "Street Withou t

Joy . " Snipers and surprise firing devices were the on-ly resistance encountered . At 1800 on 4 September ,

Lieutenant Colonel Kapetan ' s HMM-362 detache dfrom the SLF and reverted to MAG-16 control . For -

A ruined church dominates the skyline as infan-trymen of Company D, 1st Battalion, 3d Marine smove through a area of the coastal plain known toboth the French and the Americans as the "Stree t

Without Joy " in the quiet Operation Beacon Point.Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A189242


17 1

tunately, the lack of enemy activity did not subjectthe BLT to the full impact of the loss of its assignedhelicopters . The most tangible result of BeaconPoint was the evacuation or destruction of more tha n35 tons of Viet Cong rice . After the BLT marched toan assembly area near Camp Evans on 5 September ,Operation Beacon Point concluded at 0600 on th e6th .

Later that morning BLT 1/3 phased into Opera-tion Fremont, again under the operational control ofthe 4th Marines . Elements of the battalion truckedto their blocking and screening positions south ofQuang Tri . As during Beacon Point, snipers were theonly active enemy troops .

A solution to SLF Alpha 's helicopter needs occur-red on 8 September. Lieutenant Colonel Walter C .Kelly's HMM-163, UH-34D equipped, reported o nboard the USS Okinawa just in time to prepare forthe following day's extraction . SLF Alpha droppe dout of Fremont on 9 September .

One week later, on the 16th, BLT 1/3 lande dagain. Operation Ballistic Charge involved asimultaneous heliborne and surface assault of an ob-jective area four miles southeast of Dai Loc . Theoperation consisted of a rapid sweep to the northfollowed by a detailed search and destroy sweep t othe south along the track of the first northwardmove . Again, opposition consisted of Communis tsnipers, but during Ballistic Charge the battalion di ddetain 55 suspects and three confirmed prisoners .

When Ballistic Charge ended on the 22nd, BL T1/3 shifted to the operational control of the 1s tMarines for Operation Shelbyville . BLT 1/3's in-volvement started with a heliborne assault from theBallistic Charge AOA to a landing zone four mile ssoutheast of Dai Loc, close to the original Ballisti cCharge objective area . While the 2d Battalion, 1stMarines occupied blocking positions to the east, andthe 3d Battalion, 5th Marines blocked to the south ,Lieutenant Colonel Alfred I . Thomas' BLT 1/ 3swept the operational area in an easterly direction .Sniper fire was the only enemy response .

On 25 September, the BLT reversed its axis of ad-vance and, after a night movement, crossed th erailroad tracks paralleling Route 1 on the morning ofthe 26th . The 3d Battalion, 5th Marines was on theBLT's left during the advance . Late that afternoon ,Company B had a brief firefight with an enemy com-pany, but friendly artillery fire put a quick end t othe engagement for SLF Bravo . Subsequent actionremained limited to sniper fire . On the 28th the BLT

marched out of the operating area to the Libert yBridge, and then moved by trucks to Da Nang whereit reembarked . CTG 79.4 assumed operational con-trol of SLF Alpha at 1715, 28 September .

September was not a spectacular month for SLFAlpha. Twenty-two operational days resulted in 2 6Communists killed, 3 prisoners, and 108 detainees .To achieve this, eight Marines gave their lives andanother 97 sustained wounds .

Fortress Sentry/Kingfisher

17 - 25- September 1967 ,

27 September - 15 October 1967

On 16 July 1967, the 9th Marines initiated Opera-tion Kingfisher near Con Thien . This lengthy opera-tion employed a force varying from three to six bat-talions . As Kingfisher progressed, a new enem ythreat developed to the east in the I Corps coasta lregion . Identified NVA and VC units were operatingbetween the coast and Dong Ha on the northern sideof the Cua Viet River . To neutralize these Com-munist formations, III MAF planned to land SL FBravo in this by-now familiar operational area fo rOperation Fortress Sentry . Previously, Operation sBeacon Hill and Beau Charger swept the sam elocale .

A significant operational change occurred follow-ing the untimely grounding of the CH-46s ; SLFBravo had to land by surface means . III MAFdirected the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion to sup-plement the ARG landing craft .

Poor visibility, rough seas, and generally badweather hampered BLT 2/3's 17 September landin gon the dunes bordering the "Street Without Joy ." Asusual, there was no resistance on the beach and onlylight contact as the battalion took its initial objec-tives . As the battalion moved north-northeas ttoward the DMZ, the 1st ARVN Division screenedits left flank . Land mines damaged some amphibiantractors as the BLT moved inland, but contact re-mained light .

On 23 September about 100 NVA soldiers attack-ed the battalion, but it broke up the probe with theassistance of helicopter gunships . On the morning ofthe 24th, the Marines engaged another enemy forc enear the village of An My, three miles east of Gi oLinh. Prisoners revealed that the Communists ha dexpected an attack from the south or southwest an dthe appearance of the BLT east of their position ha dbeen a complete surprise .

172 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A18927 3A Navy landing craft, utility (LCU) brings elements of the 2d Battalion, 3d Marine sfrom the USS Tripoli to the beach on 17 September for Operation Fortress Sentry, th eday before the battalion phased into the 3d Marine Division's Operation Kingfisher .

The next morning at 0800 Fortress Sentry ter-minated and BLT 2/3 phased into Operatio nKingfisher to the west . * SLF participation involve dextensive sweep operations which resulted in onl yminor contact . On 10 October Lieutenant Colone lHenry Englisch relieved Major Beard as the BLTCommander . SLF Bravo phased out of Kingfisher o n15 October .

Bastion Hill/Medina/Liberty II/Fremont

10 - 19 October 1967, 19 - 23 October 1967

SLF Alpha, on board the ships of TG 79 .4, engag-ed in an extensive rehabilitation effort, while SLFBravo participated in Operation Kingfisher durin gthe first nine days of October .

On 10 October, the 1st Marines, having displace dfrom Da Nang to Quang Tri Province, initiate dOperation Medina in the rugged hills of the HaiLang Forest south of Quang Tri City . Medina waspart of a comprehensive plan to eliminate enem ybase areas . The Hai Lang Forest contained the Com-munist's Base Area 101, and elements of the 5th and6th NVA Regiments operated in and around theregion .

SLF Alpha's mission in Medina was to serve as ablocking force for the 1st Marines on the easternedge of the operational area . BLT 1/3 made itshelicopter move to assigned blocking positions onthe 10th under the operational code name Bastio nHill . The landing met no opposition . Except for one

*Chapter 8 covers Kingfisher in detail .

sharp action between Company C and a company ofNorth Vietnamese regulars early on the morning 1 1October, the battalion ' s contact with the enemy dur-ing Medina involved scattered firefights, incomingmortar rounds, and many grenade mines and boob ytraps .

A major action related to Medina took place northof the SLF sector the day after the operation officiall yened . There, the 6th NVA Regiment, movingeastward away from the SLF's former location, ra ninto the ARVN units participating in Operation La mSon 138, an adjunct to Operation Medina . By theend of the day-long battle which followed, th eARVN reported 197 NVA troops killed .

Immediately after Medina, BLT 1/3 moved southto new blocking positions west of Route 1 and th erailroad between Hai Lang and Phong Dien to par-ticipate in Operation Liberty II/Fremont . Uponjoining Liberty II/Fremont, operational control ofBLT 1/3 passed from the 1st Marines to the 4thMarines . This operation sought to prevent the Com-munists from disrupting the South Vietnamese Na-tional Assembly elections . BLT 1/3 activity durin gthe next five days involved squad and fire tea mpatrols and encounters with the enemy . Liberty/Fre-mont ended on 23 October, and 1/3 moved b ytrucks to Camp Evans to prepare for its next opera-tion, Granite, which was only three days away . On eof the most appreciated preparations was the issue o fan extra poncho and poncho liner to the SLFMarines . The cold winter rains had come to I Corps .

Neither Medina nor Liberty II/Fremont produced


17 3

any telling results, at least in the opinion of SL FAlpha. Two weeks in the field that accounted for on-ly 9 confirmed enemy dead, 7 prisoners, and 1 1suspects, while attrition gnawed at the battalion ' srolls during both operations. The casualties totale d10 Marines dead and 50 others wounded, 38 ofwhom required evacuation .

Formation Leader/Liberty II/Knox

17 - 18 October, 18 - 24 October,

24 October - 4 November 1967

Only two days after leaving Operation Kingfisher ,Lieutenant Colonel Englisch's BLT 2/3 began

Operation Formation Leader in support of the 2 dBattalion, 26th Marines . Envisioned as an area con-trol operation, Formation Leader focused on thestabilization of coastal Thua Thien Province east o fRoute 1, specifically Vin Loc and Phu Loc Districts .Because of the impending Vietnamese Nationa lAssembly elections, intelligence officers presume dthat the Communists would concentrate disruptiv eefforts against these populated districts .

The Communists did not respond . BLT 2/3 ' sgreatest problems during Formation Leader wer enontactical . Because of the grounding of theCH-46s, all troop lifts from the USS Tripoli reliedupon CH-53s from Lieutenant Colonel Joseph L .Sadowski's HMH-463, operating from MarbleMountain . The lifts were entirely satisfactory, bu trealining the BLT's serial assignment tables for th elarger helicopters gave Major Douglas W. Lemon' sbattalion S-3 office a good prelanding workout . Ad-ditionally, high seas and bad weather slowed th elanding of attached heavy vehicles at Hue . In fact ,some remained on board for the duration of th eoperation .

There were no enemy contacts on the 17th and a t1000 on the 18th, BLT 2/3 shifted to the 3d Marin eDivision's operational control . Formation Leader ter-minated and a new operation, Liberty II, started ,but SLF Bravo's mission and operational area re-mained the same . The enemy still did not respond .The most significant incident was the sighting andsubsequent artillery attack on an enemy squad lat eon the 21st . Sadly, the next day five Marines on atrash-burning detail suffered wounds from the ex -plosion of a grenade apparently dumped in th etrash . Liberty II ended at 0800 on the 24th an dOperation Knox started .

Shifted to the operational control of the 7t hMarines, the BLT moved by truck to a new assembly

area 11 kilometers east of Phu Loc. There, it bega nsweep operations under the direction of the 7thMarines, and during the next 13 days the battalio nexperienced 12 enemy contacts, mostly mortar fire .The Marines killed two enemy soldiers, but Kno xhad a debilitating effect on BLT 2/3 . Two Marinesdied in accidents and, of the 78 nonfatal casualties ,only 15 were the result of enemy action . Fungus in-fections claimed 33 victims . Knox ended at 1000 o n4 November ; however, bad weather prevented reem-barkation . Instead all elements of the BLT moved tothe Da Nang Force Logistic Command facility .

Granite/Kentucky II and III

26 October - 4 November, 6 - 16 November 196 7

On 26 October, Operation Granite began for SL FAlpha with an early morning helicopterborne assaul tinto the Hai Lang Forest . Granite was a two-battalion search and destroy operation in the regio nof Communist Base Area 114 . The two assault bat-talions, the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, and SL FAlpha's BLT 1/3, conducted Granite under theoperational control of the 4th Marines .

The first day of Granite was uneventful for th eMarines of BLT 1/3, but during the next nine day sthe enemy "continuously harassed the BLT . . . stay-ing within a few hundred meters . . . ," and "nigh tprobes were made with a consistency not normall y

experienced . . . ." 1 5By the afternoon of the 30th some of the BLT

Marines began to believe that Granite was a jinxe doperation ; supporting arms mistakes were becomingcostly . A friendly air strike, short of target, wounde dtwo Marines on the morning of the 29th . At dusk ashort 60mm mortar round wounded another Marine ,and just after midnight a short artillery roundwounded still another BLT Marine . Fortunately, thiswas the last Granite casualty inflicted by friendl yforces .

BLT 1/ 3 never did find the enemy base area in th eHai Lang Forest, but it had no doubt of the presenc eof enemy troops there . When the battalion finishedits sweep of the rugged terrain on 4 November, it sjournals revealed that it had called in 59 fixed-win gsorties and 652 artillery fire missions during the las t10 days . The battalion captured five AK-47s an dkilled 17 Communists . The tangled vegetation o fthe Hai Lang hid the rest of the story . All of the BLTreturned to Camp Evans before dark on 4

November . Granite ended with three Marines deadand 24 wounded .

174


The SLF Alpha battalion did not stay at CampEvans after Operation Granite . Just before noon on 6November, the division shifted BLT 1/3 to the 9thMarines' operational control . The BLT spent the res tof the day moving west to Cam Lo where it joinedOperation Kentucky as the 3d Division reserve . Ken-tucky began on 1 November, the day after Opera-tion Kingfisher ended . The Kentucky area of respon-sibility, including Con Thien and Cam Lo, wasnothing more than the eastern portion of the ol dKingfisher TAOR. Kentucky was the assignedTAOR of the 9th Marines while Lancaster, to thewest, was the 3d Marines' responsibilty .

BLT 1/3 celebrated the 192nd birthday of th eMarine Corps with an early morning move from Ca mLo north to attack positions less than two kilometer seast of Con Thien . With the 1st Battalion, 1s tMarines—comprised of only two companies and acommand group—on its right, BLT 1/3 jumped offon Phase II of Kentucky the next morning . TheBLT's mission involved making a sweep from east t owest around the northern face of the Con Thienbase . The 9th Marines conceived the operation as aspoiling attack to disrupt suspected Communist con-centrations around Con Thien .

The Kentucky planners were right . At 0830 on th e11th, Company D hit an enemy platoon from th eeast, the blind side of the well-dug-in and conceale dCommunist position . The Marines forced the sur-prised NVA to fight ; seven died . That afternoonCompany D hit another dug-in enemy unit . Thi sone suffered a similar fate ; six more NVA soldier sdied. One survivor, a squad leader, told his captorsthat his battalion had been in the Con Thien area forabout a month . Apparently, Kentucky, with ex-cellent timing, upset Communist plans for ConThien .

The SLF battalion's combat commitment to th eopening phases of Kentucky ended the morning of12 November . The battalion marched back to Posi-tion C-3, a base area in the strong point/obstacl esystem, and then moved on to Dong Ha by truck .BLT 1/3 remained at Dong Ha, again as 3d Marin eDivision reserve, from 12 November until release dby the 9th Marines at 0900 on the 16th, at whichtime the BLT started reembarkation . SLF Alpha ,however, would see Kentucky again .

While the BLT phased out of Kentucky, III MA Fprovided some relief for the loss of mobility cause dby the grounding of CH-46s . On 15 November ,Lieutenant Colonel Daniel M . Wilson's HMM-361

flew its UH-34Ds out to the USS IwoJima to becomethe new SLF Alpha helicopter squadron . The reliabl e34's were a welcome addition, especially since cir-cumstances forced the BLT to rely on other source sfor helicopter support during all of Kentucky II an dIII .

Badger Hunt/Foste r

13 - 29 November 196 7

In Quang Nam Province, north of the concludedBeaver Cage area of operation, enemy contact durin gthe fall of 1967 had been relatively light . The 1s tMarine Division committed units of the 5th and 7thMarines to spoiling operations to prevent infiltrationof the Da Nang rocket belt . In November SLF Brav oparticipated in Operation Badger Hunt as a con-tinuation of the spoiling tactics . The division con-ceived Badger Hunt as an amphibious operation t osupport the 7th Marines' Operation Foster which tw ospectacular VC raids triggered . On 2 November andagain on the 8th, the Viet Cong raided the distric theadquarters and refugee settlements at Hieu Ducand Dai Loc, approximately 15 miles south of D aNang . The VC killed 22 civilians, wounded anothe r42, and destroyed or damaged 559 houses .

To rid the area of the Communist raiders, bot hoperations focused on the river complex of Dai LocDistrict and the flat lands and foothills west of th eThu Bon River . SLF Bravo, under its new com-mander, Colonel Maynard W. Schmidt, and con-sisting of BLT 2/3, commanded by Lieutenant Col-onel Englisch, and a detachment of HMM-262 ,started Badger Hunt by landing at An Hoa . The 3dBattalion, 7th Marines, commanded by Lieutenan tColonel Roger H. Barnard, began Operation Fosterwest of Dai Loc and north of the Thu Bon River .

There was little contact during either operation ,with the exception of one company-sized engage-ment on the 29th . The Communists evaded bot hsweeps, heading for the hills to the west . The enem ysuffered some casualties as reconnaissance teams an dair observers called in air strikes and artillery fire onfleeing enemy groups . The final tally for BadgerHunt and Foster totaled 125 Communists killed an deight captured . Marines losses added up to 25 kille dand 136 wounded . The most significant accomplish-ment of both operations, other than driving theenemy out of the area, was the destruction of most o fthe enemy's supporting installations in the region .The Marines destroyed over 6,000 bunkers, tunnels,

THE SPECIAL LANDING FORC E

and shelters and captured 87 tons of rice . BadgerHunt ended on 29 November .

17 5

Fortress Ridge

21 - 24 December 196 7

On 1 November 1967, the 3d Battalion, 1stMarines, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Ma xMcQuown, learned it would be the new SLF BravoBLT, in relief of the BLT 1/3 . McQuown's battalionpassed to the command of SLF Bravo on 1 Decembe rand the same day embarked for the Special LandingForce Camp at Subic Bay in the Philippine Island sfor intensive training and equipment rehabilitation .On the 17th, the SLF sailed again, destination : ICorps .

Fortress Ridge involved seaborne and heliborn elandings on the beach area of Gio Linh District ,seven kilometers south of the DMZ. After seizingfour separate objectives, each company was to con -duct search and destroy operations in adjacent areas .Intelligence sources reported one battalion of th e803d NVA Regiment, an unidentified main forcebattalion, and the K400 Local Force Company nearthe beach. The operation started on the morning of21 December as BLT 3/1's Company M, command-ed by Captain Raymond A . Thomas, landed in LVTson Red Beach . Half an hour later, Company L land-ed on the north bank of the Cua Viet River, almostfive kilometers to the southwest . HMM-262 tookCompanies I and K into two zones in the sand dunesfour kilometers inland from Company M .

Nothing happened during the morning, but a t1324 hours Captain Lawrence R . Moran ' s Company Ireceived small arms and mortar fire on the south sid eof the village of Ha Loi Tay . A heavy firefight ensue dbetween Company I and Communist forces . Infor-mation from Company I indicated that they had meta sizable, well-entrenched enemy force . According-ly, the battalion mounted Company M on LVTs an dmoved it north on the beach side of the Gulf o fTonkin, where it could support Company I . WhenCompany M arrived in the dune area north of .Giem Ha Trung village, the Communists startedshelling it with mortars . Rocket and artillery firefrom Communists guns north of the DemilitarizedZone hit both companies . Darkness came early andCompany I and the Communists broke contact .Company I established a defensive position to th ewest of Ha Loi Tay . Company M set up a perimeterdefense in the area where it stopped tha tafternoon . ' 6


Rain-soaked Marines of the Special Landing Forc eboard a Navy medium landing craft (LCM-6) for th ereturn trip to their assigned ships after an operation .

Events of the 21st indicated that the Communistswere in force behind the beach, north of the day' sarea of operation . Lieutenant Colonel McQuown re-quested permission from the SLF to conduct searchand destroy operations 1,000 meters north of Objec-tive 1 and 1,000 meters inland from the beach . TheSLF approved the plan, and shortly after 0800 on th e22nd, Company M moved through the Communistpositions that had opposed Company I . The lattercompany remained in position to support the ad-vance of Company M . 1, By 0900 Company Mdiscovered the first positive result of Fortress Ridge :three NVA bodies . Both Companies I and M con-tinued moving northward for the rest of the day, fin-ding quantities of enemy arms and equipment i nabandoned positions . Company K, north of Objec-tive 3, had no contact . At dusk, Company L, fou rkilometers southwest of Companies I and M, cam eunder small arms fire from across the Cua Viet, th elast enemy action of the day . After a quiet night, thebattalion resumed search and destroy sweeps on th e23rd . The day remained uneventful . Company Ifound the major portion of the day's harvest of dud sand enemy ordnance .

Fortress Ridge concluded on the morning of th e24th . By 1100 all units were back on board ship for acontemplative Christmas Eve . In its first operation i nits new role, SLF Bravo lost 10 shipmates and hadanother 27 wounded, but the Marines, however, had



Company I, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines continues to move northward with the rest of th ebattalion on 23 December as Operation Fortress Ridge along the coast draws to a close .

counted 10 dead VC soldiers and observed enoug henemy equipment on the battlefield to know the yhad hurt the Communists . In his after action report ,Lieutenant Colonel McQuown summarized theresults of 21-24 December, writing, "Operation For -tress Ridge provided the confidence and experienc eneeded for a newly formed BLT to perform as a pro-fessional combat unit . "

Badger Tooth

26 December 1967 - 2 January 1968

Special Landing Force Bravo's last commitment i n1967 was Operation Badger Tooth . The original plancalled for the BLT to land one company by LVT t oseize Landing Zone Finch, slightly more than threekilometers inland from the beach on the southernQuang Tri Province border . The rest of the battalio nwould follow by helicopter . The proposed objectivearea was on the extreme western side of the "Stree tWithout Joy," and this time intelligence estimate splaced as many as 1,700 enemy troops in the area o foperation . 1 8

The BLT commander, Lieutenant Colonel Ma xMcQuown, described the plans for the operation :

The scheme of maneuver called for a river crossing ove rthe Song 0 Lau River once all the BLT Task Organizatio nhad landed from ARG shipping . After the river crossingthe BLT was to conduct search and destroy operationsthrough 14 towns and villages on a route runningsouthwest from 12 Finch terminating at the town of Ap

Phouc Phu, 11 kilometers from 12 Finch . Initial fire sup -port for the operation would be organic 81mm mortars ,available on-call air support, and naval gunfire support .Once the BLT had closed on the first intermediate objec-tive, Thon Phu Kinh, 105mm howitzers from a platoon ofthe 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines and a battery from the 1stBattalion, 11th Marines would provide artillery support .i 9

Information relayed to the SLF by a U .S . Armyliaison officer with nearby ARVN units changed theBadger Tooth plan . After the seizure of LZ Finch ,the SLF directed the BLT to search new objectivesconsisting of the coastal villages of Thom Tham Kh eand Tho Trung An . Intelligence officers suspecte denemy forces hid there after evading ARVN opera-tions to the north and west . Once the BLT clearedthe two villages, the SLF would continue with th eoriginally planned sweep to the southwest .

Badger Tooth started as Company L in LVTs land-ed over Green Beach at 1100 on 26 December andproceeded to LZ Finch . The operation continued asscheduled against very light opposition . Major DavidL. Althoffs "Poor Devils" from HMM-262 landedthe last elements of the battalion at Finch by 1415 .Two hours later Company K suffered the first casual-ty of Badger Tooth when automatic weapons fir ewest of the LZ wounded a Marine .

The SLF commander, Colonel Schmidt, accom-panied by the U .S . Army liaison officer to ARV Nforces in the area, arrived at the battalion comman dpost with orders for the BLT to change direction and

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sweep the coastal villages of Tham Khe and TrungAn. Company L received the mission of sweepingTham Khe, with Company M in support . After mov-ing to the edge of the village in LVTs, Company Ladvanced northwest into the built-up area . By 182 2Company L had cleared the first village and was wel linto Trung An . Both towns were clean ; the Marine skilled only three Viet Cong and detained four . Theinfantrymen found no evidence of the presence o fCommunist formations . By 1940, both Companies Land M had tied in for the night north and west o fTham Khe . The night was quiet .

At 0700 on the 27th, both companies moved ou ton another sweep of the two villages . Company Mmoved north on a line parallel to Trung An so i tcould begin it' s sweep of the village from north tosouth . Company L, with the mission to sweep ThamKe, initially moved out to the northeast . Leadingelements of Company L were almost into the sout hof Trung An when Company L's commander realiz-ed that his leading platoon had not turned southtoward Tham Ke . Company L reversed direction im-mediately and started toward Tham Ke .

Just as the leading platoon of Company L ap-proached the edge of the village, a concealed enem yforce opened up with a devastating volume of fire

from machine guns, rifles, RPGs, and mortars . Thecompany immediately suffered many casualties an dCaptain Thomas S . Hubbel decided to pull his com-pany back and regroup for another attack . He re -quested supporting arms fires on Tham Ke while hi scompany prepared for its new assault . After two ai rstrikes, followed by naval gunfire, Company Lassaulted the village . The enemy again met th eMarines with withering defensive fires, killing Cap-tain Hubbel and his battalion "tac-net" radiooperator . Lieutenant Colonel McQuown lost com-munications with the company for a short period un-til the acting company executive officer assume dcommand of Company L .

During the period without radio contact wit hCompany L, Lieutenant Colonel McQuown ordere dCompany M to move east and south and join thefight on the left flank of Company L . Company Mreached its attack position and immediately cameunder heavy enemy fire . Lieutenant Colonel Mc -Quown realized at this time that the two companie swere up against a major enemy force in well -prepared defensive positions . The search of ThamKe the previous day had been inadequate .

Lieutenant Colonel McQuown ordered Company Ito move to the south of Tham Ke . He then re -

Marines of BLT 3/1 take cover as they fight to enter the village of Tham Khe on 27December after their first search of the village the previous day failed to detect thepresence of the elaborate but well-camouflaged positions of the 116th NVA Battalion .



17 9

quested that the SLF land the tank platoon from th eARG ships . Next, he instructed Company K to takethe pressure off Companies L and M by attacking thesouth end of Tham Ke . After prepping the area wit h81mm mortar fire, Company K attacked againstfierce resistance .

Company K made no progress until the arrival oftwo Marine tanks at the company' s position . Unfor-tunately, the two tanks had sustained water damag eto their communications equipment during th elanding and could not communicate with the infan-trymen except by voice :* This reduced their effec-tiveness ; however, the tankers did knock out som eenemy bunkers by direct fire from their 90mm guns .The inability to coordinate the tanks' fire with it sown assault kept the company from making mor ethan a limited penetration into the village complex .It did, however, gain a foothold in the village amidthe enemy defenses .

Companies K, L, and M continued their battle a snight fell, Lieutenant Colonel McQuown expecte dthe enemy would use the darkness to cover thei rescape . To counteract this, he moved Company I t othe right flank of Company K where it could main-tain control over the eastern, or beach side, of Tha mKe . Company M, to the north, could cover part ofthe beach side of the village by fire . Lieutenant Col-onel McQuown also moved elements of both Com-panies L and K to the west of Tham Ke . Even thoughthe extent of the area involved precluded a link-u pof these elements, McQuown anticipated that hi sunit dispositions would block the enemy within th econfines of the village . Such was not the case .

The following morning, the 28th, Company K ,already in the southern edges of Tham Ke, an dCompany I renewed their assault on the village .They quickly subdued the initial heavy enemy smal larms fire and secured the village by noon . Mc-Quown's Marines spent the afternoon in a detaile dsearch of Tham Ke . He recalled :

This search revealed a village that was literally a defen-sive bastion . It was prepared for all-around defense indepth with a network of underground tunnels you could

*Of the five tanks assigned to the BLT, only these two par-ticipated in this action . One tank was under repair at Da Nang ; asecond would not start and had to be left aboard ship . None ap-pear to have been properly waterproofed for landing. The thirdtank reportedly " submerged" during the landing and the othertwo, though operable, "received water damage on landing ." BLT3/1 AAR, Operation Badger Tooth, dtd . 16Jan68, p . 15 (Ar-chives, MCHC, Washington, D .C .) .

stand up in, running the full length of the village . Con-necting tunnels ran east and west . This tunnel system sup-ported ground level bunkers for machine guns, RPG's, an dsmall arms around the entire perimeter of the village . Thusthe NVA were able to defend, reinforce, or withdraw inany direction . All defensive preparation had been artfullycamouflaged with growing vegetation . Residents of ThamKe, questioned after the fight, disclosed that the NVA hadbeen preparing the defense of this village for one year . 30

The search turned up numerous machine guns ,RPGs, AK-47 rifles, and thousands of rounds of am -munition which clearly indicated that a major NVAforce had defended the village, not local Viet Cong .A dying NVA soldier confirmed it ; the enemy forc ehad been the 116th NVA Battalion . The Marinesalso learned that ARVN forces operating northwestof Tham Ke had found over 100 bodies from th e116th NVA Battalion abandoned in the sand dunes .The enemy force apparently had evacuated itscasualties through the gap between L and K Com-panies during the night .

At 1800 on the 31st, a New Year's truce went int oeffect and SLF Bravo prepared to return to its ships ;the New Year's stand-down cancelled any furthe rthoughts of attacking inland . Bad weather andrough seas slowed back-loading, but by 1130, 2January the BLT had left the "Street Without Joy . "In the sharp fighting at Tham Khe, the Marines suf-fered 48 killed and 86 wounded; 31 enemy soldierswere known dead . Tham Khe was a bitter experienc efor the Marines of BLT 3/1, but Badger Tooth was apoignant tactical lesson which would be re -membered in the clouded future of 1968 .

Ballistic Arch/Kentucky V/Osceola

24 - 27 November, 27 November - 29 December ,

30 December—continuing 1968

Eight days after leaving Cam Lo, SLF Alpha land-ed again . While at sea, BLT 1/3's commander schanged, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas turned ove rhis command to recently promoted Lieutenant Col-onel Richard W. Goodale . The 24 Novembe rlanding, Ballistic Arch, was a helicopter and surfac eassault of Viet Cong-dominated villages on the nor-thern coast of Quang Tri Province, only seve nkilometers south of the southern DMZ boundary .

Ballistic Arch aimed at Communist sympathizer sreported in and around the hamlet of Mai Xa Thi .The operation was a "walk through" for most of thebattalion, but the opening minutes were tense fo rthe crews of the LVTP-5s of the 4th Platoon, Conn-

180



Company I, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines rests on thebeach on 28 December 1927 after it and Company Kcompleted their assault through the village of ThamKhe and eliminated the rear guard of the 116thNVA Battalion, which had covered the withdrawalof the bulk of the enemy battalion during the night .

pally A, 5th Amphibian Tractor Battalion and th e

embarked Marines of the BLT ' s Company A .Poor information on surf conditions presented th e

amphibian tractors with a serious problem . As theyapproached the beach, they started to take on moresea water than their pumps could handle ; at times i t

was knee deep in the tractors . Two Marines, riding

on top of a tractor washed overboard, but fortunate-ly others rescued them . At last the vehicles groundedand climbed the dunes of the Quang Tri coast .

There were no losses .

The expected contact did not materialize . Thebattalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Goodal esummarized the apparently poor intelligence whic htriggered Ballistic Arch, saying, "no fighting holes ,bunkers, or fortifications of any kind were uncovere dduring the operation . . . The area appeared to b equite pacified and the indigenous personnel were

very friendly ." 21 Ballistic Arch ended at noon on 2 7November, and BLT 1/ 3 immediately came unde rthe 9th Marines' operational control .

The BLT again phased back into the continuin g

Kentucky Operation . Its only active participation ,

however, was a sweep during the period 28-3 0November . On 2 December the battalion move dback to the A-3 Strongpoint to provide security an dengineer support for its construction . The Marine smade a concerted effort to complete construction . B y

Rice paddy mudprovides the only resistance to BLT 1 /3 Marines after poor intelligence

caused Operation Ballistic Arch to take place in a thoroughly pacified area of Vietnam .Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A189961

18 1

the time of the departure of BLT 1/3 on 2 9December, the Marines had completed the defensivewire and minefield and almost finished the bunkercomplex .

Enemy contact during the stay at A-3 was ver ylight . The battalion experienced small enemy probe suntil 11 December when supporting arms broke up aplatoon-size Communist attack . Enemy ground ac-tion dropped off appreciably afterward . Enemy ar-tillery, mortar, and rocket fire were the main deter -

rent to the Marines' engineering effort at A-3 . Fro m2 December until the 29th, 578 rounds landed onthe position. Phase V of Kentucky concluded on 2 9December. BLT 1/3 made a combined tactical foo tand motor march back to Quang Tri Airfield com-plex . The last two days of December passed as th eBLT prepared to relieve the 2d Battalion, 4t hMarines, then involved in Operation Osceola . Th eend of the year brought no slowing of the planne dtempo of SLF operations .

CHAPTER 1 2

PacificationThe Problem Defined— County Fai r

Marine Grass-Roots-Level Participation—Reporting and Evaluatio n

The Problem Defined

Military commanders in Vietnam realized tha toperations against Communist main force units ,alone, could not win the war . These operations coul donly provide a shield of security behind which th eSouth Vietnamese Government and its allies coul dimplement a Revolutionary Development o rpacification program, a program aimed solely at win-ning the support of the people .

Pacification is a relatively simple concept ; the pro-cess and means of accomplishment are extremel ycomplex . Because of differing interpretations an dfrequent interchanges of the terms "pacification, ""revolutionary development, " and "nation

building," ComUSMACV issued a memorandum ,"Clarification of Terms," which listed the followin gdefinitions :

Pacification is the military, political, economic, an dsocial process of establishing or reestablishing local govern-ment responsive to and involving the participation of th epeople . It includes the provision of sustained, credible ter-ritorial security, the destruction of the enemy' sunderground government, and the initiation of economi cand social activity capable of self-sustenance and expan-sion . The economic element of pacification includes th eopening of roads and waterways and maintenance of line sof communication important to economic and military ac-tivity .

Revolutionary development, the leading edge o f

An infantryman from Company D, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines demonstrates the need fo ra viable pacification program by holding up an empty bulgur wheat sack found in aNorth Vietnamese Army unit's bunker destroyed by the battalion on 26 March 1967 .


PACIFICATION

18 3

pacification, is the formalized Government of Vietna mprogram, under the sponsorship of the Ministry of Revolu-tionary Development, in specified hamlets generall ywithin RD campaign areas . It includes the local security forthese hamlets and the political, economic, and social ac-tivities at that level .

Nation building is the economic, political, and social ac-tivity having an impact nationwide and/or in urbancenters . It is related to pacification in that it builds on th eresults of pacification and contributes to the establishmen tof a viable economic and social community . ,

Since the beginning of United States involvemen tin Vietnam, security for the rural population re-mained the basic requirement for pacification, an dhow best to provide this security was the subject ofcontinuing debate between American and Viet-namese officials . The military side contended thatthe problem was a fundamental military issue, tha tphysical security of the contested area must b eestablished before starting any developmental pro -grams ; civil officials, on the other hand, viewed th eproblem as a political issue, stating that political ,economic, and social developmental projects wouldmake greater inroads on Communist influence an dtherefore should have greater priority . The con-trasting views led to the initiation of programs whic hoften resulted in duplication, as well as confusion o nthe part of the Vietnamese offices charged with im-plementing and administering them . To helpalready overloaded local administrators, MACVdispatched more American advisors to the provinces ,but, unfortunately, in many cases their presence ac-tually retarded pacification progress . Zealous ad -visors often stifled local initiative .

At the same time, MACV experienced equallyperplexing problems . While MACV perceived tha tsecurity was the first prerequisite for a successful pro -gram, it had difficulty implementing a sound ,balanced management system . As in the civilian pro -grams, military civic action concepts evolved by tria land error .

The Vietnamese had experimented with pacifica-tion programs since 1954 . Based on past experience ,a new program emerged late in 1965 . The Viet-namese adopted the concept of the armed propagan-da cadre as the basis for the national program : Thecivil side of the program began slowly in 1966 ,primarily because of the shortage of trained cadre ,but the Vietnamese Government provided en-thusiastic direction and the prospects for success wereoptimistic .

In February 1966, the Honolulu Conference align-

ed many of the diverse American and Vietnames eopinions and actions . Top-level U .S . and Viet-namese policy makers agreed to consider the civilia naspects of the war as important as the military effort .This summit changed the system of priorities an dcaused the initiation of additional programs an dprovision of more of the requisites needed to wagewhat many called the "other war ." Perhaps the mostsignificant outcome of the conference was Presiden tJohnson's decision that only one person would directUnited States pacification efforts in Vietnam . Thi sled to the establishment of the Office of Civil Opera-tions (OCO) in late autumn 1966 . This neworganization brought the various U .S . civilianpacification programs under the control of a senio rofficial who, in turn, reported directly to the deput yambassador .

The South Vietnamese Government assigned th eoverall responsibility for the Vietnamese side of th enational pacification plan, the RevolutionaryDevelopment Program, to Major General Nguye nDuc Thang, who headed the newly created Ministr yof Revolutionary Development . A reorganization ofthe Vietnamese war cabinet on 12 July 1966 gaveThang direct supervision over the Ministries o fRevolutionary Development, Agriculture, Publi cWorks, and Interior . At this juncture, Thang gaine dauthority to direct coordination and integration ofcivil/military Revolutionary Development activitie sat all echelons of the government .

The main operational element for the civil aspect sof Revolutionary Development was the 59-ma nRevolutionary Development cadre team . Thegovernment recruited these teams from within eachdistrict, trained them at the National Cadre Trainin gSchool at Vung Tau, and returned them to their pro-vinces for assignment to a district thief for work inone of his hamlets . Their first task involved th esecurity and defense of their assigned hamlets . Onc ethey established security they started working wit hthe people to create a better way of life within th ehamlet .

In September, to ensure military assistance for th eprogram, the South Vietnamese appointed Genera lThang to the position of assistant .for territorial af-fairs and pacification to the Chief, Joint Genera l

Staff . Major functions of his position include ddevelopment of policies and concepts for military ac-tivities in support of revolutionary development an dsupervision of the employment, maneuver, an dtraining of regional and popular forces . The primary

184


Revolutionary Development role of the militaryforces required achieving a level of security whic hwould permit the accomplishment of civil activitie sand subsequent nation building . The 1967 Combin-ed Campaign Plan assigned the primary mission ofsupporting the Revolutionary Development progra mto ARVN forces, thus, by the end of 1966, the Sout hVietnamese Government had taken major steps toconsolidate its pacification programs . *

As the Vietnamese reorganized, the Americansalso continued to reform their own programs . TheOffice of Civil Operations (OCO) confidentlyreported that it had integrated the pacification effor twith military operations and was making significan tprogress in implementing the various programs . Oneof the most important OCO contributions was theappointment of four regional directors, one for eac hcorps area . These four men had full authority over allAmerican civilians in their respective regions an dreported directly to the director of OCO; previousl ythere had been no central management of thevarious pacification programs . During the spring o f1967, the United States realized that it needed astronger organization and placed all of the variou scomponents of the American pacification effort ,both civilian and military, under a single manager ,ComUSMACV . The name of the new organizatio nwas Civil Operations and Revolutionary Develop-ment Support (CORDS) .

On 23 May, MACV Directive 10-12 implementedCORDS. Ambassador Robert Komer becam eGeneral Westmoreland's deputy for CORDS wit hfull responsibility for the entire program . The direc-tive specifically charged the ambassador with "super-vising the formulation and execution of all plans ,policies and programs, military and civilian, whic hsupport the GVN's revolutionary development pro -gram and related programs ." In addition, the direc-tive provided for the integration and consolidationof all OCO and revolutionary development suppor tactivities at all levels : nation, corps, province, anddistrict . The OCO regional director became thedeputy for CORDS to each corps commander, whil ethe senior provincial and district advisors becam eCORDS representatives at those levels . Accommoda-tion of this extensive program proved to be a simpl ematter in I Corps, chiefly because the I Corps Coor -

*For a detailed description of the Revolutionary Developmen tProgram during 1966 and the development of the Combine dCampaign for 1967, see Shulimson, U. S . Marines in Vietnam,1966.

dinating Council had performed a very similar func-tion for 20 months .

By early August 1965, Marine civic action had ex-panded to the point that coordination with othe rUnited States agencies in I Corps became imperativ efor the effective support of the Vietnamese pacifica-tion program . General Walt ordered the creation o fthe I Corps Joint Coordinating Council . The counci ldrew its members from all major U .S . and Viet-namese agencies in I CTZ, including representative sfrom both Marine and ARVN military staffs . Whenthe council met on 30 August 1965, it was the firstworking regional council of its kind in South Viet-nam. This organizational step preceded the forma-tion of subcommittees for public health, education ,roads, refugees, distribution, and police . Althoughthe Joint Coordinating Council had no directive -making authority or material resources of its own ,the influence of its members made it the most effec-tive group for carrying out the total pacification pro -

gram in I Corps .* By the fall of 1966, she success ofthe council encouraged and assisted the formation o fother joint coordinating councils ()CC) . These JCC swere independent of the corps-level council, but ha dsimilar staffs and missions . As 1967 began, growingVietnamese participation in council activities an dsponsored programs indicated the value of the JC Capproach .

During 1965 III MAF created a fifth general staffsection, G-5, to coordinate all civic action programs .The Marines established G-5/S-5 sections in everyMarine division, regiment, and battalion serving inVietnam. At the same time, to prevent overlap o fprojects, III MAF assigned responsibility for thecoordination of civic action in particula rgeographical areas to specific units . This enable dthem to coordinate all programs within their area swith local government officials . By the end of 1966 ,these two steps formed a sound base for both the IIIMAF and Vietnamese pacification programs .

Following the formation of CORDS, many of th efunctions of the III MAF G-5 section shifted to th eCORDS representatives at III MAF Headquarters .Such a shift inevitably caused some friction betweenthe two offices . Among them was the tendency o f

*Vice Admiral Thomas R . Weschler wrote that General Walt 'sleadership was the key element that molded the various agencie sinto a team dedicated to a successful pacification campaign . Vic eAdmiral Thomas R . Weschler, Comments on draft ms, 18Jun8 1(Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C .)

PACIFICATION

18 5

the CORDS staff to report through their own chan-nels directly to Saigon, bypassing III MAF . Despit edaily meetings, the G-5 section believed that muc hinformation from the CORDS system was notreaching the G-5 . "As CORDS took on more of th eresponsibility for pacification from the G-5, " wroteColonel James L . Black, who served as III MAF G-5 ,"coordination among the [III MAF] G-3, G-2, an dG-5 became almost non-existent . " III MAF sharpl yreduced the size of the G-5 section and it almost in-tegrated into the CORDS staff. However, in spite o fbeing the smallest staff section in III MAF, G-5 re-mained charged with major requirements to suppor tthe pacification effort . 2

The G-5 officer found a number of obstacles in hi spath. Even though the Army's 29th Civil Affair sCompany supported III MAF, the growth of CORD Sblurred the command relationship between III MAFand the company . Further, Colonel Black did no tbelieve the company's task organization properl yreflected its mission. Another limiting factor was th elack of understanding of civil affairs among Marine sassigned to G-5/S-5 staffs at all command levels .Few had been school trained in their duties and ha dto learn on-the-job . Those with formal school train-ing had to learn to shift their thinking fro mtheoretical, classroom concepts to the practical situa-tion at hand . The learning process slowed progress i nthe III MAF civil affairs effort .

The importance placed upon civic action require dthe III MAF G-5 to submit a daily civic action repor tto FMFPac headquarters . The report included suchtopics as the amount of lumber, clothing, garbage ,and other material distributed to the Vietnamesepeople during the last 24 hours . This classifiedreport could not be delayed, not even by heavymessage traffic during peak operational periods . "Ifthis report did not reach FMFPac within 24 hours, "wrote Colonel Black, "you would receive a 'nasty 'phone call [from Hawaii] ." The reports proble mended, according to Colonel Black, in the spring of1968 .3

County Fair

Throughout 1967, the Marines concentrated onthe basics of pacification development . In accor-dance with the Honolulu Declaration of 1966, theMarines directed much of their effort at the expan-sion and refinement of the pacification program the yhad initiated earlier . For their programs to succeed ,the Marines needed to provide secure conditions i nwhich the Vietnamese people could live and in

which all levels of legal government could functio nwithout enemy interference . To this end, theMarines' main objective was the isolation of the V Cfrom the people, both physically and economically .Golden Fleece operations, in which Marines provid-ed security during rice harvests, had proven suc-cessful in protecting the villagers' rice crops sinc eSeptember 1965 ; however, they occurred only dur-ing the two or three yearly harvest seasons . On theother hand, the war on the VC infrastructure was adaily affair .

The source of the enemy's strength was the loca lguerilla organization which operated in 5- to 10-ma ncells within each hamlet . Each cell acted as aclandestine de facto government which worked tofoster Communist influence, while simultaneousl yundermining the influence of local officials and th ecentral government . If the local population was no tsympathetic to the Communist cause, the guerilla sresorted to intimidation and terror to control in -habitants . Each guerrilla acted as an agent betwee nthe people and the VC main force units which need-ed food, recruits, and intelligence . Simply stated ,pacification involved eliminating the agents andthus reducing the large Communist units to th estatus of conventional forces groping around i nhostile territory . Furthermore, with the destructio nof the guerrilla infrastructure, the seeds of RVN in-fluence could fall on neutral, if not completely fer-tile, ground .

The Marines recognized these realities during th eearly stages of the campaign and devised severa ltechniques to combat the guerrillas . One of the mostsuccessful, initiated in 1966, was the County Fairconcept . Basically, County Fairs involved elaboratecordon and search operations conducted by combin-ed ARVN and Marine forces . Since the South Viet-namese government needed to know who belongedwhere, the ARVN handled the population contro laspects, as well as the actual searching of the targete dvillage, while the Marines usually remained in th ebackground, providing tactical,"muscle . "

Once the combined commanders selected a noperational area, Marine units moved in at night an destablished a cordon around the designated villageto prevent the VC, if any, from escaping or gainin greinforcements . At dawn, ARVN troops entered thevillage, rounded up the inhabitants, apologized forthe inconvenience, and announced that they intend-ed to search the hamlet . While district and villag eleaders mingled with the people explaining what was

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Vietnamese peasant women hold out their straw hats for the mixture of ham and ric eprepared by the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines during a "County Fair" operation in May .

happening, other officials checked identificatio ncards and took a census .

The allies tried to make the experience as pleasan tas possible . They set up a temporary dispensary toprovide the villagers with free medical and denta lcare . They fed the people, including providing can-dy and other delights for the children . Entertain-ment featured movies, live presentations, and ban dconcerts which helped to cover the serious busines sof uprooting the Communists . These organizedamusements provided the name "County Fair . "

While the distractions continued in the assemblyarea, South Vietnamese troops systematically comb-ed the village . Often the guerrillas slipped into tun-nels or spider holes at the first sign of approachin gtroops, but if the troops discovered the undergroundhiding place they literally smoked out the VC . Onsome operations, the searchers used portableblowers, called "Mighty Mites," to saturate the shaft swith tear gas and smoke .* If the guerrillas chose t orun away, they encountered the Marine cordonaround the village .

While these operations proved successful, Count yFairs were not an end in themselves . When Marin e

*The term Mighty Mite should not be confused with the similarnickname for a light vehicle used as a jeep by Marine units in th e1960s .

and ARVN units left the area, they took with the mthe security essential to the survival of pro-government villages . Even if the allies eradicatedthe existing VC infrastructure, their departur ecreated a vacuum into which other guerrilla cadrecould filter . During a survey conducted by Marin ecivil affairs personnel in the Chu Lai area, mos tcivilians interviewed stated that they appreciated themedical care, the clothing, the new schools, and al lof the other benefits, but what they really wante dwas protection from the Viet Cong . Revolutionary

Development teams and Popular Forces could onl ypartially remedy the situation because of thei rlimited training and armament . The Marines rea-lized these facts, but they also recognized the unex-ploited potential which the popular forces offered :total familiarity with local conditions, loyalties ,needs, and every physical characteristic of their hom evillages . Marine recognition of this potential, and ef-forts to develop it, produced one of the most pro-ductive innovations in I Corps, the Combined Ac-tion Program .

Marine Grass-Roots-Level Participatio n

The birth of the Combined Action Program occur -red in the summer of 1965 in Lieutenant ColonelWilliam W. Taylor's 3d Battalion, 4th Marines as ameans of controlling the population around the Phu

PACIFICATION

18 7

Bai combat base . The battalion civil affairs officer ,Captain John J . Mullen, Jr ., provided the origina linspiration . Understanding the Vietnamese culture ,Mullen realized that the militia troops living in th evillages were the key to local security . Rural Vietna-mese had an orientation toward families, ancestors ,and hamlets ; they were not strong nationalists . Mos tfarmers spent their entire lives within a 10-mileradius of their hamlets . PFs usually performed poor-ly if moved to another district, but in defense o ftheir own homes they could be tough . In the warwith the VC, motivation alone could not overcomesuperior firepower and experience . Mullen believe dthe Marines could add the necessary ingredients and ,given proper leadership and firepower, the PFs no tonly could, but would stand up to the VC .

Lieutenant Colonel Taylor agreed with Mullen' sidea and, on 3 August 1965, he sent four squads o fMarines to work with six platoons of PFs in the thre evillages northwest of his perimeter . First LieutenantPaul R. Ek, who spoke Vietnamese, became th ecompany commander and a PF lieutenant worked ashis executive officer . Under this leadership, the pro -

gram got underway .Lieutenant Ek's success with combined actio n

prompted III MAF to expand the program . GeneralWalt, a strong advocate of the pacification program ,approved of the results at Phu Bai and, in Januar y1966, decided to initiate similar programs at DaNang and Chu Lai .* General Walt's initiating order

stated :

1. . . . the Commanding General, .I Corps has concurredin III MAF proposal to expand the Marine-Popular Forc eprogram throughout all Marine enclaves and has publishedinstructions to subordinates throughout I Corps .

2. Action will be taken immediately to establish liaiso nthrough Province, District, and down to village/hamlet asrequired to take operational control of Popular Force unit swithin a zone of action in accordance with reference (b) . I neach case ensure that local officials thoroughly understan dthe program and have been apprised of General Thi's let -ter . Specifically, presentations will include that Marin eforces intend to establish communications to Popular Forc eunits, provide supporting arms, reserve forces, and plan t oplace Marines with selected Popular Force Platoons . Wherepossible Popular Force units in proximity to each other wil l

*Captain Mullen, who replaced Lieutenant Ek upon the latter' srotation in September 1965, and several members of the origina lcompany assisted and advised in the establishment of the second

unit . Lieutenant Colonel John J . Mullen, Jr ., Comments on draftms, 21May81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington ,

D .C .)

be organized into Combined Action Companies .* Indiscussions, stress the mutual benefits of the program i nthat Marines can profit from Popular Forces knowledge o farea, language, and people while the Popular Force willreceive valuable training and will be provided additiona lsecurity . Of primary importance is the fact that this rela-tionship will provide a basis for better understanding an dbuilding of mutual respect between our forces . In presen-ting the program to RVN officials, avoid the use of theterms " operational control " by substituting "cooperatio nor coordination . "

3 . Insure a thorough indoctrination on the overall aims o fprograms to all concerned . These are to improve the effec-tiveness and prestige of the Popular Forces with a view toincreasing recruitment to build up this criticallyunderstrength force . The importance of the Popular Forcesto provide security for rear areas, which will allo wMarine/ARVN combat forces to move forward, cannot beoverstressed . At every opportunity when dealing withGVN officials, highlight the Popular Force problem an dassess the adequacy of the program at local levels to im-prove this force .

4 . Upon receipt of this letter, report :a. Location of Popular Force units in area of operation .b. Assigned mission of each unit .c. Commander .d. Personnel present for duty .e. Amount and condition of equipment .f. Uniform requirements .g. Plans for implementing program .

5 . After the initial report submit summary of operationsconducted and evaluation of the program on a weekl ybasis . ,

By January 1966, there were seven combined ac-tion platoons in existence ; by July, 38 ; and by thebeginning of 1967 the number had risen to 57 . II IMAF planned still more .

While it was important to have the support of II IMAF command levels for combined action, the suc-cess or failure of the venture ultimately rested on th eshoulders of 19- and 20-year-old Marines . Combine dAction units needed a special Marine ; a man withou tthe necessary motivation, understanding, and com-passion could do more harm than good . All Marine sin the original program were volunteers with at leastfour months' combat experience, a favorable recom-mendation from their commanding officer, n orecord of disciplinary action, and, all important, nodiscernible racial prejudices . These men were the

*The name of these units soon changed to Combined Actio n

Platoons (CAPs) . The Marines found that the acronym "CAC "

was, under certain pronunciations, a vulgarity in the Vietnameselanguage .

188


foundation upon which the Marine side of the pro-gram was built .

By mid-1967, III MAF had compiled statistic swhich illustrated the dedication of Marines in th eCombined Action Program . The average Marine par-ticipant had a 75-percent chance of being wounde donce during his tour and a 30-percent chance of be-ing hit a second time . The ultimate statistic, thosewho would die, was just under 12 percent . Despitethese grim mathematical reminders, over 60 percen tof the Marines volunteered for at least one six-monthextension to their normal 12-month tours in Viet-nam. The high extension rate was a strong indicationto their leaders that the Combined Action Progra mhad a better than average chance of success .

The basic operating unit of the program, the com-bined action platoon (CAP), consisted of a 14-manMarine squad and a Navy corpsman, integrated int oa nominal 35-man Popular Forces platoon . The idealscenario following establishment of a combined ac-tion unit was as follows :

Initially, there was only one objective, around-the-clock security of their assigned hamlet . The firstdays were the most dangerous, the period when uni tcohesiveness and proficiency were most ques-tionable. The Marines first had to teach the PFs t odefend themselves . The Marines provided theknowledge of tactics and weaponry while the PFscontributed their knowledge of the terrain and localconditions . In the field the Marine squad leader ,normally a sergeant, usually controlled the unit ; butduring the daily routine, cooperation replaced com-mand. As the PFs' confidence and skill grew, CAPpatrolling became more aggressive . Continuoussharing of experience gained through daily, side-by-side participation in training and patrolling create dtruly effective, integrated platoons and a new degre eof reliable hamlet security . As the strength of theCAP grew, the peoples' willingness to accept th eunit also increased . Then, and only then, couldlasting social action within the hamlets become areality .

Time worked paradoxically for the CAP Marines .To ensure their own survival, they had to quicklytransform the CAP into a cohesive defense force, butthe opposite was the case in their dealings with th epeople . The Vietnamese, possessing a wariness ofoutsiders typical of peasant societies, would not le tthe Marines force their way into the existing socia lstructure of the hamlet . Acceptance took time .Usually the breakthrough in acquiring community

3d MarDiv ComdC, June 1967

This Marine, though wearing starched, presse dtrousers and shined boots for the visitingphotographer, wields a hoe alongside a Popula rForces militiaman to demonstrate the importance ofcooperative effort in the Combined Action Program .

acceptance came from the hamlet children . Since theCAP compound was a natural gathering place for th enaturally curious and uninhibited children, they ac-cepted the Marines and, in turn, gained the friend-ship of the Americans . In most cases, hamletchildren became the most significant factor in bridg-ing the cultural gap . As parents began to know andunderstand the Marines through their own children ,empathy could develop which aided the establish-ment of common purposes .

This approach was not without its pitfalls, as Nav yChaplain Vincent T. Capadonno, a former mis-sionary on Taiwan, pointed out in a series of lecture sto Marine units at Chu Lai in the summer of 1966 .Young American males, he said, love to play wit hchildren—for about 15 minutes . Then they tire o fthe children and start pushing them away ,sometimes having to get rough before the childre nrealize the game is over . Further, in Vietnamese pea-sant society, where infant and child mortality wer ehigh, children, though loved by their parents, ha dlittle social standing . Among the Vietnamese, socialstanding was a matter of age, with the elderly havin gthe highest, most respected status . The America ncultural emphasis on youth could lead youn gMarines to concentrate on young Vietnamese and ig-

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Popular Forces militiamen and Marines work together to improve village defenses bybuilding a traffic control gate over a bridge near the combined action platoon's position .

note the village elders, a situation that could creat eresentment within the village power structure . 6

In areas of strong Communist influence, th edevelopment of a close relationship was even mor edifficult . The Marines had to counter VC propagan-da which pictured them as blood-thirsty mercenarieswho burned, raped, and pillaged, but participantsmanaged to overcome these obstacles when their ac-tions disproved the Communists' claims . They hadto live, work, and eat with the people, respect thei rcustoms, and treat them as equals . The CAP corps -men also helped to narrow the gap by providin grudimentary but vital medical assistance. Most im-portantly, the Marines' approach had to demonstrat ethat they genuinely cared about the well-being ofthe villagers .

Once the people accepted the Marines, true civi caction could start, but again the Americans coul dnot take charge . For civic action to be effective, ithad to reflect what the people sincerely wanted, aswell as what they were willing to support . Onceeveryone determined these needs, only the imagina-tion and initiative of the Marines and the villager slimited the extent of the program . The range of pro-jects accomplished by Marines, PFs, and citizen sworking together ranged from school construction t oanimal husbandry . Many desired civic action projectsexceeded the material resources available to th eCAPs, but they could turn to the vast inventories of

agencies as USAID and CARE . Local Marine com-mands also helped by providing the hamletsavailable construction material, machinery, tools ,and clothing .

When they demonstrated military proficiency an dgained popular support, the CAPs could appl ygreater pressure on the VC . By denying the guerrillasaccess to the hamlets, the defense force curtailed th eCommunists' logistic and manpower sources . TheCAPs also established antiguerrilla intelligence net sin their immediate areas . When the people realize dthat to help the CAPs was to help themselves, the yprovided the Marines information on V Cmovements, storage areas, and the locations ofmines and booby traps .* Armed with this in-telligence, the CAPs managed to inflict heaviercasualties on the Viet Cong, driving them furtherfrom the mainstream of hamlet life .

The CAPs also attempted to erode Communis tstrength through persuasion . They aimed this effor tprimarily at the relatives of the local guerrillas . Th eMarines entreated the resident families of known V Cto ask their kin to give up the VC cause, pointing ou tthat sooner or later the CAPs would find andpossibly kill them . This approach not only ac -

*The Marines rarely, if ever, patrolled without the PFs, becaus ethe Vietnamese, being more familiar with the area, could spo tmines and booby traps more readily than the Americans .

190


celerated enemy defections, but it also reinforced th epermanency of the . CAP program in the minds of th epeasants .

All of these activities contributed to the growth o fthe villagers' belief in their own government an dtheir allies . Perhaps the most important factor inpromoting confidence in the program was the fac tthat the Viet Cong had not regained control of anyarea in which a CAP had established security . Th epresence of a successful CAP in a village complexprohibited further use of that village by the VC .

Not all CAP units succeeded, especially duringthe period of rapid expansion of the program .Lieutenant Colonel Max McQuown, the comman-ding officer of the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, was no tfavorably impressed with either of the two units i n

his battalion TAOR . He described the problems of

these units :

Few of the Marines assigned to these two CAP units ha dprior ground combat experience . . . . [They] were an ad-mixture out of combat service support units . The leadersand the Marines under them . . . lacked skills in scoutin gand patrolling, mines and booby traps, map reading ,observed fire procedures, basic infantry tactics, and V Ctactics and techniques . Further, they had scant knowledgeof the Vietnamese language and were unfamiliar with thesocial and religious customs of the people they were livin gwith .

With respect to their PF counterparts, not one PF was a

resident of either village . . . all the eligible resident males ,who should have been members of the PF platoons, wer egone! They had been drafted into the ARVN, joined th eVC, or deserted the village to keep from [serving in eithe rthe ARVN or VC] . The strength of each PF platoon i nthese villages never exceeded 20 men . . . .

Marine [and PF] members of the CAP platoon . . . kep tthemselves aloof from the villagers they were supposed tobe helping . . . .

There was no record of either CAP unit capturing a VC ,let alone destroying the VC infrastructure in these villages .In fact, the VC operated with impunity around thes evillages unless elements of 3/1 were in the area . . . .

[The chiefs of the two villages], both many time swounded [and] ardent anti-communist leaders, chose todeal directly with [the battalion S-2 and S-5 sections] wit hrespect to VC activity and civic action programs . Bothchiefs were instrumental in initiating 3/1 action agains tVC operating in and around their villages . Neither chie fhad faith that the CAP units would accomplish anything . ,

The existence of similar problems among anumber of CAP units, which were traceable to rapi dexpansion of the program, was apparent to III MA Fheadquarters . To enhance the program's effec-tiveness, General Cushman, the new III MAF com-mander, established a provisional combined actio ngroup (CAG) headquarters at Da Nang. Theprimary purpose of this provisional CAG was t ooversee training and support of the combined actio nunits . A month later, III MAF formed two more

A large South Vietnamese flag flies over the bunkers and barbed wire protecting the

gate leading into the headquarters of Combined Action Platoon 3-1 in August 1967.


PACIFICATION

19 1

CAGs to direct activities in the Phu Bai and Chu La iareas .

During July, III MAF revised control and suppor tof the CAP Marines by removing them from th ecommand of the Marine division responsible fo rtheir area . The new chain of command linked th eCAPs through their companies and groups directl yto III MAF . Under the revised system, supervisoryauthority rested with the deputy commandinggeneral of III MAF, Major General Herman Nicker -son, Jr ., via his Combined Action Program Staff.This command revision occurred following therelocation of Marine tactical units after the arrival ofthe Army's Task Force Oregon at Chu Lai .

The CAP program continued to grow durin g1967 . By July there were 75 CAPs and by the end ofthe year, 79 operated under 14 company head -quarters .

The increasing success of the Combined ActionProgram demonstrated the results achievable .Pacification involved not changing, but rather, rein -forcing the villagers' own aspirations . The successfu lCAP Marines understood this and, because of it ,achieved one of the basic goals of the entire pacifica-tion effort, the unification of interest between theSouth Vietnamese villager and the individualMarine . For the process to work in the MarineTAORs, III MAF needed the same identity of in-terest between the Marines in the regular units an dthe local populace . Marines in companies and bat-talions had to realize that their mission was the pro-tection of the people, while the Vietnamese peasantshad to learn to overcome their fear of Americans .

The Marine Corps attempted to solve this problemwith its Personal Response Project, a programdesigned to help the individual Marine to under -stand the South Vietnamese . III MAF initiated th eproject in July 1966, but it remained in a dat acollecting stage until early in 1967 . The first steps ofthe program consisted of making several surveys o fMarines throughout I Corps to establish a represen-tative sample of Marine attitudes toward the Viet-namese people . At the same time, III MAF chaplainsconducted lectures and discussions to acquaint th eMarines with the basic features of Vietnames eculture and civilization . III MAF distributed a Pla-toon Leader's Personal Response Notebook to al lsmall unit commanders as an instruction guide forMarines under their command .

In February 1967, the 3d Marine Divisionestablished a Personal Response Council and a Per -


Cpl Gary W. Armstrong fires his M-60 machine gu ntoward a Viet Cong sniper's position while on a com-bat patrol with a combined action unit on 9 May .

sonal Response Contact Team . The council and teamstarted a variety of programs directed toward im-proving Marine-Vietnamese relationships, essentiall ythrough eliminating any negative attitudes held b ythe Marines . 8 By the end of May, both the 1stMarine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Win ghad similar programs .

The Headquarters, Marine Corps statement of th epurpose and objectives of the Marine Corps Persona lResponse Project was :

The Personal Response Project is a systematic effor ttoward attitudinal improvement in intercultural relations .By discovering the ways in which people of another cultur erelate their religious and ethical value systems to daily lifethe project develops effective anticipation of acculturativ eproblems . Such anticipation and understanding is one ofthe keys to the elimination of offensive behavorial pattern stoward indigenous citizens . It is expected that appropriat emutual assistance between Marines and the citizenry wil lbe a by-product of increased understanding and con-tributory to the elimination of local guerrilla forces in aninsurgency environment .

The objectives of the Personal Response Project are to :assist military personnel to respond to the predisposition ofindigenous citizens to act in concert with their social ,religious, and cultural value systems ; identify the expres-sion of these value systems and the motivation implicit i nthem ; and recognize that the lives, relationships, and ac -

192


tions of indigenous citizens are of the same importance a sthose of all other human beings . 9

Despite the heavy language, the approach seemedhelpful . By the end of 1967, the Personal ResponseProject had become one of the anchors of III MAF'scivic action program. Lieutenant Colonel Donald L .Evans, the III MAF assistant G-5 at the time the pro-ject started, stated that he considered the Persona lResponse Project as important as psychologicaloperations and the Combined Action Program ."'

The Marines realized that any effective pacifica-tion plan must have both a political and apsychological impact . They found that civic actio nand psychological operations had to be mutuall ysupporting and to obtain a maximum benefit, re-quired close coordination with Vietnamese officials .To this end, the County Fair and Combined Actio nPrograms proved most effective . Other join tpsychological operations involved relocation o frefugees from VC controlled areas and the support o ftactical operations with armed propaganda teams'presentations, leaflet drops, audio-visual produc-tions, combat loudspeaker performances, and movi efestivals . Vietnamese Cultural Drama Teams servedin Marine operational areas to entertain localpeasants ; these teams presented short dramas andsongs weaving in appropriate political points .

The most significant psychological effort was theChieu Hoi (Open Arms) Program . This was thegovernment's campaign to win over the Viet Cong .The government provided them with assistance for anew start by teaching them a trade to use whe nreturning to their homes . Ralliers (hoi chanhs) oftenprovided valuable information, especially regardin gthe location of troops and equipment caches, bu tmore importantly, III MAF believed this progra mprovided still another avenue for achieving pacifica-tion . Consequently, III MAF accelerated planning t osupport the Chieu Hoi Program . Planned suppor tincluded the building of new Chieu Hoi centers t oincrease the handling capability of the returnees .During 1967, the Chieu Hoi Program accom-modated 2,539 ralliers in I Corps .

In July 1966, the Marines used hoi chanhs for thefirst time during a County Fair operation . The hoichanhs addressed small groups of villagers todescribe the Viet Cong methods and intentions, aswell as the benefits of the Government's Revolu-tionary Development Program . The success of hoichanh employment rapidly became apparent ; for ex -

ample, in two months' time one rallier identifiedmore than 30 VC .

Achieving the full potential of the rallier sdemanded rigid screening and orientation . Six par-ticipated in combat operations on a trial basis in Oc-tober 1966 . The hoi chanhs' intimate knowledge ofthe terrain, their familiarity with local people, an dtheir knowledge of the VC modus operandi provedinvaluable to the tactical units. When Genera lNickerson, then commanding the 1st Marine Divi-sion, learned of the success of the trial, he ordere dthat all qualified returnees join field units as soon a spossible . General Nickerson also originated the ne wcollective name for the hoi chanhs; he called themKit Carson Scouts, after the famous guide of th ewestern frontier . At the end of 1966, 19 scout sserved in the 1st Marine Division program .

In February 1967, General Walt ordered the pro -gram adopted throughout III MAF . A newlyestablished Kit Carson Training Center standardizedscout training, and by the end of December 13 2scouts served with Marine units in I Corps . Duringthe year 1967, scouts killed 58 Viet Cong, capture d37, and seized 82 weapons . Equally important to th eMarines operating with them was the scouts 'discovery of 145 mines and explosive devices .

Among other civic action programs employed b ythe Marines during 1967, public health and educa-

Pham Duoc, a veteran offive months as a Kit CarsonScout, points on a map to likely Viet Cong hidingplaces to LCpI R . D. Kilmer and Cpl P. F. Collins,while fellow Scout Ho Quyet (center) watches.


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2dLt Edward F. McCourt, Jr. (left), SSgt Roy C. Sharp, and He-Xung, an inter-preter/translator, train Kit Carson Scouts on the M-16 at the training center at Phu Bai .

tion continued to be keystones of the effort . Of thetwo, medical assistance produced the most im-mediate results . Almost every unit conductedmedical and dental civic action projects (MedCAP sand DentCAPs) for their humanitarian value . As anadjunct to MedCAPs, Navy medical personne ldistributed medical supplies to the Vietnamese an dVietnamese medical workers .

The Public Health Program bridged the gap bet-ween pure medical assistance and self-help projects .These efforts operated under the aegis of CORD Sand the supervision of the Public Health Committe eof I Corps' JCC . A general sanitation campaign in-cluded trash removal, innoculations, preventiv emedicine, pest control, and water purification .

Just as good health was a prerequisite to thevillagers' general well being, education was man-datory for economic and social growth . Medicalassistance, particularly the MedCAP efforts, produc-ed immediate, tangible results ; conversely the II IMAF civil education program offered few short-ter madvantages, but the Marines could not ignore the re-quirement for education and its long-range impact .During 1967, the Marines expanded the schoolbuilding project they started during the spring o f1966 . They coordinated this program through th eEducation Committee of I Corps JCC to determin ethe hamlets that wanted to participate . Each par-ticipating hamlet provided an adequate school site ,agreed to provide labor for its construction, arrange dfor a teacher, and paid the teacher's salary . In return ,the Marines agreed to provide construction

materials, technical advice, and heavy equipment .Each application required coordination with th elocal government and CORDS officials to ensurecompatibility with overall national school construc-tion plans .

Even more widespread than the school buildin gprograms were those of providing school supplies .Most of the refugee village schools needed every typ eof school supply . Elementary school kits from theCooperative for American Relief Everywhere (CARE )were the most popular item distributed to individualstudents . Classroom supply kits, also from CARE ,went to those students who needed onl yreplacements . By the end of 1967, almost everyschool-age child in I Corps had received, at one tim eor another, one of the CARE kits .

These humanitarian programs were very difficul tto accomplish in actual practice . Committing a bat-talion to an operation outside its TAOR or transfer -ring it to another area could often disrupt the con-tinuity of the pacification effort within a village .Vietnamese teachers were understandably reluctan tto risk their lives by working in newly-built school sin contested villages . In addition, as Lieutenant Col-onel McQuown of the 3d Battalion, 1st Marine spointed out, some projects required a 48-hour day tocomplete . "The Vietnamese people," he wrote ,"labored from dawn to darkness just to farm an draise enough food to subsist . At the end of the work-ing day they were too tired to be interested in a lec-ture on the necessity of screening or covering a toile tthat had been open for 3,000 years . . . ."" In spite of

194



Lt Thomas E . Bunnell, a Navy physician assigned tothe 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, gives a shot to a Viet-namese child during a medical civic action patro l(Medcap) to a village five miles northeast of Chu Lai.

these and other obstacles, the Marines persisted intheir pacification efforts .

Reporting and Evaluatio n

As 1967 began, the Marines in I Corps used tw omeasurement systems to evaluate progress in thevarious pacification programs . III MAF in -

dependently developed one system . On the othe rhand, MACV used the Hamlet Evaluation Syste m(HES) on a country-wide basis to evaluate all area swhere Government authority existed .

In February 1966, the Marines introduced an in-dex system to measure and record a broad range o fessential indicators of pacification status . The indexrelated civic action and Revolutionary Developmen tprograms in the TAORs and, at the same time, tie din Marine Corps combat operations to both pro -grams . Essentially, the system equated progress i npacification with the progress of the war, and includ-ed indicators of improvement which required actio nby military organizations . The system included fiv ebasic general indicators of progress :

1. Destruction of enemy military unit s2. Destruction of enemy infrastructure3. Establishment of local security by the Vietnames e4. Establishment of local government by the Viet-

namese5. Status of Nev Life Development Program s

The village served as the basic measurement uni tin this assessment since it consisted of a clearly de-fined area for applying uniform standards for com-parative purposes . The evaluator determined thelevel of pacification progress in each village based o nfive general indicators which, in turn, subdivided in-to subordinate elements . The subordinate elementscarried various weights, so that a village that full ysatisfied all elements of each indicator received 10 0points . For the subdivision and specific weights ofthe system, see table this page .

Pacification Progress Indice s

4 . Establishment of Local Governmen ta. Village chief and council elected and functioning

4b. Village chief lives and sleeps in the village

3c. Hamlet chiefs and councils elected and functioning 4d. Hamlet chief lives and sleeps in the hamlet

4e. Psyops and public information services established

3f. Village statutes enacted

1g. Village social and administrative organization com-pleted

12 0

1 . Destruction of Organized VC Military Force sa. VC local/main force units destroyed or driven out 1 5b . GVN/FW/MAF capable of defending the area

52 0

2 . Destruction of VC Infrastructur ea . Census completed

2b . VC infrastructure discovered and destroyed o rneutralized

8

c. GVN intelligence network established

5d. Census grievance teams completed interviewing eac hfamily

2e . Principal grievances proceed

32 0

3 . Establishment of Local Securit ya. Defense plans completed

2b. Defense construction completed

3c. Local defense forces trained and in place

1 2d . Communications established with supporting unit

320

5 . Completion of Initial New Life Hamlet Program sa. Necessary public health works, required to meet in-itial needs of populace, completed

4b. Necessary educational requirements, to satisfy initia lneeds, have been met

4c. Necessary agricultural works completed

4d. Adequate ground transportation into and out of th earea has been established

4e . Necessary markets established

42 0

Maximum points

100

PACIFICATION

19 5

Each component of the system depended on th eothers, thus the evaluation could not reflect a greatachievement in the category "Establishment of Loca lGovernment" until the village made large advance sin the category "Destruction of Enemy Units . " Ahigh score in "Completion of Initial New LifeHamlet Programs" was possible only if it represente dgains in security and the establishment of local ap-paratus in the village . A score of 60 points for avillage indicated that government had establishe dfirm influence . A "pacified" village was one whic hattained the grade of 80 points . The system provedto be highly successful and, with minor refinements ,became the basic technique used by the Marines toassess pacification progress . At the end of 1967, it re-mained the standard system .

The Hamlet Evaluation System, devised by th eDepartment of Defense in conjunction with the U .S .Mission Council, Vietnam, appeared in December1966 . Patterned after the Marine evaluation system ,it differed in several important areas :

The HES system focused on the hamlet level, while th eMarine system graded villages .

HES presented the results of its hamlet evaluation in let -ter form, while the Marine project rated the village b ynumerical percentage .

Several HES elements required subjective evaluation ,while the Marine system was basically objective .

HES evaluated all areas in which Government authorit ywas present, while the Marines' system rated only thosevillages in which III MAF influence was present .

HES utilized the advisory structure for its informationwhile the Marine system used the military structure .1 2

HES, like the Marine system, operated on amonthly reporting cycle . The heart of the system wa sthe Hamlet Evaluation Worksheet (HEW), whic heach district advisor prepared for each of his district ' shamlets possessing some degree of Government con-trol . The advisor analyzed each hamlet's pacificatio nstatus in terms of six general categories :

1. VC military activitie s2. VC political and subversive activities3. Security (friendly capabilities )4. Administrative and political activitie s5. Health, education, and welfar e6. Economic development

Each of the six categories received a rating in-dicator, from A (best) through E . The advisor als ocompleted a multiple-choice list of 14 question sabout the hamlet's problems during the month .Despite the basic differences between the Marines 'System and the HES, the systems proved compatibl eas well as complementary .

Neither system was flawless, however . Both re-quired a great deal of work to compile statistics thatwere not always meaningful . As Colonel Black, th eIII MAF G-5 noted, the fact a village chief slept i nhis village was misleading . "If the chief did," wroteBlack, "the usual assumption was made thatpacification was really in progress . [However, the ]chief could be VC and sleep in the village and th evillage or hamlet could be under VC control . "Nevertheless, III MAF considered the village repor tthe better indicator of pacified areas .13

PART VI

SUPPORT AND CONCLUSION

CHAPTER 13

Supporting ArmsMarine Air Operations—Fixed-Wing Operations—Helicopter Operations—Artillery

Marine Air Operations

At the start of 1967, Major General Louis B .Robertshaw's 1st Marine Aircraft Wing consisted o fthree fixed-wing groups, MAGs-11, -12, and -13 ,and two helicopter groups, MAGs-16 and -36 . Onefixed-wing group, MAG-11, operated from D aNang, while the other two were at Chu Lai . The twohelicopter groups operated from different bases also ;MAG-36 was at Ky Ha, and MAG-16 split betwee nMarble Mountain and Phu Bai . Wing headquarters ,services, command, and control functions came fromunits of Marine Wing Headquarters Group 1(MWHG-1) at Da Nang .

General Robertshaw, as III MAF's air componen tcommander, exercised operational control of thes eunits through his staff and by means of the Marine

air command and control system . The key unit i nthis system, the tactical air direction center (TADC) ,was at wing headquarters in Da Nang .* This agenc ymonitored the employment of all wing aircraft an dallocated resources to specific missions . TADC exer-cised control through two subordinate organizations ,the tactical air operations center (TAOC) and thedirect air support centers (DASCs) .

*The senior agency in the Marine air command and contro lsystem normally is the Tactical Air Command Center (TACC) .Since the Seventh Air Force had a TACC in Saigon, the 1st MA Wcenter used "TADC" as provided for in doctrine . LieutenantGeneral Keith B . McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation in Vietnam ,1962-1970, " United States Naval Institute Proceedings, May1971, p . 138 .

Sunlight reflects from a .50 caliber machine gun sticking from the side of a CH-46Ahelicopter as it heads out on a late afternoon mission to a unit southwest of An Hoa .


199

200


The TADC, manned by Marine Air Contro lSquadron 7 (MACS-7), was the main control cente rfor both antiair warfare and air traffic control . Plot-ters wrote information from the unit's varipus radarson vertical display boards from which controller smaintained positive air traffic control, as well a starget area air space control . In June, wing controlcapabilities significantly increased when MACS-4 ar-rived to replace MACS-7 . The new unit brough twith it a new semi-automated, computer-oriente dTAOC which comprised part of the Marine TacticalData System (MTDS) . This TAOC permitted th ewing to handle more than 200 aircraft tracks at th esame time . When the complete MTDS becam eoperational on Monkey Mountain on the Tiensh aPeninsula northeast of Da Nang in July, it provide da link with the Navy Tactical Data System of theSeventh Fleet for instant exchange of air defens edata with ships operating in the Gulf of Tonkin .Future plans for the MTDS included a connectio nwith the Air Force Tactical Data System for passingair defense and air control data instantly fro mThailand to Da Nang and naval units in the Tonki nGulf .

While the TAOC, collocated with the MTDS an da Hawk missile battery on Monkey Mountain, serve das the hub of wing control and air defense, th eDASCs were the main centers of support for groundunits . At the beginning of 1967, three DASCs werein operation ; one at each of the division head -quarters and one at the 3d Marine Division (For-ward) Command Post at Dong Ha . Marine Air Sup -port Squadrons (MASS) 2 and 3 provided th eDASCs . Requests for air support, both attack an dhelicopter, passed through battalion and regimenta lair liaison officers to the DASC at division head-quarters ; requests from AOs and FACs went directlyto DASC .

The support squadrons also contained the air sup -port radar teams (ASRTs) . During 1967, there wer efive ASRTs in operation . Located at Chu Lai, D aNang, Phu Bai, and Dong Ha (two), each team usedTPQ-10 radar to control aircraft in direct supportmissions during low visibility conditions . TPQ-10shad a 50-mile range, thus the Marine radar coverag eincluded almost all of I Corps .

Although their mission was not tactical in nature ,the Marine air traffic control units (MATCUs) werevital to the conduct of effective air operations . At allMarine airfields, the MATCUs provided terminaltraffic control, including landing instructions and


Men from Marine Air Traffic Control Unit 62, asubordinate unit of MAG-12, operate at the KheSanh airstrip from expeditionary equipment theyhave sandbagged against NIA artillery and rockets .

ground-controlled approach data during periods o flow visibility .

Until the activation of Marine Air Control Grou p18 on 1 September 1967, the units operating th eMarine air command and control system were part o fMarine Wing Headquarters Group 1 . With oneheadquarters squadron, two air support squadrons ,two air control squadrons, and two antiaircraf tmissile battalions on 1 July 1967, the group was on eof the largest known to Marine aviation . Its person-nel served throughout I Corps, including Chu Lai ,Phu Bai, Dong Ha, Marble Mountain, MonkeyMountain, and the Hai Van Pass . '

Throughout 1967 the 1st MAW operated underthe provisions of MACV Aviation Directive 95-4 of25 June 1966 . This directive gave the commander ofthe Seventh Air Force, in his capacity as Deput yCommander USMACV (Air), the "coordinatin gauthority" for tactical air support in South Vietnam ,but not actual operational control of Marine air . Thesystem allowed 1st MAW to meet all of III MAF's airsupport requirements while making its excess sortiecapability available to Seventh Air Force for sup -porting other U .S . and allied forces .

A Memorandum of Agreement between III MAFand Seventh Air Force guided 1st MAW's air defens eoperations during 1967 . Both services recognized the

SUPPORTING ARMS

20 1

necessity of a unified air defense system in the even tof a North Vietnamese air attack on South Vietnam .The agreement gave the Air Force overall air defens eresponsibility, including naming an air defense com-mander. The 1st MAW designated which of it sforces would participate in air defense and grante dthe Air Force certain authority over those forces, in-cluding the scrambling of alert aircraft, designatio nof targets, declaration of Hawk missile control status ,and firing orders .

Marine commanders were essentally satisfied wit hthe adequacy of these documents . In actual practice ,1st MAW controlled all air operations in support ofground units in I Corps while making available 25 to30 sorties per day to the Seventh Air Force . 2 Thissystem remained in effect until the advent of "singlemanagement" in early 1968 .

Fixed-Wing Operations

In the absence of enemy aircraft over South Viet-nam, the day-to-day mission of the 1st MAW fighte rand fighter attack squadrons became close air sup -port (CAS) . 3 By long-established doctrinal defini-tion, these air strikes were against targets so close t ofriendly forces that each mission required integratio nwith the fire and maneuver plans of the ground com-bat element. For better coordination and to reduc ethe possibility of friendly casualties, a forward ai rcontroller (FAC) with the supported unit or an air -borne forward air controller (FAC[A]) controlle dthese strikes .

There were two basic categories of CAS mission ,preplanned and immediate . A preplanned strike wasthe culmination of a complex process . For example ,a Marine battalion commander with the mission oftaking a specified objective normally would submit arequest for strike aircraft through his air liaison of-ficer the day before the operation began . From th ebattalion this request passed through the DASC a tdivision and eventually to the wing TADC at D aNang . There, the TADC assimilated all requests andassigned missions to one of the three fixed-win ggroups, depending on the nature of the target an daircraft type desired for the mission .

As soon as the TADC passed the mission to aMAG, the group operations officers compared th eorders with aircraft availability within the group an dassigned a schedule to each squadron for the follow-ing day . Each mission passed by TADC throughgroup received a mission number, a time on target

(TOT), and a prescribed ordnance load ;* thesquadron scheduling officer merely assigned pilotsand aircraft .


A Marine forward air controller in a small 0-1 obser-vation aircraft checks a target after directing an air-strike on the position by fixed-wing attack aircraft .

At the appropriate time, the aircraft took off andheaded for the target . Once airborne, the fligh tleader contacted TADC to confirm that his fligh twas airborne and proceeding on schedule . Usuallythe TADC simply cleared the leader for his origina lmission, but if a target of higher priority developed ,the TADC could divert the flight . In this case ,before entering the new operating area, the leade rcontacted the responsible DASC, which cleared th eflight to a local controller . Normally this was a divi-sion air liaison officer (ALO) or a Marine or Air Forc eFAC(A) flying over the area of the infantry unit tobe supported .

FAC(A)s in either light observation planes or UH-1E helicopters controlled most CAS missions in I

*Colonel John M . Verdi pointed out that this system did notrelieve the squadron commander of his responsibilities . Thesquadron commander had to carefully supervise the weight an dbalance of the prescribed load on the aircraft to avoid unnecessarydanger to the crew and aircraft during takeoff and comba tmaneuvering. Col John M . Verdi, Comments on draft ms, 4Jun8 1(Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C .), hereafte rVerdi Comments .

202


Corps . During these missions, the airborne con -troller monitored the ground unit's VHF radio ne tand directed the attacking aircraft over his UH Fradio . When a flight arrived on station, the FAC in -formed the pilots* of the target description, eleva-tion, attack heading, direction of pull-out, numberof passes desired, and the number and type o fbombs to be dropped on each pass . He also relayedthe direction and distance to the nearest friendl yunits . The FAC then marked the target with a whit ephosphorous rocket or a smoke grenade . Once cer-tain that the pilots had identified the correct target ,the controller cleared the jet for an approach wit hthe phrase "cleared hot ." Thus instructed, the fligh tleader would make the first pass on the markedtarget, followed closely by his wingman .Throughout the strike, the ALO or FAC would rela ycorrections to the attack planes, often directing the mto new targets as the Communist troops maneuveredor fled .

While preplanned missions required approx-imately 20 hours from time of request to time o fdelivery, the wing could respond much more quickl yif necessary . This response was an "immediate mis-sion ." If an emergency developed, the TADC o rDASCs diverted airborne flights to another target ,and briefed them en route to the new target . TheTADC also could launch aircraft from one of three"hot pads . " Each of the three fixed-wing group smaintained four planes on an around-the-clock aler tfor this type of emergency . Two of the planes at eachgroup were on primary alert, and the other tw oserved as a backup in case of another emergency . Thetime lapse between notification to launch and unti lthe on-call aircraft became airborne normally wa sjust under 10 minutes . As soon as a flight of alert air -craft became airborne, another flight replaced it o nthe pad .

Another important aspect of Marine fixed-win goperations was deep air support . These strikes di dnot take place in the immediate vicinity of friendlyforces and, therefore, did not require integrationwith the ground maneuver plan . Deep air suppor tmissions helped isolate the battlefield by destroyin genemy reinforcements, support troops, and logisti c

*Colonel John M . Verdi noted that such in-the-clear radiotransmissions also informed enemy monitors of the particulars o fthe mission . This was true of all radio transmissions, ground o rair, without voice encryption devices, especially during this periodwhen radio frequencies and call signs did not change on a dail ybasis . Verdi Comments .

resources . If a FAC(A) was available in the objectivearea, he controlled the strikes, but his services werenot mandatory because the distance from the targe tto friendly forces eliminated the chance of accidenta lbombing. However, pilots of strike aircraft oftenpreferred to work with a FAC(A) on such mission sbecause of the latter's greater familiarity with target sand enemy defenses in the area . 4

The aircraft most frequently selected for close sup -port missions was the Douglas A-4E Skyhawk . Col-onel Jay W . Hubbard's MAG-12 included four A- 4squadrons . The A-4E was a small, highlymaneuverable, attack jet capable of extremely ac -curate bombing . The Skyhawk could deliver a varie-ty of ordnance including bombs, rockets, napalm ,smoke, and 20mm cannon fire . The most significan tperformance limitation of the A-4 was the size of it spayload, roughly 3,000 pounds . *

The McDonnell F-4B Phantom II was a more ver-satile aircraft . Four F-4 squadrons operated in Viet-nam during 1967, one assigned to Colonel Franklin

C. Thomas, Jr . 's MAG-11, at Da Nang and threewith Colonel Douglas D . Petty, Jr .'s MAG-13 .Designed to perform the primary air-to-air missio nand modified to perform a secondary air-to-groun dmission, the F-4 was one of the fastest interceptors i nthe world, yet it could carry as many as twenty-fou r500-pound bombs for ground support . ,

Lieutenant Colonel John M . Verdi commented ,however, that this was a theoretical figure that di dnot reflect the realities of combat . He wrote recently :

. . . the F-4 could be loaded with as many as 24 Mk-8 2bombs . . . But (1) not an F-4B (unless one elected to g owith 2,000 pounds less than full internal fuel so as to com-ply with max gross weight), and (2) not if the target wasanywhere further away than the end of the runway . Idaresay somebody might have hauled such a load in com-bat (to get his picture taken), but in the real tactical worldthe choices came down to TANK-3-6-3-TANK ([as di dVMFA-] 122 and most USAF units) and 3-3-TANK-3- 3(most Navy units) . Of course, Brand X [squadrons] did i t6-3-TANK-3-6, which (1) overloaded the airplane, (2 )cracked the wing spars, and (3) gave the crew an un-manageable rolling moment in event of failure of one ofthose outboard MElts (multiple ejection racks] to release orjettison (something [the Air Force] found out when theytried it, which is why they went back to TANK-3-6-3 -TANK . ) 6

*As is common with aircraft, the A-4's practical payload varie dfrom as much as 5,000 pounds in the winter monsoon to as littl eas 2,000 pounds in the heat of summer, assuming a center-line ex-ternal tank . Verdi comments .

SUPPORTING ARMS

20 3


A large ordnance load and multiple bomb racks made the A-4 Skyhawk, shown here inthe A-4F version entering production in 1967, a mainstay for close air support missions .

Two other types of Marine aircraft available fo rground support operations during 1967 were th eLing-Temco-Vought F-8E Crusader and the Grum-man A6-A Intruder . One squadron of each typ eserved under MAG-11 at Da Nang .

The Crusader carried internally mounted 20mmcannon and was the only Marine aircraft in Vietna mconfigured to carry more than one 2,000-poun dbomb until the arrival of the A-6A . Because theF-8Es were originally designed as a high performancefighter, the Marines phased out these planes andreplaced them with F-4s . 7

The morning of 1 April, VMA(AW)-533, com-manded by Lieutenant Colonel Williams P . Brown ,arrived at Chu Lai to become MAG-12's first A-6squadron.* The A-6A was the only operational U .S .aircraft that had a self-contained all-weather bomb-ing capability using a moving target indicator .8 I tflew extensive interdiction missions during the mon-soon season, not only in South Vietnam, but also i nLaos and North Vietnam . The Intruder could carry aheavy bomb load to a target 400 miles away, drop it sordnance, and return to base, even during sever emonsoon conditions .

The increase in heavy ground action in northern ICorps during the early months of 1967 brough tdemands for many more close and direct air suppor tmissions in that region . The heavy fighting at KheSanh in late April and early May provided a classi c

*Lieutenant Colonel Howard Wolf's VMA(AW)-242, also fly-ing the A-6A and part of MAG-11, had arrived in Vietnam on 1November 1966 .

example of integrated employment of modern ,fixed-wing aviation in support of ground maneuve relements . In the two weeks of bitter fighting forHills 881 North and South, the 1st MAW flew morethan 1,000 sorties for Marine infantry units . Thedefeat of the enemy on this critical terrain was th eproduct of skillful and closely coordinated air -ground action .

As the enemy continued to focus on northernQuang Tri Province, Marine aviation, from 2 Jun eunder the command of Major General Norman J .Anderson, increased the tempo of attack operation sthere . Primary targets were enemy artillery an drocket sites, a major threat to allied units and in-stallations along the DMZ . By July, intelligence of-ficers had identified approximately 130 sites, in-cluding weapons as large as 152mm gun-howitzers .The heaviest raids against these positions occurredduring and after the battle for Con Thien, whe nMarine aircraft participated in joint operations calledHeadshed, Neutralize, and Eradicate . These opera-tions received the acronym SLAM, for searching ,locating, annihilating, and monitoring . This con-cept used the entire spectrum of supporting fire :B-52s, tactical air, artillery, and naval gunfire .Elements of the Seventh Air Force, Strategic Ai rCommand, Seventh Fleet, Vietnamese Air Force ,Marine and Army artillery, and 1st MAW concen-trated on destroying the enemy fire support posi-tions . By the end of the year, the effort destroye dless than 40 of the NVA weapons .

While the majority of the 1st MAW's out-of-


DepartmentofDefense Photo (USMC) A422400- BGeneral purpose bombs hang from the wings of an A-6A Intruder from VMA(AW/)-242and an F-4B Phantom II from VMFA-542 enroute on a scheduled mission in Vietnam .

country missions were in the DMZ area, Marin epilots also participated in strikes against North Viet-nam. These strikes involved the six areas of NorthVietnam which planners called "route packages . "Route Package I was immediately north of the DMZ ;Route Package VI lay in the extreme north of thecountry . Bombing of the southern portion of RoutePackage I, codenamed "Tally Ho"and under the con-trol of Seventh Air Force, began in July 1966 . By thewinter of 1967, Tally Ho missions ceased as aseparate entity ; strikes in the area thereafter fel lwithin the overall interdiction campaign . 9

The Seventh Air Force's retaliatory Rollin gThunder raids, initiated in March 1965, expanded t oinclude high intensity interdiction missions durin g1967 . On 18 May 1967, VMA(AW)-242 participatedin the first Rolling Thunder strike in Route Packag eVI (Hanoi/Haiphong) . 10 The other A-6A squadron ,VMA(AW)-533, kept just as active . Thesophisticated electronic equipment and superb all -weather capability of the Intruder made it an idealaircraft for attacks against attractive, but heavilydefended, North Vietnamese targets .

Because of the A-6's all-weather capability, 1s tMAW reduced the enemy's antiaircraft effectivenes sby flying most Marine Rolling Thunder missions a tnight and as single-aircraft missions ." During thestrikes, the attack pilots relied upon assistance fro mtheir fellow Marines from VMCJ-1 . EF-10Bs and EA -6As of VMCJ-1, the same basic aircraft as the A-6As ,carried equipment for electronic countermeasure

missions ; they carried no ordnance .12 During theraids, the EF-10Bs or EA-6s orbited beyond NorthVietnamese surface-to-air missile range and jammedthe enemy's fire control radar while the attacking In-truders made their target runs . Because of .theirlighter equipment load, the EA-6As could remai non station longer than the attack aircraft, an idealsituation for superior electronic countermeasure raidprotection . Prime targets for Rolling Thunder mis-sions were bridges, fuel facilities, rolling stock, air -fields, missile sites, and supply lines . *

In addition to close and deep air support missions ,Marine fixed-wing squadrons conducted a variety o fless dramatic, but equally important, tasks such a slanding zone (LZ) preparation . These operations il-lustrated the then prevalent Marine Corps concep tthat the helicopter was a mode of transportation, no tan attack aircraft . The 1st Wing provided fixed-wingsupport for helicopter assaults of contested landingzones . Prior to and during these landings, Marine at -tack aircraft would strike the objective area to clea robstacles and neutralize possible antiaircraft threats .As the troop-carrying helicopters entered the zone ,the covering jet pilots would shift their attacks to ter -rain around the LZ from which the enemy could op -

*After the NVA' s deployment of missiles in the DMZ area i nApril, electronic countermeasure EA-6As and older EF-10B SkyKnights remained airborne over the area to . counter this threat .Their effectiveness limited Marine aircraft losses to only tw omissile kills during 1967 .

SUPPORTING ARMS

20 5

cargo . Such varied missions required great flyingskill, especially those into Khe Sanh and Dong Ha .Flying into Khe Sanh under visual flight rules an dinto Dong Ha with its dust and short runway wer eroutine but far from dull missions for VMGR-15 2pilots . 1 3

VMCJ-l's version of the Phantom II, the RF-4B ,equipped with camels in the nose, performed avariety of photo-reconnaissance missions for 1stMAW. These aircraft also contributed directly to th edefense of Da Nang, as described by one of th esquadron 's commanders, Major Edgar J . Love :

3d MarDiv ComdC, September 196 7

Cargo parachutes stream from the rear of one ofVMGR-152 's KC-130s bringing supplies to the Kh eSanh combat base in September 1967 after enemyactivity closed the only road leading to the base .

pose the landing . These strikes not only protecte dthe helicopters, but also shielded the first infantrywaves during the critical, early phase of the landing .

Other Marine fixed-wing pilots contributed im-measurably to the overall air effort, even thoug hthey never fired a shot or dropped a bomb . Someflew the C-117Ds assigned to the headquarters of th eaircraft groups . These C-117D missions varied fromroutine logistics support to dropping flares ove rfriendly forces at night . Another group of transportpilots came from VMGR-152 . The squadron' sLockheed KC-130 Hercules provided extensive an dvaried support for both III MAF and 1st MAW .Though VMGR-152's home base remained at MCA SFutema, Okinawa, the squadron maintained adetachment of at least four planes on a rotationa lbasis at Da Nang . The Marine transport's 30,000- to35,000-pound cargo load, depending on missionrange, served many varied logistic requirements . The130s flew diversified missions such as in-fligh trefueling of jets, paradropping of bulk lots of am -munition and supplies, flare drops, and even servic eas airborne DASCs ; as well as for daily, routineshipments of hundreds of passengers and tons of

. . . after the second rocket attack on Da Nang, 14 July1967, the RF-4B played a major role in helping to keep th eVC from launching rockets within the 12,000 meter ring[around the base] . Through use of its sensors, the RF-4Bwas able to [monitor] a fairly large area on a daily basisfrom about 5 miles north of Da Nang to about 20 mile ssouth and from the sea on the east to some 30 miles in -land . When it was determined that the various [enemy ]teams transporting rockets were converging into a centra larea, harassing fires or air strikes (including B-52s) wer edirected into these areas. It was a coordinated effort ofreconnaissance patrols, artillery, air strikes, and airborn ereconnaissance . As a side light, Major Richard W .Hawthorne and Captain Richard R. Kane, while flying on e

The sun rises beneath the nose of a venerable C-11 7at the Ky Ha airfield at the Chu Lai combat base i nFebruary. This particular aircraft had logged over15,000 hours in the air and still performed reliably .


206



Cpl William H. Mielke (top) and LCpI Phillip J.Orlando of Headquarters and Maintenanc eSquadron 36 repair the AD20-8 engine of theirsquadron's C-117D at Phu Bai on 30 December .

of these many reconnaissance flights, crashed in

September 1967 and were declared missing .*"

Helicopter Operation s

The Vietnam War was the first conflict in historyto involve large-scale employment of helicopte rforces . This "Cavalry of the Sky" provided the allie swith the advantages of mobility and staying powe rwhich negated much of the advantage held by a nalready elusive enemy . To the infantryman th ehelicopter was more than a tactical expedient ; it wasa part of his life . Helicopters carried him into battle ,provided him with life and fire support, and rushe dhim to the hospital if he were sick or wounded .

At the beginning of 1967, MAGs-16 and -36 andthe SLF had a total of 11 helicopter squadron soperating in South Vietnamese air space . Of these ,eight were transport squadrons flying either th eSikorsky UH-34D, a Vietnam veteran since early1962, or the relatively new and larger Boeing-VertolCH-46A. The other three squadrons were observa-tion squadrons equipped with the highl y

*The Marine Corps later administratively declared both officer slegally dead . The determination occurred on 28 November 197 8for Hawthorne and 26 February 1980 for Kane .

maneuverable, single-engined Bell UH-1E . *

The Marines used helicopters for five basic mis-sions : tactical airlift of troops, insertion and extrac-tion of reconnaissance teams, supply, downed air-craft recovery, and search and rescue . The helicopte rgroups frequently supported more than a dozen ma-jor ground operations during a given month . The 1stMAW maintained direct control of the helicoptergroups, issuing orders to them on the basis of theground units' daily needs . The air request and allot-ment chain of command was basically the same as forfixed-wing squadrons . While the daily schedulecovered routine missions, many unforeseeable situa-tions occurred, such as medical evacuations ,emergency extractions, and downed aircraft . To dealwith these contingencies, the squadrons kept a sec-tion of helicopters on strip alert, normally either on eUH-34 or CH-46 transport and one armed UH-1E t ofly "chase . "

"Medevac" and emergency extractions wereespecially critical because lives depended on th equick and effective response of the helicopter crews .Most of these missions occurred when friendly force swere in close contact with the enemy ; in such cases ,ground fire in the landing zone was almost a certain-ty . Even with the jet and armed helicopter escort ,rescue helicopters rarely departed the landing zonewithout sustaining hits from enemy fire . Thes eflights usually took place over extremely rugged ter -rain, which gave the pilots problems in even findin gthe landing zone . MAG-16 and -36 squadrons flewthese missions daily . The skill and courage of thehelicopter crews were the major factors enablin gnearly 99 percent of the wounded evacuees to sur-vive .' s

A major factor in the success of these missions wa sthe presence of UH-1E "gunships . " Assigned to theobservation squadrons (VMOs), the UH-lEs func-tioned in a number of roles . The armed version, orgunship, carried four fuselage-mounted, electricall yfired M-60 machine guns and two 19-round rocke tpacks . Gunships flew escort and close air supportmissions and also served as command and contro l

*VMO squadrons each rated 12 light helicopters in 1965 an dthe Marine Corps had obtained UH-lEs based on this figure . Thescarcity of suitable fixed-wing observation planes resulted in fur-ther procurement, so that by 1967 UH- lEs were the only aircraf tassigned to the three VMOs in Vietnam . By December of thatyear, each squadron had between 21 and 27 UH-lEs available .This interim measure continued until the arrival of the long -awaited OV-10 in 1968 .

SUPPORTING ARMS

20 7


A Navy flight deck crewman on the USS Okinawa (LPH 3) signals the pilot of a Marin eUH-1E that he is cleared for take offin support of Operation Beau Charger, Special Lan -ding Force Alpha's assist to Operation Hickory against NVA forces below the DMZ .

"birds" for airborne forward air controllers as well assenior ground commanders . Each division com-mander had a permanently assigned helicopter ;regimental and battalion commanders used other son an "as available" basis .

In the FAC(A) mode, one rocket pack carrie dwhite phosphorous marking rockets, the other con-tained high explosive missiles . In a clean, unarmedconfiguration, appropriately referred to as a "slick, "the aircraft could carry seven to nine fully equippe dtroops . "Slicks" also performed administrative andtransport missions such as VIP flights .

An incident occurred in southern Quang NgaiProvince in late 1967 which demonstrated both thefirepower of the armed UH-1E and the tenacity ,skill, and courage of Marine gunship crews . On 19August, Captain Stephen W. Pless, a VMO-6 gun -ship pilot, was flying chase for an emergencymedevac mission when he heard over the radio net o fanother emergency situation . Pless learned that fourU .S . Army soldiers were stranded on a beach nort hof Duc Pho and were about to be overwhelmed by alarge Viet Cong force . Breaking off from his originalmission, the Huey pilot flew to the scene . On arrival ,Pless saw about 50 VC in the open ; some werebayoneting and beating the Americans . He swept in

1 stLt Jack H. McCracken, a helicopter pilot withHMM-165, escaped serious injury during a resupplymission in Quang Ngai province when th e.30-caliber round he holds smashed into his cockpitand lodged in the hard rubber heel of hir left boot .




The terror of a helicopter medevac flight under fire shows on the faces of a wounde dMarine, Cpl Larry R. Miklos (center) and an unidentified Navy hospital corpsman asthey watch an enemy machine gun shooting toward their helicopter on 1 September .

on the VC, killing and wounding many and drivin gthe survivors back into a treeline . He made his rocketand machine gun attacks at such low levels thatfragments from his own ordnance pelted the gun -ship . Though still under heavy small arms fire, Ples slanded his gunship between the Communists in th etreeline and the wounded soldiers . His two enliste dcrewmen, Gunnery Sergeant Leroy N . Poulson an dLance Corporal John G. Phelps, leaped out of th ehelicopter and raced through enemy fire to help th ewounded men .

Captain Rupert E . Fairfield, Jr ., the co-pilot, kill-ed three of the nearest VC with a burst from a M-6 0machine gun, then ran to help Poulson and Phelp sdrag the soldiers to the aircraft . Captain Plesshovered his UH-1E and sent streams of machine gunfire into the Viet Cong positions in the treeline .Under cover of his fire, the three crewmen pulled th ewounded soldiers into the helicopter . Pless heade dthe dangerously overloaded aircraft out to sea . Fourtimes the helicopter settled into the water . Each timeCaptain Pless skipped it back into the air . While thecrew threw out all unnecessary gear to lighten th ecraft, Pless jettisoned the rocket pods . Gradually ,the UH-1E gained altitude and limped back to th e1st Hospital Company's landing pad at Chu Lai . Inaddition to rescuing the Americans, the crew receiv-ed credit for killing a confirmed total of 20 VC and

probably killed another 38 . Fairfield, Poulson, an dPhelps each received the Navy Cross ; Captain Pless

The Da Nang press center provides the location fo r

this photograph taken during a news conference o n26 August following the dramatic flight that earned

VMO-6's Capt Stephen W. Pless (second from left)

his Medal of Honor . Others of the UH-1E crew, LCpI

John G. Phelps, Capt Rupert E. Fairfield, Jr., and

GySgt Leroy N. Poulson, received the Navy Cross .Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A189212

SUPPORTING ARMS

209


A smoke grenade marks the landing zone as a member of a helicopter support team -brings in a CH-34D with supplies for the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines in Operation Shelby .

received the Medal of Honor, the first awarded to amember of the 1st MAW for action in Vietnam . *

While the armed helicopters participated in man ydramatic exploits, the yeoman's share of th eworkload fell to the transport helicopters, th eUH-34s and the CH-46s . In March of 1966, the 1s tMarine Aircraft Wing's tactical/logistical airlif tcapability significantly increased with the arrival o fthe CH-46 Sea Knight helicopter . It could carry afour-man crew and 17-20 combat-loaded troops, o r4,000 pounds of cargo, in contrast to the five t oseven troops, or 1,500-pound lift capacity of the ag-ing UH-34 . The twin-engined, tandem-rotortransport had a retractable tail ramp, a 115-mil ecombat radius, and a top speed of about 145 knots .The Sea Knight was the only Marine helicopter i n

*In addition to the Medal of Honor, Captain Pless, who flewover 700 combat missions in two tours in Vietnam, earned th eSilver Star Medal, the Distinguished Flying Cross, the Bronze StarMedal, 32 Air Medals, the Navy Commendation Medal, theKorean Order of Military Merit, and the Purple Heart . Afterreturning to the U .S ., this colorful Marine aviator died in a tragicmotorcycle crash at Pensacola, Florida, in 1969 . See Appendix Dfor Captain Pless' Medal of Honor citation .

Vietnam armed with two .50-caliber machine guns . *

The arrival of another aircraft in 1967 further im-proved Marine helicopter capabilities . On 8 January ,a four-plane detachment of CH-53A Sea Stallion sfrom HMH-463 joined MAG-16 at Marble Moun-tain . They were the first increment of a phasedreplacement of the obsolescent CH-37s . By the endof the year, 36 of the big CH-53s operated in ICorps . These twin-turbine, single-rotor assaulttransports could carry an impressive internal cargo o f8,000 pounds, but more significantly the "53A " hada six-ton external lift capability which permitted bat-tlefield salvage of disabled UH-34Ds and CH-46s .By the end of 1967, Marine Sea Stallions had retriev-ed more than 120 damaged aircraft which avoide d

*Major General Norman J . Anderson has cautioned that ther ewas a greater complexity behind this simple statement about tw o.50-caliber machine guns on helicopters . This became standard ,replacing the .30-caliber," he wrote, "only after extensive ex-perience proved the need for the range and impact of the heavierweapon . Issues such as this, and there were many in the ordnanceand engineering areas, were important and should not b e[overlooked] or you create the impression that aviation saile dthrough the war without problems ." MajGen Norman) . Ander-son, Comments on draft ms, 10Jul81 (Vietnam Comment file ,MCHC, Washington, D .C .) .



Infantrymen lean forward against the rotor wash and rush forward to unload suppliesfrom a CH-46A Sea Knight helicopter in the 1st Marine Division's Operation Citrus .

destroying them in place. Troop lift and ambulanc ecapabilities also increased with the Sea Stallions' ar-rival ; normal loads were 37 combat troops or 24 lit-ters . Fully loaded, the aircraft could accomplish mis-sions at ranges up to 200 miles at a comfortabl ecruise speed of 120 knots .

The arrival of the "Super Bird," as the Marinesquickly nicknamed the CH-53, was providential . InSeptember III MAF grounded all CH-46s followin gseveral unexplained crashes . An on-site investiga-tion, conducted by a joint Naval Air Systems Com-mand/Boeing Vertol accident investigation team ,revealed that structural failures were occurring in th earea of the after pylon .* The team recommendedstructural and systems modifications to reinforce therear rotor mount, as well as the installation of an in-dicator to detect excessive strain on critical parts ofthe aircraft .

*Lieutenant General Louis Metzger, a former assistant divisio ncommander of the 3d Marine Division, recently wrote his recollec-tions of the grounding of the CH-46s : "Several CH-46s had gonedown in flight before this . One was observed by an assistant air of-ficer of the 3d Marine Division, a major [who was an] aviator . Hehad described seeing the tail fly off a CH-46 in flight . However, itis believed that [because of] a desire to accord the lost cre wmembers the honor of dying in combat rather than in an accident ,this observation was ignored . It wasn't until the accidents occuredas stated in the text, that the CH-46s were grounded . LtGen LouisMetzger, Comments on draft ms, n .d . (1981) (Vietnam Commen tfile, MCHC, Washington, D .C .)

The entire modification program, requiring ap-proximately 1,000 man-hours per aircraft, occurre din three phases : (1) disassembly of the aircraft, (2 )incorporation of the modifications, and (3)

Aviation personnel at Dong Ha on 16January lookover one of the huge CH-53s from HMH-463 onlyeight days after the first detachment of four of thenew helicopters arrived in South Vietnam for servic ewith MAG-16 at the air facility at Marble Mountain .

3d MarDiv ComdC, January 1967

SUPPORTING ARMS

21 1

3d MarDiv ComdC, December 196 7A CH-53, the Marine Corps ' largest and most power-ful helicopter, retrieves a UH-34 downed in a mis-sion to the Con Thien combat base in December .

reassembly and flight tests . Marines performed

phases one and three; Boeing Vertol personnel com-pleted phase two . Okinawa served as the principa l

modification site because it was the nearest secur eMarine base which could provide both adequatefacilities and skilled civilian workers . The programmodified 80 aircraft at MCAF Futema, Okinawa ,while the remaining 25 aircraft, already undergoin gnormal overhaul in Japan, received their modifica-tions there .

The Marines of HMM-262, commanded by Lieu -tenant Colonel Gregory A . Corliss, detached fromthe SLF to perform the Marine portion of the work .On 11 October, the Marines unloaded 40 CH-46s atFutema, and disassembly began immediately . Fivedays later, 114 Boeing Vertol specialists began phas etwo . By the end of December, the program hadmodified 89 aircraft and began phasing them backto the squadrons . The remaining 16 aircraft com-pleted the modification program in February 1968 .

Until the 46s returned, III MAF lost approximate-ly half its tactical/ logistic airlift capability and had t ofind replacement helicopters . As soon as the MarineCorps learned the seriousness of the CH-46s' defect ,it rushed 23 UH-34s from the United States by carg oplanes . They arrived on 15 October and immediatel yentered battle, often flown by pilots from the down-ed CH-46 squadrons . Ten additional CH-53s

entered the wing's inventory to further augment th elift capability in Vietnam . Finally, 31 U .S . Army

UH-lDs of the 190th Aviation Company joine dGeneral Anderson ' s forces at Phu Bai until the SeaKnights returned to flight status . 16

The shifting of additional ground forces into thenorthern two provinces of I Corps during the fall of1967 increased the tempo of helicopter operations .During this period, the two main areas of enemy ac-tivity were the DMZ and the Que Son Basin south ofDa Nang, but as combat to the north intensified ,MAG-36 at Chu Lai found itself further and furtherfrom the scene of Marine ground operations . As aresult, General Anderson ordered MAG-36 to Ph uBai where it could better support 3d Marine Divisio n

operations . The first squadron, VMO-6, relocated on4 October and 11 days later Colonel Frank E . Wilsondisplaced his group headquarters from Ky Ha to Ph uBai . The next day, Colonel Wilson took ove rVMO-3, HMM-164, HMM-362, and MATCUs-6 2and -68 from Colonel Edwin O . Reed's MAG-16 . Atthe same time, HMM-265, a MAG-36 CH-4 6squadron at Marble Mountain, passed to Colone lReed ' s command . On 30 October, another UH-34

A CH-46A from HMM-164 lands on 2 March 196 7to pick up infantrymen from the 3d Battalion, 4thMarines engaged in Operation Prairie II north ofCam Lo, while an escort helicopter circles overhead.



Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A 18979 1

CH-34Ds, the mainstay of transport helicopter operations following grounding of th eCH-46s for structural problems, land infantrymen in a dry paddy for Operation Essex.

squadron, HMM-163, joined MAG-36 from the US SOkinawa (LPH 3) and moved to the new airfield a tQuang Tri .* By the end of the month, MAG-36 oc-cupied its new home ; only HMM-165 remained atKy Ha, until space became available at Phu Bai inNovember . The relocation of MAG-36 proved to b e

*Before joining the SLF, HMM-163 had been at Phu Bai as par tof MAG-16 . LtCol Horace A. Bruce, Comments on draft ms ,14Jul81 (Vietnarn Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C . )

A CH-46A takes offafter bringing supplies to an in-fantry unit on a hill top somewhere in Vietnam .


a wise decision, as events of early 1968demonstrated .

Operational statistics indicate the sharply increas-ed scale of Marine helicopter squadrons' efforts i nVietnam during 1967 . The sorties rate increased b ymore than 20 percent over that of 1966 . In 1967, 1s tMAW helicopters flew 510,595 sorties, carryin g628,486 personnel and 70,651 tons of cargo .

Artillery

In January of 1967, the Marines had the entir efamily of Marine Corps artillery—light, medium ,and heavy—in I Corps . The method of employmentof these weapons differed little from World War I Iand Korea: direct support of a specific unit orgeneral support of divisional units .

Division-level light artillery, the 4 .2-inch mortaror the 107mm M30 mortar and the 105mm M101A 1howitzer, provided direct support of infantry units .Division Medium artillery, the 155mm M114A 1howitzer (towed) and the 155mm M109 self-propelled (SP) howitzer, were the general supportweapons .* Force artillery elements attached to th e

*The Marine Corps replaced 155mm M114Als in the Marinedivisional artillery regiments with the 155mm M109/SP jus tbefore the the Vietnam conflict . As the need for more artillerydeveloped, the Marine Corps shipped the old towed weapons t oVietnam and formed provisional batteries . Personnel and re-quired equipment came from artillery battalions already there .Ironically, the older M114A1 enhanced the overall mobility of th edivisional 155mm capability . The heavy tracked M109/SP wa sessentially roadbound and served in a " fortress artillery " role ,while the lighter M114A1 could move both by helicopter andtruck .

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214 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE


A maintenance team from HMM-165 rigs a hoist sling to a CH-46A sitting in a moun-tain stream northwest of Chu Lai on 12 May . Enemy ground fire had set the aircraft onfire and the pilot, Capt James F. Pleva, force-landed in the stream, dousing the flames .

artillery regiments provided increased range an ddelivery capabilities .' ? Force artillery included th e155mm M53 self-propelled gun and the 8-inch M5 5self-propelled howitzer . The Marine Corps replace dthe M55 during the year with the new M110 self-propelled model .

Although the basic techniques of artillery employ-ment in Vietnam differed little from those use delsewhere, local circumstances required certai nrefinements. Probably the most difficult problemfacing Marine artillerymen and the infantry the ysupported was the need to minimize civilia ncasualties and property destruction, while still fur-nishing adequate fire support . Strongly wordedMACV directives, further amplified by instruction sfrom III MAF and the divisions, enjoined restraintand careful fire planning . These required carefu lselection of helicopter landing zones and schedulin gartillery and air strikes with the goal of keeping bot hMarine and civilian casualties at the lowest possibl elevel, especially in heavily populated areas such asthose around Da Nang . Firing into populated areas ,using reconnaissance by fire, and planning harass-ment and interdiction fires presented significan tproblems . The Marine artillerymen continuall ybalanced the possible tactical advantages against th edanger to long-term pacification goals . When

Marine units planned operations in coordinatio nwith Vietnamese province and district chiefs, aliaison officer from the Marines or a Marine or Arm yadvisor stayed at the district headquarters to cool .-

An unidentified Marine helicopter crewman smoke sa cigarette beside his M-60 machine gun mount dur-ing a quiet flight in a CH-53A in December 1967 .


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