part seven - criminal procedure

8/12/2019 PART SEVEN - Criminal Procedure

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PART SEVENARRAIGNMENT, PLEA AND PRE-TRIAL

I. Arraignment

A.

Nature and purpose

-Rule 116, sec 1 (a), (b), (e)

Section 1.Arraignment and plea; how made.

(a) The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or informationwas filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment shall be made in open court by thejudge or clerk by furnishing the accused with a copy of the complaint orinformation, reading the same in the language or dialect known to him, and asking himwhether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may call at the trial witnesses

other than those named in the complaint or information.

(b) The accused must be present at the arraignmentand must personally enter hisplea. Both arraignment and plea shall be made of record, but failure to do so shall notaffect the validity of the proceedings.

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(e) When the accused is under preventive detention, his case shall be raffled and itsrecords transmitted to the judge to whom the case was raffled within three (3) daysfrom the filing of the information or complaint. The accused shall be arraigned within

ten (10) days from the date of the raffle. The pre-trial conference of his case shall be heldwithin ten (10) days after arraignment. (n)

-DOJ-NPS Manual, Part VII

PART VII. ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA

SECTION 1. Concept of arraignment. - Arraignment is a mandatory requirement thatseeks to give the accused the opportunity, at the first instance, to know why the prosecutingarm of government has been mobilized against him and to plead. At the arraignment, theaccused may enter a plea of guilty or not guilty.

SEC. 2. Duties of trial prosecutor. -

a) Before the arraignment of the accused, the trial prosecutor shall examine theinformation vis-a-vis the resolution of the investigating prosecutor in order tomake the necessary corrections or revisions and to ensure that the information issufficient in form and substance.

b) After arraignment, the trial prosecutor shall prepare his witnesses for trial.


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Government witnesses, e.g. medico-legal officer, chemist, forensic experts,examiners etc. should, as much as practicable, be presented in accordance withthe logical and chronological sequence of the technical aspects to be proved.

SEC. 3. Effect of filing a petition for review. - When an aggrieved partymanifests in court

that he has a pending petition for review with the Department of Justice and moves for adeferment of the arraignment pending resolution of his petition, the Trial Prosecutor mayconform thereto once proof of said petition has been presented by the petitioner to hissatisfaction.

SEC. 4. Concept of plea. - The plea is the reply of the accused to the charge. It raises theissue to be tried and on which the judgment/sentence of the court can be properly based.

-People v. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293 (1995)must be read in a language known tothe accused; accused must have full comprehension of his plea and itsconsequences

Facts: Appellant was charged with the crime of rape with homicide of Khazie Mae Penecilla, aminor, four years of age, choking her with his right hand. The incident happened after appellantdrank liquor. A neighbor, Leopoldo Santiago found the victims body and the parents and policewere informed. Appellant was living in his uncle's house some five arm's length from Penecilla'shouse. Appellant was arrested and interrogated by PO3 Danilo Tan. He verbally confessed hisguilt without the assistance of counsel. On the basis of his uncounselled verbal confession andfollow up interrogations, the police came to know and recovered from appellant's house, KhazieMae's green slippers, a pair of gold earrings, a buri mat, a stained pillow and a stained T-shirtall of which were presented as evidence for the prosecution. He was arraigned with theassistance of Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera of the PAO. Appellant pleaded guilty. The RTCconvicted him. Hence an automatic review for the imposition of death penalty.

Issue: Whether or Not the death penalty proper.

Held: No. The records do not reveal that the Information against the appellant was readin the language or dialect known to him. The Information against the appellant is written inthe English language. It is unknown whether the appellant knows the English language.Neither is it known what dialect is understood by the appellant. Nor is there any showing thatthe Information couched in English was translated to the appellant in his own dialect before hisplea of guilt. The RTC violated section 1(a) of Rule 116, the rule implementing theconstitutional right of the appellant to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusationagainst him. It also denied appellant his constitutional right to due process of law. It is urged

that we must presume that the arraignment of the appellant was regularly conducted. Whenlife is at stake, we cannot lean on this rebuttable presumption. There could be no presumption.The court must be sure.

The trial court violated section 3 of Rule 116 when it accepted the plea of guilt of theappellant. Said section requires that the court shall conduct a searching inquiry thevoluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the

prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability.The accused may also


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present evidence in his behalf. The trial court simply inquired if appellant had physical marks ofmaltreatment. It did not ask the appellant when he was arrested, who arrested him, how andwhere he was interrogated, whether he was medically examined before and after hisinterrogation, etc. It limited its efforts trying to discover late body marks of maltreatment as ifinvoluntariness is caused by physical abuse alone.

-People v. Estomaca, 256 SCRA 421 (1996) completely understands theconsequences of his plea; if he admits, searching inquiry may be conducted by: (A)make him relay to the court what happened; (b) find out if he has been forced orcoerced to admit; (c) ask defense counsel whether he explained to the accused theconsequences of his plea

PEOPLE vs ESTOMACA, 256 SCRA 421 (1996)

Regalado, J.:

FACTS:

Melita, the eldest daughter of the accused claims that she was raped by the accused.There is some inconsistency in the statements on record as to what actually took place on June14, 1994 during the arraignment of appellant, assisted by his government counsel de oficio,Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera. The decision of the court below, dated July 15, 1994, declares that heentered a plea of guilty to Criminal Cases Nos. 43568 and 43571, and a plea of not guilty toCriminal Cases Nos. 43567,43569 and 43570. Obviously engendered by the insufficiency of theproceedings conducted and the imprecision of the notes taken at this stage, this matter will befurther discussed hereafter. The two criminal complaints, both subscribed by the offended partyon April29, 1994 and which are the subject of the joint judgment of the lower court challengedin this appellate review.Proceeding upon the capital nature of the offenses involved, the trial court, after appellant

ostensibly waived the presentation of evidence for his defense, required the prosecution toadduce evidence purportedly to establish appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, onJune 29, 1994, the complainant herself, Melita Estomaca, appeared in court and testified thatshe was raped by her father once in December, 1993 and, again, on March 6, 1994. On theauthority of Republic Act No. 7659 which took effect on December 31, 1993, the lower courtimposed upon appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the sexual assault supposedlyperpetrated in December, 1993, and the supreme penalty of death with respect to the rapeallegedly committed on March 6, 1994. In each of the said cases, he was further ordered toindemnify the offended party in the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.

ISSUE:Whether or not the arraignment of the accused violated the due process.

HELD/RATIO DECENDI:Yes. The arraignment is invalid.Section 1(a) of Rule 116 requires that the arraignment

should be made in open court by the judge himself or by the clerk of court furnishing theaccused a copy of the complaint or information with the list of witnesses stated therein, thenreading the same in the language or dialect that is known to him, and asking him what his pleais to the charge. The requirement that the reading be made in a language or dialect that theaccused understands and knows is a mandatory requirement, just as the whole of said Section 1


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should be strictly followed by trial courts. This the law affords the accused by way ofimplementation of the all- important constitutional mandate regarding the right of an accusedto be informed of the precise nature of the accusation leveled at him and is, therefore, really anavenue for him to be able to hoist the necessary defense in rebuttal thereof. It is an integralaspect of the due process clause under the Constitution.

At threshold, what strikes this Court as peculiar is that the arraignment appears to haveconsisted merely of the bare reading of the five complaints, synthetically and crypticallyreported in the transcript, thus: (Reading the information/complaint to the accused inIlonggo/local dialect). Since what was supposed to have been read was stated in the singular,but there were five criminal complaints against appellant, this Court is then left to speculate onwhether all five criminal complaints were actually read, translated or explained to appellant ona level within his comprehension, considering his limited education.

The Court takes judicial notice, because it is either of public knowledge or readilycapable of unquestionable demonstration, that in the central and northwestern part of Iloiloprovince and all the way up to and throughout Antique, including necessarily San Joaquin

where the offenses were committed and of which appellant and his family are natives, the localdialect is known as kinaray-a.Barring previous exposure to or as a consequence of extendedsocial or commercial intercourse, kinaray-ais not readily understandable to nor spoken bythose born to the Hiligaynon regional language or who have lived in the areas under its swayfor an appreciable period of time. The converse is true for those whose native tongue is thedialect of kinaray-a,since they are generally not well-versed in Ilonggo, or Hiligaynon. Sinceall the complaints are not only in English but in technical legal language, we are again at sea asto whether and how the indictments were translated to Ilonggo and/or to kinaray-a,or thatthe appellant was truly and honestly made aware of the charges and, especially, theconsequences of his guilty plea thereto. The records are silent and do not reveal anything onthis point, nor how the dialogue between the presiding judge and appellant was translated. Yet

a mans life is at stake while this Court wrestles with that dilemma created by an omission ofofficial duty.

B. Procedure; appointment of counsel de oficio

-Rule 116, secs. 1 (a), (f), (g), 6-8

(a) The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or informationwas filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment shall be made in open court by thejudge or clerk by furnishing the accused with a copy of the complaint or information,reading the same in the language or dialect known to him, and asking him whether hepleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may call at the trial witnesses other thanthose named in the complaint or information.

(f) The private offended party shall be required to appear at the arraignment forpurposes of plea bargaining, determination of civil liability, and other matters requiringhis presence. In case of failure of the offended party to appear despite due notice, the


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court may allow the accused to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense which isnecessarily included in the offense charged with the conformity of the trial prosecutoralone. (cir. 1-89)

(g) Unless a shorter period is provided by special law or Supreme Court circular, thearraignment shall be held within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquiresjurisdiction over the person of the accused. The time of the pendency of a motion toquash or for a bill of particulars or other causes justifying suspension of the arraignmentshall be excluded in computing the period. (sec. 2, cir. 38-98)

-Const. (1987), art III, sec 11

-RA 8493, sec. 7, par 2 ~ "Speedy Trial Act of 1998

Section 7. Time Limit Between Filing of Information and Arraignment and BetweenArraignment and Trial.- The arraignment of an accused shall be held within thirty (30) daysfrom the filing of the information, or from the date the accused has appeared before the justice,judge or court in which the charge is pending, whichever date last occurs. Thereafter, where aplea of not guilty is entered, the accused shall have at least fifteen (15) days to prepare fortrial.Trial shall commence within thirty (30) days from arraignment as fixed by the court.

If the accused pleads not guilty to the crime charged, he/she shall state whether he/sheinterposes a negative or affirmative defense. A negative defense shall require the prosecution toprove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, while an affirmative defense maymodify the order of trial and require the accused to prove such defense by clear and convincing

evidence.

C. Pre-arraignment Procedure and Remedies

1. Attachment of PI Record, raffle and transmittal of records

- SC AM No. 03-1-09-SC, Part B1

1. Motion for Bill of Particulars-Rule 116, sec. 9

Section 9.Bill of particulars. The accused may, before arraignment, move for a bill ofparticulars to enable him properly to plead and to prepare for trial. The motion shall specify thealleged defects of the complaint or information and the details desired. (10a)

People v. Gutierrez, 91 Phil. 876 (1952)


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accused. On the contrary, it will serve to apprise of the accused clearly of the charges against himconsidering that conviction in criminal cases involve the deprivation of the accused of his life and liberty.In criminal cases, any defect in the accusation other than lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter maybe cured by good and sufficient evidence introduced by the prosecution.

Ambiguous phrases therefore should not be permitted in criminal complaintsorinformationsand if such phrase has been included therein, on motion of the defense andbefore thecommencement of trial,the court should order itseliminationas surplusageORthefiling of thenecessary specification, which is but an amendment in mere mattersof form.

-People v. Arlegui, 128 SCRA 556 (1984)

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the order of the Court of First Instance ofBatangas, Branch VII, dismissing on a motion to quash Criminal Case No. 2170 entitled "Peopleof the Philippines v. William Espaola"on the ground that from the language used in theinformation in relation to the Presidential Decrees punishing the alleged offense, it is not clearthat an offense was committed and that the supposed penal statutes "are not prohibitive but

rather permissive and preceptive statutes."

Respondent Espanola moved to quash the information on the following grounds:

The accusation against the accused is not a penal offense, but, more ofadministrative in nature, because Sec. 4 of P.D. No. 381 as well as P.D. No. 189,Sec. 4-B do not impose Criminal liability against the offender. The accused didnot commit any offense in the development of the beach resort because hisapplication, granting that the area is within the jurisdiction of the PhilippineTourism Authority, was duly given due course by the said body as stated in

Annex"A". Instead of charging the accused, he ought to be commended forassisting the government in the promotion of tourism. In fact, the beach resorthas become so famous that foreigners have been continuously and regularlypatronizing the place.

The land covered by the beach resort was also given due course by the Bureau ofLands and covered by a Foreshore Lease Application as clearly reflectedinAnnexes "B" and "C".

The grounds in the Fiscal's opposition to the motion to quash are:

1. That the accused has overlooked the fact that Presidential Decree No. 381which was made principally as the basis of the charge against the herein accusedprovides under Section I thereof 'that no development project for tourism purposesshall be undertaken by any person without prior approval of the PhilippineTourism Authority, in accordance with the provisions and guidelines prescribed by theDepartment of Tourism.' As a corollary thereto, Section 4 provides that anyperson violating or causing another to violate any provision of this decree or therules and regulations promulgated by the Phillippine Tourism Authoritypursuant to the next preceding section wig suffer the penalties provided for


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under Section 4-B of P.D. No. 189, as amended. Presidential Decree No. 259which took effect on August 1, 1973 which among others provides the penaltiesfor the violation of any provision of the said decree or of the rules andregulations or circulars of the Department of Tourism is now known as Section4-B of PD No. 189. Section 4-b has been misquoted because Section 4 of PD No.189 was the one quoted by the accused. Section 4-b as we have stated is anamendment to Section 4 of PD No. 189 which section is now included under PD259 as an amendatory act to PD No. 189.

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2. That it is not true that the Philippine Tourism Authority gave due course tothe application of the accused for the undertaking of a particular developmentproject at Sitio Putat, Barangay Papaya, Nasugbu, Batangas, for tourismpurposes because the letter itself dated February 14, 1979 does not indicateapproval of the authority of his application in the sense that the implications ofthe phrase "we may give due course to your proposal" do not altogether give a

guarantee and assurance to the accused that his application will be approved. ...

An examination of the information shows on its face that it does not suffer from any material orsubstantial defect or any so-called ambiguity or double meaning as to warrant the dismissal ofthe case. Contrary to the respondents' claim, the information appears sufficiently explicit. Itdoes not suffer from the obscurity, unintelligibility, or vagueness alleged by the respondents.Respondent Espanola created ambiguity where there was none. Resort to statutoryconstruction or interpretation was, therefore, unnecessary.

Assuming the information to have been vague and ambiguous, alternative courses ofaction could have been taken. Respondent Espanola could have filed a motion for a bill

of particulars if he did not feel like researching into a Presidential Decree with a Section4-b and a Section 4-B. A bill of particulars while provided for under Section 6 of Rule116 is not a popular procedure among lawyers for the accused in criminal cases. For onething, it may invite an amended information which is not only clearer but may also bestronger and more incriminating. However, it would have clarified and corrected at an earlystage the kind of doubt which the accused in this particular case alleged to have entertained.Section 6 of Rule 116 provides:

SEC. 6. Bill of Particulars. Defendant may, at the time of or beforearraignment, move for or demand a more definite statement or a bill ofparticulars of any matter which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or

particularity to enable him properly to plead or prepare for trial. The motionshall point out the defects complained of and the details desired.

The more appropriate procedure under the circumstances would have been an order from thecourtdirecting the Fiscal to amend the information because the defect, if there ever was one,was curable by the simplest of amendments or clarifications. There was no basis to grant themotion to quash and dismiss the case.


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2. Motion for Production and Inspection of Material Evidence in possessionof the Prosecution

-Rule 116, sec 10; - which are in the possession or under the control of the prosecution,police, or other law investigating agencies

Section 10.Production or inspection of material evidence in possession of prosecution.Upon motionof the accused showing good cause and with notice to the parties, the court, in order to preventsurprise, suppression, or alteration, may order the prosecution to produce and permit theinspection and copying or photographing of any written statement given by the complainantand other witnesses in any investigation of the offense conducted by the prosecution or otherinvestigating officers, as well as any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters,photographs, objects or tangible things not otherwise privileged, which constitute or containevidence material to any matter involved in the case and which are in the possession orunder the control of the prosecution, police, or other law investigating agencies. (11a)

-People v. Roldan, 99 SCRA 422 (1980);

-People v Palacios, 108 Phil 220 (1960);

3. Suspension of arraignment-Rule 116, sec. 11;

Section 11.Suspension of arraignment. Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignmentshall be suspended in the following cases:

(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition whicheffective renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to

plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examinationand, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose;

(b) There exists a prejudicial question; and

(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at eitherthe Department of Justice, or the Office of the President;provided, that the period


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of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petitionwith the reviewing office. (12a)

-Rule 111, secs. 6,7;

Section 6.Suspension by reason of prejudicial question.A petition for suspension of the criminalaction based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in theoffice of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When thecriminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the samecriminal action at any time before the prosecution rests. (6a)

Section 7.Elements of prejudicial question. The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) thepreviously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issueraised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determineswhether or not the criminal action may proceed. (5a)

-DOJ Department Order No. 70 (Series of 2000);

4. Diversion Program for Juveniles in Conflict with Law-RJCL, secs. 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 & 25

Section 19.Preliminary Investigation.- As far as consistent with this Rule, the preliminaryinvestigation of a child conflict with the law shall be governed by Section 3 of Rule 112 of theRevised Rules of Criminal Procedure. A specially trained prosecutor shall be assigned toconduct the inquest, preliminary investigation and prosecution of the case involving a child in

conflict with the law. The child, on the other hand, shall be assisted by a private lawyer or ifnone, a lawyer from the Public Attorney's Office. If there is an allegation or evidence of tortureor ill-treatment of a child in conflict with the law during custody or detention, it shall be theduty of the prosecutor to investigate the same. (n)

Section 20.Conduct of Preliminary Investigation.- Preliminary investigation shall be conductedin the following instances: (a) when the child in conflict with the law does not qualify fordiversion; (b) when the child, the parents or guardian do not agree to diversion as provided inSections 27 and 28 of Republic Act No. 9344; or (c) when, after considering the assessment andrecommendation of the social worker, the prosecutor determines that diversion is notappropriate for the child in conflict with the law. (n)

At the preliminary investigation, should there arise a need for clarificatory questions to bepropounded on the child, the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness shall apply.

Section 21.Filing of Information.- If the investigating prosecutor finds probable cause to holdthe child in conflict with the law for trial, there being discernment, the correspondingResolution and Information shall be prepared for the approval by the provincial or cityprosecutor, a s the case may be. The child and the mother or father, or appropriate guardian or


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custodian, or in the absence thereof, the nearest relative, and the child's private counsel orlawyer from the Public Attorney's Office shall be furnished forthwith a copy of the approvedresolution and the Information.

The Information shall be filed with the court within forty-five (45) days from the start of the

preliminary investigation.(n)

No Information shall be filed against a child for the commission of the following:

(a) status offences;

(b) vagrancy and prostitution under Section 202 of the Revised Penal Code;

(c) mendicancy under Presidential Decree No. 1563; and

(d) sniffing of rugby under Presidential Decree No. 1619.

Children taken into custody for the foregoing shall, with their consent and that of their parents,guardian or custodian, instead undergo appropriate counseling and treatment program. (n)

Section 22.Duties of the Clerk of Court Upon Receipt of information.- The Clerk of Court, uponreceipt of the Information, shall:

(1) Maintain a separate case docket or logbook for cases involving children inconflict with the law. Whenever possible, the Clerk of Court shall use colorcoding or other method to easily distinguish the records of children in conflictwith the law from the other case records;

(2) Determine whether the offense charged qualifies for diversion, that is itpunishable by imprisonment of not more than twelve (12) years, regardless offine, or fine alone regardless of the amount;

(3) If the crime charged is punishable by such imprisonment, immediately assigna temporary case number in accordance with Sec. 23 of this Rule and raffle offthe case to a court so that its Diversion Committee can immediately undertakethe appropriate action under Section 33 of this Rule; and

(4) If the crime charged does not quality for diversion because it is punishable byimprisonment of more than twelve (12) years, the case shall be assigned a

regular criminal case docket number raffled off to a court for formalproceedings. (n)

Section 23.Docketing of the Case- a case that qualifies for diversion under paragraph 3 of thepreceding Section shall not be docketed as a regular criminal case but instead shall be assigneda temporary case number as follows: CICL-(no.) ___- (year) ___ -D (which means diversion),before the same is raffled off to the appropriate court.


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Section 24.Venue- Subject to the provisions of Section 15, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules ofCriminal Procedure, any criminal or civil action involving a child in conflict with the law shallbe instituted and tried in the appropriate court nearest the place where the offense wascommitted or where any of its essential elements occurred.

Section 25.Released of Children on Recognizance to the Parents, Guardian, Custodian or NearestRelative.- The release of a child from a custody during the pendency of the case involving anon-serious offense as defined in Sec. 4 (u) of this rule may be ordered by the court only after ahearing for that purpose, and upon favorable recommendation of the social worker assigned tothe child, with the conformity of the public prosecutor and the private complainant. The childshall be released to the custody of a willing and responsible mother or father, or appropriateguardian or custodian or in their absence, the nearest relative, who shall be responsible for thechild's good behavior and appearance in court whenever required.

No child shall be ordered detained in jail pending trial or hearing of the child's case, subject tothe provisions of this Rule. (n)

Issues on Arraignment:

The Concept of Arraignment:

Arraignment is the proceeding in a criminal case, whose object is to fix the identity of theaccused, to inform him of the charge and to give him an opportunity to plead, or to obtain fromthe accused his answer, in other words, his plea to the information.

Arraignment is indispensable as the means for bringing the accused into court and notifyinghim of the cause he has to meet. (Borja v. Mendoza, 77 SCRA42)

Options of the accused before arraignment and plea

Before arraignment and plea, the accused mayavail of any of the following:

a.Bill of Particulars- The accused may, before arraignment, move for a bill of particulars toenablehim to properly plead and prepare for trial.

The motion shall:

a. specify the alleged defects of the complaint orinformation, and shallb.specify the details desired. (Section 9, Rule 116)

b.Suspension of arraignment- Upon motion, the proper party may ask for the suspension ofthearraignment in the following cases:

1. That the accused appears to be suffering from anunsound mental condition which effectivelyrendershim unable to fully understand the charge againsthim and to plead intelligently thereto.In such case,the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary his confinement for suchpurpose;


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2. That there exists a prejudicial question; and3. There is a petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor which is pending at eitherthe DOJ,or of the Office of the President (Section 11, Rule 116). The period of suspension shall not exceedsixty (60) days counted fromthe filing of thepetition with the reviewing office.

c.Motion to QuashAt any time before enteringhis plea, the accused may move to quashthecomplaint or information on any of the groundsunder Section 3, Rule 117 in relation toSection 1 of the same rule;

d.Challenge the validity of the arrest or legality of the warrantissued or assail theregularity orquestion the absence of preliminary investigation ofthe charge otherwise the objection is deemed waived.

Place of arraignment

The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or information was filed

orassigned for trial. (Section 1a, Rule 116)

Manner of arraignment

Arraignment is made:

1. in open court where the complaint orinformation has been filed or assigned for trial;2. by the judge or clerk of court;3. By furnishing the accused with a copy of the complaint or information;4. Reading it in a language or dialect known to theaccused;5. Asking accused whether he pleads guilty or not guilty.

6. Both arraignment and plea shall be made of record but failure to enter of record shall notaffectthe validity of the proceedings.

Time of arraignment

Under the Rules of Court, the arraignment shallbe made within thirty (30) days from the datethecourt acquires jurisdiction over the person of theON OF ARRAIGNMENTSuspension of arraignment

Upon motion by the proper party, arraignment may be suspended on thefollowing grounds:

1.The accused appears to be suffering fromanunsound mental conditionwhicheffectively renders him unable to fullyunderstand the charge against him and topleadintelligently thereto;2.There exists a validprejudicial question;3. A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at the Department ofJustice or the Office of thePresident(Sec. 11); provided that theperiod of suspension shall notexceed 60days counted from the filing of thepetition; The period of suspension shall not exceed


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sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office (Sec. 11)

4.There are pending incidents such as:a.Motion to Quashb. Motion for Inhibitionc.Motion for Bill of Particulars

II. Plea

A. Nature and purpose; procedure-Rule 116, sec. 1 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g)-RJCL, sec 27-SC AM No. 03-1-09-SC, Part B (2), (3), (4)-DOJ-NPS Manual Part VII

B. Types of pleas1. Not guilty

a. Denial; presumption of innocence-Const. (1987), art. III, sec. 14 (2)

-People v. Alba, 305 SCRA 811 (1999)

PER CURIAM

RemarkSir, This is under II. Plea, B. Types of Pleas, 1. Not Guilty, a. Denial; Presumption ofInnocence but the case did not discuss the topic.

FactsHerein accused-appellant ALFREDO Alba was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of twocounts of rape against the person of his daughter Janette. The facts as established by theprosecution are as follows: Janette, then only 9 year old, was bathing in a nearby creek whenher father ALFREDO went after her and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her. A yearlater, she was once again raped by him in their house when her stepmother was not around.After the 2nd rape, Janette could not bear the abuse anymore and thats when she finally voicedher complaint to a complete stranger, a fat man whose name she does not even know. Said fatman took pity on her and helped her with the complaint.

ALFREDO, testifying on his own behalf for the defense, denied the charges against him andcried that his daughter was imputing the crime to him just to get even because he has been hardon her in punishment for her hardheadedness and wrongdoings. The trial court, as statedabove, was ultimately swayed by the prosecutions case and convicted ALFREDO, sentencinghim with the supreme penalty of deathhence, this automatic appeal.Issue: WON ALFREDO can question the substance of the information filed in court againsthim


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HELD: NO, the court correctly found ALFREDO guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Perforce,the assailed decision should be AFFIRMED, in toto. The sentence of death is UPHELD.RATIO:ALFREDO questions the validity of the information against him by arguing that it states intoo general a term the crimes he allegedly committed depriving him of his rights to due processand to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him (1987 Const., Art III,Sec 14(2)) this must FAIL. Consistent with Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on CriminalProcedure, an information is valid as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of theoffense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof the information in the case at bar satisfiesthis rule.Also, there is proof on record that, in the proceedings of the trial, ALFREDO demonstratedthat he knew full well what the charges against him were. He denied them as only a person whois aware of the gravity of the charge against him would do. It is now late for ALFREDO toquestion the form or substance of the informations. In entering a plea of not guilty during hisarraignment, he waived all possible objections to the sufficiency of the informations againsthim44 Sections 1 and 8 of Rule 117: SECTION 1. Time to move to quash- At any time before

entering his plea, the accused may move to quash the complaint or information. SEC. 8.Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor- The failure of the accused to assertany ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, eitherbecause he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion shall bedeemed a waiver of the grounds of a motion to quash, except the grounds of no offense charged,lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged, extinction of the offense or penalty and jeopardy,as provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (f) and (h) of Section 3 of this Rule.

The informations against accused-appellant comply with the rules. They are notsusceptible of being construed as charging crimes other than incestuous rape. In addition, it issufficient if the acts complained of are alleged to have taken place as near to the actual date

when the offense was committed as the information or complaint will permit. As alreadystated above, the precise time of its commission is not an essential element of the crime of rape,without which there is no crime committed.

Indeed, the proceedings in the trial court demonstrate that accused-appellant knewfull well what the charges against him were. He denied them as only a person who isaware of the gravity of the charge against him would do.

Moreover, it is now late for accused-appellant to question the form or substance of theinformations. In entering a plea of not guilty during his arraignment, he waived all possibleobjections to the sufficiency of the informations against him. As Sections 1 and 8 of Rule 117provide:

SECTION 1.Time to move to quash. At any time before entering his plea, the accused maymove to quash the complaint or information.

SEC. 8.Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor. The failure of the accused toassert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, eitherbecause he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion shall bedeemed a waiver of the grounds of a motion to quash, except the grounds of no offense charged,


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lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged, extinction of the offense or penalty andjeopardy, as provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (f) and (h) of Section 3 of this Rule.

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court correctly found accused-appellantguilty of two (2) counts of rape. The offended party was born on January 7,1984.[16]Accordingly, when she was raped for the first time in May of 1993, she was just 9years old. When she was raped a second time on February 7, 1994, she was 10 years old.

b. Refusal to enter plea; conditional plea-Rule 116, sec. 1 (c)

(c) When the accused refuses to plead or makes a conditional plea, a plea of not guiltyshall be entered for him. (1a)

-People v Strong, 63 SCRA 113 (1975)

G.R. No. L-38626

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.

STEPHEN DOUGLAS STRONG alias STEVE STRONG

Fernando, J.:

Facts: Stephen Douglas Strong aka Steve Strong was accused for and later on charged of

murder for the death of Cornelia Bartolaba. On February 6, 1974, during the continuation of

the arraignment, the accused Stephen Douglas Strong was asked by Judge Jesus Occena "And

it is also stated here, "that on the occasion and in pursuance of said robbery and to ensure his

felonious intent, the above-named accused with intent to kill, with treachery and evident

premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of a fork

and towel, attack, assault, stab, choke and strangle one Cornelia Bartolaba, which caused her

immediate death", what do you say to that? Strongs categorical answer: "No." Then when

interrogated further to explain why he answered in the negative considering that he had

entered a guilty plea and specifically questioned as to whether he meant to say that he did notattack, nor assault, and that he did not stab, choke and strangle the victim Cornelia to death, he

simply answered "no" every time to each and ever question.

Thus it was quite unexpected when on February 8, 1974, the trial court rendered

judgment finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The Office

of the Solicitor-General manifested that the contention in appellant's brief that the plea of guilt
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/apr99/131858_59.htm#_edn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/apr99/131858_59.htm#_edn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/apr99/131858_59.htm#_edn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/apr99/131858_59.htm#_edn16


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should be disregarded as it could not be considered definite and absolute. Instead, it should be

one of not guilty with the lower court being called upon to continue the trial on the merits. The

Sol Gen further more stated; It s clear from a perusal of the afore-quoted portion of the

transcripts that the accused denied the allegations contained in the information. It is well-

settled that when a plea of guilty is not definite or ambiguous, or not absolute, the same

amounts to a plea of not guilty. ... This Honorable Court has manifested its constant concern

with improvident pleas of guilt. Trial courts have been repeatedly admonished to be

circumspect in accepting pleas of guilty in capital offenses. It is in line with this salutary

principle and in the best interest of justice that appellee is constrained to agree with the stand

of the appellant."

Issue: Whether or not the due process requirement to justify the acceptance of the plea of guilt

was met in this case?

Held: No, due process was not met in the case at hand. As noted by the S.C. in their recent

decision of People v. Ybanez, trial judges are to "refrain from accepting with alacrity an

accuseds plea of guilty, for while justice demands a speedy administration, judges are duty

bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty he understands

fully the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction."

The S.C. has invariably referred to it as furnishing the standard, and that in words too

plain to be misinterpreted. It could not be otherwise, if deference is to be accorded to the

constitutional right to due process as well as the rudimentary procedural principles. Theelement of fairness cannot be satisfied in any other manner. There must be, for a plea of guilty

to be judicially acceptable then, a showing of full understanding of what is at stake. That is so

even when an accused does clearly admit the commission of the culpable act. In the case at

hand, while there was an admission of guilt hastily made, it turned out, on his being specifically

questioned, the accused denied most categorically the allegations in the information. How could

the plea of guilt earlier made be the basis of a judgment of conviction? It was indeed deplorable,

considering that as of the time the trial judge decided the case, the S.C. had reiterated Apduhan

in no less than twenty-nine separate occasions, that he did act the way he did, apparently

heedless of what is authoritatively ordained time and time again. Even a cursory perusal of this

Court's decisions should make clear the undeviating adherence to such a basic doctrine. Judicialcarelessness, it thus appears, has never been carried before to such extremes. It ought never to

have happened, and care should be taken that it does not happen again. The decision of the

lower court dated February 8, 1974 was set aside and nullified and the case remanded back to

the RTC to it for a trial to be conducted strictly in accordance with the requirements of the law.

c. Plea of guilt but with exculpatory evidence


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-Rule 116, sec. 1 (d)

d. Withdrawal of improvident plea of guilt-Rule 116, sec 5

Section 5.Withdrawal of improvident plea of guilty. At any time before the judgment ofconviction becomes final, the court may permit an improvident plea of guilty to be withdrawnand be substituted by a plea of not guilty. (5)

-People v De Ocampo Gonzaga. 127 SCRA 158 (1984)

FACTS: Nov. 3, 1977 - An information was filed charging Gonzaga of the crime of murder for

fatally stabbing with a jungle bolo Amparo Quilatan, allegedly attended by the aggravatingcircumstances of evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of superior strengthdeliberately making use of drunkenness or after having taken liquor, armed with an illegallypossessed jungle bolo.

On Nov. 8, 1977Gonzaga appeared for arraignment without counsel. The Trial Court issuedan order appointing Atty. Saruca as counsel de officio for the purpose of arraignment only.Atty. Saruca manifested that the accused was ready for arraignment and the accused pleadedguilty to the offense charged.

The trial court then ordered the presentation of evidence but the prosecution was not ready fortrial. The prosecution witnesses had not been notified because the prosecution did not expectthat the accused would plead guilty and that trial would continue thereafter. The case was then

set for hearing the next day notwithstanding counsel de officios request that he be given 2 daysto prepare for trial and for purposes of trial Attys. Rodriguez and Koh were appointed ascounsels de officio.

ISSUE: WON Gonzagas plea of guilty is valid or should be accepted.

HELD:NO

RATIO: Records confirm the fact that the accused was not adequately informed of the natureof the crime imputed against him and the consequences of his plea. Nor does it appear that theaverments in the information, including the qualifying and aggravating circumstances wereexplained to him. No dialogue whatsoever transpired between accused and the trial judge.

In capital offenses, the trial judge should give ample opportunity to the counsel de officio toexamine not only the records of the case but also to acquire every relevant information on thematter, such as conferring with the accused adequately so that he may properly, intelligentlyand effectively represent his interests. This is but to accord substance to one of the greatprinciples of justice, guaranteed by the Constitution, which is the right of an accused to beheard by himself and counsel as a requirement of due process. The enjoyment of such a rightwould certainly be useless if the counsel of the accused is precluded from knowing fully thefacts of his client's case.


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Under Sec. 5, Rule 116, whenever an attorneyde officioisemployed or assigned by the court todefend an accused either at the arraignment or at the trial he should be given a reasonable timeto consult with the accused and prepare his defense before proceeding further in the case whichshould not be less than 2 hours in case of arraignment and 2 days in case of trial. Theserequirements were not complied with.

After accused's arraignment on November 8, 1977, the court immediately set the case for trial the nextday, November 9, 1977, disregarding counsel de ofifcio's manifestation that he be allowed the requiredtwo-day period within which to prepare for trial.

In a long line of cases, this Court has repeatedly enjoined trial judges to refrain from acceptingwith alacrity an accuseds plea of guilty, for while justice demands a speedy administration,judges are duty bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guiltyhe understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction. 4 Theessence of a plea of guilty in a criminal trial is that the accused on arraignment admits his guiltfreely, voluntarily and with full knowledge of the consequences and meaning of his act. 5 If theaccused does not clearly and fully understand the nature of the offense charged, if he is not

advised as to the meaning and effect of the technical language so often used in formalcomplaints and informations in qualifying the acts constituting the offense, or if he does notclearly understand the consequences by way of a heavy and even a capital penalty flowing fromhis admission of his guilt of the crime in the precise technical manner and form in which it ischarged, his plea of guilty should not be accepted and if accepted it should not be held to besufficient to sustain a conviction. 6

In capital offenses, the trial judge should give ample opportunity to the counsel de oficio toexamine not only the records of the case but also to acquire every relevant information on thematter, such as conferring with the accused adequately so that he may properly, intelligentlyand effectively represent his interests. 7 This is but to accord substance to one of the great

principles of justice, guaranteed by the Constitution, which is the right of an accused to beheard by himself and counsel as a requirement of due process. The enjoyment of such a rightwould certainly be viscerated if the counsel of the accused is precluded from knowing fully thefacts of his clients case. 8

Under Sec. 5, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, whenever an attorney de oficio is employed orassigned by the court to defend an accused either at the arraignment or at the trial, he shouldbe given a reasonable time to consult with the accused and prepare his defense beforeproceeding further in the case which should not be less than two (2) hours in case ofarraignment and two (2) days in case of trial. These requirements were not complied with.After accuseds arraignment on November 8, 1977, the court immediately set the case for trialthe next day, November 9, 1977, disregarding counsel de oficios manifestation that he beallowed the required two-day period within which to prepare for trial

Issues on Plea

The effect of a plea of guilty

A plea of guilty is a judicial confession of guilt( People v. Comendador G.R. No. L-38000,September 19,1980). It is an unconditional plea of guilt admits


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b. That the lesser offense is necessarily included in the offense charged.

2. After arraignment but before trial provided the following requisites are present:

a. The plea of guilty is withdrawn;b. The plea of not guilty and the withdrawal of the previous guilty pleashall be made before trial;c. The lesser offense is necessarily included in the offense charged; andd. The plea must have the consent of the prosecutor and the offended party(Section 2, Rule 116)

No amendment of complaint or information is necessary (Sec. 2).

3. After prosecution rests allowed only when the prosecution does not have sufficientevidence to establish guilt for the crime charged.4.Duty of the court after the accusedpleads guilty to a capital offense

When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall:

1. Conduct a searching inquiry into the:a. Voluntariness of the plea andb. Full comprehension of the consequences of the plea;

2. Require the prosecution to prove guilt and the precise degree of his culpability.

3. Ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if hedesires.

However, the accused after pleading guilty may not present evidence as would exonerate himcompletely from criminal liability such as proof of self-defense. This procedure is mandatory,and a judge who fails to observe it commits grave abuse of discretion.

The rationale for the requirement of presentation of evidence after the plea of guilty

To preclude any room for reasonable doubt inthe mind of either the trial court or of theSupremeCourt, on review as to the possibility that theremight have been misunderstanding onthe part of the accused as to the nature of the charges towhich he pleaded guilty; and toascertain thecircumstances attendant to the commission of thecrime which justify or require the

exercise of greater or lesser degree of severity in theimposition of prescribed penalties. (Peoplev. Basa,51 SCRA 317)5. SEARCHING INQUIRYThe objectives of a searching inquiry by the judge after a plea of guilty

To determine the voluntariness of the plea and whether the accused understood fully theconsequence of his plea.


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The meaning of the duty of the judge to conduct a searching inquiry (elementsof searching inquiry)

In all cases, the judge must convince himself:

1. The judge must convince himself that the accused is entering the plea voluntarily andintelligently;2. The judge must convince himself that there exists a rational basis for finding of guilt basedon accuseds testimony3. Inform the accused of the exact length of imprisonment and the certainty that he will serveit in a national penitentiary6. IMPROVIDENT PLEAThe concept of an improvident plea?It is a plea without information as to all the circumstances affecting it. It is based upon amistaken assumption or misleading information or advice.

Instances of improvident plea.

1. Plea of guilty was compelled by violence or intimidation;2. The accused did not fully understand the meaning and consequences of his plea;3. Insufficient information to sustain conviction of the offense charged;4. Information does not charge an offense; and5. Court has no jurisdiction.

An improvident plea be withdrawn

The court may permit an improvident plea of guilty to be withdrawn at any time before thejudgment of conviction becomes final and be substituted by a plea of not guilty.

The withdrawal of a plea of guilty is not a matter of right to the accused but addressed to thesound discretion to the trial court (Sec. 5)

The effect of a withdrawal of an improvident plea

The court shall set aside the judgment of conviction and re-open the case for new trial.7. GROUNDS FOR SUSPENSI

III. Pre-trial

A. Nature and purpose-Rule 118, sec 1

Section 1.Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. In all criminal cases cognizable by theSandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court inCities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court shall afterarraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the


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person of the accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in special laws or circulars of theSupreme Court, order a pre-trial conference to consider the following:

(a) plea bargaining;

(b) stipulation of facts;

(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;

(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;

(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes alawful defense; and

(f) such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal andcivil aspects of the case. (secs. 2 and 3, cir. 38-98)

-SC AM No. 03-1-09-SC, Part B (5), (6)

-RJCL, sec 28

-DOJ-NPS Manual, Part VIII

SECTION 1. CoflcQpt of pre-trial. - A pre-trial is a process whereby the accused and theprosecutors in a criminal case work out, usually at the arraignment stage, a naturallysatisfactory disposition of a case subject to court approval in order to expedite the trial of the

case. 1

The prosecutor shall enter into a pre-trial only when the accused and counsel agree andupon order of the court.

SEC. 2. Duties of prosecutor before and after the pre-trial conference. -Before the pre-trialconference, the prosecutor should know every fact and detail of the case. This can beaccomplished by interviewing the complainant and other witnesses and after a thoroughexamination of the available documentary and other physical evidence. The prosecutor shouldplace importance on the testimony of the expert witness. The knowledge that the prosecutorwill gain from said witness will help him determine the procedures undertaken in the

examination of a subject or thing; the scientific or technical terms applied, and the reason/s inarriving at a certain conclusion.

During the pre-trial process, the prosecutor shall bear in mind that he has to prove his

1Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed. 1979, p.1037.


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case beyond a reasonable doubt and that every act or incident should be proved by thetestimony of qualified and competent witnesses.

After the pre-trial conference, the prosecutor shall ensure that any agreement oradmission made or entered therein is in writing and signed by the accused and his counsel.

SEC. 3. Subject matters ofpre-tn.al. - The pre-trial conference shall consider the following:

a) Plea bargaining - This is a process where the defendants usually plead guilty toa lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictmentin return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge2;

b) Stipulation of facts- This is the agreement of the parties on some facts admitted,some facts covered by judicial notice (Sec. 1, Rule 129), judicial admissions (Sec.2 Rule 129), or on matters not otherwise disputed by them. In cases requiringthe presentation of government witnesses or evidence, the Trial Prosecutorshould exert every effort to secure a waiver by the accused of objections to the

admissibility of certain documentary evidence, e.g., medical or death cenificare,necropsy report, forensic chemistry report, ballistics report, PhilippineOverseasand Employment Administration (POEA) Certification, and the like, if suchevidence has no relevance whatsoever to the theory of the defense, in order tod~spense with the presentation and testimony in court of government witnesses.Whenever appropriate or necessary, the counter-affidavit of the accusedsubmitted luring the preliminary investigation may be resorted to or availed ofto denions~rate or establish the defense theory;c) Marking of documentary evidence in advance for identification;d) Waiver in advance of objections to admissibility of evidence;e) List of witnesses to be presented which should be qualified by the

following statement: "that other witnesses may be presented in thecourse of the trial"; and

f) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial.

SEC. 4. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - The following rules shall apply to cases wherethe accused pleads guilty to a lesser offense:

a) The Trial Prosecutor shall immediately move for the suspension of theproceedings whenever the accused manifests his intention in court toplead guilty to a lesser offense. This will enable the Trial Prosecutor toevaluate the implications of the offer.

b) If the lesser offense to which the accused will plead guilty is not acapital offense, the Trial Prosecutor may dispense with the

presentation of evidence unless the court directs otherwise.c) The Trial Prosecutor, with the consent of the offended party, may motu

2ibid, p.1037.


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propno agree to the offer of the accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense ifthe penalty imposable therefor is prision correcional (maximum of six [61years) or less or a fine not exceeding P12,OOO.OO.

d) When the penalty imposable for the offense charged is prision mayor (atleast six [6] years and one [11 day or higher) or a fine exceeding

~12,OOO.OO, the Trial Prosecutor shall first submit hiscomment/recommendation to the City or Provincial Prosecutor or to theChief State Prosecutor, as the case may be, for approval. If therecommendation is approved in writing, the Trial Prosecutor, may, withthe consent of the offended party, agree to a plea of guilty to a lesseroffense. For this purpose, the Chief State Prosecutor or the Provincial orCity Prosecutor concerned shall act on the recommendation of the TrialProsecutor within forty-eight (48) hours from receipt thereof. In no caseshall the subject plea to a lesser offense be allowed without the writtenapproval of the above respective heads of office.

e) In all cases, the penalty for the lesser offense to which the accused may

be allowed to plead guilty shall not be more than two (2) degrees lowerthan the imposable penalty for the crime charged, notwithstandingthe presence of mitigating circumstances. The lesser offense shall also beone that is necessarily related to the offense charged or the offense mustbelong to the same classification or title under the Revised Penal Code ortherelevant special laws.3

However, the plea of guilty to a lesser offense may not be allowed where it socontravenes lo~ nd common sense as to be unconscionable, thereby resulting inus, where the offense charged is homicide, a plea of guilty to a lesser offense of frustrated orattempted homicide, may not be allowed, since the fact of death cannot be reconciled with the

plea of guilty to frustrated or attempted homicide. Homicide necessarily produces death, whilefrustrated or attempted homicide does not.4

SEC. 5. when accused pleads guilty to a capital offense. - If the accused pleads guilty to acapital offense, the Trial Prosecutor must present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused andthe precise degree of his culpability. This is mandatory.

B. Matters covered by pre-trial; effects of pre-trial agreement and pre-trial order-Rule 118, secs. 1,2,4

Section 2.Pre-trial agreement.All agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and

3Department of Justice Circular No.55, dated 31 July 1990.

4Amatan vs. Aujero 248 SCRA 511(1995).


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counsel,otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused. The agreements covering thematters referred to in section 1 of this Rule shall be approved by the court. (sec. 4, cir. 38-98)

Section 4.Pre-trial order. After the pre-trial conference, the court shall issue an orderreciting the actions taken, the facts stipulated, and evidence marked. Such order shall bind the

parties, limit the trial to matters not disposed of, and control the course of the action during thetrial, unless modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice. (3)

-SC AM No. 03-1-09-SC, Part B (7), (8), (9), (10)

-People v. Abelita, 210 SCRA 446 (1992)

FACTS: Sgt. Wilfredo V. Mendoza and his co-policemen, Pfc. Reynaldo Castil, Pat. JesusEchavez, Cpl. Eduardo Sablay and Police Aide Diosdado Tubig, were patrolling the fishportcompound at Northbay Boulevard, Navotas, when they were approached by a man who told

them that a certain Toto was selling marijuana at Gilmar Beerhouse inside the fish port. He(Mendoza) then planne to have Toto arrested and asked the informant if he could by Marijuanafrom Toto. Upon the informants agreement, he gave the former a P10.00 bill on which heplaced his initials. The policemen and the informant proceeded to Gilmar Beerhouse and thelatter entered inside while the policemen positioned themselves outside, where they could seethe interior of the beerhouse through the spaces of its walls. The policemen saw the informantapproach Toto, who was occupying a table at a distance of four arms length from where theywere positioned, and they saw the informant give the marked P10.00 bill to Toto. Soon enough,Toto handed the informant a small white package. Upon exchange, the policemen entered thebeerhouse and met the informant, who handed the package to Sgt. Mendoza. Pfc. Castilrecovered from Toto a blue can of Bonna Milk, which contained 37 sticks of Marijuana and the

marked P10.00 bill. The small white package handed by the informant to Sgt. Mendoza, on theother hand, contained three sticks of Marijuana. Toto, whom Sgt. Mendoza identified in opencourt as herein accused, was brought to the Navotas Police Station for investigation. The 40sticks of Marijuana were brought to the NBI for laboratory examination, which confirmed thecontents as Marijuana.

Toto was charged with violating RA 6429 for selling Marijuana, in which he pleadednot guilty. His counsel filed a motion to dismiss, saying they never presented the informant incourt. However, it was denied and he was sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of P20000for the cost of the suit.ISSUE: Whether or not the Forensic Experts testimony was essential for Totos conviction.HELD: No.RATIO DECIDENDI:

The failure of the prosecution to present the forensic expert who prepared the NBI report toestablish the corpus delicti of the crime is not fatal. The records show that the accused and hiscounsel admitted the due execution and genuineness of the evidence submitted by the

prosecution witness Forensic Chemist Felicisima M. Francisco during the pre-trialconference. Thereafter, the trial court issued an Order dated April 11, 1990 whichembodied the manifestation of the prosecution that since the accused and his counseladmitted the genuineness and due execution of the forensic chemist report, it is


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dispensing with the testimony of the forensic expert. The trial court's Order dated April 11,1990 is hereunder quoted as follows, to wit:

Order

xxx xxx xxx

At the pre-trial today, the accused and his counsel admitted the due executionand genuineness of the evidence submitted by the prosecution witness ForensicChemist Felicisima M. Francisco, to wit:

Exh. ALetter request dated February 16, 1990

Exh. BReport No. DDM90-265

Exh. CThree sticks of marijuana wrapped on a white paper

Exh. DEmpty Bona Milk can

Exh. D-1Thirty seven (37) sticks of marijuana cigarettes

In view thereof, the prosecution manifested that it is dispensing with thetestimony of F.M. Francisco and it is presenting two (2) witnesses. The defensecounsel manifested, he will present two (2) witnesses. (p. 26, Record) (Brief forthe Plaintiff-Appellee, p.6)

As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the accused-appellant must have overlooked hisadmission as to the due execution and genuineness of the forensic chemist report when he

raised this first assignment of error.

We agree with the position of the Solicitor General that if the matters taken up and embodiedin the pre-trial order were not in accordance with what was really stipulated upon, thenaccused-appellant should have interposed his objections earlier or as soon as the pre-trial orderwas issued. Hence, it is clear that upon the accused-appellant's failure to interposeobjections, the facts stipulated during a pre-trial conference and embodied in a pre-trialorder bind the parties.

-People v. Uy, 327 SCRA 335 (2000)

During the pre-trial, the parties agreed on a joint trial and to dispense with the testimony ofForensic Chemist Loreto F. Bravo. They also agreed on the marking of the exhibits for theprosecution.

At the trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses SPO1 Alberto G. Nepomuceno, Jr., whoacted as the poseur-buyer, and SPO4 Eddie Regalado, another member of the buy-bust team, asrebuttal witness. The defense presented RAMON and Maritess Puno.


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We now address RAMONs contention that since the NBI Forensic Chemist did not testify, hisfindings that the specimens submitted to him were indeed shabu and weighed so much, arehearsay and leave the evidence of the prosecution insufficient to convict. RAMONs premise isthat at the pre-trial he did not waive the Forensic Chemists testimony but only "stipulated onthe markings of the prosecutions evidence." Indeed, the records disclose that during the

pre-trial, conducted immediately after the arraignment on 21 November 1995, RAMON,duly represented by counsel de parteAtty. Gerardo Alberto,[33]and the prosecutionstipulated on the markings of the prosecutions exhibits, and agreed to dispense with thetestimony of Forensic Chemist Loreto F. Bravo.Thereafter the trial court issued a JointOrder, which embodies its ruling granting the motion of the trial prosecutor for the joint trialof the two cases and the withdrawal of the motion for reinvestigation by RAMONs counsel;RAMONs plea of not guiltyin each case; and the proceedings at the pre-trial. As to the latter,the Joint Order states:

During the pre-trial, prosecution and defense agreed to stipulate on themarkings of the following prosecutions exhibits, thereby dispensing will thetestimony of Forensic chemist Loreto E. Bravo, to wit:

Exhibit "A" - Letter request;

Exhibit "B" - Preliminary report;

Exhibit "B-1" - Signature of forensic Chemist;

Exhibit "C" - Final Report for Chemical cases Nos.16199 and 16200;

Exhibit "C-1" - Signature of Forensic Chemist in said

Report;

The five (5) plastic bags with markings containingmethamphetamine hydrochloride with a total weight of 401grams will be marked as follows:

Exhibit "D" - Plastic bag with letter A;

Exhibit "D-1" - Plastic bag with letter B;

Exhibit "D-2" - Plastic bag with letter C;

Exhibit "D-3" - Plastic bag with letter D;

Exhibit "D-4" - Plastic bag with letter E;

Exhibit "E" - One (1) plastic sachet withmethamphetamine hydrochloride with a total weight of 5.8564grams;
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/mar2000/128046.html#_ftn33http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/mar2000/128046.html#_ftn33http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/mar2000/128046.html#_ftn33


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Exhibit "F" - Another Final report for CriminalCase No. 16201;

Exhibit "F-1" - Signature of Chemist in said report;

The three (3) pieces of plastic scoop and two (2) plastic containerswith markings containing residue of methamphetaminehydrochloride will be marked as follows:

Exhibit "G" - Plastic scoop color white;

Exhibit "G-1" - Plastic scoop color blue;

Exhibit "G-2" - Plastic scoop color tangerine;

Exhibit "H" - Selecta ice cream plastic cup;

Exhibit "H-1" - White plastic container;

By agreement of the prosecution and defense, set the presentation of evidence forthe prosecution on January 8, 9, 11 and 15, 1996; whereas evidence for thedefense will be on January 18, 22 and 25, 1996, all at 1:30 oclock in theafternoon.[34]

It may at once be noted that neither RAMON nor his counsel made express admission that thecontents of the plastic bags to "be marked" as Exhibits "D," "D-1," "D-2," "D-3," "D-4," and"E" contain methamphetamine hydrochloride. That RAMON agreed to dispense with thetestimony of Forensic Chemist Bravo may not be considered an admission of the findings of

Bravo on the contents of the plastic bag. Strictly, from the tenor of the aforequoted portion ofthe Joint Order, it is clear that RAMON and his counsel merely agreed to the marking ofthe exhibits, and the clause "thereby dispensing with the testimony of forensic ChemistLoreto E. Bravo" must be understood in that context.

Even granting for the sake of argument that RAMON admitted during the pre-trial thatExhibits "D" to "D-4," inclusive, and Exhibit "E" contained methamphetaminehydrochloride, the admission cannot be used in evidence against him because the JointOrder was not signed by RAMON and his counsel. Section 4 of Rule 118 of the Rules ofCourt expressly provides:

SEC. 40. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. No agreement or admission made or entered duringthe pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writingand signed and his counsel.[35]

Put in another way, to bind the accused the pre-trial order must be signed not only byhim but his counsel as well. The purpose of this requirement is to further safeguard therights of the accused against improvident or unauthorized agreements or admissionswhich his counsel may have entered into without his knowledge, as he may have waived
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Exhibit "E" is the 5.84 grams of shabu which was the subject ofthe buy-bust operation;

Exhibit "F" and "F-1", final report and signature of the forensicchemist in Crim. Case No. 16201-MN, showing the specimenexamined to be positive for shabu;

xxx

We likewise offered these exhibits as part of the testimony of thewitness or witnesses who testified thereon Your Honor.[39]

In addition to the foregoing admission by RAMON of the prosecutions exhibits, helikewise never raised in issue before the trial court the non-presentation of ForensicChemist Bravo. RAMON cannot now raise it for the first time on appeal. Objection toevidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to rejectthe evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection he

cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal.[40]The familiar rule in this jurisdiction isthat the inadmissibility of certain documents upon the ground of hearsay if not urged before thecourt below cannot, for the first time, be raised on appeal.[41]In U.S. v. Choa Tong[42]where thedefense counsel did not object to the form or substance of a laboratory report that the specimensubmitted was opium, the Court ruled that "[t]he objection should have been made at the timethe said analysis was presented."

C. Effect of non-appearance-Rule 119, sec. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 & 10

Section 3.Non-appearance at pre-trial conference. If the counsel for the accused or theprosecutor does not appear at the pre-trial conference and does not offer an acceptable excusefor his lack of cooperation, the court may impose proper sanctions or penalties. (se. 5, cir. 38-98)

-Fule v. CA, 162 SCRA 446 (1998)

This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of respondent Appellate Court, whichaffirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Lucena City, Branch LIV, convictingpetitioner (the accused-appellant) of Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (The BouncingChecks Law) on the basis of the Stipulation of Facts entered into between the prosecution and

the defense during the pre-trial conference in the Trial Court. At the hearing of August 23,1985, only the prosecution presented its evidence. At the subsequent hearing on September 17,1985, petitioner-appellant waived the right to present evidence and, in lieu thereof, submitted aMemorandum confirming the Stipulation of Facts. The Trial Court convicted petitioner-appellant.

On appeal, respondent Appellate Court upheld the Stipulation of Facts and affirmed thejudgment of conviction. Hence, this recourse, with petitioner-appellant contending that the
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Honorable Respondent Court of Appeals erred in the decision of the Regional Trial Courtconvicting the petitioner of the offense charged, despite the cold fact that the basis of theconviction was based solely on the stipulation of facts made during the pre-trial on August 8,1985, which was not signed by the petitioner, nor by his counsel. In Sec.4 of the Rules onCriminal Procedures:

SEC. 4. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. No agreement or admission made or enteredduring the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing andsigned by him and his counsel. (Rule 118) [Emphasis supplied]

Having been effective since January 01, 1985, the above rule is applicable.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the omission of the signature of the accused and his counsel, as mandatorily

required by the Rules, renders the Stipulation of Facts inadmissible in evidence.

HELD:

YES. Judgment of respondent Appellate Court is REVERSED and this case is hereby orderedRE-OPENED and REMANDED to the appropriate Branch of the Regional Trial Court ofLucena City, for further reception of evidence.

RATIO:

By its very language, the Rule is mandatory. Under the rule of statutory construction, negativewords and phrases are to be regarded as mandatorywhile those in the affirmative aremerely directory (McGee vs. Republic, 94 Phil. 820 [1954]). The use of the term shall furtheremphasizes its mandatory character and means that it is imperative, operating to impose a dutywhich may be enforced (Bersabal vs. Salvador, No. L-35910, July 21, 1978, 84 SCRA 176). Andmore importantly, penal statutes whether substantive and remedial or procedural are, byconsecrated rule, to be strictly applied against the government and liberally in favor of theaccused (People vs. Terrado No. L-23625, November 25, 1983, 125 SCRA 648).

The conclusion is inevitable, therefore, that the omission of the signature of the accused and hiscounsel, as mandatorily required by the Rules, renders the Stipulation of Facts inadmissible inevidence. The fact that the lawyer of the accused, in his memorandum, confirmed theStipulation of Facts does not cure the defect because Rule 118 requires both the accused and hiscounsel to sign the Stipulation of Facts. What the prosecution should have done, upondiscovering that the accused did not sign the Stipulation of Facts, as required by Rule 118, wasto submit evidence to establish the elements of the crime, instead of relying solely on thesupposed admission of the accused in the Stipulation of Facts. Without said evidenceindependent of the admission, the guilt of the accused cannot be deemed established beyondreasonable doubt.


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Consequently, under the circumstances obtaining in this case, the ends of justice require thatevidence be presented to determine the culpability of the accused. When a judgment has beenentered by consent of an attorney without special authority, it will sometimes be set aside orreopened (Natividad vs. Natividad, 51 Phil. 613 [1928]).

PART EIGHTTRIAL

I. Order and Procedure

A. Notice of trial; Speedy and continuous trial-Rule 119, secs. 11,21

Section 11.Order of trial.The trial shall proceed in the following order:

(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge and, in the proper case,the civil liability.

(b) The accused may present evidence to prove his defense, and damages, if any, arisingfrom the issuance of a provisional remedy in the case.

(c) The prosecution and the defense may, in that order, present rebuttal and sur-rebuttalevidence unless the court, in furtherance of justice, permits them to present additionalevidence bearing upon the main issue.

(d) Upon admission of the evidence of the parties, the case shall be deemed submitted for

decision unless the court directs them to argue orally or to submit writtenmemoranda.

(e) When the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint orinformation but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified.(3a)

Section 21.Exclusion of the public.The judge may, motu proprio, exclude the public from thecourtroom if the evidence to be produced during the trial is offensive to decency or publicmorals. He may also, on motion of the accused, exclude the public from the trial, except courtpersonnel and the counsel of the parties. (13a)

-RJCL, sec. 29

Section 29.Care of Child in Youth Detention Homes or Rehabilitation Centers. - The child inconflict with the law who has been transferred to a youth rehabilitation center or youthdetention home shall be provided with a healthy environment. If the child is placed under thecare of the provincial, city or municipal jail, the child shall be provided with adequate quarters


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separate from adults and prisoners of the opposite sex depending on the age, sex, sexuallifestyle, and such other circumstances and needs of the child.

Cf. RA 8493, sec. 7 [par.2]; DOJ-NPS Manual, Part IX

PART IX. TRIAL

Purpose: mete out justice : protect the innocent and convict the guilty

SECTION 1. Definition of trial. - A trial is a judicial examination of the claims at issue ina case which are presented by the prosecution and defense to enable the court to arrive at ajudgment pronouncing either the guilt or innocence of the accused.2

SEC. 2. Concept of trial. - The object of a trial is to mete out justice, and to convict theguilty and protect the innocent. Thus, the trial should be a search for the truth and not a

contest over technicalities and must be conducted under such rules as will protect theinnocent.3

SEC. 3. Expeditious prosecution of criminal cases filed with the courts. -The Trial Prosecutorshall always be prepared to conduct the prosecution with his witnesses who shall besubpoenaed well in advance of the scheduled trial dates.4 No postponement of the trial or otherproceedings of a criminal case shall be initiated or caused by the Trial Prosecutor except ininstances where the postponement is occasioned by the absence of material witnesses or forother causes beyond his control or not attributable to him.

SEC. 4. Order of presentation of witnesses. -

a) The order in the presentation of witnesses will be left to the discretion ofthe Trial Prosecutor. However, the prosecutor should take into considerationthe order of events as established by the evidence of the prosecution.b) Witnesses who will testify for the first time shall be afforded theopportunity to be advised to observe criminal proceedings in court to help themovercome their anxiety, excitement and tension.

SEC. 5. Preparation of formal offer of exhibits. - The Trial Prosecutor shall safely keephis documentary and other physical evidence and prepare a list thereof in the order theyhave been marked as exhibits, identifying each by letter or number, describing it briefly,

and stating its specific purpose or purposes.

SEC. 6. Defense evidence. -

a) Before reception of evidence for the defense starts, the Trial Prosecutor shall askfrom the adverse counsel the number of witnesses he intends to present.

b) If the names of defense witnesses are disclosed the Trial Prosecutor shall elicitfrom reliable sources the whereabouts of these witnesses, their moral


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character,,background, reasons for testifying andrelationship with the accused,among other things, to enable him to have a clear view of the defense of theaccused.

SEC. 7. Discharge of accused to he state witness. - When two or more persons are jointly

chargedwith the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting itscase, the court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent sothat they may be witnesses for the state provided the court, after hearing, is satisfied that:

a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whosedischarge is requested.b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper

prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused,aswhen he alone has knowledge of the crime, and not when his testimony wouldsimply corroborate or otherwise strengthen the evidence in the hands of theprosecution;

c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated inits material points. This is an indispensable requirement because it is anotorious fact in human nature that a culprit, confessing to a crime, is likely toput the blame on others rather than himself. Thus, even though a court may getthe statement of a discharged accused that other particular persons wereengaged in the crime, it is unsafe to accept without corroborating evidence, hisstatements concerning the relative blame to be attached to different members ofhis gang;~d)Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty.The mere fact that thewitness sought to be discharged had pleaded guilty In the crime charged doesnot violate the rule that the discharged defendant must not "appear to be the

most guilty. And even if the witness should lack some of the qualificationsenumerated by Sec. 9, Rule 119, his testimony will not, for that reason alone, bediscarded or disregarded.10 The ground underlying the rule is not to let acrime that has been committed go unpunished; so an accused who is not the mostguilty is allowed to testify against the most guilty, in order to achieve thegreater purpose of securing the conviction of the more or most guilty and thegreatest number among the accused permitted to be convicted for the offensethey committed.'' However, although an accused did not commit anv of thestabbing, it is a mistake to discharge him as a state \witness where he is boundin a conspiracy. All the perpetrators of the offense bound in conspiracy areequally guilty.

e) Said accused has not at anv time been convicted of any offense involvingmoral turpitude.

Evidence adduced in support of the discharge sha11 automatically form part of the trial.If the court denies the motion for discharge of the accused as state witness, his sworn statementshall be inadmissible in evidence.

SEC. 8. Witness protection. - An accused who is discharged from an information or


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criminal complaint in order that he may be a state witness as provided in the preceding sectionmay, upon his petition, be admitted to the Witness Protection Program under R.A. No.6981,"The Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act" if he complies with the other requirementsof said Act.

SEC. 9. Other persons who may avail of the Witness Protection Program. -The following mayalso avail of the Witness Protection Program under R.A. No.

6981:

a) Any person who has witnessed or has knowledge of or information on thecommission of a crime and has testified or is testifying or is about to testifybefore any judicial or quasijudicial body, or before any investigating authority,Provided, that:

1. the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony asdefined under the Revised Penal Code or its equivalent under special

laws;ii. histestimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points;iii. he or any member of his family within the second civil degree of

consanguinity or affinity is subj

part seven - criminal procedure

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