patents and the emerging markets of latin america...

Denis Borges Barbosa

Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro

Federal University of Rio de Janeiro – Institute of Economics (PPED)

PATENTS AND THE EMERGING MARKETS OF LATIN AMERICA – BRAZIL

BIBLIOGRAPHY

• VARIETIES OF LATIN-AMERICAN PATENT OFFICES: COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES

• Ana Célia Castro, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Ana María Pacón, Universidad Catolica del Peru, Mônica Desiderio, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro

• To be published in Knowledge Governance: Reasserting the Public Interest, Anthem.

• Patricia Porto, Denis Borges Barbosa Advogados, April, 2012 - Report on theBrazilian Patent System from the perspective of a local researching industry, prepared for the FARMABRASIL - Associação dos Laboratórios Farmacêuticos Nacionais de Pesquisa –Farma Brasil –

• FILOCHE Geofroy. Biodiversity Fetishism and Biotechnology Promises in Brazil: From Policy Contradictions to Legal Adjustments . The Journal of World Intellectual Property (2012) Vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 133–154.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

• SHADLEN, Kenneth C.The Political Contradictions of Incremental Innovation: Lessons from Pharmaceutical Patent Examination in Brazil , Politics & Society 2011 39: 143 originally published online 5 April 2011, http://pas.sagepub.com/content/39/2/143

• Borges Barbosa, Denis and Lessa, Marcus, The New Brazilian Government Draft Law on Plant Varieties (Or… How a Developing Country May Want to Enhance IP Protection Because It May Actually Need It) (June 6, 2009). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1415406

WHAT TO DISCUSS

• 1. A BRIEF BRAZILIAN HISTORY OF PATENTS

• 2. PATENTS FULFILL A LOCAL DEMAND?

• 3. THE PATENT OFFICE IS A SOURCE OF PROBLEMS

• 4. THE THEORY OF CAPTURE OF PTOS

• 5. THE CHANGING LOCAL REQUIREMENTS

• 6. NA ELUSIVE LONG TERM PERSPECTIVE

FROM A DIVIDED STANDPOINT TO A LOCAL-CENTERED PERSPECTIVE

WHO STARTED THE GAME & THE SECONDROUND

• 1809 The King João VI of Portugal, fleeing from Napoleon, established the capital of the worldwide Portuguese Empire in Rio. On April 23, 1809, he issued a Royal decree establishing just for Brazil (and Uruguay) a Patent Law

• It is the 4th oldest Patent Law in the world – Brazil is an original signatory of the Paris Convention

• 1930, Brazil decided to cease updating the Paris Convention, holding to the 1925 version, deemed to be the last pro-developmental one. It just adopted the most recent version on 1990, when TRIPs was in the verge of reaching its 1995 wording.

• 1961 UN General Assembly, Professor Guerreiro Ramos, Brazilian delegate asks: Does the Patent System has any purpose to the development countries?

A TURN AROUND

• The new Industrial Property Code of 1996

• Renunciation of the TRIPs 2005 term for introducing pharmaceutical patents

• The pipeline provision: retroactive protection for already published patents

• Proposed by USA to TRIPs, rejected by consensus

• Many TRIPs plus provisions …. not required by TRIPs

• A complete set of new laws covering all IP rights

BUT A DIVIDED STANCE

FILOCHE GEOFROY. BIODIVERSITY FETISHISM AND BIOTECHNOLOGY PROMISES IN BRAZIL: FROM POLICY CONTRADICTIONS TO LEGAL ADJUSTMENTS.

• A divisive Governmental Position towards IP: some ministries in favor of pipeline, many other contrary to all TRPs-plus devices

• In the pharma/chemical field, the 1996 law was inordinately open to (foreign) patent-holder interests.

• In the biotechnological area, however,

Brazilian legal policy, with regard to both ABS and IPR, has been dictated by fear and political initiative. The fear is that of losing control of genetic resources and natural substances during the course of innovation processes: these are frequently long, involve many different stakeholders and make it difficult to identify the original natural items in the final outcome. The political initiative has involved reaffirming both Brazil’s sovereignty over biodiversity with regard to third countries and the pro-eminence of state authorities with respect to its own citizens.

BUT A DIVIDED STANCE

FILOCHE GEOFROY. BIODIVERSITY FETISHISM AND BIOTECHNOLOGY PROMISES IN BRAZIL: FROM POLICY CONTRADICTIONS TO LEGAL ADJUSTMENTS.

• As a country that is home to immense terrestrial biodiversity in the Amazon region, the Cerrado and the Mata Atllântica, Brazil positioned itself as a southern nation during CBD negotiations. Biopiracy has been roundly condemned), even if the uncertain meaning of this term, its approximate use and the widely differing situations it is used to denounce mean that it is not always easy to clarify matters or find solutions that are satisfactory for all parties.

• At the same time, during negotiations on intellectual property—whether in the forum of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) or that of the World Trade Organization (WTO)—Brazil asserted its refusal to grant intellectual property rights (IPRs) such as patents to naturally occurring substances, even though rights on cultivars such as those defined by International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) have been recognized nationally since 1997.1 This refusal to grant patents stemmed from a number of factors: ethical grounds (nature is not a commodity), technological grounds (genes and their properties were not invented by mankind) and socioeconomic grounds (preventing the enrichment of some with nothing given in return).

TRIPS AND AN UNREQUITED PROMISE

• The fact that in some limited areas, especially in the public health sector, TRIPs has actually been used to achieve balance and poise do not change the overall issue. The unilateral thrust which TRIPS was meant to end just increased. It is reasonable to guess whether, in absence of TRIPs, the situation would be the same.

A very important aspect of this post-TRIPs era, by the way, is the denial of the multilateral promise. We were assured that unilateralism was over. All of us were members of the club, after paying the steep entrance fee. It was not so.

• Borges Barbosa, Denis , "Counting Ten for TRIPs: Author Rights and Access to Information - A Cockroach's View of Encroachment" (November 4, 2005). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=842564

THE FTAA

• Brazilian position in IP: everything we had to bargain, was bargained in TRIPs.

• Let´s stick to TRIPs• However, a considerable number of US and European FTAs

advance further than TRIPs

• Borges Barbosa, Denis , "TRIPs art. 7 and 8, FTAs and Trademarks" (March 9, 2006). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=889107

BRAZIL & ARGENTINA: THE DEVELOPMENTAGENDA

• Proposed the inclusion of developmental concerns at the WIPO´s ambiance

• No prior rule or exercise to such purpose since the 1981 shipwrecking

• Guerreiro Ramos revival

• Bearing in mind the internationally agreed development goals, includingthose in the United Nations Millennium Declaration, the Programme ofAction for the Least Developed Countries for the Decade 2001-2010, theMonterey Consensus, the Johannesburg Declaration on SustainableDevelopment, the Declaration of Principles and the Plan of Action of thefirst phase of the World Summit on the Information Society and the SaoPaulo Consensus adopted at UNCTAD XI;

• (1) The General Assembly welcomes the initiative for a developmentagenda and notes the proposals contained in document WO/GA/31/11.

MODE THAN A DIVISIVE ENVIRONMENT, A PLURALITY OF EMERGING ACTORS

• New Federal and state specialized courts bring closer review to patent-holders' interests.

• Civil Society NGOs and local industry’s Trade Associations (generics, seed producer´s) file suits and act as Amici Curiae in large amount of patent cases,

• Since 1999 Ministry of Health starts peer review of patent issued through ANVISA (Brazilian FDA); Patent Office fights such control. Ministry of Health issues Compulsory License of HIV drugs after three failed exercises.

MODE THAN A DIVISIVE ENVIRONMENT, A PLURALITY OF EMERGING ACTORS

• From 2007 Ministry of Health starts inducing alternative suppliers by public purchase, relying inter alia in the Dependent Patents Compulsory License statute utilizing the huge purchasing power. From December 2010, Public Contract Law changed to consider local technology development as alternative to lower prices (margin).

• Rio’s Federal Courts and Brasilia’s Superior Federal Court (STJ) align against extension of patent terms or misapplication of TRIPs before the Jan. 2001 treaty application.

• Federal Policy in IP matters centralized in the GIPI (Interdepartmental IP Steering Group); Br Patent Office does not follow directives.

• Since 2004 a new Innovation Law multiplies the number of individual and institutional interested actors in a patent system leaning towards local technology. Significant tax sparing statutes directed to local technology, patents and PVPs.

PATENTS AS A LOCAL DEMAND

HTTP://WWW.INPI.GOV.BR/IMAGES/STORIES/DOWNLOADS/PDF/INPI_RELATORIO_COMUNICACAO.PDF

PATENTS: FOREIGN VS. LOCAL DEMAND


USE BY LOCALS OF THE INTERNATIONALSYSTEM (WIPO STATISTICS 2011)

• Brazil

• 2007 – 398

• 2008 – 472

• 2009 – 492

• 2010 – 488

• 2011 - 572


PATENTS BY KIND OF APPLICANT


PATENTS BY STATE OF THE UNION


AS COMPARED TO THE PVP IN BRAZIL - COTTON

NATIONAL SERVICE FOR THE PROTECTION OF CULTIVARS – DANIELA AVIANI

AS COMPARED TO THE PVP IN BRAZIL – BEANS(NOT SOY)


AS COMPARED TO THE PVP IN BRAZIL -WHEAT


AS COMPARED TO THE PVP IN BRAZIL –SOYBEANS


PLANT VARIETIES: RELEVANCE OF NEW PROTECTION

DO PATENTS SERVE BRAZIL?

• A POSSIBLE ANSWER:

• PATENTS ARE NOT AS YET A MAJOR INTEREST FOR LOCAL INDUSTRIES AND RESEARCHERS

• BUT long term or recent EXPERIENCES AS THE BRAZILIAN LOCAL TECHNOLOGY OF AGRICULTURE MAY INDICATE A CHANGE OF INTEREST

THE BRAZILIAN PATENT OFFICE AS A SOURCE OF PROBLEMS

RAISING NUMBER OF EXAMINERS


DECISIONS IN PATENT CASES


THE PTO’S BACK LOG AS A MAJOR PROBLEM

SILVA, JOÃO GILBERTO SAMPAIO & BORSCHIVER, SUZANA. CRITÉRIOS PARA A AVALIAÇÃO DOS SISTEMAS PATENTÁRIOS. REVISTA DA ABPI, Nº JAN,/FEV. 2009, P. 30 À 41.

• The deposits of applications for patents have increased significantly each year and the number of examiners for these examinations are performed with quality and precision does not grow with demand.

• In 2010 the number of patent applications at the INPI was nearly 60,000.*In 2010 were 163,000 pending patent applications analysis, of which 57,000 may be filed, leaving a number of 106 000 patent applications pending of analysis. In that year were examined almost 16,000 patent applications and granted 3,620 patents *

• In 2010 the PTO had 273 patent examiners in all areas. The country's demand in 2010 was at least 300 examiners.

• In 2011, the expected period for examination of a patent was 8.3 years.


DBBA REPORT

• From this situation arise three scenarios:

• a) The PTO chooses to shorten the allowed time for examination of each patent, without increasing the number of examiners. In this case, , the quality of the examination will be compromised, since the examiner will not have time to do research necessary to assess the novelty and inventive activity in the case of patent - PI and novelty and inventive step in the case of the utility model patent -MU.

• b) The PTO chooses not to increase the number of examiners, neither to compromise the quality of the examination. In this the backlog will stay growing.

• C) The PTO chooses to increase the number of researchers and their expertise in each area, choosing also to create a system of assessment and administration of the examination of these patents more efficiently.


DBBA REPORT

• The problems caused by the scenario:

• In situation A, an examination performed poorly, with no quality of the research requirements for granting a patent, particularly with respect to the techniques to verify the novelty and inventive activity in the case of PI and novelty and inventive step in the case of MU - will result in a weak patent. This patent is easy object of administrative proceedings for nullity and judicial action or declaration of nullity.

• For investors, foreign or domestic this means increased uncertainty.

• The scenario complicates the confidence of investors as they increase their demand for patent applications within and outside the country.


DBBA REPORT

• Problems posed by Scenario B:

•

In situation B, investors will also undergo considerable economic and legal uncertainty, since, as we know, investments and even marketing the product or process subject of the patent frequently occurs before his granting.

• This uncertainty is two-pronged: once granted, the effects of the patent in Brazil are retroactive, essentially going back to the date of the publication of the filed application. Therefore, third parties have to take considerable risks when assessing the impact of the new patent in their manufacturing, as the content of the application may vary from its initial form.

• Furthermore, Brazilian Law assures a minimum term of 10 years post-grant, when the PTO is responsible for the delay. Therefore, the economic effect of the back-log is an increased deterrence towards third parties, affecting competition. Many observers indicate that for this reason the back-log is not fiercely opposed by the major players.

• In the case of patents abandoned by delay in examination and loss of interest in protecting, the negative scenario for Brazil is no different, considering the arguable withdrawal of investments in production and marketing of their products and processes in the country, specially in this case by local players.

•


DBBA REPORT

• Scenario C:

•

C is the option that we believe may is the most appropriate solution to the problem, affording more quality patents granted in the country. As would be expected, the strategic plans of the PTO indicates that as the preferable option, as discussed below.


DBBA REPORT

• In early 2011, the PTO indicated its intent to solve the backlog of issues by 2015. The agency wants to achieve the goal and grant patent quality in a maximum of 04 years from the date of your deposit.

• In September 2011, at the congress of the ABPI, the President of the PTO indicated such measures:

� Increased operational efficiency of patent examination sector with the creation of an electronic system for patent applications;

� hiring more examiners with masters and doctorate in the specific areas of examination.

� Update the guidelines and procedures for the examination of patents.

� Ongoing training and development of patent examiners.

� Direct most of the national applications to the PCT system whenever possible.

� Automatically eliminate formally unsuitable applications though the electronic filing system.


DBBA REPORT

• In September 2011, at the congress of the ABPI, the President of the PTO indicated such measures:

� Give priority to examination of applications for areas considered as strategic to the economic and technological development of the country.

� Increase technical cooperation with other patent offices aiming at internationalization of the exams.

� Strengthen the system of subsidy to technical examination and post-award as a way to grant patents with higher quality and greater legal certainty.

� Provide information and propose changes to the PCT system to increase the quality of technical information (international search and examination) offered by the international authorities to national and regional offices of patents.

� Revision of the rules of the Directorate of Patents, in particular, aspects related to processing of applications for patents and patent applications for utility model, strongly differentiating the two procedures.

THE PTO’S BACK LOG AS A MAJOR PROBLEM• The Report of the Federal Controller Court of Sep. 21, 2011 (Ata 39/2011) – however,

does not feel this target as attainable:

• In terms of productivity, we have that in 2009, the PTO had 223 patent examiners working in the area of granting patents, according to the Statistical Bulletin of the PTO. These 223 examiners, in turn, were able to assess 15,077 cases in 2009, leading to a per capita production of 68 cases per examiner / year. In turn, in 2010 the number of examiners increased to 273, and these were able to assess 19,471 cases, representing 71 cases per examiner / year.

•

For this reason, the simulations presented in Table 15, was considered for the years 2010 and 2011, an average of 70 cases per examiner / year as an indicator of productivity. Was used as a premise that productivity increased to 80 cases per examiner / year for the years 2012 to 2015 as a result of the measures of "Project Backlog Solution Patent." This increased productivity is also quite optimistic, representing a growth of approximately 15% in the productivity of patent examination, and it is known that it takes on average three years for new examiners reach the productivity levels of the most experienced.

• Clearly, therefore, it takes a very optimistic scenario for the purpose of reducing the period of analysis procedures for the granting of patents for less than four years is achieved by the year 2015. This finding, however, belies the measures that have been taken by the PTO to control the backlog of patents. The Federal Government should, as far as possible, grant the PTO granted the means necessary for it to increase its capacity to process analysis.

THE THEORY OF CAPTURE OF PTOS

THE THEORY OF CAPTURE OF PTOS• Brazil

• Continuity of institutional policy

• Some of the interviewed examiners noted institutional changes in INPI’s last two administrations. In general, these changes have been regarded as positive: the increase in the number of examiners,; improvements in the career pathway, greater concern with training and qualification, establishment of the Academy on Intellectual Property, the reduction in the backlog of trademarks and some patent classes, greater administrative efficiency, concern with upgrading the agency’s infrastructure, and, with the exception of biotechnology, chemistry and pharmaceuticals, where most disagreements occur, there is a consensus on the improvement of patent-examination processes. However, a few subjects point to a relaxation of “rigor” in the exams, despite resistance by the more senior staff.

• Another interesting result related to institutional changes and continuity was that INPI’s institutional culture is more influenced by EPO than by USPTO. On the other hand, a significant number of examiners declared that TRIPS had exerted little influence on the patent-exam process itself.

VARIETIES OF LATIN-AMERICAN PATENT OFFICES, CASTRO AND ALLII


• In INPI’s case, and this is of extreme relevance, the examiner’s own rate of patent appears to vary greatly and is, normally low, around 25 percent, with considerable variation according to patent class.

• In general, Brazilian informants considered the patent exam to be rigorous. However, when asked if obtaining a patent is difficult, the typical answer is that obtaining a patent is not difficult. This contradicts both the idea that the exam is extremely rigorous and the finding that each examiner has a low rate of issuing patents, which seems to be the case. One explanation that would reconcile this apparent paradox is the general lack of nonobviousness or the inventive step in patent applications.

• Definitely no pressure exists for patent examiners to issue patents. The pressure is to perform the exam in time and fulfill the quotas set by the agencies, which in the majority of cases are extremely difficult to reach.

• Nor did the examiners report conflicts with applicants. In reality, patent conflicts are resolved by INPI at another stage



• Brazil

• Main problems found

• The main problem found is the physical infrastructure and the high level of backlog in patent examinations. The interviewed examiners noted that the ongoing need for technological upgrades, given the acceleration of progress in the state of technology, has been a difficult issue to solve. The generalist style of examiners hampers the solution of specific problems in leading-edge technological subareas.

• There is also a need to regularize criteria and to create greater internal coordination among departments. No proper context exists to discuss the different criteria for patent examination and concession.


THE CHANGING LOCAL REQUIREMENTS

BRAZILIAN AGRIBUSINESS: A CASE OF LOCALIZATION, NOT HOMOGENEITY

• Embrapa’s success, was due to a “focused” approach, which meant addressing specific problems caused by local issues (e.g climate, soil) or sanitary concerns, that allowed the development of varieties suited to the cerrado and the “boom” in grain production

REAL IMPACT OF PVPS ON THE BRAZILIAN AGRICULTURE

• According to academic studies on the effect of introduction of the 1997 Statute, the impact of PVP on specific crops did not entail a significant cost increase for farmers.

• This was apparently due • to the significant presence of farmer cooperative research units,

which do not operate on a royalty-return rationale, and also

• to the ample availability of protected varieties supplied by informal sources or non-protected varieties of market-acceptable products

• BUT – Southern farms fight fiercely against Monsanto Patentson account of high royalties and denial of breeder’s rights.


• The efficiency of regional innovation has allowed Brazilian institutions to shine, contrary to the global trend.

• Plant varieties developed locally have accounted for most of the Brazilian grain market.

• Embrapa alone was responsible for 44% of recommended soy varieties for the 2007/2008 crop.

• Brazilian institutions jointly accounted for 72% of same.

NEW GOVERNMENT DRAFT OF PVP IN BRAZIL (2009) , BARBOSA AND LESSA


• According to the USDA, success factors in Brazilian

• “(…) First, substantial undeveloped, but highly viable land remains available for agricultural production.

• Second, a strong domestic demand from a large, increasingly urbanized population is bolstered by an outlook for steady per capita income growth.

• Third, rapidly growing domestic poultry and pork sectors represent a robust source of demand for grains and protein meals.

• Finally, an extensive national agricultural research network that already has a proven track record, especially with soybeans, of successful varietal development and adaptation to tropical conditions.

•

SCHNEPF, Randall D.; DOHLMAN, Erik and BOLLING, Christine. Agriculture in Brazil and Argentina: Developments and Prospects for Major Field Crops. In: Agriculture and Trade Report No. (WRS013), Economic Research Service, USDA, 85 pp, December 2001. Available at: http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/wrs013/ . p. 61.


COMMINGLING WITH THE BEASTS• In recent years, Embrapa’s relations with

multinational enterprises acting in the Brazilian marketplace have been, if anything, most amicable.

• The frequent joint R&D efforts are testament to a clearly collaborative and not contentious mood

• In the initial years of the present Federal Administration, Embrapa’s attitude towards its multinational competitors was met with acerb criticism from some leading members of the ruling Worker’s Party (which despite its name is not a conventional leftist political organization).


THE REEXAMINATION OF THE BIOTECHNOLOGYBALANCE OF INTERESTS

FILOCHE GEOFROY. BIODIVERSITY FETISHISM AND BIOTECHNOLOGY PROMISES IN BRAZIL: FROM POLICY CONTRADICTIONS TO LEGAL ADJUSTMENTS

• The call for private rights to innovations appears to go hand in hand with a concern to make scientific and technological commons available in the long term against a backdrop of global competition in the field of biotechnology. There is sometimes convergence between the positions of researchers, entrepreneurs and the State on this question.

• Public-sector researchers wish to see common rights restricted to Brazilian researchers and their private-sector (or indeed foreign) partners. Companies are aware of the interest of creating partnerships with universities that have significant human resources and tools that are frequently expensive.

• The shared aim, which resonates with the desire of the States to develop national research and industry, is thus to benefit from each other’s innovations and face up to those foreign stakeholders with which no partnerships exist.

THE REEXAMINATION OF THE BIOTECHNOLOGYBALANCE OF INTERESTS

FILOCHE GEOFROY. BIODIVERSITY FETISHISM AND BIOTECHNOLOGY PROMISES IN BRAZIL: FROM POLICY CONTRADICTIONS TO LEGAL ADJUSTMENTS

• Brazil is currently seeking to restructure these bundles of rights on nature-based innovations as part of legislative reforms that are in all likelihood imminent. In the political, scientific and industrial circles in question, the debate currently comes down to the following question: is an absence of patentability of naturally occurring life forms compatible with development of the biotechnology sector?

• If Brazil allows IPRs on natural elements in the near future, the question will then become the following: in what conditions will appropriation of innovations and natural elements through patents make it possible to develop the national biotechnology sector, and how will this redefine relations between the public and private benefits of biodiversity? ABS is not simply an issue when it comes to North-South relations on the international scene: it may also unite or divide within a single nation.

THE HEALTH AUTORITY REEXAMINATION OFPATENTS AND CHANGING LOCAL INTERESTS

SHADLEN, KENNETH C.THE POLITICAL CONTRADICTIONS OF INCREMENTAL INNOVATION: LESSONS FROM PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT EXAMINATION IN BRAZIL

• As indicated, new policy instruments include an array of financial incentives and rewards designed to encourage public and private R&D, patenting, licensing, and university–industry linkages. Actors have responded to these incentives.

• From 2000 to 2005, private sector R&D expenditures relative to sales (turnover) has increased by 211 percent, resident patent applications have increased by 48 percent, and Brazilians’ international, peer-reviewed, scientific publications have increased by 89 percent.

• Again, by international standards Brazil’s scores on such science, technology, and innovation indicators are low, but what is most important for a dynamic and political approach to coalitional change are the changes over time: growth in innovation-related investments and capabilities yield enlarged constituencies for policies that reward such activities.

THE HEALTH AUTORITY REEXAMINATION OFPATENTS AND CHANGING LOCAL INTERESTS

SHADLEN, KENNETH C.THE POLITICAL CONTRADICTIONS OF INCREMENTAL INNOVATION: LESSONS FROM PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT EXAMINATION IN BRAZIL

• In the case here, Brazilian law specifies that pharmaceutical patents are to be examined in a particular way, but Brazilian practice differs substantially; and the reasons for this are located in the changes to social structure that have eroded the coalition that underpins this particular institution.

• As firms have developed new capabilities for incremental innovation, their preferences vis-avis patents on incremental pharmaceutical innovations have changed. Yet in addition to firms acquiring new capabilities, it is also the case that new firms with additional capabilities have entered the sector and influenced patterns of political mobilization. My research suggests that both forms of transformation have occurred in Brazil; firms’ preferences have changed, and firms with one set of preferences have come to replace firms with different preferences, but the relative balance of these two processes remains unclear. Differentiating between the two processes is methodologically difficult.

PATENTS IN BRAZIL: NO CLEAR ROOM TO MANEUVER

HOWEVER, DEFINITION OF A LONG TERMNATIONAL INTEREST IS NOW ELUSIVE

• Biotechnology and biogenerics – There are clear but recent and not fully developed claims in favor of a less defensive design of the patent system –FARMABRASIL and researcher-based lobbies.

• Plant Variety – EMBRAPA and Ministry of Agriculture lobbying for na enhanced Plant-Variety Regime – contradicted by Planters and NGO interests.

• Pharma & other research – Federal Government starts in 2012 a new Federal-sponsored entity to bring to new areas the sucess of EMBRAPA.

• Exploration by BNDES of corporate and other devices that could prevent precipitous denationalization of prime-research local corporation recievingFederal funds

• M & A in by international players in some relevant pharma, agricultural and other areas.

• THE DANGER OF CAPTURE OF LOCAL INTEREST RHETORICS BY NON LOCAL INTERESTS

Denis Borges Barbosa

[email protected]

http://denisbarbosa.addr.com

A member of the

Brazilian Institute of Intellectual PropertyFor academics and researchers in IP

http://www.ibpibrasil.org

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