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Party System Formation and Coalition Buiding Patterns in RomaniaPosted by admin on November 19, 2010

 Corneliu Bjola

The quality of its mechanism of political representation constitutes a critical indicator for the well-being of any

democratic system. Drawing on two alternatives models of social differentiation, cleavage formation, party

identification and political competition, this article examines the changes that have occurred within the Romanian

political landscape, in the last decade, with regard to the structures, patterns, and dimensions of party competition. In

addition, the emerging patterns of coalition formation resulting from the 1996 and 2000 Romanian general elections

are explored on the basis of several formal theories of coalition building, including policy-blind and policy-oriented, as

well as non-spatial and “cabinet equilibrium” theories. Factor analysis and cross-tabulation of the 1996 and 2000

Public Opinion Barometers provide empirical support for the first objective, while the Winset software package fulfils

the same function for the second.

Introduction[1]Ten years after the breakdown of the communist system, the process of democratic consolidation in Central and

Eastern Europe (CEE) remains an ongoing task,[2] save for a few noticeable exceptions such as Hungary, Czech

Republic, Slovenia and Poland. Besides well-known economic and political legacies,[3] the quality of the democratic

process experienced by the countries from the region has been critically determined by the evolving patterns of

political representation, which in general lines have been characterized by five tendencies: electoral and party

fragmentation, high levels of volatility and protest voting, return of the “post-Communist” vote and parties, growing

electoral abstention, and declining confidence in parliaments and political parties.[4]When compared with their West

European counterparts, the emerging CEE party systems pose even more striking differences in terms of their degree

of social differentiation, as well as the context and patterns of party competition.

With regard to this last set of issues, the academic debate is basically divided along two alternative lines. The first

one argues that the legal-institutional uncertainty, adversarial pattern of political competition, volatile civil society, as

well as the lack of structural cleavages, party programs, and stable party structures contribute little, at least in the

short term, to the formation of stable and politically efficient multiparty systems in the CEE countries.[5] The other

side contends that the social and institutional legacy of the communist regime accounts largely for the evolving

patterns of social differentiation, cleavage formation, party identification and political competition.[6] Building on the

Lipset-Rokkan two-stage model of political cleavage formation, the supporters of this “sequential-legacy” alternative

consider the material and cognitive orientations acquired and handed down by civic actors to subsequent generations

to shape decisively all patterns of political mobilization, rational bargaining, and the construction of the new decision-

making procedures.[7]

The aim of this paper is to moderate the current debate from an empirical point of view. Both the “sequential-legacy”

and the “instability” arguments will be therefore challenged on the basis of theories of party system formation and

competition. Using as a reference point Kitschelt’s analysis of the 1990 CEE “founding elections,”[8] the paper will

examine the changes that have occurred within the Romanian political landscape, in the last decade, with regard to

the structures, patterns, and dimensions of party competition. On the other hand, several formal theories of coalition

building, including policy-blind and policy-oriented,[9] as well as non-spatial[10] and “cabinet equilibrium”

theories[11] will be tested against the new Romanian patterns of coalition formation resulting from the 1996 and 2000

general elections.

The paper will be structured as follows: the first part will provide a theoretical background on party system formation

and coalition building theories; the second section will identify empirically the main structural cleavages and

competition dimensions, and will map accordingly the corresponding mean positions of political parties; the third

section will apply formal theories for exploring the new patterns of coalition building in Romania. For the

methodological part, the paper will rely on two components: factor analysis and a cross-tabulation of the 1996 and

2000 Public Opinion Barometers (POB)[12] will be used for discerning the dimensions of political competition and the

corresponding mean positions of political parties, while the Winset software package[13] will be set up to examine the

evolving patterns of coalition formation.

Theories of Party Competition and Coalition Formation

Structural Cleavages and Party SystemsThe general theoretical view on party system formation encompasses two levels. At the macro-level, three main

variables  – political parties, institutions and the electorate, together with two additional categories – international

context and political isomorphism – have been considered to account primarily for the formation of party systems.

[14] At the micro-level, the main variables have been “deconstructed” along several dimensions: structural cleavages,

institutional provisions (i.e., electoral laws), dimensions and patterns of competition. For several good reasons,

structural cleavage theories have enjoyed the lion’s share of academic attention. In a pioneering study, Lipset and

Rokkan proposed a model of translation of structural cleavages into party politics based on a two-dimensional space

defined by territory and ideology.[15] Hence, the formation of the modern Western party system was considered to be

the result of three ‘critical junctures”: the Reformation, the National, and the Industrial revolutions.[16]Moreover, the

authors concluded the Western European party systems of the 1960s reflected, with a few exceptions, the cleavage

structures of the 1920s formed after the extension of the universal suffrage.[17] The “freezing” hypothesis has been

contested on various grounds, most importantly for not being able to distinguish between the space of voter

identification and the space of party competition, as well as for not paying enough attention to the substantive

changes and realignments taking place at the level of structural cleavages.[18]

More recently, Herbert Kitschelt advanced a new model of cleavage and party system formation in CEE, based on

voters’ position within the social structure, their ideological outlook and their predisposition to get involved in political

action.[19] The new model proposed three dimensions for structuring party alternatives: the definition of citizenship

(exclusive-nationalist vs. inclusive-cosmopolitan), the type of collective decision-making (authoritarian vs. libertarian),

and the pattern of distribution of resources and capabilities (interventionism vs. free-market).[20] On the other hand,

the assumption that structural cleavages are automatically translated into politics has been reformulated in more

flexible terms. Accordingly, the “freezing” hypothesis may actually refer not to the party alignments but to the structure

of political competition, with one side preferring to maintain a specific dimension of competition, while the other trying

to establish a wholly different one in order to become more competitive.[21] These two perspectives entail different

hypotheses with regard to the structure of the political space. The first model considers parties’ and voters’ positions

to be roughly the same and hence, it describes a political space characterized by a consensual or consociational

structure of competition, with stable blocks or coalitions, dominated by preference-accommodating parties which

compete primarily on the traditional left-right dimension. By problematizing the relation between social and political

cleavages, the second model suggests an adversarial structure of competition, with unstable blocks, structured by

preference-shaping parties, which compete into a multidimensional space.

Government Coalition Theories

The two analytical perspectives on structural cleavage and party system formation have also inspired several

government coalition theories. Policy-blind theories consider political parties to be primarily driven by office-seeking

motivations.[22] Consequently, the process of coalition bargaining represents merely a zero-sum game with a fixed

prize in terms of cabinet portfolios.[23] The winning coalitions can be predicted, apparently with a moderate margin of

success,[24] on the basis of three methods: theminimal winning (MWC1), minimum winning coalition (MWC2) and the

bargaining proposition (BP). All of them share the idea that coalitions shed surplus members but differ with regard to

the selection criteria. MWC1 assumes winning coalitions to preserve only those members whose presence is

absolutely necessary for having not a technical but a working majority. MWC2 considers not the number of actors but

that of parliamentary seats to be the critical criteria, while BP concentrates on the smallest number of actors.

[25] Besides its relatively unsatisfactory power of prediction, policy-blind theories are open to critique on several other

grounds: first, that parties do not always have a clear and hierarchical order of preferences; secondly, that parties are

not indifferent to matters that put their political credibility at risk, and thirdly, that political parties are not unitary actors

and accordingly, the position and influence of various factions should be also acknowledged.

Policy-oriented theories are more sensitive to these problems and argue that the sheer logic of elections force

political parties to be not only office but also policy motivated and to seek policy compatibility when entering into

coalitions.[26] In comparison with policy-blind theories, policy-oriented bargaining strategies include a left-right

ideological dimension. Thus, the minimal connected winning strategy (MCW) predicts the formation of “ideologically

connected” coalitions, which means that all members of the coalition are ideologically adjacent to each other on the

left-right dimension.[27] Surplus majority coalition strategy (SMC) discards “dummy” members namely, parties that

contribute nothing to the legislative majority but have a policy position between that of the two other coalition

members, and hence, it introduces the minimum number of parliamentary seats as a supplementary constraint.

[28] While more attuned to the political dynamics of the coalition bargaining process, policy-oriented theories do not

properly account for situations when the internal dynamic of political parties becomes salient, or when the competition

takes place in a multidimensional space.

Non-spatial theories are more general in scope and try to avoid the multidimensional trap affecting both policy-blind

and policy-oriented theories. This move comes of course at a price represented by the diminished empirical value of

the model. The integrated theory of democratic party government proposes the following set of hierarchical rules for

government formation: first, in case of an immediate threat to the democratic system, all significant pro-system

parties will join the government; secondly, in case of no regime threat, there is a single party government or a

majority coalition formed on the basis of the left/right ideological dimension; thirdly, in case of no salient left-right

dimension, the largest party forms a single/minority government or enters into a minimal winning coalition with other

pro-system parties.[29]

The multidimensional issue is better dealt with by the cabinet equilibrium (Winset) theory. The model assumes the

following: first, the bargaining process preceding the formation of the government is both office and policy motivated;

secondly, the resulting coalition government is a dimension-by-dimension median cabinet (DDM) that is, one in which

portfolios over each policy dimension are allocated to the parties with the median legislator on that dimension; thirdly,

DDM is an equilibrium cabinet only if it has an empty winset, both in policy and portfolios terms, or in other words, if

no political actor has the ability or the incentive to bring down the coalition government.[30] Based on this set of

assumptions and using status quo as the starting point, the Winset model initiates a searching process for alternative

equilibrium cabinets that takes into account a theoretically unlimited number of dimensions of competition. It

concludes that equilibrium cabinets are more likely to include a strong party that is, a party that can veto all coalitions

within its winset based on its median position.[31] Having briefly presented the main theoretical views on structural

cleavage formation, party competition and government coalition bargaining, the article will proceed in the next section

to examine the empirical value of these theories from a Romanian perspective.

Structural Cleavages and Political Divides in Romania

In light of the Lipset-Rokkan and Kitschelt theories, the “sequential-legacy” and “instability” models mentioned at the

beginning of this article color two different sets of hypotheses. The first one argues that the new Romanian party

system has been to a large extent shaped by the social and institutional legacy of the communist regime and

therefore, it presents not only entrenched structural cleavages but also relatively constant competition lines and

stable coalition patterns. The second model claims that the emerging Romanian party system exposes no deep

structural cleavages, but volatile dimensions of competition and high political instability due to lack of institutional and

political constraints on the parties. One way to sort out this dilemma is to assess the underlying preferences of the

voters and to observe the corresponding clustering patterns around social divides. The general picture of the existing

political divides can be then assembled by comparing the mean positions assumed on these social divides by the

political parties.[32]

In absence of clear data about the salience of the issues, the resulting political divides will be approximated as

dimensions of political competition even though they might be only dimensions of political identification.[33] From an

empirical point of view, the most appropriate statistical instrument for this type of operation is factor analysis, which

allows not only for the reduction of the number of relevant variables, but also for the identification of the latent

structures underlying public preferences.[34] Hence, the October 1996 and November 2000 POB surveys will be

applied to a principal axis factoring method (PAF), Varimax rotated, which is usually recommended for explaining the

maximum amount of variance in the data while yielding the minimum number of relevant factors.[35] Besides the

retained factors and observed variables, the results presented in Table 1 include several important statistical

indicators, such as the KMP measure of homogeneity of variables, factor loadings, the eigenvalue and the explained

variance.[36]

 

The 1996 General Elections

The social cleavages present in the 1996 Romanian general elections are shown in Table 1, while the positions

assumed by the political parties on these issue dimensions are compared in Table 2.

 

Table 1: Social divides in the Romanian electorate (1996): Varimax rotated matrix of issue opinions

Number of Cases = 2019

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy = 0.825

Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring (3 factors).

Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

Rotation converged in 5 iterations.

Factors*

I. Collectivism vs. Liberalism

II. Nationalism vs. civic tolerance

III. Corruption

Once elected, the Parliament must not be criticized. .61772

Market economy is a good thing. .61699

The well being of everyone depends on the state. .59656

Only those who take risks can win. .57499

People should follow customs as guidance in life. .56746

EU membership is useful for Romania. .56678

Willingness to get a second job. .56463

NATO membership is useful for Romania. .55265

One party system is a good thing. .55076

The state is entitled to intervene in the activity of the press.

.53809

A low paid but secured job is better than a high paid but unsecured one.

.52610

The state is entitled to intervene in the activity of political parties.

.51251

Police is corrupted .83321

Justice is corrupted .82348

Local administration is corrupted .77891

The school system is corrupted .74537

Labor market institutions are corrupted .70302

The health system is corrupted .63562

.80318

Distrust of ethnic Hungarians .79271

Distrust of Rroma .73792

Distrust of Jews .66216

Distrust of ethnic Germans

Eigenvalue 5.73 3.34 2.53

Explained variance % 16.4 9.6 7.2

Cumulative % 16.4 26 33.2

* Note: Only factors greater that .50 are displayed.

Six years after the demise of the communist regime, the factors underlying the political preferences of the Romanian

electorate confirmed Kitschelt’s analysis of the 1990 CEE “founding elections.”[37] However, the main lines of political

cleavage did not follow exactly the same patterns. The nationalist dimension separated from the mainstream

collectivist-liberal axis, while the authoritarian – libertarian political cleavage lost steam in favor of the economic

distribution axis. Hence, after running on different tracks in 1990, the authoritarian – libertarian and interventionist –

free market dimensions, clustered in 1996 into the same factor: liberalism vs. collectivism. Finally, the corruption

factor, accounting for about 7 percent of the explained variance, represented another important dimension of party

competition, especially in the context of the 1996 general elections, and sent an important but unfortunately not well-

acknowledged signal concerning one of the main polluting sources hindering the Romanian democratization process.

The results validate partially both the “sequential-legacy” and the “instability” argument. The 1996 configuration of the

Romanian political space reproduced in general lines the structural cleavages of the 1990 founding elections and

reinforced a stable but adversarial two-block structure of party competition. On the other hand, structural cleavages

were competed on different and highly volatile dimensions, while party alignments remained open to further

fragmentation. As shown in Table 2, all political parties were fairly sensitive to the three dimensions.

 

Table 2: Positions of political parties on issue dimensions in the 1996 general elections[38]

 

Liberalism  vs. Collectivism Civic tolerance  vs. nationalism Corruption

Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD

CDR            3 1.41 2.75 0.70 0.62 2.77

UDMR 3.87 0.83 1.75 1.38 2.5 1.30

USD 0.25 2.12 1 0.32 -2.62 2.06

PDSR -2.87 1.8 -2.87 0.72 -3.75 2.12

PUNR -1.02 2.13 -3.45 0.32 -2.87 2.29

PRM -4.62 0.24 -4.87 0.25 -3.87 2.41

Spread of partiesa

3.29

1.42

8.49

3.16

0.61

7.62

2.61

2.15

6.37

Average SD

Distance between extreme parties

Note: a) SD of mean factors scores.

However, the structure of the political competition exposed serious signs of instability. The “spread” among parties,

measured by the standard deviation of the mean factor scores, as well as the distance between the extreme parties

had large values, especially on the first and second factor. Both indicators suggest an unevenly fragmented political

spectrum shaped by political alignments that were not sharply defined along clear programmatic options, and

structured by competition dimensions that did not fully capture the underlying structural cleavages. Hence, the

subsequent fragmentation of the political space (i.e., ApR, UFD, ANCD) came at no surprise. On the other hand, the

position coefficients of the political parties, clustering around distinctly positive and negative values, hinted to the

evolving adversarial, two-block pattern of competition, mediated by a weak center. Fig 1 provides an illustration of the

structure of the 1996 political space along the first two dimensions of competition.[39]

Fig. 1 Structure of party competition (1996)

Liberalism (+5)

Collectivism (-5)

Nationalism

(-5)

Civic tolerance (+5)

   UDMR

CDR

USD

  PDSR

PUNR

PRM

 

 

The 2000 General Elections

Kitschelt’s model of CEE structural cleavages remained basically in place in the 2000 Romanian general elections,

but the dimensions of political competition as well as the structure of the party alignments changed again.

 

Table 3: Social divides in the Romanian electorate (2000): Varimax rotated matrix of issue opinions:

Number of Cases = 1775

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy = 0.814

Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring (3 factors).

Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

Rotation converged in 5 iterations.

Factors*

Alienation vs. state authoritarianism

Collectivism vs. Liberalism

Social intolerance

Lack of confidence in public authorities and institutions:

        Government .746

        Parliament .724

        Presidency .650

        Justice .642

        Political parties .621

        Police .586

        Trade unions .491

        Local administration .491

        Banking system .471

General values:

       EU membership is useful for Romania. .710

       The state should intervene in the activity of the press. .693

       NATO membership is useful for Romania. .693

       The state should intervene in the activity of political parties. .665

       Market economy is a good thing. .620

       One party system is a good thing. .558

       People should follow customs as guidance in life. .433

       Only those who take risk can win. .418

People not wanted as neighbors:

       HIV infected 0.653

       Ex-convicts 0.607

       Homosexuals 0.583

       Alcoholics 0.536

       Rroma 0.530

       Jews 0.526

       Hungarians 0.475

Eigenvalue 5.633 3.015 2.767

Explained variance % 20.86 11.16 10.24

Cumulative % 20.86 32.03 42.28

* Note: Only factors greater that .40 are displayed.

In the context of a growing feeling of political alienation and widespread distrust of public authorities and institutions,

the collectivist-liberal cleavage lost significant ground in favor of a state authoritarian dimension. The political

instability bred by sterile and politically costly disputes between the various members of the previous governmental

coalition[40] stimulated a strong demand for political coherence and for reinforcing the authority of the state. The

collectivist-liberal cleavage has remained yet again an important dimension of political competition with the economic

distribution axis gradually taking precedence over the political components. Interestingly, views on EU and NATO

membership scored very high on this factor in both 1996 and 2000 elections, despite general expectations to have

them both integrated into a nationalist – cosmopolitan dimension or to have generated a new pro – skeptic European

integration axis. This observation simply confirms the negative effects on the general public produced by the

demagogic and uninformed postures of political parties and mass media on the subject of European integration.

Finally, the nationalist dimension was replaced with a more general but nevertheless highly disturbing social

intolerance factor that accounted for more than 10 percent of the explained variance.

Turning back to the “sequential-legacy” and the “instability” theses, the results of the 2000 elections followed the

same middle-road pattern from 1996: “frozen” structural cleavages, stable and adversarial two-block structure of party

competition, multi-dimensional and volatile political space, fragmented and fluid space of party alignments and

increasingly active preference-shaping parties. Table 4 displays the positions of political parties on the three

dimensions.

 

Table 4: Positions of political parties on issue dimensions in the 2000 general elections[41]

State authoritarianism Liberalism vs. Collectivism Social intolerance

Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD

PDSR 3.48 0.94 -2.48 2.42 1.35 2.23

PRM 4.29 0.34 -3.9 0.42 -4.52 0.31

PD -1.08 1.81 -0.54 0.62 3.51 0.48

PNL -1.09 1.89 2.7 0.34 2.46 1.22

UDMR -1.02 0.76 2.01 0.93 2.12 1.14

CDR 2000 -3.23 1.12 0.71 1.54 2.93 1.06

ApR -2.21 0.43 2.4 0.52 3.49 1.09

Spread of partiesa

2.86

1.04

7.52

2.55

0.97

6.60

2.81

1.07

8.03

Average SD

Distance between extreme parties

Note: a) SD of mean factors scores.

Compared with the 1996 elections, the “spread” among parties as well as the distance between the extreme parties

on the three dimensions are both slightly lower, except for the last factor. This suggests a slow tendency toward

political homogenization, but only within the same political blocks since the center of the political spectrum remains

largely empty. Hence, ApR and PNTCD (as successor of CDR 2000) are expected to strengthen their political

connections with PNL, while PD will probably try to gain credits from challenging both poles. These conclusions are

based on the assumption that the democratic character of the political system will not be challenged by the

monopolistic position held currently by PDSR within the political space. Given the absence of a functional checks-

and-balances institutional system, the lack of serious political constraints, the harsh intra-block competition between

PDSR and PRM, as well as the troubled past of PDSR, this assumption cannot be positively warranted and hence,

caution is strongly recommended. Fig 2 provides an illustration of the structure of the political space along the first

two dimensions of competition, following the November 2000 elections.[42]

Fig. 2 Structure of party competition (2000)

State authoritarianism (+5)

Collectivism (-5)

 Liberalism (+5)

UDMR

   PD

          PDSR

   PRM

   PNL

   ApR

 

          CDR 2000

 

Political instability  (-5)

 

Patterns of Coalition Building in Romania

Following the results of the 1996 general elections,[43] the new government was formed by a coalition composed of

CDR, UDMR and USD, which together controlled an absolute majority of seats, 200 out of 343, in the Chamber of

Deputies. After the November 2000 elections,[44] a minority government was formed by PDSR controlling only 155

seats out of 345 in the Chamber of Deputies and 65 seats out of 140 in the Senate but relying on the parliamentary

support of PRM and UDMR. By using as case study the political configuration of the Chamber of Deputies and the

Senate from 1996 and respectively 2000, Table 5 presents the wining coalitions predicted by policy-blind (MWC1,

MWC2 and BA) and policy-oriented (MCW, SMC) theories.[45] 

 Table 5: Winning coalitions in the Romanian elections

 

1996 Chamber of Deputies 2000 Senate

Minimal Winning CDR+ UDMR+USD (200) PDSR+PRM (102)

(MWC1) CDR+ USD (175) PDSR+PD (78)

CDR+ PDSR – Grand Coalition (213) PDSR+PNL (78)

PRM+PUNR+PDSR+USD (181) PDSR+UDMR (77)

CDR+PRM+PUNR+UDMR (184) PRM+PD+PNL+UDMR (75)

CDR+PRM+PUNR+USD (211) PDSR+PRM+UDMR (114)[46]

PDSR+PRM+UDMR+PNL (127)

Minimum Winning

(MWC2) CDR+USD (175) PRM+PD+PNL+UDMR (75)

PDSR+UDMR (77)

Bargaining Proposition

(BP) CDR+USD (175) PDSR+UDMR (77)

CDR+ PDSR – Grand Coalition (213)

Minimal Connected

(MCW) CDR+USD (175) PDSR+PRM (102)

CDR+ UDMR+USD (200) PDSR+PD (78)

PRM+PUNR+PDSR+USD (181)

Surplus majority

(SMC) CDR+USD (175) PDSR+PD (78)

 

The results are strikingly modest, only slightly better than by picking the winning coalition out of a hat. The rate of

success is 15% for the minimal wining coalition theory and around 30% for the minimal connected winning theory in

1996, and 14 and respectively 0% in 2000. The bargaining proposition as well as the minimum winning and surplus

majority coalition theories enjoy the least empirical support. The non-spatial theory does not perform much better

either. Under conditions of no regime threat and dominant left-right axis of competition, this theory gives sure a CDR,

USD coalition in 1996. Moreover, under conditions of regime threat (PRM) in 2000, the non-spatial theory excludes

PRM from any majority combination. Since this was not the case, the suspicion goes then against to what most of

these theories have in common, namely the assumption of a single dimension of competition.

            The Winset-cabinet equilibrium model tries to circumvent this pitfall by addressing simultaneously several

axes of competition. The results are cautiously encouraging. Applied to the 1996 three-dimensional space defined by

liberal-collectivism, civic tolerance and corruption, the Winset model reached basically the same conclusions like the

previous theories, namely that USD was a strong party, with an empty winset on all dimensions and CDR-USD was

the most likely winning coalition. To be fair, the equilibrium model allowed for something more. By calculating the

number of winpoints preferred by parties to any given coalition, the model indicated clearly the second likely coalition

to emerge was one that included CDR, USD and UDMR.[47] After investigating the distribution of party positions on

the three dimensions shaping the 2000 electoral context – state authoritarianism, liberalism vs. collectivism, and

social intolerance -, the Winset model predicted a PSDR-PRM coalition as the first choice, and PDSR-PD as the next

likely. UDMR’s status of “dummy party”, in the sense that its specific policy position and external image input

overtakes its contribution in terms of parliamentary seats, accounts primarily for the failure of all coalition building

theories to explain its participation in all coalitions since 1996.

Under these circumstances, the Winset model seems to outperform all the others, followed by the minimal wining

(MWC1) and minimal connected winning theory (MCW), and far behind by all the rest. This observation points to the

strengths and weaknesses of applying formal theories to multi-party politics, especially in the East Central European

context. From a “sequential-legacy” perspective, the quasi-stability of structural cleavages and patterns of party

competition recommend formal theories as an useful analytical instrument for making sense of the evolving models of

coalition building. From an “instability” viewpoint, weak political alignments, volatile dimensions of political

competition, and hectic political behavior make East European politics less amenable to the prescriptions of general

theories elaborated in Western context.

 

Conclusions

The goal of this article was twofold: first, to examine from a Romanian perspective, the validity of the “sequential-

legacy” and “instability” models, tested on the basis of theories of party system formation and competition. Second, to

explore the recent patterns of coalition building in Romania by using several formal theories, including policy-blind

and policy-oriented, as well as non-spatial and “cabinet equilibrium” theories. Factor analysis and cross-tabulation of

the 1996 and 2000 public opinion surveys partially validated both theses. The evolution of the structures, patterns,

and dimensions of party competition seems to follow, at least in the Romanian case, a middle-road configuration

characterized by:  “frozen” structural cleavages, stable and adversarial two-block structure of party competition, multi-

dimensional and volatile political space, fragmented and fluid space of party alignments and increasingly active

preference-shaping parties.

On the other hand, the application of formal theories to explaining the process of coalition formation in Romania

yielded modest results. Better adapted to working into a multi-dimensional environment, the Winset model of “cabinet

equilibrium” came the closest to explaining the new Romanian patterns of coalition building. Certain versions of

policy-blind and policy-oriented theories proved also instrumental. However, weak political alignments, volatile

dimensions of political competition and hectic political behavior make East European politics less amenable to the

prescriptions of general theories developed for the West European context. A more general conclusion of this study is

that rational-choice theories present serious limits and accordingly, other approaches that problematize the

motivations of the actors in normative of even symbolic terms (i.e., sociological institutionalism, “symbolic politics”)

may add value to our understanding of the process of formation of the new party systems in CEE.

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Laver, Michael and Kenneth A. Shepsle, Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in

Parliamentary Democracies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

Lipset, Seymour M. and Stein Rokkan, Party Systems and Voter Alignments (New York, The Free Press, 1967).

Lipset, Seymour M. and Stein Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments,” in P. Mair

(ed.) The West European Party System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989): 91-138.

Mair, Peter, Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997).

Nodia, Ghia, “How Different are Post Communist Transitions?” Journal of Democracy 7, no. 4 (October 1996): 15-28. 

Prazauskas, Algis, “Ethnic Conflicts in the Context of Democratizing Political Systems.”Theory and Society 20,

(1991): 581-602.

Riker, W. The Theory of Political Conditions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962).

Sharma, Subhash, Applied Multivariate Techniques (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1996).

Shin, Doh Chull, “On the Third Wave of Democratization.” World Politics 47, (October 1994): 134-170.

Smith, Gordon, “A Systems Perspective on Party System Change”, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1: 3 (1989):

349-363.

Tacq, Jacques, Multivariate Analysis Techniques in Social Science Research: From Problem to Analysis (London:

Sage Publications Ltd., 1997).

Valenzuela, J. Samuel, “Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings” inIssues in Democratic

Consolidation (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992).

Welsh, Helga, “Political Transition Processes in Central and Eastern Europe.”Comparative Politics (July 1994): 379-

394.

[1] For competent comments and useful suggestions I am grateful to Lucian Branea, Adrian Prioteasa, and the three anonymous reviewers of RJSP.

[2] For a well-argued introduction to the democratic consolidation literature see: Valenzuela, J. Samuel. “Democratic

Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings” inIssues in Democratic Consolidation (Notre Dame: University of Notre

Dame Press, 1992); Shin, Doh Chull. “On the Third Wave of Democratization.” World Politics 47, (October 1994):

134-170; Brown, Archie. Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States (London: Macmillan, 1977).

[3] More details on the “legacy problem” can be found in: Nodia, Ghia. “How Different are Post Communist

Transitions?.” Journal of Democracy 7, no. 4 (October 1996): 15-28;  Prazauskas, Algis. “Ethnic Conflicts in the

Context of Democratizing Political Systems,”Theory and Society 20, (1991): 581-602; Welsh, Helga. “Political

Transition Processes in Central and Eastern Europe,” Comparative Politics (July 1994): 379-394.

[4] Attila Agh, “The End of the Beginning: The Partial Consolidation of East Central European Party Systems,” in

Pennings, P. and Lane, J., Comparing Party System Change (London: Routledge, 1998), 202. 

[5] Peter Mair, Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), Chapter on

“What Is Different about Post-Communist Party Systems,” 175-198.

[6] Herbert Kitschelt, “The Formation of Party Systems in East Central Europe,” Politics and Society, 20: 1 (1992): 7-

50.

[7] Herbert Kitschelt, Z. Mansfeldova, R. Markowski, Gábor Tóka, Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition,

Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 13-14.

[8] H. Kitschelt, “The Formation of Party Systems in East Central Europe,” 38-40.

[9] M. Laver and N. Schofield, Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe(Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 1990), Chapters 1 and 5, 1-13 and 89-143.

[10] Ian Budge and Hans Keman, Parties and Democracy: Coalition Formation and Government Functioning in

Twenty States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 32-62.

[11] Michael Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle, Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in

Parliamentary Democracies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Chapters 4 and 5, 61-78, 90-119.

[12] The 2000 and 1996 POB are part of a research program carried out by the Foundation for an Open Society,

Bucharest; details available at www.osf.ro

[13] The Winset program represents the computer version of M. Laver and K. A. Shepsle’s formal theory of

government equilibrium.

[14] Gordon Smith, “A Systems Perspective on Party System Change”, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1:3 (1989),

349-363. 

[15] Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments,” in P. Mair

(ed.)  The West European Party System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989),  95-96

[16] Ibid., 124.

[17] Ibid., 134.

[18] H. Kitschelt, “The Formation of Party Systems in East Central Europe,” 11.

[19] Ibid., 11.

[20] Ibid., 12-14.

[21] P. Mair, Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretation, 14.

[22] For more details, see Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957)

and W. Riker, The Theory of Political Conditions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962).

[23] For an excellent overview of various approaches to policy-blind and policy-oriented theories see M. Laver and N.

Schofield, 91-103.

[24] The success rate ranges between 33 and 40%, with MWC1 outperforming the others and MWC2 producing the

least satisfactory results. Ibid., 96.

[25] Ibid., 92-95.

[26] M. Laver and N. Schofield, 97.

[27] Ibid., 97.

[28] Ibid., 98, 101.

[29] I. Budge and H. Keman, 44.

[30] M. Laver and K. A. Shepsle, 61-66.

[31] Ibid., 73, 107.

[32] H. Kitschelt et al., 265.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Jacques Tacq, Multivariate Analysis Techniques in Social Science Research: From Problem to

Analysis, (London: Sage Publications Ltd., 1997), 266-317, and Subhash Sharma, Applied Multivariate

Techniques, (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1996).

[35] Ibid., 128.

[36] The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of homogeneity (0.70 minimum level of statistical significance) is used

for assessing the appropriateness of PAF as a statistical method for the respective set of data; factor or pattern

loadings indicate how much of the value of the measured variables correspond to the underlying factors (strong

correlations fall within the -1 ÷ – 0.40 or 0.40 ÷ 1 range); the Eigenvalue approximates the degree to which an

underlying factor maps the variance of the values of the observed variables; the explained variance indicates the % of

variance in the observed variables captured by the underlying factors; for details see J. Tacque, 270 and S. Sharma,

116. 

[37] H. Kitschelt, “The Formation of Party Systems in East Central Europe,” 38-40.

[38] The most recommended method used as a proxy for approximating party positions when survey data of party

elites is not available is the expert opinion poll. For the purposes of this article, eight Romanian professionals with

relevant political expertise in the field were asked to evaluate the positions of the main political parties on a scale that

ranged from – 5  (economic protectionism, political authoritarianism, tolerance of corruption and nationalism) to +5

(free market, liberal democracy, intransigence to corruption, and civic tolerance); party acronyms stand for: CDR –

the Romanian Democratic Convention; UMDR – the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania; USD- The Social

Democratic Union; PDSR – the Social Democracy Party of Romania; PUNR – the Romanian National Unity Party;

PRM- The Great Romania Party.

[39] The bi-dimensional representation of the structure of party competition along the first two factors (liberalism vs.

tolerance) has obviously an illustrative character. The other two combinations available, liberalism vs. corruption and

tolerance vs. corruption, are equally legitimate. Space constraints and the difficulty of representing graphically a

three-dimensional structure of competition proved decisive in selecting only the two factors with the highest PAF

score for illustrating the arguments presented above.

[40] Political instability led to the resignation of two Prime Ministers and to almost a dozen governmental reshuffles in

less than three years.

[41] The positions of the political parties were estimated through an expert opinion poll in a similar manner to that

described in footnote 38. Party acronyms stand for: CDR 2000 – the Romanian Democratic Convention 2000; UMDR

– the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania; PD- The Democrat Party; PDSR – the Social Democracy Party

of Romania; PNL – The National Liberal Party; PRM – The Great Romania Party; ApR –The Alliance for Romania.

[42] The explanation for using only the first two factors as background illustration for the structure of party competition

is detailed in footnote 39.

[43] Mandates and percentage of the total vote for the Chamber of Deputies: CDR 122 (35,57%); PDSR 91 (26,53%);

USD 53 (15,45%); UDMR 25 (7,29%); PRM 19 (5,54%); PUNR 18 (5,25%); Minoritati 15 (4,37%); for details see

http://www.election.ro.

[44] Mandates and percentage of the total vote for the Senate: PDSR 65 (46,43%), PRM 37 (26,43%), PD 13

(9,29%), PNL 13 (9,29%), UDMR 12 (8,57%); for details see http://www.election.ro.

[45] Table 5 includes all possible coalition combinations as predicted by the five theories. The precise parliamentary

coalitions resulting from the 1996 and 2000 general elections are written in bold. The proportion of combinations

matching the “real” case gives the “rate of success” of each theory.

[46] Although neither PRM nor UDMR hold high-level cabinet positions in the current government, the PDSR-PRM-

UDMR coalition functions almost flawlessly at the parliamentary level. Besides the official cooperation agreement

between PDSR and UDMR, the level of political support given by PRM to the government has been stronger and

more constant than that enjoyed among the members of the 1996-2000 CDR-USD-UDMR government coalition.

[47] The CDR, USD, UDMR coalition generates only 4 winpoints, compared with 14 yielded by a PDSR, USD, PUNR,

PRM coalition or 26 in the case of a Grand Coalition (CDR+PDSR).