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  • 8/12/2019 Paying Girls to Delay Marriage? Preliminary Evaluation Findings from a Conditional Cash Transfer Program to Delay Marriage in India, Ann Warner

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    Paying Girls to Delay Marriage?

    Preliminary Evaluation Findings from aConditional Cash Transfer Program to Delay

    Marriage in India

    Ann Warner, Senior Gender and Youth Specialist, ICRW

    Throughout the Reproductive Life Course: Opportunities and

    Challenges for Empowering Girls and Women

    April 3, 2014

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    Apni Beti Apna Dhan (ABAD)

    Our Daughters Our Wealth

    Implemented by the

    Government of Haryana from

    1994 to 1998

    Intended to address declining

    sex ratio and early marriage First CCT to promote value of

    girls in India

    Protracted payments at 18

    and unmarried as condition

    for cashing out Rs 25,000

    bond

    Specific criteria for eligibility

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    Investigating the Impact of Conditional

    Cash Transfers (IMPACCT) Study

    1. Is CCT designed around a long-termincentive of a cash benefit for girls who

    delay their marriage successful:

    Does the program succeed in delaying

    age at marriage?

    Are girls enrolled in the program more

    likely to stay in school?

    Are attitudes of parents and girls in

    ABAD households indicative of more

    value and support for alternatives to

    marriage?

    2. How and why the process ofimplementation has led to ABADs success

    or failure; and

    3. Share results, lessons, implications, and

    evaluation tools with relevant

    stakeholders.

    ABAD Savings Bond

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    Quasi-Experimental, Mixed Method Design

    Quantitative Data:

    Survey data collected in two rounds: 2012/2013 and 2014*

    Elder cohort (Round 1 and 2): beneficiary girls born

    1994-1996 and matched with eligible non-bens

    Younger cohort (Round 1): beneficiary girls born 1996-

    1998 matched with eligible non-bens

    Mothers of bens and non-bens

    Universal household listing in 4 districts (n=9,466)

    Instrumental variable analytic approach

    Qualitative data collected to understand context, how girls are

    valued, and cashing-out process

    *Findings in this presentation only for Round 1

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    Percentage Currently in School

    Significant difference between beneficiary and non beneficiary status and girl

    being currently in school for both cohorts at p< 0.05.

    76

    91

    63

    87

    Elder cohort Younger cohort

    Beneficiary Non-beneficiary

    N=4 444N=5,694

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    A higher percentage of beneficiary girls tend to drop out after completing

    more years at school compared to non-beneficiaries (p

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    Support at Home

    A higher percentage of beneficiary girls get more than 3 hours to study at

    home compared to beneficiaries, and this difference was significant (p

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    Self-Efficacy for Education

    (among girls currently in school)

    Self-efficacy

    index for

    education

    Elder cohort Younger cohort

    Beneficiary Non-beneficiary Beneficiary Non-beneficiary

    Low 43.1 38.4 41 43.2

    Medium 26.6 30.8 29.7 26.2

    High 30.03 30.8 29.2 30.6

    Total 100 100 100 100

    N 1187 1123 998 1042

    p>0.05 p>0.05

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    Multivariate ResultsResults from Instrumental Variable Bivariate Probit Regression for Current Schooling

    VARIABLESCurrently in school

    Un-weighted Weighted Weighted & birth rank restricted

    Girl Age - 0.381** - 0.368** - 0.398**

    Wealth Quintile Second (Ref-Lowest) 0.024 0.02 0.055

    Wealth Quintile Middle 0.162** 0.121* 0.178*

    Wealth Quintile Fourth 0.200** 0.153* 0.158*

    Wealth Quintile Highest 0.361** 0.354** 0.359**

    Self-Efficacy Score 0.083** 0.078** 0.079**Rights Knowledge 0.072** 0.054** 0.057**

    GEMS Score 0.028** 0.027** 0.027**

    Beneficiary Status (Ref-Non-

    beneficiary) (marginal effect=0.23)0.848** 0.875** 0.571*

    Observations 9230 9230 7261

    After controlling for the following variables: Caste, Proportion of mother attended school,

    Mother attended school, Age at marriage of mother, Mother attended school X beneficiary

    interaction, Mean number of beneficiaries in village, secondary school - coeducational in

    village, secondary school - girls only in village, higher secondary school - coeducational in

    village, higher secondary school - girls only in village

    ** p

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    Insights from Qualitative Data I have to keep an eye on hershe goes to school (in the city), what does she do there? Does

    she sit in class or roam about in the market? Why else have I fixed an auto-rickshaw for her, I

    want that she gets out of school, sits in the auto and comes home straight away

    -SC beneficiary father, Sirsa

    If a girl is educated she will maintain the house well and will know what to do because she

    is knowledgeable. If she is educated then she will take care of everything.

    - BC Beneficiary father Hissar

    She can get a job) before or after marriage.. I will have nothing to do with that. She would

    have to run her house. What should I do? Whatever she would earn, would be for her house.

    - SC Beneficiary father

    I tell them to be independentto stand on their own feet. Now my daughter cannot do allthese work that I do? She can cook for 4 people and wash their clothes, and nothing more

    than that. So I want such that even if there is some problem in your life then you would be able

    to do something to earn money. Now look at me one should learn everything to adjust to the

    bad times.

    - SC Beneficiary Mother

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    Implications

    ABAD had a positive and significant impact on girls education.

    The role of education in girls lives and its potential to enhance

    their employability or economic agency is limited by prevailing

    gender roles and expectations.

    Need for more analysis in how CCTs can best influence

    attitudes and perceptions of girls value.

    Impact on age of marriage forthcoming later this year.

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    Acknowledgments

    ICRW IMPACCT Team, particularly Priya Nanda, Priya Das andNitin Datta

    USAID Office of Global Health / Population and Reproductive

    Health / Research Technology & Utilization, particularly Mihira

    Karra, Shefa Sikder and Aysha Asifuddin Government of Haryana, Department of Women and Child

    Development

    Population Foundation of India