PC 87/4 a)March 2002

PROGRAMME COMMITTEE

Eighty-seventh Session

Rome, 6-10 May 2002

Independent External Evaluation of the Special Programme for Food Security

Table of Contents

Pages

LIST OF TABLES 1

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 2

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS 3

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 6The Strengths of the SPFS 6Lessons From the Past 7Alternative Future Approach 8

1. INTRODUCTION 101.1 Terms of Reference of the Evaluation 101.2 Evaluation Arrangements and Modalities 101.3 Outline of the Report 11

2. BACKGROUND TO THE SPFS 112.1 Focus on Food Security 112.2 Development of the Programme Concept 12

3. SPFS PLANNING AND DESIGN 16

For reasons of economy, this document is produced in a limited number of copies. Delegates and observers are kindly requested to bring it to the meetings and to refrain from asking for additional copies, unless strictly indispensable.

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3.1 Role of the Partners 163.2 The Process of Project Formulation 18

4. SPFS IMPLEMENTATION AND MANAGEMENT 214.1 Role of FAO 214.2 Organization and Management Structures 274.3 Effectiveness of National Inputs 294.4 The Contribution of South-South Cooperation (SSC) 314.5 Role of Other International Agencies and Donors 35

5. PILOT FIELD OPERATIONS 375.1 Selection of Sites 375.2 Selection of Target Beneficiaries 385.3 Selection of Technologies for Testing 395.4 SPFS Approach 425.5 Results Achieved in Pilot Field Operations 46

6. OTHER GENERAL EFFECTS/ISSUES OF SPFS 506.1 Effect on National Policies 506.2 Effect on the Donor Community 516.3 Cost-Effectiveness of the National SPFS 52

7. OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF SPFS 537.1 Lessons From the Past 537.2 Strengths of the SPFS 557.3 Alternative Future Approach for the SPFS 55

ANNEX 1: SPFS EVALUATION TERMS OF REFERENCE 61

ANNEX 2: SUMMARY CURRICULUM VITAE OF SPFS EVALUATON TEAM MEMBERS 64

ANNEX 3: SUMMARY OF BASIC DATA FOR SPFS COUNTRY PROGRAMMES 67

SENIOR MANAGEMENT RESPONSE 69

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: LIFDC Countries in Membership of FAO by Region, Undernourishment, Income Per Caput and Participation in SPFS by Order of Entry into the Programme by Region

Table 2 Summary of Percentage Breakdown of Expenditure by Source of Funds 1995-2000 (Approximate Total US$ 60 Million)

Table 3 SPFS Funding from Extra-budgetary Resources (Disbursed through FAO; Showing Beneficiary Countries and Budgets Annually 2002)

Table 4: Status of SSC in Countries with Signed Agreements

Table 5: Evolution of the SPFS over time in Latin America as given by the FAO Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Evaluation Team wishes to express its appreciation to all those from FAO, Government and the International Community who were so helpful and willingly provided information and their thoughts on the SPFS during country visits. Similar thanks go to FAO senior and technical staff in Headquarters, Regional and Country Offices who were prepared to put at the mission’s disposal the time needed to respond on the many questions we raised. The Evaluation Service provided full support to the team and a particular vote of thanks goes to Heather Young, Nadine Monnichon and Anna Carroll for their tireless patience and effort in organizing contractual and logistic matters, and to John Markie and Daniel Shallon for accompanying the team during field visits.

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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

ADB Asian Development Bank

ADG Assistant Director General (FAO)

AfDB African Development Bank

AGEP Agence d'Exécution des Projets (Senegal)

AGSM Agricultural Marketing and Rural Finance Service (FAO)

AOAD Arab Organization for Agricultural Development

ASIRP Agricultural Services Innovation and Reform Project (Bangladesh)

ASPRODEB Association Sénégalaise pour la Promotions de Petits Projets à la Base (Senegal)

BADEA Arab Bank for Agricultural Development in Africa

BOAD West Africa Development Bank

BRAC Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee

CA Constraints Analysis

CADEF Comité d’Action pour le Département du Fogny (Senegal)

CGIAR Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research

CIAT International Centre for Tropical Agriculture

CIDA Canadian International Development Agency

CNCR Conseil National de Concertation et de Coopération des Ruraux (Senegal)

CNSA Conseil National de Securité Alimentaire (Senegal)

CORSINOR Development Corporation of the Northern Sierra (Ambuquí, Ecuador)

CRM Centro de Rehabilitación de Manabí (Ecuador)

CSA Cooperative Service Agreement (FAO)

CSS Counter Seasonal Strategy

DANIDA Danish International Development Agency (Denmark)

DFID Department for International Development (UK)

DG Director General (FAO)

DGIC Directorate general for International Cooperation (Netherlands)

DSA Daily Subsistence Allowance

ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States

FAO Food and Agricultural Organization

FAOR Food and Agriculture Country Representative

FECD Fondo Equatoriano-Canadiense de Desarrollo (Canada/Ecuador)FFS Farmer Field School (FAO)

FIVIMS Food Insecurity and Vulnerability Information and Mapping Systems

FONGS Fédération Nationale des Organizations Non-Gouvernementales

du Senegal (Senegal)

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GCP Government Cooperative Programme Trust Fund (FAO)

GNI Gross National Income

GNP Gross National Product

GRS Group on Strategic Thinking (Senegal)

HIPC Highly Indebted Poor Country

HQ Headquarters

ICRISAT International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics

IDA International Development Agency

IDB Inter American Development Bank

IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development

IFDC International Fertiliser Development Center (USA)

IFI International Financial Institution

IFSS International Fertiliser Supply Scheme

ILO International Labour Organization

INRA Institut National de Recherche Agronomique (France)

IPM Integrated Pest Management

IPNS Integrated Plant Nutrition System

IITA International Institute of Tropical Agriculture

IsDB Islamic Development Bank

JICA Japanese International Development Agency

LIFDC Low Income Food Deficit Country

MOA Ministry of Agriculture (Eritrea)

MOU Memorandum of Understanding

NGO Non-Government Organization

OXFAM Oxford Committee for Famine Relief

PFL Programme for Prevention of Food Losses

PMO Programme Management Office

PRA Participatory Rural Appraisal

SIDA Swedish International Development Agency (Sweden)

SLA Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (DFID, UK)

SOFI State of Food Insecurity in the World (FAO)

SPFS Special Programme for Food Security (FAO)

SPIC Special Programme Implementation Committee (FAO)

SPPD Support for Policy and Programme Development (UNDP)

SSA Special Services Agreement (FAO)

SSC South-South Cooperation

SWOT Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats

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TA Technical Assistance

TCA Policy Assistance Division (FAO)

TCDC Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (FAO)

TCI Investment Centre Division (FAO)

TCOM Field Programme Monitoring and Coordination Service (FAO)

TCO Field Operations Division

TCOS SPFS Coordination and Monitoring Service (FAO)

TCP Technical Cooperation Programme (FAO)

UDENOR Unitá para el Desarrollo del Norte (Ecuador)

UN United Nations

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNFIP United Nations Fund for International Partnerships (Turner Fund)

UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees

UNV United Nations Volunteer

USA United States of America

USAID United States Agency for International Development (USA)

UTF Unilateral Trust Fund

UJAK L’Union des Jeunes Agricultures de Koli Wirndé (Senegal)

UK United Kingdom

UMOA L’Union Monétaire Ouest Africaine (West Africa Monetary Union)

WARDA West Africa Rice Development Association

WB World Bank

WFP World Food Programme

WTO World Trade Organization

WUA Water Users Association

WIN Water Resources Management for Improved Household Food Security,

Nutrition and Health

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. The evaluation took place some six years after the initiation of country level work under the Special Programme for Food Security (SPFS). It was undertaken both in response to the request of the Governing Bodies and to meet internal management needs, and was designed with two aims, namely to: (a) provide a credible accountability report on the SPFS, containing in-depth analysis and assessment of its continuing relevance, effectiveness in achieving results and overall cost-effectiveness; and (b) consolidate and enhance the knowledge base of the SPFS for the future by learning from the experience to date, especially by identifying emerging issues, strengths and weaknesses.

2. A representative team of nine senior external consultants undertook the evaluation. The FAO Evaluation Service provided operational support. The Evaluation Team visited FAO Regional Offices and 12 SPFS countries from each of the developing regions (i.e. Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cambodia, China, Ecuador, Eritrea, Haiti, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Tanzania and Zambia). Countries for visits were selected by the Evaluation Team from a short-list prepared by FAO of 18 countries representing each of the developing regions. In the short-listed countries, work had been ongoing in the field for at least three years, with at least three of the four components of the SPFS. The criteria for selection ensured that the team would be evaluating on the basis of substantial experience in implementing the SPFS. Approximately one week was spent in each country by groups, which normally consisted of four consultants. In each country the team held discussions with government, donors and FAO staff, and visited a sample of project sites using a checklist of points based on the terms of reference to facilitate their enquiries with farmers, national development and SPFS staff.

3. Chapter 1 of the report is the Introduction which summarises the Terms of Reference and discusses evaluation modalities and arrangements. Chapter 2 provides some background on the SPFS covering the rationale for a focus on food security and the development of the programme concept. Chapter 3 deals with the planning and design of specific SPFS programmes and the actual process of project formulation. Chapter 4 is focussed on SPFS implementation and management and considers the role of FAO, the organization and management structures, the effectiveness of national inputs, South-South Cooperation and the roles played by other international agencies and donors. Chapter 5 is devoted to assessing the pilot field operations in terms of selection of sites, target beneficiaries and technologies for testing. The approach used in implementing the SPFS field initiatives is also discussed, as are the results achieved. Chapter 6 considers the impact of SPFS on national policies and the donor community, and also briefly deals with the cost effectiveness of SPFS initiatives. Finally, Chapter 7 brings together the material presented in the earlier chapters by summarising the background and strengths of the SPFS as viewed by the Evaluation Team. This provides the foundation, which the Evaluation Team uses to propose the approach to be applied in planning and implementing the SPFS in the future.

The Strengths of the SPFS

4. The Evaluation Team found that the SPFS, as it currently exists, has a number of positive characteristics or strengths, not always shared by other donor and FAO-supported programmes, that deserve recognition and can be usefully built on in designing and implementing future SPFS related initiatives. The major ones are as follows:

It helps nurture national consciousness about food security and in principle encourages national ownership and responsibility for SPFS related initiatives;

It focuses attention on agriculture, food and nutrition, which have often tended to be eclipsed in discussions concerning poverty, ignoring the fact that agriculture is the backbone of most poor countries, and certainly of the rural sectors, and that countries, not only individual households, often do not have adequate means to purchase food

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It recognises that the most efficient approach to dealing with food security issues is using a participatory approach and establishing linkages from the national to the field level. It also recognises that empowerment of people, particularly farming households, to seek information and options and to make and take responsibility for their decisions, as well as to influence outcomes, both individually and collectively, is facilitated/nurtured via the use of farmers’ organizations, groups and Farmer Field Schools (FFSs);

It recognises and gives priority to the fact that in many low productivity systems, water availability is the primary natural constraint to agricultural development. In doing so, it also recognises that solving the problem of food security requires a multifaceted and integrated strategy not only involving water management but also intensification and diversification;

The diversification activity to supplement household incomes during food insecure parts of the year is particularly important in helping women, who often shoulder the major responsibility for raising the children and feeding all household members; and

SSC initiatives have strong political and financial support among countries in the South, and have received some funding from donors elsewhere.

Lessons From the Past

5. When the SPFS started it had what the Evaluation Team regards as a rigid and inflexible design. It also required that it initially be implemented in those areas where there was the potential for rapidly increasing production. These areas were characterised as being where there were irrigation possibilities. It was envisioned that the production focus would help solve food security problems both at the household and national levels. It soon became apparent that the early ‘micro’ oriented production focus was insufficient to ensure progress in solving the food security problem and that ‘meso’ and ‘macro’ type issues were important in enabling production increases to occur, and in ensuring benefits accrue to the producers. Thus, over time the implementation of SPFS has become ‘less rigid’ and ‘more flexible’. The Evaluation Team is in agreement with the changes.

6. Another problem of a more conceptual nature became apparent to the Evaluation Team during the visits to the case study countries. This relates to the likely tradeoffs between fulfilling the goals indicated in the guidelines for the SPFS for addressing food security at both the national and household levels. In general, the stipulation of initiating SPFS activities in higher potential areas is likely to be better in addressing the issue of improving national food security. Poverty, and hence individual household food insecurity, is likely to exist in such areas but by the same token it is likely to be less acute than in less promising agricultural areas. As a result, the sites selected for SPFS activities in the case study countries, have in general been of relatively high productivity, compared with the more marginal areas where the degree of malnourishment in rural areas is higher but the potential for increases in agricultural productivity are lower. Thus, although in the opinion of the Evaluation Team the areas selected for SPFS activities are likely to be the best as far as potentially improving national food security is concerned, in terms of improving individual household food security the impact of SPFS type activities was likely to have been higher in the marginal areas. This suggests trade-offs between the stated laudable goals of improving both household and national food security.

7. Another issue which became apparent during the visits of the Evaluation Team to the case study countries was that the time initially planned for the pilot part of Phase I of the SPFS, namely two or three years, was too short, and the selected sites too small, to have any major impact on production and food security strategies. Success of the SPFS type of approach is very dependent on the strength of the institutional structures, including extension, credit, input distribution and product marketing systems. Where there are deficiencies in this, it is very unlikely that a two to three year period will be sufficient to demonstrate impact. Evidence of implementing the expansion part of Phase I (i.e. extending SPFS activities to all agro-ecological zones of a country) was only found in Senegal, although plans do exist on paper for other countries. Also there is no country that has entered Phase II of the SPFS.

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8. The Evaluation Team was somewhat surprised to note that the sets of technical guidelines designed to help in implementing the four components of the SPFS were not more frequently used in the field. Although there appear to be good reasons for this, the Evaluation Team believes that there would be merit in setting up a Guideline Technical Committee with the responsibility of rationalising the approach to planning, producing, approving, and updating the guidelines as a whole. However, the Evaluation Team believes the Guidelines should be viewed as ‘guidelines’ and nothing more. Slavish adherence to them could be counter productive and inhibit creativity in designing/adapting the methodologies to local situations.

9. Systematic evidence of the degree of adoption/uptake of the technologies demonstrated by the SPFS was not available, partly because the SPFS has not generally collected such information and partly because many of the projects are ongoing, or have only recently ended. The Evaluation Team therefore had to form impressions from interviews with stakeholders during its field visits. Although there was some evidence of adoption by farmers who had participated directly in the demonstration of the technologies or had attended FFSs, and to a lesser extent by non-participant farmers during project implementation, there was relatively little evidence of continued use of technologies after project demonstrations, or of adoption by farmers who had had no association with SPFS. The Evaluation Team believes that the SPFS should make an effort to systematically document evidence of the uptake of the demonstrated technological packages.

10. The SPFS has made extensive use of subsidies to encourage technology adoption. This has taken two forms: providing inputs free to farmers and/or giving inputs at subsidised rates. This needs to be re-examined particularly since it does not bode well for the sustainability of the technologies after direct SPFS support to initiatives ceases. Giving inputs free should be discontinued and subsidised interest rates should only be used if it is part of national policy. Also, for sustainability reasons, credit should be administered by competent credit institutions rather than being administered directly by SPFS projects.

11. In general, to date, the impact of SPFS on national policies relating to food security, and on the donor community in terms of strategies for enhancing food security in Low Income Food Deficit Countries (LIFDCs) and resource mobilization for SPFS follow-up, has been limited.

Alternative Future Approach

12. Having evaluated the strengths and weaknesses of the SPFS, the Evaluation Team recommends that FAO and its partners should consider an alternative future approach for the SPFS which would involve the following:

FAO Should Prioritise Countries for SPFS Related Initiatives. The SPFS is currently being implemented in 62 countries. A major concern of the Evaluation Team is whether, given the limited resources (i.e. financial and human) available to FAO, it has the capacity to deal adequately with all the countries currently eligible for SPFS. Criteria to be used for prioritisation of countries would depend on whether a country wants to initiate an SPFS activity or is seeking support for continuing an activity initiated earlier. Issues to be considered should include the incidence of malnourishment in the country, the institutional infrastructure in place to support SPFS initiatives, national commitment to addressing food security issues, etc.;

SPFS Should Give Greater Priority to Household Food Security. The Evaluation Team fully supports the emphasis placed on food security by the SPFS but is concerned about the possible tradeoffs between household and national food security. To resolve the issue, the Evaluation Team suggests that: (a) for countries that are not food self-sufficient SPFS should give equal priority to areas within countries that have good potential for increasing production as well as more marginal areas; and (b) for countries that are self-sufficient or nearly self-sufficient in food production, SPFS should focus on agricultural areas where the greatest degree of household food insecurity exists. This means that attention will be focussed on the poorer agricultural areas of the country; and

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In the design of SPFS there are six specific areas that the Evaluation Team believes should receive greater explicit attention since they impact not only on the way strategies for household food security are developed but also on the potential degree, sustainability and multiplier impact of SPFS-related activities. There should be: (a) explicit consideration of seasonality, “Counter-Seasonal Strategies” (CSS) focussing on increasing food production at different times of the year, increasing the capacity of local/community/household grain storage, increasing household income-purchasing power through the improvement of the farmers’ terms of access to input and output markets including credit, and through diversification activities; (b) more explicit consideration of environmental issues and ensuring congruency between production and ecological sustainability; (c) more explicit attention to gender equality; (d) more explicit attention to linkages and collaborative arrangements not only with donor agencies but also with other developmental agencies (e.g. NGOs), and Farmers Organizations as is well illustrated by the case in Senegal; (e) more explicit attention to meso and macro-level institutional and policy issues; and (f) acceptance of a longer time period (e.g. 5 years) for achieving impact.

13. At the onset of every SPFS project, FAO should also explicitly design an exit strategy in terms of handing over responsibility at the end of the implementation period. It is recommended that a participatory log frame approach is used in the design exercise and that during the implementation phase it becomes a participatory dynamic logframe, which is periodically revisited to facilitate monitoring and evaluation with respect to the objectives, indicators, means of verification/measurement, and hypotheses/assumptions/risks associated with the project.

14. Finally, it is recommended that the SPFS develops three complementary strategies, namely: (a) increasing the effort devoted to food security mapping in order to facilitate the identification of food insecure areas; (b) introducing systematic, simple and efficient monitoring systems to improve management at different levels and independent evaluation at the project level; and (c) after carefully assessing the true needs of each country in terms of the level of expertise needed (i.e. low, medium or high), and matching those needs with available technical and human resources of other countries in the South, introduce South-South Cooperation programmes that use small numbers of cooperants with adequate language skills, to give hands-on training to, and mentor local experts and technicians.

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Terms of Reference of the Evaluation

15. The evaluation took place some six years after the initiation of country level work under the Special Programme for Food Security (SPFS). It was undertaken both in response to the request of the Governing Bodies and to meet internal management needs, and was designed with two aims, namely to:

a) Provide a credible accountability report on the SPFS, containing in-depth analysis and assessment of its continuing relevance, effectiveness in achieving results and overall cost-effectiveness; and

b) Consolidate and enhance the knowledge base of the SPFS for the future by learning from the experience to date, especially by identifying emerging issues, strengths and weaknesses.

16. The Terms of Reference (see Annex 1) covered an overall assessment of the SPFS, including South-South cooperation, and:

Review of the efficiency and adequacy of the programme implementation process; Analysis and assessment of overall achievements and results; Assessment of the viability, sustainability and replicability of the results in the

participating countries; and Recommendations for programme improvement.

1.2 Evaluation Arrangements and Modalities

17. A representative team of nine senior external consultants undertook the evaluation. The FAO Evaluation Service provided operational support. The Evaluation Team was composed as follows: D. S. C. Spencer (Team Leader, Sierra Leone), P. Spitz (Team Leader, Asia and West Africa missions, France), F. Anderson (Australia), M. Contijoch (Mexico), A. Maziliauskas, (Lithuania), D. Norman (USA), M. Sala (Ms) (Finland), V. S. Vyas (India), and M. Zaroug (Sudan). The team covered a wide range of expertise including agricultural economics, agronomy, animal science, farming systems, gender analysis, irrigation and water management, participatory approaches, evaluation, and rural development. Summary curriculum vitae of the team members are provided as Annex 2.

18. The Evaluation Team visited FAO Regional offices and 12 SPFS countries from each of the developing regions (i.e. Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cambodia, China, Ecuador, Eritrea, Haiti, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Tanzania and Zambia). Approximately one week was spent in each country by groups, which normally consisted of four consultants. In each country, the team held discussions with government, donors and FAO staff, and visited a sample of project sites using a checklist of points based on the terms of reference to facilitate their enquiries with farmers, and developmental and SPFS staff. Six members 1 of the team convened at FAO Headquarters for two separate periods of report writing and consultations with FAO staff.

19. Countries for visits were selected by the Evaluation Team from a short-list prepared by FAO of 18 countries representing each of the developing regions. In the short-listed countries, work had been ongoing in the field for at least three years, with at least three of the four components of the SPFS. The criteria for selection ensured that the team would be evaluating on the basis of substantial experience in implementing the SPFS. There was sufficient time for some results to have been achieved, thus enabling the Evaluation Team to form a view of the prospects for impact. However, this also meant that the team only made field visits to programmes that may not have benefited from the changes that have been reflected in more recent projects whose

1 Messrs Spencer, Maziliauskas, Norman, Spitz and Ms Sala took part in two missions each, while Mr Vyas participated in one mission, and all six were involved in overall report writing. Messrs. Anderson, Zaroug and Contijoch took part in one mission each but were not present for report writing.

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designs may have incorporated the experience from the countries visited. Furthermore, the difficulties of the countries that, for one reason or another, had only been able to implement less than three components could not be observed first hand. To compensate for these shortcomings the Evaluation Team extensively consulted available documentation and FAO staff at country, regional office and headquarters levels. To assist the team in its work a general briefing note and individual country briefing notes were prepared by FAO. Consequently, notwithstanding the above caveat, the team is confident that it has been able to obtain a fair and representative sample of the SPFS as it has operated from the onset to the present and takes full responsibility for this independent report.

20. However, the Evaluation Team notes that it spent a relatively short time in each country and documentation on financial returns to producers as well as on the rate of adoption of technologies by non-demonstration households was inadequate. This has meant that assessment has been largely based on extensive discussions and on questioning at field level in sample sites.

1.3 Outline of the Report

21. Chapter 2 of this report provides some background on the SPFS, covering the rationale for a focus on food security and the development of the programme concept. Chapter 3 deals with the planning and design of specific SPFS programmes and the actual process of project formulation. Chapter 4 is focussed on SPFS implementation and management and considers the role of FAO, the organization and management structures, the effectiveness of national inputs, South-South Cooperation and the roles played by other international agencies and donors. Chapter 5 is devoted to assessing the pilot field operations in terms of selection of sites, target beneficiaries and technologies for testing. The approach used in implementing the SPFS field initiatives is also discussed, as are the results achieved. Chapter 6 considers the impact of the SPFS on national policies and the donor community, and also briefly deals with the cost effectiveness of SPFS initiatives. Finally, Chapter 7 brings together the material presented in the earlier chapters by summarising the background and strengths of the SPFS as viewed by the Evaluation Team. This provides the foundation, which the Evaluation Team uses to propose the approach to be applied in planning and implementing the SPFS in the future.

2. BACKGROUND TO THE SPFS

2.1 Focus on Food Security

22. At the World Food Summit in 1996, FAO member countries committed themselves to reduce the number of malnourished people by half (i.e. to reduce the number to around 400 million). The FAO Strategic Framework, approved at the 1999 Session of the Conference, reaffirmed FAO’s role in assisting them to achieve this goal.

23. Malnutrition is present in all countries but the proportion in 1996-98 was 18 percent for the developing world as a whole,2 whereas it was: 34 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa (rising to 42 percent in East and Southern Africa and 50 percent in Central Africa); 31 percent in the Caribbean; and 23 percent in South Asia.

24. There is a high level of coincidence in low-income countries between national food deficits and the proportion of undernourished but there are exceptions. For example, Uganda and Vietnam are not food deficit countries and have 30 and 22 percent undernourished respectively. The total food supply available in a country is the single most important determining factor in the proportion of malnourished. In general, the link between GNP per capita and food security is stronger than the link to whether a country is a net food importer.

2 All figures for undernourishment refer to the State of Food Insecurity in the World (SOFI), 2001, FAO, Rome.

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2.2 Development of the Programme Concept2.2.1 Programme Objectives

25. The Special Programme for Food Security, called at that time the ‘Special Programme for Food Production in Support of Food Security in Low-Income Food-Deficit Countries (LIFDCs),3 was endorsed by the FAO Council at its 106th Session in 1994. In the 2000-2001 Programme of Work and Budget, the objectives for the SPFS were stated as: “assisting the Low-Income Food-Deficit Countries to increase food production and productivity on a sustainable basis; reduce year-to-year variability of production; and improve access to food, and by implication: increasing net incomes of small farmers, generation of rural employment, and reduction of poverty with due consideration to social equity and gender sensitivity.”

26. All FAO member countries meeting the criteria of an LIFDC are considered eligible for assistance under the SPFS. Eighty FAO member countries currently meet these criteria. It has also been agreed that the SPFS may be extended to non-LIFDCs with alternative sources of funding from the Regular Programme. Table 1 presents data for FAO member countries with LIFDC status, as well as for non-LIFDCs which have applied for or initiated SPFS programmes.

27. At the launch of the SPFS, the reasons for chronic as distinct from emergency food insecurity and malnutrition were analysed as including four closely related factors, which are both a cause and an effect of poverty:

Low productivity in agriculture, compounded by policy, institutional and technological constraints;

High seasonal and year-to-year variability in food and other agricultural production which is often linked to insufficient water or inadequate water control for crop and livestock production;

Scarcity of on and off-farm employment opportunities; and Inadequate and uncertain incomes in both rural and urban areas.

28. While in many low-income countries food production had not been rising as fast as population increases, food imports often did not provide a viable response, as foreign exchange was simply unavailable. Similarly non-emergency food aid was on the decline. FAO has argued that the only solution available to countries was therefore to increase food production. The SPFS was thus focused initially on staple foods and it was stressed from the outset that crop expansion would be country specific and market oriented. Emphasis was placed on high potential areas and emerging farmers who could assist in overcoming national food deficits. In 1996, emphasis was increased on horticultural products, tree crops, small livestock and fish, which could often provide the greatest opportunities for employment and income generation. They could also provide the possibility for higher value import substitution and savings in foreign exchange. The programme concept has increasingly emphasised work in lower potential areas with food deficit households and is now intended to demonstrate approaches in all agro-ecological zones.

29. The design of the SPFS, as stated by FAO, emphasised four constraints: a) Shortage of available moisture. Except in the more humid and temperate areas of

the world, soil moisture availability is the major factor affecting crop and livestock performance, limiting yields, and contributing to inter-seasonal variability in outputs, thus rendering technologies, which offer the prospect of raising productivity, uneconomic;

b) Lack of access to improved technologies. Once moisture constraints are overcome, varietal response capacity, soil fertility limitations, incidence of pests and diseases (i.e. both during production and storage) and lack of management capabilities and skills, emerge as major limiting factors;

3 Defined as those countries with a negative trade balance in cereals and per capita incomes of a level, which qualifies them for World Bank lending on IDA terms (i.e. countries which in 1999 had per capita GNP of US$ 1,445 or less).

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c) Excessive dependence on a narrow range of products. The lack of diversification within many production systems exposes farmers unduly to climatic vagaries, pests and diseases and price fluctuations; leads to major fluctuations in income levels and food availability during the year; contributes to environmental degradation; may fail to take advantage of complementarities (e.g. between livestock and crops); and has negative effects on diet and health; and

d) Lack of incentives for raising output and improving sustainability. This is possibly due to a negative policy, institutional and socio-economic environment, which may combine to actively discourage farmers from expanding output (i.e. including weaknesses in agricultural services, insecurity of land tenure, price instability and an absence of, or breakdown in, rural infrastructure).

30. As originally conceived the SPFS had two phases, Phase I, the pilot phase and Phase II, the expansion phase. Phase I addressed the first three constraints listed above. Phase II was intended to give particular attention to policy and investment, addressing the fourth area of constraint. No country has, as yet, formally entered Phase II and emphasis has shifted to spreading the pilot programme to a wider range of agro-ecological zones (i.e. Expanded Phase I). It has also now been stated that policy issues should be addressed as and when they arise.

31. The SPFS apparently recognised the very substantial gap between the production levels achieved in on-farm demonstrations and trials and those of the average farmer. Demonstrations were taken as the point of entry. These were intended as a means not only of providing farmers and entrepreneurs with an insight into the possibilities but also to explore with the farmers in an ongoing participatory process, the constraints to intensification of technology and improved management systems and how these might be overcome. During Phase I the SPFS has had four standard components:

a) Development of water management and irrigation potential; b) Intensification of sustainable plant production systems in both rainfed and irrigated

areas;c) Diversification (i.e. small animal production including poultry and small ruminants

for alternative income earning); andd) Constraints Analysis (CA).

32. South-South Cooperation (SSC) began in 1996 and from 1998, separate provision was made in the SPFS budget. It has become an important instrument in the SPFS and is designed for more advanced developing countries to send field technicians and experts to partner countries for two to three years, during which they work directly with the rural communities involved in the programme. The number of experts required is determined on a case-by-case basis, but with the objective of attaining a critical mass.

33. National management and integration into national programmes were regarded as key aspects of the programme from the point of view of national ownership, sustainability and cost-effectiveness. The programme has not thus used long-term international expertise, except that provided on a SSC basis.

34. The SPFS is currently under implementation in 62 countries of which 58 are LIFDCs. It is under formulation or awaiting start-up in a further 14 LIFDCs. A summary of the status of SPFS country programmes is provided in Annex 3.

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Table 1: FAO Member LIFDC Countries by Region,a Undernourishment, Income Per Caput and Date of Entry into the SPFS

LIFDC Countries in Membership of FAO(As of April 2001)b

Date of Entry into

SPFS

Under-nourished

% of Population1997-99(SOFI)

GNI Per

Capita 1999 $ (WB)

LIFDC Countries(As of April 2001)

Date ofEntry into

SPFS

Under-nourished

% of Population

1997-99(SOFI)

GNI Per Capita 1999 $ (WB)

Africa LIFDCs (38)Burkina Faso 1/95 24 240 Madagascar 7/98 40 250Senegal 1/95 24 500 Côte d'Ivoire 1/99 16 670Ethiopia 3/95 49 100 Morocco 2/99 6 1,190Guinea 5/95 34 490 Nigeria 3/99 7 260Kenya 5/95 46 360 Benin 5/99 15 380Tanzania 5/95 46 260 Chad 5/99 34 210Mauritania 6/95 11 390 Cape Verde 6/99 n.a. n.a.Equatorial Guinea 7/95 n.a. n.a. Congo, Dem. Rep. 8/99 64 */Eritrea 7/95 57 200 Swaziland 8/99 12 n.a.Niger 7/95 41 190 Burundi 1/00 66 120Zambia 8/95 47 330 Cameroon 1/00 25 600Rwanda 12/96 40 250 Togo 3/00 17 310Mozambique 3/97 54 220 Gambia 06/00 15 330Central African R. 11/97 43 290 Comoros u.p. n.a. n.a.Ghana 11/97 15 400 Congo, Rep. u.p. 32 550Lesotho 11/97 25 550 Guinea-Bissau u.p. n.a. 160Malawi 11/97 35 180 Liberia u.p. 42 n.a.Angola 1/98 51 270 Sao Tome & Prin. n.a. n.a.Mali 5/98 28 240 Sierra Leone 41 130Africa non LIFDCs Uganda 7/98 28 320 Zimbabwe 4/99 39 530Asia LIFDCs (15)China 5/95 9 780 India 5/99 23 440Nepal 11/95 23 220 Sri Lanka 9/99 23 820Cambodia 10/97 37 260 Maldives 3/00 n.a. n.a.Mongolia 11/97 42 390 Indonesia u.p. 6 600Bangladesh 8/98 33 370 Lao PDR u.p. 28 290Pakistan 6/98 18 470 Philippines u.p. 24 1,050Korea, DPR. 9/98 40 */ Bhutan n.a. n.a.Uzbekistan - 4 720Oceania LIFDCs (5) Europe LIFDCs (6) Papua New Guinea 7/96 26 810 Bosnia & Herze. 12/97 4 1,210Solomon Islands 1/00 n.a. n.a. Albania 4/98 10 930Samoa u.p. n.a. n.a. Georgia 12/98 23 620Kiribati n.a. n.a. Armenia u.p. 35 490Vanuatu n.a. n.a. Azerbaijan u.p. 37 460

Macedonia, FYR u.p. 5 1,660Latin America & Caribbean LIFDCs (7) Near East LIFDCs (10)Bolivia 10/95 22 990 Djibouti 11/98 n.a. n.a.Haiti 6/97 56 460 Egypt 12/99 4 1,380Ecuador 11/97 5 1,360 Syria. 2/99 n.a. 970Guatemala 10/99 22 1,680 Sudan 12/00 21 330Honduras 10/99 21 760 Kyrgyzstan u.p. 10 300Nicaragua 10/99 29 410 Afghanistan 58 n.a.Cuba u.p. 17 **/ Somalia 75 n.a.Latin America – non LIFDCs Tajikistan 47 280Peru 11/99 13 2,130 Turkmenistan u.p.. 9 670Venezuela 9/00 21 3,680 Yemen 11/00 34 360a As defined for purposes of FAO Council Elections. b Countries in italics are those visited by the Evaluation Team. u.p. = under preparation; n.a. = not available. */ estimated to be low income ($755 or less)**/ estimated to be lower middle income ($756-2995)Sources: FAO SOFI 2001 and the World Bank Development Indicators 2000-01.

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2.2.2 Resources for the SPFS

35. Resources for SPFS activities come from countries’ national resources, FAO’s regular budget, various donors (i.e. principally the bilateral agencies) and International Financing Institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank, as well as through the provision of personnel under SSC arrangements. FAO’s budget includes US$ 5 million per annum of seed money for the SPFS, which is contributed to by all countries as part of their assessed contributions. Countries may also request funding for individual projects under FAO’s Technical Cooperation Programme (TCP), which is also funded from the Regular Programme. This has been used in particular to support the irrigation component. Mention should also be made of the WIN project implemented in three SPFS countries and the TeleFood Programme, which makes grants of up to US$ 10,000 for projects by local people. Many of these are associated with the SPFS. Table 2 shows the distribution of funding for the SPFS in terms of actual expenditures from 1995-2000. Table 3 shows the committed budgets for SPFS programmes as of July 2001. These latter figures are not additive, as they apply to different periods and much of the expenditure will be in the future.

Table 2: Summary of Percentage Breakdown of Expenditure on SPFS by Source of Funds1995-2000 (Approximate Total US$ 60 Million)

Fund Group Source of Funds % ExpenditureFAO Regular Programme FAO/Bank Cooperative Programme 1.5%

FAO SPFS 51.1%FAO Technical Cooperation Programme (TCP) 15.7%

Sub-total FAO Regular Programme 74.3%FAO Global Trust Funds International Fertilizer Supply Scheme (IFSS) 0.2%

Programme for Prevention of Food Losses (PFL) 0.02%Sub-total FAO Global Trust Funds 0.2%FAO Government Cooperative Programme Trust Funds (GCP)

Belgium 2.6%France 1.2%Italy 7.0%Japan 1.2%Korea Rep of 1.0%Netherlands 3.8%Spain 2.0%

GCP Sub-total 18.6%Unilateral Trust Funds International Financing Institutions (IFIs) 0.4%United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

Country Programme 4.3%Support for Policy and Programme Development (SPPD)

2.1%

UN-Fund for International Partnerships UNFIP (Turner Fund) 0.2%Grand Total 100.0%Source: FAO, TCOS.

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Table 3: SPFS Funding from Extra-budgetary Resources (disbursed through FAO; Showing Beneficiary Countries and Budgets, January 2002)

Source of Funds & SPFS Country

US$ million Source of Funds & SPFS Country

US$ million Source of Funds & SPFS Country

US$ million

International Financing Institutions and FundsAfDB 7.78 IsDB 18.62 Madagascar 0.25

Cameroon 0.99 Burkina Faso 4.88 Rwanda 0.72Cape Verde 0.97 Chad 2.73 UNDP/SPPD 0.67Ghana 0.93 Comoros 2.00 Chad 0.09Guinea 0.99 Djibouti 3.16 China 0.07Malawi 0.95 Gambia 0.99 Djibouti 0.03Mauritania 0.98 Guinea 2.66 Eq. Guinea 0.03Mozambique 0.97 Niger 2.20 Ethiopia 0.10Tanzania 1.0 UMOA 1.8 India 0.15

BOAD 23.99 Benin 0.225 Liberia 0.06Benin 2.40 Burkina Faso 0.225 Niger 0.14Burkina Faso 2.53 Ivory Coast 0.225 UNFIP 1.59Ivory Coast 3.34 Guinea-B. 0.225 Cambodia 0.53Guinea-B. 2.20 Mali 0.225 Nepal 0.53Mali 2.70 Niger 0.225 Zambia 0.53Niger 5.05 Senegal 0.225 WFP 2.80Senegal 3.09 Togo 0.225 Angola 2.80Togo 2.68 UNDP 8.37 World Bank 1.94

EU 0.50 Albania 0.35 Bangladesh 0.94Guinea (*) 0.50 Bangladesh 3.14 Senegal (*) 1.00

IFAD 2.38 Burkina Faso(*) 0.27 Commonwealth 0.06Angola (*) 1.00 Cameroon 0.10 Gambia 0.06Senegal (*) 0.30 India 0.81Zambia 1.08 Kenya 2.73

Bilateral-Trust FundsBelgium 2.54 Gambia 0.61 Monaco 0.44

Burkina Faso 1.17 Guinea 1.00 Madagascar 0.16Congo D.R. 1.37 Guinea-B. 0.50 Mauritania 0.05

France 1.2 Korea, DPR 1.00 Niger 0.23Benin 0.02 Mozambique 1.76 Morocco 0.21Haiti 0.55 Senegal 1.58 Burkina Faso 0.21Madagascar 0.51 Japan 14.56 Netherlands 2.1Mauritania 0.02 Bangladesh 3.78 Mali 2.1Senegal 0.10 Cambodia 1.20 Korea Rep. 0.5

Italy 13.68 Ethiopia 1.00 Korea DPR 0.5Angola 1.12 Indonesia 2.98 Switzerland 0.05Cambodia 3.16 Lao PDR 3.10 Niger 0.05Eritrea 1.08 Niger 0.45Ethiopia 1.87 Sri Lanka 2.05

(*)=support not through FAO

Source: FAO - TCOS

3. SPFS PLANNING AND DESIGN

3.1 Role of the Partners 3.1.1 Organizational Aspects and Role of FAO

36. Planning of SPFS projects has undergone substantial changes since the inception of the programme. Initially the programme began with a Coordinating Unit in the Office of the Director-General with the Director-General (DG) himself chairing an SPFS Implementation Committee. Since the SPFS’s main orientation was on technology, and particularly on technologies appropriate for irrigated agriculture, technical staff in the Organization played an important role. With the expansion of the SPFS the Coordination Unit moved to the Field Operations Division (TCO) in 1997, and a Special Programme Implementation Committee (SPIC), chaired by the

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ADG Technical Cooperation Department, replaced the original committee, but has not met recently. The intention was for the SPFS to become a focal point for FAO’s field programmes in LIFDCs. With enactment of the policy to entrust design of the technical cooperation projects, as well as of investment projects, to the FAO Investment Centre (TCI), this became the primary unit responsible for designing SPFS projects. An additional reason, and justification, for involving TCI from the very beginning was that the expected outcome of pilot projects would be the development of a country investment strategy in which TCI could play a significant facilitative role. In addition, it provided the potential for TCI to build on the knowledge it had gained through such missions in designing other projects in the same countries. The Evaluation Team was informed that initially TCI felt somewhat constrained by the rigid nature of the initial SPFS programme, although this has become more flexible over time (see Section 7.1).

37. In FAO documentation a process approach is emphasised in designing and finalising projects. This process is expected to involve not only the national government but also other stakeholders, particularly farmers. Once an agreement is reached between the potential host country and FAO, the planning process at the TCI level starts with the organization of a Core Team, consisting of relevant FAO staff from different services. The Core Team is to assist the National Programme Formulation Committee in designing the project. TCI’s role tends to end once the project is designed. As there is no effective system of evaluation and monitoring for the SPFS (see Section 4.1), it does not get the necessary feedback to help it to learn and improve the design of subsequent projects.

38. With the move towards decentralisation, FAO Regional and Country Offices could play a more important role. At present these offices provide technical support at the implementation stage but generally have little say in the design of projects, although there are exceptions (e.g. in the case of Ecuador).

39. The Evaluation Team commends the participatory philosophy of SPFS and its insistence on stakeholder participation in programme design. Therefore, FAO must avoid intervening in ways that would negate the benefits of the approach. The Evaluation Team was made aware of an example of such top-down intervention in Senegal. Having allowed Farmers’ Associations to participate fully in the identification of priority projects through a long consultative process, FAO intervened in a top-down manner in the approval process. Without very convincing arguments as far as the Evaluation Team is concerned, it rejected proposals that came from the grassroots (e.g. threshers and mills aimed at alleviating women’s workload) and pressed for inclusion instead of problematic micro-gardens and metal silos, both introductions coming from experience in Latin America. It would appear that it was only after Farmers’ Associations protested that a few mills and threshers were included in the programme. While there might be justification for inclusion of the technologies proposed by FAO, the process adopted is counter to the Organization’s own claim for full participation and partnership with stakeholders.

3.1.2 Role of the Country

40. The process of project formulation outlined in the Guidelines for the Formulation of the Phase I of the SPFS gives very high priority to the national ownership of the projects. It clearly states that the responsibility for project formulation is national (i.e. the National Programme Formulation Team) with FAO playing primarily a catalytic role. Among the countries visited by the Evaluation Team (i.e. the case study countries) only a few appeared to have had a major input at the project formulation stage (e.g. China, Ecuador and Senegal). There were even examples where the formulation document was finalised after SPFS implementation activities had commenced (e.g. Bangladesh and Zambia).

41. An important pre-condition for an effective SPFS initiative is congruence between a national policy on food security and SPFS goals. Where a national policy already existed not only have the countries taken greater initiative at the formulation stage, but also they have had a greater influence in defining and elaborating the components of the SPFS and in selecting appropriate technologies (e.g., China). Also in at least one of the case study countries (Ecuador),

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the issue of food security was conceptualised within the national setting, enabling the SPFS to be designed in a consensual manner and in a way that was congruent with the national food security policy.

42. However, in many of the countries visited by the Evaluation Team, the role of the national governments in the planning and design of the SFPS has been rather passive. This could have been due to one or more of the following three factors:

a) Indifference on the part of the country concerning the goal of food security;b) Initially FAO being inflexible in terms of the design of the SPFS, which inhibited

open discussion among stakeholders on the structure and priorities of the SPFS during the formulation stage; and

c) The country’s weak institutional and personnel base, which necessitated FAO taking a lead role in designing the project.

43. An important consequence of the country not being fully engaged at the design stage is likely to be a reduced sense of ownership and responsibility for the SPFS as far as the government is concerned. Instead the SPFS is likely to be regarded as an FAO project, and a minor one at that, because of the small level of financial resources involved. Rather than designing the programme per se, the role of FAO should be to support institutional processes such as:

Helping in the establishment of the National Programme Formulation Team; Providing experts if needed; Assisting in capacity building in planning and project formulation; and Funding the preparatory tasks.

Where the above role has been adhered to by FAO, the results have been very satisfactory (e.g. Ecuador).

3.1.3 The Role of Other Donors

44. With the exception of Senegal, other international agencies have played no part at the initial design stage. In Senegal the Italian Government participated in the design of an SPFS project that it later financed (US$ 1.8m over a three years – 1997-99). It also provided financial support at the initiation of SPFS activities in Eritrea. In general, components of SPFS were ‘owned’ or integrated by other donors at a later stage. Further discussion of the contribution of donors is in Section 4.5.

3.2 The Process of Project Formulation3.2.1 Procedure

45. The Guidelines for the Formulation of the Phase I of the SPFS emphasise two fundamental principles underlying the formulation of SPFS projects: national ownership and stakeholder participation. A typical SPFS Preparatory Plan implements the following steps:

Establishment of FAO Core Team made up of FAO staff from Headquarters and the appropriate Regional Office;

Exploratory mission by the FAO mission leader; Review and approval of the Mission Report by the Government; Establishment of the National Steering Committee and National SPFS Team; and Formulation of the National Programme Document and Plan of Operation by the

National Programme Formulation Team.

46. Generally, these steps have been taken as a matter of course. However, two other stipulations of the Guidelines were not always strictly adhered to, namely: as indicated earlier, collaboration with national partners was insufficiently emphasised; and there was insufficient consideration of the local capacity for implementing SPFS initiatives. Such deficiencies in design obviously become apparent once the implementation has started. Project designs, in general, were often found to be deficient with respect to the following:

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Did not provide a realistic assessment of institutional capabilities to implement/support SPFS initiatives within the country;

Did not take sufficient cognisance of the expertise and experiences of other analogous development projects in the country;

Generally did not assess the economic rationale for the proposed activities; Did not recognise the critical role of monitoring and evaluation; and Did not indicate the mechanisms for ensuring cooperation/collaboration with other

institutions (e.g. research and training institutions and NGOs).

47. In the case study countries, problems relating to one or more of the above were very obvious to the Evaluation Team. Failure to adequately assess institutional capability means that the projects tend to become over optimistic and/or the same model is applied to countries and regions at different stages of institutional development. In the view of the Evaluation Team, the first step in project formulation should be an appraisal of the human and institutional capacity. A critical review of analogous national and donor-funded projects would also help in improving the design of the SPFS and the potential pay off from its implementation. Furthermore, the credibility of the SPFS would be enhanced if the potential economic and social costs and benefits were systematically assessed. As indicated elsewhere in the report, the Evaluation Team believes a lack of systematic economic analysis is a major weakness at all stages of SPFS projects. The same applies to the monitoring and evaluation component in the design of the projects, which is also considered elsewhere in the report. Finally, mechanisms for collaborating with other national organizations (training and research institutions, Farmers’ Organizations, NGOs, etc.) that are important in supporting/enhancing the impact of potential SPFS activities are rarely explored and delineated in SPFS formulation exercises. Two examples of exceptions are the mention of NGOs for social mobilisation in Bangladesh, and the case of Farmers’ Organizations in Senegal.

48. Although the approach advocated for designing SPFS projects is a ‘process’ method, it has often been adhered to rigidly with little attention to innovation, or even adaptation based on experience. If, in the design of the projects, a dynamic participatory logframe approach was adopted, involving stakeholders in a participatory manner in defining the objectives, identifying the opportunities and constraints and possible solutions, and suggesting indicators to measure key variables, some of the possible pitfalls could have been avoided.

3.2.2 Programme Components

49. In a typical SPFS project, there are four major components: water management/irrigation, crop intensification, diversification, and constraints analysis. Initially, irrigation and crop intensification were the key components. Given the philosophy of the SPFS, it was logical to concentrate on water. Proper use of water results in higher yields and enables multiple cropping, both of which can be important in augmenting food grain production. Water is a critical element in sustainable agricultural development in most parts of the world. Emphasis on water, not only in SPFS projects but also in an overall agricultural development strategy, is therefore generally fully justified. Therefore, it would have been reasonable to have expected from the outset, that the SPFS would have placed greater emphasis on a wider set of water-related activities (e.g. moisture conservation, water harvesting and watershed development) rather than focussing mainly on irrigation. Even in terms of the irrigation component, it is important to recognise that farm-level irrigation (i.e. the focus of SPFS activities) is heavily influenced by the management of the larger system (i.e. above the farm level) and that the latter may turn out to be the real constraint, as is evident in the West African countries visited by the Evaluation Team. Also, in some of the new innovations introduced in farm-level irrigation, their relatively high costs in terms of infrastructure and equipment, potentially means benefits will disproportionately accrue to the farmers with more resources.

50. The activity of crop intensification associated with the irrigation component is rationalised on the basis of the need to increase production. But intensification, combined with proper water management, has additional value in augmenting land use (e.g. two or three crops

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per unit of land per year instead of one or two). The emphasis on scale neutral technologies, namely use of fertilisers and organic manure, and the high yielding varieties, combined with efficient water delivery systems, results in the programme being suitable for limited resource farmers, except in the labour scarce economies. The issues that relate to the strategy of intensification are at both the meso- and macro-levels. They relate to: the capacity of the research system to produce better varieties; the system of seed multiplication and distribution; the fertiliser distribution system; credit delivery; and product marketing. There are also issues relating to agricultural pricing policy, and wider environment and health-related questions. SPFS documentation stipulates that many of these issues will be deferred until at least the Expanded Phase I and usually until Phase II. However, if Phase I of the SPFS projects are bedevilled with these constraints, the prospects of moving onto Phase II are not very bright. It is indeed the view of the Evaluation Team that the issues discussed above should have been handled simultaneously with the demonstrations and other activities of Phase I.

51. Diversification as a component of the SPFS came a little later. This may be because the idea of household food security as an issue in itself was initially insufficiently appreciated (i.e. the assumption being that attaining national food security would itself ensure household food security). For resource-poor farmers, especially the landless labourers and marginal farmers, diversification of activities is essential for ensuring an adequate livelihood. In the original design the diversification component was operationalised in terms of animal husbandry, with specific emphasis on small-animal raising, activities. Fortunately, a more flexible approach was adopted at the field level in most of the case study countries. Examples of vegetable gardening, horticulture, small-pond fisheries (i.e. aquaculture), rice-fish combinations, poultry etc., are as numerous as pig or goat enterprises. These activities directly address the income earning capacity of food-insecure households, provided they are specifically focussed on them. As women operate many of these small enterprises, this component, more than any other activity under SPFS, helps in empowering women.

52. Constraints Analysis (CA) is the fourth principal component of the SPFS. In this discussion on the design of SPFS activities it is important to emphasise that in the original documentation of the SPFS it was not envisioned that it had any role to play in the design stage. Logically the Evaluation Team believes CA should precede the launch of the project (i.e. be used in the design of the SPFS activities), as well as being repeated at different stages to ensure mid-course corrections. Because, as a rule, at least in the case study countries, it has not been done before the start of SPFS activities, the design of the SPFS has not benefited from CA. However, some benefits from CA remain if, as a result of such exercises during implementation of SPFS, constructive and useful modifications are made in subsequent activities. Assertions made in some quarters that CA will be particularly relevant in Phase II of SPFS when policy issues will be resolved, misses the point that many constraints faced by producers are at the micro- or the meso-levels and do not necessarily involve major policy changes for their resolution. One further point is worth mentioning with reference to CA. While appreciating that CA was added as a component sometime after the SPFS was launched, the Evaluation Team is not convinced that CA should itself be viewed as a component of the SPFS. The other components all relate to tangible productive ways/means of improving food security. CA on the other hand is a methodology or, perhaps more accurately, a package of methodologies, to aid in helping to determine what should be done. Therefore, although CA is important as far as the SPFS is concerned, it should not be viewed as a component in the sense in which the term is used in the SPFS.

53. At the country level, apart from these components, several additional activities have progressively become part of the lexicon of Phase I SPFS activities. In newer projects this tendency of adding more components is increasing (see Section 7.1). Quite a few of these ‘satellite’ activities were sponsored or supported by TeleFood, some came as additional TCP projects, and others were initiated by the national teams themselves. However, in the case study countries, these were generally initiated after the original SPFS design activity, although the Evaluation Team understands, these are now more likely to be incorporated in the design stage in countries where SPFS activities have been initiated more recently (see Section 7.1).

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54. The Evaluation Team recognises that there are countries (e.g. Cambodia and Ecuador) in which different components of the SPFS were well synchronised and integrated. However, integration of the different components to generate synergy remains an issue. Conceptually, all the three ‘product’ components are complementary, but in practice, apart from water and intensification, there was usually very little integration between the principal components, and sometimes even only a limited geographical overlap. As noted earlier in the section, introduction of the different components came at different times. For example, in an otherwise strong project, China, diversification came at a later stage and was not integrated with water management or crop intensification activities in the same villages.

3.2.3 Approach to Upscaling and Mainstreaming

55. One country (Senegal) has expanded Phase 1 activities to achieve national coverage. In the Expanded Phase I, components are implemented as appropriate in each agro-ecological zone, with only one or two components being implemented in the majority of sites. To the Evaluation Team this indicates a welcome degree of flexibility in the design of the Expanded Phase I. However, in most case study countries a major lacuna in the SPFS design is the absence of a strategy for ‘upscaling’ the project. A pilot project has a raison d’être in its potential for expansion or replication. The Evaluation Team is aware that, in a number of countries, proposals for expanding the number of sites are being considered. But such proposals are often in the nature of ‘more of the same’, in a few more locations, which therefore are not likely to address the diversity of production (i.e. biophysical and socio-economic) environments in the countries.

56. One of the primary objectives of the pilot projects should be ‘mainstreaming’ the approach and the content of the SPFS for which a multi-pronged approach is needed. Five groups of actors are important in this effort:

a) An initial condition for this type of approach is already available in many countries where the projects are located in the Directorate of Extension. To the degree that extension personnel are convinced of the SPFS approach, there are possibilities of replication subject to the appropriate adjustments as implied in the preceding paragraph;

b) Another major group that require convincing about ‘mainstreaming’ the SPFS are the policy makers. The FAO representative (FAOR) and staff in the FAO Regional Offices can be important in this effort but it is not clear as to whether this role has been explicitly assigned to them;

c) The third group to be sensitised is the donors. As was reported earlier, with a few exceptions, the donor community has tended to be largely indifferent;

d) In most societies, particularly in open societies, the opinion leaders -- journalists, intellectuals, professionals -- matter. They need to be convinced about the relevance and efficacy of the projects; and

e) However, the most important group are the project beneficiaries. If they have benefited from the SPFS approach, they will help in spreading the message.

57. If the SPFS is considered not only an important programme but also a distinct and superior approach, the strategy to ‘spread the word’ should be explicitly addressed. This, of course, assumes that lacunae in design and implementation are taken care of, and a sound project results that is worthy of ‘upscaling’ and ‘mainstreaming’.

4. SPFS IMPLEMENTATION AND MANAGEMENT

4.1 Role of FAO4.1.1 Project Management

4.1.1.1 Concept

58. The SPFS Coordination and Monitoring Service (TCOS) is in the Field Operations Division at FAO Headquarters. Details on the evolution of the organizational set up and

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management arrangements are given elsewhere in the report (see Section 3.1.1). In fact, the SPFS has now become more integrated into the mainstream of FAO’s field programme development work with the following support and management system:

Assistance to countries in the formulation of the SPFS -- the Investment Centre (TCI) at FAO Headquarters;

Management of the SPFS Regular Programme budget provision, coordination and monitoring, including overall arrangements for South-South Cooperation -- the SPFS Coordination and Monitoring Service (TCOS) at FAO Headquarters;

Establishment of a Core Team is established for the country, once SPFS is active, bringing together the various FAO staff involved -- as these are usually in different locations it is intended that they function as a virtual task force working electronically;

Support to countries and actual operation of SPFS project activities – FAO Representatives and the Field Operations Division in the Regional Offices (TCO);

Support to countries in carrying out analysis of constraints and opportunities – the Policy Assistance Division (TCA) in the Regional Offices; and

Technical support on crops, water, diversification, etc. – the Technical Divisions, especially now regionally-based staff.

59. The way in which the last three activities listed above take place has undergone significant changes in recent years as a result of the FAO decentralisation policy. For example, the TCO activities were decentralised to the Regional Offices in 1996-97, and decentralisation of operational responsibilities further to the country level with the FAO Representatives, is now being completed. The technical divisions of FAO also have decentralised teams in the Regional and Sub-Regional Offices.

60. In addition to the monitoring by TCOS and the Core Team, there are two other monitoring/review related activities:

a) Reviews undertaken by a Field Inspector. Currently there is a team of senior regional consultants (usually four) employed on a part time basis who visit a sample of country programmes each year. Their reports are provided to the Director-General and the Oversight Panel, and to the FAOR, national SPFS teams, FAO technical divisions, SPFS core team members, etc.; and

b) Participating SPFS countries regularly report on progress in implementation via standardised quarterly reports, so-called Information Sheets. In addition, some countries produce other more detailed reports, such as bi-monthly reports. At the FAO HQ level, a three-monthly progress report, based on the Information Sheets, is produced containing an update on the progress in implementation at the global level. Short narrative status reports on each country are also prepared for management and monitoring purposes.

4.1.1.2 Assessment of Achievements

61. All the case study countries were exposed to monitoring and technical backstopping missions from FAO Headquarters, regional and/or sub-regional based staff, although the actual mix and the degree and intensity varied somewhat between countries. Attitudes in the field varied about the effectiveness and value of the monitoring and technical backstopping missions, although in most cases the local teams appreciated them.

62. The Evaluation Team would like to stress that although the Information Sheets are used as a monitoring device and are given to members of the Core Team, no systematic feedback is given to the country SPFS programmes. In fact, the Evaluation Team is somewhat concerned that more attention is not actually placed on monitoring and especially on evaluation in the SPFS programmes in general. This concern involves two aspects:

a) There is generally insufficient economic/financial analysis on the technologies and enterprises being promoted under the SPFS (see Section 5.4); and

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b) There are no quantifiable estimates of the degree of uptake and diffusion of the initiatives. In the field, the Evaluation Team was singularly unsuccessful in eliciting any reliable data in this area and had to be content with anecdotal information (see Section 5.5);

Annual end-of-season national assessment workshops sometimes address these issues but not always in a systematic quantitative manner.

63. Field Inspector missions are a useful tool for identifying problems and proposing potentially relevant solutions. Eight of the countries visited by the Evaluation Team have been exposed to such missions. Niger and Senegal were each visited five times, Mauritania four times and the others once or twice. These visits by a consultant or sometimes by an FAO staff member were particularly frequent during the 1997-99 period. While the reports are fairly informative they tend to focus on operational issues rather than results. Since FAO is developing a Results Oriented Programme Planning and Management approach there would be considerable merit for future Field Inspector missions to contribute to assessing results in a systematic way in addition to flagging operational issues. Only two reviews and three evaluation missions have been undertaken in all 66 SPFS countries. These have attempted to assess results/impact. Given the importance of results/impact assessment as far as the Evaluation Team is concerned, which has been emphasized in other parts of the report, it is recommended that copies of such reviews and evaluations are given to the Oversight Panel. SPFS management should report to the Oversight Panel as to decisions and actions taken with respect to the recommendations made in such reviews/evaluations and to those made by the Oversight Panel itself. This should improve the potential for enhancing monitoring, transparency and accountability with respect to such recommendations.

64. The Evaluation Team is also concerned that currently knowledge concerning the experiences from implementing the SPFS in more than 60 countries is dispersed among a considerable number of FAO staff (i.e. at Headquarters, Regional/Sub-regional, and Country Offices, as well as among SSC and national programme collaborators). Unquestionably, there would be considerable utility in sharing lessons learned, both successful and unsuccessful, to help avoid replicating mistakes, and reduce the learning cycles. While the Evaluation Team recognises that arranging interaction to address the above concern would involve resources, it believes that the payoff from some sort of initiative with respect to this could be great. The Evaluation Team was informed that SPFS management has recognised the potential utility of this and is planning some initiatives with respect to this.

65. Finally, the Evaluation Team wishes to note one other concern. Although there is obviously considerable merit, all other things being equal, for devolution of responsibility to the FAOR level, as far as requesting monitoring, reviewing and technical backstopping activities are concerned, it has a downside. ‘Outside’ FAO staff (i.e. at sub-regional, regional and headquarters level) may have less independent opportunity to make contributions. In the Regional Offices, there was a general complaint of inadequate human and financial resources (e.g. for travel), to allow adequate backstopping of SPFS field activities. It is also apparent that some technical staff do not feel a close affinity to the SPFS. Given that FAO’s comparative advantage lies in its technical agriculture expertise, this apparent deficiency is unfortunate and is likely to impact negatively on the efficacy of the SPFS. The Evaluation Team believes that some way needs to be found to bridge this gap and bring about greater congruency between the SPFS and other technical initiatives/programmes in FAO.

4.1.2 Administrative and Financial Management

4.1.2.1 Concept

66. Administration of the overall SPFS is done through the SPFS Coordination and Monitoring Service (TCOS) while day-to-day administration of specific country SPFS programmes is done within the countries. Resources for SPFS programmes come from countries’

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national resources, FAO’s budget, various donors (i.e. principally the bilateral agencies) and International Financing Institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank, and through the contribution of personnel under SSC arrangements.

4.1.2.2 Assessment of Achievements

67. In most of the case study countries, apart from finance-related issues, administration of the SPFS programmes appeared to be proceeding satisfactorily and the Evaluation Team encountered no major problems or complaints.

68. There were issues relating in one way or another to finances discussed below. Two specific ones found were:

a) In Haiti, the salaries of agricultural ministry staff were initially supplemented through the SPFS, but later this was withdrawn. The cancellation of these subsidies had a demotivating effect on those concerned. This problem also generated frequent changes of personnel and difficulties in recruiting qualified technicians although this problem was later partially solved with the assistance of FAO and French Cooperation; and

b) The major and most pervasive issue pertained to uncertainty over FAO funding, which in the case of Cambodia was termed the ‘limping project syndrome.’ Other case study countries where this was raised as a specific issue included Bolivia, China and Ecuador. This issue particularly relates to the allocation and disbursement procedures of FAO’s regular budget for the SPFS. Apparently, specific SPFS country programmes not knowing in advance what they will receive, are left in a state of uncertainty leading to short duration contracts and commitments with frequent gaps between contracts or activities, resulting in low staff morale.

69. The Evaluation Team is very concerned about the apparent uncertainty over funding which obviously creates problems in the field relating to both expectations and implementation. Such uncertainties become compounded, given the anticipated short duration of Phase I (i.e. originally envisioned only to be two years). The Evaluation Team believes it is critically important for FAO to address such problems since they can have a very negative impact on the reputation of the Organization.

70. The Evaluation Team is pleased to note that FAO has been innovative in using funds from various sources to support SPFS-related initiatives. For example, funds from Telefood and the FAO Staff One Percent For Development have been used to support diversification related activities (e.g. group supply/marketing stores in Tanzania, small livestock and poultry in Eritrea and value added processing/marketing activities in Ecuador), even if they are of very small dimensions. Also in recent years, with the expansion of the SPFS to more countries, substantial use has been made of TCP and TCDC funding to initiate and implement specific SPFS-related activities in many countries.

71. In terms of using these other types of funding sources, it is the feeling of the Evaluation Team that some clarification would be desirable as to the conditions for their use in the field. For example:

With reference to TCPs, the Evaluation Team was concerned that such proposals normally had a narrow subject matter focus (i.e. in contrast to the SPFS which covers a wide range of activities) and are funded for one year although they can be extended to two years. Also in the field, the opinion was sometimes expressed (e.g. Ecuador and Senegal) that since a TCP is a grant, farmers have to be given the inputs free rather than setting up revolving credit schemes. The Evaluation Team was informed, however, in discussions with staff at FAO Headquarters that TCPs could, under certain circumstances, be designed in a more flexible format, and that revolving credit funds can be set up, with the proceeds from lending being recycled for the benefit of farmers.

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However, the Evaluation Team is still convinced that, as currently perceived and implemented, TCPs are not a very satisfactory method of initiating SPFS activities; and

With reference to TeleFood funds, the Evaluation Team was informed in Haiti that they could not be used for constructing farmer group input supply stores although in Tanzania the Evaluation Team found exactly that being done. Once again perceptions evidently vary from country to country and some clarification is highly desirable.

4.1.3 Guidelines

4.1.3.1 Concept

72. The plan was for FAO Headquarters to produce guidelines that could be distributed to people in the field that gave an overview, rationale and management procedures for the SPFS, and provided guidance both for its formulation and for implementing the various technical components. Specialists from different divisions at FAO Headquarters were to be called upon to help in preparing the guidelines and a Technical Review Committee was to review them prior to publication. Divisions providing staff were to be reimbursed for their time in developing the guidelines.

4.1.3.2 Assessment of Achievements

73. A number of guidelines have been produced most of which are available in English, French and Spanish, and to some extent in Arabic. These guidelines are divided into three groups as follows:

Volume 1 (Overview), consisting of sets of guidelines that provide a general overview, rationale and general guidance for the SPFS;

Volume 2 (Guidelines for Preparing and Implementing Phase I and II), consisting of about 10 main sets of guidelines that are devoted to preparing and implementing Phase I of the SPFS. Two focus on guidelines for the formulation of Phase I (2 parts) and the concepts, process and guidelines for the extension (i.e. expansion part) of Phase I (still in draft form)). Four concentrate on implementing the specific components of Phase I – namely intensification (i.e. demonstration plots), diversification (i.e. three parts including poultry and agroforestry), water control (i.e. two parts), and constraints analysis. There is also a group of five guidelines grouped under agricultural services dealing with: community funds and investment in food production; marketing support for small farmers; farmer groups in food production; promoting input output linkages for small farmers; and guidelines for urban and peri-urban agriculture; and

Volume 3 (Guidelines for Management and International Cooperation), consisting of three sets of papers dealing with management and working procedures (i.e. specifically core teams), cooperation (i.e. dealing with donors and south-south cooperation), and reporting, review and evaluation.

74. These papers are available in hard copy form and on the web. While the Evaluation Team visited the case study countries, explicit efforts were made to ascertain the attitudes about and the degree to which the various guidelines were used. Three major comments can be summarized as follows:

In general, it was apparent that the guidelines, particularly those in Volume 2 dealing with implementing the specific SPFS components have not been, or are not being used as much as would have been expected (e.g. Eritrea, Niger, Mauritania and Tanzania). Reasons given in specific countries included one or more of the following: (a) the guidelines were received too late, that is received after field activities had commenced (e.g. Bolivia and Haiti); (b) were considered too bulky and complicated (e.g. Bangladesh); (c) required translation into a local language (some were translated into Khmer in Cambodia); (d) were never made available to those in the field; and (e) had to be adapted/adjusted to fit the local situation (e.g. Ecuador);

It appeared that some guidelines were used more than others. Specifically, the two that appeared to be most commonly used/appreciated were the water control (i.e. irrigation)

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(e.g. Bangladesh, Bolivia and Ecuador) and the constraint analysis guidelines with their emphasis on participatory approaches (e.g. Cambodia, Eritrea, Ecuador, Haiti and Tanzania). Independent consultants often undertook the CA and used the guidelines, once they were available; and

It is unclear to the Evaluation Team as to how widely the guidelines on agricultural services (e.g. marketing, credit, etc., produced by the Agricultural Marketing and Rural Finance Service (AGSM)), have been distributed as the Evaluation Team found no evidence that they had been used at all in the field.

75. The Evaluation Team was somewhat surprised that greater use did not appear to be made of the guidelines in the case study countries, especially because a great deal of effort and time appears to have been devoted to developing them. However, it is not difficult to agree with the reasons given for their under-utilisation elicited in the country visits. Although there appeared to be guidelines for water management and irrigation development approved as far back as March 1996, it appears that guidelines for the other three components did not become available until 1997 and later. It would be interesting to know whether, in fact, the guidelines are used more intensively in SPFS programmes that have started in the last couple of years when they have been more available. Also, the Evaluation Team agrees that the guidelines are quite detailed and complicated in places. The CA guidelines, in particular, have a rather “catch all” set up. On the other hand, in terms of adapting the guidelines to the local situation it is apparent that this cannot easily be done at the Headquarters level. Rather, this has to be done at the field level, preferably by knowledgeable local people helped by FAO staff (e.g. core team members, FAO sub-regional, regional, or Headquarters-based staff). On the positive side, it is pleasing to note that recognition has recently been given to what has long been recognised elsewhere, namely that credit, input supply and marketing issues (i.e. meso level issues) need addressing even in Phase I, rather than being delayed to the Expanded Phase I or Phase II. As a result, in the last year or two guidelines under the rubric of agricultural services have been developed to address these areas, although as indicated in the preceding paragraph, it is not clear how widely these have been distributed.

76. The Evaluation Team wishes to make two other points about the status of the guidelines at the present time:

a) It appears that there are potentially important guidelines that are not present that could be useful in the field situation. One obvious example is that the guidelines for reporting, review and evaluation are still under preparation, somewhat mystifying given that SPFS dates back six years and the potential importance of evaluation and impact assessment as a factor in determining donor interest in providing future support. The pilot nature of the activities indeed require, by definition, timely evaluation exercises. Also, it is odd that aquaculture and small ruminants appear as potential diversification activities in the standard format document for the diversification component, but no more detailed guidelines exist for these, as they do for poultry and forestry/agroforestry; and

b) Although the guidelines are on the web, they are often not particularly user-friendly, either in terms of accessibility, in terms of content/layout, or in terms of complementing or relating to each other.

77. It is difficult not to avoid the conclusion that the approach to developing the guidelines has been somewhat ad hoc, not only with respect to coverage of subject areas but also in terms of timeliness and planning. Although Technical Review Committees were convened to approve the contents of individual guidelines, each guideline appears to have been treated as a discrete and unique stand-alone entity.

78. The Evaluation Team is convinced that the SPFS could potentially benefit from taking a closer look at the whole approach to producing, organising and streamlining the guidelines. The Evaluation Team recommends that a Guideline Technical Committee is set up for the SPFS with the responsibility of rationalising the approach to planning, producing, and updating the guidelines as a whole, as well as developing a clear and efficient communication strategy.

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79. In conclusion, the Evaluation Team wishes to caution against too much documentation. It believes a degree of rationalisation in the present system is critically important in terms of improving the potential utility of the guidelines. Another cautionary note is in order. Guidelines should be viewed as ‘guidelines’ and nothing more. Slavish adherence to them could be counter productive and inhibit creativity in designing/adapting the methodologies to local situations.

4.2 Organization and Management Structures4.2.1 Concept

80. It was envisioned that a National Programme Coordinator/Team leader, normally employed full time by FAO under the allotted budget, would be responsible for day-to-day management, and a senior government official would normally be appointed as National Coordinator to provide overall guidance.

81. In addition, according to the framework proposed for implementing the SPFS, countries were expected to establish a multi-sectoral and multi-disciplinary national steering committee. Later, in 1997, the DG of FAO, because of apparent weaknesses in national coordination and priority given to the SPFS, directed that existing or new committees should pay specific attention to the SPFS at the following levels:

At the national level, two committees: one for policy, preferably chaired at the prime-ministerial level, with the participation of key ministers; and the other, at the technical level, with the participation of the Directors of Agriculture, Fisheries, Livestock, etc.;

Analogous committees at the regional/provincial levels where the SPFS was active; and A local committee at the level of each of the communities involved in the SPFS.

To the extent possible, it was anticipated that the committees should build from existing food security, and agricultural and rural developmental institutional arrangements.

4.2.2 Assessment of Achievements

82. National Programme Coordinators/Team Leaders of SPFS programmes have been, and are currently still present, in most of the countries visited. The National Programme Coordinators met were relatively senior and experienced and technically qualified in agriculture, often with extension/governmental backgrounds. In general, as a result, at least in the case study countries, the National Programme Coordinator often appeared in practice to act as the National Coordinator of SPFS. However, in at least one country, there has only been a National Coordinator (i.e. Eritrea), while in two countries (Haiti and Senegal), the National Programme Coordinators have been partly or fully funded by the government.

83. The Evaluation Team came to the conclusion that four factors important in determining how effective the National Programme Coordinators have been in guiding/nurturing the SPFS programmes within their countries, are as follows:

The relevance of their skills/experience as far as SPFS-related initiatives are concerned, and their personal and leadership qualities;

The degree to which there has been continuity in the National Programme Coordinator position holder. Ecuador is an example of a country where the National Programme Coordinator was also involved in designing the SPFS, while in Tanzania the same person has been involved in the whole of the implementation phase. In contrast, Bolivia has suffered from a lack of continuity, having had four different National Programme Coordinators;

The degree to which the National Programme Coordinator can focus on the SPFS. In some countries, other part-time responsibilities have detracted from the time spent on SPFS matters, and sometimes also created confusion. For example, a problem arose in Eritrea, where there was no National Programme Coordinator of the SPFS and the official responsible for the SPFS was also coordinator of a Sasakawa Global 2000 project, creating for some the impression that the two programmes were synonymous; and

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How well the National Programme Coordinators are integrated with, and respected by, the national agricultural system, and are linked with the FAO country office. Their office location obviously can help in encouraging frequent contact and hence potential integration. In the case study countries where National Programme Coordinators exist, they are currently all having offices in extension/development related departments, which the Evaluation Team views as a positive feature.

84. However, concerning integration with the national agricultural system or, in essence, the degree to which government accepts ownership of the SPFS, the issues obviously go beyond the office location of the National Programme Coordinator to include those relating to the extent to which SPFS:

Relies on the national agricultural system for implementation of its activities; and Is effectively guided/monitored by a committee(s) within the national setting.

85. In general, central or regional government financed agricultural extension staff have implemented SPFS activities. In one case study country, other sources of funds have been used to hire most of the extension agents for implementing SPFS-related activities (i.e. in the Ambuqui Andean area of Ecuador with funds from the Fondo Equatoriano-Canadiense de Desarrollo (FECD) which is a Canadian-funded national NGO). In another case (Senegal), agents of Farmers’ Organizations and SSC technicians implement most of the activities. Obviously, all other things being equal, it is preferable for government extension agents and Farmers’ Organizations to be used since it builds on resident expertise and directly transfers SPFS experience to the national programme. However, financial, morale, and even technical competence/orientation limitations, often associated with national extension services, undoubtedly have sometimes inhibited their effectiveness in implementing SPFS-related activities. Thus, remedial measures have often had to be implemented by the SPFS to increase the incentive for implementing SPFS-related initiatives. These have included daily allowances for field work, running costs for vehicles, and even sometimes salary supplementation and provision of vehicles.

86. In terms of SPFS guiding/monitoring committees, the situation on the ground, at least with respect to the case study countries, appears very mixed. In general, the situation appears to be better at the local relative to the national levels. Even when the committees exist on paper at all levels, the degree to which they are active appears to be greater at the local level, perhaps not surprising given the ‘micro’ focus envisioned in Phase I of the SPFS. Three factors appear to be important in influencing the degree to which these committees function and how effective they are. These are as follows:

The priority given to the concept of food security in the country; The influence and reputation of the National Programme Coordinator of the SPFS; and Whether matters relating to food security can be successfully attached to/grafted on an

existing committee structure. The small size of SPFS-related projects in many countries appears to preclude the potential for SPFS-related initiatives to be accorded special treatment. In any case, given the multidimensional and multi-sectoral nature of food security-related issues, a strong argument can be made for grafting SPFS-related issues onto an existing committee structure, particularly if it deals with food security-related issues or can easily incorporate them. However, care needs to be taken to ensure that SPFS-related matters are grafted onto the appropriate committee.

87. Another issue relating to the organization and management of SPFS is what happens at the village/farm level. With respect to this, the SPFS makes good use of farm groups, or even as in the case of Senegal, of farmers’ organizations (see Section 5.4.2).

88. Although as indicated above, a number of ingredients are required to ensure that there is a smooth interactive continuum in SPFS, between the national, regional and farm levels, the Evaluation Team believes that a critically important ingredient is having a well-qualified, capable, innovative and influential SPFS National Programme Coordinator, who is widely respected both within and outside the SPFS. Without this and the support of the National Coordinator, it is likely

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that the linkages and integration with respect to the SPFS will not be optimised both in terms of efficiency and of impact.

4.3 Effectiveness of National Inputs4.3.1 Concept

89. Sustainability and growth of the SPFS is predicated on national ownership, which can only be achieved through national responsibility for its development and, to the extent possible, commitment of national skills and resources. This does, however, mean that, to some extent national knowledge, experience, capacity, and resources may limit the programme. Nevertheless, it was considered essential that the SPFS be mainstreamed from an early stage into ongoing governmental and non-governmental national programmes.

90. FAO in its Guidelines for the Formulation of Phase I of the SPFS requires national governments to make some commitment to the design and implementation of the SPFS, as well as making commitments in four specific areas, namely to:

a) Provide staff;b) Make financial contributions;c) Integrate the SPFS into the national agricultural programmes; andd) Provide a monitoring, review and oversight function.

4.3.2 Assessment of Achievements4

91. The starting point of an SPFS within specific countries has been the requirement that the potential host country requests support from FAO for its initiation. The fact that over 80 countries have to date requested such programmes is testament to the interest shown. Achievements with respect to the national commitments listed above are evaluated in other parts of the report. Only summaries of these are given in this section.

92. Participation in SPFS design. As indicated earlier, for a number of reasons, national governments have most commonly, at least in the case study countries, played a rather passive role in the design of SPFS activities.

93. Provision of staff. In general, national governments have fulfilled commitments in terms of staffing (i.e. specifically extension staff), although support/running costs in terms of transport and living allowances in the field, and even salary supplementation payments have sometimes been deemed necessary to enable/facilitate fieldwork and to provide the requisite motivation. Training programmes in techniques (i.e. both technical and analytical) have often also been desirable/required.

94. Financial contributions. It is not possible to give actual figures on financial contributions by governments especially since much of these are included in regular government subventions in supporting the SPFS, such as provision and upkeep of office accommodation, meeting support staff stipends, providing vehicles and related running costs, allowances, etc. In general, it appears that governments, within the limitations of their individual situations, have honoured financial commitments in terms of in-kind contributions. However, as indicated in the previous paragraph, because of the financial difficulties faced by many of the countries hosting the SPFS, these commitments sometimes required direct supplementation from outside sources, particularly with respect to South-South Cooperation.

95. The mobilization of financial resources to support SPFS implementation is an indicator of commitment, and thus, as such, deserves careful examination. Specifically:

In Senegal, the Government has funded the SPFS at an exceptionally high level out of its own budget, firstly by fully paying its obligations in the SSC agreement, amounting to

4 Issues relating to South-South Cooperation are not discussed here since they are considered in detail elsewhere in the report (see Section 4.4).

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some US$ 1.5 million, and secondly and most importantly by contributing US$5 million to the extension of Phase I. This funding has allowed the programme to spread to all parts of the country, the only such case known to the Evaluation Team;

In the case of Ecuador, as indicated elsewhere, a strong national commitment allowed the design and implementation team to go ahead in spite of confusion about FAO’s potential financial contribution. As also already indicated (see Section 3.1.2), the design team -- thanks to its own initiative – formulated a project significantly departing from the design initially proposed in the SPFS guidelines, involving tailoring it to national circumstances, which undoubtedly contributed to what the Evaluation Team believes has been a successful SPFS project;

In China, activities continued after the end of external funding, with the financial support of the Sichuan Province and the Government of China. This undoubted commitment needs, however, to be put in perspective. From China’s viewpoint, a major factor in continuing activities was the expected contribution from AusAid. That did not materialize because of an unfortunate lack of understanding between AusAid and FAO, the latter seemingly not wishing to have AusAid undertake an analytical review bordering on detailed evaluation, prior to approval of funds; and

Inclusion of SPFS activities under a loan agreement has also to be considered as a direct national contribution. For example, in Bangladesh, the Government and FAO were successful in convincing the World Bank to introduce, under the umbrella of the Agricultural Services Innovation and Reform Project (ASIRP), two activities slightly outside the usual SPFS framework, one on crop forecasting and the other on soil testing which, however, is certainly potentially relevant to the intensification component of the SPFS. In Zambia, the IFAD Southern Province Household Food Security Project, which started in 1995, was assisted by the SPFS in farmers’ training, while the SPFS benefited from support for animal traction.

96. Integration of the SPFS into the national agricultural programme. In one sense this has been done in that institutionally it is usually located in extension-related departments. However, in another sense, that is in terms of SPFS type initiatives permeating and influencing other national agricultural programmes, the evidence is much more limited, although there are exceptions (e.g., in the case of Ecuador and Senegal).

97. Provide a monitoring, review and oversight function. To facilitate countries providing a monitoring, review and oversight function, the Guidelines for the Formulation of Phase I of the SPFS specified that committees should be set up at the national level and also at the regional level where SPFS activities were being implemented. In actual fact, for various reasons discussed earlier, this appears rarely to have been done (Section 4.2).

98. In terms of government commitment, another point deserving mention, are initiatives to set up Unilateral Trust Funds (UTFs) using their own resources for use with FAO in SPFS associated initiatives (e.g. Mexico, Nigeria and Venezuela). The Evaluation Team welcomes this development, especially if the countries have enough flexibility to design programmes along the lines suggested in Chapter 7 of this report.

99. In conclusion, the Evaluation Team believes that the case study countries have made genuine attempts to fulfil their expected contributions to the SPFS. However, the effectiveness of their contributions and the degree to which they are likely to be assertive in committing or seeking further support, appears to be very heavily influenced by how much they have assumed ownership of the programme itself. This appears likely to be partly determined by how much they were involved in its design, and very much by the impact the programme has had in terms of results on the ground, as well as in terms of raising national consciousness about the importance of food security related issues and the appropriateness of the SPFS approach in addressing them. Another section in the report (see Section 6.1) addresses the degree to which SPFS has influenced national commitment to food security policies in the case study countries.

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4.4 The Contribution of South-South Cooperation (SSC)4.4.1 Concept

100. The South-South Cooperation (SSC) initiative was launched in 1996 within the SPFS framework. Its objective is to enhance solidarity among developing countries and to enable the delivery of technical assistance (TA) from more advanced developing countries to countries implementing the SPFS. The SSC is aimed at supporting the four programme components and being an integral part of the SPFS. According to FAO, the initiative is providing a new impetus to developing country collaboration. It is a tri- or quadripartite programme funded by three or four partners, which include a cooperating country, a receiving country, FAO and optionally a donor.

101. The approach of the SSC is to provide for two to three years a small team of senior experts posted at the Programme/Programme Management Office (PMO) level, and a substantial number of field technicians with strong practical experience, who will work directly with farmers in rural communities. A significant number of experts and technicians are intended to be fielded to each participating country in order to create a critical mass to maximise impact. It is expected that the teams will not only introduce improved ways of bringing about sustainable and replicable agricultural development, but also through their commitment and example, serve as an important stimulus for change within the communities to which they are assigned. The SSC is to be implemented in phases where gradually the number of cooperants would increase, ultimately up to 100, as the need dictates.

102. The cooperating country provides the TA personnel, continues to pay the salaries, social insurance and other allowances to which cooperants are entitled at home, and any travel cost within the cooperating country.

103. The host country approves the TA personnel, provides counterparts, pays cooperants a monthly subsidy of US$ 300 in local currency, pays associated local and regional travel costs, makes adequate accommodation available including utilities, and monitors and reports on performance.

104. FAO ensures screening of candidates, prepares a Special Services Agreement (SSA) for each TA, meets the costs of international travel, provides technical backstopping, supervision and monitoring, pays a one-time installation grant of US$ 300, and a monthly allowance of US$ 700 for experts and US$ 300 for technicians, to the first group of experts and technicians for a few months in order to launch the project. Then FAO negotiates the payment of these allowances through bilateral or multilateral support.

105. As with much of the SPFS, the SSC has evolved over time and has been a learning process for all partners. In July 2000, the SSC guidelines were updated by including the following new, major elements, which were originally absent:

All recruits undergo a pre-service medical check-up paid for by FAO; Each recruit signs a personal Special Services Agreement (SSA) with FAO; FAO covers the medical costs of SSC staff; and The allowance of US$ 300 provided by the host country is paid in local currency instead

of in US dollars, as was initially the case.

106. A formulation mission report, which is prepared for each collaboration initiative, forms the basis for SSC between the concerned partners, contains the detailed design of the programme and governs implementation.

4.4.2 Assessment of Achievements

107. By the end of August 2001, twenty-two agreements had been signed between cooperating and host countries (see Table 4). In addition, 16 SSC projects had been formulated but had not yet been signed, while 27 other countries had indicated an interest in receiving cooperants. About 242 SSC staff are already posted within the host countries and another 94 are expected soon.

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Table 4: Status of SSC in Countries with Signed Agreements (as at August 31, 2001)a

Date of Signature

Recipient Country

Cooperating Country

Number Experts Planned

Experts/Staff in the Field

Experts/

Technicians Expected Soonb

19-Nov-1996 Senegal Vietnam 100 100

12-Feb-1998 Ethiopia China 30 7

31-Mar-1998 Eritrea India 104 23

10-Aug-1998 Niger Morocco 98 7

19-Oct-1998 Burkina Faso Morocco 102 14 41

11-Dec-1998 Benin Vietnam 19 18

10-May-1999 Mauritania China 71 17

18-May-1999 Tanzania Egypt 100 12c

16-Jun-1999 Gambia Bangladesh 10 3

16-Nov-1999 Djibouti Egypt 29

29-Nov-1999 Madagascar Vietnam 30 17 1

06-Dec-1999 Bangladesh China 80 15

14-Mar-2000 Mali China 94 10

16-May-2000 Malawi Egypt 35

18-Jul-2000 Eq. Guinea Cuba 47 4

22-Aug-2000 Ghana China 51 5

22-Aug-2000 Cape Verde Cuba 20 4 13

5-Oct-2000 Cameroon Egypt 15 8

23-Nov-2000 Swaziland Pakistan 42

16-Feb-2001 Haiti Cuba 17

1-Mar-2001 Mozambique India 94 17

11-Aug-2001 Venezuela Cuba 56

Total 1 244 242 94

Source of Information: TCOS.a. The Evaluation Team visited recipient countries shown in bold letters.

b. Experts/technicians under this column are awaiting administrative action such as issuance of travel documents, medical clearance etc.

c. The Evaluation Team has learnt that Cooperants are being withdrawn.

4.4.2.1 SSC: A Welcome Initiative in a Globalising World

108. FAO's SSC initiative is an interesting and welcome initiative in a globalising world. Many LIFDCs lack adequate technical staff for the introduction of appropriate, economically sound and innovative technologies in a participatory manner to small-scale farmers. The SSC initiative potentially allows developing countries to forge long-term interaction at an operational level, and to share scarce technical expertise among each other at much lower costs than those associated with regular technical assistance programmes. It potentially allows recipient countries to access critically required additional expertise while simultaneously exploiting other ways and means of building up the capacities of their own staff and institutions. It is very evident to the Evaluation Team that there is strong high-level political support for the initiative among many cooperating and recipient countries.

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109. The Evaluation Team found that SSC staff have made significant contributions in a number of the countries visited. These include assistance in water management, design of irrigation structures, improvement of on-farm-irrigation systems including demonstrations in canal rehabilitation, and training in pump maintenance, as well as introduction of technologies for small livestock (poultry, pigs), home gardens, horticulture and hybrid rice breeding. They have also contributed to training activities including Farmers’ Field Schools (FFSs), and demonstrations in useful rice nursery and transplanting techniques, rural finance and marketing.

4.4.2.2 Inadequate Needs Assessment and Project Formulation

110. The concept of SSC calls for a request to be made by the recipient country followed by an offer by the contributing country. This presupposes that the subsequent project will be jointly formulated to meet the needs of the receiving country and will exploit the comparative advantage of the contributing country. In practice, the Evaluation Team has observed that needs are often not well identified and despite the screening of CVs of candidates, the qualifications of staff sent by contributing countries do not always match the priority needs of the recipient countries. This is because CVs do not necessarily capture the range of capabilities required which personal interviews of short listed candidates could do to a large extent.

111. In SSC project formulation the Evaluation Team is of the view that FAO has adopted too much of a top-down approach. Initial contacts are often at a very high political level. Once commitments are made at that level project designers often feel obliged to recommend SSC projects ‘at almost any cost’. This has sometimes resulted in agreements not being signed until long after project proposals have been prepared, and/or reluctance and minor support for the initiative at ministerial level in some countries. In some cases, the consequence has been that SSC personnel have been proposed, and have arrived out of phase with the implementation of SPFS field activities. The somewhat top-down approach contradicts the participatory approach, which is the principle underlying all aspects of the SPFS, including SSC.

112. The Evaluation Team found that, in a number of countries visited, SSC cooperants are replacing rather than adding to local human resources. Where locally trained technicians are unemployed, SSC cooperants have been brought in to perform duties which local technicians could be employed and trained to perform, with positive implications for sustainability of technical advice to farmers. Even where the necessary technicians are not available, the Evaluation Team feels that SSC designers have often not adequately explored the cheaper and more sustainable alternative - from the host country perspective - of having small numbers of cooperants train or retrain and mentor local technicians who could be employed for much less than even the US$ 300 paid by the host country for each SSC technician.

4.4.2.3 Qualifications and Experience of Cooperants

113. The Evaluation Team observed that the formal educational qualifications of SSC personnel generally correspond to the requirements of their jobs. Relatively successful recruitment has taken place in the case of Chinese cooperants assigned to Bangladesh, and Vietnamese assigned to Senegal. However, the cooperants in many cases have a narrow specialised research and/or academic background instead of broad practical experience, as is often required by the host countries, and are usually not very familiar with participatory approaches or methods. This has sometimes made it difficult for experts and technicians to perform adequately in their field assignments, despite their long working careers at home. To give some examples, the poultry specialist assigned in one country was obviously highly competent in advising large-scale poultry farms but lacked experience with reference to backyard poultry projects, the norm in the host country. In another case, irrigation specialists were mainly drawn from national-level irrigation institutions specialising in large-scale schemes rather than on-farm irrigation small-scale irrigation schemes, which need to be designed with a minimum of sophisticated tools. At the technician level, relatively mature people have often been selected who find it difficult to live in the housing often available to field technicians in host countries. They are also reluctant or unable to travel extensively by motorbike.

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114. Often the minimal understanding by cooperants of the socio-economic conditions of the host country has limited effective project implementation. In most cases, induction courses to help overcome these difficulties have not been organised for new cooperants. Furthermore, cooperants lack local or even official language and communication skills that are central to interacting with technicians and rural communities. The language problem has caused severe restrictions to the effectiveness of cooperants in some countries, to the degree that interpreters have had to be engaged. SPFS should ensure that cooperants have the necessary language capability to perform their duties. The Evaluation Team believes that it would be much more cost-effective to have a small number of technicians with adequate language skills than large numbers who require use of interpreters to perform their duties.

4.4.2.4 Implementation Issues

115. Inadequate resources: SSC projects usually assume that the host country will be able to shoulder the resource commitments detailed in the agreement. Although, as indicated above, the salary costs are usually much lower than those for normal technical assistance programmes, the numbers involved usually mean a heavy burden on government treasuries. It is already evident that the single largest problem faced in the implementation of the SSC is with respect to the difficulties faced by host countries in honouring their resource commitments. This is expected to be exacerbated in future as the number of cooperants increase.

116. Gender issues: Attention to the gender dimension of the programme, for example, in terms of recruiting both men and women experts and technicians, did not appear to the Evaluation Team to be of much concern in the SSC. The Evaluation Team found little evidence of such concern either in the documentation, or during discussions with FAO staff in the field or at Headquarters. The Evaluation Team encountered female technicians in only one country visited. However, the Evaluation Team learned from TCOS that some cooperants in other countries are female, although the statistics do not disaggregate SSC staff by gender.

117. Lack of provision for home leave: In most of the SSC agreements there is no provision for home leave for cooperants who are expected to spend two to three years without seeing their families, who do not join staff members in the host country. The Evaluation Team finds that surprising in view of the expectation that cooperants should have substantial experience, and therefore are most likely to be mid-career technicians with families. The lack of home leave provision is proving to be a problem for most SSC staff interviewed by the Evaluation Team, especially the more senior ‘experts,’ as well as for the SPFS Coordination and Monitoring Service in Rome. FAO will need to find a solution to this problem, or change the profile of expected cooperants to young, unmarried staff that are likely not to feel so much pressure to return home during a 2-3 year assignment overseas.

118. Lack of synchronisation with other field activities: Cooperants have not been available in some countries at the critical time of pilot phase implementation due to a time-consuming recruitment process and/or the SSC agreement coming later. In Bangladesh, Eritrea, Niger and Tanzania, cooperants arrived when the pilot phase was at an advanced stage, with reduced funding and/or follow-up funding not yet effective. It goes without saying that operating with limited funding has had an impact on the motivation of SSC staff, which is reflected in the ultimate results. Implementing the SSC out of step with the SPFS components has hampered impact maximisation.

119. SSC as a learning process: The SSC is considered by FAO to be a learning process, but does not appear to be fully using the lessons from similar programmes. Many types of TA programmes have existed in the past. Several countries have volunteer programmes, NGOs send various categories of staff to developing countries, and the UN itself has the United Nations Volunteer (UNV) programme. There is much experience that the SSC could benefit from (e.g. the need for field level technicians to have adequate knowledge of local languages and to go through a rigorous orientation exercise). Other SSC related problems, which could have been anticipated based on the experience of others, include the fact that a personal contract is required for each

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cooperant, annual leave arrangements need to be made in one way or other, and medical issues such as a pre-service check-up, and cost responsibilities need to be well-defined.

4.4.3 Overall Assessment

120. The Evaluation Team observes that the results of the SSC initiative are in general valuable. They are, however, relatively modest when related to the considerable efforts made by FAO to build SSC programmes, the time invested by all parties concerned, as well as the costs involved. The latter might have given higher returns and produced more sustainable effects if spent on nationals, often unemployed and willing to work at grassroots level. It should be pointed out that the vast majority of techniques demonstrated by SSC technicians are not particularly innovative and are generally well known by national researchers in the recipient countries. However, the Evaluation Team is of the view that SSC should not be assessed solely by its economic cost/benefit ratio, but also by its contribution to strengthening of South-South relationships, an issue outside the scope of this evaluation.

121. Given the high political support the programme enjoys it needs to be continued. However, FAO should take steps to correct the shortcomings indicated above. The Evaluation Team recommends that there should be a tripartite review of the programme in each country. The focus should be on carefully assessing the true needs of each host country to determine the level of expertise needed (i.e. low, medium or high), and matching those needs with the available technical and human resources of contributing countries. The Evaluation Team is of the view that in most cases it would be more cost-effective to use small numbers of cooperants with adequate language skills, to train and mentor local experts and technicians, rather than the current approach of trying to deploy large numbers of cooperants to directly work with farmers.

4.5 Role of Other International Agencies and Donors4.5.1 Concept

122. In terms of funding, FAO envisions its financial role as primarily catalytic in helping to initiate SPFS activities in the different LIFDC countries. Following demonstrated success, it would then be in a position to attract donor funds for an expanded Phase I when SPFS-related activities could be expanded to all agro-ecological areas of the country and then later to Phase II when macro policy-related issues relevant to food security could be addressed. However, donor related contributions have also been welcomed, when feasible, even at the initiation of SPFS activities.

4.5.2 Assessment of Achievements

123. The roles of other international agencies and donors with reference to SPFS activities in the case study countries can be divided into three periods, at initiation, during implementation, and prospects for the future:

a) At initiation. In general, other international agencies and donors do not appear to have been involved much at the beginning of SPFS activities in the case study countries. Apart from Italian support for SPFS activities in Eritrea and Senegal (Expanded Phase 1), there are no other examples of planned donor contributions at the initiation of SPFS activities in the case study countries (see Section 3.1.3);

b) During implementation. A number of international agencies contributed to the SPFS, directly and indirectly, for instance UNDP (Zambia), WFP (Senegal), IFAD (Zambia), the World Bank (Bangladesh), the French Cooperation (Haiti and Senegal), the Italian Cooperation (Senegal), DFID (Bangladesh), the Japanese government/cooperation (Tanzania/Niger), DANIDA (Eritrea), as well as NGOs such as a Canadian-funded national NGO in Ecuador, AFRICARE and World Vision in Zambia, and the WIN projects in Cambodia and Zambia. Most of these contributions are, however, of a modest amount (see Section 6.2), one of the largest being the Italian grant to SPFS in Senegal (US$ 1.58 million); and

c) Future prospects. These are dealt with in Section 6.2.

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124. Although the Evaluation Team noted that there has been some cooperation with other international agencies and donors in a number of case study countries, it senses there have been missed opportunities. It is apparent to the Evaluation Team that in some countries initiatives of other donors have been complementary to those of the SPFS. However, rather than being systematically/explicitly sought and nurtured/exploited these appear to have happened by chance. The Evaluation Team believes there would be merit in systematically examining, and where feasible, establishing practical working relationships/linkages with other international agencies (i.e. including NGOs), right at the outset of SPFS planning. This would not only improve the multiplier impact of SPFS, but would also improve the possibility of identifying funding for continuing SPFS.

125. The Evaluation Team believes that there is little value in starting the SPFS in a country if there is little prospect of a continuation. Discussions with TCOS revealed that FAO has signed or is in the process of negotiating Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with a number of international agencies (e.g. World Bank, ADB, IDB, IsDB, IFAD, WFP, UNDP, BOAD and the ECOWAS Fund) to support SPFS type initiatives in a number of countries. Although this appears to be a promising development in improving the sustainability of funding of the SPFS, the Evaluation Team believes it may help funding prospects even more if, rather than asking donors to subscribe to/provide support for, SPFS initiatives already on the ground, they were instead requested to indicate where FAO funding for SPFS could best be inserted into their own programmes in the recipient country. That would encourage donor support for food security type initiatives proposed by FAO. Obviously, care would need to be used in applying such an approach, in the sense that it should also reflect the interests of the recipient country which would need to be involved in approving and implementing such arrangements. However, FAO is primarily a technical not a donor agency, and such a posture more in keeping with its mandate/expertise might be advantageous. As indicated earlier, the Evaluation Team is convinced that evaluation and impact assessment are critically important in determining whether donors are likely to be interested in funding future SPFS-related initiatives.

126. There are two other points the Evaluation Team wishes to make with reference to FAO funding and funds channelled through FAO:

a) FAO funds can play a potentially important role in leveraging local (i.e. national) funds. In the Tarija Prefecture of Bolivia, the Evaluation Team was told that if FAO would continue providing some funding, it would send a positive signal to the Prefecture that the SPFS initiatives were worthy of continued support and hence increase the chances of continued funding from the Prefecture; and

b) Some international agencies are becoming increasingly reluctant to pay the 13 percent overhead attached to channelling funds through FAO. The Evaluation Team was informed in Ecuador that funding of a further phase of the SPFS by FECD may be in jeopardy because of insistence on this overhead.

5. PILOT FIELD OPERATIONS

5.1 Selection of Sites5.1.1 Concept

127. The SPFS guidelines stipulate initially focusing on high potential areas defined as having good potential for increasing production and good economic potential in terms of accessibility to markets etc. Generally, these have been interpreted as areas having good irrigation possibilities, and preference has been given to these. Recently some attention has also been paid to peri-urban and urban agriculture.

128. Many of the LIFDCs have emphasised that while focus in high potential areas represents a coherent development strategy, it does not provide an early response to the needs of the majority of rural food insecure households, who are poor and predominantly found in more marginal areas. More recent SPFS documentation has recognised the need for some orientation towards lower

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potential areas and the intention to pilot potential improvements in all agro-ecological zones of the country (i.e. known as Expanded Phase I).

5.1.2 Assessment of Achievements

129. The initial focus on quick results in the higher potential areas has obviously influenced the process of selecting SPFS sites within the case study countries. The Evaluation Team found that one or more of the following selection criteria were used by the participating countries, particularly with respect to the water and intensification components:

The presence of an irrigation scheme with existing irrigation infrastructure. This appeared to have been the major selection criterion in most of the countries visited;

Accessibility - e.g. accessibility of sites to roads which could easily be visited by extension agents and farmers (China), or accessibility to markets (Ecuador and Bolivia);

Coverage of different agro-ecological zones within the country (e.g. Ecuador and Senegal), although the selected sites by and large were still confined to the more productive areas; and

Some sites selected were recipients of earlier development projects, leading the Evaluation Team to wonder whether this might on occasion have been used as a criterion for site selection.

130. Food insecurity at the household level did not appear to be used as a criterion for site selection in most of the case study countries, because the degree of household food insecurity in the sites selected, although it existed, was unquestionably lower than in more marginal areas (see Section 7.1).

131. The sites for the diversification component in the case-study countries often corresponded with the sites for the irrigation and intensification components (e.g. Bolivia and Ecuador). However, rather than specific site criteria being used, selection criteria often appeared to focus on specific groups of the rural population (e.g. women’s groups for horticulture, small livestock or value-added post-harvest activities). This meant they were sometimes located in other sites, not necessarily congruent with the sites selected for the irrigation and intensification activities.

132. The Evaluation Team concluded that most of the areas selected for SPFS activities are likely to be the best as far as potentially increasing national food sufficiency but in terms of improving individual household food security the impact of SPFS would likely have been higher in the lower potential areas (see Section 7.1).

133. The Evaluation Team believes that the more recent reorientation of the SPFS to include some lower potential areas is welcome, not only because the needs of more vulnerable households have a better chance of being addressed by the SPFS (see Section 7.1), but because the likelihood of successfully transferring approaches and especially results from high potential areas to more marginal production environments is likely to be highly problematical.

134. In terms of transferability across agro-ecological zones the diversification component probably has more flexibility and adaptability than the irrigation and intensification activities. In this sense there has been merit in diversification activities not always having been congruent (i.e. in the sense of being on the same sites) with the irrigation and intensification activities. However, this has a downside in two senses, namely:

a) This must complicate the management and coordination of activities by the beneficiary committees (i.e. farmer groups) although, on the other hand, such activities were likely to address the needs of more needy groups; and

b) It reduces the potential complementarity and synergy explicit in the multi-faceted strategy required to address food security, particularly at the individual household level (see Section 7.3.3).

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5.2 Selection of Target Beneficiaries 5.2.1 Concept

135. In the SPFS, the principal beneficiaries have been perceived as ‘small and emergent’ farmers and their households. The SPFS concept also stresses that the programme is demand driven and is to be adjusted to each country’s needs and experience. The idea is that the SPFS is a continuing learning process, which evolves and adjusts according to the experience and results achieved during implementation.

5.2.2 Assessment of Achievements

136. As the SPFS recognises the demand-driven approach and the desirability of adjusting to local needs and experiences in targeting potential beneficiaries, it is to be expected that the ways they are selected are likely to vary. In the case study countries, three different approaches have been used in selecting direct beneficiaries to engage in the demonstration activities. These are:

a) The participatory approach, when the farmers themselves in their groups or committees have nominated the demonstration farmers, generally being those they view as being capable, trustworthy and well respected (e.g. Ecuador, Haiti and Senegal), as well as having the time to attend Farmers’ Field Schools (e.g. Cambodia);

b) Selection by the SPFS project team (e.g. Bolivia and Bangladesh), consisting of those they feel are able to shoulder the risks (i.e. particularly with respect to innovations that required some capital investment such as irrigation channels and equipment), and who were thought to be potentially good at disseminating the experience acquired; and

c) A more mechanistic approach, for example: in Bangladesh, where once villages and irrigated areas were selected, all landowners and sharecroppers in those areas were included in the pilot operations; and in China where, in two water control villages, all farmers were included as demonstration farmers.

137. The Evaluation Team considers that, all other things being equal, the farmer participatory selection of demonstration farmers is the best in terms of incentives offered to beneficiaries themselves, and believes it perhaps could be used even more widely than has been the case to date. However, the issue still arises as to how other farmers, attending the demonstration activities, and participating in credit groups and training sessions, became involved. It appears that in most cases, but not always, they were members of the community where the demonstration farms were, and joined because of their personal motivation and interest. Thus, more farmers have been targeted indirectly via training activities in most of the project sites, but the Evaluation Team has some doubt as to the effectiveness of such activities when they are not directly linked with implementation initiatives (see Section 5.5.1).

138. The Evaluation Team strongly endorses the extensive use of farmer groups and organisations not only for participating in SPFS activities but also in disseminating information on the results. However, it is important to understand the modus operandi for successful formation, operation, and sustainability of groups, and to understand under what conditions such groups might or might not work (see Section 5.4.2.1).

139. In the case study countries, many of the demonstration farmers are market-oriented, selling their products to wholesalers or directly in the market and purchasing a considerable part of the foodstuffs they consume. They were generally clearly above average in terms of not only economic but also in terms of political, educational and social status, implying that more disadvantaged farmers were less likely to be selected by the farmers themselves or by the project team. Targeting small but emergent farmers, especially in the higher potential areas, gives a quick and more visible result in terms of production and hence income increases. However, marginal farmers, having less potential in terms of productivity improvement, could have been more involved in the promotion of other income-generating activities (i.e. diversification).

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140. Women were represented to some extent in demonstrations, although this was more likely to be the case in the diversification rather than the intensification component. While not represented to the same degree as men, the Evaluation Team felt that taking into account the social, cultural and economic context, there was reasonable representation of women. One possible exception was the case of Eritrea, where up to 30 percent of the households are, de facto, headed by women (i.e. because of the war and the border-related issue) but women only constituted about 15 percent of the demonstration farmers.

141. There was little evidence in the case study countries of specific efforts at identifying vulnerable groups (i.e. the more food insecure households) or targeting initiatives at them. To the extent that women are perceived to constitute such a group, they have been specifically targeted. As indicated earlier, women in fact tended to be particularly well represented in the diversification or value-added type activities supported by SPFS directly or indirectly through TeleFood projects which, however, are of very small size.

5.3 Selection of Technologies for Testing5.3.1 Concept

142. The idea was from the outset that demonstrations would rely on methods and techniques that could be sustained in the absence of a project, and would not require such factors as inputs that could not be mobilised through the market, or require unreasonable additional amounts of labour.

143. Also, according to the SPFS guidelines, technologies demonstrated should not only be acceptable/attractive to farm households (i.e. technically feasible, economically viable, and socially acceptable) but should also have no negative and preferably a positive environmental impact. With reference to ecological considerations, themes have included eco-friendly intensification approaches such as Integrated Pest Management (IPM), Integrated Plant Nutrition Systems (IPNS), and the integration of trees and other crops for soil and water protection, fodder and fuel, into the farming system.

5.3.2 Assessment of Achievements

5.3.2.1 Irrigation and Water Management

144. The demonstration of improved water intake structures, gates and water distribution boxes, compacted earth or, alternatively, concrete lined secondary canals, as opposed to traditional temporary ditches, was widely appreciated and requested by the farmers in most of the case study countries. However, the Evaluation Team found that due to very limited project resources, such improvements could be evaluated only on a very limited scale and then only with in-kind contributions from the beneficiaries themselves, or with help from other larger projects. Very often, the technologies, even if relatively low-cost, were still beyond the financial capacities of farmers in the absence of credit affordable to them.

145. Demonstration of improved irrigation techniques on farm (e.g. furrow, border and basin irrigation, use of siphons of different dimensions for different crops, and of gated pipes which are particularly suitable for sloping land) in contrast to the currently used traditional flood irrigation, was more likely to be associated with Technical Cooperation Programme (TCP) activities. The Evaluation Team strongly opposes the strategy of providing equipment and materials (e.g. gated pipes, cement) to the demonstration farmers in the form of a grant, since the object of demonstrations is to encourage adoption by other farmers (see Section 5.4.2.3). Obviously grants are not feasible for all farmers and thus successful dissemination of such techniques is only likely to occur in conjunction with a credit programme.

146. In the Sahelian countries visited (i.e. Mauritania, Niger and Senegal), irrigation and water management or intensification on irrigated sites, components were not dealing with the most crucial issue: the frequent breakdown of ageing pumps, which were purchased years ago at

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heavily subsidized prices and for which no provision for maintenance and replacement was set aside. This issue should be addressed by the SPFS through policy dialogue at the macro- and meso-levels with credit institutions, farmers’ organizations and private enterpreneurs, as well as with donors having experience with this recurring problem and the means to address it.

5.3.2.2 Intensification

147. In most of the case study countries, complete technological packages, including land preparation, appropriate water management for irrigation, crop varieties, crop spacing, fertiliser, and pest/disease control measures for the targeted crops, have been evaluated/demonstrated. The Evaluation Team found evidence that sometimes some emphasis has been placed on the rationalisation of input use, specifically through reducing the use of chemicals, which sometimes are over used (i.e. particularly on vegetables), with the help of IPM. Some work has also been done with respect to crop rotations although often the existing rotations were considered to be satisfactory.

148. The crops demonstrated have usually been those commonly grown in the area, although occasionally there were examples of new crops from outside the area being introduced (e.g. vegetables in Bolivia, fruit trees in Mauritania). Obviously, in such cases it is important if widespread adoption is to be encouraged, for such ‘production’ oriented demonstrations to be complemented by a consumer education/sensitisation campaign indicating the merits of the new production and information on how they can be prepared for consumption.

149. Most technologies selected for field testing by the SPFS are reasonably appropriate. However, it is evident to the Evaluation Team that some technologies chosen for demonstration should have been better screened prior to their inclusion. For example, in Zambia, it was fairly obvious, given the price of maize and fertiliser, that maize hybrid in the Southern Province and improved maize in the Western Province were unlikely to yield an economic return. Liming was also most unlikely to be economic in view of transport costs, and bird problems associated with millet production were well known. In Niger, monocrop rotations introduced in one site went against existing practice and led to poor results. The technique was already known but not adopted for good reasons. A more participatory approach would have avoided such a situation. In Haiti, some varieties did not prove to be suitable (e.g. rice in terms of fertiliser levels and composition, and maize varieties) and some adjustments were required. Thus, the Evaluation Team feels that sometimes not enough care was taken in the initial selection of the technologies for demonstration.

150. The demonstration of organic farming practices was appreciated in some countries (e.g. in Ecuador and Haiti). However, there was no deliberate attempt to address the ‘organic’ produce market because there is no form of organic product certification in either Ecuador or Haiti or indeed an explicit ‘organic’ market where a price premium would be paid for such products. Thus, the attractiveness of ‘organic’ production as far as producers are concerned is confined to ideological convictions and to possible cost savings in terms of not purchasing inorganic fertiliser and other chemicals.

5.3.2.3 Diversification

151. A wide range of activities has been undertaken including: Home gardens (i.e. containing food and vegetable crops, fruit trees and medicinal plants,

and using humus/compost with worms); Value added activities including processing (i.e. threshing and shelling) and marketing

(i.e. jam making, cleaning, polishing and packaging beans); Egg, broiler, goat, sheep, pig and guinea pig production; and Aquaculture and fish and rice farming.

Training, sometimes including, but unfortunately not always, economic analysis, has been an important activity in facilitating their introduction and helping their acceptance.

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152. Although perhaps not strictly a diversification type activity, an activity that appears to be particularly promising in certain countries in facilitating such activities is setting up, under some form of farmer group ownership and management, input supply stores and product marketing outlets. The potential advantages of these activities are as follows:

With reference to inputs, improving their availability and accessibility and enabling them to be purchased at a price discount as a result of buying in bulk;

Improving accessibility to expensive equipment that would not be economically feasible to purchase; and

Providing a means for temporary storage of products to combat and take advantage of seasonal price variations.

153. Examples of the above in the case study countries include: Input supply stores in Haiti, which are under the control of the central farmers’

committees; Machinery and equipment stores in Bolivia under the control of farmers’ groups and

housed at the farms of demonstration farmers; and Input supply stores, combined with food grain marketing outlets in Tanzania, which are

under the control of farmers’ groups.

154. Some of the diversification type activities have been funded from other sources. Examples are Telefood projects relating to small livestock (e.g. Eritrea), stores (e.g. Tanzania) and production group activities (e.g. broiler and jam making activities in Ecuador). Donors have also occasionally been involved (e.g. DANIDA with reference to egg production in Eritrea).

5.3.3 General Issues

155. The issue of the financial viability of the demonstration packages appears generally to have been inadequately addressed in most countries. The Evaluation Team questions the utility of demonstrating technologies that are not likely to be profitable and/or are delivered to the farmers in the form of grants or at costs that are subsidised implicitly or explicitly by the SPFS. Obviously, the probability of spontaneous adoption by farmers is likely to be very low.

156. The Evaluation Team got the impression that there was a general paucity in terms of innovative improved technologies being demonstrated. That and the problem enunciated in the preceding paragraph imply that SPFS should liaise better not only with extension and other development-oriented projects, but also with academic and research institutions within the countries. This would not only ensure that all potentially available technologies are considered but also that such institutions would provide adequate assistance in assessing ex ante their potential economic viability. In addition, expertise in those institutions could be enlisted in helping to screen and approve any dissemination materials/leaflets prepared by the SPFS project team.

157. As discussed later in the report (see Section 7.3.3), the Evaluation Team believes that because the SPFS focuses on food security which, particularly at the household level, has a significant seasonal dimension, it is important in selecting technologies for demonstration, that specific attention is focussed on smoothing out the income/production stream throughout the year. The Evaluation Team believes this aspect has received insufficient emphasis to date.

158. The Evaluation Team believes, to the extent possible, the emphasis of the SPFS should be on demonstrating options from which farmers can choose rather than trying to deliver a complete technological package of improved technology in which one or more of the components might not be viable.

159. Although some attention has been paid to environmental related issues, the Evaluation Team believes that this has been very deficient (see Section 7.3.3). More of a systems, rather than just a commodity, approach would be of value in helping to tackle, more explicitly, environmentally related issues.

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5.4 SPFS Approach5.4.1 Concept

160. The SPFS was designed to use demonstrations and training sessions as a means not only of providing farmers and entrepreneurs with insights into possible desirable technological changes, but also to provide the opportunity to explore in a participatory mode with farmers, the constraints relating to the shortcomings of the technologies being demonstrated and how these might be overcome. This highly participatory process, which recognises the central role of the farmer as the decision-maker, is intended to empower farmers and improve the relevancy and attractiveness of the technologies being demonstrated.

5.4.2 Assessment of Achievements

5.4.2.1 Enhanced Participation and Empowerment of Local Stakeholders

161. Participation is now generally recognized as a key element in any development policy, not only as a means to foster democratic debate and encourage creativity, but also on efficiency grounds since the stakeholders need to be involved in the decisions that affect them, thus encouraging them to commit themselves to attaining objectives that have been jointly defined. In spite of the rigid design characteristic in the early days of the SPFS, national authorities were able to modify it when conditions for prioritisation of food security issues existed in the country. At the local level, the extent of participation, and particularly of women’s empowerment, has been dependent on the general political orientation of the country, on the administrative culture of the organizations involved, and on local sociocultural circumstances. In a few countries, CA allowed some local participation in designing, but mainly in redesigning, activities that had already been implemented to some extent. In Ecuador, this exercise went beyond a simple list of constraints through the use of the SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) techniques in redesigning/implementing SPFS initiatives.

162. Four important examples of ways in which farmers were able to become more involved (i.e. participatory) and empowered in SPFS activities in the case study countries were through the use of:

Farmers’ organizations; Farmers’ groups; Farmer Field Schools (FFSs); and Water Users’ Associations

163. Farmers’ Organizations. The involvement of farmers’ organizations in the Senegal SPFS should be the model of reference for SPFS even in countries with less powerful organizations. Discussions of this model in the sub-region and across sub-regions should be encouraged and supported by FAO. From the start of the programme, full operational responsibility was entrusted to two sub-regional farmers’ organizations: UJAK (L’Union des Jeunes Agriculteurs de Koli Wirndé) in the Senegal river valley and CADEF (Comité d’Action pour le Département du Fogny) in the lower Casamance, both belonging to the same federation – FONGS (Fédération Nationale des Organizations Non-Gouvernementales du Senegal). With the extension of the programme to additional sites, responsibility for its operation and financial management was given to the operational and technical group ASPRODEB/AGEP (Association Sénégalaise pour la Promotion de Petits Projets à la Base/Agence d'Exécution des Projets) of the apex organization CNCR (Conseil National de Concertation et de Coopération des Ruraux) which currently consists of 19 Federations. Micro-projects and activities have been formulated by the organizations themselves at the grassroots level in consultation with local authorities and according to the SPFS general guidelines, then sorted out at the regional level before being submitted to a national approval committee. The latter includes representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Finance, National Council on Food Security (CNSA) in the Prime Minister’s Office), ASPRODEB and FAO. To have entrusted farmers’ organizations with the formulation and execution of projects is to be highly commended. It is to be replicated elsewhere whenever

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possible, provided the temptation of interference with the needs expressed is resisted by FAO, as discussed earlier.

164. Farmers’ Groups. In addition to the unique case of use of Farmers’ Organizations in Senegal, SPFS has made good use of farmers’ groups in many countries, not only as a means of improving efficiency in terms of focussing activities on a number of farmers at one time and location, but also as a means of empowering farmers to help themselves, and to elicit their help in improving the impact/multiplier impact of SPFS activities through the dissemination of promising initiatives. In some countries (e.g. Ecuador and Haiti), farmers’ groups within communities or related to secondary canal water users’ associations have representatives on SPFS initiated central farmers’ committees which in essence provide a coordinating and overseeing function in terms of the farmers’ committees operating in a specific area, and also represent their interests in contact with outside organizations. Undoubtedly these have, and continue, to play important roles, for example, in reducing conflicts over water accessibility, providing a modus operandi for introducing group owned agricultural input stores, etc. The Evaluation Team strongly endorses the concept of farmers’ groups used extensively in organising and implementing SPFS-related activities but recognises that it is important to understand when they are not relevant or appropriate. Two specific situations or examples are the following:

a) It is important to recognise under what circumstances communal group activities are expected to and are not expected to work effectively. For example, in Bolivia, there were efforts to introduce group implemented demonstration plots involving men in an area where men tended to be very individualistic in their approach to farming and marketing. Not surprisingly these communal plots proved not to be popular or feasible and consequently the SPFS eventually resorted to individually operated demonstration plots; and

b) It is important that groups need a cause or reason for staying together (e.g. engaging in an activity that requires or benefits from collective action ensuring equitable access to a common property resource such as water). Thus, when the SPFS encourages group formation, it is important to give some thought to the potential sustainability of such groups in the long run. In the Portoviejo area of Ecuador, for example, farmers’ groups were formed under the SPFS that are unlikely to continue now that external funding has ceased. It might have made more sense to have used the existing water users’ groups that are likely to continue and, as a result, might help perpetuate some of the SPFS-related activities (e.g. collective learning and group-initiated activities).

165. Farmer Field Schools. Farmer Field Schools (FFSs) in Cambodia and Zambia were excellent examples of farmers selecting among options offered to them as to what best fits their needs and capacities. The extension officers’ role then becomes one of facilitator of knowledge building, and instead of relaying centrally contrived extension messages, they relate to locally relevant problems emerging from the FFS field study. The FFS participants (25-30 persons) meet regularly throughout the season from pre-planting to harvest, to learn about the various activities and to decide how to manage the activities chosen. In Cambodia, women actively participated in FFSs and stated clearly they found the knowledge acquired, not only beneficial for their activities, but that it also improved their social status.

166. Water Users’ Associations (WUAs). Although in some of the case study countries there was, prior to SPFS, some local control of water use, the SPFS has played an important role in supporting and improving the efficacy of the approach, and in helping to introduce it in other countries. This strategy is congruent with the current developmental philosophy of handing responsibility for managing common property resources back to local communities. In the case of water, thanks to the support of SPFS in management and conflict resolution types of training, farmer responsibility for its allocation/distribution is being encouraged through local Water Users’ Associations (WUAs). In several countries, SPFS has introduced WUAs as a way to ensure local ownership of the irrigation and drainage structures built, and to ensure participation in their operation and maintenance. The sustainability of WUAs is predicated on the orderly

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payment of water fees and the building-up of sufficient funds for maintenance and repairs. Members are being sensitised no longer to expect public funds for such purposes and/or the usual sequence of rehabilitation projects. This is most clearly manifested in the case in Cambodia where farmers, because of the turmoil they have experienced, do not have a dependency culture. However, there are potential issues that need to be appreciated and possibly addressed in encouraging such ‘collective’ type initiatives. Three examples are as follows:

a) Individuality should not be suppressed. For example, the preference for individual water pumps in Zambia, has to be taken into account in WUAs operations;

b) Land tenure issues tend to be kept in the background and not squarely addressed by SPFS. In Bangladesh, for example, where land owners, tenants and share-croppers cultivate side-by-side in the same irrigation blocks, and relatively large landowners and tube-wells owners tend to dominate WUAs, the issues at stake are not only technical and yield-centred in nature, but also relate to profitability, social sharing of costs and benefits, impacts on land tenure, and to power relationships; and

c) The role of women tends to be rather limited in WUAs, which tend to be male-dominated.

5.4.2.2 Extension and Irrigation Services

167. Extension and other support services, largely in the public sector, have until recently, played critically important roles in facilitating agricultural development. However, in the last decade or so there have been two fundamental changes in the approach to development in the form of downsizing of government services and the move to decentralisation of development initiatives accompanied by the encouragement of local responsibility and empowerment. The SPFS has been influenced by these paradigm shifts and, as indicated in the preceding sub-section, responded in a constructive manner. Two government-sponsored institutions that, as a consequence, have been heavily influenced by the changes, have been the extension service and irrigation related departments. Specific examples of the way in which such types of changes have affected the operation and efficacy of SPFS activities are given in the following paragraphs.

168. Extension Systems. Government supported extension staff are having to adopt a less directive and more participatory modus operandi. There is, however, often an in-built resistance among extension staff, particularly as farmers manage, in their own intuitive way, complex production environments, while extension staff are trained in a more fragmented and linear manner, often giving great priority to yield maximization and much less priority to farm management analysis. In one of the countries visited by the Evaluation Team, it was observed that extension workers accepted that farmers did not follow all their advice for very good economic reasons. However, extension staff had a distinctly ‘top-down’ attitude to the application of recommendations and did not themselves adequately question their validity (e.g., fertiliser recommendations) in the context of changing relative prices and subsidies, and in the light of specific local experience. Not surprisingly, the Evaluation Team observed that some of the field level extension staff provided under SSC also had a somewhat ‘top-down’ orientation or approach. Undoubtedly in some cases this tendency was reinforced by language and cultural barriers, which make the application of participatory approaches, even if desired, more difficult.

169. Irrigation Departments. The engineering culture that dominated most government associated irrigation departments has, in the light of the paradigm changes mentioned above, had to change. Departments have had to divest control of schemes to local communities/groups and hence to become much more sensitive to issues relating to local participation. Increasingly Departments are having to pay more attention to water use efficiency related issues rather than just water delivery systems per se. SPFS has, in some of the case study countries, facilitated such a change in focus.

5.4.2.3 Use of Subsidies

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170. The SPFS has two ways of making extensive use of subsidies, namely through providing inputs and marketing services free to participating farmers, and giving inputs at subsidised prices and interest rates.

171. Provision of Inputs and Marketing Outlets. Governments often used to play significant supportive roles in distributing inputs and marketing of products. Unfortunately, the private sector in general has failed to fill the lacuna left by government no longer providing such services. The SPFS via, for example, TeleFood funding, sometimes has helped fill the void through various types of farmer group initiatives. Free inputs are provided to demonstration farmers generally when the capital inputs required of farmers are substantial. This is, for example, often the case in irrigation structures where capital equipment amounting to 30% – 60% of total investment cost is given free, the rest being the contribution of farmers in kind for locally available items like sand, stone and unskilled labour. Free inputs are also often given in the intensification component for purchase of farm implements and post-harvest equipment, and even for purchased annual inputs such as fertiliser and chemicals, especially in West Africa. The Evaluation Team believes that making such free gifts to farmers is counter-productive to the long run sustainability of the project. Instead, it recommends that all inputs, including capital inputs, should be provided on credit. That way, all farmers, including demonstration farmers, will have to make the decision as to whether to take the risk of trying out the new technology. Of course an appropriate ‘insurance’ mechanism can be built into such pilot activities by compensating farmers who, through no fault of their own, incur losses rather than the benefits anticipated by the SPFS.

172. Provision of Credit. As indicated above, the Evaluation Team is not in favour of giving grants, but a dilemma arises when the cash flow/savings situation of farmers does not permit the necessary investment, and no form of institutional credit exists. Consequently in the case study countries, the SPFS has often extended credit, both on an individual and group basis. It is difficult to come to any firm conclusion as to the efficacy of such efforts, although based on discussions and the limited amount of documentation available, it appears that:

Group responsibility for repayment was usually superior to individual responsibility – and examples were found where groups were formed specifically to access credit (e.g. Bolivia), and sometimes evolved out of groups that had already come together for other purposes (e.g. demonstration activities in Tanzania); and

Repayment rates were reportedly often quite good, although there was a tendency to forgive repayment in times of stress (e.g. bad years). Also, interest rates were invariably subsidised by the project. Thus, using a revolving fund credit approach, the usual modus operandi, will result in no funds being available for credit after a few years.

173. Subsidies in SPFS credit schemes result from two elements: a purchase or sale price that is below the market price (e.g. Haiti and Eritrea), and an interest rate that is below the going market rate, which is always the case. Subsidised input prices in Eritrea and Haiti are the result of provision of fertiliser and inputs by foreign donors to the government, which passes them on to all farmers. In such cases, the Evaluation Team recognises that it would be virtually impossible for a project like the SPFS not to provide the inputs to its farmers at the subsidised prices. However, the ‘true’ market price should always be used in sensitivity analyses of results when the economic viability of the tested technologies is being assessed.5

174. The use of subsidised interest rates is currently under much debate among rural development practitioners. While classical economists, including most of the multilateral aid agencies, continue to maintain that such subsidies should not be given because of the potential of distorting the private credit markets, there is an increasing number of economists who maintain that such subsidies can be justified because of market failures which tend to drive private market interest rates above equilibrium rates, not to mention the great shortage of such credit, in most rural areas, despite progress with building up micro credit institutions in many developing

5 As indicated earlier (see Section 5.3.3) such economic analysis is usually conspicuously lacking in the case study countries.

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countries. The Evaluation Team believes that subsidised interest rates can be justified for a project like the SPFS when it is part of national policy.

175. Credit was usually given directly by the project rather than, what the Evaluation Team considers to be a superior approach, namely being channelled through relevant financial agencies. The Evaluation Team supports the notion of group responsibility for credit but is concerned that the SPFS has not generally linked the notion of compulsory savings with micro-credit. The limited success that SPFS has had with reference to credit initiatives constitutes a weakness. This is because it not only inhibits the likely sustainability of the results achieved on the selected sites, but also because it limits the extension of the technological packages and institutional arrangements promoted by the project to less affluent farming households in areas with non-existent or feeble rural financial institutions. In the future, self-help credit groups need to be developed in partnership with national and international partner agencies having both experience and resources in the savings-credit area, which the Evaluation Team views as a critical component in the strategy for alleviating food insecurity, particularly at the household level.

5.5 Results Achieved in Pilot Field Operations

176. Since the different production components of SPFS (i.e. water management, intensification, and diversification) were sometimes executed together, component specific results are difficult to isolate, particularly with respect to the water management and intensification activities. Results are therefore discussed together in this section, although attempts are made to separate them whenever possible, in order to illustrate their differential impact.

5.5.1 Adoption of Improved Technologies Demonstrated

177. For a programme such as the SPFS, which attempts to get farmers to adopt improved technologies by demonstrating them to a small group (i.e. demonstration farmers), one can distinguish four categories of adopters:

a) During project implementation -- farmers who have been informed about the technologies (e.g. in FFSs, and decide to use them on their farms);

b) During project implementation – non-participant farmers who decide to use the technologies;

c) After the period of project implementation – project farmers who continue to use the technologies; and

d) After project implementation – non-project farmers who decide to use the technologies.

178. Systematic evidence of the degree of adoption/uptake of the technologies demonstrated by the SPFS is not available, partly because the SPFS has not systematically collected such information and partly because many of the projects are on-going, or have only recently ended. The Evaluation Team therefore had to form impressions from interviews with stakeholders during its field visits. The SPFS should make an effort to systematically document evidence of the uptake of its technologies according to the four classes of adopters given above.

179. The Evaluation Team was made aware of the first type of adopters in at least three countries, specifically in:

Cambodia, where farmers who had attended the FFSs purchased inputs and practised what they had learnt;

Senegal where middle-class urban households are adopting micro-garden technology; and

Tanzania, where the technologies and methods being demonstrated were being taken up, more or less as promoted, with the exception of those for maize where line planting and use of farmyard manure and improved varieties was adopted, but the application of fertilisers and mono/sole-cropping were not, especially in the dryer Dodoma region.

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180. In many other countries visited, the farmers indicated that they learnt a lot during training sessions. However, in general the Evaluation Team found that very few farmers who had not received project inputs, were able or willing to put what they had learnt into practice as they could not ‘afford’ to purchase the necessary inputs. This is particularly true where relatively large capital inputs were required (e.g. improvement of irrigation and water management systems and purchase of land preparation or post-harvest equipment). Adoption would also be clearly constrained where market outlets do not exist or are very limited (e.g. for Nuoc nam in Senegal).

181. Although the Evaluation Team was told on a few occasions that there were cases of the second type of adopters, this could not be substantiated. However, it is important to note that this type of uptake is facilitated by the irrigation component in the SPFS. Farmers who have not directly participated in project activities may have benefited from increased water supply as a result of improvements in irrigation systems, including improved water use efficiency among project farmers. They may therefore be more willing to intensify or diversify their production systems in ways similar to those advocated by the SPFS.

182. Evidence of the third and fourth types of uptake was found in Zambia where project activities officially ended in 1998, as well as in West Africa. The Evaluation Team observed that farmers are adopting those technologies that have proved to be viable without project subsidy. For example:

In Zambia, in Western Province a cassava variety that gave both higher yields and reduced the production period from three years to 18 months. In Southern Province, cowpeas were adopted as a garden vegetable, and open pollinated short season sorghum varieties are continuing to spread slowly. However, farmers did not adopt hybrid maize, and fertiliser was not generally applied, as it was not economic. Also, following project completion farmers went on to purchase 1,900 treadle pumps (US$ 40-50 each) on credit in an IFAD-financed project. They had also extended areas under irrigation with their own resources -- probably at least doubling their irrigated areas; and

In Senegal, Mauritania and Niger improved rice varieties, such as Sahel 108 and 202 are widely adopted as they have demonstrated their superiority at constant cost. Their spread is further supported by bulk purchase through cooperatives or similar mechanisms. Technologies requiring higher input costs or capital costs have not been adopted, even when they have been shown to have high benefit/cost ratios in demonstrations, because of a lack of cash-flow and affordable credit facilities.

5.5.2 Effect on Household Food Security

183. Generally, households directly affected by SPFS field activities were limited in number, usually a few hundred (see Annex 3). The low numbers are understandable given that in all but one country (i.e. Senegal), the SPFS has not gone beyond the pilot Phase I.

184. In virtually all demonstrations significant increases in crop yields were obtained for the packages tested. However, it should be noted, as indicated earlier, that in many cases these yield increases had been demonstrated earlier within the countries, and that only in a few cases were the technologies being demonstrated particularly innovative. In a few instances (e.g. when incorrect fertiliser combinations were used for irrigated rice in Haiti), yield differences were not significantly different from farmers’ existing practices.

185. Apart from their contribution to crop yield/production increases in association with the intensification component, irrigation activities which have involved investment in structures and strengthening of WUAs have contributed to increased water supply to farms in the dry season because of increased water capture and greater water use efficiency by farmers. This has led to an increase in areas under cultivation by participating farmers and increased crop intensity (e.g. from two to three crops per year in northern Haiti), as well as diversification into cultivation of second season vegetables (e.g. Bangladesh and Tanzania), and into fish farming (e.g. Cambodia and China). The effect is thus likely to be a positive boost to household income.

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186. Although systematic calculations of actual financial and economic returns to the improved technologies tested are not generally available, it is clear that in most cases the demonstration farmers, at least, obtained increases to their household incomes due to the yield increases as well as to the subsidies involved in receiving the inputs, which were substantial in the case of irrigation demonstration farmers. However, for the latter there are clearly after-project sustainability issues linked to input availability, subsidies, credit and technical support. As already stated the Evaluation Team found very little evidence of uptake by non-demonstration farmers and results of economic and financial returns obtained by them.

187. On occasion, farmers reported that the significant yield increases did not translate into corresponding increases in household income. For example :

In Ecuador, although the yields of some crops (i.e. beans in Ambuqui, and beans and other crops in Portoveijo) were increased somewhat compared with pre-SPFS levels, the extra return in the market place failed to materialise, because of the depressed markets resulting from implementation of Plan Colombia, thereby closing the Colombian market, and the dollarisation of the Ecuadorian currency. The major benefits of the crop intensification activities are cost reductions in terms of reduced chemical use, particularly with reference to pest/disease control through implementation of scouting techniques, and the introduction of organic farming techniques; and

In the case of the improved rice technology in the south of Haiti (i.e. improved variety and fertiliser), the increased yields were obtained at a time when market prices were on the decline because of the impact of increased levels of imported rice in the local and regional markets.

188. The diversification component had particularly pervasive effects on household food security. Beneficiary households were able to improve their food security by improving household incomes from sale of produce, and/or through direct improvement of household food nutrition, particularly of vulnerable groups such as children and women, through the increased supply of protein-rich products like milk, eggs and vegetables.

5.5.3 Effects on Gender Equality

189. There are instances in which the Evaluation Team noted that women were benefiting from SPFS activities, especially those relating to the diversification component. For example:

In Ecuador, women and women groups have been the major and almost exclusive focus of diversification activities. Since women are important in handling the nutritional aspects of households, improving their income potential is likely to improve the nutritional content of the diets of their households. As is shown elsewhere (see Section 5.3.2.3), a wide and impressive range of activities has been undertaken, including home gardens, and health and nutrition related activities. Many of the diversification activities appear to be highly profitable;

In Eritrea, TeleFood projects have helped women to increase their herd/flock sizes. The package consists of improved veterinary health and feeding practices. The Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) provides some training and a committee for the programme is established in each village. The committee consists not only of beneficiaries but also of representatives from the village council and the women’s association;

In Bangladesh, Cambodia and China, the diversification component impacts women directly. Technologies reported upon favourably by these groups included the home gardens and fish production. In Bangladesh, NGOs contracted by the project for group strengthening activities trained womens’ groups in pilot areas on a variety of crop diversification and home gardening techniques;

In Bolivia, Mothers’ Clubs were specifically targeted for intensification related initiatives. However, it is important to note that women do not, in the Bolivian setting, necessarily constitute a vulnerable group, since men and women within the household participate in decision making, activities, and the resulting production/income streams; and

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In Mauritania, Niger and Senegal, the diversification component mainly benefited women, whether as a result of vegetable growing, sheep fattening, poultry raising, or, in the case of Senegal, honey production.

190. Despite the examples above, it is the view of the Evaluation Team that the SPFS has not made a deliberate effort to explicitly mainstream gender equality in its country programmes and projects. The recent FAO Gender and Development Plan of Action 2002-2007 presents a suitable framework to mainstream gender equality in the SPFS. In pursuit of FAO’s mission to help build a food-secure world, it aims at removing the obstacles to women’s and men’s equal and active participation in, and enjoyment of the benefits from, agricultural and rural development. It emphasises that a transformed partnership based on equality between women and men is an essential condition for people-centred sustainable agricultural and rural development. Three objectives of the Plan of Action are particularly pertinent to the achievement of the SPFS goals: (a) promote gender equality in access to sufficient, safe and nutritionally adequate food; (b) promote gender equality in the access to, control over and management of natural resources, and agricultural support services; and (c) promote gender equality in policy- and decision-making processes at all levels in the agricultural and rural sector.

5.5.4 Effect on Vulnerable Groups

191. As indicated earlier (see Section 5.1.2), SPFS site selection criteria led the activities to be initiated in areas of participating countries which were certainly not areas with the most vulnerable or food insecure rural households. Even in the high potential areas where the projects operated, SPFS activities did not particularly target vulnerable groups (e.g. landless labourers). Consequently, it is the view of the Evaluation Team, that the SPFS has had a minimal effect on vulnerable groups in the countries in which it has operated. In only one instance (i.e. Bangladesh) did the Evaluation Team identify a situation where there might possibly have been a positive impact on vulnerable groups. Comments by some farmers indicated the daily wage rate during the transplanting season had increased significantly as a result of SPFS intensification activities. This effect could be compounded by the impact of expanded land cultivation within the WUAs (see Sections 5.4.2.1 and 5.5.5). Such wage increases will obviously directly benefit landless labourers.

5.5.5 Effects at the Community, Regional and National Levels

192. As indicated earlier, proportions of rural households benefiting from SPFS activities in all the case-study countries were very small. Consequently, there has been only limited impact on food security at the community level, and virtually none at the regional or national level. The Evaluation Team could discern limited community level effects in a few of the countries visited. For example:

In Tanzania, community food security improved somewhat because more food and more nutritious foods were available on the local market, including eggs, milk, meat and fish. Also, at least one of the TeleFood supported stores was buying maize at a better price than farmers could obtain in the market (i.e. due to transport costs) but at a price which they believed would enable them to realise a substantial margin, through reselling the maize back in the village market later in the year;

In Bangladesh and Haiti, where all individuals in the selected WUAs are involved in the irrigation component, the improved canals have increased the irrigation command area within each WUA, so all landowners and sharecroppers are potentially beneficiaries of such extensions, whether or not they are participants in the project;

In Ecuador, the potential for irrigation has been, or is being, increased, but the benefits relating to rehabilitation and extension of area irrigated cannot be solely attributed to the SPFS since there has been close collaboration with the government sponsored authorities responsible for irrigation related activities (i.e. the CRM in Portoveijo and CORSINOR in Ambuqui). These linkages have been critically important in facilitating the community wide payoff from irrigation related activities under the SPFS;

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In Haiti, WUAs have been promoted in each area with adequate secondary canals (e.g. Laverdure) and influential central farmers’ committees have been established. Members of those committees have been trained, and have been successful in reducing the degree of water use related conflicts in the communities; and

In Senegal, because of expansion of the SPFS to all agro-ecological zones, it is expected that there will be significant favourable effects at the community level, especially as a result of the diversification component.

193. Finally, because SPFS human resource development activities such as FFSs, field days, and other training activities have usually involved other farmers, in addition to those associated/linked with demonstrations, it is likely that there could have been some community, regional and even national effects, however small. Where these activities may become institutionalised in normal extension activities (e.g. FFSs in Zambia and Cambodia), the impact is likely to be greater.

6. OTHER GENERAL EFFECTS/ISSUES OF SPFS

6.1 Effect on National Policies

194. The World Food Summit has certainly raised awareness of the crucial importance of food security. The SPFS carried this momentum further by contributing to the preparation of new instruments of food policies in some of the countries visited, namely in Ecuador and Tanzania and, to a lesser extent, in Senegal and Bangladesh. The varying degrees of the SPFS contribution depend on the commitment of individuals or groups, the state of consensus building on a national food policy, the evolving food situation in the country, and/or political changes which have occurred since 1996.

195. In one group of countries visited, the SPFS has had a major effect on food security policy. For example:

In Ecuador, the commitment of the SPFS National Coordinator and his team, along with the support of FAORs, have played a pivotal role in the drafting and signing of the Presidential Decree of January 1998 establishing a National Food Security System and making food security a state policy. In 1998, the National Assembly adopted an amendment to the Constitution explicitly declaring that food security is a ‘basic citizen’s right’. The Planning Commission is preparing a Food Security Strategy Towards 2025 and the SPFS Coordinator contributed also to the drafting of the Food Security Law, which is currently awaiting ratification by the Congress;

In Tanzania, the Technical Advisory Committee of the Comprehensive Food Security Programme supported the SPFS approach which, in turn, had a positive influence on food security policies. The strong national commitment to food security is reflected in the title and functions of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security, and in the continuation of SPFS activities after cessation of major FAO support;

In Senegal, the high visibility of the SPFS has contributed to the setting up of the Interministerial Committee on Food Security which has, however, not met since its first meeting in 1999 under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister. Its Executive Secretariat has, to date, not yet received any funding. Following the political change in the country, the Agricultural Policy Unit of the MoA has been requested by the Prime Minister to evaluate the SPFS and the Group on Strategic Thinking (GRS) in order to contribute to the formulation of a food policy; and

In Bangladesh, which attained national self-sufficiency in the late 1990s, the evolving food situation, and several political changes, have not contributed to maintaining the high degree of priority given to food security during the World Food Summit, as the idea of a National Plan of Action to attain food security by the year 2010 was the outcome of the Rome Declaration and Plan of Action. During implementation, however, the SPFS became one of many projects addressing agricultural and rural development issues and its small size and fragmentation in three quite separate components did not give it great

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visibility, including within the Department of Agricultural Extension, a large unit with more than 20,000 staff. No systematic learning about farmers’ circumstances, constraints and preferences has been derived from the On-Farm Water Management Pilot Programme and, as a result, the SPFS has contributed little, if at all, to the ongoing national debate on food security issues and policy in the country.

196. In another group of countries visited by the Evaluation Team, the SPFS did not have an impact on the overall food or agricultural policy as such, but has contributed to some elements of it:

In China, the SPFS helped support the move of the Sichuan Province authorities towards a less directive and more participatory agricultural extension system. Such an experience could be usefully directed to the most food insecure areas, particularly in Western China;

In Zambia, FFSs have recently attracted a lot of attention and appear to have the potential for being mainstreamed among participatory approaches being used for extension; and

In Cambodia, the relatively weak ownership of the SPFS by the national authorities resulting from insufficient flexibility in the design, is making mainstreaming of the potentially valuable FFS approach in the national extension system somewhat difficult. Nevertheless, the Evaluation Team did detect some SPFS influence as several of its elements have been adopted by other projects in specific geographical areas.

197. In the other case study countries, SPFS has had no discernible impact on national policies, which do not include yet a major and/or specific focus on long-term food security.

6.2 Effect on the Donor Community

198. The Evaluation Team considers that the SPFS has had no noticeable effect on donor strategies as such. Some initiatives and approaches might have had a little influence but not to the extent of modifying donor strategies.

199. The most intense interaction so far between FAO and a donor has been the FAO/DFID joint analytical study of the application of sustainable livelihood approaches in the SPFS. The study concluded that the underlying concepts and principles of the DFID Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SLA) are embedded in the implementation of the SPFS in Tanzania, and recommends further incorporation of SLA within the SPFS. The SPFS is not viewed as having had an effect on the DFID strategy, but rather the reverse is the case. The study perceived a potential for further collaboration, provided SPFS:

Develops linkages between pilot phase activities and the wider socio-economic, institutional and policy environment;

Seeks integration/collaboration with other rural development programmes; Develops linkages with sectors other than farming; and Adopts a more systematic approach that will allow a better appraisal of the impact of

programme activities on food security and livelihoods.

These recommendations, and others, if followed by FAO, would have the effect of broadening the SPFS strategy.

200. The DFID approach is congruent with the views of other donors, who generally feel the SPFS approach should be broader. Most of the donors involved in food security issues target their interventions on the most food insecure areas, households, or even individuals, and address income-generating activities or even, if not explicitly, livelihood systems. Their initial perception of the SPFS as rigid in design, ‘top-down’ in orientation, narrowly centred around crop yields, and addressing, not the most food insecure areas, but high potential areas in order to quickly achieve results leading to national food self-sufficiency, has, in most cases, persisted even though a more flexible and broader approach has, in recent years, been adopted by the SPFS. Once perceptions have been created it is difficult to change them, particularly in the absence of a credible reporting/evaluation system. Donors’ perceptions are therefore largely dependent on oral

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communication, with all its strengths and weaknesses, unless they visit the field itself as, for instance, has been the case of DFID, CIDA and the Belgian Cooperation.

201. When they know about the SPFS at all, donor representatives met by the Evaluation Team at the country level tended to perceive it as very small relative to their own programmes. That view contrasts with the ambitious goal of the SPFS to developing new approaches to be taken up by large investment programmes and bankable projects. FAO and Government officials tend to view the financial dimension somewhat differently. For instance, the support of the Government of Japan to the SPFS in Bangladesh of US$ 3.3 million for a period of five years (i.e. 2001-06) is considered a remarkable achievement for the SPFS by FAO. However, this annual support of US$ 0.66 million is, only a tiny part of the JICA annual programme in Bangladesh, which in 1999 amounted to US$ 226 million in grants alone. Another example, in the same country, is the SPFS component of soil testing and fertility management (i.e. US$ 0.33 million for the period March 2000-December 2002), which is part of a very large programme financed by the World Bank/IDA and DFID. Among the six organizations implementing soil testing activities, one NGO (BRAC), has a projected budget for the year 2001 of US$ 152 million. The relative financial contributions of partner agencies should not, in principle, be an impediment to influencing strategies at the qualitative level. However, for this to happen there would need to be remarkable achievements.

202. While SPFS achievements have not appeared to impact donors’ strategies, they have, however, generated some donor support in the countries visited, as has been shown earlier (Table 3).

6.3 Cost-Effectiveness of the National SPFS

203. No credible cost-benefit analyses or rates of return at the project level are available. The absence of monitoring and evaluation at the project level, which the Evaluation Team was informed would divert resources from implementation, is viewed by the Evaluation Team as a weakness in a pilot project. Extension and replication of technological packages and institutional arrangements require, in addition to spontaneous diffusion, an active dissemination policy supported by credible economic/financial data, particularly if there is a desire to attract donor funding.

204. In such a situation, there is little that the Evaluation Team can say about the cost-effectiveness of the SPFS. It is not possible to estimate the cost per farmer and it remains to be seen whether the benefits accruing to the participating farmers are sustainable and over what period of time. Furthermore, data on the number of non-participating farmers adopting the techniques are not available, even in relative terms. As shown in Section 5.5.5 the Evaluation Team is of the view that there has been little impact of SPFS at the community level and none at the national level, except as noted above, in some cases at raising awareness of the crucial importance of long-term food security issues.

7. OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF SPFS

7.1 Lessons From the Past

205. When the SPFS started it had what the Evaluation Team feels was a rigid design. It was also required initially that it be implemented in those areas where there was the potential for rapidly increasing production. These areas were characterised as being where there were irrigation possibilities. It was envisioned that the production focus would help solve food security problems both at the household and national levels.

206. It soon became apparent that the early ‘micro’ oriented production focus was insufficient to ensure progress in solving the food security problem and that ‘macro’ and ‘meso’ type issues were important in enabling production increases to occur, and in ensuring benefits accrue to the producers. Over time, the implementation of the SPFS has become ‘less rigid’ and ‘more flexible’ as exemplified in the evolutionary table provided by the FAO Regional Office for Latin America

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and the Caribbean (see Table 5). Thus, practical realities in implementation have compelled SPFS programmes to incorporate elements in the early part of Phase I that were previously conceptualised as being dealt with in Phase II or at the earliest during the expansion part of Phase I. Such initiatives have been found to be particularly appropriate when they can be addressed at the local level without requiring changes in policy.

Table 5: Evolution of the SPFS over time in Latin America as given by the FAO Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean

1995 Start 1998 End 1998 2000

Bolivia Ecuador Central America Venezuela

Technological transfer

Food crops Crops and small livestock

Crops, livestock, aquaculture, seaculture and primitive fisheries

Food crops Irrigation Production systems Production systems

Irrigation Sub-systems Irrigation Irrigation

Linkages: Markets and Agro-industry

Linkages: Markets and Agro-industry

Linkages: Markets and Agro-industry

Constraints analysis Constraints analysis

Soil conservation Micro-watershed conservation

Water sources and watershed conservation

Nutritional education

Nutritional education Promotion and organization

Promotion and organization

Management of development

Note: In fact, the Evaluation Team as a result of its visit to Ecuador, felt the situation there was closer to that depicted for Central America

207. In addition to the design flaws, which became apparent in implementing SPFS activities, another problem of a more conceptual nature became apparent to the Evaluation Team during the visits to the case study countries. This relates to the likely trade offs between fulfilling the goals indicated in the guidelines for the SPFS for addressing food security at both the national and household levels. In general, the stipulation of initiating SPFS activities in higher potential areas is likely to be better in addressing the issue of improving national food security. Poverty, and hence individual household food insecurity, is likely to exist in such areas but by the same token it is likely to be less acute than in less promising agricultural areas.6 As a result in the case study countries, in general the sites selected for SPFS activities have been of relatively high productivity, compared with the more marginal areas where the degree of malnourishment in rural areas is higher but the potential for increases in agricultural productivity is lower. Thus, although in the opinion of the Evaluation Team the areas selected for SPFS activities are likely to be the

6 While the numbers of relatively poor may be fairly high in high potential areas, the type of strategy that the SPFS focuses on, namely improving agricultural productivity, may at best only benefit such households indirectly (i.e. through creating seasonal employment opportunities since many are likely to be landless). Some types of diversification activities may provide some direct benefits but, the most useful strategy for helping such households is likely to be outside the remit of specific SPFS activities, e.g. creation of off-farm employment.

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best as far as potentially improving national food security, in terms of improving individual household food security, the impact of SPFS would likely have been higher in more marginal areas. This suggests trade-offs between the stated laudable goals of improving both household and national food security.

208. The rigid type design that characterised the SPFS at its inception had another downside in the sense that, because it was not flexible, it was not amenable to being adjusted to the specific priorities and strengths of countries and consequently sometimes probably inhibited the development of collegiate relationships and a sense of ownership on the part of some SPFS countries. It was also introduced as a stand-alone programme not linked to other ongoing or planned activities of other agencies including NGOs.

209. Another issue which became apparent during the visits to the case study countries was that the time initially planned for the pilot part of Phase I of the SPFS, namely two or three years, was far too short, and the number of selected sites were too small, to have any major impact, on production and food security strategies. Participatory approaches, if they are to be effective, take time, and this combined with annual variations in climatic and socio-economic conditions and the time required to develop sustainable input distribution and product marketing outlets, obviously all imply the anticipated time period was too short. In fact, in the visited countries, where explicit SPFS activities were still being implemented (i.e. excluding Zambia), the major focus, except in Senegal, was still on the sites and communities where such activities were initiated up to five or six years earlier. Success of the SPFS type of approach is very dependent on the strength of the institutional structures, including extension, input distribution, marketing and credit systems. Where there are deficiencies in this, it is very unlikely that a two to three year period will be sufficient to demonstrate impact. Evidence of implementing the expansion part of Phase I (i.e. extending SPFS activities to all agro-ecological zones in a country) was only found in Senegal, although plans do exist on paper for other countries. Also, there is no country that has entered Phase II of the SPFS.

210. Given the above issues, what can be done to improve the design and implement SPFS activities in the future that will improve their potential efficacy, impact and acceptance to both national programmes and potential donors? To address this, the Evaluation Team first assessed what the current strengths are of the SPFS, which help provide a useful foundation on which future initiatives can be built. Based on this, the Evaluation Team then agreed on what should be the major focus of the SPFS. This then led to a consideration as to what might be the optimal strategy for the SPFS to adopt.

7.2 Strengths of the SPFS

211. The SPFS, as it currently exists, has a number of positive characteristics or strengths, not always shared by other donor and FAO-supported programmes, that deserve recognition and can be usefully built on in designing and implementing future SPFS-related initiatives. The major ones are as follows:

It helps nurture national consciousness about food security and in principle encourages national ownership and responsibility for SPFS-related initiatives;

It focuses attention on agriculture, food and nutrition, which have often tended to be eclipsed in discussions concerning poverty, ignoring the fact that agriculture is the backbone of most poor countries, and certainly of the rural sectors, and that countries, not only individual households, often do not have adequate means to purchase food;

It recognises, at least in theory, that the most efficient approach to dealing with food security issues is using a participatory approach at all levels and establishing linkages from the national to the field level and that empowerment of people (i.e. particularly farming households), to seek information and options, to make and take responsibility for their decisions and to influence outcomes, both individually and collectively, is facilitated/nurtured via the use of farmers’ organizations, groups and Farmers Field Schools;

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It recognises and gives priority to the fact that in many low productivity systems, water availability is the primary natural constraint to agricultural development, but in doing so it also recognises that solving the problem of food security requires a multifaceted and integrated strategy not only involving water management but also intensification and diversification. It has also in recent years increasingly recognised the importance of water use efficiency and water harvesting related initiatives in situations where water is not readily available, for example in semi-arid/arid areas, particularly where the potential for irrigation is limited or non-existent;

The diversification activity to supplement household incomes during food insecure parts of the year is particularly important in helping women, who often have the major responsibility for raising the children and feeding all household members; and

SSC initiatives have strong political and financial support among countries in the South, and have received some funding from donors in other parts of the world.

7.3 Alternative Future Approach for the SPFS7.3.1 FAO Should Prioritise Countries for SPFS Related Initiatives

212. The SPFS is currently being implemented in 62 countries. However, a major concern of the Evaluation Team is whether, given the limited resources (i.e. financial and human) available to FAO, it has the capacity to deal adequately with all the countries currently eligible for SPFS. Currently, the criterion for eligibility to participate in/benefit from the SPFS is generally based on being a Low-Income Food Deficit Country (LIFDC), although a few of the countries currently included in the SPFS do not fit that criterion.

213. The advantages of using this criterion are that: FAO has the mandate and the responsibility to serve all its members (i.e. rich and poor),

with an accepted emphasis on the needs of the poor; The LIFDC criteria are clear cut, verifiable and are an internationally agreed definition

also used for eligibility for non-emergency food aid; and It covers most of the food-insecure countries.

214. On the other hand, the problems of using this criterion are: There are currently more than 80 LIFDCs that are FAO members, which relates to the

issue raised above about very limited resources available to FAO. In addition, even non-LIFDCs can opt to participate in the SPFS;

The LIFDC category does not reflect the extent of malnutrition, although such figures are published annually by FAO in The State of Food Insecurity in the World (SOFI).7 Also, the LIFDC category includes relatively prosperous net agricultural exporters such as Egypt and excludes relatively poor countries, such as Vietnam and Uganda that have a comparative advantage in the export of cereals, coffee, etc.; and

No account is taken of the political will for rural development which is reflected in the HIPC initiative or of the extent to which needs are already being addressed by other programmes.

215. After consideration of the above factors, the Evaluation Team has come to the conclusion that some form of prioritisation of LIFDC countries is necessary in order to prevent the limited resources of FAO being spread too thinly and to improve the prospects for impact of the SPFS. The issue is what criteria should be used in the prioritisation process. The Evaluation Team feels the criteria would differ according to whether the country is planning an SPFS project or whether the country is desirous of continuing an SPFS activity started earlier.

216. For a country wanting to initiate an SPFS activity. The Evaluation Team suggests that four criteria should be considered once a country (i.e. usually an LIFDC) has expressed interest in an SPFS activity:

7 However such data do not cover all countries, are not as reliable as LIFDC data, and are not as widely accepted as LIFDC data.

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a) Incidence of hunger and malnutrition in the country;b) Potential institutional infrastructure in place to support an SPFS initiative (e.g. are

extension and support services adequate in the public and/or private sector, can governmental policies allow an essentially bottom-up farmer driven participatory approach to addressing food security);

c) Availability of unexploited developmental opportunities (e.g. availability of appropriate technology options, diversification possibilities, accessibility to relevant marketing opportunities), especially for marginal areas; and

d) Potential for complementing, or integrating with, planned or ongoing national or donor initiatives.

217. For a country wanting support for continuing an SPFS activity initiated earlier. This would be based on the same criteria as those for initiating an SPFS activity given in the preceding paragraph, plus three others, specifically whether:

a) An explicit national commitment has been made to addressing food security issues;b) Government has assumed ‘ownership and leadership’ for the SPFS; andc) Satisfactory progress has been achieved in terms of adoption of the principles of the

SPFS approach, the results obtained, and there is potential for national and/or donor support.

218. Because of the position of FAO, as a global organization, needing to be sensitive to, and equitable in its treatment of FAO member countries, particularly the poorer ones, the Evaluation Team suggests that this prioritisation exercise should not be viewed as a means of excluding certain countries. Rather, it is suggested that low priority as far as FAO supported SPFS type initiatives are concerned should be translated into high priority for other FAO initiatives (e.g. help in strengthening and/or upgrading of the extension service), particularly for those that could help rectify the deficiencies identified as reasons for the country receiving low priority for SPFS. Also, in some situations, prior to proceeding further to continue SPFS-related initiatives (i.e. in the SPFS terminology, the expansion of Phase I) it may be appropriate for FAO to assist food security development in other ways including the policy setting, institutional capacity building for development in marginal areas, and assistance in such areas as early warning, disaster preparedness and organization of targeted food safety net programmes.

7.3.2 SPFS Should Give Greater Priority to Household Food Security

219. The Evaluation Team fully supports the emphasis placed on food security by the SPFS but as indicated earlier, it is concerned about the possible trade-offs between household and national food security. To resolve the issue, the Evaluation Team suggests consideration is given to the following:

For countries that are not food self-sufficient it is proposed that SPFS should give equal priority to areas within countries that have good potential for increasing production as well as more marginal areas. The Evaluation Team appreciates that the expansion part of Phase I is supposed to address all agro-ecological areas in the country but it is likely that the expansion strategy will need to be implemented in steps and hence in the process the more promising areas would receive major priority. Although generally food security is interpreted by the international community in broader terms (i.e. ability to produce and/or purchase food), the Evaluation Team is sympathetic with the notion that poor, highly indebted countries often lack the necessary foreign exchange to purchase the necessary food quantities to supplement domestic food production. Consequently, national food self-sufficiency is a legitimate concern as it contributes to insulating the countries from the vagaries of the market place; and

For countries that are self-sufficient or nearly self-sufficient in food production (e.g. Bangladesh, Cambodia and China), the Evaluation Team proposes that the SPFS focuses on agricultural areas where the greatest degree of household food insecurity exists – that is if the conditions outlined in the preceding section can be met. This means that attention will be focussed on the poorer agricultural areas of the country.

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7.3.3 Factors to Consider in Designing Specific SPFS Initiatives

220. Based on the Evaluation Team’s observations earlier in the report, it recommends that three basic principles should underlie the initiation or extension of SPFS initiatives in specific countries. These are:

a) The design should build on the strengths or characteristics of the SPFS as it currently exists, and outlined earlier;

b) The shift in design from a rigid or package driven approach to one that is more flexible and ‘people driven’ based on meeting needs, grasping opportunities and alleviating constraints, should be further reinforced. Specifically, this means moving away from a focus on production to also include economic, financial and social dimensions, input/product marketing and credit related initiatives. These would be approached through giving farming households the analytical tools and means to become empowered and to be able as far as possible to influence and control their own destinies; and

c) In the design exercise, the priorities and comparative advantages of national governments and donors should be recognised and, as a result, ways should be sought to develop SPFS-related initiatives congruent with, and in partnership with, national governments and donors rather than trying to focus on marketing a fixed approach and modus operandi. This would allow SPFS designs to benefit from the experiences of development partners who would be fully associated in the programmes rather than seeking their support ex-post.

221. In the design exercise itself, there are six specific areas that the Evaluation Team believes should receive greater attention since they impact not only on the way strategies for household food security are developed but also on the potential degree, sustainability and multiplier impact of SPFS-related activities. These are discussed below.

222. Explicit consideration of seasonality. For poor households heavily dependent on agriculture as a means of livelihood the degree of food security varies seasonally. Technological recommendations have to take into account the ‘normality’ of good and bad years. For the rural poor household food security is influenced by the agricultural production cycle, the amount of food stored, and the cash flow. This clustering of factors is most pronounced in seasonal rainfed marginal areas, but even in irrigated areas, it is a crucial issue for farming households with very limited resources. In both rainfed and irrigated areas, diversification activities not so dependent on water availability are important in cushioning households from the negative impacts of seasonality, and increasing their resilience to shock and negative trends through diversification of their production systems and income sources. The Evaluation Team believes it is extremely important to use the seasonal nature of food security, as a rational systematic starting point for designing strategies to improve household food security during all periods of the year. The components, which might appropriately be termed “Counter-Seasonal Strategies” (CSS), consist of:

Increasing food production at different times of the year (CSS1); Increasing the capacity of local/community/household grain storage, with due attention

given to post-harvest losses, and grain banks in order to counteract seasonal price differentials (CSS2);

Increasing household income-purchasing power through income-generating (i.e. diversification) activities, particularly at recurring/predictable times of food shortages (CSS3a), and through the improvement of the farmers’ terms of access to inputs, of the processing and marketing of agricultural produce (CSS3b); and

Introducing/supporting self-help savings/credit groups in order to reduce the impact of resource/expenditure time lags, to allow small-scale investments, and to ensure sustainability (CSS4).

223. In the countries visited by the Evaluation Team, SPFS has mainly dealt with CSS1, not very much with CSS2, to a certain extent with CSS3a (but not in the most food insecure areas),

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only sporadically with CSS3b (i.e. a few food processing activities), and in a few cases with micro-credit support (CSS4). If future SPFS-related initiatives are to have a clearly visible identity and boundaries sharply defined around the issues of seasonal hunger and counter-seasonal strategies, this will require continuation of efforts to increase food production at different times of the year, to improve implementation of strategies relating to food storage, post-harvest losses, grain banks, marketing, processing and credit, and to enter into partnerships with other agencies which have relevant experience/expertise, for example in income-generating activities (i.e. including off-farm) and rural financial institutions. Mutually satisfying partnerships with other agencies require that FAO does not claim ownership and most of the limelight, and will enable FAO to focus on areas in which it has more experience. Also, much greater effort should be made to work with Farmers’ Organizations (i.e. such as in Senegal), farmers’ groups and communities.

224. More explicit consideration of environmental issues and ensuring congruency between production and ecological sustainability. Although the concept of the SPFS emphasises the importance of increasing production without undermining ecological sustainability, the Evaluation Team believes, at least in the case study countries, it has not always received much explicit attention. The explicit emphasis has tended to be very much on yield increasing technologies. Although in a couple of countries (e.g. Ecuador and Cambodia), there was some attention to IPM and organic production methods, there was less attention to environmental issues than the Evaluation Team would have anticipated. Therefore, the Evaluation Team recommends that in the future more explicit attention is given to designing strategies that will ensure congruency between production and ecological sustainability than has been the case to date. Attention to this issue will become even more critically important as SPFS-related activities are extended into more marginal areas.

225. More explicit attention to gender equality. The Evaluation Team believes mainstreaming gender equality in a location sensitive manner in the SPFS country programmes needs to receive more explicit attention. The recently developed FAO Gender and Development Plan of Action provides guidelines for the SPFS to mainstream gender equality, partnership with country government gender policies.

226. More explicit attention to linkages. Earlier in the report the Evaluation Team indicated the desirability of the SPFS using a more systematic, explicit and planned approach to establishing linkages, not only with donor agencies but also with other developmental actors/agencies (e.g. NGOs). Moves towards doing this need to be initiated even at the design stage since they can play a potentially important role in determining the specific character of the strategies that are planned and are feasible, and in increasing the scope and potential impact of SPFS-related activities that are implemented. Examples of two specific and potentially very useful linkages are with developmentally oriented NGOs and with research institutions. Development-oriented NGOs could sometimes provide support in implementing savings/credit schemes, grain banks, community marketing and processing facilities, and supporting diversification in terms of types of activities not mainstreamed into SPFS diversification initiatives (e.g. crafts and off-farm employment). FAO, because of its mandate, has to concentrate on agriculturally related activities, but potentially important contributors to household security or the sustainable livelihoods of poor households are non-farm sources of incomes that could be facilitated through the development of creative linkages with other agencies that are focussing on such areas. This would be coherent with the right to food, as discussed in the documentation for the World Food Summit Five Years Later.

227. More explicit attention to macro and meso-level institutional and policy issues. At the macro level this relates particularly to public distribution of food, pricing policies, subsidies, and WTO issues. Meso-level type issues include credit, finance, input distribution, market identification, and development, community negotiation, agreement and action in terms of watershed development and land tenure related type issues. All such issues will often need to be dealt with in partnership with other agencies.

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228. Acceptance of a longer time period for achieving impact. A more realistic time period (e.g. up to five years) is required to adequately develop and incorporate the above considerations.

7.3.4 Implementing the Proposed Design of SPFS Initiatives

229. Given earlier comments about a more flexible design with reference to SPFS initiatives, the Evaluation Team believes there would be merit, before the design exercise per se, in implementing one or two activities, namely:

a) If the SPFS is already in the country, having a detailed independent evaluation undertaken, which would not only evaluate impact but would include suggestions/proposals for the future; and

b) At the start of the SPFS in a country, mounting a spearhead (i.e. exploratory) mission which would make no firm commitments about the future, but would informally explore the merits of initiating SPFS type initiatives based on considerations discussed earlier. If the prognosis arising is promising, then the next step would be to mount a formal design mission, which should be, to the extent possible, led and controlled by the host country, consisting of nationals, FAO representation, and potential donor representation.

230. An exit strategy as far as FAO is concerned in terms of handing over responsibility at the end of the implementation period has to be thought through in advance and gradually implemented. It is recommended that a participatory log-frame approach is used in the design exercise and that during the implementation phase it becomes a participatory dynamic log-frame, which is periodically revisited to facilitate monitoring and evaluation with respect to the objectives, indicators, means of verification/measurement, and hypotheses/assumptions/risks associated with the project. The later column is of particular importance since it relates to the policy environment and offers a bridge with the constraints analysis.

231. Finally, four complementary strategies need to be developed. These are to:a) Increase the effort devoted to food security mapping (FIVIMS) in order to facilitate

the identification of food insecure areas; b) Introduce systematic, simple and efficient monitoring systems to improve

management at different levels and independent evaluation at the project level, to glean and share/disseminate with national and partner agencies experiences with, and lessons from, implementation of the SPFS, that can help in improving later initiatives and enhance FAO credibility;

c) Assist countries in organising training and capacity building programmes in planning and project formulation; and

d) After carefully assessing the true needs of each country in terms of the level of expertise needed (i.e. low, medium or high), and matching those needs with available technical and human resources of other countries in the South, introduce SSC programmes that use small numbers of cooperants with adequate language skills, to give hands-on training to, and mentor local experts and technicians.

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ANNEX 1: SPFS EVALUATION TERMS OF REFERENCE

A. Purpose of the Evaluation

1. The evaluation is to be undertaken both in response to the request of the Governing Bodies and to meet internal management needs. The independent external evaluation will serve two aims:

to provide a credible accountability report on the Programme, containing in-depth analysis and assessment of its continuing relevance, effectiveness in achieving the results and overall cost-effectiveness; and

to consolidate and enhance the knowledge basis of the Programme for the future by learning from the experience to date, especially by identifying emerging key issues, strengths and weaknesses.

B. Issues to be Covered

2. The evaluation will cover the following main aspects in line with the standard evaluation approach:

(i) Review of the efficiency and adequacy of the programme implementation process over the period, covering:

a. programme planning and coordination within FAO;

b. technical backstopping and administrative support to the implementation in FAO (including guidelines and advisory notes, etc);

c. role and participation of the target LIFD countries;

d. collaboration with international agencies and donors;

e. financial resources mobilized (national, FAO and other external sources);

f. monitoring, review and oversight (by FAO and participating countries).

(ii) Analysis and assessment of overall achievements and results, covering:

a. Number of countries participating and their status, including features of their pilot operations (target crops, farming systems, types of farmers, integration of the four programme components, etc);

b. Results achieved in participating countries in terms of:

- number of sites covered, including the components implemented in each site;

- number and nature of participating farmers and communities in each site, including their resource commitment;

- adoption of improved production methods and practices as well as their effects on on-farm productivity;

- contribution of the pilot operations to supply and availability of food to the farmers and local communities (not only increases in supply but also in reduced variability of annual supplies);

- contribution of pilot operations to the food security of vulnerable rural population groups;

- enhanced participation of farmers and other local stakeholders, in particular women, including institutional arrangements;

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- improvements in extension and other support services to the rural producers in the context of pilot operations;

- strengthening of national capacity and commitment for food security, including policy and institutional measures;

- effects and impact on mobilizing external aid and resources for food security in the participating countries, including assistance in support of the pilot operations;

- governments’ plans for future operations;

c. Quality of design and implementation of the pilot operations, including:

- the use of the four Programme components (water, intensification, diversification and constraints analysis) and South-South cooperation;

- effectiveness of national programme management (including coordination, monitoring, reporting and problem solving);

- participation and mobilization of farmers, local actors and government agencies;

- support by, and collaboration between, the governments and FAO;

d. Key constraints experienced in the pilot operations to date.

(iii) Assessment of viability/sustainability and replicability of the results achieved in the participating countries, covering:

a. prospects for various countries, especially in those with longer implementation periods;

b. key positive and negative factors influencing viability (i.e. in terms of on-farm cost/benefit), broad sustainability of the results and replicability of the approach as a whole;

c. main lessons and issues for the future.

(iv) Overall assessment on the Programme, including South–South cooperation, where applicable, covering:

a. its cost-effectiveness and validity in the light of implementation performance and achievements;

b. strengths and weaknesses in the design, implementation and management;

c. main issues requiring action, especially in terms of:

- further improvement of the efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability of the pilot operations;

- considering the transition from pilot phase to its extension phase and into the expansion phase;

d. prospects and options for the future (by groups of countries at different stages of progress).

(v) Based on the above, make recommendations regarding how the Programme may be improved (these could be addressed to FAO, participating countries, and the international donor community).

C. Conduct of the Evaluation

3. At present, a total of 86 countries are participating in the SPFS at various stages, including 60 in the operational stage (some 30 countries with a 3-year or longer period of implementation). The evaluation will be based largely on field visits to selected countries where

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the SPFS is in operation. In order keep the exercise manageable physically and financially, field visits will be limited to 12 countries, most of which have more mature programmes.

4. To facilitate in-depth analysis and to ensure a common approach in the field visits, more detailed and operational criteria and methods for evaluating individual pilot operations will be prepared during the preliminary phase of the evaluation. The criteria and methods will be based on the methodology used for FAO field project evaluations (logical framework and result-oriented approach, including if required definition of indicators for gauging key achievements and results).

D. Implementation Schedule

5. The evaluation exercise will be implemented during 2001 as follows:

(i) Preparatory phase (present-March 2001), covering:

- preparation of final Terms of Reference and detailed evaluation methodology for field visits;

- identification potential team members, selection and their engagement;

- collection of documents and information for the evaluation;

- preparation of proposed workplan.

(ii) Desk review (March-May 2001) for the preparation of studies for use by the evaluation team, covering:

- a concise summary of the Programme;

- desk studies of the performance and achievement in countries under operational status. The studies will take advantage of available information, including Field Inspector Reports;

- a summary analysis of perceived achievements and emerging issues under the Programme;

- proposals on the selected countries for field visits to be decided finally by the evaluation core team.

(iii) Four field visits (June-October 2001) to the 12 selected SPFS countries. To the extent possible, the team should visit the Regional or Sub-regional Offices concerned. Each visit, covering about 3 countries, may last for about three weeks, including report writing.

(iv) Preparation of a synthesis evaluation report (November-December 2001 for about 2 weeks by the core team members in Rome). The team will be debriefed by the Director-General and other FAO staff.

(v) Preparation of the Director-General’s comments on the Evaluation Report’s findings and recommendations for submission to the Governing Bodies through the Programme Committee (May 2002).

E. Composition of the Evaluation Team

6. The team will comprise some 9-10 external consultants, including a team leader recruited by FAO. The team leader will take overall responsibility for the evaluation report, ensuring that it reflects the views of team members. Each mission will prepare a report on findings of its country visits.

7. The team members should have international recognition and no involvement in the planning and implementation of the Programme. They should also combine as a team the range of expertise necessary to address the substantive aspects and issues to be covered.

8. The evaluation team will be backstopped by the Chief, Evaluation Service throughout the entire exercise and one staff member of the Evaluation Service will accompany each mission visiting the regions, participating in report writing as directed by the mission leader.

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ANNEX 2: SUMMARY CURRICULUM VITAE OF SPFS EVALUATON TEAM MEMBERS

Dunstan S.C. SPENCER (Sierra Leone) – Team Leader for the SPFS evaluation. He has a Ph.D. in Agricultural Economics from the University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana, with graduate level training in animal science. He did his B.Sc. in Agriculture (with Hons) at Wye College, London University. He taught agricultural and development economics to undergraduate students in Sierra Leone, and graduate students in the USA. He has led major farming systems research projects in international research organizations of the CGIAR system including the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA), where he was the Director of the Resource and Crop Management Division, the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-arid Tropics (ICRISAT), and the West Africa Rice Development Association (WARDA). He is currently an independent Consultant, based in Freetown, Sierra Leone, in which capacity he has been a team member and leader in a number of agricultural project identification, design, appraisal supervision and evaluation missions on behalf of international organizations such as AfDB, FAO, IFAD, the World Bank and UNDP, as well as a number of Foundations such as Rockefeller and Ford. He is an expert in Women in Development, environmental assessment, impact evaluations, and poverty alleviation issues.

Pierre SPITZ (France), Mission Leader for the SPFS evaluation in Asia and West Africa. Graduated from the National Institute of Agriculture (INA, Paris) in Agricultural Economics. As a Research Fellow of the Indian Statistical Institute, he conducted research on livelihood systems in a group of villages in Bihar. He was later an Adviser to the Ministry of Planning, Economy and Finance in Tunisia, Harkness Fellow of the Commonwealth Fund, New York, Research Fellow at M.I.T. (Centre for International Studies) and Harvard University (Centre for International Affairs). He was co-founder of the Research Group on International Economic Relations at the National Institute of Agricultural Research (INRA), and later he co-directed the Food Systems and Society/Food Security in the Modern World Programme at the UN Research Institute for Social Development (1977-85). He was, thereafter, Research Coordinator, the Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues, and Director of Evaluation, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). He was Chairman of the Monitoring and Evaluation Panel of the UN/ACC Sub-Committee on Rural Development. He has worked with a dozen multilateral and bilateral agencies, in addition to FAO, IFAD and WFP. He is Director of Research (UMR Public Economics) at INRA, based at INA, Paris. His writings concern food policies, rural development, the Right to Food, system analysis and evaluation methodology.

Frank Malcolm ANDERSON (Australia) was awarded PhD in Agricultural Economics by Oregon State University (1972). He has been: Team Leader of Highlands Research Program of the International Livestock Centre for Africa; Foundation Professor, Agricultural and Horticultural Systems Management, Massey University, New Zealand; Consultant Agricultural Economist to the Turkish Agricultural Research Project; and Senior Consultant to the Eastern Anatolia Watershed Rehabilitation Project, Turkey. He has also undertaken various consultancies in Asia and Africa for FAO, ADB, IBRD and the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research. Main professional themes are agricultural research and natural resource management, and the integration of agricultural research and extension.

Manuel CONTIJOCH ESCONTRIA (Mexico) has a degree in civil engineering from the National University of Mexico and studied development planning at University College, London. He has 28 years of experience with the Mexican Government, participating in the integration of

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the National Water Plan; Coordinator of the Program for the Rural Development of the Tropical Areas of Mexico; responsible for the Irrigation and Drainage Research Centre of the Mexican Institute for Water Technology; Regional Manager of the National Water Commission NWC in the South East Region of Mexico; Sub-director General of the NWC; General Director of FIRCO, the agency responsible for the Agricultural Alliance and the Rural Employment Programme for Mexico. He has undertaken international assignments in water and rural development with the World Bank, USAID, SUEZ, PA Consulting Group and FAO.

Antanas MAZILIAUSKAS (Lithuania) has a doctor’s degree in hydraulic engineering. He is currently Dean of Water and Land Management Faculty at the Lithuanian University of Agriculture and President of the Lithuanian National Committee on Irrigation and Drainage. He has served as Director of Agriculture and Food Department, Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic of Lithuania and has international experience in Algeria, Ivory Cost, Kazakhstan, Nigeria and Uganda, including work in project development and evaluation with FAO, World Bank, EU, British Council and SIDA. His main professional themes are land and water resources management, irrigation and drainage and policy development in the agriculture and food sectors.

David W. NORMAN (USA) is Professor of Agricultural Economics at Kansas State University where he teaches courses in poverty and international agricultural development. He did his B.Sc. in Agriculture at Wye College, University of London, UK and M.S. and Ph.D. in Agricultural Economics at the Ontario Agricultural College, University of Toronto, Canada and Oregon State University, USA. He has spent twenty years working in national agricultural research systems in Africa: including Head of the Ford Foundation sponsored Rural Economy Research Unit, Nigeria and Head of the Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology at Ahmadu Bello University, Nigeria; and Chief of Party of the Mid-America International Agricultural Consortium USAID sponsored Agricultural Technology Improvement Project under the Ministry of Agriculture - Botswana. He currently undertakes short-term assignments (mostly as team leader) and has worked in over 60 countries of Africa, Asia and the South Pacific for many different agencies including UNDP, FAO, CGIAR system, DFID, DGIS, and the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations. He played a prominent role in the development and popularisation of the farming systems research approach, including the initiation of the International Farming Systems Association of which he is a past president. He is the author/part author of about 185 publications.

Maija SALA (Finland) has a background in business administration and economics. She worked for over twenty years as an adult education specialist in cooperative movements in Africa with ten years attachment to several large national level programmes. During the past eleven years she has undertaken a wide range of short-term assignments in various aspects of rural development, as a mission member and team leader, in nearly twenty developing countries funded by the World Bank, Danida, EU, Finnida, ILO, SIDA, UNDP, IFAD and FAO.

Vijay Shankar VYAS (India) Professor Emeritus IDS, Jaipur, has a Ph.D. in Economics. He has taught in the University of Bombay, Sardar Patel University, and Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad, and has occupied senior positions in academic and policy making bodies in his country and abroad. He was a Member of Agricultural Prices Commission of India, Director of Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad, and Senior Advisor in Agriculture and Rural Development in the World Bank, Washington D.C. He has consulted with CGIAR, FAO, ILO, UNDP and other multilateral and bilateral agencies. He has been on the Board of Trustees of IFPRI and CIAT and a member of the Board of Governors of IDS, Sussex. Currently, he is a member of the Central Board of the Reserve Bank of India. He has written extensively on agricultural policies and rural development and has been honoured in his country and abroad for his contributions. He is the current President of the Asian Association of Agricultural Economists.

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Mahgoub G. ZAROUG (Sudan) is a collaborating lecturer and supervisor of post-graduate students at the universities of Khartoum, and Omdurman Ahlia. He has his BSc in Agriculture, University of Khartoum and M.Sc. - Range Management and Ph.D. - Ecology from the University of California, Davis. He rose in his Government service to be Director-General of Range and Pasture. He has worked as Range Ecologist and Senior Technical Advisor for FAO in Range and Forestry in Oman. In addition to his university work he now undertakes consultancy assignments, including with FAO, UNDP, UNHCR, CGIAR, OXFAM, AOAD, BADEA, UNICEF, IDA and IFAD.

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ANNEX 3: SUMMARY OF BASIC DATA FOR SPFS COUNTRY PROGRAMMES

Country Entry into

SPFS

Extra-budgetary Funding

Sources

Number of Sites Currently Operational Number of Farmers

Total Of which – Components Total Of Which women

Water Intensification Diversification

Albania 04/98 UNDP 8 8 8 1 461 20

Angola 01/98 Italy 13 5 13 13

Bangladesh 08/98 Japan, UNDP, WB

6 6 727

Benin 05/99 13 13 13 13

Bolivia 10/95 13 1 13 13 1870

Burkina Faso 01/95 UNDP 34 34 34 16 7615 792

Cambodia 10/97 UNFIP 43 41 41 43 1491

Cape Verde 06/99 10 10 10 10

China 05/95 22 2 2 20 1500 600

Dem. R. Korea 09/98 Rep. Korea 3 2 2 2 2315

Ecuador 11/97 Canadian NGO 7 4 7 5 910

Eritrea 08/95 Italy 26 12 17 5 4010

Ethiopia 03/95 Italy, UNDP 29 7 29 0 30000 50

Georgia 12/98 n.a 815 171

Gambia 06/00 2 0 1 2

Ghana 11/97 IFPRI 6 6 0 0 270 140

Guinea 05/95 12 10 12 12 242

Guatemala 10/99 Spain 3 3 3 3

Haiti 06/97 France 5 4 5 3786 530

India 05/99 UNDP 9 0 9 0

Ivory Coast 01/99 3 0 3 0

Kenya 05/95 UNDP 119 38 119 54

Lesotho 11/97 5 5 0 0

Madagascar 08/98 France, UNDP 13 8 13 10 82

Malawi 11/97 Iceland 8 8 0 0

Maldives 03/00 n.a 300

Mali 05/98 Netherlands 7 7 7 7 386 30

Mauritania 06/95 33 20 23 29 1945

Mongolia 11/97 4 4 4 4 33 12

Morocco 02/99 1 1 1 0 290

Mozambique 03/97 Italy 17 0 14 17 212

Nepal 11/95 UNFIP,UTF 12 0 12 12

Niger 08/95 Belgium, Japan, Switzerland, UNDP,

52 17 52 5 369 140

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Country Entry into

SPFS

Extra-budgetary Funding

Sources

Number of Sites Currently Operational Number of Farmers

Total Of which – Components Total Of Which women

Water Intensification Diversification

Canadian NGO

Nigeria 03/99 3 3 3 0 4000

Pakistan 06/98 2 2 2 2 327

Papua New Guinea 07/96 7 7 7 5 700

Rwanda 12/96 UNDP 4 4 4 0 170

Senegal 01/95 France, Italy 52 29 23 38 1200 319

Syria 02/99 8 8 8 0 32

Tanzania 05/95 19 3 8 19 1141 388

Zambia 08/95 IFAD,UNFIP 16 12 16 n.a. 730

Zimbabwe 04/99 6 3 6 0 94 32

Note: Countries in bold were visited by the Evaluation Team.

Source: FAO-TCOS

Note by Evaluation Team: The data in this table were obtained by TCOS from Information Sheets submitted by country projects. They should be treated with caution since there was no consistency in the definition of “sites” and “number of farmers” as far as the different countries are concerned.

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SENIOR MANAGEMENT RESPONSE

1. We commend the Independent External Evaluation Team for preparing a succinct, helpfully critical and constructive review of the Special Programme. From the outset, when the SPFS was launched in 1994, we have seen the need to adapt the Programme to respond both to the lessons emerging from experience gained in its implementation as well as to changes in the broader development environment. We welcome this report as a most important contribution to this learning process.

2. The report provides a wealth of useful observations on the Special Programme which will enable the Programme Committee to have a well-informed debate on its achievements and its future. We expect that the representatives of those countries which are hosting SPFS activities, financing them or contributing to their implementation through providing South-South Cooperation will have much to say in this debate, and we will be particularly interested in their observations.

3. The Evaluation Team’s work was deliberately focussed on countries which had entered the SPFS early in its existence because it would be here that there would be the longest track record for review. Many of the concerns expressed in the report about the design and implementation of these early SPFS projects have, we believe, been largely addressed both in later projects which were not covered in this Evaluation as well as in SPFS Phase I Extensions. We accept, however, that there is room in the SPFS for further improvement and evolution. Some of this is a matter of closing the gap - which exists in any large-scale development programme and from which the SPFS is not immune - between intent, as set out in guidelines, and what actually happens on the ground. But there is also a need for more fundamental adjustments.

4. In responding, we do not wish to burden the Programme Committee with detailed comments on the Team’s analysis but to concentrate mainly on the report’s recommendations as to how the SPFS might be further improved in future. While we need to learn from the past and take note of the Team’s observations, especially when these are critical of certain aspects of the Programme, it is on the future that we need to focus our efforts. Should members of the Committee, however, wish to seek our views on specific comments and statements in the analytical sections of the report, we will be pleased to share them.

5. However, there are three broad themes on which our perception of the SPFS does not converge entirely with that of the Independent Review Team.

The first concerns the processes of innovation. A major purpose of the Programme is to foster creativity amongst farmers and to promote the testing and uptake of new and affordable ways of farming better, applying participatory methods (para 164 and 165 of the report). We feel that it is necessary, however, to make the point that, even in demand-driven projects and programmes founded on principles of people’s participation such as the SPFS, the Organization, based on its technical competence, must retain the right to decide upon the purposes for which its resources – or those entrusted to it – are utilized. It must also be prepared to exclude the use of funds for activities which it perceives are unlikely to be viable. FAO management also believes that it needs to encourage the testing and uptake by farmers of innovations which could respond appropriately to their needs but which are not “demanded”, if only because they are not known to participants. Indeed, one of the Organization’s comparative advantages is its international character and ability to promote technology transfer between countries.

It is in this context that we feel that the results to date of the South-South Cooperation (SSC) initiative and its impact on the processes of innovation are encouraging, especially if compared with other more conventional modes of technical assistance. We believe that this justifies the continued application of the main principles and elements of the current guidelines, adapting them, as required, to country-specific situations. What distinguishes

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the South-South Cooperation model being applied by FAO in the SPFS from more traditional forms of technical assistance is that it places strongly committed technicians with good practical skills as change agents out in rural communities where they can interact directly with front-line extension workers, local leaders and farmers. In this way, they can break the conservatism which often inhibits innovation, bring on a daily basis new and very practical ideas directly into the farming environment and encourage groups of farmers, fishermen and animal producers to adapt and test approaches to livelihood improvement that have been found to work well.

To increase the multiplier effect of SSC and to avoid creating long-term dependence, all SSC technicians are expected to share their experiences after practical work in rural communities with national staff in training of trainers. This is a part of an exit strategy which normally limits engagement periods to 3 years. The strategy, adapted to local conditions in each participating country, includes the training by SSC experts and technicians of trainers at the national level who in turn train other trainers at regional and community level, thus creating a snowball effect.

The costs per SSC expert and technician (about US$12 000 and US$7 200 per year respectively, shared between the source, host countries and FAO initially but later paid by bilateral and multilateral donors) are very low relative to conventional technical assistance (typically in the range of US$120 000 to US$200 000 per expert per year depending on funding source). This makes it possible to field in stages a critical mass of technicians under SSC arrangements, thereby stimulating a process of locally adapted change from below in many rural communities.

This formula is still new and we shall clearly need to make adjustments on the basis of feedback from the countries involved, but we see it as an exciting and affordable way through which developing countries can transfer successful experiences amongst each other, contributing in a very practical manner to food security and agricultural development. We, therefore, intend to continue playing a catalytic role in helping interested countries engage in SSC agreements and in assisting them in mobilising the necessary financial resources.

Secondly, the Team has advanced a number of proposals on criteria that might be applied in prioritizing countries for SPFS participation. Their perception that there is, indeed, a need for selecting countries implies a recognition that there are many countries which wish to join the SPFS: this is especially evident from the requests from countries outside the LIFDC list which are committed to using their own national resources to finance SPFS implementation *. The Programme Committee does not need to be reminded that the Organization’s field programmes, including the SPFS, are driven by the requests of member countries. To the extent that legitimate demands for assistance exceed the Organization’s financial and institutional response capacity, it obliges FAO to explore means of increasing its delivery. It is for this reason that the Organization is actively seeking resources in consultation with LIFDCs from bilateral and multilateral sources.

Thirdly, we feel that the Evaluation Team may have underestimated the impact of the SPFS on national policies for food and agriculture. This is, of course, difficult to judge because policies are determined through an amalgam of different influences including, of course, the broader political orientation of those in power as well as the advice given to governments by external sources of funds. The direction of policies also tends to shift only slowly except when there are fundamental changes in power structures. In this

* The fact that demand to take part in the SPFS is strong and not confined to LIFDCs would suggest that some of the Team’s assertions of lack of national ownership might be questioned.

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context, however, we believe that there are signs that many developing countries, especially those engaged in the formulation of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP), are increasingly prepared to adopt policies which will lead to improved food security and to rapid growth in agriculture. This will be clearer when we meet for WFS:fyl. It is, however, already visible at the regional and sub-regional levels, whether one considers NEPAD or the understandings reached between FAO and UEMOA and other sub-regional bodies on regional food security programmes.

It would be presumptuous to imply that the SPFS alone has prompted a shift in policy orientation. We believe, however, that through its high visibility, its demonstration that it lies within the capacity of countries to bring about rapid improvements in the output of small farmers, and its links into the World Food Summit process, the Programme can claim some responsibility. At national level, the decisions of a number of LIFDCs to extend the programme nationwide (e.g. China, Pakistan, etc.) as well as of nine other countries to commit their own funds on a significant scale to implement the SPFS country-wide, would seem to indicate that it is beginning to impact on policies.

6. We agree fully with the Team’s assessment of the strengths of the SPFS and with the recommendation that it is on these that future SPFS activities should be built. We concur with their views on the importance of flexibility in the Programme and on the need to balance microlevel measures to improve production and livelihoods with addressing meso and macro issues which could impinge on both the production and the distribution of benefits. We accept the case for a longer time horizon for pilot activities under Phase I and for larger and more sites, representative of all major agro-ecological regions of a country. Indeed, wherever resources allow, this is the direction in which recent SPFS initiatives, including those financed by developing countries from their own resources, are moving.

7. We also agree on the need to update and improve guidelines and to ensure that they are widely accessible and used. In line with the Team’s proposal, an SPFS Guideline Technical Committee will be established. Work is already in progress to develop cost-effective methodologies for impact monitoring, covering both production gains and their impact on household income and food security. FAO management also accepts that subsidies, whether on inputs or on interest rates, should be avoided except where these are consistent with national policies or might be required to indemnify participants against pioneering risks (which would otherwise be met by the state through their funding of additional on-station research). The widespread use of subsidies noted in the report is not in line with the underlying concept of the Programme that it should promote replicable innovations. One of the practical problems faced by many farmers interested in taking up new practices, however, has been the collapse of credit, input supply and marketing systems in a large number of developing countries. In such situations, it has been necessary to intervene in a pragmatic way to bridge the gap between what should be done and what can be done to enable innovators to have access to the necessary inputs and equipment.

8. In considering Options for the Future of the SPFS, our observations are as follows: Greater Priority to Household Food Security. The SPFS is a household and community

focussed programme. It is built on the understanding that improvements in local food security, especially where these stem from production gains by large numbers of small farmers, will also contribute to a higher level of food security at the national level. We take the view that in all countries in which the SPFS is operational, whether or not they are close to self-sufficiency in food, the primary focus should be on communities in agricultural areas where the greatest number of food insecure households live. But we attach one proviso: this is that the Programme should only go where it can offer practical, sustainable and viable solutions to the problems facing families, regardless of whether the areas have high or low agricultural potential. FAO management, however, notes that in many countries, contrary to conventional perceptions, the largest numbers of households suffering from malnutrition and chronic food insecurity live in areas of high

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agricultural potential, and hence a focus on high potential areas is not usually incompatible with the improvement of both household and national food security.

For the future, the aim is to extend SPFS Phase I (pilot) activities to respond to demands from food-insecure communities in all agro-ecological zones of a country: the range of activities supported by the Programme would be progressively widened as institutional capacities grow. We also envisage that increasing attention will be given within SPFS operations to empowering communities to address the underlying factors which determine the distribution of food between households within the community. We see the need for a special focus on issues related to women and households in which, as a result of HIV-AIDS and other diseases, there have been adverse shifts in dependency ratios with disastrous effects on agriculture. Some experience is being gained (with funding from telefood sources) in targeting increases in food production where these are most needed and in linking these to nutrition education, particularly through promoting school and health centre garden programmes; these examples can be more widely replicated in future under the SPFS.

SPFS Design Considerations. We welcome the Team’s recommendations set out in Section 7.3.3 and intend to make sure that they are all taken up in the design of future SPFS initiatives, including planning for the extension of existing Phase I activities. We share with the Team the concept of a people-centred approach which is designed to empower food-insecure communities to analyse the constraints and opportunities which they face and to arrive at their own choices on strategies and actions for reducing hunger and for bringing about sustainable improvements in their livelihood systems.

FAO management also strongly subscribes to the need for strengthened partnerships, building these up from the outset of project design. Furthermore we fully accept the recommendation that more explicit attention be given in project design to means of addressing seasonality issues, ecological sustainability, gender equality and linkages. Mainstreaming these approaches will require increased attention to capacity building at all levels, but with special emphasis on farm leaders and front-line extension staff, building particularly on the Organization’s experience with Farmers’ Field Schools which has been commended by the Team.

In addition to revising SPFS guidelines to respond to these recommendations as well as those on design processes contained in Section 7.3.4 (paras. 230 and 231), the Organization will provide training for staff and government officials engaged in SPFS design.

Complementary Strategies. FAO management concurs with the need to strengthen the capacity of FIVIMS to identify foci of food insecurity and to link this to the targeting of SPFS initiatives. We also share the Team’s view of the need both to improve monitoring systems, keeping these simple and cost-effective, and to support training programmes in project formulation: this will be greatly facilitated by the Project Formulation Tool Kit, currently in its test phase.

9. The development context and environment in which the SPFS is now operating has changed considerably since it was launched almost eight years ago. The proclamation of the Millennium Development Goals, the expansion of debt relief programmes, the launching of the Comprehensive Development Framework and of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and the thinking on new modes of development financing emerging from the International Conference on Financing for Development, all pose challenges and offer new opportunities for the SPFS which the Organization will address.

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