PB 80–93–1 February 1993 Vol. 6, No. 1

Special WarfareThe Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

Reconnaissance

Knowledge is power, and since ancient timesknowledge about the enemy and the operationalenvironment has been an key element of militarypower. As the commander’s eyes and ears, recon-naissance forces contribute directly to the com-mander’s battlefield intelligence. That intelli-gence, in turn, encourages success by permittingbest use of our combat power.

It is no coincidence that the first U.S. intelli-gence organization, World War II’s Office of Stra-tegic Services, was also the forerunner of our mod-ern-day Special Forces. From the OSS throughDesert Storm, reconnaissance has continued to bean important SOF mission. With the changingnature of conflict, intelligence promises to becomeeven more important as our smaller armed forcesare presented with contingency missions requiringmore discriminate use of our forces.

Special reconnaissance is one of Special Forces’five primary missions. We tend to think of SR inthe traditional perspective of a small team man-ning an observation post in a wooded area. How-ever, in today’s smaller force-projection Army,there are many possible scenarios. While deployedthroughout the world, SF teams are often the onlyU.S. presence that can gather facts and answerquestions for a joint-force commander deployinginto the country. This reconnaissance may be con-ducted from the front seat of a rental car oraccomplished by phone calls. On today’s highlymobile battlefield, SF teams may find themselvespinpointing resistance pockets in urban or by-passed areas where general-purpose forces are ill-suited for the mission. These missions willincrease the combat effectiveness of our forceswhile reducing collateral damage and noncombat-ant casualities.

In the past, our intelligence requirements had aclear focus, for the potential enemy was clearlyidentified. With the disintegration of communism,we face a much more difficult task. It is not clearwho the enemy is, where we will confront him,when that may occur and who our coalition part-ners will be. This ambiguity further complicates analready demanding mission.

In order to focus our SR experiences on thefuture, a new manual, FM 31-20-5, Special Recon-naissance Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for

Special Forces, has been developed for distribu-tion to the field this spring. The first of a newseries of how-to SF manuals, FM 31-20-5 willexpress the doctrinal concepts of SR in practicalapplications by defining it, identifying planningand mission procedures and furnishing specifictechniques practiced by operational units. In thefuture, similar manuals are planned for foreigninternal defense, unconventional warfare, coun-terterrorism and direct-action missions.

Technology for SR is also advancing, and in thenear future, soldiers can expect new equipmentwhich will allow them to collect and report intelli-gence in near-real time. Technology, however, hasits limitations. It may break down, and some of themost critical elements that define modern conflictscannot be photographed or reported on by electron-ic means — they can only be collected face to face.Our intercultural-communications skills and mili-tary experience give us the ability to collect thattype of information. Effective intercultural com-munications, combined with our tactical and tech-nical training, make Special Forces soldiers a trueforce multiplier whatever the mission.

Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow

From the CommandantSpecial Warfare

PB 80–93–1 Contents

Features2 A Theory of Ground Reconnaissance

by Maj. William H. Burgess III

9 Reconnaissance: Looking to the Future Through the Pastby Lt. Col. Robert H. Huckabee

12 FM 31-20-5: New Manual Focuses on Special Reconnaissanceby SFC Jim McGill

16 Special Reconnaissance Planning: Notes from the JRTCby Capt. Brian R. Vines

20 Intercultural Communication: The Need for Conceptual Skillsby Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow

23 Mission-oriented Language Trainingby CWO 2 Thomas F.D. Rogers

24 The OSS: America’s First National Intelligence Organizationby Lawrence H. McDonald

33 Interview: Lt. Col. David G. Christie, Australian SAS Regiment

36 Mission Planning and Rehearsal Systems: New Tools for Mis-sion Preparationby Capt. Dan Smith

Departments39 Enlisted Career Notes40 Officer Career Notes42 Foreign SOF44 Update46 Book Reviews

V E R I T A S

STREBIL

A

E T

Commander & CommandantMaj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow

EditorJerry D. Steelman

Graphic Art DirectorBruce S. Barfield

Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of theUnited States Army John F. Kennedy Special WarfareCenter and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its missionis to promote the professional development of specialoperations forces by providing a forum for the examinationof both established doctrine and new ideas.

Views expressed herein are those of the author, and donot necessarily reflect official Army position. Thispublication does not supersede any information presented inother official Army publications.

Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited, andshould be addressed to: Editor, Special Warfare,USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000. Telephone:DSN 239-5703 or commercial (919) 432-5703. SpecialWarfare reserves the right to edit all material.

Published works may be reprinted, except wherecopyrighted, provided credit is given to Special Warfare andthe author.

Official distribution is limited to active and reservespecial operations units. Individuals desiring a privatesubscription should forward their requests to:Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government PrintingOffice, Washington, D.C. 20402.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:Gordon R. SullivanGeneral, United States ArmyChief of Staff

Official:

Milton H. HamiltonAdministrative Assistant to theSecretary of the Army

03209

Headquarters, Department of the Army

February 1993 Special Warfare Vol. 6, No. 1

Cover: Night-vision-goggle photo copyright Leif Skoogfors/Wood Fin Camp and Associates,used with permission. Computer graphic by Bruce S. Barfield.

To be forewarned is to be fore-armed, and Army commandersengage in ground reconnaissance toachieve timely forewarning. Forcereductions, the concept of AirLandOperations and national militarystrategy are increasing the Army’srelative need for forewarning. As aconsequence, the art of groundreconnaissance will undergo consid-erable scrutiny and discussion overthe next several years. This articleoffers a context for discussion.

Reconnaissance is the explorato-ry, preliminary inspection or surveyof a region to examine its terrain ordetermine the disposition of mili-tary forces therein.1 Derived fromthe Latin re (again) and cognoscere(to know), reconnaissance entailsthe “recognition” and gathering ofpertinent information. When con-ducted through visual, audio and or

olfactory means by persons operat-ing on the ground or in the watersor airspace in close proximity to thetarget, reconnaissance overlapshuman-resources intelligence, orHUMINT, collection.2

Reconnaissance is a means of mil-itary geography, which has topo-graphic, demographic, meteorologicand hydrographic components, isconducted at strategic, operational,and tactical echelons, and focuseson weather, enemy and terrain.Weather concerns are typically lightconditions, visibility, wind speedand direction, and type and amountof precipitation. Enemy concernsare size, activity, location, unit ororganization, time, and equipment,or SALUTE. Terrain concerns areobservation and fields of fire, con-cealment and cover, obstacles, keyterrain, and avenues of approach, orOCOKA.

TargetsThe objectives of reconnaissance

are called reconnaissance targets.The tactics, techniques and proce-

dures employed by a reconnaissanceforce in relation to its target (aswell as the menu of other collectionassets employed against the target)are influenced by target signifi-cance, mobility and geometry.

Targets may be of tactical, opera-tional or strategic significance.Strategic objectives are related tothe attainment of long-term nation-al goals. Operational objectives areof regional or intermediate-termvalue. Tactical objectives relate tothe employment of forces in individ-ual battles and engagements.

Mobility is the relative ability ofthe target to change position orlocation. Target mobilities are high,medium and low (or immobile).High mobility targets are capable ofchanging their location withinhours or minutes, and includemobile ballistic missile units, air-craft formations and trains. Medi-um mobility targets are only capableof changing their positions over con-siderable periods of time, normallyexceeding 48 hours, and includefield headquarters of military units

2 Special Warfare

A Theory of Ground

Reconnaissance

by Maj. William H. Burgess III

Views expressed in this article arethose of the author and do not neces-sarily reflect the policies of the De-partment of the Army or other gov-ernment agencies.

of corps size or greater, semi-fixedintelligence facilities and mobilebridges.

Low (or no) mobility targets nor-mally do not change position at all,and include storehouses, airfields,fixed C3I facilities and fixed bridges.In some cases, the mobility of a tar-get is so low, or nonexistent, thatreconnaissance or surveillance ofthe target can be conducted monthsor years before any other action isundertaken.

Geometry is the relative geograph-ic diffusion or area covered by thetarget. Target geometries are point,area and linear. A point target con-sists of one or more elements concen-trated at a single place, such asradar sites, bridges and ships. Areatargets are diffused, usually consist-ing of several elements situatedwithin a certain area at varying dis-tances from each other, e.g., airfieldsand major industrial complexes. Lin-ear targets are long and narrow, andinclude railroads, highways, trails,pipelines, telecommunications lines,columns of troops on the march, longbridges (e.g., across bays), water-

ways and water obstacles.

ModesPrincipal modes of reconnais-

sance are the overlapping categoriesof battlefield reconnaissance andsurveillance, overt collection, andreconnaissance by deception.

Battlefield reconnaissance andsurveillance is the survey of mili-tary activity in a particular area ofoperations, normally done within azone of armed conflict or war bysmall groups of mounted or dis-mounted soldiers in battle dress. Itmay be done passively or by force.3Reconnaissance forces perform thisactivity in carefully selected areasto provide a picture of the battle-field or operational area by report-ing timely information on weather,threat and terrain and accuratelylocating dangerous, high-value tar-gets for relevant weapons systems.4

Overt collection is the consentedor acquiesced-in observation ofselected activities in a particulararea of interest or operations. Itmay be a primary activity, or it maybe incidental to other mission activ-

ities. Overt collection may be con-ducted in or out of battle dress.Examples of overt collection arevaried and can range from foreign-observer participation in host-nation military demonstrations tocross-border surveillance conductedfrom vehicles, aircraft or fixedobservation posts or watchtowerslocated in friendly territory.

Reconnaissance by deceptionoccurs where the existence and eventhe activities of the reconnaissanceelement may be open or known, butits true allegiance and purpose aremasked. To a degree, reconnais-sance by deception parallels “falseflag” espionage operations. Recon-naissance by deception may be sub-classified into the overlapping cate-gories of “surrogate” and “pseudo”operations. Surrogate operationsare essentially HUMINT collection-by-proxy operations, usually of verylimited scope and extent. They arenormally (but not always) done outof standard battle dress and can beconducted across the operationalcontinuum. Coastwatchers in theSolomon Islands during World WarII, for example, made extensive andeffective use of indigenous surro-gates in the execution and defenseof their collection activities.5 Pseudooperations are exemplified by theemployment in southern Lebanon ofIsraeli Army sayeret (reconnais-sance commando) troops, capable ofpassing themselves off as indige-nous Lebanese or Palestinians,6 toacquire terrorist bases and othertargets for the Israeli Air Force.

LevelsIn terms of targets and functions,

ground reconnaissance partiallyoverlaps but is distinguishable fromthe HUMINT collection means ofespionage. Levels of ground recon-naissance are defined primarily bytheir planned purposes, normallycorrelating to the echelons under-taking the reconnaissance.

Tactical reconnaissance supportsmaneuver and defense at echelonscorps and lower. It is a normal bat-tlefield activity in all combat-arms

February 1993 3

MILITARY GEOGRAPHYMILITARY GEOGRAPHY

Interrelationship of Military Geography, HUMINT,Reconnaissance, and Ground Force Reconnaissance

GROUNDFORCERECON

GROUNDFORCERECON

HUMINTHUMINT

RECONNAISSANCERECONNAISSANCE

organizations, oriented toward mili-tary factors of weather, enemy andterrain. Army tactical forces dedi-cated to ground reconnaissance nor-mally operate within 150 kilometersof the forward line of troops at corpslevel and 50 kilometers forward ofthe FLOT at division level in linearwarfare,7 and within similar rangesin nonlinear operations.8 Reconnais-sance at echelons brigade and lowertends to be generalized within therelatively limited areas of interestand zones of operations of suchunits. At echelons division andcorps, however, reconnaissance isfocused on named areas of interest,or NAI, and target areas of interest,or TAI.9

Operational reconnaissance isconducted to acquire information insupport of planning and maneuverat echelons above corps, as wheretheater assets survey a country orregion prior to the forced entry ofcontingency forces. It helps tosecure friendly forces, confirm sen-sor intelligence and verify enemyforces. The ground component ofoperational reconnaissance compris-es the collection capabilities ofground patrols, sensors, cavalry,10

fixed- and rotary-wing aviation andremotely-piloted vehicles. Thesecomplement air and naval plat-forms, national technical meansand other assets. Ground-forcereconnaissance aids in the earlylocation, tracking, targeting andattack of critical deep enemy capa-bilities and thereby enhances opera-tional flexibility and minimizes riskto friendly forces.11

Operational reconnaissance nor-mally focuses on military factors butcan also address non-military fac-tors, particularly under conditionsother than war. U.S. forces em-ployed for operational ground recon-naissance include Army Special For-ces, Navy SEALs, and Fleet MarineForce Reconnaissance companies.

Strategic reconnaissance is under-taken for national purposes, e.g., tocollect data on matters relevant tothe formulation or execution of for-eign policy of the national govern-ment. There is no Department ofDefense definition per se of “strate-gic reconnaissance,” although thephrase implies the selected place-ment of human assets and technicalsurveillance platforms (satellitesand aircraft)12 to collect information

of strategic (i.e., national) signifi-cance. It is thus a term appropriate-ly applied to espionage and otheractivities of national-level intelli-gence organizations. Ground-forcestrategic reconnaissance would thenseem to be limited to the employ-ment of national- or joint-level spiesand the occasional special-recon-naissance mission of national signif-icance (e.g., entering a hostile ordenied port and emplacing radia-tion sensors and transmitters on asubmarine suspected of carrying fis-sionable material).

Army SF have long performed“special” reconnaissance in friendly,denied or contested areas. Onlyrecently, however, reconnaissancehas been embellished with a directtie to special-operations forces tocreate the mission of special recon-naissance, defined as:13

Reconnaissance and surveillanceactions conducted by special opera-tions forces to obtain or verify, byvisual observation or other collectionmethods, information concerningthe capabilities, intentions, andactivities of an actual or potentialenemy, or to secure data concerningthe meteorological, hydrographic,geographic, or demographic charac-teristics of a particular area. Itincludes target acquisition, areaassessment and post-strike recon-naissance.14

There are difficulties with thisdefinition, however: Although thereare exceptions, most of the businessof SOF is conducted at the theaterlevel, and so “operational reconnais-sance” would in most cases be amore appropriate term applied toreconnaissance by SOF. Yet, opera-tional reconnaissance is not theexclusive domain of SOF, and thehistorical employment of SOF inreconnaissance is not limited tooperational activities. Arguably,“special” reconnaissance shouldcomprise unique reconnaissanceand surveillance activities that areclear exceptions to the norm or arebeyond the capabilities of otherreconnaissance units, irrespective ofassociations with SOF or other spe-

4 Special Warfare

Components and Levels of Military Geography

STRATEGICOPERATIONALTACTICAL

TOPOGRAPHY

DEMOGRAPHY

METEOROLOGY

HYDROGRAPHY

MILITARY

GEOGRAPHY

STRATEGICOPERATIONALTACTICAL

MILITARY

GEOGRAPHY

TOPOGRAPHY

DEMOGRAPHY

METEOROLOGY

HYDROGRAPHY

cialized organizations.

TasksDefinitional problems notwith-

standing, principal reconnaissancetasks for ground forces are definedas follows:

• Target acquisition comprisesthe detection, identification, loca-tion and reporting of a target in suf-ficient detail to permit the effectiveemployment of organic or deep-strike weapons and other means.The purpose of target acquisition isto obtain target locations, move-ments, development, strength, typeidentification and vulnerabilities.15

• Damage assessment is the de-termination of the effect of attackson a target.16 Damage assessmentby ground-force reconnaissanceentails the far or close visual, photo-graphic or electronic survey of aspecific point or area of military sig-nificance that has been subjected toan air or missile strike, a battlebetween opposing forces, or the like,

to measure results of such activity.• Topographic reconnaissance is

the specific gathering and reportingof information about the surfaceconfiguration and condition of natu-ral and man-made terrain in anNAI or TAI. It aids in the produc-tion, correction or enhancement ofmaps and overlays and assessmentof the present conditions of the ter-rain for military operations. It over-laps with meteorological and hydro-graphic reconnaissance. At the tac-tical level, topographic reconnais-sance is focused on the OCOKA fac-tors of terrain, and specificallyincludes locating and assessingfording sites and the reconnais-sance of routes, bridges, tunnelsand ferries for friendly maneuverforces. Topographic reconnaissanceat operational and strategic levelsdiffers only in scale from tacticaltopographic reconnaissance and isclosely linked with demographicreconnaissance.

• Demographic reconnaissance isthe specific gathering and reporting

of information about the inhabitantsof an area. It aids in the preparationof maps and overlays, and assess-ment of the condition of inhabitedareas for military operations. At thetactical level, demographic recon-naissance is focused on the SALUTEfactors. At operational and strategiclevels, demographic reconnaissancealso addresses psychological and cul-tural factors. Collecting data on pop-ulations in a potential zone of opera-tional maneuver is a form of demo-graphic reconnaissance. Demograph-ic reconnaissance is intimately relat-ed to topographic reconnaissance.

• Meteorological reconnaissance isthe specific gathering and reportingof information about atmosphericphenomena such as wind speed anddirection, cloud cover, surface visi-bility, weather and obstructions tovision, and state of the groundaround the observer. Meteorologicalreconnaissance supports theaterdeep-strike weapons systems, raids,and operational maneuvers by landor sea forces. It is also conducted aspart of the effort to predict the oper-ations of enemy deep-strikeweapons systems and maneuverforces.

• Hydrographic reconnaissance isthe reconnaissance of militarily sig-nificant bodies of water andmarginal land areas. It is conductedto determine depths, beach gradi-ents, the nature of the bottom, thelocation of obstacles and barriers,the speed of currents, the thicknessof ice, defensive preparations andother military and nonmilitarycharacteristics of a target.

• Nuclear, biological and chemi-cal reconnaissance is the specificdetection, gathering and evaluationof information about the presence(or absence) of radiological, biologi-cal or chemical contamination fromweaponry or industrial activity, ofthe extent of such contamination,and of specific terrain, buildings,equipment or airspace in selectedareas of military significance. Inthis regard, detection of industrialcontamination can include thesearch for trace compounds associ-

February 1993 5

LOW

ORNO

LOW

ORNO

MEDIUM

MEDIUM

HIGH

HIGH

DIFFUSELINEARPOINT

DIFFUSELINEARPOINT

STRATEGIC

OPERATIONAL

TACTICAL

STRATEGIC

OPERATIONAL

TACTICAL

GEOMETRY

MOBILITY SIGNIFICANCE

Categorization of Reconnaissance Targets

ated with the illegal narcotics trade.• Direct-action collection compris-

es short-duration raids, ambushesand other offensive actions under-taken to seize and recover person-nel, material or information of mili-tary significance for intelligenceexploitation. It overlaps many of thetechniques and procedures of recon-naissance with the tactics of directaction. At the tactical level, forexample, it includes the activities ofambush patrols and raids byarmored cavalry. At the operationallevel, direct-action collectionincludes the capture of designatedmilitary equipment or personnel inenemy rear areas by SOF.

An example of direct-action col-lection is Operation Tarnegol 53.On the night of Dec. 26, 1969, 70Israeli Defense Force commandosraided the Egyptian radar base ofRas A’rab. Dressed as Egyptian sol-diers, the Israelis landed by heli-copter, assaulted the base, disas-sembled two Russian-made P-12radar-equipment shelters from twoZIL trucks, slung-loaded the shel-ters beneath CH-53 helicopters, and

hauled them back to Israel.17

• Special-collection tasks arethose that do not fit squarely intothe forementioned task categories.They are typified by unique infor-mation requirements entailingreconnaissance and surveillanceactivities of extreme political or mil-itary sensitivity that are beyond thenormal capabilities of most recon-naissance units, and which requirespecial training on the part of par-ticipants and generation or sanctionof the requirements from very highlevels of the government.18 Con-trary to a common misconception,this category of reconnaissance doesnot include “special activities.”19

EmploymentAll reconnaissance must be con-

ducted within the four-stage opera-tional cycle of the supported unit orforce.20 Stage I reconnaissance isconducted to protect forces and pre-pare them for operations.21 At oper-ational and strategic levels, Stage Iis constant, whether forces are ingarrison or in the field. It beginswith the commencement of opera-

tional planning and extendsthrough deployment to the initia-tion of hostilities or operationalactivities. At the tactical level,Stage I reconnaissance is conductedfrom deployment through the initia-tion of hostilities.

Stage II reconnaissance is con-ducted to help set up, or shape, theconditions for decisive employmentof forces. At the operational level,critical deep enemy capabilities areacquired and tracked for targetingor attack. At the tactical level,reconnaissance assets are focusedon locating and identifying maneu-ver forces, fire support, lines ofcommunication and command andcontrol.22

Stage III ground reconnaissancesupports attainment of the desireddecisive result. At the operationaland tactical levels, it is focused onproviding information that will aidthe commander in determiningwhen conditions have been achievedfor successful maneuver: e.g., thefocus is on surveillance of friendlyand enemy lines of communication,target acquisition and damageassessment.

Stage IV operational reconnais-sance supports preparations for fur-ther follow-on or new major engage-ments or campaigns, and is focusedon determining the condition andstatus of remaining enemy forces.Stage IV tactical reconnaissancesupports reconstitution of friendlyforces by focusing on defensivesurveillance and patrolling ofavenues of approach and lines ofcommunication.

Regardless of stage, all reconnais-sance must be purposeful, continu-ous, aggressive, timely, secure, reli-able and accurate. Reconnaissanceis purposeful when it is undertakento answer well-defined, and oftentime-sensitive requirements thatsupport specific missions and activi-ties, e.g., the pre-and post-strikesurveillance of a major C3I nodewhich must be neutralized before aplanned follow-on operation by the-ater forces can be undertaken.Reconnaissance not tied to a specific

6 Special Warfare

Modes of Reconnaissance

BATTLEFIELD RECONNAISSANCEAND SURVEILLANCE

OVERTCOLLECTION

RECONNAISSANCEBY DECEPTION

and appropriate mission or activityis not purposeful.

Reconnaissance is continuouswhen it is undertaken in, and notlimited by, all conditions of weatherand terrain. Reconnaissance isaggressive when it is undertakenwith audacity and despite threatcountermeasures, e.g., the closeobservation of insurgent leaderssuch as conducted by British specialforces against the Irish RepublicanArmy in Northern Ireland. Recon-

naissance is timely when the infor-mation realized is known to thesupported commander in time forthat commander to act on the infor-mation provided to his benefit.

Reconnaissance is secure when itis undertaken with the knowledgeof only those friendly personnelwith an absolute need to know andwithout any awareness on the partof the target or other threat forces.Reconnaissance is reliable and ac-curate when it generates high-quali-

ty information about, and deter-mines precise locations of, recon-naissance targets. Reliability is thequality factor in reconnaissance.

ConclusionCommanders need information on

which to base their decisions. Often,this information is not in pre-exist-ing data bases, or the information ischanging with the fluidity of the op-erational environment. Reconnais-sance leads to information, informa-tion yields intelligence, and intelli-gence fuels the generation of landpower. Thus, a condition precedentto victory in the first battle in thenext war or conflict will be effectiveground reconnaissance. Withouteffective reconnaissance, Army com-manders may find victory elusive.

Maj. William H. Burgess III is aSpecial Forces officer currently serv-ing as a staff officer within the U.S.Special Operations Command, Mac-Dill Air Force Base, Fla. A graduateof the Military Intelligence OfficerAdvanced Course, he holds a bache-lor’s degree in political science fromSoutheastern Massachusetts Univer-sity, a master’s degree in publicadministration from Clark Univer-sity and a doctor of laws degreefrom American University.

February 1993 7

Relationship of Tactical, Operational, and StrategicReconnaissance and Espionage

TACTICALRECON-

NAISSANCE

SHAREDRESPONSIBILITY

SHARED RESPONSIBILITY

STRATEGIC RECONNAISSANCE & ESPIONAGE

OPERATIONALRECONNAISSANCE

ECHELONSCORPS AND

BELOW

ARMY/THEATER

NATIONALAGENCY

COLLECTION RESPONSIBILITY/MEANS

TA

CT

ICA

LO

PE

RA

TIO

NA

LS

TR

AT

EG

IC

CO

LL

EC

TIO

N T

AR

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T/R

EQ

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Notes:1 The Department of Defense defines reconnaissance as: “A mission

undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection meth-ods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy orpotential enemy; or to secure data concerning the meteorological,hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area.”Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military andAssociated Terms.

2 Human-resources intelligence comprises the intelligence derivedfrom the human collection discipline that uses human beings as bothsources and collectors, and where the human being is the primarycollection instrument. Joint Pub 1-02.

3 See the discussion of direct-action collection on p. 6. “Reconnais-

sance in force” is an offensive operation designed to discover or testthe enemy’s strength or to obtain other information. Joint Pub 1-02.

4 See FM 34-36, Special Operations Forces Intelligence and Elec-tronic Warfare Operations.

5 Cmdr. Eric A. Feldt, R.A.N., The Coastwatchers (Garden City,N.Y.: Nelson Doubleday, Inc., 1979); Walter Lord, Lonely Vigil:Coastwatchers of the Solomons (New York: The Viking Press, 1977).

6 The Israelis are known to use Israeli Druze, Bedouin and Circas-sian scouts, as well as Jews who have migrated from Arab countries,for such purposes. See Samuel M. Katz, Follow Me! A History ofIsrael’s Military Elite (London: Arms & Armour Press, 1989); also,Soldier Spies (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press).

8 Special Warfare

7 TRADOC Pam 525-42, U.S. Army Operational Concept for LongRange Surveillance Units; FM 7-93, Long-Range Surveillance UnitOperations.

8 TRADOC Pam 525-5, AirLand Operations: A Concept for the Evo-lution of AirLand Battle for the Strategic Army of the 1990s andBeyond (1 August 1991); John G. Roos, “New Army-Air Force War-Fighting Concept Sees Joint Power Projection Operations,” ArmedForces Journal International, October 1991, pp. 12, 14. Note, howev-er, that the historical practice of U.S. Army tactical long-range-patrolformations has been not to operate beyond accurate friendly artilleryrange.

9 NAI are points or areas where activity confirms or denies a par-ticular course of action; TAI are engagement points or areas. Bothare usually along an avenue of approach or mobility corridor. FM 34-36.

10 Although cavalry perform reconnaissance-in-force, they are prin-cipally used to screen the front and flanks of the main body, fixenemy positions for fire and maneuver, and other tasks that are notreconnaissance per se.

11 TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, p. 16.12 William V. Kennedy, et al., The Intelligence War (London: Sala-

mander Books Limited, 1983), pp. 63, 100, 101-02, 120-21, and 175.

13 FM 100-25; FM 31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces Operations.14 Joint Pub 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.15 Joint Pub 1-02; and Joint Pub 3-05.16 Joint Pub 1-02.17 Katz, Follow Me!, pp. 87-88.18 Arguably, this should be the definition of “special

reconnaissance.”19 Activities conducted in support of foreign-policy objectives that

are planned and executed so that the role of the U.S. government isnot apparent or acknowledged publicly. They are also functions insupport of such activities but are not intended to influence U.S. polit-ical processes, public opinion, policies or media and do not includediplomatic activities or the collection and production of intelligence orrelated support functions [emphasis added to the original]. Joint Pub3-05, GL-19-20; see also Lock K. Johnson, “Covert Action andAccountability: Decision Making for America’s Secret Foreign Policy,”International Studies Quarterly (1989), Vol. 33, pp. 81-109.

20 The stages described modify the current AirLand Operationsconcept by extending the duration of Stage I.

21 TRADOC Pam 525-5, pp. 16, 17.22 Ibid. p. 20.

Among the key features of the1986 Goldwater-Nichols Depart-ment of Defense Reorganization Actwas the definition of special-opera-tions forces and the identification ofspecial-operations activities.

Congress identified these activi-ties as: direct action; reconnais-sance; unconventional warfare; for-eign internal defense; civil affairs;psychological operations; countert-errorism; humanitarian assistance;theater search and rescue; and suchother activities as may be directedby the President or the Secretary ofDefense.1 The second of these,reconnaissance, demands the atten-tion of SOF planners and operators,particularly the Army’s SpecialForces, because of its historicalstrategic implications and opera-tional significance.

It is interesting to note that thelegislators who framed the 1986amendment stipulated that SOFwere to perform reconnaissance, asopposed to intelligence, activities,which fall within the purview ofother government agencies. By defi-nition, reconnaissance is limited toseeking out information and does notinvolve analysis or interpretation.

History is replete with examplesof how information gained through

planned reconnaissance was used togreat advantage by armies andnations. The earliest recorded reconmission is found in the 13th and14th chapters of the Old Testamentbook of Numbers. Here is told thestory of how Moses sent 12 special-ly-selected men into Canaan to:“See what the land is, and whetherthe people who dwell in it arestrong or weak, whether they arefew or many, and whether the landthat they dwell in is good or bad,and whether the cities that theydwell in are camps or strong-holds...”2 The information returnedby these agents provided the basisfor the Israelites’ decision to post-pone their entry into the PromisedLand.

In the 13th century, the leg-endary Mangoday forces served asthe long-range eyes and ears ofGenghis Khan and made significantcontributions to the conquest of halfthe then-known world by his Mon-gol hordes. Led by their comman-der, Yasotay, and never numberingmore than a few thousand, theseelite volunteers underwent arduoustraining, seemed to relish hardshipand were sworn to sacrifice theirlives in service of the Kha-Khan.3

At the dawn of the modern age of

warfare, cavalry performed the pri-mary reconnaissance mission andprovided commanders with informa-tion on enemy troop dispositions,positions and lines of communica-tions, as well as reporting on ter-rain and road nets. Few militaryexploits can match the color anddrama of Brig. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart’s“Ride Around McClellan” during thesecond year of the Civil War. Thisfour-day reconnaissance in force —Stuart rode with 1,200 troopers —made the dashing young Rebel lead-er an instant celebrity and gaveGen. Robert E. Lee valuable infor-mation upon which he would basehis first bold offensive against theUnion army. Ironically, it may havealso sown the seeds of Confederatedefeat at Gettysburg a year later,when Stuart’s liberal interpretationof Lee’s orders took him off onanother circuitous adventure anddeprived his commander of vitalcombat information at the war’smost critical juncture.

The period from the end of theCivil War through World War I ispractically devoid of any examplesof reconnaissance other than theuse of scouts on the western fron-tier. These men, often Indians, pro-vided vital information to Army

February 1993 9

Reconnaissance:Looking to the Future

Through the Past

by Lt. Col. Robert H. Huckabee

10 Special Warfare

posts, patrols, wagon trains and set-tlements regarding terrain, weath-er, local flora and fauna and, mostimportantly, the activities andmood of indigenous tribes.

It wasn’t until the early days ofWorld War II that the genesis of theUnited States’ special-ops capabilitycame into being under the auspicesof the Office of Strategic Services.Based on the British model, theOSS was organized to provide anational capability to conduct intel-ligence gathering and, as the OSSchief, Maj. Gen. William J. Dono-van, labelled it, “unorthodox war-fare.”4 The most notable successesachieved by OSS elements werethose of Detachment 101 in Burmaduring 1943-45 and the contribu-tions of the three-man Jedburghteams and larger (30-man) opera-tional groups in the European the-ater of operations. These units and

their wartime activities are directlylinked to today’s Special Forces.5

After World War II, our nationalleadership began to consider ourcapability to operate at the lowerend of the conflict spectrum —below the level of conventional war.From these post-war studiesevolved the decision to institutional-ize an “unconventional warfare”force structure and, on June 19,1952, the Army activated the firstsuch unit in its history — the 10thSpecial Forces Group, under thecommand of Col. Aaron Bank, a for-mer OSS operative and one of theArmy’s few special-ops experts.6During the remainder of the decadeand into the 1960s, Special Forcesdoctrine and training focused onpsychological operations, guerrillawarfare and counterinsurgency,with little thought given to recon-naissance. This would continue

until the deepening of Americaninvolvement in Vietnam caused ashift in emphasis.

Having operated in Vietnam andthroughout Southeast Asia since1957 in a variety of roles, ArmySpecial Forces changed character inthe mid-1960s. It was during thisperiod that the 5th Special ForcesGroup began conducting extensivelong-range reconnaissance opera-tions. The so-called “Greek” projectswere responsible for most of thesemissions. The first of these specialprojects, Project Delta (SpecialForces Operational Detachment B-52) was organized in 1964. ProjectsOmega (SFOD B-50) and Sigma(SFOD B-56) were formed two yearslater. Other reconnaissance activi-ties were conducted by SFOD-53and B-57 (Project Omega). Each ofthese units consisted of a number of4-10 man reconnaissance teams ofU.S. and South Vietnamese SpecialForces and indigenous irregulars,“roadrunner” teams (indigenous sol-diers disguised as Viet Cong orNorth Vietnamese) and a reaction-force unit.7

Although not part of the 5th Spe-cial Forces Group, the joint MilitaryAssistance Command - Vietnam’sStudies and Observations Group, orMACV-SOG, was activated in 1964and employed Special Forces per-sonnel to conduct ground reconnais-sance and surveillance missionsinto North Vietnam, Laos and Cam-bodia. Its operational elements wereorganized under launch sites knownas forward operating bases andlater as command-and-control sites.In 1967, three command-and-con-trol sites had been established:Command and Control - North atDa Nang, Command and Control -Central at Kontum and Commandand Control - South at Ban MeThuot. Each location was responsi-ble for a specific operational areaand consisted of 12-man (three Spe-cial Forces and nine indigenous)Spike reconnaissance teams, Spe-cial Forces-led 35-man Hatchetstrike platoons and larger exploita-tion units. Under such exotic code

Brig. Gen. J.E.B.Stuart’s “Ride

Around McClel-lan,” a four-day

reconnaissance inforce during the

second year of theCivil War, made

the Rebel leader aninstant celebrity

and gave Gen.Robert E. Lee valu-

able information.Ironically, Stuart’sabsence at Gettys-burg a year later

deprived Lee ofinformation at a

critical time.

Library of Congress

February 1993 11

names as Shining Brass, NickelSteel and Prairie Fire, MACV-SOGran a total of 2,675 cross-borderoperations from 1965 through1972.8

The Special Forces reconnaissanceprojects were closed down between1970 and 1971 and MACV-SOG wasdeactivated in 1972. The accomplish-ments and contributions of theseactivities have often been overlookedor underplayed in the post-war era ofintrospection and criticism. Evolvingfrom a fragmented effort to meet theexpanding operational-intelligencerequirements, Special Forces recon-naissance activities grew into a coor-dinated theater program which pro-vided the Military Assistance Com-mand - Vietnam approximately 50percent of its ground-combat infor-mation.9 Even Gen. Creighton W.Abrams, whose antipathy for SpecialForces was widely known, grudginglyacknowledged the effectiveness ofthese strategic operations.10

From these historical examples,one can readily detect a commonali-ty of purpose and organization ofthe forces charged to conduct recon-naissance missions. The objective ofsuch activities has remainedunchanged by the passage of time:It is to gather information andreport it. Once distilled into intelli-gence, this information can be usedby commanders or heads of state forplanning or decision-making. Too,the strategic importance of theinformation demands that thoseundertaking reconnaissance mis-sions be expressly selected andtrained for their tasks. Both ofthese considerations have contem-porary value.

In our present effort to advanceand hone our national SO capabili-ties and force structure to meetfuture contingencies and wartimerequirements, it is imperative thatwe pause to examine the historicalrecord. Looking to the futurethrough the perspective of the pastprovides a foundation of experienceupon which we can build. This isparticularly true in terms of recon-naissance, wherein the lessons

learned from Special Forces andMACV-SOG activities in SoutheastAsia can and should serve as a basisfor future operational planning,organization and training.

Reconnaissance is nothing new.The basic methodology of gatheringinformation has varied little sinceMoses dispatched that ancient mis-sion into Canaan 1,300 years beforeChrist. It is an eyes-on business.Modern technology has improvedand refined our ability to report andprocess information in a more time-ly and accurate manner. Satelliteburst communications facilitate therapid transfer of data to operationalcommanders. Futuristic high-techequipment developments, such as alightweight low-probability-of-detec-tion/low-probability-of-interceptradio and an electronic filmlesscamera, will further enhance ourcapabilities to provide real-time ornear-real-time combat informationto multiple echelons. However, it isthe still the individual soldier whoremains the basic component of anyeffective reconnaissance system.

Today’s Special Forces soldierpossesses the requisite skills tocarry out the missions assigned himby Congress, including that ofreconnaissance. It is, however, theburden of the Army’s leadershipstructures, command-and-controlsystems, equipment and training toensure the success of any endeavorhe undertakes on behalf of hisnation.

The past holds the key to thefuture.

Lt. Col. RobertH. Huckabee iscurrently chief ofthe Unconvention-al Warfare ForcesBranch, SpecialOperations Divi-sion, Directorateof Operations, theJoint Staff. Previously, he wasassigned to the Army Staff. A char-ter member of the Special ForcesBranch, he has served as a Special

Forces detachment and companycommander, and successively asgroup S-1, executive officer andgroup S-3 for the 5th Special ForcesGroup. Prior to attending the Com-mand and General Staff College in1987-88, he was the J-1 of SpecialOperations Command - Central. Hisother assignments include tourswith the 82nd Airborne Divisionand the 173rd Airborne Brigade inVietnam. He holds a master’s degreefrom Ohio University.

Notes:1 Goldwater-Nichols Department of

Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Amend-ed) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office; 1986), p. H10636.

2 The Layman’s Parallel Bible (GrandRapids, Mich.: Zondervan Publishers; 1973),p. 369.

3 Ethan Heral; “Yasotay and the Mango-day of Genghis Khan” Armed Forces JournalInternational, January 1985, pp. 38-69.

4 Alfred H. Paddock Jr., U.S. Army SpecialWarfare: Its Origins (Washington, D.C.:National Defense University Press, 1982), p.5.

5 Ibid., pp. 27-28.6 Aaron Bank, From OSS to Green Berets:

The Birth of Special Forces (Novato, Calif.:Presidio Press, 1986), p. 171.

7 Osprey Elite Series, U.S. Army SpecialForces, 1952-84 (London: Osprey PublishingLtd., 1985), p. 17.

8 Leroy Thompson, De Oppresso Liber: TheIllustrated History of the U.S. Army SpecialForces (Boulder, Colo.: Paladin Press, 1987),pp. 78-79, 82.

9 Frank R. Barnett, B. Hugh Tovar andRichard H. Shultz, Special Operations inU.S. Strategy (Washington, D.C.: NationalDefense University Press, 1984) p. 181.

10 Ibid., p. 141.

In the spring of 1993 a new Spe-cial Forces manual will be fieldedby the Special Warfare Center andSchool. FM 31-20-5, Special Recon-naissance Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Special Forces, is thefirst field manual focused on onespecific SF mission. Orientedtoward SF operational units andmission planners from the SFODAthrough SF battalion levels, themanual is a continuation of the doc-trinal processes established by JointPub 3-05, Doctrine for Joint SpecialOperations, FM 100-25, Doctrine forArmy Special Operations Forces,and FM 31-20, Doctrine for SpecialForces Operations. It defines thescope of SR, identifies planning con-siderations and conveys the experi-ences and expertise of SF unitsoperating in various geographicregions.

The new doctrinal concept of hav-ing a TTP manual for each SF mis-sion will continue with manuals onforeign internal defense (31-20-3),unconventional warfare (31-20-2)and counterterrorism (31-20-6), inthat order. Scheduled for comple-

tion in 1994, FM 31-20-1, SpecialForces Tactics, Techniques and Pro-cedures, will contain tactics andprocedures common to all SF mis-sions, such as SF command andcontrol, mission planning, infiltra-tion and exfiltration and post-mis-sion activities. Development of theTTP for direct-action missions (31-20-4) is currently on hold. Because

FM 31-20-5 is the first of the series,it contains some basic SF informa-tion which will migrate into 31-20-1. Later editions of the SR manualwill be even more SR-specific.

OrganizationThe SR TTP is broken down into

four chapters and supportingappendixes. The chapters lay the

12 Special Warfare

User Applicability Guide for FM 31-20-5

SF Group

SFOD C

SFOD B

SFOD A

Chapter 2Pre-MissionEmployment

Chapter 1OverviewApplicability Chapter 3

EmploymentChapter 4

Post-MissionActivities

Appendixes

FM 31-20-5:

New Manual Focuses on Special Reconnaissance

by SFC Jim McGill

foundation of SR mission planningand provide general SR mission pro-cedures and information. Informa-tion is ordered chronologically:

Chapter 1 provides an overview ofspecial reconnaissance, discussingthe nature and fundamentals of SR,its relationship to other missions,its history and its place in AirLandOperations.

Chapter 2 deals with pre-missionactivities, including mission analy-sis, mission planning, missionpreparation and pre-employmentpreparation.

Chapter 3 covers actual employ-ment of SR. Area assessment, tar-get acquisition, target analysis andthe various types of reconnaissance,including hydrographic, meteorolog-ical, geographic and post-strike, areaddressed in detail.

Chapter 4 concentrates on post-mission activities, including debrief-ing, follow-on missions, after-actionreports and recording lessonslearned.

The appendixes provide examplesof specific SR techniques and proce-dures, including such topics as howto construct different types of fixedobservation and surveillance sites,reconnaissance methods, mission-specific clothing and equipment,operational techniques and legalconsiderations. The order of theappendixes follows the order inwhich the subjects appear in thetext.

The user-applicability graphicdemonstrates by its shaded areasthe application of the SR TTP man-ual to the conduct of missions atvarious SF operational levels. AllSF units will find the overview use-ful, but operators at the company,battalion and group levels will findthe chapters on pre-mission,employment and post-mission activ-ities less applicable than the ODAs.Specific SR techniques listed in theappendixes will be of most benefitto soldiers at the ODA level.

MissionA simplistic definition of SR is

any reconnaissance mission that

due to its location, mission parame-ters or political implicationsrequires execution by SOF. FM 31-20 is more specific, defining SR as“Reconnaissance and surveillanceactions conducted by special opera-tions forces to obtain or verify, byvisual observation and other collec-tion methods, information concern-ing the capabilities, intentions, andactivities of an actual or potentialenemy or to secure data concerningthe meteorological, hydrographic, orgeographic characteristics of a par-ticular area. It includes targetacquisition, area assessment andpost-strike reconnaissance.” Withthese definitions of SR, we canexplore what is “special” about spe-cial reconnaissance.

Modern SR operations task SFteams to confirm, deny or refute theknown information, or pass newdata, for specific special-operationsareas. When executed in the delib-erate planning process, discussed inChapter 2 of the SR TTP, thisknown information will be thor-oughly researched as the plan ofexecution is developed. In extremecases when time constraints do notpermit deliberate mission planning,SFODs may have to execute some-

thing similar to combat patrols. Inthose cases, the SFOD generallywill be able to gain most, but not allof the required data. Mission plan-ners must weigh the criticality ofthe target against the risk of losinga unique asset that is not easilyreconstituted, the SFOD.

Historically, if a target wasbeyond the organic capability of thecorps commander because of thedistance involved, then it was auto-matically considered to be an SRmission. Current doctrine sees dis-tance as only one factor in deter-mining the need for SR.

Other considerations include theneed for SF skills such as extendedland navigation, use of specialequipment, area orientation andcultural awareness, and language.Additional training such as move-ment and camouflage techniques,taught during the Special Opera-tions Target Interdiction Course,will be useful in missions againstkey nodes. An SF team might con-duct SR in urban areas in supportof units not suited for that typeoperation, or the mission might beto fix an enemy or find a weaknessin his defenses in an area bypassedby general-purpose forces.

February 1993 13

SF skills such as movement and camouflage techniques, taught during theSpecial Operations Target Interdiction Course, are useful in SR missions.

File photo

Under the deliberate mission-planning process, SFODs willreceive training in systems identifi-cation, and when faced with a com-plex rail system or factory, will beprepared to identify and exploit keysystem nodes. Generally, the cumu-lative skills of the SF team and thefamiliarity of its members withtheir SOP and each other’s reac-tions greatly increase the probabili-ty of mission success.

All reconnaissance operationsgather information. Special recon-naissance is conducted to producenear-real-time information. On themodern battlefield, this type ofinformation is key for the comman-der’s decision-making process. Twosources of near-real-time data aresatellites and reconnaissance air-craft. They can produce detailedphotos quickly, often without theknowledge of the target. However,when the detail required is notavailable from these sources, or cer-tainty is critical, SR operations canrespond to fill in gaps in the exist-

ing data. By merging the technicaldata with first-hand reports, com-manders will gain a complete pic-ture of the battlefield.

Deciding which missions go towhich teams will be driven by theCINC’s special-operations campaignplan, the joint targeting process, theoperational SOF mission criteria,and considerations of mission,enemy, terrain, troops and timeavailable, or METT-T. While thetargeting process is only briefly dis-cussed in the SR TTP, Chapter 2addresses the result of this process,the Special Operations MissionPlanning Folder. A complete discus-sion of the nomination and target-ing process is in FM 100-25 and FM31-20.

Two common questions askedabout the SR TTP are, “What is newabout this FM?,” and “How can weget a copy?”

The SR TTP does not drasticallychange existing doctrine. It does,however, introduce new thought inthe area of “follow-on” and “roll-

over” tasking. SR is often conductedto fix a target or to gain informationwhich is passed to an attackingforce. Sometimes commanders aretempted to ask the deployedSFODA to “roll over” from a SRmission to a direct-action missionafter the target confirmation ispassed. Lightly equipped SF teamsconducting SR missions employmostly passive measures. DA mis-sions, on the other hand, are basedon violent active measures. While itis the prerogative of commanders totask subordinate units as they seefit, there is a great differencebetween an SFOD slipping awayafter conducting a SR mission andan SFOD announcing its locationand intent by engaging an enemywith whatever means it has onhand.

Another new section talks abouthome-station activities and trainingof SR teams. This section expandsthe mission-essential task list toaddress SR-specific activities thatare applicable to all SF missions. Asthe second chart depicts, the appli-cation of these activities varies withthe mission. At the high end of thescale is a team employed on a pureSR mission; at the low end is anSFODA conducting a counterterror-ism operation. Whatever the mis-sion, users are encouraged to reviewthe SR TTP and adapt its content tothe tasks at hand. Tips on construc-tion of observation and surveillancesites may prove useful to a teamputting surveillance on a drop zoneprior to the drop. Also, SR-styledmovement techniques will be usefulto the SFODA when conducting aleader’s reconnaissance during araid.

The new TTP is also designed tocross-load unique ideas from groupto group, and benefit all SF teams.For example, ideas and successfulSR techniques used by the 5th SFGroup in desert regions were incor-porated in the manual, so soldiersfrom the 7th SF Group deploying toan arid region could benefit fromthe 5th’s expertise. Mountain SRTTPs common to teams in the 10th

14 Special Warfare

Relationship of SR to Other Missions

NON-SR RELATEDTASKS

SR RELATEDTASKS

NON-SR RELATEDTASKS

SR RELATEDTASKS

SpecialReconnaissance

UnconventionalWarfare

Foreign InternalDefense

Direct Action Counter-terrorism

Area Assessment

SF Group could be exploited by the1st SF Group. While these TTPs aremainly addressed in the form ofplanning considerations, specificinformation can be found in theappendixes.

Requests for FM 31-20-5 shouldbe sent through routine publica-tions channels by updating theunit’s DA Form 12. Each SF groupshould order sufficient copies toensure that each of its SFODAs and SFODBs get copies. The SWCSDoctrine Branch has exhausted itssupply of all drafts. These draftswere forwarded through SF Com-mand to field units for comment.The same distribution list will beused for future TTPs now underdevelopment.

Users with recommendations forimproving the SR TTP should sendtheir recommendations on a DAForm 2028 to: Commander,USAJFKSWCS; Attn: AOJK-DT-DM; Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000.

ConclusionAs doctrine writers at the SWCS,

we know that the SR TTP is not all-inclusive. FM 31-20-5 will nevertake the place of a well-written andrehearsed unit SOP. It is notdesigned to be a “check the block”

mission-execution format. It isdesigned to encourage thought andpromote a systematic approach tomission employment, deployment,execution and team recovery.

The days of issuing an SF team ashovel and a pair of binoculars,then dubbing it an “SR team,” areover. As laser range finders, elec-tronic filmless cameras and globalpositioning systems become com-mon, SF soldiers must gain anunderstanding of the new devices toaid in their missions. The futurewill require extensive training withnew technologies. Yet while technol-ogy can do many things, it cannotreplace the skilled eye of the SpecialForces soldier.

SFC Jim McGillis assigned to theDoctrine Develop-ment Branch ofthe Directorate ofTraining and Doc-trine, JFK SpecialWarfare Centerand School. Hisprevious assignments include serv-ing with the 7th SF Group as anoperations sergeant for ODA 785during operations Just Cause and

Promote Liberty in Panama, and asan operations and intelligencesergeant for ODAs 761 and 766. Hismilitary schooling includes trainingthe Special Forces QualificationCourse, SF Operations and Intelli-gence Course, Military Free FallParachutist Course, SF AdvancedNCO Course, Static Line Jumpmas-ter Course and Explosive OrdnanceDisposal, Basic and Nuclear phases.He holds a associate of arts degreefrom Campbell University, BuiesCreek, N.C.

February 1993 15

In almost every rotation at theJoint Readiness Training Center,SF teams discover the need to reac-quaint themselves with current doc-trine, and the area of planning andexecuting special-reconnaissancemissions is no exception.

Predominantly, officers andNCOs alike fail to apply doctrine —the command-estimate process andintelligence preparation of the bat-tlefield — into their SR missionplanning; they focus more on prepa-ration for the briefback than for themission. Since the aim of JRTC is toreplicate combat as realistically aspossible and provide feedback tosoldiers on the application of doc-trine, the purpose of this article isto educate Special Forces soldierson SR for “real world” contingenciesrather than to serve as a checklistfor JRTC rotations.

SR is reconnaissance and surveil-lance conducted by SOF to obtain orverify, by visual observation orother collection methods, informa-tion concerning the capabilities,intentions and activities of an actu-al or potential enemy. SOF mayalso use SR to secure data concern-ing the meteorological, hydrograph-

ic or geographic characteristics of aparticular area. SR includes targetacquisition, area assessment andpost-strike reconnaissance. It is per-formed at the strategic, operationalor tactical level.1

Prior to conducting SR, SpecialForces soldiers should be familiarwith applicable doctrinal references,including:• FM 101-5, Staff Organization

and Operations• FM 31-20, Doctrine for Special

Forces Operations• FM 31-20-5, Special

Reconnaissance• ARTEP 31-807-31-MTP, Mission

Training Plan for the Special Forces Company: Special Reconnaissance

• FM 34-36, Special OperationsForces Intelligence and ElectronicWarfare Operations

• FM 34-2, Collection Management• FM 34-2-1, Reconnaissance

and Surveillance and Intelligence Support to Counterreconnaissance

• FM 6-20, Fire Support in the Air-land Battle.Upon selection to execute a mis-

sion or plan, the ODA moves into an

isolation facility, or ISOFAC,receives its operations order, orOPORD, and mission briefing, andbegins mission preparation.2 Toobtain the highest probability forsuccess, an ODA must use its timeefficiently during isolation. Timespent beforehand in developing area assessments, team cross train-ing, and training in standard oper-ating procedures can pay off duringisolations.

Battalion staffs can save detach-ments additional time by providingthem with required information “upfront.” Often at JRTC, ODAs do notreceive the battalion S-2’s intelli-gence products until they requestthem. ODAs need area assessments,doctrinal, situational, event, anddecision-support templates in orderto develop viable courses of action.Without these products, missionplanning is interrupted while theteam develops or requests analysisof the terrain, weather, enemy andbattlefield environment.

At the end of the mission briefing,the ISOFAC commander providesthe SF team with a proposed isola-tion schedule and a list of require-ments already requested or provid-ed for the team.3 These require-ments may include:• Ranges• Training facilities• Rehearsal sites• Updated intelligence products• Maps• Air items• Accompanying supplies• Items for emergency resupply• Mission-peculiar equipment• Isolation expendables• Escape-and-evasion data• Basic load ammunition• NBC equipment.

Decision makingAfter receipt of the mission brief-

ing and OPORD, the ODA uses thetactical decision-making process todevelop the commander’s estimate.The process, outlined in Chapter 5of FM 101-5 and the Army Com-mand and General Staff CollegeStudent Text 100-9, The Command

16 Special Warfare

Special Reconnaissance

Planning:Notes from the JRTC

by Capt. Brian R. Vines

Estimate Process, consists of fivephases:• Mission analysis• Course-of-action development• Course-of-action analysis• Course-of-action comparison• Decision and execution.

Mission analysis is the meansthrough which the commanderobtains an understanding of themission.4 It includes:• Purpose of the higher-headquar-

ters mission (from the missionsand intents of the next two high-er commanders)

• A review of the area of operationsto understand the higher-head-quarters mission and intent

• Identification of tasks to be per-formed, either specified orimplied

• Determination of mission-essen-tial tasks

• Determination of constraints,restrictions, required assets andrisk trade-offs

• Construction of restated missionand commander’s intent

• Construction of a time schedule.The detachment uses facts on

current status or conditions to sup-port its mission analysis. It fillsinformation gaps with assumptionsif information is not known. Duringmission analysis, the assistantoperations sergeant should begindeveloping the intelligence esti-mate based on these facts andassumptions.

Upon completion of the missionanalysis, the ODA commanderapproves the restated mission andissues his initial planning guidance,which provides a common startingpoint for the detachment to developits courses of action. COAs shouldbe developed without bias. Teammembers continuously exchangeinformation and coordinate withinthe detachment to ensure the con-current development of feasibleCOAs for consideration by the commander.5

COAs are documented by state-ments with sketches. Each onemust be significantly differentfrom any others. Significant differ-

ences include task organizationand schemes of maneuver. Detach-ment members should avoid thecommon pitfall of focusing on onegood COA and developing otherthrowaway COAs that are only dif-ferent because of infiltration orexfiltration.6

The entire ODA analyzes theCOAs individually to share infor-mation and discard COAs that arenot feasible. They use war gamingto visualize the flow of an operation,given friendly strengths and dispo-sitions, enemy assets and possiblecourses of action, and a specificoperational area. Detachment mem-bers should consider a reaction andcounteraction for each COA duringwar gaming. Detachment membersshould determine the strengths andweaknesses of each COA.7

Once COAs are analyzed, the fea-sible ones are compared to identifythe one with the highest probabilityof success. A decision matrix is anexcellent technique for determiningthe best COA. Team members mayuse their own matrix for compari-son of COAs within their areas of

responsibility.8The last phase of the comman-

der’s estimate is the decision. TheODA commander presents his deci-sion brief, known as the mission-concept brief, to the mission approv-ing authority.9 The detachment’srecommended COA is eitherapproved, combined with aspects of other COAs, or given furtherguidance.

The approved COA becomes thethe concept of the operation for theteam’s OPORD, and the basis forthe ODA’s mission planning. Oftenteams will save unused COAs aspossible contingency plans. Thecommander receiving the briefingshould have his staff in attendanceto ensure continuity. This is partic-ularly important if the ODA is tobecome operationally or tacticallycontrolled by a conventional unitthrough a Special Operations Com-mand and Control Element, orSOCCE.

In those cases, the SOCCE isvery important to an isolatingODA. It must deconflict and pro-vide to the SFODAs a plan for com-

February 1993 17

To obtain the high-est probability forsuccess, an ODAmust use its timeefficiently duringisolation. Timespent beforehandin developing areaassessments, teamcross training, andtraining in stan-dard operatingprocedures can pay off during isolations.

Photo by Craig Beason

mand and control in the special-operations area, a communicationsplan, a link-up plan, and a force-protection plan (including fire-sup-port planning and restricted-firemeasures). The SOCCE should alsocoordinate the intelligence-collec-tion efforts of the conventionalforce with the ODA. This allowscontinuity between the ODA andthe intelligence requirements of theconventional force commander.10

The SOCCE can also integrate con-ventional-force and host-nationassets into the planning and execu-tion of fire support and escape andevasion.

IPBIntelligence preparation of the

battlefield is often a weakness ofODAs participating at JRTC. Thisis a result of limited guidance fromthe battalion S-2s, time restraintsand intelligence sergeants failing toapply their education from theOperations and Intelligence Course.IPB is a dynamic approach to ana-lyzing weather, terrain and theenemy in a specific geographicallocation. It continues throughoutisolation and execution.11

Using IPB, the ODA generatesseveral visual aids that help toillustrate how the enemy might con-duct himself in a particular situa-tion. These templates, classed assituational, event and decision-sup-port,12 are graphic portrayals ofenemy force structure, deploymentor capabilities, normally drawn toscale.

Situational templates are devel-oped during the decision-makingprocess to aid COA development.They are snapshots depicting whata threat force might do at a certaintime and place on the battlefield.The situational template is theintelligence estimate in graphicform.13

During comparison of COAs, theintelligence sergeant develops eventand decision-support templates toassist in war gaming. Event tem-plates identify and analyze battle-field events and enemy activities

that indicate enemy courses ofaction. As the enemy force is visual-ized, critical areas, designated“named areas of interest,” becomeapparent. An NAI is a point or areawhere enemy activity or lack ofactivity will confirm or deny a par-ticular enemy COA. NAIs aid intel-ligence collection, reconnaissanceand surveillance, and analysis. Theevent template depicts the NAIsand the relationship of events onthe battlefield.14

The decision-support templaterelates the details of event tem-plates to decision points that aresignificant to the operation. Deci-sion-support templates are the linkbetween operations and intelli-gence. They provide a structuredbasis for using experience and judgment to reduce battlefielduncertainties.15

IPB is more than a mechanicalprocess. It provides ODAs with ameans of synchronizing the intelli-gence system with other battlefieldoperating systems. Templates helpin developing the collection plan, animportant element of the intelli-gence cycle.16

The intelligence cycle consists offour phases: directing, collecting,processing, and disseminating andusing. The commander identifiespriority intelligence requirementsduring the directing phase. PIRsserve as a tool to provide focus forthe collecting phase. This focusforces the entire intelligence systemto look for specific indicators whichwill answer the PIR. The ODA mustrestate its mandated PIRs to fit itsmission. The team’s PIR becomesthe basis for the ODA collectionplan.17

Collection planThe collection plan provides a

framework for ODAs to determineand evaluate intelligence needs.Because of the diversity of missions,capabilities and requirements, thecollection plan has no prescribeddoctrinal format. An intelligencecollection plan worksheet is a valu-able aid in planning and directing

the collection effort.18 An examplecollection worksheet can be found inFM 34-2, Collection Management,Appendix A, Figure A-1.

The final two phases of the intel-ligence cycle are processing, anddisseminating and using. The key tothese two phases is an effectiveODA internal and external commu-nications plan.

Communications planOnce the ODA infiltrates the spe-

cial-operations area, the communi-cations plan is often a measure ofmission success. It should includeinternal and external communica-tions, communications security,SAVSER SUP 5, redundancy, con-tingencies and enemy direction-finding threats. It should include allof the communications assets avail-able to the team and be thoroughlyrehearsed.

In addition to the collection andcommunications plan, the ODA pre-pares numerous other plans to meetmission requirements and contin-gencies. To save time during isola-tion, routine parts of these planscan be addressed in SOPs.

Escape and evasion planAt JRTC, units have habitually

developed weak escape-and-evasionplans. This weakness results frompoor planning and teams not receiv-ing timely E&E guidance suppliedto battalions from the joint specialoperations task force. Teamsrequire timely guidance and over-lays to support their development ofassisted and unassisted E&E plans.Developed plans need to be dissemi-nated so that team members canunderstand and rehearse them. Allagencies that can assist in the E&Emust also be aware of the plan. TheSOCCE, for example, can possiblyrequest conventional assets torecover an evading ODA.

Fire-support planODAs often neglect the fire-sup-

port plan. It contains informationnecessary for understanding howfire support will aid the operation.

18 Special Warfare

Fire support is the collective andcoordinated use of indirect-fireweapons, armed aircraft and otherlethal and nonlethal means in support of a battle plan.19 ODAsshould develop a fire-support planregardless of whether assets areavailable. This will allow quickerresponses as fire-support assetsbecome available.

Other plansInfiltration and exfiltration plan-

ning is generally strong duringJRTC rotations. The acronymPACE (primary, alternate, contin-gency, and emergency) should be arule of thumb for planning all oper-ations, including infiltration, exfil-tration, assembly, resupply, casual-ty evacuation and link-up.

RehearsalsThe importance of rehearsals can-

not be overemphasized. Isolationshould focus on mission prepara-tion, but often more time is spentrehearsing for a briefback than foractions on the objective. Rehearsalsshould include every aspect of theplan, under the best simulated com-bat environment possible, includingwearing mission equipment bothday and night.

BriefbackOnce its mission planning is com-

pleted, the detachment presents abriefback to the tasking comman-der. The purpose of the briefback isto assure the higher commanderand his staff that the ODA under-stands and is prepared to accom-plish the given mission.20 Althoughmany SF groups have their ownbriefback SOPs, the following for-mat is effective:

1. The ODA commander intro-duces his team and acquaints thecommander and his staff with theoperational area.

2. The ODA commander gives afive-paragraph OPORD on theteam’s mission.

3. The assistant operationssergeant briefs Annex A, Intelligence.

4. The operations sergeant briefsAnnex B, Operations.

5. The ODA commander con-cludes with his visualization of themission from start to finish.

6. The remainder of the detach-ment is prepared to discuss anyannexes of the OPORD not dis-cussed previously, if the commanderor his staff have any questions.

7. Charts and sand tables helpsupport the team’s briefing. Thebriefback is done from note cardsrather than read to the commander.

After the briefback the team con-tinues preparation and rehearsalsfor the mission. Emphasis should beplaced on an effective rest planprior to infiltration to ensure opti-mum performance in the opera-tional area.

This article has focused primarilyon premission activities as areasrequiring improvement in SR. Mostteams that participate in JRTC areproficient in individual skills andbasic patrolling techniques. Manyteams are familiar with applicabledoctrine but often don’t realize theneed to apply it at detachmentlevel. The key to successful SR isrealistic multiechelon training con-ducted in the most realistic condi-tions available. This can beenhanced by providing objectivefeedback to the unit on its ability touse, understand and apply currentdoctrine.

Capt. Brian R.Vines is currentlyan SFODA observ-er/controller inthe Special Opera-tions Division,Joint ReadinessTraining Center,Little Rock AirForce Base, Ark. His previous con-ventional assignments include ser-vice as a rifle platoon leader andanti-armor platoon leader in the82nd Airborne Division. He hascommanded both a military-free-fallspecialty detachment and an SFoperational detachment in the 5th

SF Group, also serving as a detach-ment commander during OperationsDesert Shield and Desert Storm. Agraduate of the Infantry OfficerBasic and Advanced Courses andthe Special Forces QualificationCourse, he holds a BA degree fromSam Houston State University,Huntsville, Texas.

Notes:1 U.S. Department of the Army, Field

Manual 31-20, Doctrine for Special ForcesOperations, p. 3-4.

2 Ibid., see pp. 7-10 to 7-18 for the deliber-ate mission-planning process.

3 Ibid., p. 7-11.4 U.S. Department of the Army, Field

Manual 101-5, Staff Organization and Oper-ations, pp. 5-8 to 5-10.

5 U.S. Army Command and General StaffCollege, Student Text 100-9, The CommandEstimate Process, p. 3-1.

6 Ibid., p. 3-6.7 Ibid., p. 4-1.8 Ibid., pp. 4-1 to 5-2.9 FM 31-20, p. 7-16 for the MICON brief.

Also see Detachment Mission PlanningGuide.

10 FM 31-20, p. 5-19.11 U.S. Department of the Army, Field

Manual 34-130, Intelligence Preparation ofthe Battlefield, p. 4-1.

12 U.S. Department of the Army, FieldManual 34-2-1, Reconnaissance and Surveil-lance and Intelligence Support to Counter-reconnaissance, pp. 2-14 to 2-26.

13 Ibid., pp. 2-14 to 2-18.14 Ibid., pp. 2-18 to 2-20.15 Ibid., pp. 2-20 to 2-23.16 U.S. Department of the Army, Field

Manual 34-2, Collection Management, p. 2-22.

17 FM 34-2, pp. 1-3 to 1-8.18 Ibid., pp. A-1 to A-9.19 U.S. Department of the Army, Field

Manual 6-20, Fire Support in the AirlandBattle, pp. 1-2 to 1-7.

20 FM 31-20, p. 7-16 for mission briefback.Also see Detachment Mission PlanningGuide.

February 1993 19

When a Special Forces soldierbegins his career he relies heavilyon his technical skills. However, ashe progresses in seniority andattains greater responsibility, ashift takes place as he becomesmore dependent on his human andconceptual skills. I would like tofocus on the human skills, or morespecifically, the “intercultural com-munication” piece of this equation.

Within the last decade, intercul-tural communication has receivedconsiderable interest and attentionin the special-operations communi-ty. We frequently approach thissubject obliquely by discussing“coalition warfare,” “force multipli-cation” or “security assistance,” just to mention a few subjects.Regardless, there is considerableagreement that intercultural com-munication is important to our totalreadiness.

Effective intercultural communi-cation is the synergy one achievesby synchronizing language, nonver-bal communications, cultural and

regional information and interper-sonal skills. This synchronization isa cognitive process. It is the mentalcapacity and agility to select, store,process and use information.

Intercultural communication is avery broad and complex area. It isbased upon multidisciplinary fieldsof study which a Special Forces sol-dier needs to master if he is to beeffective. He is exposed to thesefields in institutional training, andhis skills are enhanced and sus-tained in the unit.

LanguageWe expect every Special Forces

soldier to be bilingual. By that wemean he has a working knowledge(speaking and comprehending) of aforeign language consistent withthe regional orientation of his unit.He is first introduced to a languageat the U.S. Army John F. KennedySpecial Warfare Center and Schooland must acquire a minimum mem-orized proficiency of 0+\0+ beforehe is allowed to proceed to his

assignment with an operationalgroup. His organization then isresponsible for sustainment andenhancement training. There is alsoan inherent individual responsibili-ty to maintain proficiency. We aredoing reasonably well.

Contrary to popular belief, learn-ing a foreign language is not diffi-cult. It is a natural process in allsocieties. A billion plus Chineseand Arabs learned the two hardestlanguages in the world. They didthat under adverse weather condi-tions, rampant pestilence, wars,hunger, no Defense Language Insti-tute, no assessment and selection,no bonuses and no entertainingtechnology. So it is not surprisingthat highly motivated SpecialForces soldiers have been able toacquire linguistic skills with littledifficulty. To date not a single Spe-cial Forces soldier has failed theinitial training program at theJohn F. Kennedy Special WarfareCenter and School. It is only a mat-ter of time before language profi-ciency will be officially integratedinto Special Forces qualificationand unit readiness reporting.

Nonverbal skillsNonverbal communication is a

universal human phenomenon. It ispossible to stop speaking, but it isnot possible to stop behaving. Fromthis continual behavior others makeinferences concerning one’sthoughts and emotional states.These inferences are in turn actedupon by those who make them, aresponse just as real as if the origi-nal message had been verbal andintentional. A husband turning hisback on his wife and slamming thedoor without a word is heralding asignificant message. It is thereforenot very difficult to understandwhat benefits a person can derivefrom understanding nonverbal lan-guage, since we communicate in amultiprocess manner. (It is interest-ing to note that studies indicatefemales are better receivers of non-verbal communication than males.)

The understanding of gestures

20 Special Warfare

Intercultural Communication:

The Need for Conceptual

Skills

by Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow

and behavior is very difficult whenthe various elements are separatedfrom their context. However, whengestures and behavior are fittedtogether into their composite posi-tion, a complete picture evolves. Attimes you may find a dichotomybetween the verbal and the nonver-bal meaning. In those cases thenonverbal gesture will generallyprove to be more truthful.

Within a single culture, we utilizethe nonverbal system almost uncon-sciously. A study conducted in 1970estimates that within a single cul-ture, only 30 percent of what iscommunicated in conversation isverbal. But, it is when individualsfrom different cultural groups beginto interact that their unconsciouslyassumed system of nonverbal com-munications ceases to function well.The gestures and behavior mayactually be the same, but they maybe assigned different meaningsfrom one culture’s system to theother’s. Thus in a multicultural con-text we frequently have no alterna-tive but to send messages blindly,not knowing how they will be

received and interpreted. Unless wehave been properly trained, we havethus maximized the potential for acommunication failure.

For example, the gesture of form-ing a circle with the thumb andforefinger, the other fingers point-ing up, is widely accepted as theAmerican “okay” sign. However, inBrazil it is considered vulgar orobscene. The gesture is also consid-ered impolite in Greece and Russia,while in Japan, it signifies “money”and in southern France “zero” or“worthless.” Nevertheless, it mustbe noted that there are several emo-tions that span cultural boundaries:anger, happiness, fear, surprise anddisgust are the key ones. The bot-tom line is that we must paygreater attention to this area thanwe have done to date.

Cultural orientationThis brings us to the field of cul-

tural and area orientation. For Spe-cial Forces, an understanding of theobjective area’s people, their hopes,aspirations, religion, culture, histo-ry and economic and political

dynamics is imperative. The orien-tation must also take into accountthe area’s geography and climate.

On a very practical level, ourincreased understanding of the sim-ilarities and differences among peo-ple of different cultures will allowfor messages to be more accuratelysent and received. For example, aCatholic from Haiti, one from Romeand one from Los Angeles will viewtheir religion from very differentperspectives. In Japan, eye contactis key to the way you feel aboutsomeone, and the less of it the bet-ter. What a westerner considers anhonest look in the eye, the Orientaltakes as a lack of respect and a per-sonal affront. Even when shakinghands or bowing, and especiallywhen conversing, only an occasionalglance into the other person’s face isconsidered polite. The rest of thetime great attention is paid to fin-gertips, desk tops and the floor. Iimagine it is a good idea to keepone’s shoes shined, for many Orien-tals will have their eyes on them.

On the other hand, Arabs flinchat the sight of shoe soles. Hence,feet are best kept flat on the floor,never propped up on a table or desk,or crossed over the knee. These arejust a sampling of cultural differ-ences that can obstruct effectivecommunication when not taken intoconsideration.

Interpersonal skillsThe last area that I would like to

mention is interpersonal communi-cation. Primarily, it requires theability to maintain an open mind,the sensitivity to observe and graspthe situation, and most important-ly, the ability to listen with under-standing. For a Special Forces sol-dier it is critical that he is an effec-tive teacher, and the ultimate nego-tiator and persuader. These are theskills which allow him to be a “forcemultiplier.” To be a good negotiatoris not easy. Standard strategiesoften leave people dissatisfied, wornout, or alienated, and frequently allthree.

Often people find themselves in a

February 1993 21

CONCEPTUAL SKILLS: Planning,

Organizing, Coordinating,Staffing & Controlling

HUMAN SKILLS: InterculturalCommunications,

Character, Maturity,Endurance,Persuasion,Teaching &Negotiating

TECHNICAL SKILLS:Operations & Intelligence,Communications, Weapons,Medical & Engineering

SENIOR LEVEL

MID LEVEL

ENTRY LEVEL

Importance of Conceptual/Human Skills

dilemma. They see two ways tonegotiate: Good Guy or Bad Guy.The good guy wants to avoid per-sonal conflict and makes conces-sions readily in order to reachagreement. He wants an amicableresolution; yet he often ends upexploited and feeling bitter. The badguy sees any situation as a contestof wills in which the side that takesthe more extreme position andholds out longer fares better. Hewants to win, yet many times endsup producing an equally difficultresponse. This exhausts both himand his resources, as well as harm-ing his reputation and relationshipwith others. Other strategies usedfall between the two extremes ofgetting along with people and get-ting what you want.

We advocate a strategy based ona method developed by the HarvardNegotiation Project. Issues shouldbe decided on their merits ratherthan through haggling. It suggeststhat you look for mutual gains

whenever possible and that whereyour interests conflict, you insistthat the results be based on somefair standards independent of thewill of either side. This technique isfocused on merits and is gentle onpeople. It must be learned and fla-vored with knowledge of the foreignlanguage, nonverbal communica-tions, area and cultural under-standing, and good interpersonalskills.

Like it or not, we are all negotia-tors. Negotiation is a fact of life.Everyone negotiates somethingevery day. A person negotiateswith his spouse, with his childrenand in various person-to-personrelationships. Negotiation is abasic means of getting what youwant from others. It is back-and-forth communication designed toreach an agreement when you andthe other side have some intereststhat are shared and others that areopposed. Since conflict is a growthindustry, more and more occasions

require negotiation.For Special Forces, the ability to

effectively negotiate, persuade andteach is critical in foreign internaldefense and unconventional war-fare. Our technical competence isof little value if we are unable toget the other party to do what wethink is necessary. These skills candetermine the success or failure ofa mission.

Special Forces takes great pridein being a force multiplier, con-tributing across the entire spec-trum of conflict. However, our con-tribution will only be as effectiveas our ability to master technicaland conceptual skills and our abili-ty to skillfully pass informationthrough effective interculturalcommunication.

Maj. Gen. Sid-ney Shachnow iscurrently the com-manding general,JFK Special War-fare Center andSchool. Duringmore than 30years of commis-sioned service, he has served as acommander or staff officer withInfantry, Mechanized Infantry, air-mobile, airborne, and Special Forcesunits. His most recent assignmentsinclude serving as commanding gen-eral of the Army Special ForcesCommand and commanding gener-al of U.S. Army-Berlin. His militaryeducation includes the Infantry Offi-cer Basic and Advanced Courses,the Special Forces QualificationCourse, the Army Command andGeneral Staff College and the ArmyWar College. He holds a bachelor’sdegree from the University ofNebraska and a master’s degreefrom Shippensburg State College,Shippensburg, Pa.

22 Special Warfare

FOREIGNLANGUAGE INTERPERSONAL

SKILLS

NO

N-V

ER

BA

L

CO

MM

UN

ICA

TION

CU

LTU

RA

L &

AR

EA

OR

IEN

TATI

ON

EFFECTIVEINTERCULTURALCOMMUNICATION

OUTPUT

INPUT

Cognitive Process

February 1993 23

Over the years, language traininghas become one of the top trainingpriorities for Special Forces sol-diers, yet language sustainment hascontinued to be one of the most dif-ficult areas to maintain.

Each Special Forces group is allo-cated funds to conduct internal lan-guage training. These budgets allowfor language labs, instructors, mate-rials and OCONUS immersion pro-grams. In spite of all these re-sources, language training is attimes inefficiently conducted, whenmeasured against on ODA’s mis-sion-essential task list and upcom-ing missions. The followingapproach has been developed byODA 716 to focus its languagetraining for specific missions. Theprogram was devised for ODAswhich have a FID primary missionand an upcoming mobile trainingteam or deployment for traininginto theater.

In lieu of language-enhancementtraining that aims to generallyupgrade team proficiency, we havefound that a specific, mission-ori-ented language training program isof greatest value to the ODA. Ourprogram is based on developingpost-site-survey programs ofinstruction, or POIs, and lessonplans, or LPs, which are directlyfocused on the requirements ofupcoming missions. We base themajority of our language training —listening, writing, speaking exercis-

es and vocabulary-grammar exercis-es — on the anticipated POI and itscomponent LPs.

First, we coordinate through ourBattalion S-3 training NCO toschedule a 2-3 week block at ourbattalion language lab with anaccredited instructor. Then weschedule training time prior to theblock to write LPs to support thePOI, under the direction of ourstrongest team linguists. Thestrongest speaker is assigned theadditional responsibility of coordi-nating with the contracted instruc-tor in order to identify the neededgrammar review and lessons, vocab-ulary and exercises needed to sup-port the LPs.

Grammar is focused on properverb conjugation, with emphasis onthe present tense, the preterite, theperiphrastic future and the impera-tive. We also reinforce proper sen-tence structure and other subjects,as needed, in accordance with ourcurrent skill level. The idea is toenable us to speak in simple, directterms that our host-nation soldierswill understand. Then we work ondeveloping vocabulary lists thatsupport the lesson plans. For exam-ple, if we are discussing the con-struction of fighting positions, notonly do we have to be able to say“parapet” in the target language,but we also have to describe a para-pet in terms that recruits canunderstand: “Then you must con-struct a parapet to the front of theposition. A parapet is nothing morethan a low mound of dirt, which ispacked down and is capable of pro-viding protection against small-arms fire.” Without detailed,descriptive words in the LPs, thehost-nation troops often get lostduring the instruction.

Writing skills are addressedthrough the POI’s previously devel-oped lesson plans. The instructorcorrects them and provides one-on-one instruction on the salient gram-mar points and word usage thateach individual requires. Then werewrite the corrected LP.

After the LPs are in their final

form, we begin rehearsing theclasses under the supervision of thelanguage instructor and team lin-guist, concentrating on proper pro-nunciation, diction and instructortechniques. We are able to combineboth speaking and listening skills,as all team members participate inthis phase. The class is then givenin the target language before amurder board consisting of detach-ment members and the languageinstructor. The majority of thequestions posed by the murderboard are asked by those who are ofnative or near-native proficiency inorder to better prepare the primaryinstructor.

Our attempts to develop effectivemission-oriented language trainingare still evolving and changing.ODA-716’s approach is a combinedeffort of the entire detachment. Wehope it will serve as an example ofimagination and teamwork beingused to accomplish the mission andthat the program will be of value toother units seeking to optimize theuse of their language-trainingresources.

CWO 2 ThomasF.D. Rogers is thedetachment tech-nician of ODA-716, Company A,1st Battalion, 7thSpecial ForcesGroup. With morethan 15 years inSpecial Forces, he has served inassignments with the 10th, 11th and7th SF Groups and the Special War-fare Center and School.

Mission-orientedLanguage Training

by CWO 2 Thomas F.D. Rogers

24 Special Warfare

The Office of Strategic Serviceswas America’s first national intelli-gence agency, founded belatedly inthe crucible of war, long after othergreat powers had accorded foreignintelligence and covert operations adistinct and permanent role withintheir political systems.

As predecessor to the CentralIntelligence Agency, the OSS notonly passed on to the CIA itsrecords, methods and experience,but it provided a training groundfor many of the ClA’s eminent intel-ligence officers. Four of the ClA’sfourteen directors — Allen Dulles,Richard Helms, William Colby andWilliam Casey — have been OSSveterans.

Officers were not simply assignedto OSS by an army personnel office;rather, the OSS selected officers

from a pool. The names of thosewhose applications appear in theOSS Central Files but who, for onereason or another, were notappointed to serve in the OSS,make a most impressive list. Whenhis application for the OSS was

turned down, Olympic track andfield star Alan Cranston, now chair-man of the Senate Veterans’ AffairsCommittee,1 enlisted in the Armyas a private. Mystery writer LeslieCharteris was also not selected, butthe OSS CounterintelligenceBranch adopted the sobriquet of hisdetective hero, the Saint, as its codename.2 Asked to list his sports andhobbies, John Wayne wrote, “foot-ball, played college ball at the Uni-versity of Southern California;squash and tennis, fair; deep-seafishing, seven marlin in two years;hunting, a good field shot; horse-back riding, have done falls andposse riding in pictures, not as easyas it sounds.” Wayne was also notappointed to serve in the OSS.3

The courage and daring of themen and women of the OSS is leg-endary, making cloak and dagger abyword; OSS records document theoften incredible bravery of itsagents and operational teams.“Incredible” is not too strong a word — even the OSS director, Maj.

The OSS:

America’s First National Intelligence Agency

by Lawrence H. McDonald

Copyright 1991 by Lawrence H.McDonald, used with permission.This article previously appeared inthe Spring 1991 issue of Prologue,Quarterly of the National Archives. OSS applicant Leslie Charteris

Courtesy National Archives

Gen. William J. Donovan, carriedthe OSS’s L-tablet (potassiumcyanide) when in danger, to avoidcapture.4

Donovan served with great dis-tinction in World War I as an officerin the 42nd Division, the “RainbowDivision.” Awarded the Medal ofHonor, the Distinguished ServiceCross, the Distinguished ServiceMedal, and the Croix de Guerre,“Wild Bill,” as he was known to thetroops, returned from France one ofthe most highly decorated Americansoldiers.5 After the war, Donovanserved in the Coolidge administra-tion before founding a New YorkCity law firm in 1929. Before Amer-ica marched to war again, he was amillionaire.

Donovan’s reputation for recklessbravery followed him into WorldWar II. He went ashore with thetroops at Anzio. He met with OSSDetachment 101 guerrillas behindenemy lines in Burma. On D-Day,he and David K. E. Bruce went inwith the invasion force. When heand Bruce found themselves pinneddown by a German machine gun onUtah Beach, Donovan informedBruce that they could not allowthemselves to be taken alive andasked him if he was carrying hissuicide pill, the L-tablet. Bruce con-fessed he had neglected to bring thepoison tablet with him. Donovansearched his pockets for his own L-tablets but found none. “Ah well,”he said, “no matter for the pills. Ifthe Germans take us, I’ll shoot youfirst as your commanding officer,then I’ll shoot myself, so there’snothing to worry about.”6

He was, as President Eisenhowerlater described him, “the last hero.”He loved the excitement of war andseemed eager for American inter-vention in the war against the Axis.An Irish American and an interven-tionist Republican, Donovan made awelcome addition to the bipartisanwar coalition that President Roo-sevelt desired.

On July 11, 1941, the Presidentestablished (6 F.R. 3422) the Officeof Coordinator of Information to col-

lect, correlate and disseminate allintelligence relating to nationalsecurity.7 He appointed Donovan,who served as a dollar-a-year man,as chief of this civilian agency. TheU.S. Army, Navy, State Depart-ment, FBI, Secret Service, Immigra-tion and Naturalization Service,Customs Service and Treasury De-partment all had offices for foreignintelligence, and COI was to synthe-size and disseminate intelligence

acquired from all these agencies.8But COI failed to win their sup-

port. J. Edgar Hoover describedCOI as “Roosevelt’s folly.” WhenCOI agents made a clandestine raidon the Spanish embassy in Wash-ington to photograph documents,Hoover, eager to protect his ownterritory, ordered several FBI squadcars to the embassy, sirens blaring,forcing the COI agents to takeflight.9 Assistant Secretary of State

February 1993 25

Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan, chosen by President Roosevelt to head theCOI and later the OSS, was a Medal of Honor winner in World War I.

Courtesy National Archives

Adolf Berle disdained all espionageas “paranoid work.” Army and Navyintelligence chiefs, jealous of theirown prerogatives, offered little coop-eration and sometimes deliberatelywithheld information from COI.

COI was also divided within. Thechief of COI’s Foreign InformationService was Pulitzer Prize winnerRobert Sherwood.10 He believedthat FIS should broadcast onlywhite propaganda, the open dissem-ination of the truth, but Donovanwanted to make use of black propa-ganda as well, which deliberatelyfalsifies its source, purporting toemanate from the enemy. In thecase of the OSS, it actually originat-ed in the OSS Morale OperationsBranch, called MO, and littleescaped the fertile imaginations ofits officers. Their fabricated news-papers, radio programs, poison-penletters, leaflets, pamphlets, posters,stickers, rumors, passports of sur-render, and other machinationsbrought propaganda to the level of ascience.

It is to the MO Branch that Alliedpropaganda owed such stratagemsas cartoons drawn to foster the Ital-ian predisposition to believe thatHitler had an “evil eye,” the sampletowel marinated in itching powderand targeted especially for “Friendsof Japan” in China, leaflets purport-edly issued by the German HealthService Ministry warning of psychicimpotence resulting from airattacks, and anti-Nazi pamphletsadorned with feminine cheesecakeso distracting even well-disciplinedWehrmacht personnel could not failto notice.

In the form of gossip, MO usedmany variations on the theme“Where is Hitler?” MO spread rum-ors that Hitler was to speak at cer-tain anniversaries, while his rum-ored death, disappearance, illness,psychotic condition or flight fromGermany were all part of the or-chestration of misinformation on hiswhereabouts and silence. MO“Comeback Studies” showed thatthese plants were reported as factsin the press of neutral countries. To

counteract the effect of theserumors, German Propaganda Minis-ter Joseph Goebbels actually main-tained that he had planted misin-formation regarding Hitler’s illnessto lull the Allies into complacency.11

Like an unmanageable form ofgerm warfare, however, MO’s blackpropaganda found its way back intoAmerican lines, where it wasreported as authentic informationin the press. In October 1944 theWashington Post published a Unit-ed Press story of a “captured circu-lar” composed by a German “Leagueof Lonely War Women,” whopromised free love to soldiers home

on furlough. The circular was infact MO propaganda.12

When not carefully controlled,OSS black propaganda could per-ilously distort America’s own intel-ligence. In fall 1944 U.S. Armyintelligence in Delhi mistakenlyabsorbed MO black propagandabroadcast from Chittagong indicat-ing a weakening of the Japaneseposition in Southeast Asia.13 InJune 1945 a columnist for the Lon-don Daily Express wrote that aU.S. Army colonel serving in theOSS had found that nearly half the information in the files of theOSS Secret Intelligence Branch

actually originated in rumors disseminated by OSS itself. TheOSS colonel was obviously exagger-ating, but his observation doespoint up the dangers inherent inblack propaganda.14

Various forms of systematicdeception were employed by theOSS to mislead German intelligenceinto thinking that the Allied land-ings at Normandy were only a feintcalculated to draw German forcesaway from the main Allied attack atPas de Calais. This “grand decep-tion,” largely the work of the BritishDouble-Cross System, was essentialto the success of Operation Over-lord. To defend his Fortress Europeagainst this supposed second inva-sion force, Hitler deployed 18 divi-sions to Pas de Calais and only sixto Normandy. When the Germansfinally discovered the deception, theAllied beachhead at Normandy wastoo strong to be dislodged.15

The advantages of disinformationand deception notwithstanding,Sherwood wanted nothing to dowith black propaganda, and hejoined with Librarian of CongressArchibald MacLeish and BudgetDirector Harold Smith to heightenthe chorus of those urging the Pres-ident to dismantle COI. But Dono-van also had advocates; he profitedmuch from the advice and supportof a British naval intelligence offi-cer stationed in Washington, IanFleming, later to become the authorof the James Bond espionage nov-els.16 Fleming provided Donovanwith valuable information on thestructure and operation of theBritish intelligence system andencouraged COI to develop the clos-est possible liaison with MI6, theBritish Secret Intelligence Service.

Still more important to the vitalconnection between COI and Britishintelligence and covert operationswas Sir William “Little Bill”Stephenson, Britain’s wartimeintelligence chief in the UnitedStates, who generously suppliedDonovan with highly classifiedinformation concerning the superiormethods and organization of the

26 Special Warfare

“COI was also dividedwithin. The chief ofCOI’s Foreign Infor-mation Service,Robert Sherwood,believed that FISshould broadcast onlywhite propaganda,but Donovan wantedto make use of blackpropaganda as well.OSS machinationsbrought propagandato the level of a science.”

British Secret Intelligence Service.Little Bill made Wild Bill an indis-pensable channel for the exchangeof top-secret information and warm-ly assisted his efforts to designCOI/OSS under British influenceand direction.

President Roosevelt resolved thematter. On June 13, 1942, he abol-ished COI and established by mili-tary order the Office of StrategicServices under the jurisdiction ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff. COI’s

records and all its functions, exceptSherwood’s foreign-informationactivities, which were assigned tothe Office of War Information, weretransferred to the OSS. JCS Direc-tive No. 67, dated June 23, 1942,described and empowered the OSSto prepare intelligence studies, toplan and execute subversive activi-ties, and to collect informationthrough espionage. JCS 155/4/D,dated Dec. 23, 1942, further autho-rized the OSS to carry out psycho-

logical warfare in direct support ofmilitary operations. It defined psy-chological warfare to include propa-ganda, economic warfare, sabotage,guerrilla warfare, counterespi-onage, contact with undergroundgroups in enemy-controlled territo-ry, and contact with foreign-nation-ality groups in the United States.

From a small civilian agency com-posed of little more than a handfulof branches and offices, by the endof the war the OSS would developmore than 40 branches and unitswith a well-chosen staff of almost13,000 men and women. Modeledclosely on the British systems ofintelligence and covert operations,the OSS combined the functionsassigned to four British organiza-tions — MI6, Special OperationsExecutive, Political Warfare Execu-tive, and the Foreign OfficeResearch Department — into oneagency.17 OSS not only added oper-ational units to carry on clandestinewarfare and sabotage, but as a self-sufficient agency, assumed fullresponsibility for the entire intelli-gence cycle, including direction andplanning of intelligence require-ments; collection of intelligence;evaluation, analysis, integrationand interpretation; and dissemina-tion or distribution of the final prod-uct to appropriate offices, calledcustomers.

The OSS assigned the collectionof covert intelligence primarily toits Foreign Nationalities Branchand its Secret Intelligence Branch.FNB provided a new field of politi-cal intelligence by organizing con-tact with political refugees and withthose important groups in the U.S.that were of recent foreign extrac-tion and therefore retained distinc-tive ties with their countries of ori-gin. Its staff was small, 40 or 50people, but immigrant groups, eagerto show their loyalty to the Ameri-can war effort, voluntarily providedinformation concerning Europe andthe Mediterranean area.

Far more important to intelli-gence collection was the OSS SecretIntelligence Branch. SI’s special

February 1993 27

Military order signed by President Franklin Roosevelt abolishing the Officeof the Coordinator of Information and establishing the OSS, with Donovanas its head. The action was calculated to quell COI’s internal disputes.

Courtesy National Archives

task was espionage, the collection ofintelligence by clandestine means,primarily from human sources.Espionage is distinct from otherforms of intelligence collection suchas communications interception,cryptanalysis and photographicinterpretation. But though the OSS Foreign Broadcast QuarterlyCorporation recorded radio inter-cepts and the OSS London Office’sEnemy Objectives Unit employedphotographic interpretation to plan strategic bombing, espionagewas the main source of all OSSintelligence.18

Most of the intelligence collectionfor the French Riviera campaign inAugust 1944 was the work of theOSS, especially the OSS field officesin Caserta and Algiers, which gath-ered intelligence on everything, asWilliam Casey said, “down to thelocation and condition of every lastpillbox or pylon.” Some of the mostsignificant intelligence gatheringwas the product of OSS offices inneutral capitals.19 The OSS Lisbonand Madrid offices were establishedearly, and the OSS Istanbul officewas located in a famous seat ofintrigue. OSS Stockholm sentagents into Norway and Denmark.In Switzerland, a memorable contri-bution to determining the progressof German nuclear and bacteriologi-cal research was made by an OSSofficer, Moe Berg, who spoke sixlanguages.20 But Moe Berg will beremembered at least as well for hisyears in the American League ascatcher for the Washington Sena-tors and the Boston Red Sox.

The work of Allen Dulles’s OSSBern office was outstanding. DuringWorld War I, Dulles had served asan American espionage agent inSwitzerland. As director of the OSSBern office, he rarely failed to takeadvantage of sound intelligence pro-vided by unsolicited walk-ins. Atgreat personal risk, German anti-Nazis Fritz Kolbe, Fritz Molden,Hans Bernd Gisevius and othersbrought Dulles vital intelligenceconcerning German order-of-battle,aircraft defenses, submarine pro-

duction and the V-1 and V-2 rock-ets. At first, British MI6 expertsHarold “Kim” Philby and Sir ClaudeDansey dismissed much of the intel-ligence collected by the OSS Bernoffice as the fabrications of Germanplants spiced with just enoughtruth to make it seem plausible.Time would show that Philby was aSoviet agent, and careful appraisaland analysis would establish thequality and reliability of the OSSBern production.21

Without proper evaluation, thebest intelligence collection may be

dismissed as so many meaninglessfacts. The swarm of unprocessedinformation, sometimes haphazardand indiscriminate, generated bycollection may lead to an intelli-gence glut more confusing thanenlightening. Sorting out the rawdata produced by SI and other OSSunits, integrating it into a coherentpattern, analyzing it and preparingfinished intelligence in the form ofreports, studies and memorandumsin response to anticipated customerrequests — these were the functionsof the OSS Research and Analysis

28 Special Warfare

Allen Dulles, an American espionage agent during World War I, served asdirector of the OSS Bern office.

Courtesy National Archives

Branch. The R&A staff selected thepertinent material from the mass offragments and details furnished byclandestine sources and incorporat-ed it with information drawn fromovert intelligence — the periodicals,books, monographs and other publi-cations and records available in ouropen society. At least 80 or 90 per-cent of the intelligence exploited byR&A derived from open sourcesavailable at places like the Libraryof Congress and the NationalArchives, where the OSS main-tained small offices.22

Protecting the security of OSSintelligence collection, analysis andoperations against enemy intelli-gence was the function of the OSSCounterintelligence Branch, X-2.Counterintelligence exposed andcounteracted enemy espionage. Pen-etration, as James Jesus Angletonobserved, is the essence of counter-intelligence. OSS X-2 worked itsway inside the Axis intelligence sys-tems while preventing enemy pene-tration of OSS operations.

Before D-day, British Counterin-telligence, MI5, captured practicallyevery German spy whom the Reichhad sent into Britain, some 120agents in all, and forced them toturn against their Nazi masters.These doubled agents identifiedother German spies, revealed themethods of the German intelligenceservices, provided the Allies withGerman codes and ciphers, and sentcarefully contrived disinformationback to Germany. This Double-Cross System, made famous by SirJohn Masterman’s monograph ofthe same name, was the work of theTwenty Committee, to which Nor-man Holmes Pearson, the chief ofOSS London X-2, was assigned asliaison.23

The revelation after the war ofmassive Soviet penetration ofBritain’s Secret Intelligence Serviceat the highest level severely weak-ened the credibility of all Britishintelligence services despite post-war efforts to recover the confidenceof their allies by rigorous enforce-ment of the Official Secrets Act. In

the wilderness of mirrors that wasWorld War II espionage, JamesAngleton, known to his colleaguesin the intelligence community asthe Delphic Oracle, may havealready discovered the treachery ofKim Philby and the Cambridgeapostles Guy Burgess and SirAnthony Blunt before the warended. That the OSS was also thetarget of Soviet penetration is cer-tain. Ardent Marxists and Commu-nists, like the Lincoln Brigade vet-erans and emigré scholars, wereamong the most competent and ded-icated antifascists, and Donovanknowingly appointed them to posi-tions in the OSS. “I’d put Stalin onthe OSS payroll if I thought itwould help us defeat Hitler,” saidDonovan.24

Donovan believed that the OSS’sprincipal contribution would bestrategic intelligence, the basis forthe formation of national policy.This primarily would be the finalproduct of collection, analysis andsynthesis by the FNB, SI, R&A andX-2.25 Some of the most valuable

information contributed by OSS,however, was the tactical or fieldintelligence often provided by teamsfrom the Special OperationsBranch, or SO, working behindenemy lines with resistance groups.The foremost concern of SO teamsand missions was liaison with theresistance, providing weapons andsupplies to the indigenous under-ground forces, training them, andplanning and coordinating theirsabotage with Allied operations. SOteams also secured target informa-tion and assisted in the rescue ofdowned Allied airmen.

Outstanding among the SO mis-sions in Europe were the Jedburghteams. These were specially trainedthree-man teams parachuted intoFrance, Belgium and Holland onand after D-day. Each team consist-ed of two officers and a radio opera-tor. One officer was a native of thecountry to which the team was sent,and the other was British or Ameri-can. Working closely with theBritish Special Operations Execu-tive, SO sent 87 Jedburgh teams

February 1993 29

Soldiers from OSS Detachment 101 teach members of the native resistance touse automatic weapons in their fight against the Japanese.

Courtesy National Archives

and 19 OSS operational groups, orguerrilla units, into France alone.26

In June 1944, as the Allied inva-sion of France began, a wave of pop-ular support for the army of libera-tion swept across Europe. Resis-tance forces, assisted by the Jed-burghs, crippled German efforts tocounterattack by cutting rails, de-stroying bridges, mining roads, cut-ting off telecommunications andsabotaging German vehicles. As aconsequence, the German responseto the Allied invasion was delayedby 48 hours. So successful were theJedburgh teams that General Eisen-hower requested additional SO sup-port for resistance groups and foracquisition of tactical intelligence.27

Even before V-E Day, many of theJedburghs were transferred to theChina theater, where their methodsof training, organizing, supplyingand leading indigenous troops wereapplied with the same success as inEurope. SO teams inflicted heavylosses on Japanese forces by suddenstrike-and-withdraw tactics,destroying communications andtransportation, and isolating units.

Vital to Japan’s control of theChinese interior was the mile-longbridge that crossed the Hwang Ho(Yellow) River near Kaifeng. Thisdouble-track bridge was the threadthat joined the Japanese armies ofnorth and south China. Against allodds, Jed veterans and a braveband of Chinese guerrillas underthe command of Col. Frank Millsand Maj. Paul Cyr mined the greatHwang Ho bridge. On Aug. 9, 1945,the day Nagasaki was bombed, SOMission Jackal blew away two largespans in the bridge just as aJapanese troop train was passingover. The entire train, carryingsome 2,000 Japanese soldiers, wasdragged to the bottom of the HwangHo.28

The destruction of the Hwang Hobridge was one of many achieve-ments of SO Detachment 202 in the China theater. Pre-eminent asthe model for successful guerrillaoperations and the predecessor ofSpecial Forces was the famed SO

Detachment 101, which did much towin the war for the Burma Road. Tore-establish contact with ChiangKai-shek’s Nationalist army, theAllies had to wrest control of theLedo-Burma Road away fromJapan’s 15th Army and open thehighway from the Lashio railheadto Kunming.

Enlisting the support of nativepeoples like the Kachins, Karensand Chinese in Burma, some 1,000officers and men of Detachment 101formed a guerrilla army more than10,000 strong that fought savage

jungle warfare against determinedJapanese troops. The monsoonrains fell upon them in sheets.Leeches crawled through the eye-lets of their boots; they poured thewater and blood out of them at theend of the day. Cholera, plague andtyphus were a constant threat.Malaria and bacillary dysenterywere unavoidable. Fighting undersome of the worst combat conditionsin the war, Detachment 101 perfect-ed the art of guerrilla warfare,harassing the enemy with strike-and-evasion tactics, baiting them

into reckless retaliation against thenative population, and inflamingthe smoldering embers of resent-ment into a conflagration of hateagainst the Japanese occupation ofBurma. Before the war ended,Detachment 101 destroyedJapanese forces many times itsnumbers.29

Less than three weeks after V-JDay, President Truman signed theorder terminating OSS, effectiveOct. 1, 1945. When the OSS finallyclosed its doors, custody of all itsrecords was assigned to one of twoagencies. One thousand cubic feet ofreports and other files from thelibrary of the Research and Analy-sis Branch were sent to the StateDepartment. All other OSS recordswere transferred to the StrategicServices Unit, a War Departmentoffice made up of veterans drawnfrom the OSS Secret Intelligenceand Counterintelligence branches.

Half the records acquired by SSUconsisted of the files of the NewYork, San Francisco and Washing-ton OSS offices; the other half com-prised the records of all OSS over-seas offices. Bringing together morethan 6,000 cubic feet of records fromthe home offices and from OSS out-posts all over the world, the SSUcarefully arranged them accordingto point of origin, thereunder byOSS branch or unit, and thereunderby file type. To this day, every filefolder received by SSU bears themark of this fundamental system ofarrangement. Having labeled eachfolder, the SSU then shelved therecords alphabetically, beginningwith the Algiers Office and endingwith the Washington Office.30

In 1947 the Central IntelligenceAgency assumed custody of the OSSrecords so carefully arranged by theSSU. In 1980 the CIA began trans-ferring its OSS archives to theNational Archives, becoming thefirst national intelligence agencyever to release its once-classifiedrecords for research. The process oftransferring, arranging, anddescribing this valuable group ofrecords has been under way now for

30 Special Warfare

“Fighting under someof the worst combatconditions in the war,Detachment 101 per-fected the art of guer-rilla warfare, harass-ing the enemy withstrike-and-evasiontactics, baiting theminto reckless retalia-tion against thenative population,and inflaming thesmoldering embers ofresentment into a con-flagration of hateagainst the Japaneseoccupation of Burma.”

more than a decade. Though theCentral Intelligence Agency contin-ues to declassify and transferrecords remaining in its OSSArchives, the National Archives hasalready received more than 4,000cubic feet of OSS records andopened them for scholarly investiga-tion.31 Descriptive lists are nowavailable for most of the OSSrecords at the National Archives,and the lists have been computer-ized to improve access and control.32

Researchers use these OSSrecords more heavily than any other20th-century military records in theNational Archives. They offer akind of précis of the Second WorldWar, revealing information neverbefore available about one of thegreat defining moments in modern

history. From the intelligence filesof the OSS alone, one could write ahistory of the war, and writers andscholars the world over will contin-ue to plumb the depths of OSSrecords for many years to come.

Lawrence H.McDonald is aprojects archivistat the NationalArchives in Wash-ington, D.C. Since1985 he hasworked on theaccessioning,arrangement and description of therecords of the Office of Strategic Ser-vices. He has also served as areviews editor for the American

Archivist and has written severalarticles on the OSS and its records.Mr. McDonald holds bachelor’s andmaster’s degree from GeorgetownUniversity and a Ph.D. in historyfrom the University of Maryland.

February 1993 31

Notes:1 Entry 92, box 179, folder 56, COI/OSS Central Files, Washington-

Registry Office-Administrative Files-7, Records of the Office ofStrategic Services, Record Group 226, National Archives, Washing-ton, D.C. (hereinafter cited as RG 226, NA).

2 Entry 92, box 156, folder 64, COI/OSS Central Files, Washington-Registry Office-Administrative Files-7, RG 226, NA.

3 Entry 92, box 362, OSS folder 22087, COI/OSS Central Files,Washington-Registry Office-Administrative Files-7, RG 226, NA.

4 Instructions for the use of the L (lethal) and K (knock-out) tabletsare given in entry 110, box 38, folder 373, Stockholm Special Opera-tions Branch-Operational Files-19, RG 226, NA.

5 American Decorations: A List of Awards of the CongressionalMedal of Honor, the Distinguished Service Cross and the Distin-guished Service Medal Awarded under Authority of the Congress ofthe United States, 1862-1926 (1927), pp. 256, 697.

6 Richard Dunlop, America’s Master Spy (1982), p. 439. Donovan’sarrangements for Overlord appear in the OSS cable files, entry 134,box 159, folder 1026, Washington-Registry Office-Radio and Cables49, RG 226, NA.

7 Walter Karig published one of the earliest accounts of Donovan’swork as Coordinator of Information in his article “The Most Mysteri-ous Man in Washington” in Liberty magazine, Jan. 3, 1942. The arti-cle was filed in the COI/OSS Central Files, entry 92, box 65, folder 39(8345), RG 226, NA.

8 John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA(1987), pp. 45-53.

9 Ibid., pp. 61-62.10 Robert Sherwood won Pulitzer Prizes for his plays Idiot’s Delight

(1936), Abe Lincoln in Illinois (1938), and There Shall Be No Night(1940) and for the biography Roosevelt and Hopkins (1949).

11 MO Illustrative Material, entry 169, folder 2253, WashingtonOffice-Morale Operations Branch-Operational Files-81, RG 226, NA.

12 Entry 139, box 161, folder 2150, Washington-Morale OperationsBranch-Operational Files 69, RG 226, NA. The same story alsoappeared on the front page of the Italy edition of Stars and Stripes,Oct. 14, 1944.

13 Entry 139, folder 2058, Washington Office-Morale Operations-Operational Files 66, RG 226, NA.

14 Entry 190, box 683, folder 1113, Washington-Director’s Office-Operational File-266, RG 226, NA. The story appeared in the columnof C.V.R. Thompson, New York correspondent of the London Daily

Express, June 9, 1945. An OSS cable quoted it in a press clipping thatwas filed in the “Mud File” of Donovan’s headquarters records.

15 William Casey, The Secret War Against Hitler (1988), pp. 98-101.16 Some of Ian Fleming’s correspondence with OSS appears in

entry 190, box 318, folder 393, London Secret Intelligence Branch-Operational Files 45, RG 226, NA. Thomas F. Troy, Donovan and theCIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency(1981), pp. 81-82.

17 Robin W. Winks, Cloak and Gown: Scholars in the Secret War,1939-1961 (1987), pp. 60-61.

18 Concerning FBQ, see entry 92, box 397, folder 24402, RG 226,NA. Concerning the R&A EOU, see entry 91, London War Diaries inHistory of the London Office of the OSS, National Archives MicrofilmPublication M1623, roll 3, RG 226.

The historian David Kahn maintains the superiority of cryptanaly-sis over espionage in his book The Code-Breakers: The Story of SecretWriting (1963), p. 273. However, it is significant, as ChristopherAndrew points out, that without espionage the Allies might havetaken many years to break the all-important codes generated by theGerman code machine Enigma. Christopher Andrew, Secret Service:The Making of the British Intelligence Community (1985), pp. 448-457.

19 Casey, Secret War, pp. 48-54, 132.20 Moe Berg’s personnel file appears in the COI/OSS Central Files,

entry 92, box 313, folder 1, OSS folder 19487, RG 226, NA.21 OSS Bern Office records in entries 125 and 190, RG 226, NA, are

often annotated in Allen Dulles’s own hand. Ranelagh, The CIA, pp.72-78. The OSS Survey of Foreign Experts and the George Office alsohad the function of intelligence collection.

22 Winks, Cloak and Gown, pp. 474-476.23 Winks, Cloak and Gown, pp. 280-291. Not all SI efforts to pene-

trate Germany were successful, as William Casey’s wartime reportdemonstrates, entry 190, box 300, folders 82/A and 94, London -Secret Intelligence Branch - Operational Files - 9 and 21, RG 226,NA. Most of the SI agents sent into Germany were never heard fromagain.

24 R. Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History of America’s First Cen-tral Intelligence Agency (1972), pp. 10-11. A memorandum of DeWittClinton of Feb. 27, 1946, discusses penetration of OSS briefly: entry92, box 120, folder 32, COI/OSS Central Files, RG 226, NA.

25 In the perennial debate over the importance of analysis as

32 Special Warfare

opposed to collection, Donovan also tended to give priority to analy-sis. Entry 154, box 116, folder 2097, Kandy - Registry Office - Opera-tional Files-18, RG 226, NA.

26 Entry 91, box 24, History of the OSS in London, War Diary, SOBranch, OSS London, vol. 4, book 1, Jedburghs, pp. i-xxv, RG 226,NA. The London War Diary is the most thorough history of any OSSoverseas office, consisting of more than 14 cubic feet of records. It isreadily available on National Archives Microfilm Publication M1623.Concerning the Special Operations Branch, see rolls 6-7; concerningthe Jedburghs, see roll 8. The OSS Operational Group Commanddeveloped out of the SO Branch. OG teams were larger than those ofSO, usually composed of about 20 to 30 men. Unlike SO teams, theOG teams often engaged small enemy units in direct combat. TheLondon War Diaries describe OG operations in vol. 4-A, M1623, roll9. The origin of the name Jedburgh is uncertain. It appears as earlyas July 7, 1942, in an SOE directive. It apparently derives fromBritish infiltration during the Boer War in South Africa. See FabrizioCalvi, OSS, La Guerre Secrete en France, 1942-1945: Les ServicesSpeciaux Americains, La Resistance et La Gestapo (1990), p. 359.

27 Entry 91, box 24, London, vol. 4, book 1, Jedburghs, RG 226, NA.Bradley Smith, Shadow Warriors, pp. 290-293.

28 Many citations for Mission Jackal, SO Detachment 202 in ChinaTheater, and the Jedburgh missions in Europe can be found in theCode and Project Names printout, which is based on descriptive listswritten for the OSS Archives of the Central Intelligence Agency.

29 Roger Hilsman, American Guerrilla: My War Behind JapaneseLines (1990), pp. 67-227.

30 Researchers will note, for example, that file folders for the fourth

series of financial files created by the Secret Intelligence Branch inthe OSS Bern office, for instance, are labeled: BERN-SI-FIN-4. Totake another example, the second series of personnel files created bythe Special Operations Branch in the OSS Kunming office arelabeled: KUNMING-SO-PERS-2.

31 In 1975 and 1976 the National Archives opened 1,000 cubic feetof OSS records received from the State Department for research. Ofthe more than 6,000 cubic feet of records in the OSS Archives of theCentral Intelligence Agency, the CIA has, since 1980, transferredmore than 3,000 cubic feet of records to the National Archives. Oncethey are declared inactive, only a small part of the records generatedby federal agencies can be permanently preserved. The records of theOSS are an exception; most of them will be assigned for permanentretention at the National Archives. A critical survey of literature onintelligence can be found in George C. Constantinides, Intelligenceand Espionage: An Analytical Bibliography (1983). An official historyof the OSS was prepared by the SSU History Project. This was pub-lished in two volumes in 1976 with introductions by Kermit Roo-sevelt: Volume 1, War Report of the OSS and Volume 2, The OverseasTargets War Report of the OSS.

32 Computer printouts have re-established the original SSU systemof arrangement and sorted them out according to point of origin,associated location, branch, file type, personal name, code and projectname, entry and keyword. Volunteer workers at the NationalArchives have contributed significantly to the preservation of theOSS records by refoldering, labeling, covering records in mylar, per-forming other holdings maintenance work and by preparing recordsfor microfilming.

February 1993 33

Lt. Col. David G. Christie is theAustralian Liaison Officer for theU.S. Army Special Operations Com-mand, assigned for duty with theJFK Special Warfare Center andSchool. Assigned to USASOC sinceFebruary 1990, he was also as-signed to the former JFK Center forMilitary Assistance from 1972-74 asa student in various courses. AnInfantry Corps Officer, most of hisservice has been in special opera-tions. Since joining the AustralianArmy in 1967, he has had training,command and staff appointments inspecial operations and is a formercommander of the AustralianParachute School at Nowra, Australia.

SW: What are the missions of theAustralian Special Air Service Regiment?Christie: To achieve its mission,the regiment focuses on a number ofroles which are diverse in natureand include strategic and opera-

tional intelligence gathering,harassment of the enemy in depth,recovery operations, siege-hostageterrorist operations and special-warfare operations. Our special-warfare role may be likened to theU.S. unconventional-warfare role.Despite these varied roles the regi-ment is primarily a reconnaissanceand surveillance organization,designed to conduct operationsbeyond the scope of conventionalforces.

SW: Is it very active currently?Christie: Elements of the regimenthave remained active in training-assistance tasks throughout theSoutheast Asian and southwestPacific regions. Individually, mem-bers of the regiment participatewith other members of the Aus-tralian Defense Force in UnitedNations peacekeeping tasks. Fur-thermore, the regiment maintainsan extremely intense training cal-endar and participates in a range of

bilateral training exercises with theU.S. and regional forces.

SW: What are the prerequisites forthe SAS, and what kind of trainingdo you go through?Christie: All applicants must havecompleted about two years’ service.This saves the regiment resources,in that basic training has alreadybeen completed. Additionally, thetwo years’ service criterion is, initself, a selection procedure, sinceapplicants must have their com-manding officers’ recommendations,and they must have performed wellto achieve that recommendation.Applicants must be mentally andphysically fit, they need to be ableto accomplish demanding tasks,alone or as a member of a group, inconditions that are less than pleas-ant, and they need to continuallyperform to the limits of their abilityand endurance. The regiment’sselection criteria are similar to theSpecial Forces Assessment and

Interview:

Lt. Col. David G. Christie, Australian SAS Regiment

34 Special Warfare

Selection Course conducted by your1st Special Warfare TrainingGroup.

SW: How long is the selectioncourse?Christie: The selection course isapproximately three weeks in dura-tion. This course is not designed toteach. It is designed to identifythose applicants best equipped to beable to assimilate the demandingyear of training that will follow theselection procedure and then to usethat training to accomplishassigned tasks. Motivation plays avery big part in success on theselection course and service in theregiment.

SW: How much influence did yourcourse have on our SFAS Course?Christie: I understand that yourtraining group sent a team toobserve a number of other courses,as well as the course conducted bythe Special Air Service Regiment.While in Australia, your teamobserved closely the conduct of afull selection course and departedAustralia with a full course pack-age. The information gathered inAustralia was used in the produc-tion of the SFAS Course. I don’t findthe similarities surprising at all. Infact, even if the courses had beenproduced in total isolation, I wouldthink there would be many similari-ties. Both forces, after all, requirevery similar performance from theselected soldiers.

SW: Once selected, do the soldiers gothrough the regular SAS trainingcourse?Christie: Before posting to theSpecial Air Service Regiment, allapplicants who have successfullycompleted the selection coursemust complete a basic parachutecourse and an SAS patrol course.On posting, all soldiers arerequired to relinquish rank andrevert to the rank of trooper. In theSpecial Air Service Regiment, theinitial rank is that of trooper, but aprivate is not the same as a troop-er. Soldiers must then complete a

series of courses, including basicdemolitions, weapons handling,regimental signaller, and medicalassistant. Once assigned to a troop,reinforcements undertake trainingin the basic skills of the troop towhich they are assigned. Thesetroop skills relate to the differentenvironments in which the troopsspecialize — air operations, wateroperations and vehicle-mountedoperations. The selection-and-rein-

forcement training cycle takesabout 10 months, that is, from thecommencement of the selectioncourse to posting to an SASSquadron. On posting to an SASsabre squadron, all soldiers com-mence advanced training, althoughthis is still concerned with thebread-and-butter requirements oftheir trade, such as shooting, field-craft, navigation and small-unit

tactics. Soldiers also complete moreadvanced training in their special-ist skill areas.

SW: Would other people in the Aus-tralian Army attend the sameschools?Christie: No. One of the Special AirService Regiment subunits is atraining squadron. The trainingsquadron is manned primarily byexperienced senior noncommis-sioned officers who have advancedskill levels in the various specialistareas. In this regard, the trainingsquadron performs much the samefunction for the Special Air ServiceRegiment as your training groupdoes for Special Forces. TrainingSquadron conducts courses specifi-cally for the regiment, and the stan-dards required are those set by theregiment’s commanding officer. Thecourses conducted by TrainingSquadron are not normally avail-able to other Army members.SW: What is a sabre squadron?Christie: The term sabre squadronis used to describe the fightingsquadrons of the regiment. TheSpecial Air Service Regiment hasthree sabre squadrons. In addition,there is a regimental headquartersto provide command and controland set policy guidelines, a basesquadron to provide for the admin-istrative needs, a signal squadronand the training squadron I men-tioned earlier.

SW: Since their main mission isreconnaissance and surveillance,what kind of reconnaissance train-ing do they get?Christie: I mentioned the basictraining all soldiers receive beforethey are posted to a squadron andthe advanced training once posted.The patrol course goes into detail inthe techniques of conducting apatrol, how to best use the environ-ment, the conduct of observationand surveillance and the reportingof information obtained. In addi-tion, the Special Air Service Regi-ment spends considerable effort onteaching skills such as patrol

“U.S. Special Forcesprovide an immensecapability to supportU.S. interests. I thinkthat capability ischaracterized by thor-oughly competent peo-ple at all levels.”

February 1993 35

debriefing, to ensure that maximumbenefit is gained from each patrol.Our soldiers need to know how topull all the reconnaissance informa-tion into a format that will describewhat they’ve seen to someone whoneeds to use the information, and sothey are taught to compile all thisinformation into a reconnaissancesurvey, or target survey. The aim ofthat from the SAS Regiment’s pointof view is to allow a regular-armyunit, or a naval or air force asset, tomove against that target, should itbe desired, and so the intelligencehas to be well-presented. As in yourSpecial Forces, there is a consider-able amount of equipment to assistsoldiers in gathering information,and the skills needed to use thatequipment for maximum benefitrequires good training. All of theseskills are enhanced on the PatrolCommander’s Course. In the spe-cialist areas, courses teach suchskills as beach reconnaissance andsurvey.

SW: So the reconnaissance informa-tion gained wouldn’t just be for SASuse?Christie: That is correct. In theAustralian Defense Force, elementsof the Special Air Service Regimentassigned to operations would becommanded at the highest level.That may well be a joint-task-force

commander, or it may be directly bythe headquarters of the AustralianDefense Force. The informationgained by the Special Air ServiceRegiment is for the commander ofthe force that SAS elements aresupporting.

SW: Can you make any comparisonbetween the reconnaissance skillsthat we train for in Special Forcesand what you train for in SAS?Christie: I think the reconnais-sance skills needed are the same inboth countries. But I think the Spe-cial Air Service Regiment spendsmore time learning and reinforcingthe basics. The style of instructionin the Special Air Service Regimentis much more personal. From thetime of allocation to a patrol, whichis the basic operational element ofthe regiment, consisting of five men,it is the responsibility of the patrolcommander to ensure that hispatrol is well trained, and hespends most of his time making thishappen. The skills required forreconnaissance and surveillancedemand as much learning time andpractice as demolitions, scuba div-ing, or any other advanced skill.From my observations and under-standing of the missions required ofU.S. Special Forces and the envi-ronments in which these missionsmust be achieved, there is very lit-

tle time available to conduct train-ing in something so basic aspatrolling. In addition, SpecialForces has available an enormousarray of high-tech equipment forwhich training must continually beconducted.

SW: From your service here, whatimpressions have you formed of Spe-cial Forces?Christie: I think Special Forces area wonderfully skilled force withimmense capabilities. I don’t alwaysagree with the methods of training,but I grew up in a different environ-ment, so I’m probably biased towardthe SAS way of doing things. I thinkSpecial Forces are being forced tobecome more conventional, which Ithink is something that your com-manders are well aware of. I alsothink that the force is “headquar-tered to death.” The importantthing is that U.S. Special Forcesprovide an immense capability tosupport U.S. interests. I think thatcapability is characterized by thor-oughly competent people at all lev-els. I am very thankful to have beenable to watch and learn, just bybeing here.

Army special-operations forceshave a critical need for informationabout their operational areas inorder to conduct mission analysisand planning. To provide a rapidresponse to potential worldwidemilitary or humanitarian crises,commanders, staffs and soldiersneed to be able to integrate infor-mation, plan, assess, rehearse andexecute operations for areas withwhich they are unfamiliar.

No change in current planningprocedure is needed. What is need-ed is an improvement in executionof the planning procedure, in termsof speed, planning data and meth-ods for exchanging data betweenusers. The answer may lie in auto-mated mission-planning-and-rehearsal systems, which can con-solidate and present visually, infor-mation that has been gatheredthrough a comprehensive collectionplan. It should be understood thatan MPRS is not a substitute for themission-planning process — it is atool to assist planners and opera-

tors to plan their missions.The purpose of an MPRS is to

increase the accuracy and speed ofmission planning and rehearsal byintegrating operational, intelligenceand terrain information. A systemwhich superimposes imagery,threat and tactical-situation infor-mation onto terrain would producean electronic sand table for use inthe following:

• Familiarization — to help deci-sion makers or operators learnabout the operational area duringmission preparation.

• Site/target/objective planning —to assist in the design of tactical mil-itary plans (actions at the objectivearea).

• Line-of-sight analysis — todetermine what can be seen fromvarious vantage points for planningobservation, cover and concealment,communications, range fans forfriendly and threat weapon systems.

• Route planning — to assist inthe design of ground and air routesduring a mission.

• Fire-support and air opera-tions — to plan for suppression ordestruction of threat capabilities.

• Decision making — to assist indevelopment and assessment ofcourses of action.

• Rehearsal/navigation — topractice moving through the opera-tional area. This can be a static ormoving product used to assist theoperator with navigation and otheraspects of mission execution whileon an operation.

• Debriefing — to assist an opera-tor in recalling and explainingdetails of an operation in which heparticipated.

• Image analysis — to gain a bet-ter understanding of an image.

• All-source analysis — to gain amore comprehensive view of anarea, facility, objective or target.

• Intelligence reporting — tocommunicate intelligence informa-tion to decision makers, operatorsor other intelligence users.

An MPRS is limited by the avail-ability, age and accuracy of the data

36 Special Warfare

Mission Planning and Rehearsal Systems:

New Tools

for Mission Preparation

by Capt. Dan Smith

February 1993 37

Left: A perspective viewof Rattlesnake DropZone, produced by theArmy Space Commandsystem. Through a pro-cess called image-per-spective transforma-tion, the system com-bines digital terraindata with imageryfrom satellite photos.(Photos courtesy ArmySpace Command)

Left: Satellite photo of the Joint ReadinessTraining Center, including the area of Rat-tlesnake Drop Zone.

Below: Digital terrain map of the area sur-rounding Rattlesnake Drop Zone.

it uses and the time it takes to pro-duce products. Some systems usecomputer graphics to cover gaps indata and to add more apparent real-ism. It is important to rememberthat some features, such as treespacing and diameter, for example,would be different in reality fromwhat is seen on a screen.

A system being specifically devel-oped for SOF is the SOF Planningand Rehearsal System. SOFPARS isplanned as a family of systems toprovide a mission-planning-and-rehearsal capability for air, groundand maritime missions. It will bedeveloped in three phases, with con-tinual SOF-operator feedback dur-ing the development. Phase I is acomprehensive planning andrehearsal system for Air Force andArmy special-operations-aviationunits. It is designed to includethreat-modeling, route planning,integrated maps and imagery, gen-eration of 3-D perspective views andautomated production of mission-planning products.

Phase II would allow Army andNavy SOF to use computers to scandigital maps and imagery fromnational and civil sources, and tobuild databases for use in planningvarious courses of action. Phase IIwould also generate 3-D perspectiveviews and automated mission-plan-ning products. Phase III will be amission-rehearsal system whichwill let troops simulate movementthrough designated areas from vari-ous viewing angles. Perspectiveviews generate a snapshot of ter-rain which may then be manipulat-ed by rotation or zooming in or out.In a rehearsal system, the snap-shots occur so rapidly as to be

indistinguishable, and the viewerappears to be in motion.

Contracts for development ofSOFPARS Phase I were awarded in1991 for system delivery in January1993; contracts for Phase II wereawarded in June 1992 for systemdelivery in March 1993. Contractsfor Phase III are scheduled to be letin 1995. Once the systems are deliv-ered, they will be tested and evalu-ated for further development.

Another automated planning andrehearsal system, not SOF-specific,is currently being demonstrated bythe Army Space Command toacquaint potential Army users withthe system’s capability. The systemexploits digital imagery and terraindata, from both government andcivil sources. Terrain data providesthe elevation and other topographicinformation, and imagery providesinformation about the current stateof the ground and situation.

Using these data, the Space Com-mand MPRS produces three-dimen-sional perspective views through aprocess called image-perspectivetransformation. IPT is the geomet-ric transformation of digitalimagery to change the apparentcamera/sensor position, creatingtrue perspective scenes from anypoint of view.

Demonstrations are tailored to arequestor’s requirement and canrun as long as four weeks. TheARSPACE system has been used tosupport exercises at the JointReadiness Training Center. In oneexample, a SOCCE and SF ODAsused the MPRS for mission plan-ning, then the SOCCE used it toassist the brigade staff to plan itsmission and to inform the staff of

ongoing SOF operations. Unitsinterested in more information onthe system or demonstrations cancontact Capt. Scott Netherland,Army Space Command, at DSN692-8773, commercial (719) 554-8773/8713.

Capt. DanSmith is currentlya detachment com-mander in Co. A,2nd Battalion,11th SpecialForces Group. Aformer enlistedintelligence ana-lyst and Special Forces weaponssergeant, he has served as an intelli-gence analyst and combat-intelli-gence-team member with the 5th SFGroup, as a detachment executiveofficer and detachment commanderwith the 20th SF Group, and as atactical surveillance officer and tac-tical intelligence officer with the29th Infantry Division. In his civil-ian occupation, he is an intelligenceoperations specialist in the Office ofthe Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelli-gence, Headquarters, Department ofthe Army. In addition to the SpecialForces Qualification Course, he is agraduate of the Intelligence OfficerBasic Course and the Infantry Offi-cer Basic and Advanced Courses. Heholds a bachelor’s degree in journal-ism from Marquette University andis a candidate for a master’s degreeat George Mason University.

38 Special Warfare

February 1993 39

SQI “D” reinstated forreserve-component

CA soldiers

Language proficiency important for promotion,

future assignments

ANCOC to becomerequirement for promotion

to SFC

Skill-qualification identifier “D,” Civil Affairs operations, has again beenauthorized for reserve-component Civil Affairs soldiers. The approval ofCareer Management Field 38, Civil Affairs Specialist, as an RC-uniqueMOS did not identify all soldiers assigned to RC Civil Affairs units or thepositions which require Civil Affairs training. Future changes to RC CivilAffairs authorization documents will include the addition of the “D” quali-fier to a number of MOSs throughout the structure.

Promotion competition is becoming more specialized and focused. Althoughspeaking a language is not a requirement, proficiency could be used as adiscriminator for promotions and assignments. With the high quality ofsoldiers competing for promotions and assignments, soldiers should keeptheir proficiency rating current and their records updated.

Effective Oct. 1, 1993, promotion to sergeant first class will be linked toattendance and completion of the Advanced NCO Course. Unit comman-ders and sergeants major are strongly encouraged to continue placing thehighest priority on NCOs’ preparation and timely attendance to ANCOC.Sgt. Maj. Thomas Rupert reminds soldiers that ANCOC consideration listsare only that — final lists are made once all deferments are taken out.

The following points of contact may be useful to enlisted SF soldiers whoneed to contact the SF Branch about assignments or career development:

Maj. Christopher Allen ................. Enlisted Branch ChiefSgt. Maj. Thomas Rupert.............. Professional-development NCOMrs. Faye Matheny....................... 18 B, C and D assignments managerMs. Jacqui Velasquez.................... 18 E, F, Z and ROTC assignments,

ANCOC managerMs. Dyna Amey ............................. SFQC accession managerSSgt. Therese Archambeault........ 37F assignments, ANCOC managerMrs. Loretta Spivey ...................... Branch secretary

Sgt. Maj. Thomas Rupert asks that soldiers direct assignment-relatedquestions to the assignment managers and career-development questionsto the professional-development NCO. Students in the SF QualificationCourse with assignments questions should contact their student PAC.Branch phone numbers are DSN 221-8340/6044, commercial (202) 325-8340/6044. Address correspondence to: Commander; PERSCOM; Attn:TAPC-EPK-S; 2461 Eisenhower Ave.; Alexandria, VA 22331-0452.

PERSCOM points of contact

Enlisted Career NotesSpecial Warfare

40 Special Warfare

Officer Career NotesSpecial Warfare

The Special Forces Accession board met Sept. 28-30, 1992, to considerapplications for Special Forces from year-group-89 officers. The boardselected 202 applications for 138 YG 89 requirements in SF. The number ofthose officers who will successfully complete Special Forces Assessmentand Selection, the Special Forces Detachment Officer Qualification Courseand language school is unknown. Based on last year’s statistics, theseapplicants should produce approximately 131 SF officers two years fromnow. Additional YG 89 applications will be accepted until the fall of 1996.Prospects are good that YG 89 will eventually be filled to the authorizedlevel of manning.

Because of a shortage of Special Forces officers on active duty, particularlycaptains, an action is currently being developed that would allow reserve-component SF captains to apply for active duty. Many details have yet tobe worked out, but plans call for a board to consider applications from offi-cers who meet the still-to-be-determined screening criteria. Selected offi-cers would be brought on active duty for a three-year tour. Based on theneeds of the Army and officer performance, some officers may be allowed toapply for “career status” and compete for selection to major. For furtherdetails contact Capt. Scott Peters in the SWCS Special Operations Propo-nency Office, DSN 239-2415/9002, commercial (919) 432-2415/9002.

SF Branch chief publishesstanding orders

The chief of the Special Forces Branch, Lt. Col. William J. Davis III, hasrecently published his branch philosophy and standing orders for all Spe-cial Forces officers:

1. Be honest — Always tell the truth. In these demanding times of the drawdown, we must be totally frank with our soldiers. Integrity isnon-negotiable.

2. Be factual.3. Always do your best — No one can expect more from you, and I

cannot accept less. This is what our soldiers deserve. Demonstratethis by execution and not by idle words.

4. Never divulge sensitive information.5. Never predict what a board will do.6. We are PERSCOM professionals — The red and blue books serve as

our FMs and TMs. Your character, maturity, interpersonal skills andcommon sense will guide you to the target.

7. Be aware of your operational surroundings.8. Never let emotionalism cloud your perspective.9. Always remember who you are and what you represent to our

families, our Army, our Department of Defense and our nation.10. Never forget the Golden Rule.11. Never forget our Special Forces heritage.12. Twelve orders and 12 men. Never forget the A-team. De Oppresso

Liber! God bless America!

FY 92 SF Accession Boardselects 202 from YG 89

RC SF officers may be ableto apply for active duty

February 1993 41

Some 18/39 officers eligiblefor RSC credit

Some FA 39 officersreclassified

Some FA 39 officers may notice a different area-of-concentration identifieron their next ORB. According to the SWCS Proponency Office, some FA 39officers have been reclassified from 39B, PSYOP Officer, to 39B/C, PSYOPand Civil Affairs Officer, based on their training and duty assignments.This increases the inventory of 39C officers in the functional area and theOfficer Distribution Plan.

SOPO welcomesnew personnel

Special Forces officers with Functional Area 39 who completed the ForeignArea Officer Course prior to July 1986 are eligible to receive constructivecredit for the Regional Studies Course. To update their ORBs, eligible offi-cers should contact Maj. Ray Morales, FA 39 assignments officer at PER-SCOM, DSN 221-3115. He has a roster of officers who qualify for construc-tive credit, but he cannot update ORBs unless officers notify him.

The SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office has recently gained thefollowing personnel: Lt. Col. Dave Wildeman, chief of SOPO; Maj. RonFiegle, CA Branch manager; CWO 3 Schaun Driscoll, 180A manager; SFCR.B. Gardner, operations sergeant; Mrs. Jeanne Schiller, FA 39 manager;and Mrs. Mary Ann Handran, secretary. Recent losses are Lt. Col. WilliamA. Behrens, to Office of the Defense Attaché - Lebanon; Maj. Jose Mar-tinez, to U.S. Army - South; and CWO 3 Bobby Shireman, to the JointReadiness Training Center, Fort Chaffee, Ark.

Reserve-component officers assigned to Civil Affairs troop program units inpositions requiring Branch 38 qualification are now required to completethe new two-phase Civil Affairs Officer Advanced Course. Phase I of thenew course, taken by correspondence, consists of both Army common-coreand Civil Affairs-specific subcourses. Phase I culminates with a writingrequirement which must be completed prior to the officer attending PhaseII resident training at Fort Bragg. Officers previously enrolled in the oldfour-phase CAOAC are authorized to complete that course for qualifica-tion, with a few conditions. First, they must have been enrolled in eitherthe OAC Phase I common-core correspondence course offered by the ArmyCorrespondence Course Program prior to Oct. 1, 1991, or Phase I of theCombined Arms and Services Staff School prior to Oct. 1, 1992, to meet theold common-core requirement. (Officers who have previously completedany other advanced course are exempt from this requirement.) Second, allCAOAC students must have been enrolled in the old Phase III correspon-dence course not later than Oct. 1, 1992. ACCP will no longer enroll stu-dents in this course. Finally, all correspondence requirements under thefour-phase system must be completed by Oct. 1, 1993. Officers who cannotmeet these requirements must enroll in the new two-phase advancedcourse, including those officers who have previously completed any of theold resident phases. Officers who enrolled in and completed the pilot PhaseI of the new CAOAC are authorized to complete the course by attendancein Phase IV of the old CAOAC. No other waivers or exceptions are autho-rized. Phase II of the new CAOAC will be taught at Fort Bragg beginningin the first quarter of FY 94. For more information, contact Maj. RonFiegle in the Special Operations Proponency Office, DSN 239-6406, com-mercial (919) 432-6406.

New Reserve ComponentCivil Affairs Officer

Advanced Course fielded

42 Special Warfare

Foreign SOFSpecial Warfare

Combatting enemy sabotage and diversionary units, both in the rear ofdeployed operational formations and in strategic rear areas as well — was acontinuing concern of Soviet military planners. As a consequence, rear-areaforces and employment concepts were well-developed even at tactical levels.With the dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, however, mili-tary and internal-security forces designated to perform these tasks were ini-tially fragmented and disorganized, and eventually allocated among thenewly independent states and restructured. The requirement for dealingwith enemy SOF, nevertheless, was identified as a most important missionfor Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States. Just months afterthe USSR’s dissolution, a 1992 article in the premier Russian military jour-nal Military Thought reviewed the growing importance and effectiveness ofspecial warfare as demonstrated in the Gulf War and elsewhere. Theauthors judged that it was necessary to create a “unified system for combat-ting special operations forces” throughout the depth of the country, toinclude “specially formed (assigned) personnel and equipment distributed byzones of responsibility and by presumed areas of combat against specialoperations forces.” The missions and actions of such a system were set out, toinclude the requirement for interaction among military forces, border troopsand internal troops, National Guard units, and civil defense and territorialunits. However, given the continuing disarray in Russian military and secu-rity forces, highly permeable borders and the presence of interethnichotspots inside Russia and around its periphery, creating such a systemremains a distant goal.

Salvadoran police force part of 1992 peace accords

Russians seek system to combat foreign SOF

The creation of a new police force in El Salvador, completely civilian in itsmembership and command, was one of the fundamental components of theJan. 16, 1992, peace agreement between the Government of El Salvador, orGOES, and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front. In March 1992,in response to this provision of the accords, the GOES abolished the NationalGuard and the Treasury Police Security Corps, which were among the mostactive counterinsurgency forces during the 12-year war. In their place,authorities created the Brigada Especial de Seguridad Militar (SpecialBrigade for Military Security — BESM). Directly subordinate to the Ministerof Defense, the unit is composed of four battalions and includes a 456-manmilitary-police battalion organized and structured after the U.S. Army MPdoctrinal concepts model. The brigade’s mission statement, unit TO&E, andtraining calendar were developed in 1992 with the assistance of a U.S. mili-tary adviser. Essential training to prepare the unit for its deploymentincluded: provost-marshal operations, criminal-investigations procedures,physical security, crime prevention, deserter apprehension, prevention ofdrug and alcohol abuse, leadership, small-arms skills, and counterterrorismtraining. The MP battalion will deploy for military-security duties sometimein 1993. The other three battalions (475 men each) guard the borders withGuatemala and Honduras. They are charged with guaranteeing nationalsovereignty, suppressing smuggling of drugs and other contraband, and sup-porting other governmental agencies in the frontier regions.

February 1993 43

Ukraine sets up Golden Eagle units

Multiservice unit primary Colombian

hostage-rescue force

The Fuerzas Especiales Anti-terroristas Urbanas (Urban CounterterroristSpecial Forces, or AFEAU) is Colombia’s primary national-level hostage-res-cue force. A multiservice force, it has elements from the Army, Air Force,Marines and the Colombian National Police. Created in 1985 after existingmilitary and security forces were unable to respond to the M-19 guerrillaattack on the Palace of Justice in Bogota, it has been deployed against ter-rorists, insurgents and drug traffickers. Each service element provides a 15-man force (two officers and 13 enlisted personnel), all volunteers and all pos-sessing basic and specialized military skills. It is commanded by an Armymajor and has a headquarters section which includes an executive officer,first sergeant and radio-telephone operator, bringing its total strength to 64personnel. The AFEAU is under the direct control of the Comandante de lasFuerzas Armadas (Commander of the Armed Forces), and is located at theEscuela de Caballeria (Cavalry School). AFEAU equipment includes scoped7.62mm Remington sniper rifles, Israeli Galil 7.62mm rifles, 5.56mm AR-15s, 5.56mm M16A-2s, 9mm MP-5 machine guns, 9mm Beretta pistols,Browning 9mm pistols, Remington 12-gauge shotguns, night-vision devices,M-79 40mm grenade launchers, 7.62mm M-60 machine guns, internalsecure voice communication equipment, and numerous types of rappellingequipment. Training is conducted north of Bogota at Facatativa, andincludes close-quarters combat; bus, train and airplane hostage-rescue oper-ations; sniper training; explosive training; small- and long-arms marksman-ship; airmobile/air-assault operations, and self-defense techniques. In Febru-ary 1990 the AFEAU deployed to Cartagena during the first anti-drug sum-mit, attended by President Bush. It secured and controlled the Cartagenaairport, established sniper positions at the “Casa de Huespedes” (guesthouse) where the Colombian, Peruvian, Bolivian and U.S. presidents met,established control of the roadway from the airport to the Cartagena Con-vention Center, and raided presumed narco-guerrilla houses and farms. Itshould be noted that the AFEAU was the unit that captured the notoriousdrug trafficker Carlos Lehder Rivas in February 1987.

In a number of former Soviet republics, internal-security forces are requiredto deal with problems having both law-enforcement and military dimensions.Responding to rising levels of criminal and random violence and other acts of“terrorism,” as well as a perceived need to maintain rapid-response unitscapable of dealing with natural disasters, epidemics and other emergencies,Ukraine has set up specialized paramilitary security forces throughout thestate. These forces — called Berkut (Golden Eagle) detachments to symbol-ize their asserted mobility, combat readiness and resolve — began formingin January 1992 under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. They are based onpreviously existing Militia Detachments of Special Designation, which in thelate Soviet period dealt with particularly violent acts of terrorism and chal-lenges to Soviet authority. Planned Golden Eagle strength was to total near-ly 3,000 personnel organized into a regiment in the Ukrainian capital ofKiev, with battalions or companies located in other cities. Berkut detach-ments are equipped and trained in ways analogous to the counterterrorist orspecial-weapons-and-tactics squads of large Western cities; they possessarmored personnel carriers and are comparable to the Austrian “Cobra”counterterrorist force.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. and Maj. Arnaldo Claudio of the Foreign Military Studies Office, Combined Arms Command, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

44 Special Warfare

3rd SF Group activates 3rd Battalion

The 3rd Special Forces Groupactivated its 3rd Battalion in cere-monies at Fort Bragg Oct. 16, giv-ing the 3rd Group its full comple-ment of battalions.

Col. Philip R. Kensinger, 3rdGroup commander, presented the col-ors to Lt. Col. Richard W. Mills, thebattalion’s first commander since itsdeactivation on Dec. 10, 1969. Mills’previous assignment was with theUnited Nations Transitional Authori-ty in Cambodia, where he served as amilitary observer.

“The significance of this activationcannot be overstated,” Kensingersaid. “While the rest of the Army isexperiencing downsizing, SpecialForces Command is standing up anew unit.”

The 3rd Group, oriented towardthe Caribbean and Africa, was reacti-vated in June 1990; its 1st Battalionwas reactivated at the same time.The 2nd Battalion was reactivated inOctober 1991. Soldiers from 3rdGroup participated in DesertShield/Storm and Provide Comfort in1991 and helped Haitian refugees atGuantanamo Bay Naval Base inCuba.

Ranger veterans dedicatememorial stones

Two organizations of Army Rangerveterans recently unveiled engravedmemorial stones at Fort Bragg to thememory of Rangers who died in ser-vice to their country.

The memorials, located in theJohn F. Kennedy Memorial Plaza,near the headquarters of the ArmySpecial Operations Command, werededicated Nov. 24, 1992, to thoseRangers who fell in battle and to

commemorate the Ranger unit lega-cy, officials said. Representatives ofthe Ranger Regiment Associationand the Merrill’s Marauders Associ-ation unveiled the Georgia granitestones engraved with the names oftheir organizations.

Speakers at the ceremony includedLt. Gen. Wayne A. Downing, com-manding general of the Army SpecialOperations Command and a formercommander of the 75th Ranger Regi-ment; Col. David L. Grange, currentcommander of the 75th Ranger Regi-

ment; and retired Army Capt. PhilPiazza, president of the Merrill’sMarauders Association.

“We in the Army special-operationscommunity owe a great debt to ourpredecessors in Merrill’s Maraudersand the Ranger Regiment,” Downingsaid. The 75th Ranger Regiment isthe Army’s premier light-infantrystrike force. The 75th derives its lin-eage from the 5307th CompositeUnit, a World War II outfit that

became renowned for its heroics inthe Asian jungle, chiefly in Burma.The 5307th was commanded by Col.Frank D. Merrill, for whom theMarauders were named.

New equipment will assistrecon missions

Special-operations soldiers willsoon have high-tech additions totheir reconnaissance and intelli-gence-gathering capabilities.

The Electronic Filmless CameraSystem will give SOF soldiers theability to capture photo images indistant locations and transmit themdirectly to their headquarters foranalysis. The system’s camera willstore images on a magnetic disk,according to Gus McGrue, equipmentspecialist in the Combat Develop-ments Division of the Army SpecialOperations Command’s Force Devel-opment and Integration Directorate.The digital image can then be trans-mitted over standard SOF radio sys-tems or by military or commercialtelephone.

The EFCS will consist of two setsof equipment, the out-station andbase-station sets. The base-stationset, the AN/USC-50, composed of acamera, monitor, digital-imaging pro-cessor, still-video reader, modem andprinter, will be deployed at a rear-area site, McGrue said. It will be ableto receive, store, process, edit anddisplay photo images. The base sta-tion will be capable of selectivelytransmitting to and receiving fromother base-station units or out-sta-tion units.

The out-station system, theAN/PSC-6, will have the same capa-bility as the base station, McGruesaid. EFCS cameras will be similarto currently available 35mm com-

UpdateSpecial Warfare

Ranger stone in the JFK Memorial PlazaU.S. Army photo

February 1993 45

mercial systems, but must be capableof functioning under adverse climaticconditions and suited for parachuteand airdrop delivery. Both sets willbe capable of using commercial orvehicular power, 28 volts DC.

The product of a joint study by theArmy Special Operations Commandand the Army Materiel Command,EFCS is scheduled for delivery tofield units in fiscal year 1993.

The Improved Remotely-monitoredBattlefield Sensor System will allowSOF reconnaissance forces to collectinformation on movement of person-nel and vehicles without exposingthemselves to detection.

Composed of monitors, repeaterunits, and infrared, seismic/acousticand magnetic sensors, the systemoffers small size and light weight,important factors for SOF missions.“IREMBASS is a SOF-specific spinoffof the earlier REMBASS,” said GlennLatendresse, also an equipment spe-cialist in the Combat DevelopmentsDivision of USASOC Force Develop-ment and Integration. “REMBASS istoo heavy and too big for SOF. IREM-BASS offers the same capability in asmaller size.” Three sensors, arepeater and a monitor, for example,have a combined weight of 22pounds.

IREMBASS’s battery-powered sen-sors can be buried or camouflagedand placed near likely areas ofenemy traffic. When activated by atarget, they transmit data in shortbursts to the system monitor.Although limited to line-of-sighttransmission, their range can beextended by use of the repeaterunits. At the receiving end, readoutson the hand-held monitor classify thetarget as personnel or vehicles andindicate type and direction of move-ment. Since the sensors operate onlywhen activated, Latendresse said,they have a minimum battery life of30 days.

A complete system will consist oftwo monitors, two repeaters, fourseismic/acoustic sensors, two mag-netic sensors and two infrared sen-sors, Latendresse said. The system iscompletely compatible with the

REMBASS, allowing it to comple-ment or replace items from the earli-er system, as necessary.

IREMBASS will be issued on thebasis of nine per SF battalion, oneper support company, and six perRanger battalion. Fielding is sched-uled to begin during the first quarterof fiscal year 1994.

96th CA Battalion receivesnew streamer

The 96th Civil Affairs Battalionrecently received the MeritoriousUnit streamer for its activities in thePersian Gulf war.

Lt. Gen. Wayne A. Downing, com-mander of the Army Special Opera-tions Command, hung the streameron the unit’s flag, calling the 96th“the hardest working, most oftendeployed unit in the United StatesArmy.” The ceremony took place dur-ing the battalion’s change of com-mand on Nov. 10, 1992.

Lt. Col. James F. Powers replacedLt. Col. Carl T. Sahlin, who had ledthe unit since November 1990, whenhe assumed command during adesert ceremony in Saudi Arabia.Powers was formerly assigned to theSpecial Operations Command -Europe, in Stuttgart, Germany.

As the only active-duty CivilAffairs unit, the 96th sent soldiers tothe Virgin Islands in 1988 followingHurricane Hugo, to Panama in 1989for Operation Just Cause, to the Per-sian Gulf in 1990 for OperationsDesert Shield/Storm, and to theGuantanamo Bay Naval Base inCuba in 1991 to provide shelter toHaitian refugees. Members of theunit also deployed to Florida in 1992to aid in relief efforts following Hur-ricane Andrew.

3rd SF Group dedicates newheadquarters

The 3rd Special Forces Group hasdedicated its new headquartersbuilding to a Canadian officer in the1st Special Service Force killed dur-ing World War II.

During ceremonies held Nov. 6,1992, the headquarters, located on

Fort Bragg’s Yadkin Road, wasnamed MacWilliam Hall in honor ofLt. Col. Thomas Cail MacWilliam,commander of the 1st Battalion, 2ndRegiment, 1st Special Service Force.MacWilliam was killed in action dur-ing the offensive to seize Monte LaDifensa, Italy, on Dec. 4, 1943.

The ceremony was attended byMrs. Thomas Griffith, who was mar-ried to MacWilliam at the time of hisdeath, and his son, Thomas A.MacWilliam. The two assisted 3rdGroup commander Col. Philip R.Kensinger in unveiling a portrait ofColonel MacWilliam.

“We in Special Forces trace our lin-eage directly to the First Special Ser-vice Force, and it is more than appro-priate to select an individual fromthat unit for the honor of this memo-rialization,” Kensinger said. “Lieu-tenant Colonel MacWilliam personi-fied the virtues that we value in Spe-cial Forces today, and specifically inthe 3rd Special Forces Group.”

The 3rd SF Group traces its lin-eage to the 1st Battalion, 2nd Regi-ment of the First Special ServiceForce. The Canadian-American unitwas constituted on July 5, 1942. Themission to seize Monte La Difensacalled for the 1st Battalion to attackby climbing sheer cliffs to the rear ofthe German position. Under heavyfire, the battalion attacked andfought hand-to-hand to overrun theGerman positions.

SF Regimental History Calendar available

The 1993 Special Forces Regimen-tal History Calendar has recentlybeen distributed to SF units by theArmy Special Operations Command’sOffice of the Command Historian.

The weekly planning calendarcommemorates dates from SF histo-ry. For information on availablecopies, contact Dr. Richard Stewart,USASOC command historian, atDSN 239-4720, commercial (919)432-4720.

46 Special Warfare

The Banana Wars: A History ofUnited States Military Interven-tion in Latin America from theSpanish-American War to theInvasion of Panama. By IvanMusicant. New York: MacMillanPublishing Co., 1990. ISBN: 0-02-588210-4. 470 pages. $24.95.

The subject of U.S. interventionin Latin America is not really invogue at this time. It has recentlybeen used by the political left todecry the U.S. for its “imperialist/colonialist” policies. The right,meanwhile, dismisses it out ofhand as unimportant and of noconsequence. As usual, both sidesmiss the mark. We need to studythe events covered in The BananaWars. Not to shackle us, intellectu-ally or politically, but to find andapply insights for the future. Goodpolicy uses history as an asset, butis not paralyzed by it. As special-operations soldiers, we have aresponsibility to be prepared togive the best advice and counselpossible. This must be informed by history, or it will always beinadequate.

The organization of this book is agood one. It is mainly chronological,but modified by country: the authorcovers one country or operation at atime, as much in chronologicalorder as possible. There is someoverlap with regard to time, but hefinishes each subject without mix-ing the information. This allows thereader to use each chapter, as need-ed, if he wants to deal only with onediscrete situation. It also allows forcomparative use, without unduehunting within the text. The chap-ters cover, in order, the Spanish-American War (1898), Cuba (1899-1917), Panama (1885-1904),

Nicaragua I (1912), Haiti (1915-1934), Dominican Republic I (1916-1924), Nicaragua II (1927-1934),Dominican Republic II (1965),Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989).

From a stylistic standpoint, somemay be put off. It is a standard his-torical work. While much morereadable than most academicworks, it is nonetheless an academ-ic book. Fortunately, it is at aboutthe apparent “minimum acceptable”length for a history book, nearly 500pages. The ability to use individual

chapters separately, as mentioned,helps to overcome the problem oflength. The author is a naval histo-rian, and most of his sources areNavy and Marine Corps in origin,but this does not detract from theusefulness to an Army reader.

The main strength of the book isits even-handedness in analysis.Musicant blasts the U.S. when hedescribes the times we were wrong-minded or greedy in our motiva-

tions or policies. He is just as quickto point out the numerous timesthat the greed and malevolence ofindigenous figures is at the heart ofthe issue. This refreshingly un-polemical approach is welcome.Musicant also uses an incrediblenumber of primary sources. Thisadds to the zest of the prose by pro-viding almost continuous eyewit-ness accounts throughout. A stylis-tic strength is the use of a singlequotation from an actual partici-pant at the beginning of each chap-ter. This device sets the tone and, infact, summarizes each chapter.

A weakness that results from theheavy reliance on Navy and MarineCorps sources is an overemphasison the importance of the Navy inseemingly all the “banana wars.”The Navy was a key player, but theauthor could have shortened thebook by at least 100 pages if he hadleft out extensive explanations oftypes of cruisers and steamingtimes. For some, Musicant’s highdegree of detail might be considereda weakness, but a history bookwithout a great deal of detail isliable to be more akin to fictionthan true historical writing.

The Banana Wars is well worthreading and having on your shelf asa reference work. It should be atleast reviewed by all who work inLatin America, for a deeper under-standing of the roots of resentmentwe sometimes feel there. This is aserious book that will take sometime and intellectual effort toappreciate and fully utilize. It isworth the effort.

Maj. Steven BucciCGSCFort Leavenworth, Kan.

Book ReviewsSpecial Warfare

Ashes To Ashes: The PhoenixProgram and the Vietnam War.By Dale Andradé. Lexington, Mass.:Lexington Books, 1990. ISBN 0-669-20014-X. 331 pages. $22.95.

Ashes To Ashes is an examinationof the American Phoenix Programand its parallel South Vietnameseprogram, Phung Hoang, against theViet Cong infrastructure. As theauthor points out, informed discus-sion of Phoenix/Phung Hoang hasbeen severely lacking over theyears. Rather, the program hasbeen so tainted with negative pub-licity that those persons most quali-fied to discuss it have, for the mostpart, chosen to keep quiet instead.However, Ashes To Ashes begins tofill a void in America’s understand-ing of “the other war” in Vietnam(i.e., anti-infrastructure operationsagainst the Viet Cong). Filling thatinformation void is important tothose American special-operationsforces that have foreign-internal-defense missions, if they are tolearn the lessons of that conflict.

While Ashes To Ashes is a goodstart toward understandingPhoenix/Phung Hoang, it is not acomplete account. The book focusesprimarily on operations, while inad-equately examining intelligenceactivities. The author repeatedlystresses the importance of intelli-

gence in anti-infrastructure opera-tions, yet he reveals nothing aboutthat support, other than low-levelhuman-intelligence operations.Low-level HUMINT is the essenceof effective police work — the samepolice work that is so important in aLIC environment. However, theauthor also makes several refer-ences to the importance of intelli-gence provided directly by the CIA — without discussing thatintelligence, its sources or methods.

Indeed, the author’s limited dis-cussion points to another aspect ofintelligence support: what were thecontributions (or lack thereof) ofservice intelligence organizationsand the DIA? The author notes thatthe priority for those intelligenceorganizations was order-of-battleintelligence, but was that their onlypriority? In the author’s defense,much of that information is proba-bly still classified, and some of itmay never be declassified. However,the need for further informationabout intelligence support toPhoenix/Phung Hoang remains.

Additionally, Ashes To Ashes suf-fers from three other problems.First, in an effort to evaluate theeffectiveness of Phoenix/ PhungHoang, the author sometimesresorts to relying on statistics —the same statistics which hederides. (For example, “Statistics,the opiate that soothed Saigon...”[page 129]) Second, the authormakes repeated references to the“incompetent” and “corrupt” Viet-namese, while Americans are por-trayed as omnipotent and benevo-lent. Third, the book suffers frompoor editing. These relatively minorproblems detract from an otherwisefine effort.

A historian by training, theauthor supplies a variety of inter-esting data from various sourcesabout Phoenix/Phung Hoang, but henevertheless fails to provide a com-prehensive analysis of what thisinformation means. Such an analy-sis may have to wait until moreinformation about the program isdeclassified. However, Ashes To

Ashes makes a good start towardunderstanding “the other war” inVietnam, and the author deservescredit for that.

Capt. Tim M. Mather2nd Bn., 11th SF GroupFort A.P. Hill, Va.

Uncomfortable Wars: Toward aNew Paradigm of Low IntensityConflict. Edited by Max G. Man-waring. Boulder, Colo.: WestviewPress, 1991. ISBN: 08-133-8081-2.139 pages. $32.50.

Congratulations to Max Manwar-ing for compiling some of the bestarticles and papers available on thetopic of low-intensity conflict. Con-tributors to the book include someof the brightest minds in the busi-ness: Gen. John R. Galvin, WilliamJ. Olson, Gen. Fred F. Woerner,Col. Courtney E. Prisk, AmbassadorEdwin G. Corr and Lt. Col. John T.Fishel.

Like nearly all compilations frommultiple authors, the book suffersfrom a lack of smooth transitionsfrom one topic to the next, but over-all, Max Manwaring has done asuperb job in the editorial processwhile attempting to “connect thedots.”

February 1993 47

Essentially, the focus of the bookis on the need for the United Statesto develop a new model (orparadigm) to address the threatposed by what has come to beknown as LIC. The authors find sixprimary areas in which Americamust concentrate its efforts if it isto be successful in the often violentand emerging “new world order.”They are: 1) Establishment of legiti-macy; 2) Organization for unity ofeffort; 3) Type and consistency ofexternal support; 4) Discipline andcapabilities of armed forces; 5)Intelligence; 6) Ability to reduceoutside aid to the adversary. Stu-dents of LIC will recognize each ele-ment as essential in U.S. support tocounterinsurgency operations.

The work is well focused onSOUTHCOM’s area of responsibili-ty, with examinations of the Sin-dero Luminosa, or “Shining Path”insurgent movement of Peru; U.S.support to the legal government ofEl Salvador against the FarabundoMarti Liberation Front; and astrategic view of Latin America byGeneral Woerner.

Whether or not you agree withthe authors is largely irrelevant.These are thought-provoking ideasoffered by people who know thebusiness of combining the military-diplomatic means of this nation atboth the practical and theoreticallevel. Uncomfortable Wars would bea welcome addition to any profes-sional soldier’s library. Buy it, readit, and think about it.

Maj. Robert B. Adolph Jr.4th PSYOP GroupFort Bragg, N.C.

The Phoenix Program. By Dou-glas Valentine. New York: WilliamMorrow and Company, 1990. ISBN0-688-09130-X. 416 pages. $24.95.

The Phoenix Program, by DouglasValentine, is a selectively and preju-dicially researched work. It is signif-icantly flawed by the author’s prede-termined conclusion that thePhoenix program was not only a

deliberate instrument of terror butalso the harbinger of a legacy of con-spiratorial evil that pervaded, andcontinues to pervade, U.S. policy athome and abroad. The true villainand target of the book extends farbeyond the relatively limited themethat the title indicates. That villainis the Central Intelligence Agency.

Valentine’s agenda is to convincethe reader that Phoenix was muchmore than a particular effort insti-gated by the CIA to better coordi-nate the attack on hidden Viet Congcadres. Instead, Phoenix was a darkconcept that became a way of opera-tional life, infecting virtually every

aspect of the U.S. involvement inVietnam. In his concluding chapter,Valentine further expands thisspeculation into U.S. involvementin Central America.

If you are proponent of Big Broth-er-type conspiratorial themes, thisis the book for you. Valentine’s pre-conceived argument is so dominantthroughout the book that the readerwonders how honest the author wasregarding his intent with many ofthose he interviewed. It appearsthat the conclusion of this work waswritten well before the body andthat all that was needed was to findwhat the author considered to besubstantiating evidence. Tostrengthen his thesis, the author is

selective in his uses of otherresearch.

A case in point is StanleyKarnow’s Vietnam: A History.Although Valentine quotes Karnowthroughout for Vietnamese histori-cal reference (sometimes out of con-text), he is strangely silent onKarnow’s comments regardingPhoenix itself. A critic of the pro-gram, Karnow nevertheless honest-ly recounts the testimonies of for-mer high-ranking Viet Cong offi-cials as to the effectiveness ofPhoenix in disrupting the revolu-tionary infrastructure. You will notfind such balance in Valentine’sbook.

All of this is unfortunate, becausethere are elements of potentialvalue within the book. Relying to agreat deal on interviews with bothcivilian and military personnelinvolved to varying degrees withthe Phoenix effort, the book doesprovide insight into the problemsthat afflicted the program. Theseproblems included the terribleimprisoning, torturing and killing ofinnocent Vietnamese, the great dif-ficulty in persuading the Viet-namese to commit to the conceptand in convincing the myriad agen-cies and forces to cooperate witheach other in a common goal, andthe consequences that resulted fromplacing unqualified or unethicalAmericans in positions that influ-enced Phoenix activities. There are,too, the instances of unquestionablyimmoral and illegal behavior byAmericans that should be identifiedfor what they were.

Within the framework of a bal-anced examination and analysis ofthe program itself, The Phoenix Pro-gram could have been a solid contri-bution to the study of Americanattempts, both good and bad, tocombat communist revolutionarywarfare. Instead, the effort will bewasted on all but those alreadyinclined to believe the absoluteworst about the United States’effort to combat communism.

Military readers may well findthe book difficult to read, both for

48 Special Warfare

its confusing style and consistentnegative interpretation of virtuallyall U.S. or South Vietnamese action.The chapters are topically orientedon either components of the pro-gram, characteristics of the pro-gram (such as“Covert Action”), orwhat the author has determined tobe stages of the program’s exis-tence. There is no continuity, how-ever, in either time reference orsubject to link the chapters, leavingthe reader wondering who wasdoing what, to whom, and when.Valentine’s understanding of bothrevolutionary and counterrevolu-tionary warfare is poor, and muchof his history is simply wrong. Spe-cial Forces readers will find it ofinterest, for example, that thefounding of the “First SpecialForces” was linked to the formationof the French counterinsurgencyforce Groupements de CommandosMixtes Aeroportes, the GCMA, in1951, or that “legions of SpecialForces” were rushed to Vietnam byPresident Kennedy.

In summary, this book is clearlyone to avoid. The problems with thePhoenix program have been articu-lated in other works such as Blau-farb’s The Counterinsurgency Era,Race’s War Comes to Long An,Andrade’s Ashes to Ashes, and oth-ers that offer much more to the mil-itary professional interested in thefield of revolutionary warfare.Valentine’s endless accounts of thetorture and killing inflicted on theacknowledged innocent victims ofPhoenix provides legitimate causefor study and reflection on the abso-lute critical nature of moral legiti-macy, properly trained personnel

and committed allies in the prosecu-tion of counterinsurgency. Yet thepiece is so thoroughly compromisedand colored by the author’s passion-ate conviction of the corruptness ofthe American effort that it is impos-sible to obtain an even view of thereality that was Phoenix.

Maj. John F. Mulholland7th SF GroupFort Bragg, N.C.

Dirty Wars: Elite Forces vs. theGuerrillas. By Leroy Thompson.New York: Sterling Press, 1991.ISBN: 0-7153-9441-X (hardcover)192 pages. $27.95.

Some things improve with age,and so it is with author LeroyThompson. Billed in the press pack-et as “counterinsurgency expert and

former bodyguard to Gen. WilliamWestmoreland,” but more widelyknown for writings fit for unsophis-ticated audiences, Thompson hasfinally produced a decent book inDirty Wars: Elite Forces vs. theGuerrillas.

The book begins with a brief butinteresting introduction to guerrillawarfare before 1900 and coversmost of the major guerrilla wars ofthe 20th century. The layout is, infact, very well done. The text isinteresting and readable and bro-ken up with scores of color andblack-and-white photographs. Side-bar articles are used throughout thetext to highlight the history of aparticular unit or otherwise empha-size a point.

Thompson identifies himself asthe author but does not, however,cite a single reference or source forany of his information. Anothercurious aspect of the book is thatsources are listed for very few of itsmany photographs. Such mightmake a reader suspect Thompson’saccuracy and originality. The bookis also a bit overpriced for its con-tent. All told, Dirty Wars is decentenough for dayroom reading but notquite worthy of the library of a seri-ous student of military elites orguerrilla warfare.

Maj. William H. Burgess IIIUSSOCOMMacDill AFB, Fla.

February 1993 49

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