PB 80–93–4 October 1993 Vol. 6, No. 4

Special WarfareThe Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

Current peacekeeping operations in Somalia,Bosnia and Cambodia highlight a mission inwhich U.S. forces may likely find themselvesincreasingly involved.

New Army doctrinal manuals anticipate thatrole. The recently released FM 100-5, Operations,includes a chapter which, for the first time, focuseson peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and dis-aster relief. FM 100-23, being written at TRADOC,will concentrate on peacekeeping operations.

The impact of all this is significant, becausethese types of operations will occur in more com-plex politico-military environments. Those whocarry them out will have to be correspondinglymore sophisticated. Two aspects of this sophistica-tion stand out.

The first is that peacekeepers/enforcers mustunderstand that even minor tactical or humani-tarian actions may have enormous strategic andpolitical implications. Who is separated, how theyare separated and where the separation occurscan affect local balances of power, create percep-tions and implicitly align the peacekeeper/enforcerwith one side or the other. One can produce unde-sirable outcomes without realizing what he or sheis doing. In these types of operations, everythingis strategic.

The second is intercultural communications. Ina place like Bosnia, for example, where three sep-arate languages are spoken, competing religiousgroups, historical grudges and complex culturaldifferences make effective communication a majorchallenge.

All of this has implications for special-opera-tions forces. As our deployments for OperationProvide Comfort, Restore Hope and HurricaneAndrew have shown, our SOF are able to performeffectively across this spectrum of non-traditionalmissions. They have unique skills in language,intercultural communications, regional and cul-tural orientation, restoring government services,and communicating information to the population.The level of seniority and maturity is also a signif-icant factor. They are capable of operating insmall groups tailored for the situation and ofworking as part of a joint force.

But while we are qualified by past experienceand training to perform these missions, the future

holds much to learn and the prospect for change.In many respects these are not traditional doctri-nal missions, and they may require us to adapt.

Peacekeeping is not peaceful. It is a dangerous,complex and increasingly violent mission. The tra-ditional separation between peacekeepers andcombat soldiers is becoming less distinct, and thischange, as well as the fact that we may be operat-ing as part of a UN force, may require new rulesof engagement.

We may also find that the missions of peace-keeping, humanitarian assistance and disasterrelief become intertwined in this new environ-ment, with each one requiring some aspects of theothers. In all cases, our intercultural-communica-tion skills and ability to understand the localpolitical situation will be extremely important.

The decision to involve U.S. forces in peacekeep-ing operations is up to the national commandauthorities. As soldiers, we cannot make thosedecisions, but we must anticipate the demandsthose decisions will place upon us and ensure thatwhenever these missions occur and wherever theywill take us, our training, doctrine and modern-ization will allow us to react quickly, effectivelyand successfully.

From the CommandantSpecial Warfare

Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow

PB 80–93–4 Contents

Features2 SOF in Peace-Support Operations

by Lt. Col. Thomas K. Adams

8 The Army’s 218th Birthday: Continuity, Change, Growthby Gen. Gordon R. Sullivan

11 The Customer Guide to Airpowerby Lt. Col. Richard Schaller

14 The Activities of Detachment 101 of the OSSby James R. Ward

22 Remaining Engaged in Africa: An Army SOF Strategyby Lt. Col. Robert B. Adolph Jr.

26 Sniper Training in the 10th Special Forces Groupby CWO 2 Brent A. Delorier

29 PSYOP In The Early 1980s: The Way We Wereby Dr. Alfred H. Paddock Jr.

34 Interview: Special Forces in El SalvadorLt. Col. Geoffrey Lambert, Lt. Col. Frank Pedrozo and Col. J.S. Roach

39 Operation Guantanamo: Civil Affairs in Actionby 2nd Lt. William A. Woods

Departments47 Enlisted Career Notes48 Officer Career Notes50 Foreign SOF52 Update54 Book Reviews

V E R I T A S

STREBIL

A

E T

Commander & CommandantMaj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow

EditorJerry D. Steelman

Graphic Art DirectorBruce S. Barfield

Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of theUnited States Army John F. Kennedy Special WarfareCenter and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its missionis to promote the professional development of specialoperations forces by providing a forum for the examinationof both established doctrine and new ideas.

Views expressed herein are those of the author, and donot necessarily reflect official Army position. Thispublication does not supersede any information presented inother official Army publications.

Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited, andshould be addressed to: Editor, Special Warfare,USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000. Telephone:DSN 239-5703 or commercial (919) 432-5703. SpecialWarfare reserves the right to edit all material.

Published works may be reprinted, except wherecopyrighted, provided credit is given to Special Warfare andthe author.

Official distribution is limited to active and reservespecial operations units. Individuals desiring a privatesubscription should forward their requests to:Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government PrintingOffice, Washington, D.C. 20402.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:Gordon R. SullivanGeneral, United States ArmyChief of Staff

Official:

Milton H. HamiltonAdministrative Assistant to theSecretary of the Army

05215

Headquarters, Department of the Army

October 1993 Special Warfare Vol. 6, No. 4

Cover: Computer graphic by Bruce S. Barfield

In February 1993, Marine Gun-nery Sgt. Harry Conde was onpatrol in the strife-torn streets ofMogadishu. He was on a mission ofmercy, bringing food to the starvingand order out of anarchy as part ofOperation Restore Hope. Suddenlya figure darted out from betweentwo buildings and lunged at Conde’sface. Reacting quickly, he shot theintruder with a round of buckshotfrom his M-79.

In April, a court-martial convict-ed Conde of aggravated assault. Theintruder had not been a terrorist orone of the local bandits; instead, theblast wounded Ahmed Abdi Omar, a13-year-old street thief who claimedto have been reaching for Conde’ssunglasses.1 Presumption of inno-cence is not a part of infantry doc-trine, but that may have to change.

We may also have to change ourviews of peace-support operations— including peacekeeping andhumanitarian assistance — whichare no longer as peaceful as they

used to be. Soldiers of 32 nations,including the United States, havebeen deployed for more than a yearin the former Yugoslavia as part ofthe United Nations ProtectionForce. To date, at least 27 Protec-tion Force members have beenkilled and more than 380 wounded.According to Gen. John M. Sha-likashvili, chairman of the JointChiefs and former NATO supremeallied commander in Europe, “Thedays of pristine peacekeeping as weunderstood it for years are probablyover. Prudence dictates that in ourplanning we take that aspect ofcombat into account.”2

Modern peacekeeping is a com-plex and convoluted environmentwhere the old rules — such as “sol-diers kill people and break things,”and “peacekeepers fight only in self-defense” — may not apply.

Since the collapse of the SovietUnion, a new state of internationalaffairs has arisen. Usually charac-terized as a “new world order,” it

might better be termed the “newworld disorder.” Whatever its name,this new state creates new problemsfor the military peacekeeper.

Even a casual look at the head-lines featuring Somalia, Cambodia,Bosnia, the former Warsaw Pactand the Middle East brings homethe fact that disorder is a primarycharacteristic of the new order. Asecond glance underlines the impor-tance of various peace-related activ-ities by the United Nations, increas-ingly with large-scale U.S. involve-ment. The U.N. is now involved in13 peace-related operations with asignificant military component, farmore than at any previous time.

U.N. intervention has commonlytaken place under the authority ofthe various articles of Chapter VIIof the United Nations Charter.Except in clear cases of cross-borderaggression (as in Korea andKuwait) intervention has generallybeen limited to peacekeeping and toimposition of various sanctionsshort of force.

Traditionally, internationalpeacekeeping, both under U.N. aus-pices and otherwise, has been estab-lished around three core principles,a sort of doctrine by consensus:

• Consent by all contending par-ties, including an explicit invitationfrom the country(ies) where peace-keepers will be located

• Impartiality of the peacekeep-ing force and

• Use of force only in self-defense.The clear purpose of this interven-tion was to guarantee thesovereignty of the nation-statesinvolved, usually by deterring orredressing aggressive behavior.

The prospect of a much greaterrole for the U.N. and greater use ofcoercion, including military force,was raised when Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the U.N. secretary general,authored An Agenda for Peace: Pre-ventive Diplomacy, Peacemakingand Peace-Keeping, in December1992.

In this document, Boutros-Ghaliimplies new rules for U.N. interven-tion. The most significant of these is

2 Special Warfare

SOF in Peace-Support Operations

by Lt. Col. Thomas K. Adams

October 1993 3

that the U.N. may now intervenewithout the consent of all parties.The rationale for this stems fromhis position that individuals andgroups have “international rights,”essentially basic guarantees, suchas freedom from genocide, based onthe U.N.’s charter of human rights.By extension, the U.N. has a rightto intervene in cases where theseinternational rights are violated,such as the anarchy and starvationin Somalia. Some U.S. policy mak-ers have argued as well that “undercertain conditions the UnitedNations has the right to preventgenocide from occurring.”3

Agenda for Peace also proposes“preventive peacekeeping,” in whichrelatively small U.N. forces woulddeploy to threatened areas signal-ing international disapproval of anyanticipated aggression. This wasthe intention when the U.N. securi-ty council agreed to send severalhundred observers to Macedonia todeter attacks from Serbia.4 Withthese new peace-support activities,the rules of impartiality and force-only-for-self-defense go away.

Not surprisingly, personnel inU.S. special-operations forces havebeen and will continue to beinvolved in these difficult anddemanding activities. When U.S.conventional forces landed nearMogadishu in December 1992, SOFwere already there, setting thestage for Operation Restore Hope.As the United States Special Opera-tions Forces Posture Statement for1993 makes clear, Army special-operations units, including SpecialForces, Civil Affairs and PSYOP,can expect increasing employmentin these areas.5

This is made all the more likelyby the current administration’sview of appropriate intervention. InPresident’s Clinton’s inauguraladdress, he pledged Americanaction whenever “the will and con-science of the international commu-nity is defied.” In the words of Clin-ton’s U.N. ambassador MadeleineAlbright, “If there is one overridingprinciple that will guide me in this

job, it will be the inescapableresponsibility ... to build a peacefulworld and to terminate the abom-inable injustices and conditions thatstill plague civilization.”6 The sameposition was underlined by then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Gen.Colin Powell, when he warned thatU.S. forces can expect such futuremissions “as a given.”7

Peacekeeping problemsThis raises some interesting prob-

lems for the “new peacekeeping.”One is the very universal quality ofthe “abominable injustices” that areto be corrected. These conditionsoccur in numerous places on a dailybasis, and often on a wide scale.Another obvious problem is that, asin Bosnia-Herzegovina, there maybe significant military forces willingto contest this intervention. In theformer Yugoslavia there are at leastseven major armed factions thatamount to ethnic or territoriallybased armies equipped with armor

and artillery. The smallest of thesenumbers about 15,000, while thelargest has a strength of more than130,000. Somalia is an even morecomplex situation. There, dozens ofcontending factions with constantlyshifting allegiances seek to co-optthe U.N. forces and exploit theirpresence.

This last point raises the basicdoctrinal issue of impartiality, oneof the core principles of the oldpeacekeeping. “Impartiality is thesine qua non for whatever effective-ness, authority and leverage peace-keepers have, and perhaps morethat anything else, it makes peace-keeping a distinctive kind of conflictcontrol activity, one that hasworked where partisan control mea-sures would have failed.”8

The U.S. Army has a specialinterest in the peacekeeping prob-lem as the likely provider of suchforces and the designated executiveagent for peacekeeping within theDepartment of Defense. However,

A member of the U.N.Peacekeeping Forcekeeps watch on a streetin Bosnia.

United Nations photo

doctrine for these activities is stillforthcoming, notably a new FM 100-23 on peacekeeping, now underdevelopment by the Army Trainingand Doctrine Command.

What does exist is a general con-sensus among planners that thereare three separate forms of peace-related activities: humanitarianassistance, peacekeeping (under thetraditional rules) and peace-enforce-ment (more or less a conventionalmilitary operation). Althoughhumanitarian assistance is treatedas a separate type of operation,experience in Somalia suggests thatit is likely to have a peace-enforce-ment component. Desert Storm andthe accompanying Operation Pro-vide Comfort indicate that, likewise,peace-enforcement is likely toinclude humanitarian assistance.

The new FM 100-5, Operations,supports this view with its treat-ment of humanitarian assistance,peacekeeping and peace enforce-ment as forms of “operations otherthan war.” Peacekeeping is definedas American forces in support ofdiplomatic efforts to maintainpeace, while peace enforcement isseen as U.S. forces acting to restorepeace through military operationsor the threat of such operations.9

In short, peacekeeping enforces acease-fire, while peace enforcementsets out to create one. But, as notedearlier, “peace support” is not a cat-egory characterized by clean defini-tions, and these activities may notoccur in isolation. Most likely theywill include a humanitarian-assis-tance effort, providing relief tocountries where there is massivesuffering from anarchy, disease orstarvation.

Non-U.N. peace supportNot all peacekeeping/peace-sup-

port takes place within the struc-ture of the U.N. The MultinationalForce and Observers, or MFO, is aU.S.-sponsored peacekeeping forcein the Sinai Peninsula policing the1979 Egyptian-Israeli Treaty ofPeace. The MFO was created in

August 1981 after the U.N. securitycouncil was unable to agree on apeacekeeping force to undertake themission. The organization, however,is explicitly modeled after success-ful U.N. peacekeeping operations.10

In March 1993 the United Statesbegan Operation Provide Promise, awell-publicized series of reliefflights to air-drop supplies to thebeleaguered Muslims in easternBosnia. This is also a unilateralAmerican operation.

Under U.N. auspicesCommonly, although not neces-

sarily, peace-support operationswould occur under U.N. auspicesand as part of a combined force. Asenvisioned by Boutros-Ghali, thesecurity council would have underits direct control a sort of standing“peace force” composed of battalion-and regiment-sized componentsdrawn from various membernations. The troops would be underthe operational command and con-trol of the security council, as arethe current 13 U.N. peacekeepingoperations.11

The Bush administration rejectedthis proposal, and the current U.S.

Congress has not been supportive ofsuch a standing force. Lacking sucha force, U.N. operations are carriedout under a variety of ad hocarrangements. The U.S. Army par-ticipates in several of these opera-tions in various ways. For example,the Army provides individualobservers to the U.N. Iraq-KuwaitObserver Mission, which performs amore-or-less traditional peacekeep-er’s role by monitoring the bufferzone between the Gulf War combat-ants. Other Army soldiers are partof the United Nations TemporaryAuthority in Cambodia. In thiscase, the U.N. is attempting anambitious program to supervise thegovernment, hold elections, disarmguerrilla factions and assist eco-nomic development. On the otherside of the planet, a 350-man Armyhospital unit, Task Force 212, issupporting the U.N. ProtectionForce in Yugoslavia.

U.N. control of these activities (asopposed to mere sponsorship,which, in effect, grants permission)presents a basic problem in thatthere is no United Nations militaryheadquarters per se. The U.N. officeresponsible is the Office of Peace-

4 Special Warfare

United Nations photo

A member of the United Nations Temporary Authority in Cambodia inspectsa soldier’s weapon.

keeping Operations, headed by anundersecretary general. This officehas only a small multinational coor-dinating staff to advise the secre-tary general. It is not structured forthe command and control of mili-tary peace-support operations. Fur-thermore, there is no provision forintelligence and communicationsfunctions to be accomplished by theU.N. In American military parlancethere is very little C4I (command,control, communications, computersand intelligence) structure. Fur-thermore, there is no U.N. peace-keeping doctrine to help structurethese functions and little expertisefor ad hoc operations.

However, Article 41, Chapter 7(2)of the U.N. charter does allow thesecurity council to invite a lead orframework nation to act on behalf ofthe U.N. as the United States didduring the Korean War and thePersian Gulf War. Strategic direc-tion is provided by the securitycouncil and the secretary general,while operational control lies withthe force commander. What followsis that the C4I functions will be per-formed or at least managed by thelead nation, presumably the U.S.

In Operation Desert Storm, SOFpersonnel with special languageskills and training in cultural andpolitical sensitivity formed 109 coor-dination-and-training teams tooperate communications and infor-mation-processing equipment foreach national command element.These teams also provided com-mand-control-and-intelligence infor-mation to the host command toensure coherent, unified action.This capability has an obviousapplication in multinational peace-support operations.

U.S. special-operations forceshave demonstrated a real capacityfor these missions and continue togain valuable experience as part ofthe ongoing Operation ProvideComfort in Iran-Iraq and Turkeysince 1991. SOF personnel therehave demonstrated a range of capa-bilities from aerial delivery of emer-gency supplies to mass-communica-

October 1993 5

New manual to address peace supportWith unrest rampant in the world today, the need for support to peace

operations is becoming an ever-increasing requirement. The support ofU.N. operations throughout the world by U.S. military forces is essentialand expanding. Although this is a new environment for the use of ourforces, it is not a new mission. The roles and functions of the military arewell-suited for this kind of operation. The understanding of the opera-tional environment is critical for success, however, and for that reason,the Army is developing a new field manual to address support to peaceoperations, FM 100-23.

Special-operations forces are no stranger to this type of operation andhave proven to be a unique and valuable asset to peace-support opera-tions. The five principal missions of SOF: unconventional warfare, spe-cial reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, direct action and countert-errorism, provide a strong training base for SOF support to PSO. ThreeSOF organizations especially suited for PSO are: Special Forces, Psycho-logical Operations and Civil Affairs.

SF assets are prepared to deploy rapidly into denied or hostile areas toprovide initial assessments or begin operations when and where it is notoperationally prudent to use conventional forces. They can provide initialengineering, medical, security and intelligence assessments. With theirlanguage and area orientation, they can be invaluable as liaisons withhost-nation assets, coalition forces, other military organizations and non-military agencies. They are prepared to assist in training and organizinghost-nation security forces to establish and maintain order. They mayalso improve coalition interoperability by cross-training with coalitionforces.

PSYOP are planned operations to convey selected information andinfluence the emotions, motives, reasoning, and ultimately, the behaviorof its audience. PSYOP aims to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes andbehavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. PSYOP can play animportant role in facilitating cooperation between the belligerents andthe peace-support forces. Tactically, PSYOP forces can assist throughpersuasion rather than intimidation. Through the use of local informa-tion programs such as radio or television broadcasts and leaflet distribu-tion, PSYOP elements can help ensure that the operational objectivesand efforts are fully supported and understood by the target audience.

CA assets provide the supported commander with activities thatestablish, maintain, influence or exploit relations between militaryforces and civil authorities and the civil population in order to assist mil-itary operations and consolidate operational objectives. CA may includeperformance by military forces of activities and functions normally theresponsibility of local government. They can make assessments of theneeds of civil activities, assist in the development of these programs, actas the interface between civil authorities and the military supportingagency, serve as a liaison with the civil populace, develop population-and-resource control measures and coordinate with international sup-port agencies.

The role of SOF in peace-support operations is well-founded and willcontinue to be a valuable asset. With their area orientation and training,the ability to deploy rapidly and work in austere conditions, SOF willcontinue to be a key player in PSO. — Maj. Robert Snyder, DoctrineDivision, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, USAJFKSWCS

6 Special Warfare

tions support provided by the 4thPSYOP Group. Army Special Forcespersonnel proved their value bylocating suitable sites for refugeecamps and then helping local lead-ers organize and train for greaterself-sufficiency. SF medics took partin joint SOF medical aid and train-ing teams that were credited withdramatically reducing the dailydeath rate among the refugees. InEastern Europe and the formerUSSR, SOF survey teams have con-ducted regional assessments, and inthe Commonwealth of IndependentStates, worked with local militaries,

including Russian spetsnaz, to dis-tribute relief supplies.

PlanningDespite the fact that the exper-

tise, experience and flexibility ofspecial-operations forces gives thema real advantage in undertakingpeace-support operations, they willfind that like other military plan-ners, they face at least three gener-al problems in planning for peace-support operations.

Lack of focus. Given the very gen-eral nature of the peace-supportmission, it is very difficult to predict

with any confidence where the nextmission may occur. Africa, forexample, has never been a centralissue for American policy makersand military planners. Neverthe-less, in Africa alone there are atleast six countries in which a singlemisstep could easily lead to Somali-like chaos: Angola, Liberia, Malawi,Mozambique, Sudan and Zimbabwe.To make the situation worse, threeof these, Angola, Liberia andSudan, have active civil wars, whilea fourth, Mozambique, has a guer-rilla insurgency.

Peace support in locations likethese is unlikely to be peaceful. ArmySpecial Forces groups and CivilAffairs units have a unique advan-tage with their specific geographicorientation and linguistic capabilities.

Nothing ever happens where weexpect it to. Peace-support operationsseem to occur where there are thefewest resources, either in terms ofexisting forces, intelligence or otherrequired materials. This capacity foraustere operations in underdevel-oped areas and their relatively self-sufficient nature make SOF unitsexceptionally appropriate to thisenvironment. Their ability to conductreconnaissance missions could alsohelp to overcome shortfalls in intelli-gence information.

Everything is strategic. In peaceenforcement, the tactical level ofoperations almost disappears. Aspointed out by Donald M. Snow,even the most “tactical” of actionscan have vastly wider implications.“Who is separated, how they areseparated and where separationoccurs in, say, a neighborhood, atown or even a street can affectlocal balances of power, and canimplicitly align the peace enforcerwith one side or another.”12

It is hard to imagine any actionthat will not benefit one side morethan another. What this suggests isan interminable series of actionsaimed at balancing and counterbal-ancing benefits in the name of fair-ness and neutrality. In Somalia,U.S. forces managed to avoid seri-ous missteps and, more important-

U.N. Good Offices Mission to Afghanistanand Pakistan (UNGOMAP), 1988-89

Monitor withdrawal of Sovietforces from Afghanistan.

U.N. Iran-Iraq Observer Group (UNIIMOG),1988-91

Monitor cease-fire inIran-Iraq War.

U.N. Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I),1988-91

Monitor withdrawal of Cubanforces from Angola.

U.N. Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG),1989-90

Supervise Namibia’s transitionto independence.

U.N. Mission in Central America (ONUCA),1989-91

Monitor compliance with peaceaccords; demobilize Contras.

U.N. Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II),1991-present

Monitor cease-fire and creationof new army.

U.N. Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM),1991-present

Monitor buffer zone afterGulf War.

U.N. Mission for the Referendum in WesternSahara (MINURSO), 1991-present

Conduct referendum onindependence in Morocco.

U.N. Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL),1991-present

Monitor human rights elections,national reconcilation.

U.N. Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC),1991-92

Supervise government, run elections;demobilize armed factions.

U.N. Temporary Authority in Cambodia(UNTAC), 1992-present

U.N. Protection Force in Yugoslavia(UNPROFOR), 1992-present

Replace Yugoslav forces inSerbian areas of Croatia.Humanitarian relief escortunits in Bosnia.

U.N. Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I & II),1992, 1993

Security for humanitarianaid shipments. U.S.-led fromDecember 1992 throughspring 1993.

U.N. International Task Force (UNITAF),1992-93

U.N. Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ),1993-present

Implement peace settlementin civil war.

Operation Description

U.N. Peacekeeping Operations, 1985-1992

October 1993 7

ly, to avoid being pulled into localquarrels. The Somalia case, more-over, benefited from the fact thatthere were no important foreigninterests involved. In the case ofCambodia, where both Thailandand China have important con-cerns, things are more difficult.

The maturity, selectivity, regionalexpertise and high state of trainingof special operators make themnearly ideal to operate in such ademanding environment.

In summary, special-operationsforces have an important andincreasing role in peace-supportoperations. Of the seven traditionalSOF missions — unconventionalwarfare, direct action, special recon-naissance, foreign internal defense,counterterrorism, psychologicaloperations and civil affairs — three(foreign internal defense, psycholog-ical operations and civil affairs)may be seen to have immediateapplication to peace support. Expe-rience in operations such as ProvideComfort have shown that SOF canbe effective in these roles.

The most important quality, how-ever, is the demonstrated capabilityto operate in politically sensitive

environments. Special-operationsmissions are characterized by theirpolitically sensitive context and therestraints that imposes. SOF per-sonnel are expected to apply forceonly when required to accomplish amission, and then with prudence.According to the SOF PostureStatement, “As mature militaryprofessionals, SOF is attuned to thesanctity of human life, the long-term effects of unnecessary orexcessive violence and the need tobring conflict to a rapid and reason-able conclusion.”13

As we attempt to deal with thedisorder of the new world order, itwill become increasingly necessaryfor the U.N. to apply force inquelling disturbances and guaran-teeing human rights. U.S. forceswill probably play a significant rolein this activity, either as part of alarger force or as the lead nationacting on the U.N.’s behalf.

Among U.S. forces, SOF, withtheir versatility, language and cul-tural skills, regional orientationand familiarity with the missions ofFID, PSYOP and Civil Affairs, arebest suited to provide humanitarianassistance and deal with the politi-

cal sensitivities of peacekeeping andpeace support.

Lt. Col. Thomas K.Adams, Ph. D., is cur-rently a specialist inpeace support in theOperations OtherThan War Departmentof the U. S. ArmyCommand and General Staff Collegeat Fort Leavenworth, Kan. He is theauthor of several articles in the areasof operations short of war and specialoperations. An MI officer, he is Spe-cial Forces-qualified with extensiveexperience in operations short of war.His most recent assignment was aschief of counterdrug intelligenceoperations for the U.S. Army South-ern Command.

Notes:1 Jim Hogland, “Prepared for Non-Combat,”

The Washington Post, 15 April 1993, p. A5.2 Ian Kemp, “Peacekeeping,” Janes’

Defence Weekly, 13 March 1993, p. 26.3 Rep. Alan Wheat, quoted by Jake

Thompson in “Where Next and Why?”Kansas City Star, 14 December 1992, p. A-5.

4 William J. Durch, The United Nationsand Collective Security in the 21st Century(Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War Col-lege) 1993, p. 13.

5 U.S. Special Operations Forces PostureStatement, 1993, pp. 2, 33.

6 As quoted in Time magazine, 17 May1993, p. 74.

7 Gen. Colin L. Powell, “U.S. Forces: Chal-lenges Ahead,” Foreign Affairs, Winter1992/93, p. 36.

8 Ramesh Thakur, International Peace-keeping in Lebanon: United Nations Authori-ty and Mutinational Force (Boulder, Colo.:Westview Press, 1987), p. 153.

9 U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-5, Opera-tions (Final Draft, 19 January 1993), pp. 8-9and 8-11. See also Field Manual 100-20, Mil-itary Operations in Low Intensity Conflict,1990, p. 4-10.

10 Lt. Col. Steven J. Argersinger, Peace-keeping, Peace Enforcement and the UnitedStates (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. ArmyWar College), May 1991, p. 8.

11 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “Setting anAgenda for the United Nations,” Journal ofInternational Affairs, Winter 1993, p. 293.

12 Donald M. Snow, Peacekeeping, Peace-making and Peace-enforcement: the U.S. Rolein the New International Order (Carlisle Bar-racks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S.Army War College), February 1993, p. 34.)

13 SOF Posture Statement, p. 4.

Soldiers of the peacekeeping force in Somalia reflect its multinational character.

United Nations photo

On June 14, the Army celebratedits 218th birthday — an anniver-sary that deserves the attention ofthose in and out of uniform. Itmarks another year of selfless ser-vice dedicated to ensuring thatAmerica remains strong and free. Ina world filled with fledgling democ-racies and armies searching for anidentity, we can take great pride inour uniquely American institutionand our role in the Republic.

On our anniversaries, it is appro-priate to reflect on our institution’spurpose and heritage — and on ourown character and duty. While eachyear contains many successes andfrustrations for us personally, wemust remember that continued suc-cess of the Army in executing itssacred trust is a personal successthat reflects on each of us. Thatknowledge strengthens us as wereflect on the past, serve today in atrained and ready Army, and pre-pare for the challenges of the 21stcentury.

Our Army’s journey of service

paralleled the development of ourdemocratic institutions — from the“First Muster” in MassachusettsBay Colony through Concord Bridgeand Lexington Common — to today.In that sense the Army holds nospecial claim on its members — weare all citizens. The idea that frag-ile democracy can flourish only in asecure environment was clear to theFounding Fathers. They recognizedthat freedom comes with a price.

Through all the early attempts todevelop and achieve a stable politi-cal system — the Articles of Confed-eration — the various rebellions —culminating in the Constitution —the American debate over how tobest field a credible, capable Armydemonstrates our critical role inservice to the nation. That debatehas continued through to today inmany trials — the Civil War — theopening of the West — efforts atnation building at home and abroad— and the emergence in this centu-ry of our nation to internationalpre-eminence. The people that have

worn the uniform — in whateverstate of organization or prepared-ness — have always been there forthe country.

That legacy of selfless service —both institutional and personal —connects us to our past and to eachother. It is continuity — strength —our purpose and our anchor in tur-bulent times. History has taught ustwo things. First, we have with-stood the buffet of change before.Second, while the spirit of selflessservice has cushioned the buffet ofchange — the swings in our Ameri-can defense debate and the dynamicinternational responsibilities of ourcountry have constantly taught usthe perils of unpreparedness.

Turbulent times are upon usagain. Our task is to respond appro-priately to provide for the securityof the nation. We are doing that.This anniversary marks a differentArmy in relation to its times thanthe Army that celebrated the 200th,175th or 150th birthdays. Reflect onthe Army of 1975, 1950 or 1925.

8 Special Warfare

The Army’s 218th Birthday: Continuity, Change, Growth

by Gen. Gordon R. Sullivan

While our history gives us conti-nuity of purpose, the world we livein today requires a different Armythan any of us have ever known. Weare well on the way to transformingour Army into the power-projection,crisis-response force that Americaneeds.

We achieved victory in the ColdWar — a victory no less importantbecause there will be no streameron the Army flag to symbolize thedecades of perseverance in a for-ward-deployed Army. We haveaccomplished much, in the face ofhistorical and present pressures towhich we could have easily suc-cumbed in many areas. As I havetold many of you on my visits —whenever I see another accomplish-ment in transforming the Armywhile staying trained and ready ona daily basis — I am strengthenedto see continuous forward move-ment in the face of hundreds of rea-sons why progress should not occur.

We have made the cuts in forcestructure while treating our peoplewith dignity and respect. We havereleased more than a quarter of amillion soldiers and civilians fromthe active component and reducedour European-deployed force bymore than half — to a little morethan 100,000.

We have maintained the highlevel of training and readinessrequired to answer the nation’s callin a wide range of unpredictablemissions. Many of these missionsare new to soldiers who were prod-ucts of a forward-deployed ColdWar Army — but those missions arenot new to your Army. We haveincreased the operational deploy-ments of Army forces by about 100percent in the last two years — tomore than 20,000 troops in over 60countries as a steady-state opera-tional requirement above andbeyond the forward-presence forces.

We have built on the successes ofour joint efforts in Panama, theGulf, and elsewhere around thenation — and around the world —to improve the seamless web ofcapabilities available to the nation-

al command authorities. Decisiveland combat power, the Army con-tribution to the simultaneous appli-cation of unique and complemen-tary capabilities, provides thenation the wide range of capabili-ties upon which it relies heavily —in Macedonia, Somalia, in LosAngeles, Homestead, Cambodia, theSinai and countless other areas andmissions.

We have accommodated the phys-ical requirements of change —reshaping while operating all overthe world. But more importantly,we have not relinquished the keyintellectual initiative to the forces ofchange that confront us. FM 100-5has provided the substance and pro-

cess to examine the world in whichwe will live and successfully accom-plish the missions that the futurewill bring.

Our intellectual focus has createdopportunities to innovate and adaptthrough simulators, simulationsand application of off-the-shelf tech-nology in every aspect of our dailyoperations and future preparations.Louisiana Maneuvers has producedintellectual ferment at the cuttingedge of war and warfare — focusingand controlling change to benefitthe Army in every facet of its opera-tions — from the Department to thefoxhole. Battle Labs have openednew paths to efficiency in the Con-cept Based Requirements System —integrating the combat developers

from the Army and industry just astechnology integrates the battle-field.

Our modernization strategyfocuses our limited resources to linkthe most promising and neededtechnologies with our highly skilledand intelligent human talent to cre-ate weapons systems that can domi-nate any potential adversary. Thepower of the microprocessor hastouched the way each of us accom-plishes our tasks — from the com-bat-arms soldier maneuvering withalacrity and precision and deliver-ing lethal fires; to the logisticiantracking needed supplies; to themedical officer providing remote,global consultation; to the Armycivilian conducting analysis in thelab.

We have made remarkablestrides in using the power of infor-mation technology to structure ourdecisions about the future — whileremaining trained and ready today.I am convinced that we are on theright track — and just as impor-tantly, that we are neither too farout in front, nor lagging behind.

Throughout all this activity, itwould be easy to lose sight of thehuman element in our mission. TheArmy, more than any other service,remains a people-based institution.As Creighton Abrams said, “Peoplearen’t in the Army, people are theArmy.” Decisive land combat powerrequires the best young Americanmen and women that this greatnation can provide, because onlytalented people with intelligencecan man and maintain our equip-ment. Only people of strength andstamina can endure the sacrifice.And only soldiers of character canaccomplish the complicated anddangerous missions we anticipatefor the future.

As I have traveled around ourglobal-focused Army, I have seen —in the eyes and the actions of oursoldiers — the qualities that pro-duce victory. The soldiers from FortPolk headed back to Kuwait a sec-ond time for Intrinsic Action —before moving to Fort Hood, the

October 1993 9

“While our historygives us continuity ofpurpose, the world welive in today requiresa different Army thanany of us have everknown. We are well onthe way to transform-ing our Army into thepower-projection, cri-sis-response force thatAmerica needs.”

understanding of service and sacri-fice. The young infantryman inPanama — a veteran of Just Causeand Desert Storm in the 82nd and arecipient of the Combat Infantry-man Badge — who understandstraining so well that he is compet-ing for the Expert InfantrymanBadge. The medical specialist inFlorida, Croatia, Somalia — whocares for his fellow man and livesboth the Army and the Hippocraticoath. The helicopter pilot in Soma-lia, Desert Storm, Wiesbaden, BaleDogle — she knows that Americaninterests demand the best. TheGuardsmen and Reservists in Cen-tral America — who take the role ofcitizen soldier so professionally, andinstill in other nations the princi-ples of duty, honor and country. Thebrand new PFC on the range atGraf, “It means more responsibility,sir.” The young WO 1 at Fort Ruck-er, “It’s been all I expected and

more.” The member of the OPFORat Hohenfels who replies to “Who’sin charge?,” with, “I am, sir!”

I see this spirit and dedication toexcellence everywhere I go. Thesesoldiers are not wringing theirhands. They are rolling up theirsleeves.

The continuous maturation ofthe force — new methods, think-ing, techniques and capabilitiesmerged with the timeless andessential principles of humanendeavor and organization — pro-duces an Army that is constantlygrowing. America’s Army growsevery day in sophistication, incapability, in versatility and preci-sion. That it does so is a tribute toour soldiers, their families, ourjunior leaders and to our civiliancomponent. It is also a tribute toour senior leadership.

Today and tomorrow there willbe much to do, and I need your con-

stant support — your counsel andyour service. I do not know precise-ly what the future will bring, andthere are many reasons to be pes-simistic, but I am confident thatthe outcome will never be in doubt.America’s Army will continue to bea trained and ready force of allcomponents, serving the nation athome and abroad in a wide rangeof missions. America’s Army,reshaping for the future, is andwill be a strategic force, providingdecisive land combat power as theessential ingredient required fordecisive victory.

Gen. Gordon R. Sul-livan is currently theChief of Staff of theU.S. Army.

10 Special Warfare

Since the end of the Persian GulfWar, the Air Force has made manychanges. It’s not the same old “TAC,SAC and MAC” Air Force. Nowthere are new major commandswith broader responsibilities.

These changes were made withthe customer in mind, whether thatcustomer is the national commandauthority or a Special Forces A-detachment. New commands meannew relationships and new ways ofdoing business, and an understand-ing of the new relationships willhelp users to strengthen their part-nership with airpower.

Vital to developing that partner-ship are the liaison personnel theAir Force places with its many cus-tomers. The primary objective ofliaison work is team building.Liaisons assist their host comman-ders in organizing interserviceteams which are the building blocksof joint operational effectiveness. Tobuild winning interservice teams,leaders keep their troops in fre-quent contact with their service

counterparts through a variety ofoperational, staff and educationalforums. This contact developsmutual understanding of each oth-ers’ capabilities and operationalrequirements and highlights thosethings we have in common. Thesecommon areas form the interserviceagenda and determine where liai-son personnel will focus theirefforts.

The many Air Force people wholink airpower to customers providespecialized expertise and training tohelp customers use airpower effec-tively. These include air liaison offi-cers, theater airlift liaison officers,special-operations liaison officers,staff weather officers, enlisted ter-minal air controllers, combat-con-trol teams, pararescue, and a vari-ety of exchange officers in opera-tional, staff and logistics positions.Even though they come from differ-ent technical and operational back-grounds, they all have something incommon — they link airpower tothe customer.

These liaisons also link their par-ent Air Force organizations to theirhost units. Each Air Force majorcommand participates in or hosts anational forum for scheduling airassets. Liaison elements assist theirhosts in acquiring these air assetsfor training by helping them pre-pare for these scheduling forums.

DefinitionSimply stated, airpower is the use

of aircraft to accomplish a mission.It comes in many forms: an uncon-ventional aircraft delivering a medi-cal team to a village in an underde-veloped country, a stealth fighterstriking targets deep in Iraq, or anAWACS conducting surveillanceover Bosnia.

In planning the use of airpower,it helps to understand its character-istics. Traditionally, these havebeen speed, range and flexibility,but our experience in the Gulf Waralso highlighted the evolving char-acteristics of stealth and precision.Customers should plan their use of

October 1993 11

The Customer Guide to Airpower

by Lt. Col. Richard Schaller

12 Special Warfare

airpower to take advantage of allthese characteristics.

‘Absolute’ airpowerAlso helpful in understanding air-

power is the distinction between“absolute” and “relative” airpower.The Air Force motto, “Global Reach,Global Power,” symbolizes its statusas an absolute airpower organiza-tion. Organized, trained andequipped to conduct air operationsin direct support of national-securi-ty objectives, it can reach any placeon earth rapidly and deliver combatpower with stealth and precision.But even though its capabilities aredesigned to exploit the leading edgeof technology and meet the needs ofthe national command authority,they may not always be best-suitedfor each of its service counterparts.

Relative airpower organizationshave capabilities tailored to meetthe needs of their parent services.Army aviation is an example of arelative airpower organizationwhose abundant capabilities areoptimized for combined operationswith Army units.

Recently, Sen. Sam Nunn’s con-

cern that we are one nation withfour Air Forces (Army, Navy, AirForce, Marines) seemed to indicateredundancy in airpower. In fact,there is only one absolute Air Force,complemented by three relative air-power organizations who, with theircomprehensive capabilities, are tai-lored to provide their parent ser-vices with organic air support. Theredundancy which does exist is theoverlap necessary to bind the ser-vices in a mutually-supportive,interoperable and cohesive forceready to achieve any national-secu-rity objective.

Three commandsTo practice its absolute airpower,

the Air Force is now organized intothree commands, the Air CombatCommand, the Air Mobility Com-mand and the Air Force SpecialOperations Command.

The Air Combat Command isheadquartered at Langley Air ForceBase, Va. It includes all fighter,bomber and battle-management air-craft, such as AWACS and JSTARS,stateside. The Pacific Air Forcesand U.S. Air Forces-Europe are the-

ater components.ACC also includes some tanker

and airlift aircraft and the Air Res-cue Service. ACC hosts a jointaction steering committee, or JASC,which includes general-officer par-ticipation by ACC, the Army’sTraining and Doctrine Command,the Navy’s Atlantic Fleet and theMarine Corps Combat DevelopmentCenter.

The JASC identifies its interser-vice agenda by focusing on opera-tional areas of common interest.Agenda items are then coordinatedthrough an interservice staff agencywith Army, Navy, Marine and AirForce representatives called the AirLand Sea Applications Center. TheALSA Center is directed alternatelyby an Army or Air Force colonelwho synchronizes ACC, TRADOC,LANTFLT, and MCCDC staffactions supportive of the JASC’sinterservice agenda. The results aremulti-service procedures publishedin a variety of multi-service pam-phlets and taught formally to stu-dents from all services at the USAFAir Ground Operations School atHurlburt Field, Fla.

The school teaches a variety ofjoint-battle-management and fire-control courses and includes aneight-member Army staff elementto ensure that the curriculum isresponsive to Army capabilities andrequirements. It is the formalschool for USAF tactical air controlparties who place these proceduresinto practice at their host Armyunits. From JASC to the tactical aircontrol parties, there is customerinput at every level in developingthe air-land-sea team.

The Air Mobility Command isheadquartered at Scott AFB, Ill.This command combines airlift andtanker aircraft with global com-mand-and-control and logisticsinfrastructures to satisfy the mobili-ty needs of all customers. AMC alsohosts a JASC with TRADOC partic-ipation to ensure customer input atthe executive level. The AdvancedConcepts and Requirements Agencyis the interservice staff agency

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Customer Guide to Airpower

responsible for coordinating AMCand TRADOC staff actions to sup-port the agenda established by theJASC. The ACRA also staffs andpublishes multi-service proceduresfor air mobility.

These procedures and the JointDeployment System are taught atthe USAF Air Mobility School, alsoat Scott AFB. Procedures are putinto practice at the unit level by themany airlift-control squadrons resi-dent to Air Force wings and the the-ater airlift liaison officers residentwith customers.

The AMC commander also spon-sors the Airlift Affiliation Program,open to all customers of air mobili-ty. The affiliation program linkscustomers directly to their local air-lift-control squadrons, who provideroutine support and the Airlift LoadPlanners Course. This course teach-es customers the practical aspectsof air mobility planning, prepara-tion and procedures. TALOs residewith their host units and assist inplanning and executing airborneoperations.

The Air Force Special OperationsCommand is headquartered atHurlburt Field, Fla. It includesMC-130, HC-130, AC-130, MH-53and MH-60 aircraft. It is the aircomponent of the U.S. SpecialOperations Command and respondsdirectly to the USSOCOM comman-der’s direction and guidance. A liai-son-officer exchange program syn-chronizes interservice staff actionsand communications between

AFSOC and its service counterpart,the U.S. Army Special OperationsCommand.

The AFSOC commander sponsorsa special-operations affiliation pro-gram which enables Army and AirForce commanders at the wing andgroup level to develop and maintainroutine and frequent contact toremain current on each others’capabilities and requirements. The1st Special Operations Wing, or 1SOW, also at Hurlburt Field, hostsa joint training element whichincludes four Special Forces soldiersand a Navy SEAL master chiefpetty officer who coordinate train-ing for visiting members of theirservices with the 1 SOW.

The USAF Special OperationsSchool at Hurlburt instructs stu-dents from all services on the histo-ry, capabilities and requirements ofAir Force special operations.Together, these organizations devel-op and maintain the interservicerelations critical to the unconven-tional air-land-sea team.

National security is accomplishedthrough teamwork. In building theinterservice team, the Air Force hasdesignated liaison personnel as air-power advocates who provide theirhosts with skills for training, coor-dinating, planning and mission exe-cution. To use airpower effectively,customers should know its charac-teristics and be able to blend abso-lute and relative airpower for mis-sion effectiveness.

Liaisons ensure that service coun-

terparts communicate and remaincurrent on each other’s capabilitiesand requirements and are valuablein solving airpower problems. Inter-service mechanisms, including ele-ments at executive, staff, school andoperational levels, drive joint doc-trine development and implementair-land-sea operations. These ele-ments develop the interservicebuilding blocks of jointness. Theyare team-building functions andensure that its customers and part-ners in national security willalways benefit from the Air Force’svision of “Global Reach, GlobalPower.”

Lt. Col. RichardSchaller is currentlychief of the SpecialOperations Division ofthe U.S. Air ForceSpecial OperationsSchool at HurlburtField, Fla. His previous assignmentsinclude service as liaison to theArmy Special Operations Commandand instructor at the JFK SpecialWarfare Center and School, and ascommander of Detachment 6, Spe-cial Operations Combat Opera-tions Staff, at Pope AFB, N.C. Heis a command pilot with more than4,500 hours experience including C-141s, CASA 212s and DC-3s. Heholds a bachelor’s degree from theAir Force Academy and a master’sdegree from Webster University.

October 1993 13

Detachment 101 of the Office ofStrategic Services was the first unitin U.S. military history createdspecifically for the purpose of con-ducting unconventional warfareoperations behind enemy lines. Itwas formed on April 14, 1942 toperform espionage, sabotage, guer-rilla warfare, propaganda, andescape and evasion operations insupport of U.S. military objectivesin China.

The strategic situation developingin the Far East at the beginning ofWorld War II seemed to indicatethat unconventional-warfare opera-tions could be very useful in Chinaor Burma. The war in the Far Eastbegan in 1931, when Japan invadedand annexed Manchuria. In 1937the Japanese navy gained commandof the sea approaches to China bycontrolling the coastline, and theJapanese army occupied China’skey port cities. Chiang Kai-shek’s

Nationalist government fled fromthe Japanese invaders to Chungk-ing, deep in the interior of China.

Having lost his ports and accessto the sea, Chiang needed a supplyroute to the rest of the world, so heordered a road built from Kunming,China, to Lashio in Burma. The681-mile road was built by tens ofthousands of Chinese laborers in ayear and a half and was opened totraffic in mid-1939. Supplies forChiang’s government and troopswere shipped by sea to Rangoon, byrail to Lashio, and then by road toKunming. It was called the BurmaRoad, and it was NationalistChina’s main source of supply fromthe outside world for two and a halfyears — from mid-1939 to early1942.

When the Japanese attackedPearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941, theirstrategic objective was to knock outthe U.S. Navy so that it could notinterfere with Japan’s plans to con-quer Asia. From bases in FrenchIndochina and Thailand the

Japanese knifed down the MalayPeninsula to defeat the British inSingapore, took the Philippinesaway from the Americans, and cap-tured the oil-rich Dutch East Indies.They did this with bewilderingspeed.

Japanese aircraft first bombedRangoon, Burma, on Dec. 23, 1941.Three weeks later two Japanesearmy divisions invaded southernBurma from Thailand. It was obvi-ous to President Franklin D. Roo-sevelt and his top military advisersthat the Japanese would soon cutthe Burma Road. The need to keepChina in the war became a majorstrategic objective of the UnitedStates. Chiang Kai-shek had 346divisions, totaling almost 4 millionmen, which were poorly supplied,inadequately trained and badly led,but they tied down a large numberof Japanese divisions. Despite otherpriorities, the United States woulddo what it could to supply National-ist China and keep it in the war.

In January 1942, while the

14 Special Warfare

The Activities of Detachment 101 of the OSS

by James R. Ward

Copyright 1991 James R. Ward.Used with permission.

Japanese were moving into Burma,Gen. George Marshall appointedMaj. Gen. Joseph Stilwell to be com-mander of all U.S. forces in theChina-Burma-India theater as wellas chief of staff of Allied forces inChina under Chiang Kai-shek. Stil-well had spent 13 years of his Armycareer in China and spoke fluentMandarin.

Stilwell faced many problems. Hewas about to get his third star, buthe had no American ground combatforces under his command, andthere was no likelihood that hewould get any American units for atleast another year. The U.S. PacificFleet was badly damaged at PearlHarbor, the Japanese navy hadcomplete command of the westernPacific, and the Japanese army wasin the process of conquering andoccupying all of the Far Easterncountries rimming the PacificOcean. Also, the European andPacific theaters had higher priori-ties than the China-Burma-Indiatheater. The only ground forces Stil-well would have under his com-mand for the next year or twowould be Chinese, but the Japanesewere moving fast to close theBurma Road, the only supply lineStilwell had for those Chinesetroops.

So in those dark days of late Jan-uary 1942, when Stilwell received astaff study proposing that a smalldetachment of American officersand men be sent to his command toconduct intelligence and unconven-tional-warfare operations behindJapanese lines in China or Burma,he accepted it. The study had beensent to Stilwell by Col. PrestonGoodfellow of the Coordinator ofInformation, later to become theOSS.

Stilwell welcomed the proposalthat Detachment 101 be created,but he refused to accept the Armyofficer initially proposed as its com-mander. Stilwell said the unitwould need a leader who would notbe deterred by the difficulty of themission. When Goodfellow askedStilwell to recommend someone,

Stilwell proposed Carl Eifler, whohad previously served as a lieu-tenant in a reserve unit Stilwellonce commanded. Eifler had beencalled to active duty and was serv-ing as an infantry captain inHawaii. In mid-February 1942,even before Stilwell arrived inChina to take over his new com-mand, Capt. Eifler was recruited asthe first member and commandingofficer of Detachment 101.

Eifler was a good choice. His firsttask was to cut through the redtape and bureaucratic delays thathad to be cleared for the originalcontingent of Detachment 101 to beselected, recruited, trained,equipped and transported halfwayaround the world to the China-Burma-India theater. Eifler neededto find good men with a variety ofmilitary skills at a time whenAmerica’s military forces wereexpanding faster than ever before,when everyone with any militaryskills whatsoever was in greatdemand.

Detachment 101 needed men withknowledge of the languages and cul-tures of the Far East, and skills inlogistics, military science and tac-

tics, engineering, communications,medicine, photography, explosives,parachuting and flying airplanes.

Eifler was given authority to pickanyone he wanted for his new unit.First, he selected Capt. JohnCoughlin, a West Point graduate, tobe his deputy. Coughlin, in turn,recruited Capt. William R. Peers.Within a few months, these threemen selected, recruited, trained andequipped the original contingent ofDetachment 101 personnel.

It took the Japanese slightly morethan three months to capture all ofBurma, a country about the size ofTexas. The Japanese had excellentintelligence on the strong and weakpoints of the British defenses inBurma. They bypassed the strongpoints and broke through the weakpoints with quick thrusts. TheJapanese army was effective in theuse of jungle-warfare tactics. Theyused deep-penetration strike forcesto set up roadblocks and ambushthe British troops behind their ownlines. The British forces were road-bound. They became demoralizedand incapable of stopping theJapanese.

Months before the war began,

October 1993 15

Maj. Gen. Joseph Stilwell (center), commander of U.S. forces in the China-Burma-India theater, approved the creation of Det 101 in 1942.

Photo courtesy Special Warfare Museum

Japan had recruited and exfiltrated30 young Burmese, mostly studentsfrom Rangoon University, who werevery eager to rid the country ofBritish colonialism. When theseyoung men returned, they led theJapanese armed forces into Burma,conducted subversive tactics amongthe Burmese people, and providedthe Japanese with intelligence. Theeffectiveness of these “30 Com-rades” on behalf of the Japaneselater made it very difficult for OSSagents to operate in territory occu-pied by ethnic Burmese.

When Rangoon fell on March 8,1942, the Burma Road was closed.Two more Japanese divisions werelanded in Rangoon. Stilwell flewinto Burma to command the twoChinese divisions that had beencommitted in support of the British.The Chinese forces were no moreeffective in stopping the Japanesethan the British forces had been,but the better-trained of the twoChinese divisions performed rea-sonably well before it ran out ofsupplies, proving Stilwell’s con-tention that the Chinese could fightwell if properly trained, led andequipped. By May 5, all of Burma

was in Japanese hands except thetiny British outpost of Fort Hertz atPutao, close to the northern tip ofBurma where the frontiers of Tibet,India and China almost converge.

Stilwell refused to fly to safety.He walked out of Burma to India,where he announced to the worldthat he had taken a hell of a beat-ing and was humiliated by it, butthat he wanted to return and retakeBurma.

While Stilwell was in Burmaretreating with his Chinese divi-sions, Detachment 101 was beingformed. It was activated in mid-April 1942. Less than three monthslater, Eifler, Coughlin, Peers andthe first group of 21 members ofDetachment 101 were at the China-Burma-India Headquarters in NewDelhi, India.

When Stilwell arrived, he metwith all the officers and men ofDetachment 101. He urged them toset up a base in northern India andbegin operations into Burma assoon as possible. He said he wantedthe officers and men of Detachment101 to learn to survive and live inthe jungles, and to consider them-selves as pioneers in blazing the

way back into Burma. Stilwellwanted information, and he alsowanted sabotage operations aimedat reducing the effectiveness of theJapanese air base in Myitkyina.Japanese aircraft flying out of theMyitkyina air base were shootingdown U.S. planes flying with sup-plies for China over “the Hump,”the Himalayan mountain rangebetween Burma and China. Stilwellordered Detachment 101 to blow uproad and railroad bridges leading toMyitkyina from the south. He saidhe wanted “to hear lots of boomscoming out of Burma.” In addition,he asked Detachment 101 to main-tain liaison with the British so thatthe colonial government would haveno complaint about Detachment101’s activities.

The remainder of 1942 was devot-ed to setting up Detachment 101’sbase and training camps at Nazirain northern Assam; establishingcommunications with Washington;recruiting and training Burmesenationals to serve as intelligenceagents, radio operators and sabo-teurs; and devising and makinglightweight portable radios thatcould transmit messages overmountains from positions in Burma500 miles away. The British werecooperative in making availablepotential agents found among theBurmese nationals in the IndianArmy. Other potential agents werefound in refugee camps.

It was obvious from the beginningthat Caucasian Americans could notpass themselves off as natives ofBurma. Detachment 101 did notdrop operational groups, or OGs, ofAmericans by parachute for recon-naissance, sabotage or other specificoperational purposes deep behindenemy lines in Burma as the OSSdid in Europe.

Later in the war, Detachment 101did deploy American OG units onreconnaissance operations along theArakan Coast of Burma in supportof British 14th Army operations.Detachment 101’s Maritime Unitwas also used in coastal reconnais-sance operations searching for

16 Special Warfare

Capt. William R. Peers (short sleeves) escorts Maj. Gen. William Donovan ona tour of Det 101 headquarters in Burma.

Photo courtesy Special Warfare Museum

potential agent and troop-landingareas, as well as probing for under-water minefields and Japanesebeach defenses. For the most part,however, the military mission inBurma entailed training, deployingand supporting native agents inintelligence-collection operationsand in organizing, supporting andleading native guerrilla forces incombat to maximize the potentialmilitary effectiveness of thesenative forces against the Japanese.

The sign at the entrance toDetachment 101’s base camp in

northern Assam stated that it was“The U.S. Army Experimental Sta-tion.” That excellent cover namewas sufficiently innocuous to leadsome of the local people to concludethat it was a research facility forthe study of tropical diseases, a factwhich deterred the curious fromprying into what was going on atthe base camp. It was also anappropriate name because much ofwhat Detachment 101 did initiallywas experimental. Its memberslearned their lessons through trialand error and on-the-job training. A

great deal was learned about sur-viving and fighting in the junglesfrom natives, especially the Kachinhill tribesmen, some of whom camefrom such remote and primitivemountainous areas that they hadnever seen a wheel until they firstsaw them on airplanes.

At the end of 1942, when Detach-ment 101 attempted its first infil-tration operation, there were sixJapanese divisions scatteredthroughout Burma. The mission ofthe first infiltration unit, known asA-Group, an eight-man team com-posed of Burmese natives and twoBurma-domiciled Englishmen, wasto attack and sabotage the roadsand railroad used for bringing sup-plies from the south into Myitkyina,where the Japanese 18th Divisionheadquarters was based.

Detachment 101 had not yetacquired an air-drop capability, sothe initial plan called for A-Groupto infiltrate overland from FortHertz, where British officers com-manded a battalion of mountaintribesmen called the NorthernKachin Levies. It soon becameapparent that the terrain was soformidable and dangerous and thedistance to the target area — 250miles — was so far that they couldnot complete the mission and returnto Fort Hertz before the monsoonbegan in May.

They decided to abort the over-land mission and infiltrate byparachute. A deal was made withthe Air Transport Command, whichwas losing pilots and planes on theHump run. The ATC would furnishthe planes, parachutes andparachute-instructor personnel, andDetachment 101 would develop anair-crew-rescue program and helptrain air crews in jungle-survivalskills.

With the help of the ATC, A-Group was parachuted into theKaukkwee Valley, where theyestablished a base camp. They senttheir first message to 101 Head-quarters in India, and then headedover the mountains to the railroad.On the first night after reaching the

October 1993 17

railroad, they split into two teamsand blew the railroad in 30 placesusing variable time-delay fuses. Onthe second night, one of the teamsblew up a railroad bridge, droppingtwo spans of the bridge into a river.

At the same time in January 1943,an American major was leading ateam down from Fort Hertz to Ngum-la, north of Myitkyina, to establishan intelligence base and train guer-rilla forces to conduct sabotage andharassment operations. Detachment101 was finally in business.

These early operations were rela-tively insignificant compared withwhat Detachment 101 was toaccomplish later, but they were thebeginning. A great deal was learnedfrom those early missions aboutinfiltration techniques into Burmaand supporting men in the field byair.

By the end of 1943, Detachment101 had six intelligence bases thatwere staffed by Americans operat-ing in northern Burma. Each ofthese bases ran intelligence-collec-tion operations and had Kachinguerrilla forces that were able todefend the approaches to the basesand conduct sabotage and harass-ment operations. In addition, evendeeper behind Japanese lines, 101had agent/radio operator teamsscattered along the main trans-portation arteries leading to North-ern Burma. All of these communi-cated by radio with the main basein Nazira, India.

In late 1943, a 40-foot speedboatarrived to facilitate sea infiltrationoperations along the Burma coast.While planning other uses for thisboat, Eifler was informed that anAmerican B-24 had been shot downand crash-landed in the Bay of Ben-gal west of Rangoon. Eifler immedi-ately led the crew of his new boat450 miles deep into enemy watersin a successful rescue of the B-24’snine-man crew. Shortly after this,Eifler was badly injured during asea-infiltration operation in whichhe brought two rubber rafts backfrom the beach to the launch boatwaiting 600 yards out.

When Maj. Gen. William Dono-van, head of the OSS, visited 101Headquarters in December 1943, heplaced Peers in command of Detach-ment 101, put Coughlin in charge ofOSS strategic operations in theChina-Burma-India theater, andtransferred Eifler back to the Unit-ed States to brief authorities inWashington and for reassignmentto other duties.

Detachment 101 continued toexpand slowly but steadily until thebeginning of 1944, when Stilwelltold Peers he wanted Detachment101 to expand its guerrilla forcesrapidly to 3,000 men. Stilwell want-ed 101 to assist Merrill’s Maraudersand the Chinese troops in theirdrive down the Hukawng Valley. Hesaid that if the guerrillas were real-ly effective, 101 would be autho-rized to expand its guerrilla forcesto 10,000 men.

Stilwell then provided Detach-ment 101 with eight additional offi-cers, some arms and ammunition,and six aircraft from the Troop Car-rier Command for air-supply pur-poses. More of everything, includingpersonnel, was also ordered fromOSS headquarters in the United

States. During 1944 and early 1945,Detachment 101 greatly expandedits guerrilla force to a peak of about10,800 in March 1945.

Detachment 101 was fortunate.Its members had more than a yearto build an intelligence base beforethey were required to conduct guer-rilla warfare. That was a tremen-dous advantage, because with thisintelligence base they always knewmore about the enemy than theenemy did about them. WhenDetachment 101 did commit itsguerrilla units, it was initially insupport of conventional militaryforces, Merrill’s Marauders, theMars Task Force, and the Chineseand British troops. Detachment 101provided them with intelligence, attimes scouted for them on themarch, patrolled their flanks andoccasionally served to screen theirmovements so that the Japanesewould think that only a guerrillaforce was on the move in their area.

Guerrillas generally controlled thejungles on the flanks and to the frontof these conventional forces so thatthe Japanese were confined to themain north-and-south corridors —the roads, the railroad and the

18 Special Warfare

Photo courtesy Special Warfare Museum

1st Lt. Wallace Welch of Det 101 and a group of Kachins plan an ambushoperation in northern Burma early in 1945.

Irrawaddy River — where conven-tional forces and the 10th Air Forcecould attack them. Detachment 101harassed the Japanese supply linesand rear bases, thereby forcing themto devote more of their combat forcesto cover their flanks and rear.

For the most part, Detachment101 guerrilla forces that fought inclose support of allied military unitswere organized in formations nolarger than the size of a company.They were generally deployed wide-ly in small groups conducting recon-naissance, ambushes and hit-and-run harassment operations. Theywere highly mobile, supplied almostentirely by air, and tended to relymore on dispersion than entrenchedpositions for defense. They weremore effective when close to thefighting forces than when deployeddeep behind Japanese army lines,because the continuing pressure ofour conventional forces on theJapanese prevented the latter fromdisengaging and attacking the guer-rilla forces with enough strength tocut them off and destroy them.

Detachment 101 guerrilla forcesoperating in northern Burma westof the main north-south road, riverand rail corridors, however, werenot close to the main fighting forces,and they had to fight independentlyagainst the more widely dispersedJapanese army units near theChina border.

These guerrilla forces consisted ofbattalion-size formations that hadthe mission of clearing theJapanese from their tactical area.They often engaged Japanese armyunits in sustained offensive anddefensive combat. Their success inclearing their tactical areas evenafter they had moved south of theKachin Hills into the Shan stateswhere the native population wasnot initially friendly convincedhigher authorities later in the warthat Detachment 101 could broadenits mission.

The war in northern Burma wasfought in three phases. The firstphase began in November 1943 andended in late August 1944 with the

capture of Myitkyina and the secur-ing of flights over the Hump toChina from disruption by theJapanese air force. The secondphase ended with the capture ofLashio, Maymyo and Mandalay inMarch 1945. The third phase endedin July 1945 with all of the oldBurma Road from Rangoon toLashio and Xunming back underAllied control.

During the first two phases,Detachment 101 played an impor-tant role both as a supplier of intel-ligence and as a guerrilla force insupport of American and Allied con-ventional military forces. Duringthe third phase, however, Detach-ment 101 was assigned the conven-tional military mission of clearingthe enemy from an area of about10,000 square miles in the Shanstates in order to secure the BurmaRoad. For its success in accomplish-ing that mission, Detachment 101was awarded the Presidential Dis-tinguished Unit Citation.

Although it won the citation forits success in completing a conven-tional military mission, Detachment101 had been created to performunconventional tasks such as espi-onage, sabotage, guerrilla warfare,propaganda and escape-and-evasionmissions.

In the performance of its espi-onage task, Detachment 101 provid-ed 75 percent of all the intelligencefrom which the 10th Air Force choseits targets and 85 percent of all theintelligence received by Stilwell’sNorthern Combat Area Command.In addition to a number of Ameri-can-staffed intelligence bases estab-lished in Burma, Detachment 101infiltrated 162 native agent/radioteams into Burma by air, by sea orover land.

Detachment 101 sabotage agentsand guerrillas demolished 57bridges, derailed nine trains,destroyed or captured 272 trucks orother vehicles and destroyed 15,000tons of Japanese supplies. These

October 1993 19

Photo courtesy Special Warfare Museum

The author (left) as amember of Detachment101 in Burma.

sabotage operations also had theeffect of forcing the Japanese todeploy additional troops to protecttheir rear-echelon bases and lines ofcommunication.

Detachment 101’s greatest effec-tiveness was in the field of guerrillawarfare. The unit’s members pio-neered the use of air and radio com-munications to support and coordi-nate guerrilla-warfare activities.They recruited, organized, trained,equipped and led more than 10,800guerrillas in effective support ofconventional military operations.Detachment 101’s guerrilla forceskilled 5,428 members of theJapanese army, wounded an esti-mated 10,000 and captured 78Japanese prisoners. Their own loss-es were 27 Americans, 338 nativeguerrillas and 40 espionage agentskilled.

Reports on the success of theescape-and-evasion operations varyfrom a total of 232 to 425 allied air-men rescued. The Detachment builttrails and cache sites along theHump run, and the higher figuremay include those who parachutedto the ground and used these trailsand cache sites to escape. It may

also include airmen who werebrought to safety by Kachins whowere influenced to help by 101 butwere not directly under the controlof Detachment 101 personnel. Thelower figure, 232, was taken fromthe Northern Combat Area Com-mand’s historical account of thenorthern and central Burma cam-paigns, and it does not includethose who may have been rescuedduring the last four months of thewar in Burma.

The success of the propagandaand psychological-warfare effortswas difficult to measure. It wasimpossible to judge how effectiveDetachment 101’s efforts were indemoralizing the Japanese army inBurma. The members knew fromintelligence reports that Allied mil-itary victories had a very demoral-izing effect upon the Japanesearmy, but the unit was not success-ful in persuading individualJapanese soldiers to surrenderthrough its propaganda.

It was also difficult to determinethe value of propaganda in helpingto win the loyalty of the Kachinsand even some of the Shans. It waseven more difficult to evaluate the

impact of propaganda on theBurmese people, but when the “30Comrades,” the Burmese national-ists who aided the Japanese entryinto Burma, decided to switch theirallegiance to the Allies because theywere disillusioned with Japan’sempty promises of independence,Detachment 101 helped them to doso. A Detachment 101 agent called“Mac” led a representative of Gen.Aung San, a man named Thakin PeTint, to a secret airstrip built by theOSS specifically for the purpose ofexfiltrating him. He was flown toBritish 14th Army headquarters,where General Slim made arrange-ments for the Burma NationalArmy to switch sides on March 26,1945. But that was more of a secretpolitical coup engineered by theBritish with Detachment 101’s helpthan a propaganda achievement.

Detachment 101 was fortunatefor many reasons. Its members hadtime to experiment, to learnthrough trial and error and to buildan intelligence base before havingto undertake guerrilla-warfareactivities. By early 1944, they hadbuilt a very efficient support organi-zation, without which they wouldnot have been able to support by airthe guerrilla force they had created.

Detachment 101 was also luckythat the people living in the areasthey first had to infiltrate wereKachins and that the American andIrish missionaries who worked withthem had won their loyalties to theextent that they did. The unit hadnone of the political problems thatwould have plagued it if the mem-bers had to operate in countriessuch as China or Vietnam.

The Kachins were not by natureinclined to engage in conventionalassault and defensive combat, butthey were outstandingly effective inthe use of guerrilla tactics in moun-tainous jungle terrain to surprise,deceive and confuse the Japanese.

Detachment 101 made mistakes,but it also learned a great deal fromthese mistakes and tried not torepeat them. Unfortunately, theDetachment was instructed to keep

20 Special Warfare

Photo courtesy Special Warfare Museum

Kachin forces watch for possible movement of Japanese forces along a trail inBurma.

no records while behind enemy linesbecause of a fear at OSS headquar-ters that such records might beused by the Japanese to justify tor-ture in the event Detachment 101members were captured. As aresult, they wrote no after-actionreports covering their guerrilla-war-fare operations. Such reports wouldhave been invaluable in recordingfor historical purposes the lessonsthey learned through trial anderror.

Detachment 101’s contribution tothe Allied war effort in Burma wasvery valuable, but it cost very little.Only about 120 Americans served inthe field at any one time, directingand supporting a guerrilla forcethat grew to more than 10,000natives. Detachment 101’s casualtyrate was exceptionally low for thenumber of men fielded and thedamage inflicted on the enemy.

The veterans of Detachment 101are unanimously proud of theirunit’s accomplishments, and theyall concur that much of its successwas attributable to the leadershipprovided by Colonels Eifler andPeers. Although very different inpersonality and temperament, theywere both men of extraordinaryintegrity, courage and dedication tothe successful accomplishment ofDetachment 101’s mission. Eachseemed to be the right person at theright time in command of Detach-

ment 101. It was reassuring to themen in the jungles in close proximi-ty to the enemy to know that whenthey needed it, they could count onthe timely delivery of an emergencyammunition drop, a piece of vitalintelligence, an air strike, or medi-cal support and evacuation. Eiflerand Peers made Detachment 101 awell-integrated, efficient team thatresponded effectively to thedemands of the theater commander.

Although OSS Detachment 101clearly functioned under andresponded to the military chain ofcommand in the China-Burma-India theater, its OSS supportstructure provided it with vitallyneeded flexibility that it would nothave had if it had been fully inte-grated into and totally dependenton the U.S. military support struc-ture that existed at that time.Detachment 101 was able to drawmuch of what it needed from themilitary support structure, but itwas also able to rely on its OSSresources when the military wasnot able to support it as swiftly asrequirements demanded.

The OSS contributed to the over-all Allied war effort in World War IIby providing useful tactical andstrategic intelligence and by pro-moting and supporting the resis-tance potential of the people inenemy-occupied territory in theentire spectrum of unconventional

warfare. It is probable, however,that the greatest contribution of theOSS in the long run was to provefor the historical record that theUnited States needed a centralizedintelligence agency and that thearmed forces of the United Stateshave much to gain by developingand retaining a permanent uncon-ventional-warfare capability suchas exists today in the United StatesSpecial Operations Command.

In World War II,James R. Ward wasrecruited from theparachute infantry bythe OSS because of hisproficiency in foreignlanguages. The OSSassigned him to Detachment 101 inBurma, where he commandedKachin and other ethnic guerrillaforces in combat for more than 13months. Later, as a reserve officer,he had active-duty tours with the10th, 7th, 3rd and 6th SpecialForces Groups, which he claimswould have killed him if he were notin good physical shape. Staying inshape since has enabled him to winnational and world triathlon cham-pionships in his age group andbecome, at age 75, the oldest finisherof the Ironman Triathlon in Hawaii.

October 1993 21

U.S. Army special-operationsforces have proven their utility inthe environment called low-intensi-ty conflict. Peacetime engagementstrategy, as suggested by JamesLocher III, former assistant secre-tary of defense for special opera-tions and low-intensity conflict,puts SOF at the forefront of Ameri-ca’s attempt to foster democracyand stability around the globe.

Nowhere is a SOF strategy poten-tially more beneficial than on thecontinent of Africa. Unlike Europeand Asia, Africa is not a majorindustrial power. It does not pro-duce many finished goods for Amer-icans to consume, nor is it a majortrading partner like Germany orJapan. Yet Africa is important tothe United States for reasons ofpragmatic self-interest and onmoral grounds. A SOF strategy inAfrica looking into the next centurycan pay America significant divi-dends at relatively little cost.

The majority of nations in Africawere still under colonial rule in

1950, but decolonization camerapidly after, and by 1967 most ofthe former colonies had achievedindependence. Unfortunately, manyof the new African nations did notpossess even rudimentary govern-mental infrastructures. The compet-ing ideologies of democratic capital-ism and Marxism-Leninism vied forinfluence and in some cases fueleddomestic tribal animosities that canbe seen today.

In some cases, lacking trainedand educated populations, economicand governmental structures, andsaddled with national bordersimposed by former European rulers,African nations found the post-colo-nial period tumultuous. A greatdeal of political discord continues.Much of the African continentremains plagued with populationproblems — over-population insome regions and under-populationin others. Disease is common in thecentral region, predominantly sleep-ing sickness and AIDS, and famineremains a life-threatening problem

for millions, particularly in thenortheast. Radical Islam is current-ly making rulers of the Arabizednorth and east African countriesuncomfortable, and the state ofSouth Africa continues on the roadtoward potential racial warfare.

Despite its enormous problems,Africa remains an important region.According to a Department of Statediscussion paper, for the UnitedStates, Africa represents:• The political forces of the world’s

largest regional bloc;• A rich source of natural

resources;• The ancestral home of 25 million

Americans;• A growing market for American

exports;• An opportunity to demonstrate,

through private enterprise andgovernment-to-government aid,that democratic institutions andindividual initiative provide abetter solution to the problems ofthe Third World than do totali-tarianism and economic regimen-tation; and

• Possibilities for our adversariesto exploit regional tensions andfoster insecurity through theindiscriminate provision of armsand support for violent solutionof local conflicts.1

Pragmatic argumentThere are both pragmatic and

moral reasons for being engaged inAfrica, but for the moment, let usconcentrate on matters of nationalself-interest. The African continentis more than three times the size ofthe United States and possessestremendous natural mineralresources. These mineral resourcesconstitute much of the “grist” uponwhich modern societies depend.Diamonds, oil, chromium and plat-inum are just a few of the mineralresources critical to an industrialand ever-more-technical nationsuch as America. From a purelyself-interested perspective, theUnited States must remain engagedon the continent.

22 Special Warfare

Remaining Engaged in Africa:

An Army SOF Strategy

by Lt. Col. Robert B. Adolph, Jr.

October 1993 23

Africa contains a veritable trea-sure house of the known worldreserves of the following: chromium— 97 percent, cobalt — 69 percent,diamonds — 92 percent, manganese— 59 percent, platinum — 78 per-cent, tantalum — 69 percent, andvanadium — 49 percent. AnnualU.S. mineral needs equal 10 trillionpounds a year — nearly two tons ofmetals for each citizen. Mineralimports account for approximately$25-$30 billion of imports everyyear. The U.S. is more than 50-per-cent dependent for 23 of 40 essen-tial minerals.2

According to Kenneth Kessel’sbook, Strategic Minerals: U.S. Alter-natives, chromium, manganese,cobalt and platinum are strategical-ly essential. Cobalt is essential inthe manufacture of jet engines;steel cannot be made without man-ganese; and chromium makes thecreation of stainless steel possible.“These four have few or no goodsubstitutes, are essential to the pro-duction of important weapons orkey industrial processes, and arelocated primarily in countries ofquestionable supply reliability —southern Africa and the former

USSR.”3

U.S. dependence is such thatCongress passed the Strategic Min-erals Stockpiling Act in 1979. Theact was precipitated by a congres-sional finding that stated: “Domes-tic resources for some materialscannot support military, industrial,and essential civilian needs fornational defense.”4 The act “Pro-vides that strategic and criticalmaterials be stockpiled in the inter-est of national defense to precludecostly and dangerous dependenceupon foreign sources of supply intimes of national emergency.”5

A March 31, 1989, review of thestatus of American stockpilingefforts under the legislationrevealed significant shortages inmany of the minerals plentiful inAfrica. Further growth in technolo-gy-oriented weaponry can be expect-ed, increasing American depen-dence on African mineral resources.According to L. Harold Bullis andJames E. Mielke, “It seems reason-able to require that U.S. foreign pol-icy reflect the importance of main-taining the independence and free-dom of action of major U.S. suppliernations, as well as the importance

of continued U.S. access to keystrategic and critical raw materials,whatever their source.”6

Moral argumentPossibly just as important as the

self-interest motive are the moralimperatives which should drivefuture U.S. interests in Africa.America, like many of Africa’s for-mer colonial rulers, suffers from ahistory pockmarked by racial preju-dice. The American Civil War after1863, with President Lincoln’sEmancipation Proclamation, wasfought over the issue of black slav-ery. The United States is still tryingto attain the goal of a color-blindsociety. Additionally, 25 millionAmericans have ethnic roots inAfrica. As the world’s “moral leader”after the fall of the Soviet Union, canthe United States afford to ignorefuture African economic, governmen-tal and social development?

America also has historical tieswith a number of African nations.Morocco was the first nation to rec-ognize the independence of theUnited States from Great Britainand has maintained a close andmutually beneficial relationshipever since. Liberia was founded byfreed American slaves. Its capital,Monrovia, was named for formerU.S. president James Monroe.Egypt, although not always a friendto America, now receives more U.S.economic and military aid than allother countries except Israel. Egyptwas also a staunch ally in America’srecent war with Iraq. America hasmaintained generally friendly rela-tions with Zaire, as well as othernon-democratic African counties.And Africa’s newest nation, Namib-ia, was founded with the support ofthe U.S. working through the Unit-ed Nations.

America also has an interest inthe growth and perpetuation ofhuman rights. The United Nations“Universal Declaration of HumanRights,” of which the United Statesis not only a signatory, but one ofthe primary authors, reads remark-

Although not a major industrial power, Africa offers to pay significant dividends to U.S. involvement into the next century.

U.S. Army photo

24 Special Warfare

ably like the American Constitu-tion. The Declaration recognizes“the inherent dignity and ... equaland inalienable rights of all mem-bers of the human family... (and) asa last resort, to rebellion againsttyranny and oppression, thathuman rights should be protectedby the rule of law.”7

Americans might do well toremember that without supportfrom France, America might neverhave succeeded in its revolution.Although difficult to imagine now,the 13 colonies could have lost theirwar with the English had not theFrench fleet blockaded British ship-ping and French troops assistedGeneral George Washington. Themost revolutionary words ever putto paper can be found in America’sDeclaration of Independence. Free-dom, justice and the inherent digni-ty of the individual are words thatecho back to us from the BalticStates, Eastern Europe and Asia, aswell as Africa. American support todemocracy in the Third World is amoral imperative.

SOF strategy in AfricaFrom the perspective of this arti-

cle, the larger question may be,“What is the strategic rationale fora SOF presence in Africa?” It isobvious that the continent is stillsuffering from the throes of decolo-nization and the after-effects of theCold War. Ethiopia, Angola andSomalia have been a few of theAfrican pawns in the “great game”between the U.S. and USSR. Mili-tary support provided to Ethiopiaby the USSR turned that countryinto an armed camp and allowed itto prosecute wars in Eritrea and theOgaden.

Some former colonial powers arestill engaged on the continent.According to one source, “Francehas maintained a major militarypresence in Africa ... It has been thecontinent’s second largest supplierof arms, providing some 9 percent ofNorth Africa’s and 30 percent ofsub-Saharan Africa’s require-ments”8 But France is hardly theonly player. Great Britain “crushedmutinies which almost overthrewthe established governments ofKenya, Uganda and Tanzania ... Itmaintains small military trainingteams in a number of Common-wealth African countries”9

The point in mentioning the twocountries above is to demonstratethat other Western nations haveinterests and obligations in Africa,and that there is little Americamight do there that will not involveother actors — possibly in coalitiontoward the attainment of mutualgoals.

The recent success of coalitionforces in Iraq leads to the questionwhether similar coalitions might bepossible in future political and mili-tary activities. SOF, because oftheir language abilities and cross-cultural-communications training,have extraordinary capability whenused in coalition with other nations’forces. In fact, SF detachmentswere attached to Arab battalions inthe Persian Gulf War for just thisreason.

The question of forward-deployedforces is a thorny one in Americanpolitics. Whether or not the U.S.will continue to maintain signifi-cant military forces overseas intothe 21st century remains to bedetermined. But a SOF presence inAfrica, either forward-deployed oron a temporary and intermittentbasis, may be in the long-terminterests of America. It should beclear that ARSOF are generally thebest trained forces available tooperate on the continent of Africa aswell as the remainder of the ThirdWorld.

The kinds of wars that have beenfought across the African continentalso support the use of SOF. Amajority of armed conflicts in Africasince decolonization have beenguerrilla-type wars. These havebeen primarily low-technologyinsurgencies which are the “breadand butter” of SOF. Whether insupport of a fledgling democracy ora democratic insurgent movement,SOF are the best troops available tohelp either achieve their goals.

The new opportunities are signifi-cant. Not the least of these is theopportunity to set an example forAfrican military establishments. Bytheir mere presence in a ThirdWorld environment, large conven-

Person-to-person contacts such as this medical training exercise give U.S.forces the chance to establish rapport with local populations.

U.S. Army photo

October 1993 25

tional American armed forces oftenhave negative effects. One need notlook any farther than the Philip-pines for an example — the popula-tion of the Philippines has oftenbeen politically polarized over theconventional American militarypresence in their land.

Circumstances have changed.That polarization was against thebackdrop of super-power competi-tion. With the fall of the SovietUnion, democracy is the only suc-cessful political paradigm left whichAfrican nations might come to emu-late. According to Edward J.Perkins, the move toward democra-cy in Africa is well under way:

The new Africa is moving awayfrom the view that the state cansolve all ills — toward recognition ofthe important role of the individualand the community in generatingand sustaining growth. Rulers of thenew Africa are coming to realizethat political stability is won byestablishing participatory govern-ments which respect the rights ofindividuals.10

Even with some African demo-cratic movements well under way,SOF, either permanently forward-deployed or on temporary duty, cantrain, advise and assist African mil-itaries without many of the politicalramifications that attend theemployment of large conventionalforces. Additionally, it is oftentimesthe military in Third World nationsthat hold the real keys to power.SOF military-to-military contactcan provide an example for otherdemocratically minded militaryestablishments.

Unlike the American political-military experience with sharp divi-sions between power blocs, it iscommon in Africa for the military toplay a much larger role in domesticpolitics. This circumstance need notnecessarily be bad. An African armywhich has been trained in total, orin part, by American SOF couldeventually come to accept greatercivilian political dominance. This isno easy task, but the example set byAmerica’s military can come to be

the model to emulate.Also, because of the nature of

many African and other ThirdWorld cultures, person-to-personcontact is the most valued and long-lasting. The American notion that aone-time deployment of troops cansolve the security problems of afledgling democracy is absurd. Onlylong-term and consistent Americanpolicies which encourage democracyin foreign militaries and populacescan be expected to bear fruit. SOF’sregional expertise, linguistic abili-ties and maturity make them theobvious choice to maintain many ofthese military-to-military contacts.

Philosophically, it must be accept-ed that the United States maysometimes fail in these attempts.There are no absolute answers andno guarantees of success. Wherehuman beings are concerned, it isdifficult, if not impossible, for Amer-ican policy makers to determine aThird World leader’s commitment todemocratic principles. For bothpragmatic and moral reasons, theattempt should be made; and ascolumnist George Will suggestedconcerning the people of the ThirdWord, “The business of America isjustice and securing the blessings ofliberty.”11

The time for African democracymay be here. According to RobertFatton Jr. in the Political ScienceQuarterly:

Too many times they (Africans)have seen and suffered the conse-quences of broken promises; toomany times they have experienced apolitics of coups and countercoupsthat alters nothing except the facesof embezzlers; too many times theyhave been devoured by causes andleaders they have supported andembraced.12

Democracy, supported by theUnited States, may be manyAfrican nations’ best hope for a sta-ble and just future. There are solidpragmatic and moral reasons forthe United States to remainengaged, and Army special-opera-tions forces have a unique role toplay in helping to bring democratic

freedoms to the African continent inthe next century.

Lt. Col. Robert B.Adolph Jr. is current-ly assigned to theJoint Special Opera-tions Command. Hisprevious assignmentsinclude UnitedNations tours in Cambodia and theMiddle East. A Special Forces offi-cer, he has held command assign-ments in Special Forces and Mili-tary Intelligence units. He holdsmaster’s degrees in internationalaffairs and national security studiesand strategy.

Notes:1 U.S. Department of State, “Sub-Saharan

Africa and the United States” (Washington,D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,December 1985), p. 1.

2 Data extracted from a briefing given bythe U.S. Army Base Engineering Activity,Rock Island, Ill., to the Department of Jointand Combined Operations, U.S. Army Com-mand and General Staff College, March1985, (hereafter called Rock Island Brief).

3 Kenneth A. Kessel, Strategic Minerals:U.S. Alternatives (Washington, D.C.: Nation-al Defense University Press, 1990), p. 21.

4 Rock Island Brief.5 Rock Island Brief.6 L. Harold Bullis and James E. Mielke,

Strategic and Critical Minerals (Boulder,Colo.: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 270-271.

7 “Universal Declaration of HumanRights,” Basic Documents on Human Rights,ed. Ian Brownlie (Oxford: Clarendon Press,1981), pp. 21-22.

8 “Africa South of the Sahara,” EuropePublications Limited, 17th Edition (London:1987), p. 51.

9 Ibid.10 Edward J. Perkins, “The Seedlings of

Hope: U.S. Policy in Africa,” Current Policy,No. 1183, Address before Africare, Washing-ton, D.C., June 11, 1989, U.S. Department ofState (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office), p. 2.

11 George F. Will, “A Land Fit for Heroes,”Newsweek, 11 March 1991, p. 78.

12 Robert Fatton Jr., “Liberal Democracyin Africa,” Political Science Quarterly, Fall1990, p. 470.

As early as 1984, the 10th SpecialForces Group ran pre-sniper train-ing to prepare its soldiers for formalsniper training at the JFK SpecialWarfare Center. This pre-trainingcontinued until 1987, when thecommander of the 1st Special Oper-ations Command directed the 10thGroup to expand and upgrade itsSpecial Operations Target Interdic-tion Course to a Category II snipercourse.

This upgrade accomplished threeobjectives: It allowed the unit totrain its own snipers, easing theload on the Special Warfare Center;it allowed sniper-trained soldiers toretain their highly perishable skills;and it served as an excellentpreparatory course for soldiers whowere accepted at the Special War-fare Center SOTIC.

The 10th Group used SOCOMRegulation 350-1 as the course out-line and paralleled as many of theSpecial Warfare Center’s lessonoutlines as possible. Current differ-ences between the two courses are

minute.The SOTIC committee has also

undergone changes over the lastseveral years. Initially, it was com-posed of soldiers selected from theunit, with little regard to equal rep-resentation from sub-units. Next,the committee was an actual A-detachment. This proved to be a

tremendous overload for the ODA:it was expected to perform both itsteam duties and the necessarySOTIC committee duties.

Taking advantage of previouslessons learned, a third committeewas selected with one sniper-quali-fied soldier from each line companyof the Group’s 2nd and 3rd battal-ions. To retain balanced representa-tion, the officer-in-charge and threeNCOs were taken from the 2nd bat-talion, while the 3rd battalion pro-vided the NCOIC and 3 NCOs.Besides the OIC and NCOIC, theremaining six NCOs hold the posi-tions of S-1, S-2, S-3, S-4, S-5,armorer and range NCO.

The eight-man committee may bedeployed by the commander in anyof three ways: as an eight-man,MOS cross-trained, sniper/counter-sniper detachment; as two four-mansniper teams working with theiroriginal battalions; or as eight indi-viduals returned to their originalODAs or ODBs, since they are car-ried by paragraph and line number

26 Special Warfare

Sniper Training in the 10th Special Forces Group

by CWO 2 Brent A. Delorier

with their units and are special-duty attachments to the headquar-ters service company.

Members of the committee main-tain certification standards in PT,weapons qualification, MOS profi-ciency, language, HALO/SCUBA(if qualified), and professionaldevelopment.

The 10th Group SOTIC commit-tee is fortunate to have its ownrange facility, Curry Range, namedin honor of Capt. Joseph P. Curry,who was killed over Lockerbe, Scot-land, in 1988. Range limits do exist,but they allow for silhouette targetengagement slightly beyond 900yards.

The range consists of five firinglanes from each of the hundred-meter berms. Besides the mainberm, which handles the various-sized bulls-eyes, moving targets andsnap targets, the length of therange is dotted with steel silhou-ettes. The steel targets are 19 1/2inches by 39 inches (E-type), 24inches by 39 inches, or an 8-inchhead exposure only. These variable-sized targets greatly assist studentsin learning to use the Mil-Dot reti-cle of the M-3 Ultra scope, which is

mounted to the M-24 sniper weaponsystem.

The course, five weeks long, islimited to 10 sniper students perclass. At least four instructors arerequired to maintain an acceptablestudent-instructor ratio. Beforeattending the course, each studentmust pass a PT test, qualify expertwith an M-16, have vision cor-rectable to 20/20 and pass a Min-nesota Multifacet PersonalityInventory, an in-depth personalitybattery.

The first day of the course con-sists of an M-16 diagnostic shoot toensure that each student is capableof acquiring 38 of 40 targets. After acourse introduction and brief histo-ry of sniping, the students spendthe entire first week working withthe M-24 iron sights (globe front,micrometer peep rear) on an NRAposition shoot. During this time thestudents are introduced to the finerpoints of ballistics and environmen-tal factors and their relation to ele-vation and windage sight settings.

Once the iron sights have beenmastered, the students move to thetelescopic sight, the M-3 Ultra.They must apply everything they

have learned about elevation andwindage to the scope, while addingin the range-determination capabili-ties of the Mil-Dot scope reticle.Students are initiated to the use ofthe scope with known-distance tar-gets. Grouping exercises are animportant part of this phase, stress-ing five-round, one-minute-of-anglegroups. This means placing five con-secutive rounds inside a one-inchcircle at 100 yards. Students thenmove to acquiring targets atunknown distances.

Camouflage and concealmentplay an important part in thecourse. Each student is required toconstruct his own ghillie suit for thestalking phase. Imagination, origi-nality and practicality are stressedin the construction of the snipersuit. Stalks vary in length, as thestudents attempt to evade detectionby the instructors using 20-powerspotting scopes, while still movingto within 200 meters of designatedtargets. Students also learn toreload their own ammunition toincrease the accuracy of theirassigned sniper systems.

To pass the course, students mustscore at least 70 percent for eachshooting event. The committee’s jobis to produce snipers for their ODAsand their commanders, and 10thGroup SOTIC instructors will spendthe necessary time to retrain stu-dents, giving additional time tothose having difficulties. In the pasttwo courses (since the current com-mittee was assembled), all 20 sniperstudents have completed the course.

The SOTIC committee, in con-junction with the Group headquar-ters, is currently attempting to pro-cure .50-cal. Barrett heavy sniperrifles as well as some foreign sniperrifles. The course currently providesfamiliarization with the M-1D, M-21 and the M-14NM rifles. A desireto incorporate SVD familiarizationis being addressed, pending pro-curement. The committee is alsoplanning to purchase 300 Winch-ester magnum rifles and SIMRADscopes.

The 10th Group SOTIC commit-

October 1993 27

Course facilities provide tower, rooftop parapet and window positions for usein urban training scenarios in the 10th SF Group Sniper Course.

Photo by Brent Delorier

tee is also responsible for five-daysustainment training for each com-pany’s snipers, a five-day validationprogram, and a five-day advancedmarksmanship program for non-snipers. The SOTIC committee iscoordinating with the Battalion S-3s to run four SOTIC classes per fis-cal year in addition to the valida-tion, sustainment and advancedmarksmanship programs.

The 10th Group SOTIC also hasits own repair facility within thecommittee building, where it per-forms match-grade repairs andupgrades. Two members of the com-mittee have attended a one-weekrepair training course offered by acommercial arms manufacturer.The committee hopes to send moreinstructors to the course, as well asto the Match Armorers Course atFort Benning, Ga. By providingaccess to these courses, the Groupwill reap the benefits of in-houserepairs for all its sniper weaponssystems, no matter where they aredeployed.

CWO 2 Brent A.Delorier is currentlythe officer in charge ofthe 10th SF Group’sSpecial OperationsTarget InterdictionCourse. His previousassignments with the 10th SFGroup include serving as a teamleader, detachment technician andintelligence sergeant in the 2nd Bat-talion and serving as a weaponssergeant in the 3rd Battalion. Inaddition to the SF QualificationCourse, he has completed the Spe-cial Operations Target InterdictionCourse and the Defense LanguageInstitute course in German.

28 Special Warfare

Photo by Brent Delorier

A student fires his M-24 sniper rifle from inside the building of the 10thGroup sniper training facility.

Prior to the 1985 DoD MasterPlan, the Army psychological-opera-tions community faced a number ofchallenges which demanded plan-ning, commitment and hard work toovercome.

This account focuses on the peri-od of the author’s command of the4th Psychological OperationsGroup, from November 1979 to May1982. While this is principally apersonal perspective, the period isrepresentative of the conditionsfaced by the PSYOP community inthe early 1980s.

During the height of U.S. involve-ment in Southeast Asia, the Armyhad PSYOP units at Fort Bragg,N.C., in Germany, Panama andOkinawa, in addition to a group inthe Republic of Vietnam. With post-Vietnam reductions, however, bythe mid-1970s the only active

PSYOP unit remaining was the 4thGroup at Fort Bragg.

By the early 1980s, Cold War ten-sions began to intensify. The SovietUnion’s invasion of Afghanistan,the Iranian hostage situation andincreased concerns by the U.S. forits interests in Central America andSouthwest Asia signalled height-ened rivalry between the two super-powers.

In January 1980, the 4th PSYOPGroup conducted a PSYOP capabili-ties assessment in preparation forthe visit of a team from the Office ofthe Secretary of Defense. In fact,during 1980 and 1981, the 4th POGproduced four such assessments forOSD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff andU.S. Army Forces Command. Thetheme of all these assessments wasthe same: As requirements forPSYOP support were increasing,there were no commensurateincreases in the capabilities of thegroup. There was a significantrequirements/capabilities mis-match.

To address the deficienciesrevealed by our initial capabilitiesassessments, we developed ninelong-range goals to guide the activi-ties of the 4th Group. Our first goalwas to enhance understanding andappreciation of PSYOP within theArmy. Improvement in this areahad to occur in order to achieve anyprogress toward our other goals.Too few commanders and staff offi-cers had sufficient knowledge con-cerning the value of the psychologi-cal dimension.

There were three main reasonsfor this lack of awareness. First,PSYOP instruction had virtuallydisappeared from the curricula ofour service schools. Second, fewPSYOP officer slots in headquarterslevels above the 4th Group — the“supporting superstructure” — werefilled by PSYOP-qualified officers.Third, there was a general failure tointegrate PSYOP with operationalplanning.

These three problem areas wereinterrelated. If a senior commanderor staff officer had not been intro-duced to PSYOP through his formalschooling and did not have a compe-tent PSYOP officer on his staff,what motivation did he have tointegrate PSYOP effectively into hisoperational planning? And if he didnot recognize the value of PSYOP tohis unit’s operational readiness,what motivation did he have tofight for adequate resourcing ofPSYOP units?

We addressed this challenge inseveral ways. First, we used ourPSYOP capabilities assessments asthe basis for briefings that we pre-sented to any senior personnel whowould listen. Some of these effortshad favorable outcomes: ThePSYOP assessment prepared forFORSCOM formed the basis for a“PSYOP enhancement action”which the Department of the Armyapproved in 1982.

This same example also demon-strates the difference a qualifiedPSYOP staff officer can make. Untilmid-1981, there had been no full-time PSYOP officer on the DA staff

October 1993 29

PSYOP In The Early 1980s:The Way We Were

by Dr. Alfred H. Paddock Jr.

This article was previously pub-lished in the Fall 1992 issue of Per-spectives, the journal of the Psycho-logical Operations Association.

30 Special Warfare

for several years. With the supportof our higher command, we weresuccessful in convincing the Armydeputy chief of staff for operationsthat this situation was not in thebest interests of the Army. Asked tonominate an officer for this position,we suggested Col. Tom Timmes,who arrived at DCSOPS just intime to play a key role in successful-ly staffing our PSYOP enhancementaction through DA.

We also showcased some of ourresearch products in tailored presen-tations. One study, “The Soviet Psy-chological Operations Threat,” elicit-ed considerable interest as a resultof numerous presentations in theU.S. and for the unified commands.

Finally, both the 4th POG and itsreserve-component PSYOP col-leagues devoted considerable efforttoward educating conventional-unitcommanders and their staffsthrough the process of operationalplanning and participation in exer-cises. The emergence of the CAP-STONE program was particularlyhelpful in this endeavor.

It is important to emphasize theadverse impact that the lack of aPSYOP supporting superstructure

had on the 4th Group. In far toomany cases, if action on doctrine,planning or materiel developmentwas required, the 4th Group had toprovide both the impetus and thepersonnel needed to accomplish thetask. We did so because we wantedto get things done, but it addedtremendously to the strain on ourlimited resources. The lack of aPSYOP supporting superstructureand the absence of PSYOP instruc-tion in service-school curricula werebeyond the 4th Group’s direct abili-ty to control, but we believed theywere glaring long-term deficienciesthat had to be addressed if PSYOPwere to be institutionalized as aviable weapons system.

The second goal, bring the 4thGroup up to comparable strength ofother groups within the JFK Centerfor Military Assistance, addressedour most glaring deficiency — per-sonnel shortages. At the time of ourrecommended PSYOP enhancementaction in mid-1981, the group wasat 73-percent fill. Specialty Code 48(Foreign Area Officer) and 35 (Intel-ligence) represented the group’score of officer skills. We had 41-per-cent fill in SC 35, and 33-percent fill

in SC 48.Within the enlisted grades, the

intelligence MOSs 96B and 96Cprovided the skills essential to ourbusiness. The group was short 73percent of authorized E-6s and E-7sin MOS 96B and assigned only 46percent of authorized E-6s and E-7sin MOS 96C. At the same time,junior-enlisted personnel were over-represented — the group hadassigned 195 percent of authorizedE-3s. Compounding the problemwas the fact that the Army had noenlisted MOS dedicated to PSYOP.

After 2 1/2 years of reportingshortages on monthly readinessreports, completion of severalPSYOP capabilities assessmentsand numerous command lettersdetailing our critical shortages, the4th PSYOP Group’s personnel sta-tus continued to lag behind the Spe-cial Forces groups. Our require-ments vs. capabilities dilemma hadnot been resolved — at least not forthe short term.

On the positive side, however, thefoundation for improvement overthe longer term was laid as a resultof the 1982 PSYOP enhancementaction, which raised the group’s per-sonnel priority, provided it with anadditional 332 spaces, and approvedthe creation of an enlisted MOS forPSYOP. In the spring of 1982, inresponse to a directive from theArmy Chief of Staff, we conductedan analysis to determine require-ments for PSYOP units in the 1980sand to define missions, capabilities,organizations and command-and-control structures necessary to sup-port their training and operations.Based on this analysis, the Depart-ment of the Army subsequentlyapproved 168 personnel spaces forthe group, in addition to the 332spaces previously obtained — atotal of 500 new spaces.

We were also successful in vali-dating 32 O-4 positions as AERBslots (those requiring graduatedegrees), and increasing our civil-ian-employee spaces from 28 to 55.Altogether, these measures provid-ed the potential for enhancing

PSYOP soldiers use a jeep-mounted loudspeaker system during the 1980s.Much of PSYOP’s equipment was in need of replacement or modernization.

U.S. Army photo

October 1993 31

administrative, operational andanalytical capabilities and in lateryears would effectively double thegroup’s size.

Our third goal, to bring PSYOPinto pace with the modern Army indoctrine and equipment, illustratedour next pressing need. Simply stat-ed, we had antiquated PSYOP-pecu-liar equipment, desperately in needof replacement and modernization.Our AN/TRT-22 radio transmitterwas old and immobile, and therewere only four such systems avail-able in the Army. We had obsoleteprinting equipment, no televisioncapability, and no leaflet round forthe Army’s 155mm artillery. Wehad practically no tactical dissemi-nation capability, and there was lit-tle expertise and support among theother services for aerial dissemina-tion of leaflets. In one area, publicaddress sets, we had critical short-ages — only 20 sets were availableto support a requirement for 380systems in active and reserve-com-ponent PSYOP units.

Notwithstanding the deficienciesin our equipment, we experienceddemands for its use to support otheragencies in peacetime activities. Foran extended period of time we pro-vided an AN/TRT-22 radio, and thepersonnel to operate it, for a UnitedStates Information Agency mission.In 1980 the group was extensivelyinvolved in the Cuban refugeeresettlement program. Officers ofthe group served as principal assis-tants to the commanders of taskforces operating in Key West,Miami, Fort Chaffee, FortIndiantown Gap and Fort McCoy.Support to each camp included staffadvice and assistance, editing andproducing camp newspapers, pro-viding linguist support, operatingdirect audio-visual communicationsmedia, and, at selected camps, oper-ating radio stations.

To get started on modernization,we launched an extensive equip-ment-improvement program in1980, working closely with theInstitute for Military Assistanceand other headquarters. Our associ-

ation with the Rapid DeploymentJoint Task Force helped increasethe priority for our efforts, and DAapproval of the PSYOP enhance-ment action in 1982 provided aboost.

With regard to doctrine, our capa-bility to respond to missiondemands was constrained by theexisting planning systems and staff-proponency relationships. PSYOPplanners had to deal with three sep-arate planning systems: the JointOperations Planning System, orJOPS; the Army Doctrinal PlanningSystem, outlined in FM 101-5 andFM 33-1; and the NATO PlanningSystems, prescribed by standardiza-tion agreements. Each system pre-scribed a different format and pro-vided for different proponency forPSYOP planning.

In both the JOPS and NATO sys-tems, proponency for PSYOP plan-ning fell under the J-3/G-3 area; inthe Army Doctrinal System, PSYOPwas included under the CMO/G-5.We believed that staff proponencyfor PSYOP in the Army systemshould be under the G-3, and we pro-vided our recommendations to IMAfor this doctrinal change. TRADOCapproved the change in the spring of1981, and thereafter we providedinput through IMA for the draft FM100-5, Operations, to reflect thechange in staff proponency.

Another shortcoming at this timewas the lack of joint PSYOP doc-trine. In order to properly supportthe newly created RDJTF, we devel-oped an operational concept thatboth XVIII Airborne Corps and thecommander of the RDJTF approved.We tested the concept during twoRDJTF command-post exercisesand submitted a concept paper onPSYOP support of a joint task forceto IMA for eventual inclusion inArmy doctrine.

The fourth goal, improve tacticalPSYOP training and operationalreadiness, reflected our concernover our ability to accomplishPSYOP-specific tasks. We needed toeliminate, if possible, training timedevoted to activities not related to

the development and disseminationof propaganda. Through internalcommand-post exercises and field-training exercises, we improved ourstaff and propaganda-developmentprocedures and placed increasedemphasis on PSYOP-peculiarrequirements and training for print-ing personnel. We made lessprogress, however, in dissemina-tion-training techniques, and thisremained a major shortfall.

Our fifth goal, improve quality ofstrategic PSYOP studies and assess-ments, addressed the requirement toask ourselves constantly whetherour scheduled studies, the basicPSYOP studies and special PSYOPstudies, were PSYOP-specific. Toooften, we fell into the more comfort-able routine of producing primarilyarea studies. To combat this tenden-cy, we sent as many of our civiliananalysts as possible through PSYOPcourses at IMA and the Air Force’sSpecial Operations School. Whenpossible, we also included civiliananalysts as participants in field andcommand-post exercises. Finally, weinstituted a review process whichincluded the participation of thegroup and battalion commanders.

The increase in unscheduled stud-ies and assessments during theearly 1980s constituted a real chal-lenge. In 1980 alone, we had 18unscheduled special PSYOP assess-ments and four national strategicPSYOP plans which addressedinternational hot spots, compared totwo such requirements in 1979. Thehigh-level attention these assess-ments and plans received in theinteragency arena enhanced thegroup’s stature and gave us addi-tional justification for an increase inpersonnel. At the same time, howev-er, these efforts to provide qualityproducts, often under short suspens-es, affected our ability to respond toother mission requirements.

In addition to improving the qual-ity of our research, we made a realeffort toward our sixth goal, inte-grate strategic studies and tacticalPSYOP training. Essentially, a mil-itary PSYOP unit engages in two

32 Special Warfare

activities: research and analysis,and operations. In theory, a PSYOPunit in peacetime conducts researchand analysis of specific geographicregions and target audiences, devel-ops plans to support conventionaland special-operations units, andparticipates in field exercises thatemploy these plans.

Execution, however, was quitedifficult for us to accomplish. One ofthe problems we faced was thattaskings for studies, planning sup-port and exercise participationcame from multiple channels. Thesame was true of taskings forunscheduled assessments andplans. Unfortunately, the areaexperts responsible for developmentof these time-sensitive productswere the same personnel requiredfor the production of scheduledstudies and operational plans tosupport rapid-deployment and con-tingency missions. Here again ourshortage of key officer and civilianpersonnel was a hindrance, forcingus to continually set and reset pri-orities to allocate resources from asmall core of expert personnel.

But we also were faced with amanagement and coordination prob-

lem at higher command and stafflevels. We made a conscious effortto get unified commands to requeststudies, in priority, which support-ed their most important contingen-cy plans. We also began to resistparticipation in those exerciseswhich did not provide realisticstrategic scenarios.

Ultimately we proposed a three-year integrated approach to PSYOPplanning and production require-ments which was accepted by OJCSand the unified commands. Thesesteps, in combination with quarter-ly planning and coordination meet-ings with OJCS and the ArmyReadiness Command, enabled us toshow considerable progress in align-ing PSYOP battalions, studies,operational planning and exerciseparticipation — which resulted inimprovements in PSYOP staff pro-cedures, campaign planning andpropaganda development.

In all of our capabilities assess-ments in the early 1980s, we notedthe lack of a national-level coordi-nating mechanism for PSYOP. As aresult, we believed, PSYOP policyupon which unified-commandPSYOP plans were based was ill-

defined. Strategic-level PSYOPplans frequently require the assetsof, or coordination with, other U.S.agencies, and in our view, the lackof an interagency coordinatingmechanism resulted in time-con-suming and incomplete coordinationof theater PSYOP requirements andplans. This also applied to multi-agency peacetime activities.

Our seventh goal, to achieve acloser relationship with the unifiedcommands, illuminated anotherglaring weakness. In early 1980,the 4th Group had only undertakendetailed contingency planningefforts with one unified command,U.S. European Command, andmuch remained to be done in thatarea. We put a lot of effort into cor-recting this weakness, and by thespring of 1982 we had briefed anddelivered PSYOP supporting plansfor approval to EUCOM/USAREUR,PACOM/KOREA, RDJTF, andSOUTHCOM/LANTCOM. This,with concurrent implementation ofCAPSTONE planning and partici-pation in unified-command exercis-es, was the focal point of our opera-tional efforts. The absence of quali-fied full-time PSYOP staff officersin the unified commands, however,placed a great deal of responsibilityon the 4th Group for impetus andplanning.

Hand-in-hand with the 4thGroup’s need to achieve a closerrelationship with unified commandswas our responsibility to improvethe relationship between active andreserve-component PSYOP units,our eighth goal. There were somepragmatic reasons for establishingthis as a separate goal.

In the first place, 80 percent ofour mobilization capability camefrom the reserve component — 34 ofthe 38 units in the Army’s totalPSYOP force. Second was the com-ing of age of the CAPSTONE pro-gram during the early 1980s. Thisproved to be an invaluable vehiclefor bringing the Army’s PSYOPcommunity closer together.

As FORSCOM’s planning agentfor CAPSTONE PSYOP actions, the

U.S. Army photo

Resettlement of Cuban refugees was only one of the many demands placedupon U.S. PSYOP forces in the early 1980s.

October 1993 33

4th Group developed alignment ofplanning and training associationsfor all 38 PSYOP units and provid-ed an implementing plan forFORSCOM approval. We hostedseparate meetings with each of thethree RC PSYOP groups to coordi-nate these actions, and conducted alarger two-week conference with allRC units to develop a theater fieldstandard operating procedure forEUCOM.

The 4th Group developed andsubmitted to FORSCOM a five-yearprogram for CONUS and OCONUSexercise participation by all PSYOPunits. We coordinated exercise par-ticipation of RC PSYOP units innumerous CONUS and OCONUSexercises and sent mobile trainingteams to RC PSYOP units to assistin planning and training activities.We coordinated and directed plan-ning activities of the PSYOP com-munity for operational planningsupport of the unified commands.

Active and reserve group and bat-talion commanders and their staffscame to know their counterparts ona first-name basis and developedmutual respect and appreciation.The relationships we developed inthe PSYOP community provided amodel for how the CAPSTONE pro-

gram was supposed to function.Our final goal, improve long-term

planning in all staff areas, indicat-ed the need for staff officers andcommanders to look beyond theirindividual tours in accomplishingtheir responsibilities. If the goalswe established and the work thatwe did were to provide a frameworkfor programs that subsequent groupcommanders could build upon andbring to fruition, we should have avision of what needed to be doneover the long term.

Lt. Gen. Glenn Otis, then the DADSCOPS, once introduced a presen-tation we were giving to the Armystaff council with these words: “The4th Psychological Operations Groupis the most overcommitted andunder-resourced O-6 command inthe Army.”

Why were we able to accomplishas much as we did with limitedresources? Because we had a core oftalented, hard-working and consci-entious officers, civilians and enlist-ed personnel in both the 4th Groupand the reserve component. All ofus were proud of what we hadaccomplished together, despite thefrustrations. We were believers inPSYOP.

Dr. Alfred H. Pad-dock Jr., completed a31-year Army careeras a colonel in October1988. His militarycareer included com-mand and staffassignments in Korea, Laos, Oki-nawa, Vietnam and the U.S. Heserved three combat tours with SFunits in Southeast Asia. Among hisvaried assignments, he was aninstructor in strategic studies atU.S. Army Command and GeneralStaff College; served in the Politico-Military Division of the DA Staff inWashington, D.C.; commanded the6th PSYOP Battalion and the 4thPSYOP Group at Fort Bragg; wasthe military member of the Secre-tary’s Policy Planning Staff, Depart-ment of State; and completed hisservice as the Director for PSYOP,Office of the Secretary of Defense. Agraduate of the U.S. Army Com-mand and General Staff Collegeand the U.S. Army War College, heearned his B.A. degree in politicalscience from Park College and holdsM.A. and Ph.D. degrees in historyfrom Duke University.

Lt. Col. Geoffrey C. Lambert wasthe plans officer for the 3rd Battal-ion, 7th Special Forces Group at thetime of the Oct. 15, 1979 coup thatled to U.S. involvement in El Sal-vador. He has been actively involvedin the Latin American theater foralmost two decades. His most recentassignments were with the 7th SFGroup as commander of the 1st Bat-talion and as deputy group comman-der. He is currently a student at theArmy War College.

Lt. Col. Frank Pedrozo served inEl Salvador as the adviser to the 5thBrigade in San Vicente from June1985-June 1986 and as the opera-tions adviser and U.S. Milgrouptraining and operations officer from1989-1992. He has served in variouspositions in the 7th SF Group andhas extensive experience in LatinAmerica. He is currently chief of unittraining and operations, U.S. ArmySpecial Forces Command.

Col. J.S. Roach served in El Sal-vador as a member of an operationalplanning and training team, or

OPATT, from March 1984-March1986. He has also served in SOUTH-COM Headquarters from 1983-1984and as the Defense Attaché in Bogo-ta, Colombia from 1990-1992. Heassumed command of the 7th SpecialForces Group in June 1993.

SW: How did the 7th Special ForcesGroup become a player in the devel-opment of the policy for El Salvador?Lambert: Prior to the creation ofthe theater special-operations com-mands, the commander of the 3rdBattalion, 7th Special Forces Groupin Panama informally wore the hatof the UW advisor to the CinCSOUTH. With the deactivation ofthe 8th Special Forces Group, thecommander of the 3rd of the 7th,atthat time Lt. Col. Chuck Fry, inher-ited that role, and it was necessaryfor him to advise the CinC. I guess toput it into context, we have to realizethat not only did we not have theaterSOCs, we had no USASOC, we hadno USACAPOC, we had no USSO-COM, and with the post-Vietnam

restructuring, we had lost our CAand PSYOP outfits, so he was carry-ing quite a large rucksack full ofknowledge, and he was the only manin-theater who had it.

SW: How was the CinC staff struc-tured, and how well-prepared was itfor the crisis in El Salvador?Lambert: Actually, they weren’tprepared at all. The priority of effortat that time had been on the imple-mentation of the Panama CanalTreaty, and Col. Curt Ebitz was thesole desk officer in the J-5 LATAMoffice responsible for El Salvador,Honduras and Nicaragua. He wasnot a theater expert, but he wasextremely perceptive. He workedabout 18-20 hours a day, and that isnot an exaggeration, to keep up withthe events in his domain. The CinCtrusted him completely, and he, inturn, trusted the 7th Group to pro-vide conceptual assistance becausehe needed the help and couldn’t findanyone else.

34 Special Warfare

Interview: Special Forcesin El Salvador

Lt. Col. Geoffrey LambertLt. Col. Frank Pedrozo

Col. J.S. Roach

SW: What were the early SF missions?Lambert: Some initial ones wereone-man MTTs to El Salvador toaugment the MILGROUP. Thesewere necessary because AmbassadorBob White in El Salvador remainedunconvinced that the left was a prob-lem. He felt that no external supportwas required for the government ofEl Salvador, he did not acknowledgethe external communist support forthe guerrillas, and he refused toallow the CinC SOUTH, Lt. Gen.Wallace Nutting, into country. Sothe CinC used selected 7th Groupsoldiers and officers to go TDY toaugment the MILGROUP in El Sal-vador to do situational assessmentsand try to come up with some sort ofplan. I think the initial formaldeployment was a civil-disturbanceMTT approved during the Carteradministration to prepare the mili-tary for the Jan. 23, 1980 demon-stration by 250,000 leftist sympa-thizers in the capital city. Previouslyfilmed demonstrations captured themilitary firing on marchers, shootingmany of them in the back, and thisawoke us to the severity of the prob-lem and the importance of our task.

The MTT was put together quicklyand spent a considerable portion ofthe instructional block in-country onhuman-rights considerations, inaddition to non-violent crowd-controltechniques. Although the demonstra-tion was the largest in Salvadoranhistory, and many of the demonstra-tors came with rifles wrapped intheir banners and ready to fight, theSalvadoran security forces usedwhat we had taught them andbehaved professionally, and therewas no violence. This initial smallstep forward in humanizing the con-flict remains a proud memory forthose of us involved in the beginningof Special Forces participation in thewar.

SW: What was the 55-man trainerconcept and how did it evolve?Lambert: Political decisions were amajor factor in the 55-man concept.The Oct. 15, 1979 coup really signi-

fied the end of the oligarchy in ElSalvador, but the CinC SOUTH feltthat although the military’s connec-tion with the far right endangeredprogress toward democracy, themost serious threat to democracy inEl Salvador was from the left. TheReagan transition team accepted theneed for continuity with PresidentCarter’s policy of supporting agrari-an and banking reform, whichrobbed the radical left of much of its

recruiting base. The principal focusof policy was to support militaryinstitutions and civilian politiciansof the democratic parties in order torestore a sense of authority anddirection to the government. GeneralNutting sought to provide a modestnetwork of personnel that could pullintelligence, operations, communica-tions and logistical assets together toexecute a cohesive policy. So in Jan-uary or February of 1980, the 3rd ofthe 7th was called on a weekend to

put together in one day a presenta-tion to the CinC SOUTH staff of anadvisory concept to El Salvador. Wedid a quick cut-and-paste drill andcame up with a phased program foran initial 55-man trainer and assis-tance team to meet General Nut-ting’s intent, to be followed by a 250-man contingent of advisers, down toat least company level. Our assess-ment was that the war would be sat-isfactorily terminated in about 3-5years with the full package. TheSOUTHCOM staff assembled, andafter a briefing from two 3rd of the7th officers, wrote a message on yel-low legal pad for the CinC’s signa-ture and transmission to JCS. TheCinC planners, though, stated thatonly the 55-man portion should beaddressed — they believed that thefollow-on advisory concept, the 250-man contingent, would have no polit-ical viability or support. To our sur-prise, the CinC chopped immediatelyon the message, and 7th Group wason its way.

SW: As a co-author of the concept,what do you think could have beendone better?Lambert: First of all, consideringthat U.S. support would be relianton the Salvadoran national will, andthat advisory assistance was such apolitically sensitive subject in theU.S. so soon after Vietnam, weshouldn’t have proposed such a largepackage. Had we been sensitive tothis, we probably would have pro-posed a 100-man package, and itprobably would have done a lot morethings. We had no idea that the 55-man limit would somehow become aceiling, but it did. We were absolute-ly amazed that it got approved.

Secondly, at the start, we solvedproblems piecemeal until we gotorganized. We turned the hose onthe fire with small training teams atthe unit level, and then trained thestaffs how to use the folks that wehad trained. We didn’t use the multi-echelon training approach, we justkind of jumped into things and senttraining teams here and there. Wewere busy trying to plug the gaps,

October 1993 35

Lambert: “We solvedproblems piecemealuntil we got orga-nized. We turned thehose on the fire withsmall training teamsat the unit level ...”

but really, there was no effectiveoverall policy to guide our participa-tion. When, in 1982, Gen. FredWoerner, the deputy CinC SOUTH,was tasked to lead a team to assistthe government of El Salvador indeveloping a political strategy withan accompanying economic and mili-tary strategy, things improved great-ly. It’s sad that this couldn’t havebeen done at the start.

Finally, we should have weightedthe development of national PSYOPand Civil Affairs campaigns muchheavier in our initial concept. Butthere were no PSYOP or CivilAffairs units on active duty, therestructuring from Vietnam had vir-tually wiped them out. We couldhave really used PSYOP and CAplans to support Duarte, the presi-dent elected in 1984, and this wouldhave facilitated the overall effort byspreading the human-rights mes-sage at the onset of our involvement.

Roach: Let me say something aboutthe multi-echelon concept of trainingand one of the problems that we hadwhen we were there as trainers. Wefound that there was no obligationfor the Salvadoran brigade comman-der to follow what the national armyheadquarters had put out as thetraining program. It was taken asadvice — if the brigade could do it,they would, but they didn’t have to.For that reason, I’m not sure that wecould have imposed multi-echelontraining. The way that the OPATTssucceeded was by going into thebrigade and helping the brigadecommander accomplish his agenda. Idon’t know that we could haveimposed an outside solution, no mat-ter how logical, integrated and goodit was, because the brigade comman-ders wouldn’t have accepted it. Theprogram had to come from theground up.

Pedrozo: I think one point needs tobe made about the 55-man limit. Itwas never congressionally mandat-ed — it was a deal struck betweenthe executive branch and Congress,where the executive branch said,

“Don’t put a limit on how many guyswe can put in-country, because wedon’t know what’s going to happen.We’ll keep the number at — howmany guys do we have there today?Fifty-five? Great, we’ll keep thenumber at 55, and we won’t countthese guys — medics, helicopterpilots, guards at the embassy, thattype of thing — and you guys don’tput a ceiling on it. The 55-man limit

probably became the most-watchedfigure in the entire war, and I cantell you, because at the end of it, Iwas the guy counting 55-man bodies,that we never exceeded it.

Lambert: They never were advisers,either, they were trainers. Theynever were legally authorized toadvise.

Roach: The U.S. trainers carriedweapons, but were only allowed to gointo training areas. Sometimes you

ended up advising the brigade com-mander, if you gained his confidence,through your training activities. Hewould accept advice and ask youquestions, but that was within thecuartel, or close-in training areas,not out in the field.

Pedrozo: I think an important pointto make about Special Forces partici-pation was the quality of the individ-ual. The selection process for train-ers was very rigorous. The trainershad to meet certain criteria, and Ithink that one of the reasons that wedidn’t have more people killed in ElSalvador was the quality of the guythat we sent down there. The factthat we were able to do as much aswe did is a good reflection on thetraining that we received in SpecialForces.

Roach: Let me give you an example.We talked earlier about the fact thatyou only influenced people based onhow effective you were at solvingtheir problems. When I got there, theCinC SOUTH was really concernedabout intelligence within the bri-gades, and there was a program toput a U.S. military-intelligence offi-cer in each brigade. The first group ofMI captains was there for six monthsTDY, but then the U.S. Armycouldn’t come up with six Spanish-speaking replacements. So the Mil-group thrashed around trying to fig-ure out an alternative and finallydecided to bring six O&I-qualifiedSpecial Forces NCOs to take the MIcaptains’ positions. At first the Sal-vadorans didn’t like it very much,because in their society, officers andNCOs are tremendously different.But after six months, the Salvadorancommanders didn’t want to give upthe O&I-qualified SF NCOs.

Although these NCOs reported into be intelligence specialists, in veryshort order they proved that theycould also give training — snipertraining, mortar training, infantrytraining, staff training — and if theSalvadoran brigade commander hada problem, the SF NCO could andwould be part of the solution.

36 Special Warfare

Roach: “The way thatthe OPATTs succeed-ed was by going intothe brigade and help-ing the brigade com-mander accomplishhis agenda.”

SW: What were SF’s greatest contri-butions to the war in El Salvador?Pedrozo: I think that quality oftraining was one of the greatest con-tributions that we made. We took aconstabulary force of about 12,000guys, and over a period of 12 years,turned it into a 60,000-man army,with a 55-man adviser limit. If youthink about it, that’s quite an accom-plishment, and it’s something that Ithink Special Forces can be reallyproud of. Another contribution waswhat Colonel Lambert was talkingabout — lessening the level of vio-lence. Human-rights training wasone thing that we did throughout,and if you wanted to look for athread of continuity in the war, itwas the human-rights issue.

Roach: Human rights wasn’t a sep-arate one-hour block at the begin-ning of the day. You had to find away to couch it in the training sothat it wasn’t just a moralisticapproach. It was not an issue thatthe Salvadorans were confusedabout. The Salvadoran militaryunderstood they weren’t supposed toviolate human rights, but theybelieved they were driven to extrememeasures by extreme circumstances.When you could convince them in anoperational context why humanrights made sense, you started to gettheir attention. When the Salvado-rans started to see, “that if we don’tshoot the civilians, we’ll get theirsupport, and therefore be able torout out the guerrillas,” then theysaw human rights from a pragmaticperspective.

Pedrozo: By the fact that we werein the brigades, we became the con-science of the Salvadoran army.Toward the end of the war, Salvado-ran officers were saying things abouthuman rights that you would neverhave heard at the beginning of thewar. They created a human-rightsoffice in the military to investigate,internally, human-rights abuses andallegations. They had really come along way.

Roach: One of the things can hap-pen, in this type of situation, is thatour government may say, “Honorcivil rights.” And there is great moti-vation for the Salvadoran govern-ment to say, “Good, we honor civilrights.” But the U.S. didn’t have away to check that, and for that mat-ter, neither did the Salvadoran gov-ernment, because they didn’t havefirm control over their entire coun-try. One of the things the trainers inthe brigades did was to provide adouble-check as to what was reallygoing on. And when the national-level government would say, “We’redoing whatever you want us to do,”our embassy could say, “Well, weknow that isn’t true.” I don’t knowhow many times that happened, butit happened, and the Salvadoranshad the feeling that they were beingwatched at the lower level.

Pedrozo: I don’t know if “watched”is a good word. You were integrated.Brigade commanders told you thingsthat you probably had no businessknowing, and they knew that youwere going to tell people back at theembassy, but they told you anyhow,because they trusted you. It’s a realstrange relationship, and it’s one ofthe things that makes FID unique.The President of the United Statessays, “This is our policy in CentralAmerica,” and the ambassador says,“This is our plan for the country,”but when you’re down in the brigadeor below that level, you are foreignpolicy, because everything you do isAmerican foreign policy.

SW: What was the evolution of thetraining?Pedrozo: When we first went downthere, we were, like Colonel Lambertsaid, just plugging holes. We werethe trainers. If the gringos didn’t doit, it didn’t get done. Eventually, itgot to the point where we hadtrained a base of people that spokethe same language, training-wiseand operationally, and we becametrainers for the trainers. At the endof the war, we were overseeing whatwas going on and getting into more

of the multi-echelon-type training.Our focus shifted from trainingsquads, platoons and companies totraining battalions, to looking at thereorganization of the Salvadoranarmy as a whole, creating new insti-tutions to move them into the nextcentury. We’re doing things rightnow that are going to effect the Sal-vadoran military for the next 50 or100 years.

Lambert: One of their brigade com-manders came up to Fort Bragg tovisit us recently. We sat down andhad a debate on how to implementthe red-, green- and amber-cycletraining out of FM 25-100, and aboutdoctrinal issues and their TRADOCheadquarters. He got it all from ourfolks about a year ago, and we had agreat rapport in talking about mod-ernization and perspective and allo-cation of resources. It’s absolutelyamazing to see the progress theyhave made in a little over a decade.

SW: A good question is why did wewin?Lambert: I think there were threefactors. One was our resources andtrainers. The second is that the otherside lost its resources and its ideolog-ical model. And finally, I think it wasthat the Salvadoran army and thecivilian government identified thepopulation as the center of gravityfor victory.

SW: Did we make that happen or didit evolve?Lambert: We made it happen.

Pedrozo: I think we influenced it.

Roach: “Influenced” might be tooweak a word, but “made it happen”might be too strong; it’s somewherein between. I think that we played avery important part in making ithappen, but I don’t think we can saythat we did it by ourselves.

Pedrozo: The Salvadorans, at theend of the war, had a very sophisti-cated PSYOP and Civil Affairs capa-bility. We gave them the initial

October 1993 37

national plan and they did regionalplans, where a lot more CA andPSYOP guys came down and advisedthem, etc., and they went out andactually did these things. They didhumanitarian civic action, they didpsychological operations, the wholenine yards, as far as that went, withthe object of the people being thecenter of gravity. When I went therein 1985 there were a lot of peoplefence-sitting. Ten percent werestrongly for the government, 4 per-cent were probably strongly anti-government and everybody else said,“Let’s see how this thing is going toend up.” But when I went there in1989-1990, it was completely differ-ent — I would say 90 percent of thepeople were firmly in the govern-ment’s camp at that point.

Roach: Let me give you an exampleof how we contributed. There weretwo programs that we were trying toimplement in 1985 that weren’tworking separately, but Lt. Col. AlAdami, the 5th Brigade OPATT,found a way to make them worktogether. The first of the two pro-grams was civil defense — tradition-ally two or three men were hired byeach village, but since they werepaid as civil defenders, they tendedto either already be the town drunksor to quickly become the towndrunks. Since they had the onlyweapons in the village, they tendedto be involved in abuses. These “pro-fessional civil defenders” didn’t havethe support of the people, and thesystem was a total disaster.

The second program was rural re-electrification, which had a lot to dowith economic vitality. But the Sal-vadoran government found that asthey went along putting in SegmentA, Segment B and Segment C, theywouldn’t get further than Segment Cbefore the guerrillas would knockdown Segment A, and they keptgoing back through this frustratingcycle.

Colonel Adami came up with asolution that made the two programswork together. First, he had to con-vince USAID that we should only

put in electrification where the vil-lagers would support the civil-defense program. Then he convincedthe Salvadoran brigade commanderthat the civil-defense program had tobe reformed and used as a carrot forthe re-electrification program. TheSalvadoran brigade commander thenhad to sell the program to the peo-ple. He talked to the local civiliansand said, “If you want electrification,you’ve got to form a civil defense, but

a new form of civil defense, like avolunteer fire department. We’lltrain 120 people in the town, andevery day 15 will take their turnbeing the civil-defense patrol.”

This new civil-defense programcreated a social balance of power,where everyone is involved in civildefense, not just the three towndrunks. Since everyone was in-volved, it created an internal systemof checks and balances that discour-

aged abuses. So with the interplaybetween these two projects, you’vegot re-electrification in high gear,and a civil-defense program to pro-tect the project. There was a reasonfor the local people to support thecivil defense, because they were get-ting electricity. People support theirgovernment because the governmentprovides for them, and that was theproblem in El Salvador before: thegovernment wasn’t providing, andtherefore the people weren’t support-ing. This is what Colonel Lambertwas talking about earlier — the gov-ernment came to see the Salvadoranpeople as the center of gravity.

SW: What was SF’s role in the peaceprocess?Pedrozo: The effectiveness of whatwe did in El Salvador I think isunderlined by two things, the firstthing was that the guerrillas said, atthe end of the war, in a conversationwith a national-level guerrilla leaderthat I was privy to, that the mostdamaging thing that occurred in thewar was putting American trainersin the brigades. The reason wasbecause as the Army became moreprofessional, they had fewer human-rights abuses, and when they hadfewer human-rights abuses, theguerrillas lost a lot of their propa-ganda value and a lot of theirrecruiting capability, simply becausethe Americans were changingthings.

The other thing that gauges oureffectiveness was that when thepeace process was going on, theguerrillas were very concerned thatafter the war, sufficient military aidwould continue through El Salvadorto keep the advisers in the brigades.The advisers, in the FMLN’s eyes,were the fair brokers, they were theguys that were going to make surethat things got done right and thatthere were not any more abuses.When the guerrillas said all thesethings at the end of the war, it justindicated that we did it right thistime.

38 Special Warfare

Pedrozo: “The guerril-las said, at the end ofthe war, ... that themost damaging thingthat occurred in thewar was puttingAmerican trainers inthe brigades.”

In the autumn of 1991, the fall ofits democratically elected presidentcaused a massive exodus of politicaland economic refugees from Haiti.President George Bush directedthat these Haitians be processedthrough camps set up at the U.S.Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay,Cuba, and by June 1992, nearly45,000 such refugees had passedthrough the camps.

Army Civil Affairs soldiers werecalled to serve in the camps, theirmission being to manage the campsand provide humanitarian assis-tance to camp residents. This articleoffers a view of a typical day in oneof the camps to highlight theresponsibilities of Civil Affairs sol-diers and show how their effortsaffected both the quality of life andU.S. democratization attemptsamong the Haitian refugees.

Each morning at approximately 3o’clock, the Civil Affairs camp staffescorted 20-30 migrant cooks to thecombined cooking area just outsidethe camp perimeter. These cooks

prepared the morning meal for thethousands of migrants residing inthe camps.

At 6 a.m., the Haitian-selectedcamp leader, referred to by his con-stituency as “camp general,” wouldmake a good-morning broadcastover the camp loudspeaker systemand inform the subordinate campleadership of work details for theday. Camp generals were seniorHaitian leaders often selected bygeneral migrant consensus; eachwas responsible for one camp.

Camp leadership was hierarchi-cally structured by tent-block lead-ers and further subdivided into tentleaders. The camp general wasresponsible through the CivilAffairs staff for camp cleanlinessand order, and for heading weeklytown meetings. These meetingsgave migrant leaders an opportuni-ty to meet formally with the CivilAffairs camp commander (a majoror higher) and U.S. civilian agencyon-site managers.

Breakfast was served from 7-8

a.m. Civil Affairs soldiers organizedthree serving lines consisting ofmen, single women and women withchildren. This ensured that womenwith small children received priori-ty attention during mealtime, and itreduced waiting time. In severalcamps, the Civil Affairs staff usedlarge cargo parachutes, placed overflagpoles and tied down at the ends,to make field-expedient shaded eat-ing areas.

After breakfast, mess crewscleaned the dining area and theday’s activities began. Anyone too illto attend breakfast would report tothe medical tent, staffed by U.S.Navy medics and Haitian migrantinterpreters, to receive appropriatemedical treatment.

Following breakfast, Civil Affairspersonnel reported to the campcommand tent for the daily staffmeeting. At this meeting, chaplains,military linguists and military-police liaison personnel, along withthe Civil Affairs camp staff, dis-cussed and resolved problems,

October 1993 39

Operation Guantanamo: Civil Affairs in Action

by 1st Lt. William A. Woods

40 Special Warfare

learned of significant events andmade plans for the following day.

By 9 a.m., various migrant crewshad already begun carrying outduties such as litter pickup, raisingtent flaps and watering the soccerfield to eliminate dust in the aridencampment. Other teams ofHaitians were deployed by the campgeneral to assist in joint camp pro-jects such as setting up of churchand schoolhouse tents under thedirection of Civil Affairs personnel.Simultaneously, Civil Affairs supplyteams distributed clothing, house-hold products, baby food and linen.

School-aged Haitian children hadthe opportunity to attend classestaught by U.S. military linguists.Math, English as a second languageand American history were three ofthe topics taught in Creole, theirnative tongue. Adult migrants wereperiodically offered lessons indemocracy and American history.These lessons were taught by joint-task-force military linguists andCivil Affairs solders.

Throughout the day, Civil Affairsteam members were responsible forthe location and continued move-ment of groups of migrants selectedfrom various in-processing func-tions. These in-processing needs ofthe U.S. Immigration and Natural-ization Service and U.S. PublicHealth Service included blood tests,X-rays, dental examinations, medi-cal follow-ups, immigration inter-views and U.S.-sponsor locationmeetings. Civil Affairs personnelalso moved throughout the camps,stopping at tents to gauge migranttemperament, encourage betterhygiene and proper water-usagepractices and assist migrants inproblem-solving. This contact alsohelped to reduce the likelihood ofany intimidation caused by thepresence of uniformed soldiers.

At about 3 p.m. a camp-wideloudspeaker broadcast announcedthe commencement of dinner. Theevening meal generally consisted ofrice and beans along with shreddedbeef, chicken or pasta with meat.With dinner and clean-up complet-

ed, many of the migrants visited thecamp command tent. The CivilAffairs camp management had anopen-door policy, and migrantscame to discuss domestic and familyproblems and health concerns, andto gain knowledge about the UnitedStates from the Civil Affairs campstaff.

An element of the 4th Psychologi-cal Operations Group from FortBragg, N.C., produced a bilingualdaily newspaper originally titled“Sa’k Pase” (Creole for “What’sgoing on”), and later renamed “Na’Boule” (Creole for “We’re cooking!”).This paper helped educate themigrant population, and because ofthe remote nature of the Guan-tanamo Bay naval station, keptU.S. military personnel informed oncurrent world events. The CivilAffairs staff ensured that the dailywas distributed to more than 12,000Haitian camp residents and mili-tary personnel.

Evening intercamp soccer gamesand tournaments were frequent andwere encouraged by Civil Affairsand military-linguist personnel.This competitive sporting activity,perhaps more than any other mili-

tary-Haitian migrant interplay, fos-tered camaraderie. Though thecamps were not without disharmo-ny and occasional small pockets ofcivil unrest, these soccer gameswent a long way toward maintain-ing a basic camp calm. Each campgeneral recruited his own all-Haitian team, and both the CivilAffairs staff and the military lin-guists fielded teams. The CivilAffairs staff acquired goal posts,soccer balls and sneakers for themigrant players.

On-site chaplains organizedevening services in specially desig-nated areas and occasionally heldRoman Catholic confessional andcommunion activities. Working withthe chaplains and military supplyteams, the Civil Affairs camp staffwas able to offer canned shrimp cre-ole to the Haitian migrants for East-er Sunday dinner. This not onlybroke the monotony of rice andbeans, but also reinforced in theminds of the migrants the U.S. mili-tary’s sincere desire to recognize andencourage free religious practice.

At 8 each evening, an eager teamof Haitian youths between 10 and16 would enter the command tent,

One of the camps established to house Haitian refugees at the GuantanamoBay Naval Base.

U.S. Army photo

pick up a 16mm movie projector andthe evening movie reels, and set upfor the evening’s film. After learn-ing to run the projector from theCivil Affairs staff, these boys tookgreat pride and pleasure in running“le cinema.” Most migrants wouldbring their cots to an open fieldwith a plywood screen for two hoursof entertainment.

After the movie, most CivilAffairs camp personnel left thecamp, and a small overnight teammanned the command tent to han-dle emergencies. Periodic walkingpatrols, run in coordination withthe military police, helped increasethe migrants’ sense of safety atnight.

Operation Guantanamo was areal-world opportunity to applyCivil Affairs doctrine and procedurein a peacetime environment. Thehumanitarian needs and interestsof the Haitians were served, allow-ing civilian-agency professionals toprocess nearly 45,000 Haitian boatpeople through the GuantanamoBay camps. With the current uncer-tainty of the world and the growthof refugees in every hemisphere, thehumanitarian-assistance mission isone which active and reserve CivilAffairs soldiers are likely to becalled upon to perform again in thenear future.

1st Lt. William A.Woods is an ArmyReserve officerassigned to the 353rdCivil Affairs Com-mand, Bronx, N.Y.During OperationGuantanamo, he was the operationsofficer in the largest refugee camp,managing more than 3,000 Haitianmigrants. In his civilian profession,Lieutenant Woods is a marketingmanager with the MetropolitanTransportation Authority’s NewYork City Transit Authority.

October 1993 41

When properly planned and exe-cuted, the deployment-for-trainingprogram provides unparalleled“live environment” training oppor-tunities for Special Forces teamsand personnel that measurablyimprove their ability to execute for-eign internal defense and other SFmissions.

But the coordination path that aproposed DFT must follow is lacedwith bureaucratic booby-traps thatcan delay and distort the originalmission concept and timing of aDFT. By law, the explicit purpose ofa DFT must be for the training ofU.S. forces. Therefore, the trainingconcept is specifically focused onU.S. training needs. Any trainingbenefits that accrue to the hostnation are incidental.

Nonetheless, any potential hostnation that is going to sponsor a for-eign military element on its nation-al territory is going to have its ownopinion of what that incidentaltraining might be. This inevitablyaffects the original training

MICON. The theater special opera-tions command, too, reviews theconcept and makes changes basedon the CINC’s guidance regardinghis regional strategy. Factor in theresident U.S. military group’s viewson what should and should not betrained, and it is not hard to seehow a training proposal can easilyfall victim to circumstances.

These potential “Murphy” factorsargue strongly for a well-analyzedand planned MICON based on anhonest evaluation of a detachment’straining shortcomings and objec-tives. Such a MICON serves as asolid point of departure for achiev-ing the fundamental requirement ofthe program — training of the U.S.element. With this training plan theteam can respond to political andsituational realities that affect theoriginal MICON with alternativesthat continue to support detach-ment training needs.

All too often, however, detach-ments enter into the DFT coordina-tion process with only the vaguest

concept of what they want to do.Details are left to be worked out onthe site survey with the host nation.This leaves the detachment vulner-able to virtually everyone in thecoordination chain and surrendersthe initiative in the training agen-da. Given the resource constraintsthat are now, and will continue tobe, a fact of life for the U.S. Army,this is unacceptable. Special Forces,founded on the ability to train oth-ers, cannot just deploy into theater,throw together a training conceptduring the pre-deployment site sur-vey, execute, and deem that “goodtraining.”

Concept development for anOCONUS DFT should be the resultof properly applied Army trainingdoctrine. Throughout its trainingcycles, every detachment shouldassess its ability to execute requiredindividual and collective tasks thatsupport the detachment’s mission-essential-task list. This is done con-currently with training throughboth informal and formal after-action reviews and in deliberatereview processes such as thedetachment’s battle-focus analysis.

The assessment phase also incor-porates evaluations from externalsources and results of mandatorytraining requirements outlined inArmy Special Forces CommandRegulation 350-1. The end productshould be a coldly honest and pro-fessional evaluation of the currentstate of detachment readiness andcapability to perform its assignedmission. An inaccurate or self-deceiving assessment lays the foun-dation for failure and waste. Identi-fied weaknesses must be brokendown into their component collec-tive and individual tasks in prepa-ration for the next phase of thetraining-management cycle.

After identifying tasks andrequirements requiring trainingattention, the detachment entersthe critical planning phase with thecomponents necessary to plot itstraining strategy. These compo-nents must be coherently orderedand sequenced toward the desired

42 Special Warfare

Grabbing the Brass Ring:Making the Most

of Overseas Training

by Maj. John F. Mulholland

capability. This road map priori-tizes training and resource require-ments determined essential toaccomplishing training goals andobjectives — the map’s destination.It is in this phase that the detach-ment must decide the role of theDFT in the training plan.

Team planners must bear in mindthat DFTs represent a major train-ing activity that requires the dedi-cation of dollars, airlift and time, toname but three constant factors.The detachment leadership isaccountable, then, to obtain maxi-mum benefit from the treasure com-mitted to its deployment.

Properly structured DFTs providethe mechanism for superb multi-echelon training. A detachment caneasily plan and conduct a full-pro-file mission in accordance with itsapplicable Special Forces MissionTraining Plan. Whether it is seen asthe culmination exercise of thedetachment training plan or as afull-blown rehearsal for a follow-onMTT, the outstanding trainingpotential of a DFT, combined withits associated high-resource com-mitment, absolutely demand that itclaim a priority position in teamtraining strategy.

The ultimate product of the DFTassessment and planning phases isthe MICON. The preparatory home-work outlined above bears fruit inthe MICON-development and site-survey stages of a DFT. First of all,the detachment’s MICON shouldclearly articulate the training goalsand objectives, as well as thedesired mission profile, that thedetachment has determined to beessential to accomplish its trainingstrategy. Next, the MICON shouldpropose a sequence or mission out-line that satisfies this end-state andidentifies potential incidental bene-fits to the host nation. After all, thepackage must be “sellable” to apotential host nation. Since ourseminal missions in Special Forcesstem from the requirement to trainindigenous forces, this packaging iscomplementary.

The real benefits of preliminary

planning are twofold. First, itallows the detachment leadership toprioritize its training objectivesshould the proposed MICON, trans-mitted by message traffic, not meetwith total approval from any of themany players discussed earlier.

For instance, a detachment withthe primary mission of FID and asecondary mission of special recon-naissance may have proposed aMICON that calls for training withan indigenous infantry company onlight-infantry operations in a jungleenvironment for four weeks, fol-lowed by two weeks of unilateral SRtraining, with host-nation targetsupport. If, however, there is anexisting agenda in-country to sup-port humanitarian civic-action pro-jects that is essential for DFTapproval, then the detachment isprepared to adjust to the situationwith a a counterproposal of light-infantry training and HCA support,accommodating both parties’ prima-ry requirements.

The second benefit of the prepara-tion is the foundation it gives thepre-deployment site-survey teamwhen negotiating with their host-nation counterparts for acceptance ofthe U.S. proposal. The give and takeof these negotiations is inevitable. Infact, they should be seen as an excel-lent training opportunity to practicethe art of selling a program to apotential partner, as we may becalled upon to do someday in supportof our own national interests. Thefoundation afforded by properassessment and planning allows forthe sacrifice of secondary or tertiarytraining objectives to accommodatehost-nation requirements while pre-serving the primary.

In execution, DFTs differ littlefrom any other important OCONUSexercise. The same requirementsfor professionalism and leadershipexist with the awareness that oneis a guest in another land, with allthe implications and requirementsassociated with that fact. Indeed,these environmental considera-tions, impossible to mimic inCONUS, are the crucial character-

istics that make this training eventso valuable for Special Forcesdetachments.

The real value of the DFT will notbe realized without a post-missionassessment. If the DFT played thedominant role in a detachment’straining strategy that it shouldhave, the detachment leadershipwill be able to evaluate preciselythe team’s ability to accomplish itsMETL. If detachments cannot makethis determination at the end of theDFT, it was inadequately plannedand structured.

The process outlined here is notlimited to DFT coordination andpreparation. It is precisely the pointthat the application of standardArmy training doctrine shouldapply to the SF DFT process.

Accurate and detailed missionpreparation is critical to the successof this incredible training opportu-nity that allows Special Forcesdetachments to conduct full-profilemission training in their assignedareas, languages and culture. Thedetachment leadership must fullyassess and outline the team train-ing plan. The chain of commandand the operations and trainingstaffs at battalion and group levelsmust also assist detachments in theprocess and support the satisfactoryachievement of their training goals.

Maj. John F. Mulholland is a for-mer battalion executive officer forthe 1st Battalion, 7th SF Group.

October 1993 43

Army personnel officials at thePentagon have recently expressedconcern that well-publicizedaccounts of military downsizingmay lead many soldiers to questionthe viability of an Army career.

Despite being caught up in thesteepest drawdown since the end ofthe Vietnam War, the Army’s toppersonnel official predicts that pro-motion and schooling opportunitieswill be comparable to those of thepast or better.

As the ranking manager of Armyforce levels, Lt. Gen. Thomas P.Carney seeks to eliminate the anxi-ety soldiers may experience inregard to the drawdown. He feelsthe best way to do this is by keepingthem tuned to what he calls “fast,factual and focused” information asthe restructuring process unfolds.

“We’re going through a period ofturbulence that naturally causessome uncertainty among our sol-diers,” Carney said, but he adds,

“The major reductions appear to bebehind us.

“We are committed to maintain-ing a quality force. Personnel pro-grams will continue to be focused onmaintaining readiness, while caringfor soldiers and families. As wedownsize today and in the future,we must remember the Armyremains a great institution in whichto serve. Education, training, familyprograms and job satisfaction stillfigure high in our work to restruc-ture the Army,” Carney said.

Voluntary separation incentivesand offers of early retirement willcontinue to be the primary meansby which the Army will achieve itsend-strength goals; these areexpected to continue through fiscalyear 1996.

Personnel officials offer the fol-lowing by-rank look-ahead into thenext two years based on the mostcurrent information, with somespeculation regarding force struc-

ture and budget reductions thatmay occur within that period.

Colonels• Selective Early Retirement

Boards will continue if voluntaryretirements remain at projectedrates. Fiscal year 1994 will be thelast year in which colonels will havemultiple SERB reviews (i.e., if a fileis reviewed by the fiscal 1994 board,it will not be reviewed again). TheFY 1995 board will review thosecolonels who complete two years ingrade that year.

• Joint-duty assignments willremain high priority for qualifiedofficers.

• There is now a significant pay-longevity increase for colonels with24 years’ service.

• Waivers to retire with twoyears in grade are still available.

Lieutenant colonels• SERBs will be conducted

throughout the drawdown period,with a significantly lower selectrate —about 5-10 percent.

• Promotion rates to colonel haveincreased to 50-percent opportunityand should remain stable at thatlevel.

• “Pin-on” point to colonel willremain about 22 years, eightmonths.

• Selection for battalion-levelcommand will remain competitiveat historic rates.

• Senior service college shouldnot change from its present selec-tion rate of about seven percent andwill remain extremely competitive.

• As with colonels, waivers toretire with two years in grade arestill available.

Majors• The Army is replacing reduc-

tion-in-force procedures and theVoluntary Separation IncentiveProgram for field-grade officers byimplementing the Early RetirementProgram — also known as the “15-year retirement.”

• The Early Retirement Program

44 Special Warfare

Downsizing: Personnel Manager

Offers a Glimpse of the Future

will be used to size and shape thefield-grade force.

- The first priority is to offer earlyretirement to senior majors in over-age skills, and generally those non-selected for promotion. Early retire-ment will be used to properly size“promotion COHORTS” prior to con-sideration for lieutenant colonel.

- There are no plans to offerearly retirement to critically shortspecialties.

• Promotion selection rate to lieu-tenant colonel will remain at about70 percent.

• “Pin-on” point average to lieu-tenant colonel has decreased from17 years, four months to 16 years,10 months. It will decrease furtherto 16 years, six months.

• Competition for resident Com-mand and General Staff Collegewill remain keen. Completion of res-ident or non-resident CGSCremains necessary to be competitivefor promotion. Resident selectionrates will increase from 50 percentto 60 percent.

• More majors will be assignedjoint-duty and reserve-componentpositions in the future.

• Majors twice non-selected forpromotion to lieutenant colonel willbe selectively continued until retire-ment-eligible, but the period of con-tinuation may be curtailed prior to20 years’ service. Early retirementwill then be offered.

Captains• An FY 1994 RIF board is sched-

uled for February. It will considerofficers in year group 1985 for earlyseparation. However, if enough Vol-untary Separation Incentive andSpecial Separation Benefit applica-tions are received, the board will becanceled. A similar board will bescheduled in fiscal 1995 to consideryear groups 1986 and 1987.

• Promotion rate to major willremain at 80 percent opportunitythroughout the drawdown periodand beyond.

• “Pin-on” point average to majoris averaging 11 years, 10 months. It

should decline to about 11 years,five months, with an objective ofreaching 11 years.

• The VSI/SSB will be offered toofficers in the RIF zone and to thosewho are once non-selected for promo-tion to major. One-time non-selectswith more than 15 years’ service willbe offered early retirement.

Lieutenants• The Army will gain 3,700

active-duty lieutenants in fiscal1993 and will probably continuethat number throughout theremainder of the drawdown period.

• The Voluntary Early Release/Retirement Program will be offered.A pilot program in FY 1994 will beoffered to a limited number of lieu-tenants with 2-3 years’ active duty,provided they transition to reserve-component units for the remainderof their service obligation.

• The fiscal 1994 Captain, Army,Promotion/Lieutenant RetentionBoard is projected for October. Thefiscal 1993 captain selection ratewas 92 percent after retention loss-es were removed. This compares to92 percent over the last five yearsand should remain in the 92-per-cent range during the remainder ofthe drawdown.

Warrant officers• Promotion consideration is pro-

jected to 80-, 76- and 44-percentopportunity to chief warrant officers3, 4 and 5, respectively.

• Warrant officers can expect tobe considered for promotion everysix years after selection to CWO 2.

• The Selective Retirement Boardfor warrants will continue in fiscal1994 and possibly through thedrawdown period.

• The Army is seeking legislativeapproval to conduct a regular Armywarrant RIF. When approved, aRIF board will be conducted in fis-cal 1994 and possibly through theremainder of the drawdown period.

• Early retirement and VSI/SSBwill be offered to selected warrantofficer grades and specialties based

on requirements. A RIF may be pre-cluded if sufficient voluntary sepa-ration applications are submitted.

Sergeants major• No anticipated Selective Early

Release Board/Senior EnlistedRelease Board will be held if volun-tary retirements remain at project-ed rates.

• No change is anticipated in the30-year retention control point.

• Retention beyond 30 years’ ser-vice will continue for nominativepositions.

Master sergeants• Promotions to sergeant major

will sustained at a rate of 300-400yearly.

• “Pin-on” point average for pro-motion to sergeant major will holdsteady at 20.9 years.

• Master sergeants will be consid-ered for promotion to sergeantmajor about six times during theircareer. Nearly one of three will bepromoted. However, if a mastersergeant has not been selected dur-ing the first four selection boardsfor which eligible, the likelihood forpromotion decreases to less thanone in 25.

• Sergeant Major Course atten-dance will continue at about 700resident and 300 non-resident seatsin 1994. When the course convertsto nine months in length, atten-dance will be about 600 residentsand 25 non-residents yearly.

• Non-commissioned Officer Edu-cation System linkage to promotionwill be completed by Oct. 1, whenall master sergeants selected forpromotion will be required to com-plete the SMC prior to promotion.NCOs without SMC who are select-ed for promotion will receive firstpriority for attendance at the resi-dent course.

• Master sergeants will not beconsidered for early retirement.

• There will be no change to theretention control point of 24 years.

• A longevity pay increase hasbeen added for 24 years of service,

October 1993 45

and is received for retirement pur-poses by the master sergeants andpromotable sergeants first classwho reach their retention controlpoint.

Sergeants first class• Anticipate promotions to mas-

ter sergeant to be sustainedbetween 1,500-2,100 per year (com-pared to 2,333 in fiscal 1992).

• “Pin-on” point average to mas-ter sergeant will hold steady at 17.9years.

• Sergeants first class may beconsidered for promotion on anaverage of eight times during theircareers. Nearly one in four will bepromoted. However, if a sergeantfirst class has not been selected dur-ing the first four selection boardsfor which eligible, the likelihood forpromotion drops to less than one in30.

• Early retirement may be offeredin select overage specialties as pub-lished by U.S. Total Army Person-nel Command.

• There will be no change to theretention control point of 22 years.

Staff sergeants• Anticipate promotions to

sergeant first class to be sustainedbetween 5,600-7,000 per year (com-pared to 5,473 in fiscal 1992).

• “Pin-on” point average tosergeant first class will hold steadyat 13.7 years.

• Staff sergeants may be consid-ered for promotion more than 10times during their careers. Nearlytwo out of three staff sergeants will

be promoted to sergeant first class.However, if a staff sergeant has notbeen selected during the first fourboards in which eligible, the likeli-hood decreases to less than one in15.

• Beginning Oct. 1, staffsergeants selected for promotionmust complete the Advanced Non-commissioned Officer Course beforepromotion can take effect. Promo-tion selectees who haven’t complet-ed ANCOC will receive priorityplacement on the ANCOC list.

• ANCOC attendance will be sus-tained in proportion to authoriza-tions by specialty at about 7,000seats in fiscal 1994, projected toabout 6,300 seats in fiscal 1995 and1996.

• Early retirement will be offeredin select overage specialties as pub-lished by PERSCOM.

• No change will occur in theretention control point of 20 years.

• VSI/SSB will continue to beoffered in select specialties for FY1994.

Sergeants• Anticipate promotions to staff

sergeant to average between10,000-12,000 per year (comparedto about 10,000 in fiscal 1992).

• “Pin-on” point average for pro-motion to staff sergeant will holdsteady at 7.6 years.

• Basic Noncommissioned OfficerCourse will be in proportion to thedrop in authorizations by specialtyto about 18,000 seats in fiscal 1995and 1996.

• NCOES linkage to promotion

was complete Oct. 1, 1992. Allsergeants selected for promotion arerequired to complete BNCOC priorto promotion.

• Beginning Oct. 1, the retentioncontrol point for promotablesergeants will be 15 years’ service.Early retirement will be offered tothis group of soldiers in fiscal 1994at 15 years, 29 days’ service.

Corporals/specialists• Expect 23,000-25,000 promo-

tions a year to sergeant (comparedto 26,700 in fiscal 1992), withslightly lower time-in-service aver-age upon promotion.

• “Pin-on” point average for pro-motion to sergeant will hold steadyat 3.9 years.

• Promotable corporals and spe-cialists must complete the PrimaryLeadership Development Courseprior to promotion.

• The retention control point willremain at eight years’ service.

Privates first class• Promotions to specialist are not

projected to change.• “Pin-on” point average for pro-

motion to specialist will hold steadyat less than two years.

• Soldiers not promoted to spe-cialist by the end of their first termof enlistment must separate fromservice.

This information was provided bythe Army News Service.

46 Special Warfare

October 1993 47

In support of the recent Army decision to implement the nine-monthSergeants Major Course beginning in August 1995, the following changeswere in effect for the August 1993 selection board for command sergeantsmajor, sergeants major and the Sergeants Major Course:• The selection board did not consider NCOs for SMC resident, non-resident

and sister-service attendance. NCOs selected for promotion to sergeantmajor by the board and not previously selected for SMC will attend thecourse in July 1994.

• Master sergeants previously selected for SMC must attend the residentcourse by January 1995 and will attend Classes 44 or 45. Class 45 will bethe last six-month class.

• NCOs previously selected to attend the non-resident course and sister-ser-vice academies will attend as scheduled.

• NCOs to attend Class 46, the first nine-month class, will be selected bythe calendar-year 1994 CSM/SGM selection board.

For more information, contact SFC R.B. Gardner or SFC Murray in theSWCS Special Operations Proponency Office, phone DSN 239-9002/8423,commercial (919) 432-9002/8423.

Selective Re-enlistment Bonus Program multipliers were decreased forSpecial Forces soldiers effective September 30. The chart below shows cur-rent multipliers and zones.

MOS From To18B, weapons 3A, 3B None18C, engineer 3A, 2B 1A, 1B18D, medical 3A, 3B 2A, 2B18E, communications 3A, 3B None18F, intelligence 3A, 3B 1A, 1B

Re-enlistment Zones:A: Re-enlistments between 21 months and six years of active-duty service.B: Re-enlistments between six and 10 years of active-duty service.

A limit of $20,000 in SRB entitlements and a three-year minimum term arerequirements of the program. CMF 18 is now authorized two-, three-, four-,five- and six-year re-enlistment terms. Eligibility windows are:• Any time no earlier than eight months before estimated termination of

service and no later than three months before ETS.• Any time eight months before ETS when a service-remaining requirement

is imposed by DA that cannot be met on the current enlistment or anextended enlistment. Soldiers selecting this option are ineligible foraccrued-leave, cash payments.

• A soldier may cancel an extension if the cancellation will place him in theeight-month window before ETS. When an SRB is calculated, extensionswill be counted as previously obligated service.

Soldiers who apply for the Bonus Extension and Retention Program will beapproved for a specific zone. A soldier must be one year from ETS to apply.

Army to implement 9-monthSergeants Major Course

Re-enlistment bonusesdecrease for Special Forces

Enlisted Career NotesSpecial Warfare

48 Special Warfare

Officer Career NotesSpecial Warfare

Several actions are currently under way to update regulations and guidancerelated to Army warrant officers:• AR 611-112, Manual of Warrant Officer MOSs, is being revised to mandateand improve mobility in MOS 180A by including the new grade of CW5. Itwill also update SF qualifications, duties by grade and rank-coding tables.• DA Pamphlet 600-11, Warrant Officer Professional Development, is beingrevised to encompass a chapter on each warrant-officer MOS. The revisionwill include information on duties and responsibilities of the SF warrant offi-cer and the life-cycle model for MOS 180A, which will outline training,assignments and self-development by grades and years of service.• AR 621-1 is being revised to give WOs greater accessibility to partiallyfunded degree-completion programs. CW2s will be eligible for associate’s-level, and CW3s for baccalaureate-level training.• The Warrant Officer Leader Development Action Plan has a stated goal ofassociate’s degrees for CW2s and bachelor’s degrees for CW3s considered forpromotion to CW4; consequently, education means success in promotion. Formore information on the warrant-officer program or professional develop-ment, contact CWO 3 Shaun Driscoll, DSN 239-2415/9002, commercial (919)4322-2415/9002.

FA 39 officers interested in advanced civil schooling should be aware of twofully funded master’s-degree programs. The first, offered at Fort Bragg, isa 12-month program which accepts 40 students per year and awards amaster’s degree in international relations. The second, offered by theNaval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif., is an 18-month program forfive 18/39 students per year and awards a master’s degree in nationalsecurity affairs. Applications for attendance in either program should bereceived by Maj. Morales, FA 39 assignments officer, no later than Sept.30, 1993. Packets may be accepted after the suspense date if quotas arestill available. Applications consist of DA Form 1618-R, Application forDetail as Student Officer, a current Graduate Record Examination and acopy of the applicant’s undergraduate transcript. PERSCOM convenes aboard in November to evaluate and recommend officers for ACS. Appli-cants are reviewed regarding overall qualifications, not prior academicaptitude only. Officers who graduate from either program will be requiredto serve in an Army Education Requirement System position to repay theirmaster’s degree. For more information, contact Jeanne Schiller, FA 39manager in the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office, at DSN 239-6406/9002, commercial (919) 432-6406/9002.

Actions under way to update WO regulations

FY 93 promotion rates highfor SF warrant officers

Fully funded schooling available for FA 39 officers

The FY 93 promotion list for CW3 and CW4 shows high selection rates forSF warrant officers. The primary-zone selection rate was 87.5 percent forCW3 and 100 percent for CW4. Army primary-zone selection rates were78.9 percent for CW3 and 74.9 percent for CW4.

October 1993 49

Officers planning to attend Phase IV of the Civil Affairs Officer AdvancedCourse should remember that they must meet all prerequisites before theycan be accepted into the class. These include height and weight require-ments, completion of Phases I, II and III, and grade of O-2 and above. Ofthose officers currently enrolled in the two-phase officer advanced course,only those who enrolled in and have completed the pilot Phase I are eligi-ble to attend Phase IV in lieu of the new Phase II. All other officers cur-rently enrolled in the new two-phase officer advanced program must firstcomplete Phase I and then request enrollment in the new Phase II, whichbegins in FY 94. Officers who wish to attend Phase IV must also ensurethat they have an assigned seat for the course. Those who arrive for train-ing without an assigned seat, even though they may have valid orders, willnot be admitted and will be returned to their home station. For more infor-mation, contact Maj. Romano, Co. B, 3rd Battalion, 1st Special WarfareTraining Group, at DSN 236-5377, commercial (919) 396-5377.

Check prerequisites for CAAdvanced Course

Qualified Civil Affairs reserve officers who do not transfer to the CivilAffairs Branch are being unfair to their units, according to Capt. R. AlanKing, of the Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations CommandG-1. “The unit manning report does not recognize reserve Civil Affairsofficers as qualified if the officers are not currently in the Civil AffairsBranch,” King said. The misrepresentation gains greater significance con-sidering that other reports, such as the unit status report, used to judge aunit’s readiness, incorporate data from the unit manning report. Autho-rized 1,455 Civil Affairs officers, USACAPOC has only 301 officers in theCA Branch. There are currently 380 reserve officers qualified for the CABranch who have not submitted branch-transfer requests, King said. Offi-cers should branch transfer requests through their unit personnel admin-istrative center.

Current Army policy mandates a 5-8-year accession goal for all warrantofficers. The policy allows the service proponent to waive as much as 12years of active federal service for applicants. MOS 180A now has 314 of itsauthorized 364 warrant officers, and the program will be filled by the endof FY 94. Commanders should encourage their best-qualified NCOs to con-sider this program before they become ineligible by years of service. Appli-cants exceeding 12 years of active federal service may still apply and willbe considered on a case-by-case basis.

WO applicants may be ineligible by years of service

Qualified CA reserve officersshould transfer to CA Branch

50 Special Warfare

Foreign SOFSpecial Warfare

Linkages between crime and a number of ethnic conflicts, insurgencies andcivil wars increasingly present a spectrum of complex problems for law-enforcement and security forces. In the former Yugoslavia, one of the by-products of conflict has been further development of a brisk trade in drugsand arms. Local “mafias” in every former province cut out territory for theircriminal activities and have developed international ties, as well. A featureof these groups is their ethnic composition, with numerous charges andcountercharges exchanged over alleged drugs-for-arms deals and other crim-inal activities. State sponsorship of narcotics and arms trafficking has beenalleged, as well. The former Yugoslav province of Macedonia, where a smallnumber of U.S. troops have been deployed for some months, has been thetarget of a number of charges of criminal and terrorist activity, from Serbiaand Greece in particular. The president of Macedonia, for example, has beenaccused of being a heroin trafficker and using the proceeds to buy weapons.Defenders, however, say that the charges are fabrications of the Serbs andGreeks, with the “real” heroin traffickers found in the Yugoslav (Serbian)security establishment, including the Serbian Armed Forces Special Opera-tions component formed in May 1992. According to the Macedonian media,the presence of heroin and “ecstasy” laboratories on Macedonian territory isattributed to these kinds of schemes and is not associated with the Macedo-nian government. Members of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Orga-nization-Democratic Party of Macedonian National Unity terrorist organiza-tion are also said to be involved in drug trafficking with a Macedonian-Alba-nian drug mafia and Serbian traffickers. Thus, Macedonian smugglers, whowith some frequency transport heroin into the former Yugoslavia, may beaffiliated with any of several different political or profit-motivated agendas.Macedonia is well-situated to traffic in Turkish heroin but is an opium-poppy cultivator, as well. In Macedonia, opium-poppy cultivation is legal,and, according to the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Water Manage-ment, some 1,609 hectares are state-controlled, while 786 hectares are in theprivate sector. Even assuming that clandestine crops did not exist, theopportunities for illegal diversion of opium products would be substantial.Overall, the security environment in Macedonia, former Yugoslavia andother parts of Eastern Europe have acquired complexities that, aside fromtheir law-enforcement dimensions, constitute planning considerations formilitary forces operating in the area and region.

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union’s centralized security and militaryestablishments, reports of Russian and other officers participating in privateparamilitary or criminal enterprises have proliferated. Russian organizedcrime groups, for example, are reported to include former KGB personneland veterans of the war in Afghanistan, while military or paramilitary vol-unteers have been employed as provisional armed groups in civil conflicts inareas of the former USSR, in the former Yugoslavia and in the Middle East.In the latter region, the use of former Soviet KGB personnel to train pro-Ira-nian Hizbollah terrorists has been reported. Early in 1993, the bodies of fourwell-armed Russians dead from gunshot wounds were discovered near the

Crime linked to various ethnic conflicts

Reports say Russiansecurity-service

personnel free-lancing

October 1993 51

Beirut airport. They were reported to be former members of a Ministry ofInternal Affairs counterterrorist unit disbanded after the August 1991 Sovi-et coup. They had reportedly contracted to train Hizbollah personnel, thoughthe possibility that they were working for a “state” organization was leftopen, as well. While numerous details and rumors regarding the incidentwere examined, the clearest concern was expressed in the form of a question:had former military and security-service personnel “been transformed fromreal heroes into undesirable rabble, and had (they) become a mortal dangerto the society that raised them?”

Russian SOF possibly usedin counterdrug operations

The Russian military newspaper Red Star recently discussed a new Russiandocumentary film, “Black Shark,” that deals in part with the war in Afghan-istan and features footage of the KA-50 multi-role combat helicopter (NATOcode name HOKUM) and other then-top-secret equipment items tested oremployed in the conflict. The film was also said to reveal another “secret” —that military intelligence participated in counterdrug operations in the“Golden Crescent,” which includes the high-volume drug-producing states ofIran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Precise activities and locations were notgiven, but personnel involved were said to involve “active and present-dayofficers of the 15th Independent Brigade of Special Designation (Spetsnaz).”Over the last year in particular, Russian spokesmen have expressed growingconcern about the smuggling of drugs and weapons from Afghanistan to theformer Soviet central Asian republics and on to Russia. The recent revela-tion of military spetsnaz actions against narcotics trafficking may presageincreased actions against a problem recognized as a national security threat.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. and Lt. Col. Geoffrey Demarest of the ForeignMilitary Studies Office, Combined Arms Command, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

Guatemalan peace talks mayend guerrilla warfare

The on-again, off-again peace talks between the Guatemalan governmentand the communist guerrillas of the Guatemalan National RevolutionaryUnion, the URNG, could lead to a formal end of armed activities by that rev-olutionary organization. Even if an accord can be reached with the top guer-rilla echelon, however, Guatemalans have reason to doubt that it would endguerrilla warfare in their country. The URNG high command does notalways display complete control over its subordinates in the field. Some ofthe apparent lack of discipline may well be planned, allowing the URNGjefes to deny their responsibility. Guerrilla combat strength has diminishedto perhaps as low as 800, but continuing use of Mexican sanctuaries putstotal victory by the Guatemalan Army out of reach. Mexican attitudes havebeen a largely unmentioned factor in the determination of the war. In theopinion of some specialists, the Mexican government has generally turned ablind eye to the presence of Guatemalan guerrillas on Mexican soil, eventhough URNG leadership openly bases its public operations out of MexicoCity. However, it seems that the Mexican government recently decided todistance itself from the URNG. This spring, when a cottage munitions plantbelonging to the Guatemalan guerrillas blew up in Chiapas, the Mexicangovernment recognized the illegal guerrilla presence. Guatemalan and Mexi-can officials have generally identified with distinctly different ideological col-ors, and many observers in Guatemala feel that subordinate leaders in theURNG will continue to find favor among elements of the Mexican govern-ment. According to them, if this pro-guerrilla sympathy remains, it will helpthe Guatemalan guerrillas continue armed pressure against theGuatemalan state indefinitely.

52 Special Warfare

Plans unveiled for SOF medical training center

The Army Corps of Engineersrecently unveiled plans for the Spe-cial Operations Medical TrainingCenter to be built at Fort Bragg aspart of the JFK Special WarfareCenter and School.

Ground breaking for the $15-$18million project is scheduled in lateFebruary or March 1994, said Mari-on Harrison, design branch chief forthe Corps of Engineers’ Savannahdistrict. Completion is projected for1996, with the first class starting inJuly of that year.

Army Special Forces medical-sergeant candidates, as well as stu-dents from other services, will trainin the 73,739 square-foot complex.The center will have 10 classrooms,ranging from 20- to 200-studentcapacity, and a 1,000-book medicallibrary, said Maj. Robert Jones, exec-utive officer for the SOMTC. Thecomplex’s clinical area will include10 operating rooms and radiology,anatomy, laboratory and pharmacyrooms.

Approximately 500 future SFmedics will train in five classes to beconducted simultaneously in the cen-ter, Jones said. The SOMTC will bebuilt in the wooded area behind FortBragg’s Main NCO Club. — CarolJones, USASOC PAO

5th SF Group receives Valorous Unit Award

The 5th Special Forces Groupadded the Valorous Unit Awardstreamer to its colors in a ceremonyat Fort Campbell, Ky., June 11.

Approved by the Secretary of theArmy Dec. 23, 1992, the award rec-ognizes members of the 5th Groupfor extraordinary heroism in mili-

tary operations against an armedenemy during Operation DesertStorm in Iraq and Kuwait.

All soldiers assigned or attached tothe 5th Group between Jan. 17 andFeb. 28, 1991, are authorized to wearthe Valorous Unit Award ribbon.

Document to introduce SOF to conventional Army

A document scheduled for releasein January will formally introducespecial operations to the convention-al Army.

The training support package forFM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Spe-cial Operations Forces, is intended tobe an overview of special-operationsdoctrine to show how SOF fit intothe total combat picture. The pack-age will be sent to all Army schoolsand is intended as the primary vehi-cle for instructing the conventionalArmy about SOF, according to Jim

Pritchert, one of the package’s devel-opers in the SWCS 1st Battalion, 1stSpecial Warfare Training Group.

“Old hands in the special-opera-tions community will not notice anynew material in this publication,”Pritchert said. The manual isintended to help future conventional-force commanders use SOF to theirfullest extent.

Members of the SOF communitywho would like to review the pack-age and make comments or sugges-tions should contact Jim Pritchert;Attn: AOJK-GP-A-SA; USAJFK-SWCS; Fort Bragg, NC 28307.Phone DSN 239-5121, commercial(919) 432-5121.

New SF MTPs address various levels of command

The first of a series of new SpecialForces mission training plans isscheduled to be mailed to field unitsfor comment in November 1993.

ARTEP 31-805-MTP, SFGroup/Battalion, is one of fourMTPs projected to replace existingsingle-volume SF mission-specificARTEP documents producedbetween 1988 and 1990. The newseries will provide a separate MTPfor each echelon of command withinthe SF group.

ARTEP 31-805 will be distributedas a coordinating draft in Novemberto every SF group for appropriatestaffing and comment. User feedbackwill help to ensure that the MTP isan effective tool for SF units andstaffs and provides a logical methodfor training to combat standards.

Coordinating drafts for the othermanuals in the series are scheduledas follows: ARTEP 31-807-MTP, SFCompany (April 1994); ARTEP 31-807-30-MTP, SF Operational

UpdateSpecial Warfare

The Special Operations Medical Training Center

Detachment “A” (July 1994); andARTEP 31-807-34, SF SelectiveTasks (U) (October 1994).

The MTPs will provide SF unitswith a menu of training eventsand programs and suggested train-ing methods for achieving criticalmissions.

11th SF Group seeks applicants for MI slots

The Army Reserve’s 1st Battal-ion, 11th Special Forces Group inLouisville, Ky., has opportunitiesfor qualified soldiers to provide mil-itary-intelligence special operationssupport.

Positions are available in gradesof private first class to mastersergeant in MOSs 96B, 96D, 98C,98G, 98H, 98K and 31C. Ranger-and SF-qualified soldiers willing totransition to 98G and 98H, as wellas linguists in European languages,are also encouraged to apply. Formore information contact SSgt.Thomas Haynes at (317) 283-9894.

USASOC names NCO, soldier of the year

The U.S. Army Special OperationsCommand recently announced thewinners in its NCO and Soldier ofthe Year competition.

Winners were SSgt. James D. Pip-pin, a 75th Ranger Regimentinstructor from Fort Benning, Ga.,and Spec. Clare L. O’Shaughnessy,U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psycho-logical Operations Command. Bothreceived Army Certificates ofAchievement from Maj. Gen. SidneyShachnow, commander of the JFKSpecial Warfare Center and School.They also received Class-A anddress-blue uniforms and $1,000 sav-ings bonds.

Runners-up were SSgt. Byron R.Shrader, JFKSWCS, and Spec.Marshall Brooks, U.S. Army Spe-cial Forces Command. Other com-petitors were SSgt. Robert Aber-nethy, USSFC; SSgt. DouglasHiwiller, USACAPOC; Sgt. KeithR. Salo, 160th Special OperationsAviation Regiment; Spec. Kenneth

M. Decoursey, 160th SOAR; Spec.Scott Johnson, JFKSWCS; andSpec. James D. Seley, 75th RangerRegiment.

Memorial stone honors World War II Rangers

Members of the Army SpecialOperations Command dedicated amemorial stone in the JFK PlazaJuly 9 to the Rangers of the SecondWorld War.

Present-day Rangers from theRanger Regiment’s three battalions:the 1st, Fort Stewart, Ga.; 2nd, FortLewis, Wash.; and 3rd, Fort Ben-ning, Ga., stood in formation tohonor their guests, who includedmembers of the World War IIRanger Battalions’ Association.

Lt. Gen. J. T. Scott, USASOC com-mander, assured the veterans theyhad left behind a powerful and livinglegacy. “You, along with your com-rades of the OSS, the 1st Special Ser-vice Force, the 5307th CompositeUnit and the Alamo Scouts, areresponsible for reviving a tradition inthe United States military. The tra-dition of a special kind of warrior —one whose skills, courage and will-ingness to sacrifice know no equal.”

Training videos hold audience attention

You’re in charge of training yourdetachment in infiltration and exfil-tration planning, but how can youmake your class more interesting?

Training videos are effective train-ing aids that hold audience attentionand teach through visual and audiomeans. They provide the unit withrecognized experts on the subjectmatter and up-to-date doctrinalchanges.

The nearest training support cen-ter has a list of available trainingvideos and can also search for a par-ticular subject on the Defense Auto-mated Visual Information System.DAVIS will produce a printout of allrelated training videos within DoD.Videos can be ordered by their titleand production identification num-ber, or PIN.

Some SOF videos currently avail-able are: Edible Wild Plants Sur-vival Series (PIN 708290 and709852), Terrorism Series (PIN702280, 702281, 702282, and702283), and Army Civil Affairs andthe Country Team (PIN 71460).

Other SOF videos are in produc-tion: Special Forces Tabletop BaseStation Series (PIN 710038 and710105), Infiltration and ExfiltrationPlanning Series (PIN 710093,710098, and 710109), and PSYOP —The Invisible Sword (PIN 709472).

If there isn’t a training video onthe subject you want, request one beproduced. It takes about 12 monthsfrom the time funding is requesteduntil the video is completed. Instruc-tions for requesting video productioncan be found in Annex R of USASOCReg 25-2. For further information,call Diana L. Beebe, audiovisual pro-gram officer, at DSN 239-8853/9959,commercial (919) 432-8853/9959. —Diana L. Beebe, JFKSWCS

SWCS employees selectedfor leadership program

Two civilian employees of theJFK Special Warfare Center andSchool were selected in July for the1993 Women’s Executive Leader-ship Program.

Martha Levister, an instructionalsystems specialist in the Directorateof Training and Doctrine, and DoeAnn Keane, a statistician in theDirectorate of Evaluation and Stan-dardization, have been selected forthe 12-month program. WELP con-sists of core training in subjects suchas management and leadership, fol-lowed by 30- and 60-day develop-mental assignments with otheragencies and a one-week shadowingassignment to allow participants toobserve successful senior employeesat work.

WELP was created in 1984 to pro-vide employees with managerialexperience early in their careers. Itis open to male and female civiliansin grades GS-11 and -12.

October 1993 53

54 Special Warfare

Godwin’s Saga: A CommandoEpic. By Kenneth Macksey. London:Brassey’s Defence Publishers, 1987.ISBN: 0-08-034742-8. 149 pages. $18.

Retired British Army major Ken-neth Macksey’s dramatic account ofyoung John Godwin and the fatedCheckmate commando mission intothe fjords of German-occupied Nor-way during World War II makes afascinating and a bit depressingreading. Godwin’s Saga deserves aplace on the reading list of special-operations soldiers, especially thoseinvolved in small-boat amphibiousoperations.

Macksey tells an interesting tale.He traces the life of John Godwinfrom his native Argentina (he was ofEnglish parents) to his enlistment inthe Royal Navy, and then on to hisrole as a naval commando officer incombined operations targetedagainst Norway. The author detailshis assignment to Operation Check-mate, in which he and five othercommandos would be dropped off theNorwegian coast in a smaller boat bya fast motor-torpedo boat, or MTB,set up a mission-support site on anuninhibited shore and move fromthere in canoes to raid local enemyinstallations with limpet mines andother devices.

Unfortunately, as Mackseyrelates, the mission began to fallapart almost as soon as the teamwas launched into Norwegianwaters. Although they managed tosink one small German vessel, God-win and his teammates were quicklycaptured, imprisoned in Norway andthen transported to German concen-tration camps, where they died justweeks before Allied forces liberatedthe camps.

The book’s value is found at sev-

eral levels. On the surface, it illus-trates the value of planning, prepa-ration, training and correcting ofdeficiencies noted during rehearsal.During a rehearsal for the opera-tion, Godwin and his team had trou-ble with overheated bearings in theboat that was to take them into thefjords. The problem occurredbecause the MTB towed their boatat 20 knots, when their boat wasdesigned for a maximum speed of 7knots.

Godwin and his colleagues essen-tially wished away the problem, andtheir boat was unable to moveunder its own power just a fewmiles from its drop-off point in Nor-wegian waters. This inhibited theirmobility, decreased the planned tar-geting window, forced them to havecontact with civilians (which wasprohibited), caused the team tosplit, forced them into an evasivesituation for which they were notprepared and ultimately led to theircapture by German troops. When

the one party, positioned at the mis-sion-support site, went into evasion,they failed to destroy their boat,maps and other critical documents,all of which fell into German hands.There was no established rat linefor this party to use to get to Swe-den, and they were betrayed by aNorwegian whom they had askedfor directions. The other party wascaptured when a German sea patrolnoticed them moving around anabandoned house on a island thatwas to be their rendezvous with theMTB a few days hence.

The author also illuminates thetension between military planners(the British) who want to carry outdestructive raids in occupied territo-ry to throw their enemy off balanceand representatives of the govern-ment in exile (the Norwegians) whofear enemy retaliation and otherhardships visited upon their coun-trymen as a result of such raiding.He also explores the raiding-for-thesake-of-raiding mentality versus thenotion of raiding for defined purpos-es only. On a slightly different level,Macksey does a good job of illustrat-ing the consequences of failure forspecial-operations forces, as hedescribes the torments of Godwinand his party, first in German cus-tody in Norway and then in the hellof Sachsenhausen and other Naziconcentration camps. Mackseydescribes, for example, their beingforced to march 48 kilometers perday, in a malnourished state, atSachsenhausen to test shoes for theGerman military.

Godwin’s Saga is a brief andunadorned injection of realism into abody of literature dominated by rosysuccess stories. Appreciating risk andlearning from failure are importantsurvival traits for special-operations

Book ReviewsSpecial Warfare

personnel, and Macksey’s book is agood addition to the library of theserious student of special operations.

Maj. William H. Burgess IIIUSSOCOMMacDilll AFB, Fla.

Raiders or Elite Infantry? TheChanging Role of the U.S. ArmyRangers from Dieppe to Grena-da. By David W. Hogan Jr. Westport,Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1992.ISBN: 0-313-26803-7. 296 pages.$47.95.

In this especially well-researchedbook, David Hogan presents thedilemma unique to Ranger units:Are they special-operations forces orhighly trained infantry? Hogandetails the struggle between thesepositions from World War II toGrenada. He highlights the debatewith both historic example andaccounts of leading personalitiesfrom the battalion level to the the-ater headquarters and within thehalls of the Pentagon. Each of theseleaders has his own view as to thepurpose of a Ranger unit, its employ-ment and its position within the con-text of a mass-produced, egalitarianArmy. The author’s position as anhistorian in the U.S. Army Center ofMilitary History gives him uniqueinsight to this continuous problem.

Hogan contends that the Rangerswere developed primarily from thefrustration of Allied defeats in WorldWar II. This frustration caused theAmerican Army’s senior leadershipto attempt to develop a capabilityalong the lines of the British com-mandos. This effort had two purpos-es: to demonstrate an offensive capa-bility to the American public and togain a core of combat experience toprovide leavening to the mass-devel-oped forces. The Army’s senior lead-ership did not consider the Rangersas SOF.

Based on this ad hoc start, theearly Ranger leaders could notestablish a specialized doctrine, a C2system nor a force structure to sup-port their units. Instead the Rangers

were forced to rely on the imagina-tion and benevolence of the theatercommanders to provide employment.This lack of top-down support led tothe Rangers’ being held in a state oflimbo. When a real special operation,such as Pointe du Hoc, was requiredin a theater, the Ranger forces weretrained and resourced. Conversely,when no operation loomed on thehorizon, the Rangers were employedas very good line infantry or dis-banded. In either case, the core ofexperience was lost to the Army.

This book is especially valuable tothose SOF soldiers who are forcedevelopers or members of unifiedheadquarters. It provides a series of

issues which we must address to theconventional Army to ensure thattoday’s SOF are properly integratedinto the battlefield. Hogan’s choice ofhistorical examples clearly demon-strates errors that the communityhas made in the past.

The first of these issues is articula-tion of a clear purpose for a special-operations force. An example is pro-vided in which force developersattempting to retain Ranger struc-ture suggested that the force could beused in paramilitary operations likeSpecial Forces. This suggestion wasaccepted; however, the force retainedwas ill-equipped to accomplish thetask. This failure caused the conven-

tional Army to once again questionthe relevance of this special force.

Following closely on this issue isthe question of SOF doctrine. Hoganrepeatedly demonstrates that theRangers’ lack of an Army-accepteddoctrine left their operations at thewhim of the senior conventionalcommanders. This lack of doctrinalunderpinning has caused Ranger-like units to be continuously rein-vented, employed and disbandedduring the last five decades.

Hogan’s final issue is that of ade-quate organization. Ranger develop-ers, in an effort not only to “sell theirproduct” at the least cost, but also toreduce the battalion’s operationaltail, repeatedly under-resourced C2,liaison and sustainment functions.Under-resourcing led to liaison offi-cers of company-grade rank attempt-ing to compete with general-officerliaisons for the theater commander’sear. Further, lean sustainmentrequired the battalions to consumeresources from conventional units.This parasitic relationship furtheralienated conventional commanders.

The book is an excellent read andprovides the SOF professional withperspective on developing and main-taining our forces. In these times ofshrinking budgets and demands formeasurable capabilities, Hogan pro-vides a road map on how not to artic-ulate our message.

Maj. Robert D. LewisODCSOPS, HQDAWashington, D.C.

Swords of Lightning: SpecialForces and the Changing Face ofWarfare. By Terry White. Washing-ton, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1992. ISBN: 0-08-040976-8 (hardcover). 292 pages.$25.

You’re leaving tomorrow for a 30-day deployment and you need some-thing to read. So there you are in thebookstore, up to the eyeballs in spe-cial-operations wanna-be books, timerunning out, when suddenly, a slick,glossy, full-color dust jacket catchesyour eye. Looking closer, you see

October 1993 55

what could almost be a recruitingposter, with several SEALS risingfrom the depths looking for trouble,the book’s title boldly emblazonedwith the Special Forces’ shoulderpatch. It looks impressive. Con-vinced that your mission has beensuccessful, you snatch the book fromthe shelf and, hesitating only slight-ly to pay the required $25, dash outthe store.

Later, long after the aging C-141has hurled itself into the sky, youpull out your new book and settle infor some in-flight reading. Beforelong, though, a terrible feeling creepsover you — originating from the wal-let area. You realize that somethingis horribly wrong.

Could this happen to you? It couldif you like your facts straight aboutU.S. special operations and buySwords of Lightning. This book isadvertised as a “the first completeaccount of the evolution and deploy-ment of Special Forces.” It is defi-nitely not.

Although containing interestingand informative portions, Swords ofLightning ultimately falls far shortof its billing as either a history orcomplete assessment of special oper-ations for several reasons. The mainreason is that the author’s researchconcerning U.S. special operations isall too often simply wrong, and hisassessments of those missions areflawed, prejudiced and uninformed.

There are other reasons, as well.The historical sketches that theauthor uses to illustrate aspects ofspecial-operations capabilities aretoo shallow to really capture the his-torical relevance or context of theoperation. Next, the book’s scope islimited to essentially U.S. andBritish special operations, with somecursory discussion of other special-operations forces. From the introduc-tion on, the book lacks a clearmethodology that outlines theauthor’s purpose and how he intendsto achieve it.

The book’s terminology is oftenconfusing. The term “SpecialForces,” for example, is used repeat-edly, both generically and in refer-

ence to U.S. Special Forces. Thereare no established criteria usedobjectively throughout by the authorfor assessing the special operationsdiscussed within the book, defeatingany claim to real analytical contribu-tion. Readers familiar with the artic-ulation of U.S. Army special-opera-tions forces’ roles and missions asoutlined in FM 100-25 will be disap-pointed at the author’s lack of preci-sion and distinction in his dissectionof special-operations missions. Infact, the author never makes a cleardistinction between special-opera-tions forces and contingency forces,which he labels “quick-reactionforces.”

The strongest portions of the bookare those with which the author isclearly most familiar, British specialoperations. White’s accounts essen-tially match those primary and sec-ondary sources from which his exam-ples are drawn. However, it is appar-ent that the author has chosen tohighlight the successes of Britishefforts while glossing over, or ignor-ing, problems that they, like allforces, have encountered.

Not so when dealing with U.S. spe-cial operations. Indeed, White is notat all reluctant to catalogue real orinaccurately assessed mistakes fromour experience. His listed research

sources include virtually none ofthose publications that have becomestandard references for U.S. special-operations history and analysis, e.g.,Stanton’s Green Berets at War.

White simply gets it wrong toomany times when dealing with thehistory of U.S. special-operationsforces and events. These errorsrange from the irritating, sloppytype to more serious misjudgmentsthat reflect an incomplete under-standing of the application of U.S.special-operations forces. Needexamples? Well, certainly a “com-plete account” should get the region-al orientation of U.S. SF groupsright, the leadership developmentrole of the U.S. Army Ranger Schoolstraight, the fact that the 75thRangers don’t do “LRRP,” and thatthe 82nd Airborne Division is decid-edly part of the U.S. Army’s conven-tional force structure, not ARSOF.

The more serious mistakes, how-ever, revolve around the author’sinaccurate and unjustified negativeconclusions regarding U.S. special-operations from the Vietnam era for-ward. U.S. counterinsurgency suc-cesses, often lost within the overallcontext of the failed Vietnam effort,are discounted by White. The suc-cess of the Civilian IrregularDefense Group program, as firstapplied a classic application of popu-lation-and-terrain denial to an insur-gent, is not only unacknowledged,but derided.

This trend toward generalizationsand fault-finding on U.S. specialoperations continues throughout.His section on Operation UrgentFury in Grenada, which highlightsthe well-known mistakes thataccompanied that experience, con-cludes with the unattributed obser-vation that it was “nothing less thana military disaster.” A career SpecialForces sergeant-major who wasclosely involved with the operationmade the opposing observation thatwith Governor Scoon and family suc-cessfully secured, all American citi-zens secured, and minimal U.S.casualties, it is hard to look at theoperation as a military disaster.

56 Special Warfare

White’s facts regarding Just Causeare just as biased and laced witherrors, particularly concerningactions around Torrijos-Tocumenairport. It was, of course, SpecialForces soldiers from the 7th SFGroup, supported by AC-130s, whodefended and denied the PacoraRiver bridge to the PanamanianDefense Force, not Task Force Pacif-ic. Nor was “much of the fighting” atTorrijos airport conducted in thelounges as White records. It was the82nd Airborne Division that liberat-ed the Renancer prison near Gam-boa, and 28 C-141s were absolutelynot parachuted into the bogs sur-rounding the Panamanian airports(hopefully an editing error).

So if you, too, are tired of reading“definitive major works” that turnout to be laced with bogus informa-tion, do yourself a favor and skip thisone. If you’re interested in theBritish experience with special oper-ations, consider borrowing it fromyour buddy when he gets back fromthe deployment. Since this appearsto have been White’s first book,maybe he would’ve been betteradvised to have taken a smaller biteand stayed with material with whichhe was presumably more familiar —British SOF and their experiences.

Maj. John F. MulhollandFort Bragg, N.C.

War, Peace and Victory: Strat-egy and Statecraft for the NextCentury. By Colin S. Gray. NewYork: Touchstone Books (Simon &Schuster), 1990. ISBN 0-671-60695-6; 0-671-74029-6 (paper); 442 pages.$12.95.

Colin S. Gray, one of America’sdeans of diplomacy and strategy, hassucceeded where others have failed.In a book which is destined tobecome a classic, Gray performs amasterful job in exploring andexplaining why nations do what theydo in modern times. By way of hiscomparisons and analyses, he high-lights today’s international eventsand projects them into a possible

American future. Through the use ofhistorical analogy, the author drawsparallels between modern nation-states and those of yesteryear. In sodoing, he highlights cogent eventsand trends for further analysis andexamination.

Be forewarned, this is not a bookfor those with only a passing interestin the arts of statecraft, war anddiplomacy. If your depth of concernfor international events begins andends with CNN news or your dailynewspaper, this book may not be foryou. The issues that Gray examinesare complex. His analyses go deep tothe heart of issues seldom well-examined by the American media. In

other words, the book is not writtenfor neophytes.

This book is of particular value tosenior officers because it examineswar, and the role of war, from anational perspective. Gray uses thewritings of Clausewitz, Jomini,Luttwak, Mahan and other strategicthinkers as starting points for thecomparison of differing historicalAmerican strategies in the interna-tional forum. This methodologyworks. Gray’s effort seems to beaimed predominantly at graduate-level international-affairs studentsand policy makers.

Gray’s approach to his subjectreflects a more holistic, and there-fore more easily comprehensibleapproach than this reviewer hasseen used previously. Most scholarstend to specificity at the cost of over-all understanding. Too much detailtends to obscure the larger, andoften more important picture. Graydoes not fall into this trap, and he isto be applauded for making thisdeparture from the norm. By takingthis approach to his subject, he isfree to theorize concerning the inter-relationships of culture, geographyand strategy. What he says makessense.

Although the entire book hasvalue, Gray’s chapters on technologyand war, coalition warfighting andnational security policy are particu-larly trenchant. America’s recentconflict with Iraq, in coalition withother nation-states, and the adventof the emerging “New World Order,”make his observations especially top-ical and interesting. Gray seems tovalidate the U.S. Army’s emphasison the care and training of its sol-diers when he states that, “All ofmilitary history shows that superiormilitary method applied by dedicat-ed warriors is more important thantechnological advantage — all otherfactors being tolerably equal.” Fromthis perspective it is clear that tech-nology was not our greatest advan-tage during the Gulf War. Our great-est asset continues to be well-trainedand motivated soldiers.

This is a book that will not growdusty on my bookshelf at home. Iexpect to be referring to it often foryears to come.

Lt. Col. Robert B. Adolph Jr.Joint Special Operations Cmd.Fort Bragg, N.C.

October 1993 57

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