Special WarfareThe Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

PB 80–94–3 July 1994 Vol. 7, No. 3

JTF Haiti

From the CommandantSpecial Warfare

The ability to deploy and sustain air,land, and sea forces to any region of theworld for missions spanning the opera-tional continuum is known as force projec-tion. U.S. force projection emphasizes rapiddeployment, quick termination of conflictson terms favorable to the United States,and minimal casualties, both friendly andenemy.

Force projection is the process by whichunits plan, deploy, conduct operations,conclude operations and redeploy. It isnecessary in all four stages of AirLandoperations:

Stage I - Detection and Preparation. Afterassessing the mission, enemy, terrain,troops, and time available, units are tai-lored and prepared for deployment. To theextent possible, the senior commanderdevelops a clear definition of the desiredend state and determines the correct mix offorces and their proper arrival sequence.

Stage II - Establishing the Conditions forDecisive Operations. After initial deploy-ment, the commander focuses on buildingthe capabilities of his force. If operationshave not yet begun, he may attempt to gaina positional advantage or to build up forceto deter a potential adversary.

Stage III - Decisive Operations. Forcesaccomplish the mission rapidly, interactingwith allied services and forces from othernations.

Stage IV - Force Reconstitution. Unitsresolve the conflict, restore combat power,prepare for future operation and redeploy.

Global force projections of Army unitswill always be joint operations with AirForce, Navy or commercial strategic lift,and Army units must maintain a state ofreadiness with an emphasis on propertraining.

Sustainment of force projection requiresa joint theater-logistics structure capable ofjoint responsibilities. This structure mustbe established simultaneously with those

for operational- and tactical-level logistics.The concept of force projection must be

included when developing doctrine, train-ing, leadership, organizational structure,and materiel. In doctrine, force projectionwill provide the entire force with a commonterminology and established procedures.Proper training will prepare the force andenhance its readiness. In the organization-al structure, the basic force-projection unitwill comprise elements from the active com-ponent. The Army must continue to exploitthe technological strengths of its weaponsand equipment; these will help compensatefor the possibility that smaller numbers offorces may be required to fight, even whenoutnumbered.

The Army has demonstrated its ability toproject forces in the recent past. Its futurechallenge is to maintain and enhance thisexpertise in its transition to a smaller,increasingly CONUS-based force.

Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow

PB 80–94–3 ContentsJuly 1994 Special Warfare Vol. 7, No 3

Commander & CommandantMaj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow

EditorJerry D. Steelman

Associate EditorSylvia McCarley

Graphics & DesignBruce S. Barfield

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:Gordon R. SullivanGeneral, United States ArmyChief of Staff

Official:

Milton H. HamiltonAdministrative Assistant to theSecretary of the Army

06299

Headquarters, Department of the Army

V E R I T A S

STREBIL

A

E T

Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly ofthe United States Army John F. Kennedy Special WarfareCenter and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Itsmission is to promote the professional development ofspecial-operations forces by providing a forum for theexamination of both established doctrine and new ideas.

Views expressed herein are those of the author, and donot necessarily reflect official Army position. Thispublication does not supersede any information presentedin other official Army publications.

Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited, andshould be addressed to: Editor, Special Warfare,USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000. Telephone:DSN 239-5703 or commercial (910) 432-5703. SpecialWarfare reserves the right to edit all material.

Published works may be reprinted, except wherecopyrighted, provided credit is given to Special Warfareand the author.

Official distribution is limited to active and reservespecial-operations units. Individuals desiring a privatesubscription should forward their requests to:Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government PrintingOffice, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Features2 JTF Haiti: A United Nations Foreign Internal Defense

Missionby Lt. Col. Stephen M. Epstein, Lt. Col. Robert S. Cronin and Col.James G. Pulley

10 JTF Haiti: Lasting Impressionsby Navy Lt. Tonya H. Wakefield

12 U.N. Military Civic Action in Cambodiaby Lt. Col. Robert B. Adolph Jr.

19 International Affairs Symposium Examines Regional Problemsby Norvell B. DeAtkine

22 Psychological Operations in Desert Shield, Desert Stormand Urban Freedomby Col. Jeffrey B. Jones

30 Military Coordination Center: Forward Component of Provide Comfortby MSgt. Linda Brandon

32 Threat Weapons and Weapons Technologies: Implicationsfor Army SOFby Julie M. Merchant

40 Innovative Means of Achieving Innovative Technologyby Rand Ellis

43 Officer Skills: From Technical and Tactical to a Sense of Humorby Col. Mike Burns

46 Interview: Retired Lt. Gen. William P. Yarborough

Departments49 Enlisted Career Notes50 Officer Career Notes52 Foreign SOF54 Update56 Book Reviews

2 Special Warfare

Thursday, Oct. 14, 1993, Port-au-Prince, Haiti — On this day, Cana-dian Air Force engineers, U.S. Navy

Seabees, Haitian military engineers andpublic-works personnel should have begunthe renovation of the Lycée AntenorFirmin, a boys’ public high school locatednext door to the Ministry of Justice.Instead, a hundred meters away, JusticeMinister Guy Malary and two of his staffwere machine-gunned by paramilitaryauxiliaries of the Port-au-Prince police

force. The contrast between what shouldhave happened and what actually hap-pened dramatizes the demise of a good for-eign-internal-defense mission that was inthe right place at the wrong time.

Jean-Bertrand Aristide was electedpresident of Haiti on Dec. 16, 1990, by 67percent of the vote — the largest majorityfor any head of state then serving in theWestern Hemisphere. Two months later,he took office as the first democraticallyelected head of state in the history of

JTF Haiti:A United NationsForeign Internal DefenseMissionby Lt. Col. Stephen M. Epstein, Lt. Col. Robert S. Croninand Col. James G. Pulley

A crewman on the USSHarlan County guides aforklift ful l of suppliesaboard the ship in prepara-tion for the humanitarian mission to Haiti.

DoD photo

July 1994 3

Haiti, the second oldest republic in thehemisphere, independent since 1804. Afteronly seven months in office, Aristide wasdeposed in the bloody military coup ofSept. 30, 1991, which ushered in a periodof violence, international isolation andeconomic misery.

Nearly two years later, on July 3, 1993,Lt. Gen. Raoul Cédras, commander in chiefof the Forces Armées d’Haiti, or FAD’H,the Haitian armed forces, bowed to thepressure of a United Nations embargo andjoined President Aristide in signing theGovernors Island Accord, a 10-step plan toreturn Haiti to democratic rule. On Sept.23, 1993, the U.N. Security Council passedResolution 867 authorizing an expandedmission in support of the transition. Thir-teen days later, the advance party of JointTask Force Haiti flew into Port-au-PrinceInternational Airport.

MissionThe more general U.N. mission in Haiti

had begun a year earlier, in September1992, with the arrival of 18 observers tomonitor and report on human-rights abus-es. By the time the Governors IslandAccord was signed, the number ofobservers had increased to about 200, andthey were called the International CivilianMission, or ICM. At the heart of theaccord lay the need to remove the Haitianpolice from the control of the Haitian mili-tary. To accomplish this, two other compo-nents were added to the existing U.N. mis-sion. The first was the International PoliceMonitors, or IPM, consisting of a nucleusof 100 Royal Canadian Mounted Policeand 476 French gendarmes, with addition-al police from Argentina, Algeria andother French-speaking U.N. memberstates, whose mission was to establish andtrain an independent, professional, civil-ian police force. The second componentwas Joint Task Force Haiti, consisting of

599 U.S. and 110 Canadian military per-sonnel, whose mission statement read,“On order, JTF Haiti deploys to Haitiunder United Nations operational controland conducts military training andhumanitarian/civic action programs insupport of Haitian democratization.” TheIPM was to begin work after PresidentAristide’s planned return on Oct. 30. TheJTF mission, projected to last 179 days,was to be under way by the middle ofOctober.

The JTF Haiti mission fit the classicFID profile, undertaking civic-action pro-grams designed to help a friendly govern-ment solidify its position, protect itselffrom subversion and lawlessness andmobilize popular support by improvingconditions for its people. The missionoffered a unique opportunity to demon-strate the viability of a complete packageof special-operations forces, calling for ablend of the specific capabilities of soldiersin Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psy-chological Operations.

Special ForcesThe task of providing training to profes-

sionalize the FAD’H was assigned to 100soldiers of the 2nd Battalion, 3rd SpecialForces Group. Training was to begin withHaitian troops garrisoned in the Port-au-Prince area, the country’s political centerof gravity. Later, 12-man A-detachmentswould deploy throughout the country towork with soldiers in the eight remainingmilitary districts. In the more remoteareas, these trainers, together withHaitian troops, would also coordinate andexecute small-scale humanitarian andcivic-action projects.

The first step in designing the trainingprogram was to determine the skillsappropriate for a reformed Haitian mili-tary that had given up its police functionand had shifted its purpose to serving the

4 Special Warfare

needs of Haitian constitutional authority.Training was to focus on coastal and fron-tier security, disaster relief and search-and-rescue operations. Soldiers would betaught land navigation, operations indarkness, patrolling techniques, rap-pelling, helicopter-supported operationsand battlefield trauma treatment. Theywould learn discipline and pride throughtraining in physical fitness, drill and cere-monies, military appearance and deport-ment, the chain of command and the roleof a soldier in a democracy. The objectiveof this training would be to establish anarmy respected for its ability to serve andprotect Haitian society instead of onefeared for its ability to terrorize that soci-ety at gunpoint.

The goal of reforming the Haitian armyinto a force respectful of human rights,loyal to its chain of command and respon-sible to constitutional authority couldclearly not be completed in six months.However, the Special Forces soldiers couldhave convinced the soldiers of the FAD’Hthat they would benefit from committingthemselves to the process. A more profes-sional army is better able to feed, clothe,

house, pay and care for its members andenjoys higher morale and prestige.

The most compelling reason, however,for Haitian soldiers to want to profession-alize themselves was fear: They held on totheir privileged position by terrorizing theHaitian population. During his presiden-cy, Aristide took political steps to under-mine the power of the military. In turn,the military, fearing that the tiger it wasriding was getting out of control, tightenedits grip with a coup d’etat. A conspicuousprofessionalization program would haveoffered Haitian soldiers an opportunity torehabilitate themselves in the eyes of thepublic, to relax their grip and to dismountfrom the tiger in safety. Working andtraining side by side with professional rolemodels of discipline, integrity, compe-tence, toughness and dedication to duty,the Haitian soldiers could have learned totake pride in these virtues and to buildtheir self-respect and public image uponthem. Once the FAD’H had become inter-ested in professionalizing itself, follow-onmilitary training missions could have com-pleted the task.

Civil AffairsA heavy Civil Affairs involvement was

required for designing, coordinating andmanaging the humanitarian and civic-action components of the JTF Haiti mis-sion. HCA projects were intended to cre-ate small but sustainable improvementsin the lives of the Haitian people. Medicalassistance, for example, focused on pro-viding training to health-care providersrather than on treating patients. FiveCanadians and 36 Americans — commu-nity health nurses, preventive-medicinetechnicians, general practitioners, envi-ronmental health specialists, an entomol-ogist, and a veterinarian — were drawnfrom all services of the armed forces.They would work with the Ministry of

A Special Forces instructorteaches land navigation toa group of foreign soldiers.

U.S. Army photo

July 1994 5

Health and the University of Haiti,teaching public health to medical andnursing students and developing a train-ing program for health-service providersin the field. Even before the arrival of theadvance party, Civil Affairs officers incountry had begun to establish the neces-sary contacts with Haitian authoritiesand experts to help the medical staffdevise a plan that would meet Haitianneeds and that would work harmoniouslywith existing Haitian institutions.

Engineering HCA projects focused on therenovation of schools as a way of making amodest but lasting contribution to Haiti’sfuture. These projects also served as a sym-bol of the friendly intent of the U.N. mis-sion and as an opportunity for the FAD’Hto demonstrate a new commitment to pro-moting the interests of the people of Haiti.Working with the Haitian ministries ofEducation, Public Works, and Health, aswell as with concerned Haitian engineersand architects, Civil Affairs officers puttogether a list of eight schools and one hos-pital to be renovated in the Port-au-Princearea. They would have established coordi-nation between their Haitian points of con-tact, the U.S. Navy Seabees and CanadianAir Force engineers who were to completethe work with the Public Works Ministryand FAD’H military engineers.

The medical and engineering projectswere phased to begin in Port-au-Princeand later extend throughout the country.As activities became more decentralized,16 soldiers of E Company, 96th CivilAffairs Battalion, organized into fourdirect-support teams and deployed intooutlying regions, were to coordinate theseprojects with local authorities. They wouldalso survey the needs and the resources ofthe outlying regions in an effort to identifyadditional worthwhile projects.

Civil Affairs carries doctrinal responsibil-ity for liaison with local authorities, inter-

national organizations and U.S. agencies.Although the JTF Haiti liaison officers hadonly begun to develop their relationshipswhen the U.N. mission unraveled, theirroles were validated during their brief peri-od of operation.

Field-grade officers from the ArmyReserve’s 358th Civil Affairs Brigadewere selected to serve as liaison officerswith five activities: the office of theDeputy for Peacekeeping Operations, orDPKO, at U.N. headquarters in NewYork; the U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince; the IPM; the ICM; and the FAD’Hgeneral staff. The ICM liaison officer wasoriginally expected to extend his coverageto nongovernmental organizations, theU.S. Information Service, and the U.S.Agency for International Development, asthe mission matured. Instead, he became

Training local health-careproviders is one way inwhich medical civic-actionprograms can improve thelives of the host-nationpopulation.

U.S. Army photo

6 Special Warfare

the JTF representative to the U.N. securi-ty-management team. The FAD’H liaisonofficer was shifted to the U.N. specialenvoy when the FAD’H proved to beunwilling to communicate.

Each liaison officer found that the agen-cy to which he was dispatched was eagerfor a direct channel of communicationwith the JTF commander. The officerassigned to U.N. headquarters learnedthat the DPKO military adviser was espe-cially pleased with the new link. Becausethe DPKO adviser had been receivingreports only though routine U.N. distribu-tion channels, with his attention dividedamong 70,000 troops deployed around theworld, he had found it difficult to keepabreast of developments in Haiti.

Each liaison officer discovered that hiscivilian background was invaluable inestablishing rapport. At the U.S.Embassy, where the staff was overloadedby the additional needs of the U.N. mis-sion, the JTF liaison officer began coordi-nating support requirements. He wasimmediately productive because of theexperience he had gained as a reservistduring a two-week tour in the embassy

just before the 1991 coup. The ICM liaisonofficer defused an initial hostility to allthings military by stressing his status as a“citizen soldier” reservist and his civilianinvolvement with the American RedCross. Drawing on his credentials as aPhiladelphia assistant district attorneywith experience “on the street,” the IPMliaison established a bond with the RoyalCanadian Mounted Police. The remainingliaison officer had expected to use thecross-cultural experience he had gained asan anthropologist to improve communica-tions with the FAD’H. Instead, he found ituseful in the unfamiliar, interculturalworld of the United Nations.

The JTF commander met with his liai-son officers daily. More than just occasionsfor liaison reports and the commander’sguidance, the meetings became true semi-nars and valuable additions to the mis-sion’s planning and analysis process. Theliaison officers took turns organizing eachday’s agenda around a theme, moderatingdebates and keeping discussions on track.These sessions were freewheelingexchanges of ideas and information thathelped the liaison officers to understandthe commander’s intent, allowed the com-mander to test his thoughts on a friendlyyet critical audience, and enabled every-one to view the daily events in a clearerperspective.

Psychological operationsHaiti offered an ideal environment for

PSYOP employment: Literacy is low, andHaitian society relies on word-of-mouthcommunication. Official broadcasts andpublications are viewed with suspicion.Rumors are the preferred source of infor-mation, and their credibility is judged byhow well the listener knows the personrepeating them.

A military information support team of10 soldiers from the 9th Battalion, 4th

U.S. Army photo

A U.S. soldier and a Thaicivilian work together duringan engineering civic-actionprogram.

July 1994 7

Psychological Operations Group, wasscheduled to deploy on D-21 to begin aninformation campaign for three audiences.To the Haitian military, it would commu-nicate the benefits of professionalization.To the police, it would communicate thedesirability of separation from the army.And to the population at large, it wouldcommunicate confidence in the democraticprocess. A comprehensive publicity pro-gram using radio, television and newspa-pers was designed to support the medical-and engineering-assistance projects. TheU.S. Information Service, staffed by onlytwo public-affairs officers, prepared to wel-come the members of the team and tomake its facilities available to them.

Unfortunately, the U.S. and the U.N.never became players in the informationcampaign. The deployment of PSYOP per-sonnel was delayed first by the U.S. coun-try team in Haiti and later by the Officeof the Secretary of Defense. The reluc-tance to use PSYOP stemmed partly froma concern that “psychological operations”would be perceived badly by the interna-tional community and partly from anuneasiness that PSYOP might be associ-ated with “propaganda.” Changes in ter-minology were debated: The militaryinformation support team was renamedan information support team and, finally,a public-awareness liaison, or PAL. Per-haps, too, the country team and the Officeof the Secretary of Defense were guidedby a faith that the truth would be its ownbest advertisement.

In fact, the truth was never communi-cated. The first four soldiers of PAL didnot arrive in Haiti until D-1, the daybefore the USS Harlan County attemptedto dock in Port-au-Prince. This was longafter any effective information-manage-ment actions could have been taken. Bythen, the opponents of President Aristidewere firmly in control of the flow of infor-

mation, and the U.S. and the U.N. simplydid not compete.

ProblemsAs advance-party personnel continued

to coordinate the military professionaliza-tion and HCA projects, they encounteredincreasing resistance. The FAD’H generalstaff interpreted the word “moderniza-tion,” appearing in U.N. Resolution 867, tomean that the Haitian army should begiven more and better lethal weapons sys-tems. Attempts to schedule professional-ization training were repeatedly counteredby requests for tanks, self-propelledartillery, attack helicopters and fighter-bombers. The FAD’H employed a varietyof stalling tactics. At meetings, their rep-resentatives filibustered, withheld infor-mation and denied having the authority totake any constructive action. Understand-ings reached at one meeting evaporated bythe next meeting. It became clear that theJTF was operating in a political climatethat the diplomatic strategists had neitherpredicted nor planned for.

Military planners, assuming that thesigning of the Governors Island Accord

Soldiers of the 4th PSYOPGroup examine materialsbeing developed for use inan information campaign.

U.S. Army photo

8 Special Warfare

meant that both the Aristide and FAD’Hfactions had reached a willingness to coop-erate, expected the mission to be carriedout in a permissive environment. However,President Aristide’s heated rhetoric contin-ued, uniting factions opposed to hisregime. At the same time, members of theFAD’H remained reluctant to surrendertheir power and profit and genuinelyfeared for their lives should PresidentAristide return to power. Without examin-ing in detail the motivations and the mutu-al mistrust of these factions, it is sufficientto say that neither side cooperated fully inthe transition to a democratic government.

The Governors Island Accord had estab-lished a time line for this transition: OnOct. 15, key members of the FAD’H were toresign; on Oct. 30, President Aristide wasto return to Haiti. These milestones cameto be seen as deadlines. Even though diplo-matic progress stalled, the deployment forJTF Haiti continued as scheduled. Diplo-mats hoped the presence of a U.N. militaryforce would somehow drag the diplomaticprocess forward and create a more secureenvironment. Instead, diplomatic progressremained stalled, and the environmentbecame even more dangerous.

The JTF thus encountered a situationmuch different from the one for which ithad been configured. Military planners hadcrafted a task organization to accomplishits objectives in a permissive, cooperativeenvironment. Security of the U.N. militaryforce was to have been the responsibility ofthe FAD’H. Soldiers of JTF Haiti were per-mitted to ship but not to carry side arms.When the deteriorating environmentreached the semipermissive stage, it wastoo late to reconfigure the force packageand impossible to clear a politically sensi-tive increase in defensive-weapons capabili-ty with the diplomats of the U.S. countryteam, the United Nations, and the de factomilitary government of Haiti.

The violent demonstrations by thearmed paramilitary organizations thatgreeted the USS Harlan County in Port-au-Prince harbor on D-Day, Oct. 11, 1993,made it clear that the circumstances incountry had changed dramatically fromthose reported and upon which plans hadbeen based. The U.N. mission began todissolve rapidly. On Tuesday, Oct. 12, theship was ordered to depart, still loadedwith the personnel and materiel needed tobegin the training, medical and construc-tion projects. The next day, the Frenchgovernment withheld a contingent of gen-darmes scheduled to join the IPM. Thurs-day morning, Oct. 14, the Canadian gov-ernment withdrew the Royal CanadianMounted Police, and in the afternoon,paramilitary auxiliaries assassinated Jus-tice Minister Malary. Some members ofthe ICM began catching flights out ofPort-au-Prince International Airport. Oth-ers convoyed overland into the DominicanRepublic, fortunately without incident.The convoys had to travel without securitybecause the U.N. military contingent hadnot been allowed to bring into Haiti suffi-cient personnel or weapons to protectthem.

Saturday morning, Oct. 16, after thefinal two chartered aircraft — filled withwomen, children and nonessential U.N.civilians — had departed, a U.S. Navy C-9Nightingale arrived at Port-au-PrinceInternational Airport to extract theadvance party of JTF Haiti and to unloada team of 25 well-armed U.S. Marinesbrought in to reinforce the AmericanEmbassy’s security detachment — theright force package for an environmentthat had turned violent.

ConclusionsSince the events of October 1993, Haiti

has again been ostracized by the interna-tional community. A combined naval task

July 1994 9

force is tightening a new U.N. embargoaround the country. Diplomatic effortscontinue. Eventually, the situation inHaiti may reach a point where all partieswill genuinely desire an accord. Perhapsin a truly permissive environment, a JointTask Force Haiti II may be possible.

If another mission is undertaken, itsplanners should heed the lessons learnedfrom JTF Haiti. The new JTF should becarefully configured and include an organ-ic security capability. It should bedeployed into an environment that hasbeen well-prepared diplomatically, and itshould be supported by a strong PSYOPeffort. If the lessons learned from JTFHaiti are exploited, then a JTF Haiti II,integrating the capabilities of SpecialForces, Civil Affairs and PSYOP, canmake a valuable contribution in establish-ing a lasting Haitian democracy.

Lt. Col. Stephen M. Epstein, currently assignedto the 358th Civil AffairsBrigade, was part of theJTF Haiti advance party.During Operation ProvideComfort, he served as mayorof a 5,000-person Kurdish refugee camp inZakho and commanded the Residual CivilAffairs Detachment in Dohuk, Iraq. Heholds a Ph.D. in anthropology from theUniversity of Pennsylvania.

Lt. Col. Robert S. Cronin, currently assigned to the358th Civil Affairs Brigade,was part of the JTF Haitiadvance party. He hasserved on active duty inKorea, commanded a mili-tary-intelligence detachment and served onthe general staff of the 79th Army ReserveCommand. He is a graduate of the Univer-

sity of Delaware, and his civilian careerhas been in commercial finance, insuranceand real estate.

Col. James G. Pulley, cur-rently assigned to the JFKSpecial Warfare Center andSchool, commanded the U.N.military contingent and theJTF advance party in Haiti.He has commanded SpecialForces A- and B-detachments, a mecha-nized infantry company and a cohortBradley battalion in the 2nd Armor Divi-sion and the 2nd Armor Division (For-ward). Most recently, he was commander ofthe 7th Special Forces Group. He is a grad-uate of the Army War College and holds amaster’s degree in public administration.

10 Special Warfare

In a steadily worsening political situa-tion, the advance party of Joint TaskForce Haiti faced numerous difficulties

in ensuring the safety of its troops, yet itmade significant mission progress duringits short time in country.

The task-force commander and five staffpersonnel arrived in Port-au-Prince Oct. 4,eleven days prior to the scheduled resigna-tion of Lt. Gen. Raoul Cédras, Haiti’s mili-tary leader and the spearhead of the 1991coup. In Port-au-Prince, the six joined asmall group of Army Special Forces train-ers who for two weeks had been workingout of the Villa Creole Hotel. Two dayslater, the remainder of the advance partyarrived, increasing its number to 54. Thenewcomers were lodged in an old hotelcalled La Griffonne, but the Villa Creolecontinued to serve as the center of opera-tions. The advance group prepared for thearrival of the USS Harlan County, whichcarried approximately 250 United Nationstroops as well as construction equipmentand materials for the establishment of abase camp.

Even though the civilian government ofHaiti was eager to accept our assistance,the lack of FAD’H cooperation was evident.Liaison between the task-force commander,the U.N. special representative, the actingU.S. ambassador and Haitian authoritiesresulted in a flurry of correspondence con-cerning preparation for the arrival of U.N.troops. Letters exchanged between theprime minister, the port captain and theU.S. Embassy arranged for the HarlanCounty’s use of pier facilities and informedthe FAD’H of the ship’s pending arrival and

of its security requirements.But the FAD’H, controlled by Cédras

and Lt. Col. Michael Francois, displayedapprehension at the outset, and Cédraspublicly referred to the Harlan County’sscheduled arrival as an invasion. As ofFriday, Oct. 8, the Haitian Army’s 52ndCompany, controlling access to the inter-national airport, had received no wordfrom FAD’H headquarters regardingefforts to establish the U.N. base campthere.

Our visit to the FAD’H headquartersFriday afternoon was met with mock indif-ference. We were received politely by Col.Charles Andre of the Haitian Navy, whopurported to be the senior officer presentand stated that he had received no wordregarding the base camp and that littlecould be done until the following week.Our visit the next day met with an evencolder reception. We were eventuallyescorted to Col. Andre’s office, where helaunched into a lengthy commentary indi-cating his personal approval of U.S. inter-vention but his lack of confidence in theU.N. On our visit to the FAD’H headquar-ters the day prior to the arrival of the Har-lan County, we were made to wait andwere not offered seats. After considerablepersuasion on our part, one of severalguards went upstairs and quicklyreturned, stating that our point of contactwas not there. When we asked about threeother officers, including the officer of theday, he gave the same response, withoutchecking to see whether they were present.

On Oct. 11, the Harlan County attempt-ed to dock and was met by several armed

■ perspectiveJTF Haiti: Lasting Impressionsby Navy Lt. Tonya H. Wakefield

July 1994 11

patrol boats and a crowd of angryprotesters. The ship was soon divertedback to Guantanamo Bay. Its departureand the lack of U.S. resolve were treatedas a FAD’H victory in the local press.

The advance party was left in a precari-ous situation, armed with only 9mm pis-tols and lodged in two separate locations.Its leadership now faced the challenge ofmaintaining morale in a rapidly deterio-rating political environment and ensuringthat cooler heads would prevail. Given theunit’s noncombatant structure and limitedfirepower, a moment of panic on anyone’spart could have been devastating. Amidthe constant sound of gunshots and vividpress accounts of the Haitian Minister ofDefense’s assassination, the group’s lead-ers succeeded in maintaining morale anddiscipline through a combination of person-al interaction and leadership by example.

Personal interaction included a knowl-edge of personal details and the use ofhumor. Under the circumstances, theimportance of “knowing the troops” couldnot be underestimated, and a well-timeddisplay of a sense of humor served to easetensions and to build loyalty. Orders andcorrections gained emphasis because theycame not from a rank or position, but frompeople whom we knew and respected.

Leadership by example included occa-sional departures from traditional roles inorder to strengthen unit morale and buildesprit de corps. While the military rankstructure remained intact and disciplinewas crucial, leaders made certain adapta-tions to lead effectively in this potentiallyvolatile environment. A prime example wasthe inclusion of senior officers in the watchrotation at the Villa Creole. Armed sentrywatches were established at both hotels,and roving patrols were added later; allpersonnel were included without exception.Although the additional watch rotationscould have been conducted by 0-3s andbelow, the inclusion of the senior officersboosted morale and stifled complaints.

The real key to maintaining unit moraleand avoiding problems was interactionbetween combat veterans and those withno combat experience. Most of the seniorofficers and NCOs of the advance party

were members of Army Special Forces,and their demeanor was pivotal in main-taining group composure. Regardless ofrank, each SF soldier was placed in a defacto leadership role, setting the tone ofthe unit as a whole. In monitoring radiofrequencies, the U.S. Embassy net, andpress accounts of shootings and demon-strations, the administrative personnelmade an unconscious note of the SF sol-diers’ reactions. Their overall state ofmental preparedness, tempered by cautionand situational awareness, was in mostcases emulated by the rest of the unit.

Despite the overt lack of FAD’H cooper-ation, the advance party made consider-able progress during its 10-day stay inPort-au-Prince. It selected initial projectsfrom lists provided by Haitian officials,conducted site visits to the first school tobe renovated, obtained permission forU.N. medical personnel to visit local hospi-tals, conducted site surveys of the airfield,and made lists of FAD’H equipment needs,including desired spare parts and techni-cal assistance, in spite of the armed forces’apparent unwillingness to cooperate.

Though its progress was quickly halted,the advance party’s accomplishments rep-resented not only a useful lesson in leader-ship but also a ray of hope for U.S. andHaitian relations. Perhaps the greatestaccomplishment was the discovery of thegood will and hopeful disposition of theHaitian people. Should the GovernorsIsland Accord be resuscitated or a similarsolution be offered in the future, humani-tarian and technical-assistance efforts willhave a foundation upon which to build.Lessons learned from JTF Haiti will bene-fit not only the U.S. government and theU.N., but the Haitian people as well.

Navy Lt. Tonya Wakefield was a mem-ber of the JTF Haiti advance party. A 1990graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy atAnnapolis, she is currently assigned toPatrol Squadron 30 at the Naval Air Sta-tion, Jacksonville, Fla.

12 Special Warfare

Although the United Nations con-ducted peacekeeping operationsthroughout the Cold War, little rig-

orous, analytical thought went into theprocess. Contributor nations providedunits, usually light-infantry battalions,and the U.N. used them in such places asLebanon, Cyprus and Egypt. The U.N.also borrowed officers from contributornations to serve as unarmed militaryobservers.

U.N. peacekeeping operations, in gener-al, are still relatively immature. Most offi-cers and soldiers remain untrained in per-forming peacekeeping functions. There areno required U.N. schools, no U.N. doctri-nal staff guides, no recommended tables oforganization and equipment, and nostrategies or policy guidance for peace-keeping. Each mission literally “startsfrom scratch,” adding to the alreadyambiguous and confusing peacekeepingcircumstances.

Although military civic action should bean essential part of the peacekeeping pro-cess, the U.N. has not yet learned theirimportance, or that they require staffingand budgetary support. This situationmust be corrected for the future.

BackgroundIn March 1992, the U.N. deployed the

U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia,or UNTAC, a peace mission involved insupervising the administration of the

country, verifying the withdrawal of Viet-namese forces, demobilizing more than150,000 troops, repatriating more than350,000 displaced Cambodians and orga-nizing and supervising a national election.

Even without funding, the military com-ponent of UNTAC, commanded by Lt.Gen. John Sanderson, an Australian,engaged in numerous civic-action projects.This was made possible through grants offunding and materials from governmentsof a few of the nations that provided con-tingent forces. In most cases, however,grants were restricted to areas where aparticular government’s national contin-gent was located: The Dutch providedfunding to their national contingent bat-talion. The French contingent battalionreceived a great deal of support fromFrench nongovernmental charitable orga-nizations. The French and Indian govern-ments provided medical supplies, as didthe government of Japan (the Japaneseprovided 43 tons of medical supplies andmedicines), in sufficient quantities to bedistributed to every sector. The Germangovernment provided funding for pediatricmedicines, but only enough to support itsmedical contingent in Cambodia’s capital,Phnom Penh.

This hodgepodge of funding and materi-al support, although welcome in theprovinces where it was provided, createdenormous disparities between sectors: thehaves and the have-nots. Some battalions

U.N. Military CivicAction in Cambodiaby Lt. Col. Robert B. Adolph Jr.

July 1994 13

were able to do much in the way of civicaction, others very little.

One prominent problem was the lack ofpediatric medicines. The fact that as muchas 45 percent of the population of Cambo-dia is under the age of 14, according to theUnited Nations International Children’sEmergency Fund, presented a significantdrawback to the UNTAC military physi-cians who were treating injured and dis-eased Khmer children.

In many cases military doctors usedtheir battalions’ medicines, brought withthem from their own countries and meantfor the treatment of their own soldiers, forthe treatment of Cambodians. Much totheir credit, some of the battalion com-manders supported their medical person-nel’s desire to help.

Cambodia’s medical problems go farbeyond the lack of medicines: There ispractically no medical infrastructure inthe country. More than 15 years ago, theKhmer Rouge wiped out the educatedclasses, including the doctors. According toUNTAC’s chief medical officer, Col. PeterFraps, of Germany, “Only 33 of 500 quali-fied medical practitioners survived thecruel genocide of this country.”

UNTAC medical personnel were over-whelmed by the vast medical needs of thelocal population. In Fraps’ words, “Theexisting health system in Cambodia isdeplorable, inhumane, life-condemningand totally bankrupt.” Policy guidancefrom U.N. headquarters New York calledfor UNTAC military medical personnel toadminister to the health needs of UNTACpersonnel only. However, with malaria,dengue fever, tuberculosis, anemia andmalnutrition endemic to many regions ofthe country, the military contingent livingamong the people in the provinces couldnot ignore those problems.

There is more to civic action than pro-viding medical support to the civil popu-lace. Digging wells (to provide a cleansource of drinking water), repairing roadsand bridges, building or repairing schoolsand orphanages, and repairing and refur-bishing medical and dental clinics andhospitals are also civic-action activities.

UNTAC engineers built or repaired

hundreds of small- and medium-sizedbridges and smoothed or resurfaced morethan 1,000 miles of roadway. UNTACfunded these projects because they sup-ported free and fair elections. Cambodianshad to have a passageway to the pollingbooths.

My involvement in UNTAC civic actionbegan with a formal proposal to the forcecommander to create a large civic-actionstaff. This proposal was not favorably con-sidered for two reasons: First, the submis-sion was tendered in late February 1993 —only three months before the Cambodianelections. Second, UNTAC was not mandat-ed to conduct civic action. The force com-mander stated that had he received the

proposal earlier in the mission, he mighthave approved a larger civic-action staff.

A subsequent, less ambitious proposalcalled for the establishment of a force com-mander’s special assistant for civic action,with one officer assistant. On March 1,1993, Lt. Gen. Sanderson approved thecreation of the Civic Action Cell, composedof two officers: myself, with the title civic-action coordinator, and an operations offi-cer. The new CAC worked directly for thechief of staff and reported through him tothe force commander.

According to the UNTAC liaison officerat U.N. headquarters New York, this wasthe first time a peacekeeping mission hadestablished a formal civic-action staff

Photo by Robert B. Adolph Jr.

Khmers line up for medicalattention at a mobile medi-cal dispensary run by oneof the U.N. battalions.

14 Special Warfare

function. The decision to create a civic-action staff element, despite its size, is aprecedent that could prove meaningful toboth current and future missions.

There was no small irony in the U.N.’schoice of the operations officer, Maj.Arthur Alexandrov of Russia. Many com-mented that we were a gratifying, ifunlikely, pair — American and Russianofficers working together, assisting in therebuilding of Cambodia. In only a very fewyears, the world had changed dramatically.

Civic action was being performed byUNTAC well before the proposal of a CAC.The force commander had even appointeda civic-action officer within the MilitaryPublic Information Office; however, thejob was far too big for one man. Further-more, the Military Public InformationOffice was not well-suited for a civic-actionofficer because his time and energies weresometimes diverted to information priori-ties. The conduct of civic action must be aseparate staff function.

Each of the national contingent battal-ions had a different idea of what constitut-ed civic action. In every province, therewere Pakistani, Japanese, Australian,Chinese, Thai, Indian, Indonesian, Dutch,French, Bulgarian, Malaysian, Uru-guayan, Bangladeshi, Ghanian andTunisian battalions, each with its ownnational and individual notions about civicaction. No policy guidance existed to clari-fy this situation, and there was no fund-

ing; both are essential. Because of this,some battalions limited their activities torehabilitative programs for cantoned sol-diers (cantonment of factional soldiers andweapons was part of the UNTAC man-date). These UNTAC-funded programsincluded driving schools and classes onmetalwork — essentially, job training.Although the projects were satisfactory,they touched the lives of relatively fewand had little impact overall.

Other battalions felt that their limitedmedical civic action fulfilled their civicresponsibilities. Because of the lack ofmedicines and medical personnel, “limit-ed” in some district medical clinics meantadministering to not more than 50 Cambo-dians a day, even though hundreds wereturned away.

MethodologyWith no staff, except Alexandrov, and no

budget, starting out in the CAC seemedlike a near-impossible mission. It wasclear that whatever might be accom-plished had to begin with an assessment.We began by visiting every sector in Cam-bodia by helicopter.

During our provincial visits, we dissemi-nated a CAC-written, UNTAC civic-actionpamphlet outlining the UNTAC philoso-phy of civic action and the duties andresponsibilities of the CAC, sector civic-action coordinators and senior U.N. mili-tary observers.

We evaluated both ongoing and plannedcivic action, briefed officers on theUNTAC civic-action philosophy, advisedsector commanders on what support wasavailable from UNTAC headquarters inPhnom Penh, and explained why conduct-ing civic action enhanced a battalion’ssecurity posture.

To ensure that every sector commanderappointed a civic-action coordinator to hisstaff, pressure had to be applied throughthe Deputy Force Commander’s office. Afew battalions had already appointed offi-cers to perform this duty; others had not.To have any hope of being effective, theUNTAC CAC would need to have a subor-dinate staff point of contact in every sec-tor. This requirement was fulfilled beforePhoto by Robert B. Adolph Jr.

A cantoned and retrainedCambodian soldier showsoff his handiwork at anIndian-run and U.N.-spon-sored metalwork trainingcenter in Kampong ChamProvince.

July 1994 15

the end of March.Appointing a civic-action coordinator for

each battalion staff may have been thesingle most important action in whateversuccess we subsequently enjoyed. Despitethe fact that no funding was available,most civic-action coordinators took theirjobs seriously and in many cases conduct-ed limited civic-action projects. They col-lected donations from their comrades; per-suaded people to give their time and ener-gies; supported nongovernmental charita-ble organizations; organized sportingevents with the locals; and provided trooplabor to support the refurbishing of hospi-tals, schools and pagodas.

In attempting to institute and sustainsmall military-civic-action projects on ashoestring, we requested that each compa-ny in a battalion adopt a project in itsregion or immediate area. This conceptwas later determined to be very successful.Even without funding, company comman-ders and their soldiers assisted the localschools, orphanages, hospitals and homesfor the handicapped. Homes for the handi-capped are important: Cambodia has moreamputees per capita than any other coun-try in the world because of the extremelycommon use of land mines there.

We suggested to senior-sector militaryobservers that individual UNMOs couldaccomplish much if they were properlymotivated, and we recommended thateach UNMO team leader adopt a local pro-ject. UNMOs performed all kinds of civicaction, nearly always without material orfinancial support: teaching English andFrench at local schools, supporting non-governmental charitable organizations,coordinating medical support for remotevillages and repairing schools and medicalclinics. Because UNTAC could not fundcivic action, officers and soldiers alikeoften donated their own money to supportthe projects.

One UNMO, Maj. Peter Stiglich, USAF,personally funded and built a playgroundfor Khmer children. Impressed withStiglich’s altruistic drive, local Khmersnamed the playground “Peter Park” andbuilt a monument there in his honor. Thecentral government later awarded Stiglich

the Cambodian “Medal of Reconstruction.” During trips to the provinces, we noted

that nearly every sector commander hadexamined what his battalion might do incivic action if funding were available.Many commanders had good ideas, but nomoney was available to bring their ideasto fruition.

The lack of money was an issue that hadto be addressed. Somehow the CAC had toacquire funding, although fund raisingwas not a mandated function. In provinceswhere there were no nongovernmentalcharitable organizations and no U.N.agencies, the task of conducting civicaction would be left to the military. In dis-tricts where there were no military units,civic action was provided by U.N. civil per-sonnel, U.N. police, electoral personneland military observers.

In recognizing the military’s innatecapabilities, the director of UNICEF allot-ted $50,000 to the CAC for the military’suse in repairing or building as many as 10primary schools. These schools were locat-ed in six provinces where little funds hadbeen spent previously for such projects.Although the projects were managed bysector civic-action coordinators, the localpopulace, and oftentimes U.N. civil admin-istrative personnel, were involved. Muchwas accomplished with limited funds byusing local labor and materials.

In response to a CAC proposal, the U.N.High Commissioner for Refugees agreed toprovide $100,000 for a joint projectbetween the CAC and a French charitableorganization. The funds were to be used topurchase mosquito netting for Khmers liv-ing in malarial-infested regions of Cambo-dia. The French handled distribution, theCAC procurement.

The problem, however, was not onlyfunding, but rather the kind of funding.The CAC needed money in the form of dis-cretionary funds for quick-impact projects.We submitted another proposal to theU.N. High Commissioner for Refugees for$50,000 in discretionary funds for therepair of schools, hospitals and orphan-ages. This request was approved, and thefunds were later disbursed to sector civic-action coordinators for projects in the

16 Special Warfare

provinces.We also strengthened the connection

between the U.N. Military InformationOffice and the CAC. We provided the mili-tary information officer copies of ourweekly reports to the force commander. Inturn, the MILINFO officer planned mediacoverage of significant civic action, there-by improving UNTAC’s public imageamong the local populace as well as amongthe world press.

With the establishment of the CAC, sup-port of nongovernmental charitable orga-nizations such as CARE, Action Interna-tional Contra La Faim and others, wasrecognized as a priority. These NGOs pro-vided what UNTAC could not: long-termsustainment of projects and programs.They were in Cambodia well beforeUNTAC’s arrival and would remain longafter our departure. UNTAC’s mandateexpired in the fall of 1993.

The CAC-produced pamphlet discussedearlier also outlined military capabilitiesto support NGO activities. Copies of thepamphlet were distributed throughout thecountry to every NGO. The results wereheartening. Although many NGOs wereinitially uncertain, the CAC began receiv-ing requests for support within a fewweeks. The UNTAC CAC, in turn, sent therequests to sector civic-action coordinatorsfor action.

Sector civic-action coordinators handledNGO requests for support in their own

sectors. If a sector’s civic-action coordina-tor was unable to provide the support, therequest was forwarded to the UNTACCAC for consideration. All requests formultiple-province or countrywide supportcame directly to the UNTAC CAC.

Working with NGOs, UNTAC engineersdug ponds in which the handicapped couldraise fish for food; military doctors sup-ported privately funded inoculation pro-grams; commanders provided security andground transportation to those working inand near Khmer Rouge-controlled areas;and air operations provided limited heli-borne and fixed-wing transport intoremote areas for personnel as well as NGOmedical supplies.

Working together, we accomplishedmuch more than if we had worked sepa-rately. At the most basic level, weattempted to match an UNTAC militarycapability with a stated NGO need. Wesatisfied an overwhelming majority of thehundreds of requests received.

SecurityWe had many discussions with officers

from various national contingents in theprovinces who viewed civic action in oppo-sition to security issues. They felt thatdedicating more soldiers to civic projectsmeant that fewer would be available forsecurity duties. At every opportunity, weattempted to convince these officers thattheir best security might be an aggressivecivic-action program.

UNTAC units and UNMO teams thatconducted civic-minded projects won bothrespect and admiration from the localsand were often forewarned of impendingattacks and recently mined roadways.Cambodians who felt that UNTAC mem-bers were their friends acted accordinglyand provided U.N. soldiers with informa-tion about the movements and disposi-tions of hostile factions. Such valuableinformation could not have been securedin any other way.

An unarmed military observer, Maj.Kevin Fossett , USMC, related an incidentthat occurred in the heavily Khmer Rougeprovince of Prear Vihear in northern Cam-bodia. During a vehicular patrol, FossettPhoto by Robert B. Adolph Jr.

Workers repair a Cambodi-an primary school in north-western Cambodia. Repairswere sponsored by theDutch Battalion with moneyacquired from the Dutchgovernment.

July 1994 17

was approached by a friendly Cambodianand warned about an ambush that hadbeen set by the Khmer Rouge less than akilometer ahead. Fossett heeded the warn-ing and changed his route. He later veri-fied that the Cambodian’s story was true.Fossett credited civic action previouslyperformed in the area as key to buildingrapport with the locals and ultimately sav-ing his life.

The missing-in-action joint task forceoperating out of Phnom Penh also benefit-ed from the positive relationships betweenU.S. military personnel and the Khmers.American observers assigned to the U.S.Military Observer Group informally sup-plied the MIA JTF with reports receivedfrom local contacts regarding Americanservicemen missing from the time of theVietnam War. Lt. Col. Gene Thompson, aSpecial Forces U.S. military observer teamchief, taught English in his spare time inKham Pong Cham Province. One of hiscontacts from the school volunteered infor-mation that later assisted in an MIA JTFinvestigation.

The causal linkage between the localpopulace’s providing valuable informationto military members and UNTAC civic-action programs is anecdotal yet convinc-ing. Security and information-gatheringwere enhanced through civic action.

Recommendations• Establish a separate civic-action staff

function for future peacekeeping missions.The staff should be equal to other stafffunctions such as logistics, operations andadministration. Civic action must beplanned prior to and instituted on the firstday of a peacekeeping mission.

• Allocate a budget that will supportsmall, quick-impact projects such as therepair of schools and hospitals and thedigging of wells. U.N. staff agencies cansupervise these projects and provide policyguidance.

• Provide medical support and fundingfor medicine. Medical support is essentialin any peacekeeping area of operations.Funding for medicine is crucial and shouldbe recognized as a separate funding cate-gory. Military doctors possess enormous

capability for doing good; they should beallowed the opportunity. The WorldHealth Organization and UNICEF couldprovide policy guidance on issues such asmedical protocols governing the treatmentof infectious diseases.

• Increase the size of the medicaldetachments assigned to contingent bat-talions. Medical personnel and their com-manders will feel compelled to assist thelocal population, and they should be finan-cially and materially supported. The goodwill won by medical and all other civicaction ultimately serves the mission.

• Increase the number of engineersassigned to contingent battalions, depend-ing upon the mission requirements andthe assessed needs. Engineers are essen-tial in building and repair projects.

• Give future force commanders author-ity over their own budgets. Currently,U.N. career civil servants control allmonies in a peacekeeping mission. Hadthe force commander of UNTAC had theauthority, he would have funded civicaction, but that power was reserved forbudgeteers at U.N. headquarters. TheU.N. sometimes tasks commanders withextremely difficult missions, but with noauthority over one of their key resources:money.

ConclusionThe argument that U.N. organizations

conduct civic-action programs, thereby

Photo by Robert B. Adolph Jr.

Indonesian engineers repaira bridge in Kampong ThomProvince. Building andrepairing bridges was nec-essary so that voters couldget to the polling booths.

18 Special Warfare

negating the need for a military compo-nent to conduct similar programs, is not asound one. The preponderance of the peo-ple living in the provinces of Cambodia areunfamiliar with the U.N. High Commis-sioner for Refugees, the U.N. DevelopmentPrograms and the U.N. InternationalChildren’s Emergency Fund. Despite theirgood works, these organizations are rela-tively small and low-profile. For mostCambodians, the U.N. was represented bythose whom they saw every day near theirhomes and workplaces: the U.N. soldiers,the electoral officials and the police.

The military is often the largest compo-nent in a peacekeeping mission. The vastmajority of personnel, trucks, aircraft,engineering assets and medical facilitiesare military. The UNTAC military compo-nent had the capability to accomplishmore in a shorter period of time than anyother organization in the country.

In Cambodia, military capabilities forcivic action far outstripped those of anyother component. Yet UNTAC was notmandated to conduct civic action. FromU.N. headquarters’ perspective, such aproposal would likely have been per-ceived as infringing on the prerogativesof U.N. staff agencies such as UNHCR,UNDP and UNICEF.

Those prerogatives no doubt appearimportant from New York’s perspective.But in the provinces, the sheer weight ofhuman suffering in and around UNTACmilitary-component units affected eachmember deeply. Soldiers in the remotestregions of Cambodia faced Khmer malnu-trition and disease daily. Many in the mil-itary component wanted to help and did.Yet much more could have been done iffunding and staff guidance had been pro-vided from the early days of the U.N. mis-sion in Cambodia.

According to UNTAC’s Medical Branch,as of April 1993, military medical personnelhad treated 38,355 Cambodians for injuryand disease since the beginning of the mis-sion. They did it without funding from U.N.headquarters. The number of Cambodianstreated accounted for 26 percent of all thecases seen. Early statistics in May 1993suggested that the percentage of Cambodi-

ans being treated was rising.The funding that CAC ultimately

received came from local UNICEF,UNHCR and other officials who had recog-nized that financial support for militarycivic action was money well-spent. DanielLeBlanc of UNHCR in Phnom Penh stat-ed, “We had no doubt that the militarycomponent would follow through on theprojects we funded. We also recognizedthat the military was an enormous,untapped resource for furthering the goalsof our organization.”

A military civic-action staff should beestablished in all peacekeeping organiza-tions. Activities must be funded andsupervised by the appropriate U.N. staffagencies — in support of the larger goalsof the U.N. beyond the peacekeeping mis-sion itself. Perhaps the best way toensure funding for military civic-actionprograms is to provide future peacekeep-ing commanders authority over their ownbudgets.

The military component of any peace-keeping operation is not a charitable ordevelopmental organization. Conductingmilitary civic action goes to the heart of thepeacekeeping mission itself. Civic action isthe best means of gaining and maintainingthe initiative in winning the hearts andminds of a local populace, improving infor-mation gathering and enhancing security.The good will generated as a result of civicaction is more than worth the investment interms of potential lives saved and missionsaccomplished.

Lt. Col. Robert B. Adolph Jr., is a Special Forces officerwith a Civil Affairs functionalarea. In 1993, he completed anassignment as civic-actioncoordinator for the UnitedNations Transitional Authori-ty in Cambodia. Adolph also served in U.N.missions with Military Observer GroupsLebanon and Egypt. He holds master’sdegrees in international affairs and innational security studies and strategy.Adolph is currently assigned to the Joint Spe-cial Operations Command, Fort Bragg, N.C.

July 1994 19

Many nations face continual chal-lenges as a result of the end of theCold War. The bipolar world of

that era made international life relativelystable and predictable, if not entirely safeand secure. Developing nations were ableto ignore their internal problems becausethey were fully focused on the struggle fornational security amidst the privatemanipulations and the public breast-beat-ing of the great-power pachyderms: theUnited States and the former SovietUnion. Now, across the globe, nations areforced to face internal challenges and, atthe same time, adjust to new and far-less-certain international relationships.

To examine the challenges in fiveregions of the world (Africa, Asia, Europe,Latin America and the Middle East), theRegional Studies Course of the SpecialWarfare Center and School’s 3rd Battal-ion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group,hosted the Fifth International AffairsSymposium Dec. 2-4, 1993. The RSC isdesigned to provide Psychological Opera-tions and Civil Affairs officers with funda-mental training in duties requiring areastudies and political-military analysis.

The theme of the symposium was “TheRole of Special Operations Forces in aChanging World Environment.” Guestparticipants were civilian and militarysubject-matter experts from business, gov-ernment and academia. Symposium work-shops covered each of the five regional

areas. Although every region of the worldpresents significant challenges to U.S. pol-icy-makers, the Middle East remains pre-eminent. The following summary of thediscussions on the Middle Eastern regionis an example of the discussions in theother symposium workshops.

The Middle EastThe Middle East represents a region

that is just beginning to face challengeswhich have been dormant in recent years.These challenges include the changes inleadership and ideology, the rise of Islamicfundamentalism and the compatibility ofIslam and Western-style democracy.

Over the last five years there have beeninteresting developments in the MiddleEast. The demise of the Soviet Union andthe coalition success of Operation DesertStorm marked the decline of old transna-tional ideologies, such as Pan-Arabismand Arab-Socialism, as viable mechanismsfor mobilizing the population. In theirplace, the state has emerged victorious.This poses two profound problems.

First, the concept of statehood is a West-ern invention that is anathema to Arabunity and an obstacle to Pan-Arabism.Democracy, with capitalism an ancillaryrequirement for U.S. aid, provides a less-than-perfect alternative to Pan-Arabism.Unfortunately, the lack of Western dia-logue inhibits the development of an inno-vative ideological option. Surprisingly,

InternationalAffairs Symposium ExaminesRegional Problems

by Norvell B. DeAtkine

20 Special Warfare

vibrant debate is occurring within theIslamic fundamentalist community. Dis-cussions on topics such as the compatibili-ty of Islam and democracy, minorityrights, and the role of women in Islamiclife may provide legitimacy to Islamic fun-damentalism by projecting it as a feasibleideological alternative to Pan-Arabism ordemocracy.

The second issue, which is not givenmuch attention in media or in print butwhich has profound implications for sta-bility in the Middle East, is the successionof leadership. The current leadership iseither elderly or ailing. Hafiz Al Asad(Syria) and King Hussein (Jordan) are inill health. King Fahd (Saudi Arabia), YasirArafat (Palestine Liberation Organization)and Yitzak Rabin (Israel) are in theiradvanced years. Their successors lackeither a strong personality, popular sup-port, or the intellect to administer a state.Prince Hassan (brother of King Hussein)of Jordan is an example of a potential suc-cessor who lacks popular support.

This weaker leadership will assume thereins of power when the need for strongleadership will be more critical than it istoday. The end of the Cold War, the signif-icant change in the status quo resultingfrom Operation Desert Storm, and theunprecedented Israeli-Palestinian peaceinitiative mark the end of business asusual. Leaders will be less able to useexternal threats to divert their peoples’attention from internal shortcomings.Now, leaders must address the socioeco-nomic problems that have plagued theirstates. High unemployment, poor econom-ic planning, corruption, water shortagesand the lack of housing are just a few ofthe issues that will challenge the newleadership. It is doubtful that they canrise to the occasion to effect reform with-out the threat of widespread violence.

Their task will be exacerbated by the

weakened state of the institutions them-selves. Fissures in the Alawi (the rulingreligious sect of Syria) unity may lead toloss of power after the departure of HafizAl Asad. At one time, Jordan and themonarchy were seen as one. This is nolonger true. The absolute power of themonarchy is eroding under the intrusionof democracy. These fragile institutionsmay be too weak both to tolerate the pres-sures of change and to control the direc-tion of change, thereby plunging countriesinto crises. If the leadership fails in anenvironment where there is a lack of acredible ideology to supplant the failedtraditional transnational beliefs, Islamicfundamentalism may ascend to power.

Islamic fundamentalismIt is critical to discuss Islamic funda-

mentalism in the context of Iran. Iran isinvolved in a massive modernization of itsmilitary. Although most experts agreethat Iran’s purchases exceed its actualdefensive needs, it currently poses littlethreat to its neighbors and no immediatethreat to U.S. interests. The Iran-IraqWar exhausted Iran’s will to fight. For themost part, its military hardware is old andpoorly maintained. And although the U.S.-sponsored embargo of military spare partshas been effective, Iran may be capable ofreconstituting sufficient military power tostrive once again for regional dominance.

Iran is still involved in the exportationof a militant, polarized Islamic fundamen-talism. For example, Egypt sharply criti-cizes Iran for promoting Islamic funda-mentalism within its borders, but to solelyblame Iran for its rise is naive and beliesthe truth. The real threats are poor socio-economic conditions and widespread cor-ruption, which exist in many Middle East-ern countries. Poverty is endemic, andgovernment inability to change the condi-tions is creating a combustible situation.

July 1994 21

Egypt is a perfect example.Islamic fundamentalism has always

existed in Egypt. It was born there in the1920s and re-emerged in the 1960s afterthe decline of Nasserism. It is growingonce again because the indigent socioeco-nomic conditions have worsened in thelast few years. Demographics, especiallythe increasing population, have strainedresources. Massive underemployment, lowwages and institutional corruption havecreated a bloated, ineffective bureaucracy,thus fanning the flames of dissent. Gov-ernments such as Egypt’s are unable tomeet the needs of their people, as demon-strated by their inability to organizehumanitarian assistance after naturaldisasters.

The poor infrastructure is only one rootcause of the re-emergence of Islamic fun-damentalism. Egyptians, like many Arabs,are disillusioned with their leadership’sinability to unite the Arabs, to provide foran egalitarian society as promised in theKoran, and to uphold the moral values ofthe Islamic community. They are lookingfor an alternative to the old transnationalideologies that have failed them. In thistime of crisis, it is natural for a communi-ty to fall back on its basic values.

In recent years, Islamic fundamentalismexpanded its appeal to the middle class.The fundamentalists have spoken outagainst the poor socioeconomic conditions,and they are the only group debating cur-rent issues such as the compatibility ofIslam and democracy. This process hasprovided a long-sought legitimacy toIslamic fundamentalists. Since fundamen-talism is the only ideology currently in theregion that offers hope and a moral stan-dard, Middle Easterners are turningtoward it.

Is democracy compatible with Islam?There is little dialogue in the West to helpanswer this question; however, there are

issues to resolve. First, democracy is anevolutionary process. It took more than200 years for America to achieve its cur-rent form of democracy. Most Middle East-ern states have existed for less than 50years. Most Middle Eastern countrieshave not advanced their societies to apoint where they can adopt our form ofdemocracy. The second issue is capitalism.Although we view it as inherent in thedemocratic process, it is viewed as amoralamong the Islamic leaders of the MiddleEast. Capitalism does not satisfy themoral needs of the Middle Eastern people.Two countries are seen as test beds fordemocracy: Yemen and Jordan. It is tooearly to predict the results of these demo-cratic experiments or the kinds of democ-racy that may emerge.

Norvell B. DeAtkine is currently director of MiddleEast studies in the JFK Spe-cial Warfare Center andSchool’s 3rd Battalion, 1stSpecial Warfare TrainingGroup. A retired Armycolonel, he served more than 26 years as amember of the Field Artillery Branch andas a foreign-area officer. A 1956 graduateof the U.S. Military Academy at WestPoint, he completed the Army War Collegein 1981. In addition to a bachelor’s degreefrom West Point, he holds a master’sdegree in Middle East studies from theAmerican University in Beirut. Theauthor wishes to acknowledge the contri-butions to this article of Maj. Jim Neal,who furnished notes and co-authored theoriginal proceedings. Maj. Neal is current-ly assigned to a United Nations positionin the Middle East.

22 Special Warfare

Psychological operations did not winthe Gulf War, but like brilliant plan-ning, superior technology, massive

firepower, logistics and well-trainedforces, they played a significant part.

By encouraging coalition solidarity,reducing enemy combat power and deceiv-ing the enemy about allied intentions,PSYOP contributed to the success of coali-tion operations and saved tens of thou-sands of lives on both sides. An examina-tion of the war’s PSYOP reveals lessonsthat will assist soldiers and their leadersin planning and conducting future crisis-response operations.

Before the Gulf War, during combatoperations, and in the aftermath, approxi-mately 650 soldiers from the 4th Psycho-logical Operations Group and fromreserve-component PSYOP units con-tributed to the coalition efforts. They pro-vided radio and TV support, broadcast tac-tical loudspeaker messages and produced29 million leaflets. The leaflets were deliv-ered by everything from balloons to B-52s;some were even smuggled into Baghdaditself! PSYOP messages persuadedapproximately 44 percent of the Iraqiarmy to desert, more than 17,000 todefect, and more than 87,000 to surrender.Integrating their efforts with those of theU.S. Central Command, 21 PSYOP sol-diers, working with their Turkish counter-parts in Joint Task Force Proven Force insouthern Turkey and using radio broad-

casts and leaflets, helped cause the defec-tion, desertion and surrender of some40,000 Iraqis — all without firing a shot.During the critical weeks following thewar, PSYOP soldiers assisted the newlyliberated Kuwaiti people. Othersremained in northern Iraq for six months,supporting coalition humanitarian-assis-tance operations with the Kurds.

Months before the Iraqi invasion ofKuwait, specialists from the 4th PSYOPGroup were already in the region, workingfor U.S. defense attachés in Iraq, Kuwait,Jordan, Djibouti, Yemen and Pakistan; forthe United States Military Training Mis-sion to Saudi Arabia; and in the Sinai withthe Multinational Force and Observers.The cultural, linguistic and military expe-rience these soldiers gained proved invalu-able to the overall PSYOP effort in theGulf.

With the Iraqi invasion, additionalPSYOP soldiers deployed to the regionwith the initial elements of the 82nd Air-borne Division, followed shortly by aPSYOP staff officer with the advanceparty from Special Operations Command,Central Command, or SOCCENT. A teamof military and civilian specialists fromthe 4th PSYOP Group deployed almostimmediately to USCENTCOM headquar-ters in Tampa, Fla., to prepare a strategicPSYOP plan. Gen. Norman Schwarzkopfapproved the plan in late August, and itwas forwarded to Washington for intera-

Psychological Operationsin Desert Shield, Desert Storm andUrban Freedom

by Col. Jeffrey B. Jones

July 1994 23

gency implementation. The 4th PSYOPGroup also developed a theater PSYOPplan with details down to the tacticallevel. PSYOP units began predeploymentpreparations as the scope of the operationevolved.

Mission and objectivesThe mission of the PSYOP Task Force

was threefold: Phase I demonstrated U.S.resolve, consolidated support, dissuadedregional Iraqi support, deterred hostilitiesand promoted combined and multinationalinteroperability. Phase II reinforced U.S.and allied defensive efforts and persuadedIraq to discontinue hostilities. Phase IIIsupported offensive operations and pro-moted and maintained local, regional andinternational understanding and support.

As approved by the commander in chiefof USCENTCOM, task-force objectiveswere to:

• Gain acceptance and support for U.S.operations.

• Intimidate Iraqi forces.• Encourage Iraqi discord, alienation,

malingering, loss of confidence, resistance,desertion and defection.

• Create doubt and fissures in the Iraqileadership.

• Strengthen the confidence and deter-mination of friendly states to resistaggression.

• Project the U.S. as a credible deter-rent and a capable force.

OrganizationThe PSYOP organization for combat,

along with U.S. and coalition forces,evolved into a multitheater, joint and com-bined effort. Working as an echelons-above-corps element of U.S. Army Forces,Central Command, or USARCENT, thePSYOP Task Force initially consisted of

PDCCOMBINED

CELL

ARCENT

EUCOMDET

PDB 6 POB* 9 POB* 8 POB13 POB

EPWSOCCENT

PSEMARCENT

PSE

PRINT MEDIA SIGNAL

LNO SECTION- COMBINED- CAIRO- OTHER GOV’T AGENCIES- COMPONENTS

4th POG (A)

CENTCOM

LegendOperational ControlTactical Control

✱

PSE– Supported XVIII ABN and VII Corps– PSYOP Support Element

Organization of PSYOP Task Force in Desert Storm

24 Special Warfare

half the U.S. Air Force’s 193rd SpecialOperations Group (providing two EC-130Volant Solo aircraft for aerial dissemina-tion) and elements of the 4th PSYOPGroup, including the Middle East-oriented8th PSYOP Battalion, the 9th PSYOP Bat-talion, a tactical unit supporting the XVIIIAirborne Corps and the SOCCENT, andthe PSYOP Dissemination Battalion withprint and media. In response to the presi-dent’s decision to double the size of theU.S. force, the PSYOP Task Force expand-ed with the addition of a tactical battalionto support the VII Corps, tactical elementsto support U. S. Marine Forces, (includingloudspeaker teams from four reserve-com-ponent PSYOP companies), a reserve-com-ponent battalion to support enemy-prison-er-of-war operations, a PSYOP element inTurkey with JTF Proven Force, and a liai-son element in Cairo. All were in placebefore the air war began in January 1991.On Feb. 27, a separate task force underthe operational control of SOCCENTdeployed to Kuwait City to support libera-tion and consolidation operations.

The PSYOP Task Force received guid-ance from three levels: the strategic level(Washington and the Undersecretary ofDefense for Policy, the National SecurityCouncil, and the interagency Public Diplo-macy Coordinating Committee), the opera-tional level (senior U.S. and Saudi com-manders, Generals Schwarzkopf andKhalid), and the tactical level (ground

combat commanders).Although the commander in chief of

USCENTCOM approved the theaterPSYOP plan, the interagency-approvalprocess, mandated by DoD Directive3321.1, was slow, and the PSYOP TaskForce did not receive execution authorityuntil December. Months of potential psy-chological preparation of the battlefieldwere lost, but once both U.S. and host-nation approval was granted, PSYOP dis-semination began almost immediately.Had the Saudis not requested U.S. sup-port to encourage Iraqi desertion anddefection, PSYOP might not have beenallowed to play an active role in the war atall.

Theater supportInitially, theater PSYOP efforts in sup-

port of USCENTCOM were directedtoward unifying the disparate elements ofthe multinational force. The POTF creat-ed, developed and produced a regionallyoriented videotape, “Nations of the WorldTake a Stand.” Distributed throughout theMiddle East and Southwest Asia as aproduct of the United States InformationAgency, the videotape presented the coali-tion as a formidable force unified under acommon cause in support of the wishes ofthe world. Produced in four languages, thetape was played continuously throughoutthe region. Its effectiveness was heraldedthroughout the U.S. State Departmentand the Department of Defense.

PSYOP leaflets had a succession ofthemes designed to intensify by incre-ments: In late December they were “Peacenot war,” “Arab brotherhood,” “Time isrunning out,” “The world is allied againstaggression,” and “Saddam has betrayedyou.” As the United Nations deadlineapproached, the primary theme became“Coalition technological superiority andthe inevitability of defeat.”

Once hostilities began on Jan. 17, 1991,the pace of PSYOP support increasedgreatly, particularly when intelligencesources began reporting the effectivenessof leaflet, loudspeaker and radio cam-paigns against enemy forces in Kuwaitand Iraq. The coalition later opened a sec-

Soldiers of the PSYOPTask Force load a leafletbomb during OperationDesert Storm.

U.S. Army photo

July 1994 25

ond PSYOP front targeted at northernIraqi cities and military sites. Radio andleaflet operations were staged out ofsouthern Turkey by the U.S. EuropeanCommand’s JTF Proven Force.

Within the overall operational environ-ment, PSYOP support to the unified andcomponent commands took several forms:

• USCENTCOM-approved regionalradio broadcasts out of Egypt and Turkeywere designed to strengthen U.S. andcoalition ties while providing the enemywith factual, current information on theprogress of the war.

• A strategic leaflet campaign againstBaghdad, air bases deep in Iraq, andRepublican Guards units in northernKuwait and southern Iraq stressed themagnitude of the allied effort, the error ofSaddam Hussein’s political position andthe futility of standing against thestrength of the coalition forces.

• Several USCINCCENT-directedleaflet missions designed to degrade theenemy’s morale and will to fight resultedin significant numbers of desertions,defections and surrenders before theground offensive began.

USARCENT supportPSYOP supported USARCENT by

enhancing deception operations, by sup-porting operations with loudspeaker sur-render appeals and by broadcasting“Voice of the Gulf” radio programs fromtwo ground stations, Qaysumah and AbuAli, as well as from the 193rd SOG’sVolant Solo aircraft. Sixty-six loudspeak-er teams provided direct support, down todivision level, across the entire coalitionfront.

The 8th POTF also provided tacticalleaflet dissemination, using 155mm leafletartillery rounds and F-16 aircraft carryingM-129A1 leaflet bombs. Leaflet operationsat this level were designed to supportdeception and offensive operations.Leaflets overprinted with the VII andXVIII corps logos were dropped along thecentral Kuwait-Saudi Arabian border.They were so successful in implying thatthe main U.S. advance would occur insideKuwait that the USCENTCOM comman-

der canceled subsequent missions becauseof the significant Iraqi buildup in front ofthe Arab Corps.

The combination of massive air powerand leaflet and loudspeaker operationscreated a PSYOP environment that pro-duced large numbers of desertions, defec-tions and surrenders, including the capitu-lation of an entire battalion-sized unit,before the ground campaign began. Thepervasive Iraqi belief in coalitionsupremacy led to massive surrendersthroughout the ground campaign. The 8thPOTF also provided extensive PSYOP sup-port to the overall theater EPW program.PSYOP elements deployed in theater topacify and exploit EPWs at both USAR-CENT EPW camps.

The purpose behind the exploitation

program was to interview volunteer Iraqiprisoners and obtain information for loud-speaker and broadcast messages thatwould be transmitted to their fellow Iraqisoldiers. These appeals contributed to thelarge number of EPWs taken with little orno hostile fire. Finally, the 8th POTF pro-vided support to Urban Freedom, USSOC-CENT’s liberation of Kuwait City, and toTask Force Freedom, the USARCENT-directed consolidation operation inKuwait, with the mission of re-establish-ing radio and print activities to supportrepatriation and settlement of the capital.

Other supportPSYOP support to the Air Force compo-

nent of Central Command, USCENTAF,occurred primarily during the preparationphase, with the development of a downed

The combination of massive air power andleaflet and loudspeaker operations created aPSYOP environment that produced largenumbers of desertions, defections and surrenders, including the capitulation of anentire battalion-sized unit, before the groundcampaign began.

26 Special Warfare

flier “pointy-talky,” a multilingual bloodchit displaying an American flag andpromising a reward to anyone who assist-ed the bearer. PSYOP forces also madebroadcasts to support search-and-rescueoperations. These products were notrestricted to USCENTAF efforts; they sup-ported all pilots and crews in theater. Ini-tially, the 193rd SOG’s Volant Solo air-craft monitored Iraqi radio transmissionsand rebroadcast the Voice of America.Once the task force received disseminationapproval, these aircraft became the prima-ry aerial conduits for the POTF’s “Voice ofthe Gulf.” In the later phases of the war,PSYOP also prepared, developed and exe-cuted, on a small scale, a campaign aimedat persuading Iraqi pilots to defect, with

their aircraft, to Saudi airspace ratherthan to Iran.

PSYOP support to the Marine Corpsforces of Central Command, USMAR-CENT, was similar to that provided toUSARCENT. Support consisted of 25loudspeaker teams, leaflet artilleryrounds, M-129A1 leaflet bombs droppedby MARCENT F/A-18 aircraft, and EPWexploitation teams. Marine pilots, liketheir Army, Air Force and Navy counter-parts, were also issued the multilingualblood chits. The Marines were enthusias-tic about using tactical PSYOP to supportall phases of their operations. ThroughMARCENT-wide application of PSYOP,the Marines were effective in taking pris-oners and influencing enemy actionthrough loudspeaker teams and leafletdrops. PSYOP supported the MARCENTdeception plan by disseminating leaflets,floated to the beach in plastic water bot-

tles, designed to convince Iraqis inKuwait that an amphibious assault wasimminent. Intelligence gathered after ces-sation of hostilities indicated that thiscampaign was highly successful.

PSYOP efforts to support U.S. NavyForces, Central Command, or USNAV-CENT, were limited to a leaflet drop sup-porting deception operations and a MAR-CENT loudspeaker operation on FaylakaIsland. As a result of the loudspeakeroperation, 1,405 Iraqi soldiers surrenderedto a significantly smaller U.S. Marineforce without firing a shot.

USSOCCENT PSYOP support duringDesert Storm was limited to leaflet dissem-ination, three loudspeaker teams and tacti-cal leaflet support using deception andintimidation themes. During Urban Free-dom, the SOCCENT operation to clearKuwait City, the 8th POTF was reconsti-tuted with print, media, propaganda-development and loudspeaker assets.

MilestonesDuring Desert Shield, Desert Storm and

Urban Freedom, the PSYOP Task Forcemet the following milestones:

• 342,000 leaflets disseminated by bal-loon, waterborne and manpack operations.

• 18.7 million leaflets disseminated byhigh-altitude MC-130 aircraft.

• 3.3 million leaflets disseminated byF-16 aircraft, spanning 36 missions, usingM-129A1 leaflet bombs.

• 2.2 million leaflets disseminated byB-52 aircraft, spanning 20 missions, usingM-129A1 leaflet bombs.

• 1.1 million leaflets, public-serviceposters and handbills disseminated inKuwait City.

• A videotape, “Nations of the WorldTake a Stand,” was distributed in multiplelanguages to each regional capital in theMiddle East and Southwest Asia. Twohundred copies were disseminated inBaghdad.

• An audiotape, “Iraq the Betrayed,”designed to foment anti-Saddam senti-ment, was broadcast from EC-130 VolantSolos, and copies were also smuggled intoBaghdad.

• The radio program “Voice of the

Despite facing a death penalty for possessingcoalition leaflets, a large percentage of Iraqidefectors and EPWs were carrying leafletswhen they surrendered. One prisoner wasreported to have had 345 leaflets when hearrived at the EPW camp.

July 1994 27

Gulf” broadcast 18 hours a day for 40days from two ground stations and anaerial platform over Saudi Arabia andfrom two additional ground stations anda Volant Solo aerial platform overTurkey. A combined Saudi, U.S., Egyp-tian, Kuwaiti and British propaganda-development cell developed the tapes andscripts. Broadcasting included 3,250news items, 13 Iraqi EPW interviews, 40press releases and interviews, and 189PSYOP messages.

• PSYOP soldiers supported EPW oper-ations at two EPW camps, three corps col-lection points and numerous divisional col-lection points.

• Individual and combined loudspeakeroperations persuaded thousands of Iraqisoldiers to surrender without friendlyforces having to fire a shot or maneuverinto harm’s way.

Impact indicatorsThe following indicators attest to the

success of PSYOP activities in OperationsDesert Shield, Desert Storm and UrbanFreedom:

• Prior to hostilities, leaflet operationsgenerated extensive Iraqi concern aboutthe penetration of Kuwaiti airspace byU.S./coalition aircraft. In fact, thatairspace was never penetrated before hos-tilities began.

• Iraqi soldiers fired weapons at leafletsfalling from the sky.

• The morale of the Kuwaiti citizenrysoared once leaflet operations began.

• Iraqi units were repositioned becauseof deception-leaflet operations.

• The Iraqi III Corps commander’ssandtable, found in Kuwait City, depictedvirtually all coalition avenues of approachas coming from the sea.

• Despite facing a death penalty for pos-sessing coalition leaflets, a large percent-age of Iraqi defectors and EPWs were car-rying leaflets when they surrendered. Oneprisoner was reported to have had 345leaflets when he arrived at the EPWcamp.

• Massive numbers of Iraqis desertedprior to and during the war.

• Iraqi death squads operated between

the Iraqi and coalition fronts to stop andassassinate defecting Iraqi soldiers.

• Frontline Iraqi troops reported thecontinual harmful effect of coalition leafletand radio messages.

• The Iraqis mounted their own leafletand information campaigns to countercoalition leaflet operations.

• The Iraqi command confiscated its sol-diers’ personal radios.

• Iraqi sources attempted to jam coali-tion broadcast operations.

• Iraqi EPWs reported listening to coali-tion broadcasts for “true” information.

• The Iraqi chain of command reportedto its soldiers that coalition leaflets werecontaminated by chemical agents.

• Iraqi “Mother of All Battles” broad-casts changed frequencies to counter coali-tion broadcasts.

• A 500-man battalion surrendered inthe XVIII Airborne Corps’ sector prior tothe start of the ground war. After theground war began, more than 87,000Iraqis surrendered, including the 1,405soldiers on Faylaka Island. Ninety-eightpercent of all EPWs either carried or hadseen PSYOP leaflets.

• Fifty-eight percent of all EPWs report-ed hearing the “Voice of the Gulf” andtrusted the broadcasts. Eighty percent ofthose followed the instructions or actionsencouraged by the broadcasts.

• Thirty-four percent of all EPWsreported hearing loudspeaker broadcasts,

A UH-1 helicopter carriesloudspeakers used for dis-semination of PSYOP mes-sages during OperationDesert Storm.

U.S. Army photo

28 Special Warfare

and more than half of those complied withthe surrender messages.

Lessons learned• Given the success of PSYOP in Pana-

ma and in the Gulf, its legitimacy as a forcemultiplier has improved remarkably. How-ever, there are still those who do not under-stand its components, its applicability or itspotential in peacetime and in war. DoD andinteragency education remains a primaryrequirement to ensure that PSYOP will beused successfully in the future.

• The DoD-approval process for peace-time PSYOP prevented PSYOP activitiesduring the deterrence phase. DeterrencePSYOP can be very effective in preventingor postponing combat operations. A base-line of generic, non-theater-specificPSYOP initiatives must be developed andendorsed by the senior military comman-der on the scene and by the U.S. ambas-sador as soon as possible.

• Deployment of PSYOP specialists wasdelayed during the Gulf War despite thesmall amount of airlift they require, theirhigh return on investment and the factthat they are the only means of shapingthe battlefield during the deterrencephase. Early deployment of PSYOP forcesis critical to deterrence and psychologicalpreparation of the battlefield.

• With the exception of the 64 strategicinitiatives approved in August 1990 by thecommander of USCENTCOM and for-warded to the Joints Chiefs and the Secre-tary of Defense, there is little evidence ofstrategic PSYOP during either the deter-rence or combat phases of the Gulf War.This deficiency was noted by the BritishMinistry of Defense. Strategic propagandaanalysis was performed throughout theconflict by the 8th PSYOP Battalion’scivilian Strategic Studies Detachment.The analysis was provided to all compo-nents as well as to the U.S. country team.

• The Washington-based Public Diplo-macy Coordinating Committee, althoughinitially effective, played little tangiblerole in the orchestration of internationalpublic opinion. This committee should con-vene routinely, before and during crises,and should play an active role in seeking

support from allies and friends.• Effective, coordinated, combined mul-

titheater PSYOP requires planning, effort,patience, communications and commandendorsement. Much can be done in peace-time to increase the probability of successin a crisis or in war.

• Host-nation approval and participa-tion are essential to effective PSYOP inmost theaters.

• Liaison with the U.S. country teamwas critical in achieving expanded con-duits in Iraq and Kuwait. From theambassador, the deputy chief of missionand the U.S. Information Service repre-sentatives to the members of the defenseattaché office, support for PSYOP couldnot have been better.

• PSYOP contributed significantly tothe success of operational and tacticaldeception operations.

• Joint PSYOP with the Air Force andthe Marine Corps contributed to the suc-cess of ground operations. Althoughunderstandably reluctant in the beginningto commit aircraft to the PSYOP effortsolely for the delivery of leaflet bombs,USCENTAF provided B-52s, F-16s andC-130s, targeting Republican Guards divi-sions, frontline divisions in Kuwait andIraq, towns, villages and even Baghdadbefore the end of the war. Coordinationwas constant and effective. The comman-der of USMARCENT became an enthusi-astic advocate, committing both personneland fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft to thePSYOP effort.

• PSYOP support to EPW operationsproved invaluable. Several administrativecamp-support requirements, such as pro-cessing-station signs, camp rules andEPW handouts, became the responsibilityof PSYOP almost by default. Althoughsupport could have become a diversionfrom more time-sensitive tactical require-ments, it did not.

• The U.S. Army inventory of 155mmleaflet artillery rounds would have beeninsufficient for multicorps offensive oper-ations had the war lasted longer. Produc-tion of the rounds has since been discon-tinued. This may be a mistake, eventhough maneuver warfare makes their

July 1994 29

use less likely.• Loudspeaker operations were instru-

mental in persuading thousands of Iraqisto surrender. The theater requirement forloudspeakers, however, exhausted theU.S. supply from both the active andreserve components. More loudspeakersare clearly needed.

• Virtually without exception, organiclinguist skills proved insufficient for therequirement. Without Arab augmentation,unilateral U.S. PSYOP efforts would havefailed.

• Reserve-component PSYOP forcesactivated for the war performed superbly.The tactical requirements, however, werefor loudspeaker and liaison teams, not forheadquarters. The only exception to thiswas the need for a headquarters elementfrom the EPW PSYOP battalion.

• There is no substitute for in-countrytraining. Exercises, long-term TDYs andpermanent assignments that placedPSYOP soldiers in the area before theIraqi invasion proved invaluable.

• During consolidation, PSYOP forceswere instrumental in the re-establishmentof print and media capabilities in Kuwait.They also contributed to post-occupationhumanitarian-assistance operations.

In his recommendation for the 4thPSYOP Group’s Meritorious Unit Citation,Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf stated that thegroup conducted the largest and most suc-cessful psychological-operations campaignin U.S. military history. During 7 1/2months in the Gulf, PSYOP accomplishedits mission as an effective combat multi-plier for an entire unified theater, savingthousands of lives on both sides of thewar. There can be no greater contribution.

Col. Jeffrey B. Jones is currently the commander ofthe 4th PSYOP Group, FortBragg, N.C. A 1971 gradu-ate of the U.S. MilitaryAcademy at West Point, hehas served in a variety ofArmy, joint and United Nations commandand staff assignments. He commanded the

8th PSYOP Battalion during OperationsJust Cause and Promote Liberty in Pana-ma and Desert Shield and Desert Storm inSouthwest Asia. Colonel Jones holds amaster’s degree in international relationsfrom the Johns Hopkins School ofAdvanced International Studies in Wash-ington, D.C.

30 Special Warfare

There is nothing covert or low-keyabout Operation Provide Comfort’sMilitary Coordination Center in

northern Iraq. In fact, its mission is “tosee and be seen” by the estimated threeand one-half million people living there.

Based in Zahko, just inside the Iraqiborder, the MCC is the most forward-deployed military ground component ofOperation Provide Comfort.

Military personnel from four countries —Turkey, France, Britain and the U.S. —serve in this coalition force of two dozenmembers who continuously patrol thetowns and villages of northern Iraq. Theyspend their days talking with local authori-ties and monitoring resettlement progress,the condition of roads and bridges and thesecurity conditions. They also ensure Iraqimilitary forces adhere to coalition condi-tions for humanitarian operations.

A deteriorating economic base and thehigh unemployment rate make depen-dence on humanitarian assistance just ascrucial as dependence on physical securi-ty. Internal sanctions have disrupted fuelsupplies, electrical power, medical sup-plies, and a large part of food supplies tomost of northern Iraq.

Relief organizations provide physicalcomforts with food, clothing and construc-tion materials. The high visibility of MCCpatrols provides the psychological comfortthat tells the people it’s safe to rebuild.

MCC patrols canvass the entire securityzone. Some patrols are conducted from theair, using U.S. Army UH-60 helicoptersassigned to the MCC’s rear headquartersat the Turkish Air Force’s Pirinclik AirBase, and operated out of Diyarbakir AirBase. Other patrols are conducted by vehi-cle, using humvees and landrovers thattravel in well-armed convoys. MCC mem-bers often find themselves navigating dirtroads, steep hillsides and an occasionaldead end. Sometimes, several hours areinvested looking for a particular village,only to find that it no longer exists. “Vil-lages that are far from the main roadswere easily destroyed by air but are diffi-cult to rebuild,” explained Lt. Col. PhilippeEngelmann, senior French representativefor the MCC. “So the people simply findDoD photo

MilitaryCoordination

Center:Forward Component of Provide Comfort

by MSgt. Linda Brandon

DoD photo

(Above) Members of theMCC contingent talk to vil-lagers in northern Iraq dur-ing a security patrol. Thehigh-visibility patrols ensurethat villagers will have theconfidence to rebuild.

(Right) An American UH-60helicopter sits outside a vil-lage in northern Iraq. Heli-copters are used to patrolthe area.

July 1994 31

other places to live.” While the names ofthe villages and the people change, thestories of poverty, hardship, fear, andaggression are repeated.

On a recent patrol, MCC members stoodin a young man’s front yard as he relatedhis story through an interpreter. His fami-ly, which had made their living raisingsheep for market, were forced to abandontheir home and most of their belongingsand to leave Mosul, Iraq.

Although they’d known eviction was apossibility, they were given no explanationand less than an hour’s notice before beingforced out by armed government troops.Having nowhere else to go, they tookrefuge with relatives in a small towninside the security zone, where they nowshare a small house with two other fami-lies. As the young man talked, MCC per-sonnel tried to determine the exact plightof his family and others in the area. Theman and his family are just one of manysmall groups trying to rebuild their livesunder the protective umbrella of OPC.

MCC personnel live in a compound thatis actually several rented houses whichhave been transformed into a secure work-ing and living environment. The com-pound contains office space, living quar-ters, a central dining area, several TVrooms and a small weight room. Mostagree that their accommodations are smallbut comfortable. “You basically haveeverything you could want here — exceptyour family,” said Sgt. Gareth Jones,Royal Air Force. But the concrete walls,concertina wire and around-the-clockguards are constant reminders of the seri-ousness of the MCC’s role in OperationProvide Comfort.

MSgt. Linda Brandon was a member ofthe Combined Information Bureau forOperation Provide Comfort. This articlewas reprinted from Tip of the Sword,Incirlik Air Base, Turkey.

DoD photo

DoD photo

(Left) A woman washesclothes in a village in north-ern Iraq.

(Below) Barriers in thestreet near the MCC com-pound give evidence ofheightened security.

32 Special Warfare

There now appears to be a consensuson the national security outlook forthe next decade. Undoubtedly, the

post-Cold War international environmentpresents the United States with securitychallenges unprecedented in ambiguity,diversity, risk and, particularly for Armyspecial-operations forces, opportunity. Forthe first time since the 1930s, no singlepower confronts the U.S. with a clear andpresent danger. However, the collapse ofthe Soviet empire and the end of the ColdWar in many ways only exacerbate theproblems facing the U.S.

For many decades, nearly all of ourintelligence analysis was directed towardone country. We understood well the Sovi-ets’ strategic doctrine and tactics for con-ducting offensive and defensive operationsand had confident estimates of the capa-bilities of their weapons. The Cold Warenvironment was also one in which U.S.national security strategy carefullyrationed the use of military force to onlythose conflicts that promoted democracyover communism. The world was a dan-gerous place, but the superpowers wereheld in check by the knowledge that each

had the capability to destroy the planet.It is not surprising that the sound of

hammers tearing down the Berlin Wallwas joined by voices sounding the collec-tive ecstasy of the “new world order.”Unfortunately, five years later, reality hasproven that the new world order is neithernew nor orderly. The old forces of adven-turism, nationalism and separatism havereappeared, often with violent and unpre-dictable consequences. Coupled with thisis a new national security strategy, still inits infancy, that allows U.S. militaryinvolvement in the complicated scenariosof operations other than war, such aspeacemaking operations and nation-build-ing efforts. The implication for Army spe-cial operations is clear: We must be con-tinually prepared for a variety of threatforces, many with credible military capa-bilities due to the explosive proliferation ofarms worldwide. Maintaining an aware-ness of weapons and weapons technologiesthat ARSOF may face will assist in thatpreparation.

Any discussion of weapons and weaponstechnologies must address the subject ofproliferation. Proliferation, with its vari-ous implications, is the hottest defensetopic of the 1990s. However, most discus-sions on the subject fail to define the prob-lem specifically or to place it in perspec-tive to the overall threat. Relevant pointsthat must be addressed include characteri-zation of the arms-market environment,

Threat Weaponsand Weapons Technologies:Implications for Army SOF

by Julie M. Merchant

Author’s note: This article is a con-densed, unclassified version of the ArmySpecial Operations Command briefing“Technical Threats to ARSOF.” The infor-mation is derived from nonproprietary,noncopyright sources.

July 1994 33

recognition that possession does not equalcapability, and recognition of informationgaps concerning proliferation to noncon-ventional forces. Avoiding these issuesrisks creating an 11-foot ghost, called pro-liferation, similar to the 11-foot Sovietbear created in the 1980s.

The first matter of concern is the char-acterization of the arms market. A decadeago the international arms market wasone of many potential buyers with deeppurses, but it had with very few sellers.Today, the situation has reversed.Because of fiscal constraints, arms-produc-ing countries have resorted to massivemarketing campaigns to fund researchand development. Concurrently, the deepwell of funds for purchasing weapons hasdwindled, largely because of declining oilprices worldwide. Gone, too, are the largearms grants provided by the former SovietUnion, which aided in the buildup of coun-tries such as Cuba and Syria. Althoughmassive arms deals will be the exceptionrather than the rule, the flood of weaponson the market will allow any potentialaggressor to purchase what he wants, pro-vided he has a large-enough checkbook.

Secondly, the existence of a hostile forcewith an array of sophisticated weaponsdoes not automatically present an over-whelming danger. The more importantissue is whether that force also possessesthe ability to fully exploit the technicalcapabilities of those weapons. Factors thatwill determine a force’s ability to achievemaximum benefit from a given weaponinclude quality of training, professional-ism of the force, ability to assimilate tech-nology, ability to develop tactics and doc-trine incorporating a heterogeneousweapons mix, and the ability to sustainand maintain a weapons inventory.

Finally, and especially important toARSOF, most of the discussion of prolifer-ation today involves only weapons beingbought and sold by conventional standingarmies. The discussion has yet to turn toperhaps the more important subject ofjust what is being acquired by insurgentsand other paramilitary forces thatARSOF may face in future conflicts.These groups often display an unexpected

creativity and flexibility in the use of low-technology weapons, thereby compound-ing the problems associated with assess-ing their capabilities.

Army special-operations forces, in thecourse of being deployed worldwide, mayencounter forces armed with variousmixes of increasingly sophisticatedweaponry. It is impossible to discuss inone article the complete array of weaponsthat ARSOF may face. Therefore, this dis-cussion will focus on those developmentsin both weapons and weapons technologiesthat will have the greatest implications forARSOF operations now and in the future.

ReconnaissanceReconnaissance, surveillance and target

acquisition, or RSTA, continues to be oneof the most important combat-supportfunctions on the modern battlefield. Time-ly, accurate intelligence on the dispositionand location of enemy forces is prerequi-site to the success of any operation. Thecurrent international arms market offers amyriad of systems and technologies thatenhance both man- and machine-opera-tional RSTA capabilities. These systemsand technologies, which include electro-optical sensors, acoustic/seismic sensorsand reconnaissance platforms, are usedwith varying degrees of success in manyregions worldwide.

Many nations are purchasing surveil-lance and reconnaissance systems primar-ily for employment in a defensive, early-warning and intelligence- acquisitionmode. While the majority of such systemsprovide a long-range, daylight-surveil-lance capability, they also enhance sol-diers’ nighttime fighting abilities. Of allthe technological advances occurring inthis field, the development and prolifera-tion of electro-optical devices, along with“real time” automated processing of datareceived from existing sensors, will havethe greatest implications for special-opera-tions forces.

U.S. night doctrine and the correspond-ing reliance on EO sensors such as night-vision devices were widely reported duringthe conflict in the Gulf and, more recently,in Somalia. EO sensors include infrared

34 Special Warfare

image converters, image intensifiers, ther-mal imagers and low-light-level televi-sions. U.S. industrial-manufacturing capa-bilities in this area are unsurpassed; how-ever, widespread awareness of U.S. capa-bilities has caused rampant growth in thedevelopment and acquisition of vision-enhancement devices worldwide. The pro-liferation of these systems has obviousimplications for operations conductedunder the cloak of darkness. IntegratingEO technology with weapons such as man-portable surface-to-air missiles will meanthat concealment of darkness can nolonger be assured for SOF aviation units.

The first generation of EO devices camein the form of infrared image convertorsfielded by Germany during the last yearsof World War II. Still in use, these systemsemploy infrared illumination devices, suchas searchlights, with the visible light fil-tered out. With a target-recognition rangeof about 1.5 km, infrared night-visiondevices allow troops to operate at nightwithout being seen, unless the opposingforce has similar systems. Infrared conver-tors are still being installed on easternEuropean and Asian vehicles despite theirobsolescence in the West, and the potentialfor their removal and subsequent use as

independent systems is great.Image intensifiers represent the next

level of EO sensor development. Thesesystems, incorporating increasingly sensi-tive photo-cathode material that allowsthem to operate with natural nighttimeambient light, were introduced into mili-tary inventories in the 1960s. Successivegenerations of systems have producedintensifiers with increased sensitivities,higher resolutions and longer battery life.

U.S. industry is currently enhancing theproduction of third-generation devices andleads the way in the development and pro-duction of fourth-generation image-intensi-fier devices. While manufacturers espousethe benefits of third-generation devices(three times the sensitivity, twice theimage resolution, and about three timesthe battery life of second-generation sys-tems), few have reached the internationalarms market. Second-generation systemswill be widely sought by forces which needa reliable night-operation capability.Third-generation systems most likely willbe available only to countries or organiza-tions willing to spend larger amounts ofmoney for the increased capabilities.

The development of image-intensifierdevices was followed by the development ofthermal-imaging systems, which requireno illumination and operate on thermalemissions from objects in the field of view.Different target aspects may be revealedby the system’s ability to move the polarityof the image between white/hot toblack/hot. Another advantage of thermal-imaging systems is that they may be usedduring daytime operations to “see” throughexternal camouflage and battlefield smoke,thereby revealing potential targets. First-generation TI systems are available world-wide and will be used increasinglythroughout the remainder of the century.Future generations of these devices,including man-portable systems, will esca-late in importance as manufacturing capa-bilities spread and systems become avail-able on the international market.

Finally, low-light-level television devicesintegrate image-intensifier systems andTV systems, resulting in an image displayor processing at low ambient-light levels.

A soldier uses a hand-heldinfrared surveillance device.

U.S. Army photo

Coupling a second- or third-generationimage-intensifier tube to a TV camera —technology that can be acquired at an elec-tronics shop — produces a solid-state,rugged, low-light-level TV camera. LLLTVsystems are being incorporated into othermilitary systems, such as vehicles andweapons, as less expensive alternatives tothermal-imaging devices. Because of theirlow cost, LLLTVs are affordable systemsfor forces that can purchase off-the-shelfequipment and modify it for military use.

Automation of resources supportingRSTA is an additional area in which thereturn on investments will be great.Forces with insufficient automated-data-processing capabilities will not be able toperform real-time processing of the datareceived by the myriad of RSTA sensorsand platforms already built and fielded.To this end, military organizations mayinvest varying amounts of money toachieve equitable capabilities, dependingon the range of their operations. Smallparamilitary forces may integrate laptopcomputers with existing sensors toimprove perimeter security, while nationsrecognizing the importance of the knowl-edge-based battlefield may establish pow-erful and expensive automated-data-pro-cessing resources to reap the benefits ofexpensive RSTA sensors and systemsacross the battlefield.

Electronic warfareEffective radio communications are a

fundamental requirement for mobile oper-ations, yet they can easily become the tar-get of electronic-warfare measures such asjamming, geolocation and interception.EW contributes to the disruption of com-mand and control at decisive points and isa key element on the battlefield. AlthoughEW techniques may be used on all types ofelectronic systems, of major concern toARSOF are the technologies that aim tointercept, geolocate or jam communica-tions; and the use of EW against ARSOFinformation systems.

The extent to which EW systems havebeen manufactured and fielded has beenwell-established by open-source publica-tions. A review of these sources reveals

that a variety of systems covering theentire electromagnetic frequency spectrumis available worldwide. Ranging fromsophisticated airborne platforms to simple,remotely delivered ground systems, thesesystems will enable hostile forces to use avariety of communication-jamming tech-niques and to locate and intercept signals.For most forces, the advancements in thesesystems and their proliferation lessen thechallenge of countering unencrypted nar-row-band communications. As communica-tions begin to use modern modulationschemes such as direct sequence, frequen-cy hopping or hybrid spreading, EW equip-ment designed to counter these modula-tions will emerge. Spaced-based communi-cations are also likely to be increasinglytargeted as forces worldwide begin to relymore heavily on satellites as relays.

The capabilities to engage in EW mayvary greatly. While the latest technologyis available on the open market, forcesthat have not invested heavily in sophisti-cated systems may not be able to cover theentire frequency spectrum using automati-cally tuned systems. To communicatewithout interference or detection, ARSOFmust understand the EW systems avail-able to the opposing force.

Computers, computer systems and auto-mated networks are pervasive in theDepartment of Defense. Critical to thesupport of ARSOF operations across thetactical, strategic and sustaining-baseenvironments, these systems make attrac-tive targets. The threat is genuine and isgrowing. Potential adversaries are individ-uals or groups, both foreign and domestic,who have the capability and the intent toexploit a system. Their motives includemilitary, political or industrial gain aswell as personal amusement.

Adversaries have three primary objec-tives: the compromise of information, thecorruption of data and the disruption ofoperations. To achieve their objectives,they may use an individual equipped witha personal computer, modem and tele-phone line; or they may use multipleactors and governmental support. Thelikelihood of a given threat varies depend-ing on whether the information system is

July 1994 35

36 Special Warfare

deployed in the tactical, strategic or sus-taining-base environment.

A case demonstrating the threat toinformation systems is that of the Han-nover Hackers. From the mid- to late1980s, a group of German computer hack-ers from West Berlin and Hannover usedthe German telephone network to entercomputers at the universities of Karlsruheand Bremen. From there they connected tointernational telephone networks andgained access to computers in the U.S.,Canada, Japan and western Europe.According to some reports, the hackerswere successful in more than 40 percent oftheir remote log-in attempts. To enter thesystems they relied on purchased, stolenor copied passwords, the testing of likelypasswords, and the random generation ofpasswords. Upon log-in, the hackers

granted themselves privileges and theninstalled a Trojan horse that allowed themto record authorized passwords fromunknowing users.

MinesA rapid evolution has taken place in

mine technology over the last two decades,and an increased emphasis on mine war-fare throughout the world has created anexpanding market for all types of minesystems. Their low cost, indefinite shelflife and manpower savings explain theirwide appeal. Land and naval mines arenow essential weapons in conflicts at alllevels: from grass-roots insurgencies tomajor confrontations between well-equipped armies. Effective mine warfareobstructs the mobility of opposing forcesand creates favorable conditions for the

Honduras

Nicaragua

Costa Rica

Colombia

Falkland Islands

South Africa

Botswana

Namibia

Angola

Former Yugoslavia

Sudan

Chad

Western Sahara

Morocco

Libya

Egypt

Turkey

Ethiopia

Iraq

Iran

The Yemens

Somalia

Mozambique

Zimbabwe

India

Burma

Thailand

Cambodia

Vietnam

New Guinea

Countries With Significant Landmine Incidents

July 1994 37

mine employer. Modern mines were first used on the

battlefield near the end of World War I inresponse to the emergence of the tank.Mines evolved into a serious threat duringWorld War II when conventional anti-tankmines and anti-personnel fragmentationmines were widely used. Today, an esti-mated 85-100 million anti-personnel andanti-vehicle mines may lie unexploded inmore than 60 nations. Countries with thehighest density of mine employmentinclude Afghanistan, Angola, Somalia andCambodia, where civil-war combatantsused the explosive devices to terrorizecivilian populations. Mines pose problemslong after conflicts; they can be a definitedeterrent to light industry, agriculture,repatriation of refugees and overallnation-building processes in whichARSOF may be involved.

Evolving technology is making minesmore deadly, more disruptive and moreeconomical. Developments in areas suchas remote delivery, detectability, blast-resistant fusing, multiple sensors and“smart” systems have boosted the effec-tiveness of current systems. They havealso simplified laying of the fields andhave lowered logistical burdens. The per-centage of advanced-technology mines isincreasing; and even though new technolo-gy is costly, mines are still affordableweapons for any military organization.

The surge of technological sophisticationin mines presents keen challenges to theU.S. countermine-development program.Foreign mines are developed with a fairunderstanding of countermine conceptsand are designed to counter detection,identification, removal, neutralization andpredetonation. Developmental lead timefor mines is much shorter than for coun-termine programs. Any country can pur-chase mines to counter specific counter-mine capabilities or developments.

Air defenseDesert Storm demonstrated the role

that air forces can play in preparing theway for ground attacks. Recognizing theimportance of air assets, threat forces willseek the most effective weapons to deny

air superiority, whether on a limited scale,as in Somalia, or on a greater scale, as inmajor regional conflicts. Currently, sur-face-to-air missile systems are the fore-most choice.

Surface-to-air missiles can be dividedinto two categories: those that use radio-frequencies to guide and track the missilethrough flight, and those that use infraredguidance to target thermal emissions ofaircraft. Infrared systems are usuallyman-portable. Over the last several years,an incredible amount of information hassurfaced on surface-to-air systems engi-neered and manufactured by countriesaround the world, especially systemsoffered for sale by Russia. The capabilitiesof these systems, spanning tactical andstrategic ranges, have been widely adver-tised at trade shows, which indicates their

availability on the arms market. Pricesrange from several million dollars forsophisticated RF systems to several thou-sand for infrared systems.

The publicized effectiveness of theStinger in Afghanistan and both the SA-7and the SA-14 in El Salvador, along withtheir relatively low cost, has caused man-portable systems to be widely sought.Because of their ease of employment,these systems have the potential to dis-rupt ARSOF missions. Originally, visual

A soldier practices the useof an SA-7 surface-to-airmissile.

U.S. Army photo

38 Special Warfare

target acquisition made man-portable sys-tems nearly ineffective at night. As previ-ously mentioned, however, their combina-tion with night-vision devices could givethreat forces a credible nighttime air-defense capability.

Unmanned aerial vehicles have existedsince the 1930s and have been used incombat by many nations. Although theyhave been widely used by Israel duringthe last two decades, it was not untilDesert Storm that the full value of UAVsas inexpensive airborne platforms wasrealized. Most UAVs now in developmentuse strap-on payloads and are intended formultimission purposes. This feature pro-vides an inexpensive and flexible capabili-ty for reconnaissance, communications,electronic warfare or direct attack. Thecost of a typical multimission UAV, includ-ing payloads, is 0.1 to 1 percent of the costof a typical manned aircraft and thus maybe affordable for even the smallest ofpotential adversaries, especially those whochoose off-the-shelf systems and modifythem for a specific use.

Directed energyConventional small-arms technology is

rapidly nearing its limit worldwide.

Weapons will reach their limits of preci-sion within 10-15 years. As industry looksto the future, it will probably pursue tech-nologies using “energy bullets” fired fromdirected-energy weapons.

Directed-energy weapons, includinglasers, radio-frequency weapons and parti-cle-beam weapons, have several advan-tages over more conventional weaponssystems. One advantage is their nearlyinstantaneous flight to target. Thus, thepotential for retargeting is considerable,allowing for the engagement of a multi-tude of targets over a wide field of view.Targets can also be engaged at reducedranges, where the probability of targethard kill is increased. A disadvantage ofDEWs is weapon performance may be hin-dered by inclement weather.

The most likely developments of thenext decade will be in laser technologies.Increasingly prevalent on the modern bat-tlefield, lasers are used in range determi-nation, target designation, target guidanceand communication. Long postulated as ameans of surpassing the sophisticatedweapons of the modern battlefield, laserweapons have shed their futuristic imageand are now a modern reality.

Laser weapons can be divided into two

U.S. Army photo

A soldier wears a Soviet-made protective suitagainst nuclear, biologicaland chemical hazards. TheNBC threat is likely to con-tinue as nations export theirstocks to other countries.

categories: low-energy and high-energy.Low-energy laser weapons attack the sen-sors on military equipment and the eyes ofpersonnel. Their application produces a“soft kill,” which eliminates or interfereswith only a specialized function of the tar-get, such as sight. High-energy laserweapons can attack the same range of tar-gets, producing soft-kills at greater rangesor “hard kills,” which structurally damagethe targets.

Any country or organization with a mod-est engineering capability can adapt cer-tain commercially available lasers for usein a limited role as blinding weapons. Cur-rent Western export controls are not suffi-cient to control the proliferation ofweapon-quality lasers. Countries outsideWestern export control may also be eagerto sell laser equipment. The increasingavailability of laser hardware and newtechnology make the development of “lowtechnology” weapons a real possibility.

Weapons of mass destruction includenuclear, biological and chemical weapons.In the last several years, the internationalcommunity has expressed growing concernregarding these weapons. WMD in thehands of hostile forces threaten not onlyU.S. lives but also the viability of ourregional power-projection strategy.Attempts to control the export of theseweapons and their associated technologieshave been unsuccessful, and proliferationis likely to continue until we can enforceexport controls. Until then, ARSOF mustbe prepared to operate, survive andaccomplish their missions in nuclear, bio-logical and chemical environments.

No single dominating threat, such asthe former Soviet Union, will be theundisputed focus of U.S. security policyduring the next decade. Many smallerpowers (Third World countries as well asparamilitary forces) are acquiringincreasingly powerful and diverse mili-tary capabilities, thereby narrowing thetechnology gap that now favors the U.S.Regional powers will continue their mili-tary buildup as a result of transfers ofhigh-technology hardware from majorarms exporters and an expansion ofindigenous production capabilities.

Besides the products of the majorexporters — the U.S., Russia, China andcertain European countries — those ofother countries such as Argentina, Brazil,North Korea, Pakistan and South Africawill add to market supplies. Overall, con-tinuing improvements in weapons sys-tems and military capabilities and theavailability of these improvements to anyhostile force will increasingly threatenARSOF’s ability to enter an area eitherovertly or clandestinely, sustain long-term operations, accomplish specific mis-sions, report information and intelligenceto higher authorities and extract forceswithout discovery.

Julie M. Merchant cur-rently serves as the scientificand technical intelligenceanalyst in the Office of theDeputy Chief of Staff, U.S.Army Special OperationsCommand. Prior to thisassignment, she served as a threat analystfor the U.S. Army Missile Command,Huntsville, Ala., and as the special-pro-jects officer with the U.S. Army SupportGroup-Forward in Saudi Arabia. She is agraduate of the State University of NewYork at Oneonta and is currently complet-ing a master’s degree in engineering fromthe University of Alabama at Huntsville.

July 1994 39

40 Special Warfare

For U.S. special-operations forces tobe the best in the world, each of itsparts must be effective. The accumu-

lation of many advantages produces theedge that decides mission success.

Even the best-trained personnel can’tperform effectively without the bestequipment. The best technology occursthrough the relentless pursuit of innova-tion. In these times of tight budgets, thepursuit of innovation calls for innovativeperspectives.

The traditional breadth, diversity andglobal spread of SOF missions have alwayscalled for an above-average degree of tech-nological innovation. This is a need thatwill not change as we enter the 21st centu-ry. The accelerating global spread of indus-trial, business and consumer technologieswith war-fighting applications willincrease the need for SOF to retain a com-petitive edge, in environments where weoperate without a home-team advantage.

In his 1986 book, Innovation — TheAttacker’s Advantage, Richard Fosterdescribed the virtual necessity of main-taining innovative business forces both forthe survival and for the prosperity of cor-porations. Innovations are of benefit notonly to users but also for the suppliersproviding them.

For many decades the United Statesmaintained a high degree of innovationfunding through money spent on defense.Like the ripples created when a stone

strikes the surface of a pond, waves ofinnovative technology eventually spreadacross our industrial, business and con-sumer sectors. Some of our global competi-tors, with Japan being the most promi-nent, did not follow our route, but insteaddirectly funded primary research in othersectors, such as consumer products. Theythen spread the resulting innovations tobusiness, industry and defense products.It is clear that both approaches are suc-cessful, with time being a decisive factor.

Recent changes in domestic economicpriorities and global politics have com-bined to increase the needs for SOF whilebudgets are tight. To maintain the fastestpossible pace of innovation, we must seeknew means. In a war-fighting environ-ment, if the opposing force uses differenttactics that work, it can be advantageousto add some of these tactics to our owndoctrine to gain superior capabilities.

In adding to established doctrine, a crit-ical aspect is understanding the nature ofthat doctrine. Change can bring strength,but it can also bring surprises. No onelikes surprises — unless they are goodones!

Innovation created America, has madeit great and will bring it continuedstrength in the future. Yet even here inAmerica, our history shows that innova-tive technology can encounter obstacles.When Alexander Graham Bell first invent-ed the telephone, he was not met with

Innovative Meansof Achieving InnovativeTechnology

by Rand Ellis

July 1994 41

cheers. At that time, the telegraph-domi-nated world viewed the telephone as aworthless device! Fifteen years ago, asApple was creating the personal computer,the significant majority of experts in thecomputer industry felt strongly that themainframe was the sole means of dealingwith data. Because they didn’t appreciatethe entire nature of the problem, theydelayed a major solution.

To be effective in our pursuit of innova-tive solutions to problems, we must clearlyunderstand the fundamental nature of theproblem. The tools we use today frequent-ly represent the culmination of manysmall steps in a direction of development,often established over many years. Thesesteps create an inertia that can trap uswhen an innovative solution approachesfrom another direction. We become blind-ed by the assumptions we have accumulat-ed over time. The inventor’s clarity ofvision often comes from eyes not blindedby assumptions of the past. Like inven-tors, the generals who have commandedgreat victories have often seen circum-stances not as the majority of others have,but as they truly were.

In the past few years, the term “dual-use technology” has become the defensebuzz phrase. It is a phrase based in thecompromise between needs and funding. Itcan mean much more.

Effective dual-use technology does notmean using off-the-shelf industrial, busi-ness or consumer technologies in war-fight-ing roles so much as it means taking theessence of those innovations and combiningthem with traditional defense technology.In our search for innovative solutions toproblems, no stone can be left unturned.Today we must look for better ways andmeans from military, industrial, businessand consumer sources. A great deal of inno-vation can be achieved through combiningand repackaging technologies.

A close partnership between SOF warfighters and SOF suppliers can producebenefits for all team members. Whenresearch provides a breakthrough in SOFtechnology, that research must be quicklyleveraged into advances for domestic andinternational industrial, business and con-

sumer products. This tends to go againstthe views and the practices of the past aswell as our instinctive desire to keep ouradvantages close to home. However, a keylesson of the past decade is that our globalcompetitors will quickly jump on anyopportunity that we delay action on. Whilewe must be concerned with the dangers ofa hollow armed forces, we must be equallyconcerned with the dangers of a holloweconomy. Both are equally threatening,and no simple solution exists for eitherproblem.

What SOF suppliers can contributetoday is their ability to deal more with cre-ators of innovative technology from nonde-fense sources and to turn the essence ofthese innovations into valuable SOFassets. As we fund SOF technologicalresearch, achieve new technologies, deploythese technologies in SOF environments

and spin them out to broader applications,we can also take advantage of theresearch funding of other sectors and theflow of technology from the opposite direc-tion. If we look at the way SOF has oper-ated over the past decade, we will see thatthis has already been taking place to amoderate degree.

What is really important, as we preparefor an increase in SOF roles in the 21stcentury, is to make sure that the “special”in special operations remains prominentand that conventional military anddefense industry ways and means do notdominate and strangle SOF.

A key advantage of the industrial sup-port for SOF lies in the unique breadth ofthe window that SOF provides both at thedomestic level — to the rest of the U.S.armed forces — and at the internationallevel — to allied SOF and conventionalforces. The diversity of SOF missions canalso help open the doors for commercial

Like inventors, the generals who have commanded great victories have often seencircumstances not as the majority of othershave, but as they truly were.

opportunities here in the United Statesand around the world.

Ultimately, leadership is neither grant-ed nor assumed; it is earned. For Americaand SOF, leadership is earned by fieldingthe best personnel and equipment that wecan. This leadership is maintainedthrough the determined and continuousquest for innovation in both tactics andtechnology. With regard to SOF equip-ment, innovation must be applied to allaspects of SOF technology, from the big-ticket items, such as aircraft, all the waydown to the laces for boots. This balance iscritical. In planning for the next battle, wemust draw our lessons not only fromDesert Storm but also from the broad his-torical perspectives of Somalia, Kuwait,Panama, Grenada, Beirut, Vietnam,Korea and World War II.

People around the world instinctivelylook to leaders for solutions to their prob-lems. The example set by our special-oper-ations personnel around the world cancontribute positively to our success in theinternational community. The partnershipbetween SOF and SOF suppliers is ofgreater impact than defense budgets alonecan reveal.

As uncertain as circumstances mayappear today, one thing is assured: SOFwill continue its role as a leading innovatorand will continue to challenge SOF suppli-ers to provide the best possible technology.It is the basic nature of people to thrivewhenever they are challenged. Greatness isoften achieved when we rise to meet a diffi-cult challenge. We can look forward to anumber of new challenges in the 21st cen-tury. With innovation, our continued suc-cess is not only possible, it is assured.

Rand Ellis wore a green beret in 1969 while he wasassigned to the Recon Sec-tion of the Royal CanadianRegiment’s Third Battalion.From 1970 to 1978, hisCanadian Forces assign-ments included four years as a combatradio technician with No. 1 Combat

Group, a tour of duty with the U.N. peace-keeping force in Cyprus, and four years ofinstructor duty at the Canadian ForcesSchool of Communications and ElectronicsEngineering. As a civilian, his work focus-es on personal portable communicationstechnology applications in industrial,police and fire-service hazardous opera-tions. He has qualified in winter andmountain warfare, and as a skiing instruc-tor and scuba diver.

42 Special Warfare

July 1994 43

Arecent survey of Army general offi-cers conducted by the Army WarCollege to assist in its curriculum

development included the following ques-tion: “What skills/knowledge do you feelsenior officers will need in the next 5-15years?”

The general officers identified specificskills in nine broad areas. Most of theseskills are already taught or cultivated inthe Army, but they can be developed onlyover a period of time.

This sample of the survey results pro-vides a list of traits that officers shouldpossess, and it may also help in identify-ing the large number of underlying realand necessary skills that will be requiredof senior officers over the next severalyears. Although it is important that everyofficer survey the “skill requirements” of acareer in the Army, it seems especiallyimportant for foreign-area officers, whooften must maintain proficiency in twowidely different specialties.

Technical and tactical skills• First and foremost are the traditional

skills of the military profession. All otherprerequisites for success assume techni-cal and tactical proficiency in an Armyspecialty.

• Technical military competence of lead-ers is the key to achieving combat readi-ness in their units, but even this is not

sufficient. Leaders who possess technicalskills will have to be innovative andaggressive in meeting individual and unitstandards of competence in ways that theyhave not been called upon to do in thepast. They must be able to turn ideas intoaction. They must also be contributors ofknowledge, creators of solutions and well-reasoned risk takers of an almostentrepreneurial nature.

• All officers must establish a solidfoundation in ground warfare and an in-depth understanding of the use of mili-tary force. Over the years, officers mustdevelop these skills into an understand-ing of strategy and the operational art ofwarfare.

Joint and coalition skills• Multiservice and multinational skills

must become second nature. The Armywill seldom operate outside the joint (mul-tiservice) environment. Army officers’long-standing appreciation of joint opera-tions must, in the future, include skills inthinking and operating jointly and theability to think beyond parochial Armyinterests.

• The possibilities of conducting opera-tions in a combined (multinational) envi-ronment are also high, with the greatestlikelihood being ground operations. Oper-ations such as peace enforcement, peace-keeping and humanitarian assistance

Officer Skills:From Technical and Tacticalto a Sense of Humor

by Col. Mike Burns

will very likely characterize the forcecommitments to a regional conflict.

Resource-management skills• Officers must acquire a comprehensive

understanding of how the Army runs andoperates, not just a casual glimpse of whatone is exposed to over time. Officers mustalso develop the skills to manage resources,and they must be able to make difficultdecisions about resource allocations.

• As managers of resources, officersmust listen to competing priorities, strate-gies and policies and learn how to achieveeffective results while compromisingmeans but not standards.

• Finally, officers must develop bettermethods of root-cause analysis, problem-solving and process management.

Automation skills• Officers must be proficient in the use

of computers and simulations and have anin-depth knowledge of automation, itsuses and applications to management,training, warfare and combat support.

• Officers who employ weapons systemsmust achieve complete familiarity withautomation and information systems asthey apply to both training and fightingwith sophisticated weapons.

• Officers must be on the leading edgeof simulations in training and be able, atall levels, to integrate tactical field train-ing with simulations.

• To ensure combat readiness, officersmust be able to assess the level ofwarfighting skills gained through simula-tions and the level to be achieved throughtactical training.

Communicating, negotiating skills• Officers must develop the ability to

present their case skillfully, analytically,correctly and simply. “Ability” equals pub-lic-speaking skills. “Simply” equals charts.

• Officers must understand the rolesplayed by those in public relations and leg-islative affairs and develop an appreciationfor the immediate impact that the newsmedia can have, especially television.

• Officers must also be able to function

in a controversial environment and towork controversial issues to an acceptableconclusion. To accomplish this, officersmust have the political and diplomaticskills to articulate requirements whenresources are scarce, the ability to developcrisp, irrefutable logic to press the caseand, finally, an understanding of how tocreate win-win situations through negotia-tion and compromise.

Internationalist skills• With a regionally oriented national

strategy, officers must be aware of both thenational and international political envi-ronments and strive to gain a better under-standing of history and the long-standingtensions now coming to the forefront ineach region.

• Political-military skills will assumeeven greater importance and will requirean understanding of the culture and histo-ry in areas considered to be the most like-ly for conflict. And while there is areduced emphasis on Russian capabilities,officers must gain a broad understandingof the regional dangers and the potentialfor conflict in the Pacific, Southwest Asia,Middle East, Europe and Latin America.

• Officers should develop at least oneforeign-language skill.

• Over the years, an officer must gain acultural understanding of the Third World.

People skills• Officers must continue to develop the

ability to lead and direct ever-larger orga-nizations while also caring for people.

• Officers must be able to listen to otherviews and opinions and to respect othercultures when making decisions.

• Officers must be able to deal with peo-ple on a personal basis, maintain their loy-alty and avoid creating animosities.

• There is no substitute for competenceand leadership, but if you don’t under-stand people in the Army, you are in thewrong profession.

Family and social needs• In an increasingly married Army, offi-

cers must understand the social and fami-

44 Special Warfare

ly needs of the soldier who has a spouseand family, the two-soldier family and thesingle-parent soldier.

• Officers must also have an under-standing of the breakup of the “tradition-al” American family and its relationship tothe troops they lead.

• Officers must strive to understand thecommunity and the social needs of thecountry and to stay attuned to a domesticenvironment with significant social prob-lems and inequities.

Personal character and vision• In the challenging environment of

the future, officers will require strongpersonal character — notably, integrity,ethics and courage. With limitedresources, keeping standards and qualityat a high level may lead to hard choices.Officers must have the integrity to standup and say “can’t do” when the pressureto draw down and cut corners builds. Itwill take strong convictions to maintainquality of forces.

• Officers must be able to articulatetheir vision of the future and remain firmin the face of adversity or when challengedabout their integrity and ethics.

• Officers must develop the cognitiveskills to think strategically, conceptuallyand analytically; i.e., the ability to thinkclearly about complicated issues and to make decisions under conditions ofuncertainty.

• Officers must learn to set directionwhile dealing with uncertainty andchange. They must not be afraid to think“outside the box” or to explore all opportu-nities, whether they are economic, techno-logical or political.

• Officers must develop exceptionalproblem-solving skills and organizationalskills because they will be asked to resolvefar-reaching and complex issues for whichthere are no best answers.

• Finally, officers must be able to dealwith more stress. They must remain flexi-ble, be highly communicative, be able todeal with and develop new concepts, besensitive to subordinates’ requirements,be able to take on much more responsibili-

ty and, all the while, maintain a sense ofhumor.

Col. Mike Burns is cur-rently in preparation forassignment as the Armyattaché to Athens. His mostrecent assignment was as aplanner in the Office of theUndersecretary of Defensefor Policy. This article was adapted fromthe survey titled, “U.S. Army War College2000: Army Senior Officer Education,”August 1992, and the verbatim general-offi-cer comments in response to the questionindicated. The author has taken liberty tocombine and group the comments of thesurvey respondents and to add personalobservations in order to make the responsesreadable and consistent.

July 1994 45

Retired Lt. Gen. William P.Yarborough is a 1936 graduate ofthe U.S. Military Academy at WestPoint. In 1940 he formed America’sfirst parachute battalion as a com-pany commander, subsequentlybecoming test officer and S-2 for theProvisional Parachute Group andlater the Airborne Command. Dur-ing World War II he participated inseven major campaigns, includingAmerica’s first use of paratroops inNorth Africa, the Sicily invasion,ground combat at Anzio as part ofDarby’s Rangers and the airborneassault into Southern France. Inthe late 1950s he served as deputychief of the U.S. Military AssistanceAdvisory Group to Cambodia andlater as commander of the 66thCounterintelligence Corps Group inGermany. From 1961 to 1965, heserved as commander of FortBragg’s JFK Center for SpecialWarfare. In later assignments heserved as senior member of the U.N.

Military Armistice Commission-Korea, chairman of the U.S. delega-tion to the Inter-American DefenseBoard, as an Army corps comman-der in Korea, and as chief of staffand deputy commander in chief ofU.S. Army-Pacific. He retired fromthe Army in 1971 and is a writer,lecturer and research consultant.

SW: When you were commander ofthe JFK Center for Special Warfare,the Army was preparing for a newtype of warfare, counterinsurgency.What were the main difficultiesinvolved?Yarborough: The new commandinto which I moved would be calledupon to think beyond the relativelysimple concepts of behind-the-linessabotage and guerrilla raids, and toaddress a new dimension describedby the term “subterranean war-fare.” The perception that “subter-ranean warfare” was a massivestrategic threat to the Free World

came from President John F.Kennedy. Familiar with the irregu-lar-warfare doctrine of Mao TseTung, the president insisted thatthe armed services prepare to copewith the new form of aggression.Thus the term “counterinsurgency”was born and, with it, the presiden-tial mandate to build an elite forcethat could translate theory intoaction. Fortunately, Special Forceswas the military anomaly aroundwhich the kind of instrument thepresident had in mind could becrafted. Without sacrificing theirtechnical capability to conductguerrilla operations, they wouldnow be called upon to teach othershow to defeat guerrillas and theshadowy mechanisms which spawnand sustain them. Inasmuch assubversion in any sovereign state isa very private and touchy matter,access to the mechanisms whichproduce it is especially difficult foroutsiders. Thus, to be of significant

46 Special Warfare

Interview:Retired Lt. Gen.

William P. Yarborough

assistance to a foreign state afflict-ed with insurgency, Americanscharged with the task would haveto develop more than a skin-deeprapport with the indigenous peopleinvolved. In view of the sensitivepolitical and psychological environ-ment, judgment, maturity, self-dis-cipline and the ability to work har-moniously with a variety of ethnicgroups would be all-importantqualities in determining an individ-ual’s suitability for the extraordi-nary missions he would be calledupon to perform. Contrary to thebeliefs of some of our most respect-ed military leaders at that time,conventional forces could not pro-vide anything remotely appropriatefor addressing these politicallycharged quasi-military problems.

In order to meet the risingdemand for Special Forces, twosubstantial problems had to besolved. The pre-1961 Special Forcestraining programs had to bereworked to include the vast areasembraced by the concepts of coun-terinsurgency, and the trainingbase had to be expanded drasticallyto accommodate the increase inSpecial Forces’ strength.

In bringing the formerly, almostexclusively guerrilla warfare-ori-ented training programs of SpecialForces into harmony with the con-cept of counterinsurgency, wesought help from many sourcesincluding the British, whose tri-umph in Malaya pointed the waytoward sound and workable doc-trine. The French defeat in Indochi-na indicated no less eloquently thedirection our own efforts shouldtake if we were to benefit fromtheir excruciating experience. Inaddition to the works of Mao TseTung, Che Guevara and Vo NguyenGiap, our instructors and studentsat the Special Warfare School used,almost as a textbook, Street With-out Joy, the history of the Frenchwar in Indochina by the Frenchauthor-soldier, Bernard Fall.

The seemingly impossible goal of

raising the output of Special Forceswithout lowering their quality hadbeen made more attainable becauseof the groundwork laid by my pred-ecessor, then-Col. George M. Jones.By persistent and persuasive repre-sentation to the Deputy Chief ofStaff for Personnel of the U.S.Army, he had succeeded in gettingauthorization to take high-qualityNCOs and NCO material fromother Army units. This was partic-ularly obnoxious to the comman-ders of those units, but it meantthat the attrition rate in SpecialForces training and selection couldbe held down and that the caliberof Green Beret advisers in contactwith foreign military and securityforces would be of the highestorder.

SW: Are there special-operationsconcerns that we should keep inmind as we prepare for operationsother than war?Yarborough: Yes, there are agreat many. Among other consider-ations, operations that might seemlogical from a purely military pointof view may not be acceptableeither to Congress or to the majori-ty of the American people. Weought to look pragmatically at thespecial-ops possibilities around theworld, to determine what is feasiblefrom an American psychologicaland political point of view. Certainthings are ruled out because of pop-ular opinion. An overly emotionalor idealistic perception of our obli-gation to address many of theworld’s ills must be tempered bythe hard fact that some solutionsare beyond our capabilities. More-over, our bombs, bullets and bayo-nets may be our most immediatelydeployable reaction, but they couldalso be the least effective in con-fronting a multitude of challengesto our national interests worldwide.

One of my concerns is that Spe-cial Forces, which should be thePh.D.s of the special-ops philoso-phy, may have gradually been con-

ventionalized to such a degree thatthe Ranger skills and the Rangerphilosophy have sometimes intrud-ed into the Special Forces area in away that violates the principle ofeconomy of force. With the airborneand the Ranger organizations, Ithink there’s enough potential fordoing all the things that have to dowith fire and movement. Thismeans long-range reconnaissance,and it means the kinds of thingsthat have to do with demolitionsand target hunting behind thelines. The only proviso I’d make isthat if long-range reconnaissancerequires working with indigenousforces, then Rangers might not bethe people to do it. They probablywould not be language-trained orarea-trained to the degree thatwould enable them to empathizewith the people. I feel that thehighly honed language- and area-trained individual should be keptfor jobs that require that kind ofsensitivity. There should be anemphasis and a premium on thatkind of development. This is not tosay that a Special Forces guyshould not have all the skills thathe has. But I’ve always felt that theTOEs should be flexible enough sothat if a man cannot carry a ruck-sack 500 miles but has tremendousknowledge of the history of a coun-try and of the mores and the cul-ture and has the personality thatallows him to be accepted by theleadership in the country, we oughtto be able to say to hell with theTOEs. There is a requirement tolook at the future and to look atsome of the cases where we haven’tbeen able to cope and to seewhether this extraordinary mili-tary phenomenon can be warpedinto position where it can handlethose things. We have an exampleright now — Haiti. If there were aninstrument for doing anythingthere, it would be Special Forces:people who speak the language,who understand the culture, whowould not throw their weight

July 1994 47

around, but who would quietly andpersistently preach the gospel thatthe United States wants them to,recognizing that the differencesbetween the cultures might preventthe Haitians from completelyaccepting our formulas.

Another concern of mine isPSYOP — it was also one of BillDonovan’s primary concerns.PSYOP continues to be an area inwhich the United States, because ofits peculiar idea about the sanctityof an individual’s opinions, has onehell of a time adopting a nationalposition on a psychological theme.The military has the mechanics forPSYOP: We know how to print, weknow how to scatter leaflets, andwe know how to care for the peoplewho are doing these things. But theintelligence that must go into aPSYOP campaign never is the com-plete premise of the military. Thereshould be a mechanism for tappingthe whole spectrum of the intellec-tual world — social scientists, his-torians and psychologists. And thatmechanism ought to be nationallyunderstood and controlled, andwhen the military goes into action,it should have the benefit of thosethings. We have yet to bring themassive power of PSYOP to bear onour national crisis with regard todrug usage. The determination ofthe American people to fight andwin World War II was aided andnurtured by all of the persuasivepower that propaganda could gen-erate. The skills of the psychologi-cal warriors of the United StatesArmy should somehow be broughtto bear against drug users andtheir providers with the same fer-vor and vigor. When the nation isin danger, as it is from the drugthreat, extraordinary measuresmay be justified as long as there isno violation of the principles uponwhich our rights and freedoms arebased.

There is one final thing: thenexus between military action andpolice action. In most of the coun-

tries in which we’ve operated wherethere was internal disorder and themilitary moved in to do somethingabout it, a case for martial lawdeveloped immediately. Martiallaw means that the rights and theprivileges of citizens are held inabeyance, and sometimes when themilitary is in control, the situationbecomes worse than it would haveif it had been left alone. Therefore,the requirement for a highly

trained police force and the preces-sion between military action andpolice action, smooth and regulatedby law, is absolutely necessary.

SW: Do you think there will bewider use of special-operationsforces?Yarborough: The term “special-operations forces” now takes in amuch wider environment. Goingafter a hostage, or something simi-

lar to that, is a peripheral thing —it’s something we have to do. Thefailure of Desert One was the rea-son Congress mandated that wehave a Special Operations Com-mand. Desert One was a simpleoperation compared to some of thepolitical-military, quasi-militaryones I’ve been talking about. Thatstraightforward kind of thing hasbeen done time and time again. Wecan produce the people for that,there’s no problem there. But toproduce the people who have thefinesse, the understanding and thesensitivity to produce a set of rules,regulations and laws that allow themilitary to have one leg in the polit-ical arena without doing violence toour national structure — that’s thechallenge.

SW: Have you noticed manychanges in Special Forces soldierssince the late 1960s?Yarborough: I still think they’rethe most magnificently picked peo-ple that the nation has ever had. Ihave never been prouder in my lifeof being a part of any organizationor philosophy than of my alignmentwith Special Forces. I’ve seen theseguys all over the world. They haveintegrity and maturity and under-standing — it’s like a doctor know-ing when not to do something. Ihave some pictures of our GreenBerets working in a leper colony inVietnam. That, to me, was the epit-ome of dedication and compassion.They weren’t going to get anythingout of those guys, not even a letterof commendation. I felt we had cho-sen our men so carefully, that whatthey were doing they were doingbecause they knew it was right andthat it would reflect well on theUnited States. I don’t think anycountry has ever produced any-thing like them.

48 Special Warfare

“The highly honed lan-guage- and area-trainedindividual should be keptfor jobs that require thatkind of sensitivity. Thereshould be an emphasisand a premium on thatkind of development.”

July 1994 49

Enlisted Career NotesSpecial Warfare

The commander of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, Maj. Gen.Sidney Shachnow, has expressed concern that SF sergeants first classunderstand the increasing competition for promotion to master sergeant.The SF promotion population for master sergeant now comprises approxi-mately 1,100 SFCs in the three primary zones. Special Forces has 692authorizations for master sergeants, and approximately 85 positions arenormally available through attrition. The “select” objective mandated bythe Department of the Army is usually 85 percent or less of the number ofauthorized slots for promotion. As the proponent for Special Forces, Gen-eral Shachnow has recently approved Chapters 13, 14, and 15 of DA Pam-phlet 600-25, Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development Guide,expected to be fielded this fiscal year. Promotion boards will use Chapter13 to determine the Special Forces categories “fully qualified” and “excep-tionally qualified” as criteria for promotion to master sergeant. All SFCsshould know the criteria for these categories; they should talk with theirteam sergeants and sergeants major for guidance and take necessarysteps now to ensure they will be competitive among the growing numbersin the zones. The fast-moving promotion pace for Special Forces wasneeded when the force was growing. As the growth period ends, promo-tions will slow to a rate commensurate with the attrition of the force.

Special Forces SFCs facegreater competition

for promotion

PERSCOM points of contact The following points of contact reflect recent changes in the staff of the Spe-cial Forces Enlisted Branch:

Capt. Adrian Erckenbrack SF Enlisted Branch chiefMSgt. Terry Palmore Senior career adviserSSgt. Stewart Marin 37F career adviser, CMF 18/37F

NCOES managerMs. Jacqui Velasquez 3rd and 7th SF groups, SWCS,

USASOC, SF Command, SATMO, 96th CA and ROTC assignments

Mrs. Faye Matheny 1st, 5th and 10 SF groups, and JRTC assignments

Ms. Dyna Amey SFQC student managerAssignment-related questions should be directed to the appropriate assign-ment managers and career-development questions to the senior careeradviser. Students attending the SF Qualification Course who have ques-tions on assignments should contact their student PAC. Questions regard-ing NCOES should first be directed to the SF group schools NCO. The newbranch phone number is DSN 221-5395, commercial (703) 325-5395, fax -0524. Address correspondence to: Commander, U.S. Total Army Per-sonnel Command; Attn: TAPC-EPK-S; 2461 Eisenhower Ave.; Alexandria,VA 22331-0454.

50 Special Warfare

Officer Career NotesSpecial Warfare

FA qualification improvesofficer potential

SOPO releases news for SF warrant officers

The proponent’s vision for the officer population of the Special ForcesBranch is full integration with the Army and joint communities. One ofthe requirements of this vision is the establishment of an officer popula-tion with the proper functional-area mix. There is currently a shortage ofofficers to fill key SF Branch-coded FA positions, both Army and joint.Furthermore, there is an insufficient inventory to perform FA jobs, Armyand joint, outside the SOF community. SF officers in non-SOF FA assign-ments play a key role in the integration process. In an effort to establishan officer population with the proper FA mix, each year the Special Oper-ations Proponency Office develops a functional-area breakdown for a yeargroup’s fifth year of service. For example, during the first quarter of FY95, SOPO will prepare an analysis of officers in YG 89. Special ForcesBranch then uses the SOPO data to assign a functional area to each offi-cer in the target year group. The functional areas assigned to SF officersin their fifth year of service are Psychological Operations and CivilAffairs; Personnel Programs Management; Comptroller; Public Affairs;Foreign Area Officer; Operations Research and Systems Analysis; ForceDevelopment; Automation; and Operations, Plans and Training. The SFBranch sends each officer a preference statement, which the officer usesto indicate his FA preferences. Branch then assigns FAs on the basis ofthe officer’s preference, academic degree, language background and filequality. SF officers should strive throughout their careers to become qual-ified in both their branch and functional area. By becoming FA qualified,the officer supports the entire integration process. He also returns tobranch assignments with valuable knowledge and skills that support theSF mission. FA-qualified officers gain promotion potential and, in somecases, command opportunities. For more information, contact Maj. DanielJ. Adelstein, SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office, phone DSN239-2415/9002, commercial (910) 432- 2415/9002.

The Special Operations Proponency Office of the Special Warfare Centerand School has released the following items of interest to Special ForcesWarrant Officers:• MOS 180A is currently at 91 percent of its authorized inventory of Spe-

cial Forces warrant officers. The implication of this increased strengthlevel is fierce competition among all applicants in future selectionboards. Commanders are encouraged to interview all prospective appli-cants prior to writing letters of recommendation. A letter of recommen-dation is a key endorsement of the applicant and should reflect theapplicant’s potential, experience and qualifications.

• Qualified NCOs who are considering applying for the Special ForcesWarrant Officer Program must be cognizant of active-federal-servicelimitations and age-policy limitations. Headquarters, Department ofthe Army, allows the commanding general of USAJFKSWCS to waive

July 1994 51

up to 12 years of AFS. SWCS will consider recommending waivers forexceptional applicants with up to 14 years of AFS. Active-componentapplicants must not be over the age of 36. Reserve-component appli-cants fall under an interim age policy, in effect until November 1995,capping an applicant’s age at 42.

• A curriculum review board met recently to help refine the new War-rant Officer Advanced Course. Future CW3 selectees and CW3s whohave not attended the WOAC will have the opportunity to do so. TheWOAC, which emphasizes joint operations and planning, will add aunique credential to MOS 180A, and future senior warrants will bebetter able to adapt to the challenges of their operational environment.

• Forthcoming changes will affect MOS and principal duty titles for Spe-cial Forces warrant officers. The MOS title will be “Special Forces war-rant officer.” Principal duty titles for MOS 180A, to be used for OfficerEfficiency Report and Officer Record Brief purposes, are: “assistantdetachment commander,” “company operations warrant officer,” “bat-talion operations warrant officer,” “group intelligence warrant officer”and “group operations warrant officer.”

• All warrant officers should understand the difference between theirMOS title and their principal duty title. The MOS title is not to be usedas a principal duty title on OERs, ORBs and other documents thatrequire a description of what you are doing, not what you are. Promo-tion boards will look for this distinction during the selection process.

• Senior warrant officers who wish to present a briefing on MOS 180A totheir units, related to professional development, health of MOS 180A,recruiting and general information should contact the manager of MOSl80A for a mail-out briefing. This is a trial program to get the profes-sional development information better disseminated to the field.

• The point of contact for all issues pertaining to the Special Forces War-rant Officer Program is CWO 3 Shaun P. Driscoll, JFKSWCS SpecialOperations Proponency Office, phone DSN 239-2415/9002, commercial910-432-2415/9002.

The Civil Affairs Branch had the highest selection rate for reserve-compo-nent majors considered for promotion to lieutenant colonel in 1993. The1993 Department of the Army promotion list revealed 29 reserve CivilAffairs majors promoted from a list of 43 eligible. The 67-percent selec-tion rate was significantly higher than the 42-percent average promotionrate for all branches. “CA majors have exceeded the DA average everyyear for the last five years by a minimum of 15 percent,” said Maj. RonaldFiegle of the Special Warfare Center and School’s Special Operations Pro-ponency Office. Historically, about 60 percent of officers not selected forpromotion have not completed the military education requirement, Fieglesaid. Majors being considered for lieutenant colonel must have completed50 percent of the Command and General Staff College courses. Evalua-tion reports and failure to meet physical fitness standards account forabout 20 percent of officers not selected, Fiegle said.

CA Branch has highest RC selection rate to LTC

52 Special Warfare

Foreign SOFSpecial Warfare

Renewed combat operations by Azerbaijani military units along theperimeters of the Nagorno-Karabakh region in the spring of 1994 resultedin some unexpected tactical successes against Armenian-held positionsand ended — at least for a time — a long series of frustrating losses forthe Azeris. Their former failures, characterized by operational- and tacti-cal-level incompetence, appear to have been somewhat mitigated both byrecent training provided by Turkish special-operations officers and by therumored appearance of Afghan mujahedin. Pakistani mercenaries mayalso have been involved. Despite these small gains, any significant victo-ries for Azeri forces in the near term can be safely ruled out. The Armeni-an forces within Nagorno-Karabakh continue to occupy the most favorableterrain and retain decisive advantages in military leadership, organizationand motivation. Furthermore, political unity within Azerbaijan is lacking.The six-year struggle has already ruined the careers of many Azeri politi-cians, and they are reluctant to authorize decisive action for fear of losingmajor battles. The long-term implications of this local conflict, however,remain dangerous. Fighting, to date, has largely been confined to Azerbai-jan and Armenia. But the competing interests of Turkey and an increas-ingly resurgent Russia could result in a broader regional confrontation. Inthe past, fighting in this area has also caused Iran to deploy troops (com-mandos and conventional infantry) on its northern border ostensibly toprotect its territory from the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians.

Turkish SOF train Azerbaijani forces

Mexican insurgency seen from two views

Armed actions by the suddenly visible Zapata National Liberation Army,the EZLN, beginning on Jan. 1, 1994, in the southern Mexican state ofChiapas elicited many judgments about the composition and affiliations ofthe insurgent force. While uncertainties and ambiguities about mostaspects of the Mexican insurgency abound, there are two sharply drawnand divergent views that frame some of the possibilities — an official Mex-ican government appraisal and assertions by the EZLN itself. On the onehand, the Mexican government has characterized the EZLN as a “highlyideological” organization composed of “extremist organizations” thatinclude both Mexicans and foreigners, and which is motivated by a mix-ture of local and foreign interests. In this regard, the presence of 1970sMexican revolutionaries together with guerrillas from “countries south ofMexico” were mentioned. While acknowledging the serious economic andsocial problems of Chiapas that have led to popular unrest among theIndian and peasant populations, Mexican government spokesmen takespecial note of the EZLN’s “affinity toward other violent factions that oper-ate in brother countries of Central America.” They emphasize strong non-Indian outside influence and publicly reject the idea of an Indian uprising.Weapons — new and older automatic arms, rifles, shotguns and pistols —are identified as largely of U.S., Russian and United Kingdom manufac-ture. EZLN training and conduct are said to be governed by written disci-plinary, planning, tactical, security and other materials. EZLN tactical

July 1994 53

organization, according to government spokesmen, is based on “squads,”each comprising a sergeant, corporal, radio operator, medical specialistand 20 combatants. Other organizational features include activist cellsthroughout Chiapas linked by citizens-band radios, some 15 training cen-ters in southern Mexico, and “safe houses” and assembly centers for revo-lutionary indoctrination. A different view of the EZLN composition andaffiliation is presented by the Zapatistas themselves: EZLN communiquesand spokesmen stress their indigenous origins and goals. They insist thatthe EZLN has no foreign members and has not received any support orguidance from foreign insurgent movements or governments. EZLN troopsand leaders are declared to be “mostly Chiapas Indians” along with Mexi-cans from other areas and social levels, who operate under the direction ofthe “Clandestine Indian Revolutionary Committee” — EZLN GeneralCommand. The EZLN is silent on its overall numbers, armament and sup-port, but stresses its knowledge of the mountains, military training andlarge numbers of troops spread through the mountains. As the EZLNmembership considers the peace accords and promises developed in directtalks with government representatives, and as the Mexican governmentlooks to the August 1994 elections, the questions of EZLN motivations,intentions, strength and affiliations will remain central security issues forMexico and its neighbors.

Although severe 1994 winter weather reduced the scale and intensity ofcombat operations along the mountainous Tajik-Afghan border, infiltra-tions by the Tajik Islamist opposition based in Afghanistan continuedduring this period and on into the spring. Russian and Tajik intelligencereports also indicated that the rebels were concentrating forces in severalnorthern provinces of Afghanistan where training camps prepare volun-teers for future covert missions. The Islamic insurgents claim to bestrengthening their positions for a new warm-weather offensive and onceagain are hinting that they have acquired advanced weapons “character-ized by a substantial destructive capability” (i.e., Stinger and Milan).Such claims in the past have proven false. Nevertheless, public appealsby insurgent forces for more help from Arab and other Islamic states(Iran) have attracted the attention of the Russian government and media.Now, the Russian and Tajik governments fear that with the opening ofthe snow-covered mountain passes and the arrival of spring and summerweather, the rebels will begin receiving substantial reinforcements fromnortheastern Afghanistan for launching a new offensive to regain territo-ry. It was recently revealed that in 1993, Russian troops in Tajikistanbarely averted the destruction of the 330-foot high dam at the Nurekhydroelectric power station during a fire fight with the potential sabo-teurs. According to Russian estimates, thousands of square kilometers ofland would have been flooded had insurgent plans been executed to deto-nate three explosive-filled trucks inside dam tunnels. Overall, while theinsurgents constitute a less-than-sophisticated force, they clearly pose aserious threat to Tajikistan’s stability. A protracted guerrilla warremains likely for the former Soviet republic.

Infiltration operations continue into Tajikistan

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. and Lt. Col. John E. Sray of the Foreign Military Studies Office, Combined Arms Command, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

O&I training to become partof SFANCOC

The commander of the SpecialWarfare Center and School hasdirected that the current SpecialForces Assistant Operations andIntelligence Sergeant Course bemerged into the SF AdvancedNoncommissioned Officer Course.

The decision is based on a studywhich concluded that tasks taughtin the current SFAOISC are com-mon to all CMF 18 MOSs. Thechange will ensure that all seniorSF NCOs receive training in oper-ations and intelligence skills.

The new SFANCOC course willbe 18 weeks long, as opposed tothe current eight weeks. It will bestructured into four phases: threeweeks of common leadership train-ing, 12 weeks of CMF 18 commontasks, two weeks of MOS tracktraining and a one-week field-training exercise. O&I subjectswill be taught during the common-task phase.

The first SFANCOC class underthe new concept will begin Oct. 1,1994. Selection procedures forattendance will be the same asunder the current Noncommis-sioned Officers Education System.Responsibility for conducting thecourse will remain with the U.S.Army John F. Kennedy SpecialWarfare Center and School NCOAcademy.

To ensure that all SF NCOs whohave already attended SFANCOCreceive the necessary O&I train-ing, SWCS has developed a 10-week Special Forces Operationsand Intelligence TransitionCourse. The course is scheduled to

begin in January 1995 and runthrough December 1996.

Units will receive quotas for theSFOITC through the normalschools-allocation channels andwill maintain their own order-of-merit lists. SFANCOC graduateswho have not attended SFAOISCmay apply for the course.

SWCS is currently analyzingcourses of action to address SpecialForces warrant-officer concerns

such as the prerequisite ofSFAOISC for acceptance into theSpecial Forces warrant officer pro-gram, according to CWO 3 ThomasMerrill of the Advanced Skills/SERE Development Branch. Candi-dates for warrant-officer trainingwho have not received O&I train-ing will be considered for theSFOITC on a case-by-case basis.

SWCS is also considering options

for reserve-component soldiers,including consolidation of the now-separate RC SFANCOC and RCSFAOISC courses, Merrill said.

Graduates of the new SFAN-COC will be awarded a secondaryMOS of 18F40 in addition to a mil-itary education level coding of “T.”As mission and personnel-manage-ment requirements dictate, unitcommanders and the Enlisted Per-sonnel Management Division, U.S.Total Army Personnel Command,will direct that a soldier’s sec-ondary MOS of 18F40 be changedto his primary MOS.

SOCCE handbook providesinterim doctrine

A new handbook provides inter-im doctrine for special operationscommand and control elementspending its incorporation into spe-cial-operations manuals.

The Special Operations Com-mand and Control Element Hand-book was published and distribut-ed to the field on Feb. 23, 1994. Itdescribes SOCCE duties, responsi-bilities, missions, mission-essen-tial task lists, command and con-trol and linkup operations, accord-ing to Steven Cook of the SWCSDoctrine Management Branch. Asample linkup annex is included inthe handbook.

Major doctrinal changes includ-ed in the handbook are:

• The SOCCE will be placedunder the tactical control of thesupported general-purpose force.

• The SOCCE is the primarylink from the general-purposeforce to the SOF command-and-control structure.

54 Special Warfare

UpdateSpecial Warfare

U.S. Army photo

Students attending the SF O&I Course

• Command of the SOCCE anddeployed SOF remains under thecontrol of the joint-force special-operations component command.

A large portion of the handbookfocuses on general-purpose-forceoperations. SOCCE personnelmust be proficient in the tactics,techniques and procedures of gen-eral-purpose forces, usually at thecorps level, Cook said.

Local reproduction of the hand-book is authorized to ensurewidespread dissemination andintegration of SOCCE operationsinto Army systems. The proponentfor the handbook is the JFK Spe-cial Warfare Center and School.For more information contactSteven Cook, Doctrine Manage-ment Branch, SWCS Directorateof Training and Doctrine, at DSN239-8689/5393, commercial (910)432-8689/5393.

USASOC soldiers receivenation’s highest honor

The Medal of Honor was posthu-mously awarded to two U.S. ArmySpecial Operations Command sol-diers by the President of the Unit-ed States May 23.

The nation’s highest honor wasawarded to MSgt. Gary I. Gordon,33, and SFC Randall D. Shughart,35, for their actions during theattempted rescue of a downed heli-copter crew in Mogadishu, Soma-lia. Carmen R. Gordon andStephanie A. Shughart acceptedtheir husbands’ awards, the firstMedals of Honor to be awardedsince the Vietnam war.

During the Oct. 3, 1993, firefightin Mogadishu, Gordon andShughart volunteered to be putdown near a crippled Blackhawkto ward off oncoming enemy and toprovide medical care. Both soldiersdied, while the pilot, Chief War-rant Officer Michael Durant, sur-vived and was ultimately takenprisoner by a swarm of Somalifighters.

“They (Gordon and Shughart)performed one of the bravest acts Ihave ever witnessed,” Durant saidafter his eventual release. “With-out a doubt, I owe my life to thesetwo brave men.”

During the beginning of theirseventh mission in Somalia, Gor-don and Shughart provided coverfire to the Task Force Ranger sol-diers below from a Blackhawkhelicopter, USASOC officials said.

The two expert riflemen provid-ed firepower for a combat search-and-rescue team who fast-roped into secure a downed helicopter.When another helicopter crashed,Gordon and Shughart volunteeredto go in at the second crash site.

“The two sergeants unhesitat-ingly volunteered to go to the aidof four critically wounded com-rades at the second crash sitedespite being well aware of thegrowing number of enemy closingin on the site,” officials said in aWhite House release.

Both Gordon and Shughart hadserved more than 14 years in theArmy and were graduates of theRanger School and the SpecialForces Qualification Course. Gor-don was a native of Lincoln,Maine. Shughart was a Lincoln,Neb., native who grew up inNewville, Pa. — USASOC PAO

SWCS to release ODA handbook

The Special Warfare Center andSchool will soon release for staffinga new handbook for Special Forcesoperational detachments to use asa field reference guide.

Intended primarily for ArmySOF, Special Forces OperationalDetachment-A Handbook addressesdetachment cross-training tasks,as well as mission-planning guide-lines, to make the SOF operator amore independent and self-sup-porting soldier.

The handbook describes keyMOS tasks that should be trained

by all detachment members. Onceapproved, the handbook will beproduced in a pocket-sized format,printed on waterproof paper, andassembled with screw-type connec-tors inside a plastic cover. This for-mat will enable soldiers to removeor add information directly appli-cable to their current mission.

For more information contactCapt. Robert C. Kolpien, SF Devel-opment Branch, Directorate ofTraining and Doctrine, JFKSWCS,at DSN 239-8286/9802, commercial(910) 432-8286/9802.

Videotape series explains antenna theory

A new three-part videotape seriesis available to help Special Forcescommunications sergeants select theproper antenna system for battle-field conditions.

The series, titled “Special ForcesAntenna Theory and Wave Prop-agation,” is designed to help SF com-munications sergeants analyze, rea-son and improvise under adverseconditions.

Produced by the JFK Special War-fare Center and School, the seriesuses 3-D graphics and videotapedexercises to present theories of radio-wave propagation, antennas andtransmission lines, and antennaselection and construction, as theyapply to communications equipmentand missions of Special Forces.

Soldiers may request the video-tapes through their local trainingaudiovisual support center usingthe following titles, television tapenumbers and product identificationnumbers:

Part I — “Radio Wave Propaga-tion and Theory,” TVT 31-8, PIN706582; Part II — “Antenna andTransmission Line Theory,” TVT 31-9, PIN 709205; Part III — “AntennaSelection and Construction,” TVT31-10, PIN 709206.

July 1994 55

Perilous Options: Special Oper-ations as an Instrument of U.S.Foreign Policy. By Lucien S. Van-denbroucke. New York: Oxford Uni-versity Press, 1993. ISBN 0-19-504591-2. 257 pages. $35.

In Perilous Options the authorstudies the question, “Why do U.S.forces have consistent failures athigh-risk special operations?”Through his study, Lucien Vanden-broucke concludes that these opera-tions contain a series of recurringdeficiencies. The author’s positionin the Brookings Institute allowedhim to conduct interviews with par-ticipants in both government andmilitary operations.

The book examines four opera-tions: the Bay of Pigs, the Son TayRaid, the Mayaguez Rescue andDesert Storm. These operationsare conspicuous for their lack ofsimilarities. One was a CIA-ledattempt to topple a government.Three are hostage/prisoner res-cues, and of these, only twoinvolved SOF. Many of Vanden-broucke’s cited failures do nottranslate from one operation to thenext. Instead, the author attemptsto employ 20/20 hindsight indescribing information, intelli-gence or decisions which shouldhave been known or executed.

Vandenbroucke uses a narrowdefinition of strategic special opera-tions. His operations are comman-do-type coup de main strikes, con-ducted under the highest politicalauthority. Each operation reviewedwas the result of an attempt toemploy special operations toresolve a major foreign-policy crisisor failure. The impact of SOF oper-

ations such as strategic reconnais-sance, foreign internal defense anddirect action are not considered.Further, the author focuses only onfailures and does not consider suc-cesses such as the 1954 CIA-ledoverthrow in Guatemala, the 1964hostage rescue in the Congo or thenoncombatant evacuation opera-tion in Somalia. Vandenbroucke’sexplanation for this exclusion issuspect.

The author does perform anexcellent job in developing somerecurring problems, including unre-alistic expectations, poor humanintelligence, a lack of clear inter-agency coordination and poor plan-ning analysis. The book demon-strates a need for immediate atten-tion by the SOF community inthree areas: First, improved coordi-nation of SOF operations withother SOF, conventional forces andother national agencies. The book

forces the reader to conclude thatSOF still relies too heavily on adhoc organizations to coordinate itsactivities. Second, the danger ofinadequate inspection and over-sight of high-risk operations. Ineach operation, the planners wereallowed to assess risk and chancesof success. As planners, these indi-viduals became advocates for theplan. Never were assessments ofthe cost of failure and the feasibili-ty conducted by uninvolved experts.Finally, political decision makersare not equipped to realisticallyevaluate a strategic operation interms of likelihood of success,potential for failure and impact onfuture policy in the area of opera-tions. Instead, these leadersengaged in “wishful thinking,”assuming that all would go accord-ing to plan.

Additionally, Vandenbrouckeinvokes three areas where theSOF planner must “tell it like itis.” First, we are obligated in pre-senting the political masters arealistic appraisal of the potentialrisks in our operations. We mustrefuse to estimate a percentage ofsuccess. In three of the operationsstudied, these arbitrary estimatesprovided the decision maker thebasis of his “go” decisions. High-risk operations are a sequence ofevents. Failure at any phase likelymeans failure to all. Second, wemust make our leaders aware ofdecision points and the point of noreturn. This candor will facilitateintervention by higher headquar-ters at the appropriate times.Finally, we must follow our owndoctrine, which requires primary,alternate, contingency and emer-

56 Special Warfare

Book ReviewsSpecial Warfare

gency planning. This doctrineforces us to plan for failures in theprimary operational plan. Theoperations studied are conspicuousin having only one plan.

Perilous Options is well-writtenand makes an excellent read. It isrecommended to national securityleaders and military professionalsas a first exposure to strategic oper-ations; however, additional read-ings are necessary to give the read-er a full appreciation of planning,risk assessment and lessonslearned from these courageousundertakings.

Lt. Col. Robert Lewis4th SOSCFort Shafter, Hawaii

The Commandos: The InsideStory of America’s Secret Sol-diers. By Douglas C. Waller. NewYork: Simon & Schuster, 1994.ISBN: 0-671-78717-9. 399 pages.$23.

I was fully prepared to dislikethis book, being immediately suspi-cious of works which claim to bethe “inside story,” especially whenwritten by a journalist and outsiderlike Douglas Waller. But as I read,I found myself being won over.

Shortly after the Gulf War,Waller wrote a cover article forNewsweek on America’s special-operations forces. His research forthat article was, apparently, thegenesis of this work. Through per-sonal interviews with numerousmembers of America’s special-oper-ations community, Waller crafts abook that tells some very crediblestories.

Waller provides chapters exam-ining not only Gulf War specialoperations, but also the early train-ing and education of the soldiers,sailors and airmen who performedthose operations. In fact, this is oneof the strengths of the book.

The author personally followedSpecial Forces soldiers in training

through exercise Robin Sage —the final stage of SF training. Hetells the story of the Navy SEALs’“Hell Week” in its entirety asseen through the eyes of one boatcrew. He also rides with an AirForce CH-53 Pave Low helicoptercrew as they train for low-level,night and pinpoint insertions andexfiltrations.

Determining the veracity of thesestories is perhaps the first duty ofthe reviewer. I sought out some ofthose whose exploits in trainingand war are detailed in Waller’schapters. To date, they all agree

that, although the author missedsome facts at the margins, the bookas a whole is remarkably accurate.

In addition to SOF training,Waller details some of the GulfWar’s better-known special-opera-tions missions. These include Lt.Col. (now Col.) Rich Comer’s 20thSpecial Operations Squadron jointmission to destroy two key Iraqiradar installations with ArmyApache helicopters — this missionis generally thought of as the firstplanned combat action of DesertStorm.

Also included are CWO ChadBalvanz’s and MSgt. Jeff Sim’s

compromised recon missions, sub-sequent firefights and hot exfiltra-tions from deep within Iraqi territo-ry; Navy Lieutenant Tom Dietz’sSEAL Team’s deception of MinaSaud, which assisted in deceivingthe Iraqis that a Marine amphibi-ous assault was planned on thebeaches of Kuwait; the Joint Spe-cial Operations Command’s searchfor SCUDs in the western Iraqidesert and even a story about psy-chological operations — an abso-lutely critical, if often overlooked,capability.

Perhaps the author overreacheshimself with his discussion of Gen.Carl Stiner’s supposedly poorlycrafted attempts to have SOF playa larger role in the Gulf War. Alsoof unknown veracity is Gen. Nor-man Schwarzkopf’s distrust of eliteforces — although this perceptionis widely held to be factual in theSOF community. These thingsmight be true, but the author pro-vides little in the way of supportingevidence.

Overall, Commandos is readable,reasonably accurate and entertain-ing. Given the author’s profession,it is understandable that it is writ-ten in journalistic style withoutfootnotes, but for that reason, it isnot recommended as a primary ref-erence book for scholars.

Finally, and especially for thoseunfamiliar with the SOF communi-ty, the book provides a number ofpotentially informative insightsinto SOF — the target audience ofCommandos is obviously “them”and not “us.” The determination ofwhether or not this constitutes “theinside story” is up to the reader.

Lt. Col. Robert B. Adolph Jr.Joint Special Operations Cmd.Fort Bragg, N.C.

July 1994 57

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