PB 80–94–4 October 1994 Vol. 7, No. 4

From the CommandantSpecial Warfare

On Aug. 4, 1994, a colorful ceremony wasconducted at Fort Bragg’s JFK Plaza — thechange of command of the JFK SpecialWarfare Center from myself to Maj. Gen.William F. Garrison.

The ceremony was all about change, theonly permanent thing in life. As theassumption-of-command letter was readand the organizational colors were passed,the JFK Center and School came undernew management.

For the outgoing commander this is abittersweet occasion — he is sad to leave,but he enjoys all the compliments thespeakers and the guests tend to showeron him. Still, I could not help beingreminded of the lines by an unknownpoet concerning the fact that no one isindispensable:

Sometime when you feel that your going,

Would leave an unfillable hole,Just follow this simple instruction,And see how it humbles your soul.Take a bucket and fill it with water,Put your hand in it, up to the wrist,Pull it out, and the hole that’s

remaining,Is a measure of how you’ll be missed.

Unwritten protocol dictates that thenew commander’s remarks be short andpositive, and Bill Garrison lived up tothat standard — his acceptance remarkstotaled two sentences.

Those of us who know Bill Garrisonknow him as a calm, extremely intelli-gent, visionary, experienced general offi-cer. His military credentials are impres-sive, and his frame of reference is experi-ence, not theory. He has held a variety ofcommand positions, most recently ascommander of the Joint Special Opera-tions Command. His other assignmentsinclude service as deputy commandinggeneral of the U.S. Army Special Opera-

tions Command and deputy commanderof the U.S. Army Intelligence SecurityAgency of the U.S. Army Intelligence andSecurity Command.

General Garrison has extensive experi-ence in combat arms. As a junior officerhe was a battalion senior adviser withthe U.S. Military Assistance Command-Vietnam and company commander ofboth A Company, 1st Battalion and BCompany, 2nd Battalion in the 509thInfantry, 8th Infantry Division in WestGermany. He was a provincial-reconnais-sance-unit team leader with the U.S. Mil-itary Assistance Command-Vietnam andcommander of the 1st Battalion, 505thInfantry of the 82nd Airborne Division.

Bill Garrison is extremely well-suitedfor his new command, and I wish him thevery best as he carries his responsibilitiesto new heights of achievement.

Retired Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow

Maj. Gen. SidneyShachnow

Maj. Gen. William F. Garrison

PB 80–94–4 ContentsOctober 1994 Special Warfare Vol. 7, No. 4

Commander & CommandantMaj. Gen. William F. Garrison

EditorJerry D. Steelman

Associate EditorSylvia McCarley

Graphics & DesignBruce S. Barfield

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:Gordon R. SullivanGeneral, United States ArmyChief of Staff

Official:

Milton H. HamiltonAdministrative Assistant to theSecretary of the Army

07138

Headquarters, Department of the Army

V E R I T A S

STREBIL

A

E T

Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly ofthe United States Army John F. Kennedy Special WarfareCenter and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Itsmission is to promote the professional development ofspecial-operations forces by providing a forum for theexamination of both established doctrine and new ideas.

Views expressed herein are those of the authors and donot necessarily reflect official Army position. Thispublication does not supersede any information presentedin other official Army publications.

Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited, andshould be addressed to: Editor, Special Warfare,USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000. Telephone:DSN 239-5703 or commercial (910) 432-5703. SpecialWarfare reserves the right to edit all material.

Published works may be reprinted, except wherecopyrighted, provided credit is given to Special Warfareand the author.

Official distribution is limited to active and reservespecial-operations units. Individuals desiring a privatesubscription should forward their requests to:Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government PrintingOffice, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Features2 PSYOP in Somalia: The Voice of Hope

by Lt. Col. Charles P. Borchini and Mari Borstelmann

10 Unconventional Operations Forces of Special Operationsby Col. Mark D. Boyatt

18 Civil Affairs in the Gulf War: Administration of an Occupied Townby Maj. Douglas E. Nash

28 SOF Planning for Coalition Operationsby Lt. Col. Robert D. Lewis

34 Tanks and Helicopters: Factors Influencing the Rate of Innovation by Guy M. Hicks and George E. Pickett Jr.

42 MQS Evolves into Officer Foundation Standardsby Lt. Col. Thomas G. Sterner and Carol M. Bushong

46 Interview: H. Allen Holmes, Assistant Secretary of Defensefor Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict

Departments49 Officer Career Notes50 Enlisted Career Notes52 Foreign SOF54 Update56 Book Reviews

Psychological operations saved tens ofthousands of lives during the GulfWar, and during Operation Restore

Hope in Somalia, PSYOP proved to haveremarkable adaptability to peacetimeoperations as well.

Operation Restore Hope began in earlyDecember 1992, when President George

Bush announcedthat the U.S. wouldlead a “coalition ofthe willing” in com-mitting a significantmilitary force tohelp ensure thedelivery of much-needed humanitari-an assistance to thepeople of Somalia.

From the outset,PSYOP was inte-

grated into all plans and operations.Almost immediately after the president’sannouncement, PSYOP staff plannersfrom the 4th PSYOP Group at Fort Bragg,N.C., were dispatched to the U.S. CentralCommand at MacDill Air Force Base, Fla.Their mission was to integrate PSYOPinto the plans of both the U.S.-led UnifiedTask Force, or UNITAF, and its compo-nents from 22 countries.

During the five-month period prior tothe May 4, 1993, change of command fromUNITAF to the United Nations Opera-

tions in Somalia, or UNOSOM II, themain focus of psychological operations wasto facilitate the flow of informationbetween Somalis and the organizationsresponsible for implementing the humani-tarian mission of Operation Restore Hope.

To ensure that PSYOP would be consis-tently applied and that PSYOP assets couldrespond to a broad spectrum of operationalrequirements, UNITAF formed a jointPSYOP task force, which worked directlyfor the UNITAF commander, Lt. Gen.Robert Johnston. The JPOTF’s mission wasto provide advice, to analyze PSYOP-rele-vant intelligence and produce all printedproducts (leaflets, handbills, posters),including a Somali-language newspaper,and to transmit radio broadcasts via AM,FM and shortwave programming.

According to Johnston, “Having under-stood the potential impact of PSYOP, Iwas extremely interested in havingPSYOP up front for this operation,because I thought the most useful part ofPSYOP would be that it would preventarmed conflict.”

Composed of 125 soldiers and civiliansfrom the U.S. Army’s 4th PSYOP Group,one U.S. Navy sailor and a dozen Somalilinguists, the JPOTF worked with coali-tion forces, senior U.S. and U.N. civilians,and nongovernmental and private volun-teer organizations. Throughout the courseof Restore Hope, the JPOTF designed, pro-duced and disseminated large numbers of

2 Special Warfare

PSYOP in Somalia: The Voice of Hope

by Lt. Col. Charles P. Borchini and Mari Borstelmann

Photo courtesy 4th PSYOP Group

A U.S. soldier overseesthe delivery of supplies inSomalia.

October 1994 3

more than a dozen different handbills andposters; issued 116 editions of a Somali-language newspaper; transmitted radiobroadcasts twice daily; produced and dis-seminated more than seven millionleaflets; deployed tactical PSYOP teamswith the coalition forces; and providedadvice to the U.S. special envoy, Ambas-sador Robert Oakley and his staff.

Tactical operationsThe first PSYOP soldiers deployed from

Fort Bragg to Mombasa, Kenya, wherethey joined the U.S. 15th Marine Expedi-tionary Unit aboard the USS Tripoli. Theyaccompanied the initial Marine landing atMogadishu on Dec. 9. Over the next sever-al weeks, eight tactical PSYOP teamsaccompanied UNITAF ground forces asthey deployed throughout central andsouthern Somalia to secure relief convoysand to promote stability.

From the initial landing on the beach atMogadishu to the May 1993 transition toUNOSOM II, the eight tactical PSYOPteams participating in Operation RestoreHope faced many challenges. Using theirloudspeakers, teams broadcast numerousmessages to the Somalis, including sur-render appeals, procedures to follow dur-ing weapons sweeps and at roadblocks,and announcements to organize crowds atfeeding sites. Tactical PSYOP teams alsodistributed the UNITAF newspaper Rajoin many of the major towns and villages ineach humanitarian-relief sector.

In Mogadishu, Marine maneuver com-manders integrated tactical PSYOP teamsinto complex security operations that tar-geted the local arms markets. In mid-Jan-uary 1993, for example, a Marine opera-tion directed against an area of the cityknown as the Argentine Arms Marketused tactical PSYOP teams to inform localresidents of the operation and to request

their support and noninterference. Heli-borne PSYOP personnel thanked thecrowds as Marines cleared the area anddropped leaflets informing the people ofMogadishu that the objective of the opera-tion was to improve security in the city.

Maj. Gen. Charles E. Wilhelm, com-mander of U.S. Marine Forces in Somalia,described the tactical PSYOP teams as “acombat subtractor ... they reduced theamount of unnecessary bloodshed by con-vincing Somali gunmen to surrenderrather than fight.”

Acting as the “scout platoon” of theJPOTF, tactical PSYOP teams used face-to-face communication to assess the secu-rity environment and to collect PSYOP-relevant information. This was also themost effective means for PSYOP soldiers

A tactical PSYOP team in-forms Somali citizens of anupcoming military operation.

Photo courtesy 4th PSYOP Group

to assist the humanitarian-relief-sectormaneuver commanders in understandingthe perceptions, attitudes and concerns ofthe Somali people. Tactical PSYOP teamsmet directly with village elders and reli-gious leaders to reinforce UNITAF mes-sages presented in the Rajo newspaperand in radio broadcasts.

In addition to using traditional PSYOPmethods of communicating with the localpopulation, tactical PSYOP teams foundunique ways of using their interpersonalskills. While waiting for officers to returnfrom a community meeting, one teamattracted a crowd of several hundred curi-ous children. After many attempts to dis-perse the children, one soldier thoughtthat they might be distracted by playing agame. Once he explained the rules andstarted the game, the children joined inenthusiastically, and the remaining sol-diers were able to return to their mission.

Rajo newspaperOn Dec. 20, four days after the arrival of

the main contingent of forces inMogadishu, the JPOTF began publishing

a daily newspaper and broadcasting adaily radio program — both called “Rajo,”which is Somali for “hope.” Rajo, theSomali-language newspaper, of whichmore than 27,000 copies were publisheddaily, was eventually distributed to everytown and village where UNITAF forceswere deployed.

At the beginning of operations, theRajo publishing and editorial staffincluded 4th PSYOP Group soldiers andcivilian specialists as well as Somali lin-guists from the U.S. Rajo articles cov-ered a number of relevant issues butgenerally focused on military operationsto secure Mogadishu and each of themajor towns, humanitarian relief provid-ed to the famine areas, redevelopmentefforts, hope for the future and analysesof the reconciliation and national-unityprocess.

Regular features included interviewswith relief-agency staff, public-healthinformation on treating common childhooddiseases, the status of security in eachhumanitarian-relief sector, reports onrebuilding the educational system andjudicial institutions, and forming localpolice forces and security councils.

As a complement to the newspaper, theJPOTF established Radio Rajo, a 45-minute, Somali-language program trans-mitted twice daily on AM/medium wave,FM and shortwave. The program includedreadings from the Koran, Rajo newspaperarticles, selections of Somali poetry andshort stories, news about Africa, signifi-cant events throughout the world andSomali music. The programs broadcastover shortwave eventually reached everycity and town in Somalia where UNITAFforces were located.

Guided by a broadcast journalist fromthe 4th PSYOP Group, a team of Somalistaff members, PSYOP specialists and

4 Special Warfare

U.S. soldiers distribute cop-ies of the Rajo newspaperto Somali children.

Photo courtesy 4th PSYOP Group

October 1994 5

civilian analysts worked together to devel-op articles that incorporated a number ofthemes encouraging Somali clans to putaside their differences and rebuild theircountry. Themes included the following:• Fairness of UNITAF rules of

engagement.• Impartiality of UNITAF.• The need for Somalis to resolve Soma-

lia’s problems.• Inability of UNITAF and relief agencies

to do more than assist in the resolutionprocess.

• Roles and capabilities of the 22 nationsparticipating in UNITAF.

• Redevelopment and re-establishment ofSomalia’s infrastructure.

• Agreements made by faction leadersand the consequences of violating thoseagreements.

• Disarmament progress in each humani-tarian-assistance sector.The process of collecting information

required routine research efforts beyondMogadishu. In January 1993, for example,JPOTF staff members traveled to the townof Marka, where they interviewed Presi-dent Aadan ‘Abdullah’ Usmaan, Somalia’sfirst head of state and an important sym-bol of national unity. Excerpts from thisinterview were published in the newspa-per and broadcast over Radio Rajo as well.

One of the most popular features of thenewspaper was a cartoon devoted to thecomments and the observations of a Soma-li man named Celmi (after the U.S. Navysailor who was born in Somalia and servedas a linguist for the JPOTF) and his wisefriend, the camel Mandeeq. The dialoguebetween these two characters reinforced

(Above) A soldier from the joint PSYOP task force producesmaterial for broadcast over Radio Rajo.

(Left) A U.S. Marine hands out copies of the Rajo newspaperto waiting Somalis.

Photo by Terry Mitchell

Photo courtesy 4th PSYOP Group

6 Special Warfare

various PSYOP themes and described spe-cific aspects of the UNITAF mission.

A consistent propaganda theme broad-cast by one of the local warlords over his radio station and published in hisfaction’s newspaper was that UNITAF —U.S. forces in particular — was exploit-ing Somalia’s precious natural resources.PSYOP countered this propaganda by broadcasting and publishing stories in the Rajo describing the true nature of engineering activities throughoutSomalia.

In an effort to encourage national unityand to revitalize Somali traditional cul-ture, Rajo sponsored a poetry contest andpublished the six winning entries in a spe-cial edition of the paper. Commenting onthe importance of Rajo to the success ofthe operation, Ambassador Robert Oakleysaid, “We are using Rajo to get the correctinformation into the hands of the Somali

population and to correct distortions. ...The faction leaders, I know, read it very,very carefully. Every once in a whileAideed or Ali Mahdi ... draws my attentionto something that appeared in the news-paper. So they’re very, very sensitive to itand they know its power.”

Leaflet operationsThe initial landing of U.S. forces in

Mogadishu on Dec. 9 was preceded by adrop of approximately 220,000 leafletsfrom a U.S. Marine CH-53 Sea Stallionhelicopter. This operation used two kindsof leaflets to announce the arrival of U.S.forces and to alert inhabitants of the needfor convoy-security missions. The “hand-shake” leaflet communicated the basicmessage that the intent of the mission wasto assist, not harm Somalis; the convoy-security leaflet stressed that coalition

U.S. Marines control crowdsof Somalis waiting to re-ceive medical treatment.PSYOP leaflets stressedthat U.S. forces came tohelp, not harm, the Somalis.

Photo by Terry Mitchell

October 1994 7

troops would use force to protect the reliefshipments. These three-by-six-inchleaflets had been printed at Fort Bragg bythe 4th PSYOP Group.

Throughout the operation, PSYOPteams, using U.S. C-130s, U.S. MarineCH-53s, U.S. Army UH-60s and UH-1s,and a Canadian C-130, continued to dropthe two leaflets along major supply routes.The handshake leaflets were dropped twoor three days prior to the arrival ofUNITAF forces in each town; the convoyleaflets were dropped two or three daysafterward. During one operation, PSYOPteams used U.S. Navy S-3 Viking fixed-wing aircraft to jettison 60 canisters, eachcarrying 2,500 leaflets, over the targetarea. With the gradual redeployment ofU.S. C-130s, leaflet missions were alsoconducted from New Zealand Andovers, asmall version of the DC-3.

The handshake and convoy-securityleaflets were only two of 37 differentleaflets eventually produced duringRestore Hope. Even after the establish-ment of the newspaper and the radio pro-gram, UNITAF continued to use leaflets,designed and printed by the JPOTF inSomalia, to support military operations.Leaflets announced rules prohibiting spe-cific categories of weapons and behaviorand informed local communities that coali-tion troops were authorized to use force ifthey were threatened. While the rules foreach major town were roughly the same,they reflected local conditions and weremodified as the security environmentchanged. Tactical PSYOP teams attachedto Army and Marine forces in each human-itarian-relief sector requested leaflets withthemes based on the specific situation con-fronting each maneuver commander.Leaflet concepts were coordinated with theUNITAF director of operations and thendesigned, printed and dropped over the

target areas. Announcements published inthe Rajo reinforced leaflet messages.

Leaflets, handbills and posters support-ed several engineering projects as well. InDecember and again in March, engineerscleared Mogadishu’s streets of abandonedand destroyed vehicles, downed telephonepoles, sand, debris and other objects thatblocked the flow of traffic along majorroads and near market areas. Later in theoperation, Army engineers and NavySeabees repaired or constructed morethan 1,200 miles of roads, drilled 14 wells,and erected a Bailey bridge across theJuba River near the town of Jilib. Leaflets,handbills and posters complemented eacheffort by informing the Somali people ofthe upcoming operation and asking themto cooperate by staying clear of hazardousengineering equipment. These products

U.S. forces deploy leafletbundles over Somalia.

Photo by Mark Dwyer

8 Special Warfare

also requested that Somalis report minelocations.

PSYOP also supported several humani-tarian-relief operations conducted by non-governmental organizations. A majorproblem facing Somalia is the large num-ber of displaced persons and refugees whowere forced to leave their homes duringthe civil war. With no reliable source offood or medical care, these groups havebecome totally dependent on relief provid-ed by the NGOs.

The “pastoral scene” leaflet supportedprograms encouraging displaced personsand refugees to return to their homeswhen it was safe to do so, in order to har-vest their crops and to begin planting forthe next growing season. The goal of thisleaflet, and of articles written for Rajodescribing specific NGO resettlement pro-grams, was to help break the cycle ofdependency and to encourage self-sufficiency.

Mine-awarenessLike many nations around the world,

Somalia has a serious problem with

mines. During Operation Restore Hope,mine explosions killed or injured severalUNITAF personnel as well as many Soma-lis. PSYOP specialists produced severaldifferent posters and published articles inthe Rajo newspaper advising Somalis tobe aware of mine hazards.

Toward the end of the operation,PSYOP also produced coloring booksdetailing the first-aid requirements forvictims of mine-related accidents; hand-bills explaining how to exit a mine fieldsafely; and posters illustrating the mostcommon mines found in Somalia. Theunderlying message was the same:“Report, don’t touch, mines.” Copies of theproducts were also distributed to othermembers of the UNITAF coalition.

Contingency operationsAt the end of February 1993, on the first

day of Ramadan, violent demonstrationstook place in the area of Mogadishu con-trolled by Mohamed Farah Aideed, leaderof the Somali National Alliance. Followingthe demonstrations, children began carry-ing toy handguns, which they pointed atUNITAF forces. By the end of Ramadan,toy guns were prevalent throughout thecity, and there were several incidents inwhich UNITAF forces came close to shoot-ing children, thinking the guns were real.The JPOTF initiated a campaign toaddress the problem in the Rajo newspa-per, over the radio and in leaflets. TheRajo radio program included an interviewwith a prominent representative of aSomali women’s group who spoke in verystrong terms about the dangers of the chil-dren’s behavior. Fortunately, there wereno accidents, and the number of incidentseventually decreased.

PSYOP also responded quickly to therepeated crises in Kismayo. After HersiMorgan took Kismayo in late February,

A civi l ian relief workerhelps distribute supplies toSomali cit izens duringOperation Restore Hope.

Photo courtesy 4th PSYOP Group

October 1994 9

Johnston and Ambassador Oakley issuedan ultimatum for him to withdraw hisforces to a town on the Kenya border. TheJPOTF produced and dropped leafletsinforming Morgan’s supporters, as well asthe people of Kismayo and other majortowns in the lower Juba valley, of the situation.

PSYOP was a key battlefield operatingsystem and contributed significantly tothe success of Operation Restore Hope. AsJohnston later said, “PSYOP reallyworked well to convince (Somalis) that wewere there with the military capability totake care of the factions, and that we weregoing to provide support and safety. Ithink that was the (unique) dimension ofPSYOP.”

Operation Restore Hope focused interna-tional attention on the challenges that mili-tary forces face as they apply their combattalents and training in support of difficulthumanitarian objectives. The soldiers ofthe 4th PSYOP Group who served in theJPOTF readily adapted to the challenge.Having witnessed PSYOP’s direct contribu-tion to Somalia’s first steps toward peaceand reconstruction, these soldiers are noweven better prepared to participate infuture peacekeeping operations.

Lt. Col. Charles P. Borchi-ni is currently assigned tothe Office of the Secretary ofDefense for Drug Enforce-ment Policy and Support inWashington, D.C. During hismilitary career he has servedin a variety of command and staff assign-ments as a Military Police officer. A formercommander of the 8th PSYOP Battalion ofthe 4th PSYOP Group, Lt. Col. Borchiniserved as commander of the joint PSYOPtask force during Operation Restore Hope.

He is a 1994 graduate of the U.S. ArmyWar College.

Mari Borstelmann is acivilian analyst and a Hornof Africa area specialistassigned to the 4th PSYOPGroup. She deployed withU.S. PSYOP forces to Soma-lia as the civilian analyst.She holds bachelor’s and master’s degreesfrom Boston University and has completeddissertation research for a Ph.D. inAfrican history.

10 Special Warfare

The term “special-operations forces”is used to describe a broad array ofdiverse forces and organizations.

The essence of SOF, the elements thatcontribute most significantly over the longterm to the U.S. national security strategyin terms of the numbers of active missionsand their effect on national security objec-tives, is its unconventional-operationsforces. But current doctrine does not iden-tify specific unconventional-operationsforces, nor is there a definition of uncon-ventional operations in Joint Pub 1-02,Department of Defense Dictionary of Mili-tary and Associated Terms.

Unconventional operations, or UO, arelow-visibility, economy-of-force and econo-my-of-resource operations. They areunique in that relatively small operationalelements work in a combined environmentby, through or with indigenous counter-parts. The UO environment is usuallypolitically sensitive, frequently requiringclose cooperation with the Department ofState and other non-DoD agencies inremote locations and across the opera-tional continuum.

During peacetime, UO consist primarilyof operations with nations important tothe U.S. national-security strategy. Some

examples are foreign-internal-defenseoperations, humanitarian-assistanceoperations, nation-building operations,counterdrug assistance and security-assistance programs. During conflict orwar, UO are primarily unconventional-warfare operations. Examples are guerril-la warfare, evasion and escape, subver-sion, sabotage and other operations of alow-visibility, covert or clandestinenature.1 The above-mentioned peacetimeoperations may also continue during con-flict as economy-of-force efforts, eitherwithin the operational and strategic areasof operation or in other areas. An exampleof this synergistic effect was demonstrat-ed during the Gulf War: While some U.S.Army Special Forces contributed to theeffectiveness of coalition warfare in thearea of operations, other Special Forceselements conducted missions in Turkey,Africa, South and Central America, thePacific and Asia.

Unconventional operations provide alow-risk political option with a high poten-tial for political return. Conducted withoutfanfare, UO usually attract little, if any,media coverage.

UO forcesUnconventional-operations forces are

those U.S. special-operations forces whohave unique capabilities to conduct awide range of UO, as opposed to those

Unconventional Operations Forcesof Special Operations

by Col. Mark D. Boyatt

Views expressed in this article are thoseof the author and do not necessarily reflectpolicies of the Department of the Army orthe Department of Defense.

October 1994 11

SOF elements whose missions are morespecialized.

Unconventional-operations forces con-centrate primarily on teaching, training,and organizing military, paramilitary orother indigenous forces in the conduct ofFID operations, unconventional warfare,humanitarian assistance, nation buildingand counterdrug assistance. Best definedas forces principally organized and trainedto accomplish their missions with, throughor by counterpart relationships withindigenous personnel, UO forces areunique. The only SOF specifically orga-nized, trained and equipped to conductmissions in this manner are the numberedArmy Special Forces groups.

Roles and missionsAccording to Joint Test Pub 3-05, Doc-

trine for Joint Special Operations, SOFhave five principal missions and six collat-eral special-operations activities.

Principal missions• Unconventional warfare • Direct action• Special reconnaissance• Foreign internal defense• Counterterrorism

Collateral activities• Security assistance• Humanitarian assistance• Antiterrorism and other security

activities• Counternarcotics• Personnel recovery• Special activities

Several of these missions are, in reality,subsets of others. By introducing the con-cept of unconventional operations, we cancombine several of these missions, shrink-ing the principal ones to three, with sever-al subsets. These proposed changes betterorganize and clarify SOF missions intofunctional areas.

Principal missions• Unconventional operations

- Unconventional warfare

- Foreign internal defense- Security assistance- Humanitarian assistance- Counternarcotics

• Direct action2

- Counterterrorism- Personnel recovery

• Special reconnaissance

Collateral activities• Special activities• Antiterrorism and other security

activities

The proposed changes would categorizeUW and FID as the primary elements ofUO. Security assistance, humanitarian

assistance and counternarcotics wouldbecome subsets of FID. Counterterrorismand personnel recovery would become sub-sets of DA. Such a realignment of missioncategories would simplify the trainingfocus for units.

The chart on page 12 shows the SOFelements and their primary missionsunder current doctrine.3

By doctrine, Special Forces have fiveprimary missions — unconventional war-fare, foreign internal defense, specialreconnaissance, direct action and coun-terterrorism. Much of the attention SFreceives focuses on only three missions:counterterrorism, direct action and spe-cial-reconnaissance operations.

A Special Forces NCO in-structs Salvadoran soldiersin small-unit tactics.

U.S. Army photo

12 Special Warfare

Five missions are too many and resultin a dilution of effort and resources, espe-cially when considering direct-action, spe-cial-reconnaissance and counterterrorismmissions. Units usually approach these asstand-alone missions and train to executethem in a unilateral manner. Each mis-sion then receives repetitive training time,consuming significant resources. Addition-ally, other SOF or general-purpose forcesinclude direct action, special reconnais-sance and counterterrorism among theirmissions. Some of these units are actuallybetter-trained, better-organized and bet-ter-resourced for those missions than arethe Special Forces groups. This is duplica-tion we can ill afford in these times ofshrinking budgets.4

The probability that counterterrorismforces will be needed may have increasedwith the uncertainty facing the changingworld.5 Counterterrorism must keep itshigh priority because of political sensitivi-

ty, but as a subset of direct action. Sinceother elements focus on counterterroristmissions, Special Forces groups should notbe so tasked.6

Unilateral direct action and specialreconnaissance are high-visibility opera-tions and have always received dispro-portionate attention as SF missions. Spe-cial Forces groups can and do conductthese operations, but only by sacrificingexpertise and competence in unconven-tional operations. The capability to con-duct a mission does not equate with com-petence. As with CT, other units andsome general-purpose-force elementsreceive specific resourcing to train, equipand organize for DA and SR.7 SF soldiersare better able to conduct these missionsthrough coalition operations with indige-nous assets. For unilateral DA and SR,Special Forces assets should be consid-ered only when other SOF units or gen-eral-purpose forces are inappropriate or

Special ForcesRangersSO Aviation

SEALsSpecial Boat UnitsSEAL Delivery Vehicle Teams

Fixed-wingRotary-wingSO WeatherSO CCT/PJ

UW, DA, SR, FID, CTDA, CTDA, SR, support for all operations

Army

UW**, DA, SR, FID, CTSupport for all operationsSupport for all operations

Support for all operationsSupport for all operationsSupport for all operationsSupport for all operations

Navy*

Air Force

UW, DA, SR, FID, CT

Special-Mission Units

* The USMC Marine Expeditionary Unit (special-operations capable) is not listed becauseit is not a core SOF element.** Although the SEALs have unconventional warfare as a mission, their definition of UW ismore like the definition of direct action. They see UW as strikes and raids behind enemylines, unlike Army Special Forces. Army SF practice UW in the traditional sense of workingwith indigenous elements in a denied area.

SOF Primary Missions

October 1994 13

unavailable.The second chart shows SOF elements

and their proposed primary missions. Theintroduction of unconventional operationsas a mission category, along with directaction and special reconnaissance, focusesthe missions functionally.

The ability of Army Special Forces toconduct the broad range of unconventionaloperations is unique in the U.S. military.Certainly, other SOF elements and, onoccasion, elements of the general-purposeforces execute portions of unconventionaloperations. However, only the SpecialForces groups, by virtue of their organiza-tion, training, equipment and orientation,are capable of covering the complete UOspectrum.

Unconventional operations have uniquecultural aspects that are importantwhether we are teaching or conductingmilitary operations. Conducting effectiveUO requires a detailed knowledge and

understanding of the host nation’s culture.Intercultural communication, whichincludes language training and regionalstudies, is a basic element of the trainingof a Special Forces group. Unfortunately,when Special Forces units focus on a non-UO mission in response to a tasking, thecultural aspects are the first to suffer.Achieving adequate proficiency in culturalaspects requires regional focus and inten-sive training. Conducting unconventional-warfare or foreign-internal-defense mis-sions requires an integrated proficiency indirect action and special reconnaissance,but with a different training focus. In UO,these missions will be executed in a com-bined environment by, through or with for-eign counterparts.

Why focus the SF mission on UO? Whynot leave the missions as now assigned:UW, DA, SR, FID and CT? The reason isresources, with the primary resourcebeing time. Currently, many SF units

Proposed SOF Primary Missions

Special ForcesRangersSO Aviation

SEALsSpecial Boat UnitsSEAL Delivery Vehicle Teams

Fixed-wingRotary-wingSO WeatherSO CCT/PJ

UODADA, SR, support for all operations

Army

DA, SRSupport for all operationsSupport for all operations

Support for all operationsSupport for all operationsSupport for all operationsSupport for all operations

Navy*

Air Force*

DA, SR

Special-Mission Units*

* Elements of these SOF organizations, on occasion, conduct FID, a portion of UO.

14 Special Warfare

focus strictly on DA, SR or CT.8 According-ly, most of their training time is spent per-fecting their unilateral capabilities inthese areas, degrading their ability to betruly effective in the more complex activi-ties of unconventional operations. Theycannot make the transition without signif-icant effort and time. Likewise, unitseffectively trained in UO will not be ableto make a rapid transition to effective uni-lateral DA, SR or CT missions. These, too,are complicated missions requiring inten-sive training.

With regard to the capability of theoverall force, critics can point out a short-fall resulting from the proposal to deletespecial reconnaissance as a unilateral SFmission. This shortfall is in human intelli-gence, or HUMINT, forward of the corpsfire-coordination line. Many commandersexpect Special Forces to fill this role, andif there are no other options, SpecialForces may have to. But we should notassume that Special Forces will act unilat-erally. If UO forces are permitted to con-duct peacetime, preconflict missions intheir assigned regions, a secondary benefitmay be the availability of indigenousassets. An effective and efficient way ofcollecting HUMINT is through indigenousassets trained by UO forces. Indigenousassets might conduct missions unilateral-ly, or they might be organized, trained,equipped and led by UO forces. Unilateralcollection by SF is the method of last

choice.Unfortunately, we seem fixated on CT,

DA and SR missions. As a result, thesehighly visible missions receive most of theattention and resourcing — unconvention-al-operations missions don’t receive equalattention. It is these routine and not-so-glamorous unconventional operations,however, which contribute most to U.S.national-security strategy in terms of thenumbers of missions conducted and theireffect on national-security objectives.9

RecommendationsFirst, we need to codify in doctrine the

terms “unconventional operations” and“unconventional-operations forces.” Weneed to recognize UO forces as a distinctelement of SOF and as key players inimplementing national-security strategy.

Secondly, unconventional operationsmust be the primary mission for active-component Army Special Forces groups.Eliminate DA, SR and CT missions orclearly state that they are duplicative sub-ordinate missions of SF. Clearly indicatethat other SOF or general-purpose-forceelements are more appropriately tasked toundertake these missions. Unconventionaloperations require intense focus. Diver-sion of training time and resources to mis-sions that can be performed by other ele-ments is an unjustifiable duplication.

Finally, and most important, SpecialForces units must become activelyinvolved outside the United States to gainmore insight into the various regions andto assist with regional stability. Thisinvolvement would require some change tothe current structure, funding andemployment of SF battalions. Thestrength of Special Forces is in their cul-tural focus, and we must capitalize uponthis strength.

To accomplish these goals, we must sig-nificantly increase funding and priority forunconventional operations. Ensure region-al orientation and funding for the UOforces to operate as much as possible intheir respective regions. Give the 15 activeSpecial Forces battalions clear areas orregions of responsibility that will remain

U.S. Navy SEALs deployfrom a combat rubber raid-ing craft. These Navyforces are well-suited forDA and SR missions.

U. S. Navy photo

October 1994 15

fixed. It takes a long time, sometimesyears, to cultivate an area and to inculcateregional expertise in a unit. A UO forcecannot change its regional and languageorientation every few years and be expect-ed to develop a significant degree of exper-tise or cultural understanding.

Carefully select these areas of responsi-bility based on world dynamics, not oncurrent force structure. We need to identi-fy the regions and allocate the SF battal-ions; then determine the headquartersstructure at SF group level. This maymean that one theater has seven battal-ions oriented on subregional areas andethnic groups, while another may requirefive battalions, and a third may requireonly three battalions. At the same time,make the SF battalions more organiza-tionally independent, even at the expenseof the SF group support structure.

The current structure of the SF groupheadquarters will require modification.Most of the structure should be moved tothe battalions. Another consideration is tomove the group headquarters into the the-aters and designate them as the Army-component headquarters for the regionalcommander in chief’s special-operationscommands. The focus of UO-force activitywill be the SF battalion, not the group.

By emphasizing the unconventionaloperations role of Special Forces, theUnited States gains regional expertswith on-the-ground experience. Addition-ally, mutual trust and understanding,cultivated through personal and sus-tained contact with regional personali-ties, may be the most important outcomeof the long-term regional orientation. Inmost developing nations, personal rela-tionships are key to trust and under-standing. Who you are personally ismore important than what you repre-sent. UO forces can develop these rela-tionships and facilitate the critical inter-face between coalition forces in a conflict,as they did in Desert Storm. If sufficient-ly resourced, UO forces can maintain aforward presence that could reassurenervous nations and increase regionalstability. Furthermore, in the event of anincident or conflict, these elements

would provide a ready source of first-hand regional expertise.

ConclusionPresident George Bush stated in the

January 1993 National Security Strategyof the United States, “Through a strategyof engagement and leadership, we seekglobal and regional stability which encour-ages peaceful change and progress. To thisend, we have four mutually supportivegoals that guide our overall national secu-rity efforts. These are protecting the Unit-ed States and its citizens from attack; hon-oring, strengthening, and extending ourhistoric, treaty and collective defensearrangements; ensuring that no hostilepower is able to dominate or control aregion critical to our interests; and work-ing to avoid conflict by reducing sources ofregional instability and violence, limitingthe proliferation of advanced militarytechnology and weapons of mass destruc-tion, and strengthening civil-militaryinstitutions while reducing the economicburdens of military spending.”10

Unconventional-operations forces havea significant, if not leading, role to playin implementing these national securityefforts. Indications are that the world ofthe 1990s, and likely beyond, will bemore unstable than the world of the1980s. The control and the relativelyenforced stability of the bipolar world ofthe 1970s and 1980s have given way to a

U.S. Air Force SOF, such asthis combat control team,are capable of supporting alltypes of SOF operations.

U. S. Air Force photo

16 Special Warfare

growing concern by numerous nationsabout their national security.11 The rolethat the U.S. is to play in this unstableenvironment is unclear. One means thatis available, though in need of attention,is unconventional operations. UO, pru-dently and judiciously executed, can pro-vide regional stability through a low-levelU.S. presence that acts as a brake onregional ambitions.

Nations that see or benefit from theseunconventional operations may becomemore convinced and assured of U.S. inter-est and concern for a given region. Thepresence of UO forces can foster diploma-cy, whereas their absence may foster con-flict. Nations or regions that perceivethemselves as outside the sphere of con-cern of the world’s only superpower mayfeel compelled to pursue their own inde-pendent means of national security. Thiscan lead to regional arms races, possibleproliferation of weapons of mass destruc-tion and regional instability.

U.S. foreign policy is in transition. It isunclear what vision will emerge, and it isdifficult to anticipate world and regionalevents. Samuel Huntington describes itthus: “All in all, the emerging world islikely to lack the clarity and stability of the Cold War and to be a more jungle-like world of multiple dangers, hiddentraps, unpleasant surprises and moralambiguities.”12

Unconventional operations can providea window through which this “jungle-likeworld” can be viewed with greater clarity.This is the arena, the regionally focusedarena, within which unconventional oper-ations forces thrive and, if properly andtimely employed, can provide a uniqueoption in executing the U.S. national secu-rity strategy.

Col. Mark D. Boyatt iscurrently commander of the3rd Special Forces Group.Commissioned in Infantry,he has served as an Infantryplatoon leader, companyexecutive officer and compa-ny commander. His Special Forces assign-

ments include serving as a detachmentcommander and group operations andtraining officer in the 5th SF Group, as anaction officer in the Army Special Opera-tions Agency, as commander of the 1st Bat-talion, 1st SF Group, and as chief of stafffor the JFK Special Warfare Center andSchool. A graduate of the Armed ForcesStaff College and the Army War College,he holds a bachelor’s degree from the Uni-versity of Tennessee at Knoxville.

Notes:1 Unconventional warfare (DoD) [Joint Pub 1-02]:

A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary opera-tions conducted in enemy-held, enemy-controlled orpolitically sensitive territory. Unconventional war-fare includes, but is not limited to, the interrelatedfields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, sub-version, sabotage, and other operations of a low-visi-bility, covert or clandestine nature. These interrelat-ed aspects of unconventional warfare may be prose-cuted singly or collectively by predominantly indige-nous personnel, usually supported and directed invarying degrees by an external source(s) during allconditions of war or peace.

2 Direct-action missions may be conducted as partof unconventional operations, such as unconventionalwarfare and counternarcotics, but the desire is thatthese missions be combined operations if possible.

3 Joint Test Pub 3-05, Doctrine for Joint SpecialOperations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, October 90).

4 The Rangers are an excellent direct-action unit.They prefer not to be employed in less than battal-ion-size elements, although in some cases they willexecute company-size operations. The Navy SEALteams are excellent at small direct-action and recon-naissance operations but are limited to coastal andriverine areas. Special-mission units are specificallytrained to conduct all missions: CT, DA, SR and lim-ited FID and UW. The general-purpose force hasreconnaissance units that conduct tactical reconnais-sance missions.

5 Walter Laqueur, first in his monumental worksGuerrilla, 1976, and Terrorism, 1977, and in The Ageof Terrorism, 1987, makes the point that terrorism isa tactic to effect political change and has been usedover the centuries by disaffected and politically impo-tent segments of society. Terrorism is a tactic closelyassociated with insurgencies and guerrilla warfare.As political phenomena, they are not mutually exclu-sive of each other. The future, reflected in the post-Cold War realities, suggests that insurgency and ter-rorism will occur with increasing regularity.

6 CT proficiency requires intense effort to becometruly surgical. However, the CT mission given to SFis an in-extremis mission. If honestly approached inthis manner, and not as a de facto duplication of theprincipal CT forces, then this is only a DA mission.Obviously, the degree of risk increases.

October 1994 17

7 Some examples are the special-mission units, thespecial-support units, the Rangers, divisional andcorps reconnaissance units, and the SEALs. None ofthese units focus on UO.

8 The 7th SF Group is probably an exception tothis generality. Of all the Special Forces groups, the7th is most oriented to UO.

9 Special Forces elements have been training withtheir counterparts in nations around the globe formany years. Through their presence in these coun-tries, relationships and contacts have been estab-lished that have had far-reaching effects. In many ofthese countries, the military counterparts with whomSpecial Forces have worked have eventually risen tovarious positions of power — in some cases evenheads of state. These relationships have led toregional stability in some cases and to access to criti-cal facilities in others. In almost all cases, SF areviewed in these countries as informal ambassadors ofthe U.S. and as positive examples of democracy. Theleverage gained in negotiations with foreign govern-ments over our national security goals and objectivesoften staggers the imagination of the casual observ-er. For example, if one accepts that one of our goalsin Liberia was to gain and maintain the trust andthe confidence of its leader, President Doe, then theefforts of a single Special Forces sergeant met andexceeded expectations. There are other operations,usually classified, in which the accomplishments ofSpecial Forces soldiers far exceeded anythingthought possible in terms of the long-term positiveimpact on U.S./allied relations.

10 The White House, National Security Strategy ofthe United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern-ment Printing Office, January, 1993), p. 3.

11 During the Cold War, these countries enjoyedrelative national security because of the competitionbetween the USSR and the U.S. Neither superpowerwould permit tangible threats to its respective satel-lites, surrogates or friends. Without superpowerinfluence, these nations may now pursue regionalambitions or threats from their now-unconstrainedneighbors.

12 Samuel Huntington is an Eaton professor of theScience of Government and is the director of the JohnM. Olin Institute of Strategic Studies at the Centerfor International Affairs at Harvard University.

18 Special Warfare

During the Gulf War, U.S. ArmyCivil Affairs units performed avariety of tasks, including liaison

duties with the host-nation government,humanitarian-relief activities, planningfor noncombatant evacuation operationsand educating U.S. units about Saudi Ara-bian culture. These are missions for whichall CA units train regularly.

A task that is rarely practiced, however,

is the administration of an occupied townor city in enemy territory. The Armygained considerable experience in thistask during World War II and the KoreanWar, but it has had little opportunity toengage in it since. During OperationDesert Storm, Company B of the 96thCivil Affairs Battalion had the mission ofadministering the town of As Salman afterits seizure by the French 6th LightArmored Division.

EmploymentCompany B’s mission during Operation

Desert Shield/Storm was to support theXVIII Airborne Corps and its subordinateunits with Civil Affairs teams. From thebeginning of Desert Shield in August 1990until reserve-component CA units wereactivated and deployed in December 1990,Co. B was the only CA unit supporting theentire corps. Its first teams arrived inSaudi Arabia with the lead elements ofthe 82nd Airborne and 24th Infantry divi-sions. During this five-month period, Co.Blocated water wells and negotiated con-tracts for their use, assessed and evaluat-ed potential sources of labor, producedbilingual instruction cards for guard per-sonnel, established liaison with local offi-cials to minimize the impact of incidentsbetween U.S. forces and the Saudi popu-lace, and provided assistance to the corpsstaff judge advocate and Saudi officials on

Civil Affairs in the Gulf War:Administration of an Occupied Town

by Maj. Douglas E. Nash

A Civil Affairs officer evalu-ates a desert well in SaudiArabia for suitability of useby American forces.

Photo courtesy Douglas Nash

October 1994 19

claims against the U.S. government. Thecompany also developed and coordinatedplans for the evacuation of civilians in theeastern province, and developed and coor-dinated a noncombatant-evacuation-oper-ation plan for U.S. and third-countrynationals.

Authorized 36 personnel, Co. B had only22 personnel present for duty when DesertShield began. Soldiers from other compa-nies of the 96th CA Battalion wereattached to the company, giving it a peakstrength of 34 personnel in November1990.

Attached to the XVIII Airborne Corps,the company assigned teams to each of thecorps’ major subordinate commands — the1st Cavalry, the 24th MechanizedInfantry, the 82nd Airborne and 101st Air-mobile divisions, the XVIII Airborne CorpsArtillery, the 1st Corps Support Com-mand, the 16th MP Brigade, and the 3rdArmored Cavalry Regiment. Teams variedin size from two to four personnel. Theirequipment was limited to trucks, radiosets and individual weapons, and theywere completely dependent upon the unitsto which they were attached for support.

Support to French forcesEarly in January 1991, the company

was notified by the XVIII Airborne CorpsG-5 that it would be attached to theFrench 6th Light Armored Division for theliberation of Kuwait. Co. B began move-ment on Jan. 17 to the 6th LAD’s tacticalassembly area north of the village ofRafha. En route, some of the company’steams also supported the convoy move-ment of the corps. By Jan. 29, these teamshad rejoined the company, which was thenbusily engaged in supporting the Frenchforces in the Rafha area, providing muchthe same operational and planning sup-port as it had for the XVIII AirborneCorps units.

Company B was somewhat of an oddityto the French, who had no Civil Affairscapability in their force structure. After aninitial adjustment period, curious Frenchsoldiers who wanted to meet “les Améri-cains” and trade for highly prized sou-

venirs sought out members of the compa-ny. Other French soldiers were more curi-ous about what a Civil Affairs unit coulddo for them.

The XVIII Airborne Corps had request-ed that the company be attached to the6th LAD because the division would havethe task of seizing and administering theonly sizable Iraqi town in the area — AsSalman. Although other Civil Affairs unitswere available, they had only recentlydeployed into the theater. Company B hadthe most experienced and best-trained CAassets, and a number of its officers andNCOs spoke French.

Before the ground-attack phase ofDesert Storm began, Co. B becameacquainted with its new division and thearea around Rafha. The company conduct-ed area surveys and assessments andestablished working relationships with theemir of Rafha and other local authorities.These relationships proved invaluable tothe 6th LAD and the XVIII AirborneCorps in dealing with the inevitable fric-tion involved in massing thousands of sol-diers and vehicles in a civilian community.

MissionWhile the air war continued, the compa-

ny received an updated mission statementfrom the French division commander,General Michel Roquejeoffre. The missiondirected that Co. B conduct civil-military

A Civil Affairs officer meetswith a Saudi emir to dis-cuss matters affecting thedeployment of Americanforces.

Photo courtesy Douglas Nash

20 Special Warfare

operations to reduce civilian interferencewith military operations, identify andacquire local resources, fulfill legal obliga-tions and moral considerations in accord-ance with international law and agree-ments, and terminate hostilities with con-ditions favorable to the long-term nationalinterest of the allied coalition. Implicit inthis mission was that the company wouldassume responsibility for the administra-tion of the town of As Salman. As condi-tions permitted, it would receive adminis-trative and logistics support from theFrench to carry out its mission.

Since the 6th LAD had no staff positionequivalent to a G-5, the Co. B commanderwrote the Civil Affairs annex to the 6thLAD operations plan. The company’s twoFrench linguists translated the document,and it was published as part of the divi-sion’s plan. The concept of operations forCo. B was that during preparation for theground campaign, the unit would updatearea studies, refine CA plans, identifystockpiles of humanitarian-relief suppliesand pre-position them as far forward aspossible. During the ground campaign

itself, the company would concentrate onpopulation control to minimize civilianinterference with military operations.Unit personnel would also conduct earlyassessments of the attitudes and basicneeds of Iraqi civilians.

Once As Salman was seized, taskswould be prioritized as follows:

• Coordinate and execute a civil-infor-mation program to create a favorableimage with the Iraqi civilian population.

• Locate local resources and assist intheir acquisition for use by allied forcesand the civilian population.

• Conduct displaced-civilian operations.• Alleviate human suffering among

civilians in accordance with Article 56 ofthe Geneva Convention.

• Assist French commanders in fulfill-ing their obligations under internationallaw.

• Conduct civil administration of occu-pied areas, including the re-establishmentof essential services.

• Plan for the transfer of civil-military-operations functions to follow-on elementsof the 360th CA Brigade.

PUBLICWORKS

PUBLICSERVICES

LAW &ORDER

CIVILINFOR-MATION

PUBLICHEALTH &HOUSING

ADMIN/LOG

CA

DIV MAIN CP

CAB 96

Task Organization for Administrative Mission

October 1994 21

To accomplish these tasks, the unitdeveloped an approach best described as“civil affairs triage.” Similar to categoriz-ing wounded personnel, the processenabled the company’s teams to decidewhat could be fixed quickly and placedback into operation, what could be fixed inthe long-term, and what could not befixed.

To carry out its mission, the companyreorganized along functional lines andestablished five teams. The public-worksteam would locate and assess Iraqi gov-ernment facilities; the public-servicesteam would assess the civilian popula-tion’s requirements for survival; the law-and-order team would handle populationcontrol and enforcement of directives tar-geted at the Iraqi populace; the civil-infor-mation team would coordinate psychologi-cal operations targeted toward the Iraqipopulace; and the public-health-and-hous-ing team would determine health andmedical requirements and the condition ofcivilian housing.

Each team consisted of an officer, anNCO, an operations specialist (usually amilitary policeman), and a volunteerKuwaiti translator. The volunteers, mili-tiamen from a training camp north ofDhahran, added a much-needed Arabic-language capability.

Objective: As SalmanOne of the most difficult tasks the unit

had before the ground war started was toacquire reliable information about AsSalman. Unit members made acquaint-ances with local merchants, police,Bedouins and administrators and, throughthese sources, gathered enough informa-tion to generate a detailed picture of AsSalman and the entire French sector.

Using its area study and the applicationof 14 political-military analytical factorstaught in the Regional Studies Course atFort Bragg’s John F. Kennedy SpecialWarfare Center and School, the companydeveloped a plan to administer As Salmanonce it had been seized by the French.

Founded approximately 1,800 yearsago, As Salman was home to 4,500 people,

many of whom were nomadic Bedouinswho lived there only during the winter.Located about 70 miles north of the SaudiArabian-Iraqi border, the town hadserved as a watering hole for caravansalong the “Darb’ al Hadj,” the historic pil-grimage route from Baghdad to Mecca.This route, recently paved, had beenrenamed major supply route “Texas” bythe XVIII Airborne Corps. It became oneof the major avenues of approach to theEuphrates valley.

With the coming of the Iraqi Ba’athregime, As Salman became a major gov-ernmental “corporate” town. In addition tohousing a border police battalion in afortress two miles east of the town, AsSalman also housed a military garrison, amilitary school and a local Ba’ath partyheadquarters. It boasted a modern healthclinic, running water, several schools, aweather station and many other amenitiesnot common to Iraqi towns in the region.

Once the air war began, large numbersof the town’s residents fled north to avoidthe bombing. An Iraqi reserve division,the 45th (composed mostly of Kurds), wasmoved to As Salman and ordered todefend the Iraqi far right flank while itcontinued to incorporate large numbers ofreservists into its force structure.

CAB 96

PERSONNEL:1 – TEAM LEADER - O-3/CPT1 – TEAM NCOIC - E-7/SFC1 – OPNS SPECIALIST - E-4/SPC1 – TRANSLATOR - KUWAITI

EQUIPMENT:1 – M-1009 3/4 -TON TRUCK1 – AN/VRC-461 – BULLHORN

Typical Team Organization

22 Special Warfare

Soldiers from Co. B would not enter AsSalman until it had been secured by theFrench division’s 3rd Colonial MarineInfantry Regiment, the 3rd RIMA. On themorning of Feb. 26, the company com-mander was told to link up immediatelywith the 3rd RIMA for the attack on AsSalman. Fortunately, the unit hadplanned for this contingency, and itsteams were prepared. After a hasty confer-ence, one CA team was attached to each ofthe four French infantry companies todeal with civilians and EPWs encounteredduring the attack. One remaining teamwould move with the French battaliontrains to receive displaced civilians andEPWs from the forward teams and holdthem at a collection point for interrogationby French military-intelligence personnel.

When the armored vehicles of the 3rdRIMA reached the edge of As Salman, thetroops dismounted and began clearing thetown house by house. The Iraqis did notdefend As Salman, and all that alliedtroops had to show for their efforts were17 Iraqi prisoners and 13 civilians. TheEPWs were shipped to Rafha, but thecivilians were allowed to remain. Afterinterrogation by the unit’s Kuwaiti inter-

preters, each civilian was escorted back tohis home by a CA team and told not toleave the dwelling.

Civil affairs triageOnce As Salman had been searched and

secured, Co. B quickly moved its commandpost and displaced-civilian collection pointto the center of town. A quick survey ofthe town disclosed that damage was mini-mal. The 3rd RIMA commander estab-lished his command post in the muhk-tarate, the Iraqi mayor’s office, since itwas centrally located and was the mostmodern building with enough room forcommunications equipment. Company Bestablished its command post in a nearbyboys’ school.

On Feb. 27, the company’s teams fannedout across the town to assess infrastruc-ture damage, the availability of food sup-plies and the condition of the medical clin-ic. As Salman had been designated by theIraqis as both a divisional headquarterssite and a mobilization point. Tons ofabandoned equipment, weapons, and vehi-cles were scattered throughout the town.Teams also located large amounts of food,

U.S. Civil Affairs soldiersissue food rations to Iraqivillagers in As Salman.

Photo courtesy Douglas Nash

October 1994 23

medicine, bottled water and ammunition.While sappers of the French Foreign

Legion removed and destroyed arms andammunition, the public-service teammoved hundreds of bags of flour, rice andbeans, as well as stores of cooking oil andsalt, to a food-issue point at the boys’school. The public-health-and-housingteam evaluated the clinic that Iraqi troopshad used as a field hospital. Despite itsrecent use, the clinic was well-stocked andequipped. Although badly in need of clean-ing, it could soon be placed back into oper-ation for the returning civilian population.

The public-works team assessed the con-dition of the town’s utilities, communica-tions and roads. The town telephoneexchange had been removed by the Iraqis.The power plant, though capable of beingrestored, lacked a trained engineer tooperate it. Allied bombing had destroyedthe waterworks on the northern edge ofthe town, and the only reliable sources ofwater were private wells. If the town’sinhabitants did return, the several hun-dred bottles of water discovered by Co. Bwould not last long.

The law-and-order team searched thetown police station, which had been hit bya 500-pound bomb. Despite the damage,team members were able to retrieve thetown’s police files, which would help iden-tify potentially disruptive elements oncethe townspeople began returning. Theteam also made identity cards for each ofthe town’s inhabitants and was preparedto issue them should the villagers return.The team leader met daily with his Frenchmilitary-police counterpart to coordinatelocal security tasks and exchange informa-tion. All local security, except for Co. B’scompound, was the responsibility of theFrench.

The civil-information team was alsofully occupied during the first several daysafter the town was seized. After question-ing all of the Iraqi civilians in the town,the team discovered that the secularmayor, who held an Iraqi civil-serviceposition, had fled, as had all members ofthe Ba’ath party political structure. How-ever, the traditional tribal leader of thetown, the muhktar, had remained.

The company commander decided thatthe allies should formally recognize themuhktar as the sole legitimate civilianleader of As Salman, and the French gar-rison commander concurred. The civil-information team was given the mission ofenhancing the muhktar’s legitimacy andusing him to channel information aboutthe town’s new “administrators” to itsinhabitants.

Since the muhktarate was being used bythe French, Co. B’s commander set up themuhktar’s new office in an unused room inthe boys’ school, near the company com-mand post. The civil-information teamalso arranged daily town-council meetingswith the muhktar and various tribal andfamily heads, in which details of theadministration of the town were workedout. The muhktar was also briefed ondirectives issued by the French area com-mander that would affect the town’s popu-lation. Important information, such as theneed to boil drinking water and the dan-gers posed by unexploded munitions, wasregularly disseminated during the meet-ings. The meetings were also a forum forgrievances. The fact that there were noinstances of rebellion or outbreaks of hos-tility during the town’s administration isindicative of the success of the meetings.

Every evening, team leaders met withthe company commander to share infor-mation and to update the As Salman areaassessment. To keep both the 6th LAD

Civil Affairs soldiers andKuwaiti volunteers assistthe muhktar of As Salman(center, with glasses) atthe food-issue point.

Photo courtesy Douglas Nash

24 Special Warfare

and the Corps G-5 informed of its activi-ties, the company submitted daily situa-tion reports that detailed its activities andprovided estimates of supplies required forthe town’s population.

The French, for their part, did notintrude into this process. They remainedsatisfied with the company’s performanceas long as the town did not demand toomuch in terms of security or logistics sup-port and did not interfere with militaryoperations. However, the French com-mander stipulated that only prewar resi-dents of As Salman would be allowed toreturn. All others were to be turned away.

Population returnsBy Mar. 5, 1991, the teams had complet-

ed their inventories. All foodstuffs hadbeen moved to a storage site in the compa-ny’s compound. Military equipment hadbeen removed from most of the residentialareas of the town. Tons of gear, ammuni-tion and weapons had been collected byFrench Foreign Legion sappers anddestroyed north of the town.

Several wells had been placed backinto operation, and the town clinic hadbeen cleaned in preparation for the dailysick call that would begin when the population returned. Company B’smechanic had repaired a garbage truckand two water trucks, making themoperational. All these services would bebadly needed when the estimated 2,500

townspeople returned.An estimated 500 townspeople were

camping in the desert. Although they werenotified by the muhktar that it was safe toreturn to their homes, they did not trustthe Americans at first — Iraqi propagandahad painted the allies as barbarians. Thevillagers sent representatives to AsSalman to see for themselves. If the Amer-icans were telling the truth, the villagerswould return. Word was also passed alongby Bedouins to those townspeople who hadfled north that it was safe to return home.These groups also sent representatives tosee what the Americans and the Frenchwere up to.

By Mar. 9, the trickle of returnees hadbecome a flood. To establish control of thereturning townspeople, the law-and-orderteam set up a checkpoint at the northernentrance to the town. All other routes intothe town were sealed off by the French. Atthe checkpoint, all returning traffic wasstopped and vehicles and personnel weresearched for weapons and other contra-band. Because of Islamic customs regard-ing the treatment of women, the unit’ssole female soldier was joined by threeother female soldiers from the Corps G-5and the CA Brigade to assist with search-es of women.

The law-and-order team quickly discov-ered that most Iraqis had no identity doc-uments. Many had had their identitycards confiscated by the Iraqi secretpolice; others had thrown them away tohide their identity. The lack of identitycards made screening the legitimateinhabitants of the town difficult, but theKuwaiti translators were adept at ferret-ing out the required information. Forexample, they could tell by an Iraqi’sdialect whether he was a local Bedouin ora resident of Baghdad. Questionable caseswere checked against the captured policefiles.

Iraqis who were not returnees wereturned away. Many were found to be IraqiArmy deserters, and when their numbersbegan to pose a threat to security at thecheckpoint, they were taken to the EPWcage in Rafha. Returnees who had beenscreened were in-processed and issued an

Villagers of As Salman re-ceive bulk issues of rationsat the food-issue point.

Photo courtesy Douglas Nash

October 1994 25

American-made identity card and fourdays’ rations. All returnees were briefedby the muhktar on the allied administra-tion and its rules. They were also told thatthey would have to go through the muhk-tar with questions or complaints — theywere not allowed to deal directly with theallies. This helped establish the muhktaras the legitimate Iraqi leader in the town.

Challenge of ‘military government’By Mar. 24, the company had processed

2,768 returnees, most of whom chose toreturn to their homes. Others, mostlyBedouins, returned to their pastures inthe surrounding area. Most of the unit’spersonnel were heavily involved in theday-to-day duties required to administer atown of more than 2,000 inhabitants; onlythe law-and-order team remained at thecheckpoint north of town, where it contin-ued to screen and in-process the fewremaining returnees.

Realizing that the unit was not largeenough to adequately administer thetown, the company commander decided totransfer as many duties as possible to themuhktar once he was able to handle them.

For example, the civil-service team hadinitially staffed the food distribution pointand had managed the issuing of rations.The muhktar was directed to pick a staffto run the food-issue point. One of thecompany’s operations specialists wouldsupervise the operation.

Soldiers from Co. B had initially driv-en the water trucks and the garbagetruck, but an Egyptian national latervolunteered to perform this duty. He“hired” several local assistants, who wereusually paid with extra rations of food.By the end of Co. B’s stay, water distri-bution and trash hauling were civilianresponsibilities.

As food stocks were exhausted, theFrench Army provided military rations forissue to the townspeople. Although theallies could have flooded the town withfood, the company commander believedthat it would not be in the Iraqis’ bestinterests to raise their standard of livinghigher than it had been before the war.They received what was adequate to sus-tain their day-to-day needs, and local mer-chants slowly began to fill in the gaps.

The public-health team administered

French and American sol-diers talk with villagers ofAs Salman.

Photo courtesy Douglas Nash

26 Special Warfare

sick call at the town clinic. Since all Iraqipublic-health personnel had fled north,the French Army medical personnel per-formed this vital service, often seeingmore than 100 patients each day. Careprovided at the clinic played a major rolein developing favorable attitudes towardthe allies in general and the Americansin particular. As a result, the Iraqis coop-erated with their American administra-tors, even going so far as to compel theirneighbors to follow the allies’ rules andregulations.

By Mar. 20, the town was virtually self-sustaining except for food and medicalsupplies. On Mar. 23, the company movedfrom the boy’s school to an abandoned bor-der-police fortress on the northern edge oftown. This move was necessary becausethe town council had decided to reopen theschools, probably the most conclusive evi-dence that normalcy had returned to AsSalman and that the unit’s mission hadbeen successful. That same day, the com-pany commander met with the com-mander of the 354th CA Command fromVII Corps to discuss the hand-off ofresponsibility for As Salman. The follow-ing day, the company was relieved by VIICorps units and began its redeployment toCONUS.

ConclusionDuring Operation Desert Storm, Co. B

was able to execute a classic Civil Affairsmission — the administration of an occu-pied town in enemy territory. With littleprior experience in performing such atask, a small unit was able to complete itsmission with a minimum diversion ofallied resources. A combination of factorscontributed to the unit’s success: planning,experience, service support, training, ini-tiative, PSYOP, and cultural and languagetraining.

Planning was crucial to the success ofthe mission. Not only was a solid opera-tions plan important, but also constantrehearsals, updated area studies, andcoordination with supported and support-ing units. The operations plan was adjust-ed constantly during the administration of

As Salman, ensuring that the companywas flexible enough to adapt to changingcircumstances. Area assessments wereimportant because they were used as toolsto teach company members about the vil-lage they would soon be administering.Soldiers knew each street, each building,and the ethnic makeup of the town beforethey ever saw it.

Experience was another crucial factor.Although all the members of Co. B hadreceived some formal Civil Affairs training,six months in the theater — working withthe inhabitants and dealing with real prob-lems — gave the unit experience in locatinglocal resources, dealing with local officialsand operating in a desert environment.

The unit’s success could not have beenachieved without administrative and logis-tics support from the XVIII AirborneCorps G-5 and the 6th LAD. The companylearned to live without support fromARCENT or CENTCOM: these organiza-tions were too remote. Although AsSalman was administered in an austerelogistical environment, the town’s needswere largely met by energizing the consid-erable assets of the corps. Fortunately, therapid cessation of hostilities enabled the6th LAD to divert a larger amount ofresources for the Iraqi populace than itordinarily would have.

Company B trained throughout the aircampaign to conduct its mission. Teammembers were fully aware of their individ-ual roles and of the general concept of theoperation. Teams conducted rehearsals oftheir assigned missions, and when theground war began, each soldier was ready.

The importance of collective and individ-ual initiative was also reinforced. Allthings do not come to those who wait. Unitmembers must often aggressively seekinformation and gather resources withoutwaiting for help. This is especially impor-tant on the modern battlefield, where CivilAffairs units compete with other servicesfor the same limited assets.

Another lesson learned was the need forCivil Affairs and PSYOP to work closelytogether. Each must have a workingknowledge of the other’s job. Because bothspecialties are in short supply on the bat-

October 1994 27

tlefield, CA and PSYOP soldiers may haveto fill in for each other. This was the casein As Salman. Because PSYOP supportwas unavailable, Co. B improvised loud-speakers, leaflets and other media. Allindications showed that these attempts,although crude, were successful, in partbecause several of the unit’s members hadattended formal blocks of instruction onPSYOP or had worked closely enough withPSYOP units to gain an understanding ofthe fundamentals.

Finally, cultural and language expertiseproved to be the company’s most crucialadvantage. The knowledge of Arabic cul-ture gained after six months of dealingwith indigenous peoples on a daily basisenabled the unit to approach its missionwith the required degree of sensitivity.The Americans showed respect for Islamicculture and gained the trust of the localleadership, and the people of As Salmanwere receptive to American administra-tion. Cultural sensitivity is the most diffi-cult skill to learn and the most perishable,but it is one of the crucial factors thatmake SOF an effective combat multiplier.

As the Army and other services preparefor a future characterized by operationsother than war, episodes such as theadministration of As Salman may becomecommonplace. Commanders may findthemselves responsible for the safety andwell-being of thousands of enemy citizenswithin their area of operations. While inmany respects As Salman was an ideal lab-oratory for revalidating CA concepts andprinciples, all units can benefit from thelessons learned from Co. B’s operations.

Lessons learned• PSYOP should be incorporated into

all aspects of planning for humanitarianmissions.

• Language and intercultural skills arecrucial to success.

• CA units cannot provide security fortowns — that is an MP mission.

• U.S. forces should be prepared to workwith allied and international forces.

• Political-military factors taught in theRegional Studies Course are excellent

analytical tools for Civil Affairs andPSYOP units.

• Infantry skills are necessary inpreparing for combat operations. CA unitsmay have to accompany the ground-assault force.

• Flexibility and ingenuity are crucial —don’t wait for detailed guidance or try to fit the doctrinal template to real-world situations.

• METT-T applies to the planning proc-ess for CA and PSYOP units too.

• JRTC must continue to emphasize theadministration of occupied population cen-ters during its exercise play.

• CA units should view an administra-tive mission as a temporary one. If theybecome indispensable, they may remainindispensable. Reactivate the indigenousleadership as soon as possible.

• Use local resources as much as possi-ble — don’t be a distractor for the maneu-ver commander.

• All members of CA units are workers —the only way to get an administration mission moving is to practice hands-on leadership.

Maj. Douglas E. Nash iscurrently attending the ArmyCommand and General StaffCollege, Fort Leavenworth,Kan. His most recent assign-ment was commander of theRegional Studies Detach-ment, 3rd Battalion, 1st Special WarfareTraining Group, Fort Bragg, N.C. Hisother assignments include service as com-mander of Company B, 96th Civil AffairsBattalion, where he served during Opera-tion Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Opera-tion Provide Comfort and Operation Guan-tanamo. A graduate of the Civil AffairsCourse and the Regional Studies Course,he holds a bachelor’s degree from the U.S.Military Academy and a master’s degreefrom Troy State University.

28 Special Warfare

During Operation Desert Storm,special-operations forces from theU.S., Great Britain, France and

the Arab coalition partners cooperated inexecuting a variety of SOF missions.Their combined efforts provided a proto-type of coalition special warfare.

Future military operations are likely tosee an increasing use of coalition specialoperations, and SOF planners must learnto integrate available elements into a truecoalition force.

Three dynamics are at work to makecoalition special warfare a norm in thefuture. First, former Secretary of DefenseLes Aspin’s “Bottom-Up Review” definesmultiple tasks for America’s armed forces,including operations other than war suchas peacekeeping, peacemaking andhumanitarian assistance. The U.S. com-mitment to these tasks will require theuse of all available force multipliers,including indigenous and coalition forces.

The second dynamic is the drawdown ofAmerican forces. Cuts in the conventionalforces of all the services make it more like-ly that those constrained resources will behusbanded to respond to major regionalcontingencies. Military requirements suchas operations other than war may rely onthe capabilities of regionally aligned SOF,indigenous forces and coalition contribu-

tions to serve as stopgaps for conventionalshortfalls.

Finally, the national military strategymakes it clear that the United States willfight future wars as part of a coalition.The current administration has embracedthe concept of multilateralism, and SOFwill be employed to maximize these coali-tion efforts.

DilemmaToday, active-component Special Forces,

Civil Affairs and PSYOP units find them-selves heavily employed, conducting oper-ations in foreign internal defense, coun-terterrorism, counternarcotics and otheractivities. These missions are important tothe United States and to the stability ofthe regions in which they take place. Callsby the current administration forincreased international activism couldresult in increased SOF deployments,especially with the reduction of forward-based U.S. conventional forces. The result-ing dilemma is, “Will sufficient SOF beavailable to respond to the requirementsof a regional crisis short of war?”

If not, the national command authoritymay not choose to redeploy an already-engaged SOF unit to fulfill a requirementin another theater. The solution might beto employ allied SOF in consonance with

SOF Planning for Coalition Operations

by Lt. Col. Robert D. Lewis

October 1994 29

apportioned U.S. SOF to fulfill the theatercommander’s requirement.

Allied SOF contributionsUsing allied SOF would offer three dis-

tinct advantages:• Unique cultural attributes: SOF from

nations within or bordering the theater’sarea of responsibility, or AOR, will likelyinclude soldiers who share a common lan-guage, ethnic and cultural traits and reli-gious beliefs with military personnel andcivilians in the AOR. These soldiers willbe more easily assimilated and hiddenwithin the area of operations.

• No stigma of American intervention:The U.S. government or its allies maydevelop a requirement for SOF in an AOR,but political considerations might precludethe employment of U.S. SOF. Under suchconditions, SOF from a nonthreateningally might better meet the requirement.

• Operational experience in the AOR:Allied SOF from within the crisis regionhave previously developed the operationaltechniques, personnel and equipmentissues for successful employment. As aresult, these forces may be more easilyemployed than U.S. forces who have notworked in the area.

Each nation’s SOF has its own capabili-ties and its own limitations. Considera-tions such as command and control, intel-ligence, infiltration and exfiltration, andcommunications are common across thespectrum of mission profiles, but no othernation has structured its forces with themyriad capabilities of U.S. SOF. Alliedforces may need the U.S. to provide somekind of support.

SOF analysisU.S. regional special-operations com-

mands, or SOCs, can be tasked to assumeoperational control of allied SOF, or a SOCmay be integrated into an allied com-mand. From either position, U.S. SOFplanners could be expected to project themost effective employment of specialforces from different nations, using somekind of evaluation process. During assign-ment to the headquarters of Allied Forces

Northern Europe, the author had theopportunity to work in a combined, jointheadquarters that conducted planning forSOF from several nations. Planners had toallow for the employment of SOF from asmany as six different countries, and theyevaluated each of the forces against sevencriteria. Discussion of the evaluation willassume that allied forces have been allo-

cated to the SOC, which serves as a coali-tion headquarters.

What purpose does the force serve? — Anation creates and maintains SOF forthree primary purposes. In many ThirdWorld nations, SOF is designed as anagency of state security or “palace guard.”In such cases, the purpose of the force isnot war fighting, but internal security forthe government against the indigenouspopulation. Under such circumstances, theforce provides no tangible advantages andtwo important liabilities. First, the centralgovernment is very unlikely to release thisforce for war fighting. Second, this force isprobably unpopular with the native popu-lation, so its usefulness in FID or inunconventional warfare is poor.

Other nations design their SOF as afunction of their intelligence services.These are primarily stay-behind militaryforces, or SBMF, designed to operate forextended periods in enemy rear areas. Thethree doctrinal missions performed bySBMF are strategic reconnaissance, directaction and unconventional warfare. Theirstrengths lie in the extensive systems ofcontacts and caches established in likely

What purpose does the force serve?

What type of force is it?

What is the force structure?

What are the capabilities/limitations of the force?

Can allied capabilities eliminate limitations?

What are the likely mission profiles?

Can combined SOF operations be undertaken?

SOF Analysis1

2

3

4

5

6

7

30 Special Warfare

areas of conflict. SBMF also have two lia-bilities. First, their intelligence servicesdesire information of national strategicvalue, not operational value. As a result,regional SOCs should not expect theseforces to be released to them. Second, thenature of stay-behind means that theseelements will remain dormant as thefighting occurs around them. They willactivate only when the forward edge of thebattle area is well past them.

Many other allied SOF are organized toperform special reconnaissance and directaction. Their roles are similar to those ofAmerican Special Forces or Rangers.These forces may be employed by the SOCif released.

What type of force is it? — Two issuesare relevant to this question — terms ofservice and command relationships.Throughout the world, countries raiseboth professional and conscripted forces.Obviously, long-service professional spe-cial forces receive additional training toperfect their doctrine, structure and tech-nology, which enables them to undertakecomplex SOF missions. These forces arealso retained as cohesive formations forlong periods. Conscript forces do not havethese luxuries. They have less time totrain and are constantly retraining on thesame tasks because of personnelturnovers.

Command relationships concerningallied forces can also be confusing. A con-

crete principle is that a nation will alwaysretain command of its forces. This com-mand may be exercised in a simple one-time approval of tasking authority to anAmerican SOC, or it may require thatevery action directed by the AmericanSOC be approved by national authorities.Normally, communications and sustain-ment will remain national responsibilities.However, certain countries will seek sub-stantial logistics support as a prerequisiteto participation in a coalition.

What is the particular unit’s force struc-ture? — Few nations organize their forces toperform the multitude of tasks conducted byAmerican SOF. Generally, allied forces arestructured to execute one or two doctrinaltasks, such as special reconnaissance anddirect action, because they lack the person-nel and equipment to conduct other tasks.Structure must be examined in terms of theteams/patrols, command and control, intelli-gence, communications and sustainment.The SOF planner must be careful to employa force only within its capabilities.

What are the force’s capabilities and lim-itations? — To determine the specificcapabilities and limitations that will affecta force’s employment, the planner mustevaluate each force in the following areas:operational time frame, means of infiltra-tion and exfiltration, communications,technological level and caches.

• Operational time frame: This is thelength of time a force can be employed.Short operational time frames limit a SOFelement to specific missions such as directaction. Forces capable of longer employ-ment times can undertake deeper and morecomplex missions. By defining the opera-tional time frame, the planner cansequence the infiltration and exfiltration ofU.S. and coalition SOF teams at appropri-ate points throughout the operation. Fur-ther, the time frames will define the tasksthat each national SOF can undertake.

• Means of infiltration and exfiltration:Each nation trains its SOF units in differ-ent methods of infil and exfil. Techniquesvary from intentional stay-behind opera-tions, to overland marches, to airborne,airland or seaborne infiltrations. Plannersshould attempt to employ each nation’s

A U.S. Navy SEAL trains aSaudi Special Forces sol-dier on the use of divingequipment during OperationDesert Storm.

Photo by Thomas Witham

October 1994 31

SOF element using the methods its sol-diers know best. Initially, infil and exfilplanning for allied SOF should be limitedto the employment of national means.

• Communications: The planner exam-ines communications with regard to range,sustainability, speed and security. This isdone from two aspects — the capabilitiesof the SOF element to relay reports fromthe team/patrol to its base station, and thecapabilities of each ally to process thesereports into a usable product and to com-municate the data into the coalition com-mand structure. Of particular importanceare the liaison requirements for eachnation within the coalition headquartersor the SOC.

• Technological level: The planner mustexamine the technologies that an alliedforce can employ in its missions. Two pri-mary areas to consider are special recon-naissance and direct action. Technology willdefine the parameters of the special recon-naissance mission and should be evaluatedin terms of observation ranges, night-visioncapabilities and all-weather capabilities.Direct-action technology will define the typeand complexity of the target system that theSOF element can undertake. Very few

nations have acquired the capability to pro-vide terminal guidance (laser target desig-nation and transponders).

• Caches: Many allies have alleviatedshortfalls in robustness and technology byestablishing well-developed cache systemsthroughout their nations. The caches areinspected and updated on a routine basis.This form of sustainment is especially pop-ular among nations that rely on large-scale,stay-behind warfare. Of concern to regionalSOCs are three issues. First, what is in thecaches and are these resources compatiblewith American or other allied SOF? If pos-sible, planners should pursue standardiza-tion of ammunition, communications andbatteries. Second, can SOF other than thehost nation’s gain access to these caches?Finally, will the host nation allow U.S. ele-ments or other forces to build their owncaches in-country?

Operational planningUsing their analyses, SOC planners can

overlay the available U.S. and allied forceson the battlefield. In addition to the con-sideration of each force’s capabilities andlimitations, three additional factors must

U.S. SOF deploy with arubber boat from a heli-copter. Few al l ies wi l lhave the infiltration andexfiltration capabilities ofU.S. forces.

U.S. Air Force photo

32 Special Warfare

be considered.First, areas of operation must be

restricted to a single nation. Egyptiancommandos, for example, should not sharean AO with the British SAS. This precau-tion reduces the chance of allied SOF ele-ments compromising one another. A tech-nique that can be employed is the use ofoperational bands, with each band provid-ing the AO for a nation’s SOF. The defin-ing principle of these bands is primarilythe infil and exfil capabilities of eachnation. An example of this technique isshown in the chart below.

Second, planners should determinewhether assets can be shared by morethan one nation’s forces; for example,whether American aircraft could be usedto infiltrate and exfiltrate forces of othernations. The U.S. Air Force’s special-oper-ations wings bring the most developedcapability, but there may be small num-bers of U.S. aircraft available. The SOCshould also be prepared to request assis-tance from allies as the situationdemands. Conditions requiring extensivecontact with the local population or use ofa conveniently located cache, for example,may determine that a specific mission can

best be accomplished by an allied SOFteam.

Finally, certain missions could beassigned to SOF teams composed of indi-viduals and elements from two nations.Combined teams should be employed onlyif each contributing force brings a specificcapability required by the mission; forexample, the combination of allied andU.S. forces to conduct laser-target-desig-nation operations. Extensive contact withthe local population would favor the use ofa national team, but the target might besufficiently complex to require a laser-marking capability that the allies mightnot have. A national patrol with anattached U.S. two-man lasing team wouldbe the solution.

OperationsIn the arena of coalition SOF opera-

tions, the author’s experience has shownthat the allied command’s activities willfall into three areas: liaison betweennational SOF and the command, coordina-tion of SOF and conventional operationsand response to operational emergencies.

As an allied headquarters, the SOC willreceive liaison cells from each SOF ele-

XXXXX

XXXXX

ITALIAN FRENCH

BRITISHEG

YP

TIA

N

UN

ITE

D S

TA

TE

S

SOF Areas of Operation

October 1994 33

ment it employs. These liaison cells havethree functions:

• Provide the SOC with expertise con-cerning tactics, doctrine and employmentof national SOF elements.

• Process and coordinate commands andinformation between the SOC and theirnational teams.

• Coordinate and deconflict missionsand mission changes between the SOCand the national command.

The SOC must provide resources to theliaison cells. They will require a secureplace to work and access to sufficient com-munication nodes to conduct their coordi-nation. The SOC will be required to inte-grate the liaison cells’ national communi-cations gear into its array.

One of the primary purposes of the SOCis to coordinate the activities of SOF withconventional operations. These operationsmay involve ground forces from one nationand SOF from another; the SOC, with itsliaison cells, must ensure a coordinatedeffort. Coordination is especially impor-tant in the synchronization of direct-actiontargets, in the deconfliction of operationsand in the linkup with conventional forces.Targets selected for direct action aredesigned to provide a large payoff forfuture operations. An example would be aseries of simultaneous SOF attacks on air-defense systems to generate a blind spotthrough which deep-attack aircraft couldfly undetected.

The SOC will also deconflict SOF withconventional operations. Infils and exfilsusing each nation’s SOF aircraft, sub-marines and other means must be coordi-nated with friendly air-defense arrays,fire-support systems and front-line units.Routes of ingress and egress will have tobe shared with conventional force plan-ners. Further, conventional deep attacks(air, missile and artillery) must be decon-flicted with the movements of employedSOF teams. SOC personnel will berequired to attend most of the conven-tional maneuver and interdiction plan-ning meetings.

Linkup operations between advancingconventional forces and employed SOF arechallenging in the coalition world. Such

linkups will require personnel from theSOC and the national SOF liaison cell tojoin the advancing unit to effect linkup.Linkup should be planned prior to infiltra-tion; however, battlefield uncertaintiesmay cause linkup to be performed ad hoc.

ConclusionIn the future, American armed forces

are less likely to “go it alone.” They mayoperate as part of a multinational coali-tion, and the shrinking U.S. force struc-ture may also lead to a greater U.S.dependence on the contributions of alliedforces. The existing command, control,communications and intelligence structureof the U.S. regional SOCs is capable ofemploying coalition assets, but SOF plan-ners must be prepared to plan the employ-ment and integration of allied units. Ananalysis such as the one presented herewill allow planners to evaluate alliedforces’ capabilities and limitations in orderto employ each force to its bestadvantage.

Lt. Col. Robert D. Lewis iscurrently assigned to the 4thSpecial Operations SupportCommand, Fort Shafter,Hawaii. A Special Forcesofficer, he has served in com-mand and staff positions inboth Field Artillery and Special Forcesand was formerly assigned to the Direc-torate of Operations, Readiness and Mobi-lization in the Office of the Army DeputyChief of Staff for Operations. A distin-guished military graduate of CaliforniaState University, Chico, he is also a gradu-ate of the Army Command and GeneralStaff College and the Naval Commandand Staff College.

34 Special Warfare

Innovation has always been an essen-tial, indeed critical, element of effec-tive military forces and peacetime

deterrence. The Soviet Union was defeatedin part by U.S. innovations in technology,weapons, doctrine, etc., which raised ques-tions in the minds of Soviet leaders as towhether they could wage war or competein peacetime effectively. Crises such asDesert Storm have been resolved in theUnited States’ favor, with less loss of life,in part because of our innovations in tech-nology and operations (e.g., long-rangetank fires and day/night operations).

Innovation will continue to be impor-tant. New technologies, e.g., information;old technologies used in new ways, e.g.,ballistic missiles; and new operationalconcepts, e.g., precision strike, provideopportunities for the U.S. and other statesto change the way combat occurs. With theglobal spread of technology and knowl-edge, the U.S. can no longer remain confi-dent that it will be the only power to adoptthese. Meanwhile the understandabledecline in the defense budget requiresmore innovative use of remainingresources to enable the U.S. to respond tothe variety of situations that may develop.

How innovation occurs in the militaryand in large organizations in general isnot thoroughly understood. The militaryinnovations of the 1920s and 1930s showthat great advances are possible, even in

periods of austerity such as the one DoD isnow entering. Budgets influence, but donot dictate, the rates of innovation. Anddespite the enthusiasm of technologists,history suggests that it is not the inven-tion of new science or devices that consti-tutes innovation. Invention provides newsystems, but systems have little utilityuntil the accompanying doctrine is devel-oped, the operational practices areingrained into soldiers and their leaders,the accompanying strategy is developedand the invention is deployed so that polit-ical and military leaders alike become con-vinced it will work.

If innovation involves more than themere appearance of an invention, thenattempts to foment or accelerate the ratesof innovation require more than just fund-ing science. Moreover, understandingwhat causes innovation should suggestactions that military organizations andpeople of all ranks could use to effectchange. In an attempt to understand whatthese factors might be, the authors haveexamined the steps and missteps taken inacquiring and incorporating into the Armytwo major weapons of this century: thetank and the helicopter.

Main battle tanksFrom World War I through the Korean

War — a span of almost 40 years — theU.S. Army struggled not only with the

Tanks and Helicopters: Factors Influencing the Rate of Innovation

by Guy M. Hicks and George E. Pickett Jr.

October 1994 35

development of the tank but also with itsintegration into the Army force structure.In contrast, by World War II several othernations had embraced the tank as a majorinnovation and an important battlefieldweapon. What are some of the reasons forthis difference between the U.S. and othernations?

U.S. tank experience on the battlefield,in exercises, in training, and throughexperimentation was limited during thefirst several decades of the tank’s existence.In early 1918, the U.S. Tank Corps wasestablished in France as part of the Amer-ican Expeditionary Force, but it saw limit-ed combat in the closing days of the war.By contrast, the British and the Frencharmies had used tanks for several years.

This lack of experience with the tanknot only limited direct observation andexperimentation under combat conditionsbut also led to an absence of a persuasivebody of knowledge from which to launchan aggressive research-and-developmenteffort and tactical evolution after the war.A major postwar evaluation of artilleryresulted in 50 pages of detailed guidelinesfor changes to artillery pieces and muni-tions. Guidelines for postwar tank devel-opment consisted of two pages of generalstatements.1

During the years following the war, fewopportunities existed for developing addi-tional experience using the tank. Experi-ments by George Patton and DwightEisenhower in 1919 and 1920 were clan-destinely conducted and terminated. Anexperimental unit formed in 1928 wasdisbanded after three months; anotherone formed in 1930 was disbanded afterseven months. In 1935 a test unit finallyachieved permanence. Between 1919 and1939, no tank was approved as a stand-ardized weapon, and until 1931, noexperimental model could be used inmaneuvers.

Bureaucratic infighting among Armybranches delayed the formation of anarmor organization. Competition for thetank and over its role emerged quicklyafter World War I. Dwight Eisenhowerdescribed in his memoirs the covert man-ner in which he, George Patton, and oth-

ers went about experimenting with tanksat Camp Meade in 1919 and 1920. Overthe course of a year, Eisenhower and Pat-ton, both tank company commanders, con-ducted daily field experiments in tactics,followed by evening discussions of the the-ories of armor deployment. Their findings,which were based on their field trials,were accepted for publication in severalmilitary journals. The reaction was swift.Eisenhower was called before the Chief ofInfantry and was told that his ideas werenot only wrong but dangerous, and thathenceforth he would keep them to himself.Particularly, he was not to publish any-thing incompatible with solid infantry doc-trine. If he did, he would be hauled beforea court-martial.2

Various study boards unanimously rec-ommended that “tanks should be recog-nized as infantry-supporting and infantry-accompanying weapons and be organizedfor association with, and for combat aspart of, an infantry command.”3 Congressthen abolished the Tank Corps throughthe National Defense Act of 1920 and for-mally assigned tanks to the infantry.

Conflict between the infantry and thecavalry continued throughout the 1920s.Both branches vied for control of the sys-tem, insisting that the tank’s primaryresponsibility was to support their respec-tive views of mechanized warfare. Thecavalry was interested in making the tanklight and swift and adapting it to standardhorse cavalry tactics. The infantry wasinterested in designing a tank that wouldsupport infantrymen on foot. It wouldhave to be slow-moving and equipped with

Eisenhower was called before the Chief ofInfantry and was told that his ideas were notonly wrong but dangerous, and that henceforthhe would keep them to himself. Particularly, hewas not to publish anything incompatible withsolid infantry doctrine. If he did, he would behauled before a court-martial.

36 Special Warfare

heavy armor.4Senior leadership in the Army did not

provide consistent support for the develop-ment of armor. At the close of World WarI, Secretary of War Newton Baker andArmy Chief of Staff Gen. Peyton Marchsought independent status for a tankcorps. John J. Pershing, commanding gen-eral of the American Expeditionary Force,vigorously opposed this move and arguedthat tanks should become an adjunct tothe infantry. To bolster his position, Per-shing organized a number of reviewboards to evaluate the lessons of the warand to make specific recommendationsthat the tank be assigned to the infantry.

In 1927 Dwight Davis, secretary of war,observed field maneuvers conducted bythe British Experimental MechanizedForce. Impressed with the demonstration

of mobility and firepower, Davis broughtabout the creation of a small but similarforce in 1928 to conduct tests. To encour-age experimentation, he ordered the com-mander of the newly formed tank unit toignore all regulations prescribing organi-zation, armament and equipment. Theunit, however, was disbanded after athree-month test.

Davis then appointed a planning boardto review long-range mechanizationoptions. In late 1928, the board releasedits report, which called for an invigoratedmechanization program and the establish-ment of a separate tank corps. The reportbrought immediate resistance from theArmy chief of staff, who argued that estab-lishing a tank corps would retard develop-ment of the tank for its intended missionas “an auxiliary to the infantryman.”

Another experimental mechanized forcewas established in November 1930. Butafter only seven months, it was disbanded

by the new chief of staff, Gen. DouglasMacArthur, because of decreasing fundingfor Army weapons and President Hoover’sintention to propose a ban on all offensiveweapons.

Budget constraints caused by demobi-lization and shrinking defense funds ham-pered the tank’s development. Congressabolished the Tank Corps in 1920 partlyon the basis of cost. During hearings onthe measure, several congressmen voicedstrong opposition to the creation of anoth-er branch because of the large fixed costsand the overhead associated with anyorganization. Throughout the interwarperiod, from 1920 to 1940, budget prioritywas given to maintaining the numbers ofpersonnel in the force. Research anddevelopment typically received less thantwo percent of the total Army budget.

The ordnance budget, from which thetank was funded during the period, wassubdivided into 21 separate categories.The amount spent on artillery was 10times greater than that allocated to tanks;even small arms received more funds thanarmor. R&D levels fell consistentlythrough the 1930s, affecting all weaponssystems, especially tanks. From 1925 to1939, the average annual budget for tankdevelopment was $60,000, barely enoughto purchase and test one tank prototype ayear.5

Research and development seem to havebeen hampered less by technology than byother factors. Technology-related chal-lenges obstructed tank design from 1920to 1940. User-established requirementsconflicted with the state of technology —objectives for armor thickness and calibersof guns could not be met within the estab-lished weight limit, for example. Specificperformance requirements for subsystems,e.g., suspension, power plants and trackdesign, also required significant technicaladvances.

In developing new tanks, the Army’sdesign organization — the OrdnanceCorps — complied with requirements stat-ed by the infantry and (during World WarII) by Army ground and armor forces.Attempts to diverge from stated require-ments and to pursue more innovative

In contrast to 40 years of tank evolution, theArmy’s use of helicopters progressed in about15 years from a small effort involving a few highly specialized units to an essential weaponsystem incorporated into all major combat units.

October 1994 37

designs were limited and unsuccessful.For example, in the early 1920s the officialstated requirement for a light (five-ton)and a medium (15-ton) tank led the Ord-nance Corps to terminate its developmentof a heavier tank.

Even during World War II, as the U.S.faced losses from better-armed and better-protected German tanks, the introductionof more powerful tanks was delayed byArmy policies. At that time, the Army wascommitted to standardizing the M-4 Sher-man tank, even though that tank lackedthe caliber of gun and the thickness ofarmor to combat newer German tanks.This commitment was based upon strongsentiments that a standard tank was moreimportant because of the intercontinentaldistances separating the European battle-field from maintenance facilities in theU.S. and because of Army acquisition poli-cies that new designs not be provided tocombat units until after they had been rig-orously evaluated and standardized.Heavier tanks, which were ready to besent to overseas Army units in 1942, wereheld back. Not until early 1945 did combatunits begin receiving the stronger M-26Pershing.6

The technical challenges do not appearto have hampered the Army’s adoption ofarmor warfare as much as Army acquisi-tion policies, mercurial top-level supportand conflicts between branches.

HelicoptersIn contrast to 40 years of tank evolu-

tion, the Army’s use of helicopters pro-gressed in about 15 years from a smalleffort involving a few highly specializedunits to an essential weapon systemincorporated into all major combat units.In 1950, the Army had only several hun-dred aircraft of all types (helicopters andfixed-wing aircraft). By 1960, it had sev-eral thousand helicopters and had begunreorganizing its combat units to incorpo-rate them. By 1964, it had begun to buildthe 1st Air Cavalry Division entirelyaround airmobility.

This transition was one of the most rev-olutionary changes in the Army’s

approach to conventional war during the40 years following World War II. It addeda third physical dimension to the battle-field, changed the notion of time and dis-tance for unit commanders, affected most,if not all, of the Army’s branches andaffected the allocation of funds within theArmy by adding a new category of sys-tems. These changes took place not only inthe face of potentially divisive internaldisagreements, but also in the face of sub-stantial resistance from the Air Force.How was this accomplished?

Opportunities occurred for the heli-copter’s utility to be unambiguouslyobserved. The value of helicopters wasseen clearly during the Korean War. Smallhelicopters for use in liaison and medicalevacuation arrived in December 1950. TheMarines were the first to use the heli-copter to transport combat troops into anattack, and they demonstrated its utilityin resupplying units under fire.7

Impressed by the Marines’ use, Gen.Matthew Ridgway requested in November1951 that the Army provide four heli-copter transport battalions, each with 28helicopters. He also recommended that sixmore battalions be added later.

The Army was committed to airmobilityeven before a proven troop-carrying heli-copter was in production. The helicopter’sadvantage in medical evacuation, aerialobservation, general transportation, andcommand and control also supported theprincipal roles of the various Armybranches. In Korea, helicopters airliftedmore than 15,000 of the 23,000 medevaccasualties.8

Technical problems that could haveslowed the adoption of helicopters weresolved. The helicopter was used brieflynear the end of World War II, but techni-cal limitations constrained its utility. Inthe 1950s, as new uses for the helicopterwere being identified, technology wasdelivering the performance increasesneeded for evolving missions. Moreover,technological improvements were easingthe challenge of training pilots and wereimproving safety records.

For example, the turbine engine provid-ed increased power-to-weight ratios and

38 Special Warfare

eliminated the need for a heavy clutch,thereby improving payloads, rates ofclimb, and service ceilings. Complexmechanical systems were replaced bysophisticated power and servo-control sys-tems that eased the pilot’s load and madethe helicopter safer to fly. Advances inrotor head design and rotor RPM controlsincreasingly lifted the pilot’s burden ofhaving to delicately maintain constantrotor speed through different flightregimes. Finally, early helicopters hadrotor blades that were specificallymatched as a pair to each helicopter; if onewas damaged, both had to be replaced.Design and manufacturing standardseventually made blades interchangeable.9

Top-level support was given to theArmy’s adoption of helicopters. In 1950-

1951, the secretary and the undersecre-tary of the Army saw the potential inhelicopter aviation. The Army staffformed a small special-staff component tooversee helicopter development. Theprincipal activists on this staff workeddirectly for general officers who believedin air mobility and could influence others.The activists worked throughout most ofthe 1950s to strengthen helicopter avia-tion. In 1962 they were instrumental informing the Howze Board, which provid-ed the basis for a major expansion inArmy aviation.

Selection and training of junior andsenior officers was far-sighted. During theearly 1950s, senior officers realized that asuccessful Army aviation program wouldrequire general-officer support in theimmediate future and both junior- andgeneral-officer support in the long term.To place top officers with aviation experi-ence into the senior ranks, two specialflight-training classes for lieutenant

colonels and colonels were arranged in1955-1956. Officers Armywide wereencouraged to apply for the 24 slots. Amajor percentage of those who graduatedadvanced to the rank of general. In thelate 1950s and throughout the 1960s,additional promising colonels and generalswere sent to pilot training.

To ensure that the aviation program didnot founder because of the absence of goodyoung officers, Army policies were alteredto encourage their participation. In theearly 1950s, personnel policies preventedWest Pointers and ROTC graduates fromapplying for flight school until after theyhad completed several years of unitassignments. Often, these officers werethen too old to attend flight school.Because of resistance from the Army’schief of personnel, helicopter advocateswent directly to the vice chief of staff forthe creation of a regulation enablingyoung officers to select flight school upongraduation from college.

Aggressive and bureaucratically skill-ful advocates overcame organizationalobstacles. As new doctrinal and opera-tional concepts for helicopters were beingdeveloped, enthusiastic officers attempt-ed to ensure that each major branch inthe Army received a part of the action. Inthe late 1950s, helicopters were assignedto combat units belonging to manybranches. In a division, artillery receivedaircraft to conduct fire adjustment;armor received a cavalry unit of attackhelicopters; infantry received troop heli-copters; and all commanders receivedhelicopters to use in command and con-trol. In selecting officers for flight school,the Army made efforts to ensure that keybranches were represented in order toachieve support for Army aviationthroughout the service.

Opportunities were exploited. Generalofficers and key lower-ranking officersused opportunities to improve support forArmy aviation. During the 1940s and1950s, for example, bitter disagreementserupted between the Army and the newlyformed Air Force over their respectiveaviation roles. Their positions borderedon the extreme. One event that crystal-

Resistance tends to be closely related to thedegree to which a new idea ‘threatens’ thebasic, historical orientation of a suborganiza-tion or poses new tasks that are difficult toaccommodate within a branch’s structure.

October 1994 39

lized the dispute occurred in a peacetimetraining incident in the early 1960s. AnArmy helicopter landed and loaded thecasualty; then an Air Force helicopterlanded, and its pilot ordered the casualtytransferred to the Air Force helicopter.Within a week this story had reachedRobert McNamara, who then convened ameeting between the chiefs and the secre-taries of both services. After three hoursthey emerged with notes on generalagreements, which Army and Air Forceaction officers pressed into final formover a week’s time.

AnalysisThe innovations of tanks and heli-

copters are very different events, occur-ring at different times in the 20th century.The Army that adopted the helicopter dur-ing the 1950s was a larger, more experi-enced, and probably broader, intellectualinstitution than it was in the 1920s and1930s. Hardware and technology weremuch more a part of its portfolio, and itspotential opponents and conflict arenaswere more distinguishable. The helicopterbenefited from this and from its inherentlack of threat to the core competencies ofthe combat branches.

On the other hand, the histories ofthese two systems appear to share com-mon threads in the roles of leaders, fol-lowers, organizations, resources and tech-nology. These similarities, in turn, sug-gest some notions about the actions thatinfluence the rate at which an innovationis implemented. Although these conclu-sions are listed below in an Army context,they appear to have a broad applicationto other organizations.

• Top-level support is important to therate of progress. Indeed, depending uponthe degree of resistance, top-level supportmay have to be quite active to ensurethat an innovation is not slowed or haltedby opposition, benign neglect or strictadherence to old bureaucratic procedures.

• The support of internal organizations,such as the different branches of theArmy, must be gained. Resistance tendsto be closely related to the degree to

which a new idea “threatens” the basic,historical orientation of a suborganiza-tion (e.g., the cavalry’s focus on horses) orposes new tasks that are difficult toaccommodate within a branch’s structure(e.g., ordnance at one time did not ade-quately support helicopter maintenancebecause it had no appropriate organiza-tion to which to assign the function).

• An aggressive set of advocates —“change agents” — must perform effective-ly . Advocates provide the energy fordeveloping new operational concepts, forlocating resources, for overcomingbureaucratic resistance and for providingthe long-term health of the innovation.They fight the day-to-day struggle for aninnovation, which top-level leaders usual-ly cannot do, and may even have to act inconflict with rules and regulations.

• An adequate number of capable per-sonnel must be provided for the near andthe long term. In the near term, the topranks must be “inoculated” in order toprotect and enhance the innovation.Lower-ranking personnel must be trainedto execute the changes needed, to ensurethat the innovation performs well in itsfirst appearances and to provide the corefor future senior leaders.

• The rate of innovation will be directlyaffected by the speed with which the newsystem, concept or idea is placed with oper-ating personnel and units. Early experi-mentation on an innovation placed withoperational units provides several criticalinputs to the advancement of that innova-tion. First, it engenders new concepts foremployment. Second, it provides practicalfeedback that can be used to affect systemdesign. Third, it foments thinking andenthusiasm among people who will laterbe in positions to influence the pace andthe nature of the innovation.

• The rate of progress in technology hasto be sufficient to keep pace with the evo-lution of conceptual thinking and organi-zation, but it will not necessarily causethe innovation to move faster. Technologycan act as a catalyst in the developmentof a major innovation. If technology pro-vides answers to technical problemsfaster than the organization, the people,

40 Special Warfare

and the doctrine are prepared to absorb,then the pace of innovation will not beaccelerated. However, if technology failsto advance rapidly enough to keep pacewith these other factors, it can slowprogress.

• The creation or the use of opportuni-ties is important in testing innovations,developing support for them and overcom-ing obstacles. Crises, combat missionsand exercises provide opportunities togather data, to develop ideas, and to testconcepts and systems. In some circum-stances, a crisis is essential in providingunambiguous data high enough in theorganization to overcome existing andsubstantial bureaucratic resistance.When opportunities do not occur, advo-cates may try to create them. Recognizingthe importance of opportunities andexploiting them when they occur may bea key difference between slower andfaster adoption of innovations.

• Establishment of operational unitsand high-level staff organizations isimportant in preserving an innovation.Staffs provide a place for advocates whocan use their charter as the basis forskillfully maneuvering an organizationinto accepting an innovation. Operationalunits — even if experimental — providethe means by which to test and developthe innovation, to create opportunities fordemonstrating the change, and to build acadre of enthusiasts. Moreover, unitsrequire bases, logistics support, person-nel assignments, special regulations andtraining. Many of these functions are cen-trally controlled within the Army, andhaving to respond to the needs of anexperimental unit may bring aboutimplicit support for its existence.

• Budgets, like improvements in theunderlying technology, are a necessarybut not sufficient condition for successfulinnovation. The presence of funds cannotnecessarily overcome technical obstaclesthat only time-consuming and diverseactions of research and development willalleviate. Nor can funds overcomebureaucratic barriers that have not beenovercome by advocates, practical expo-sure and other factors. Indeed, one might

contend that the critical constraint ininnovation is neither money nor technolo-gy. It is time — as expressed in reducingbarriers internally, waiting for or creat-ing opportunities and providing the rightpeople to apply the innovation.

The examples of the tank and the heli-copter demonstrate that a major risk tosuccessful innovation lies in simple viewsabout what is essential to success. Tech-nology is a necessary but not sufficientcondition. Limited budgets will not neces-sarily terminate an effort. Although top-level leadership is critical, its presencedoes not guarantee success. The key issueis not the presence or the absence of eachof the above nine items, but rather theirmix and context. Organizations thatemploy more of the above factors willprobably move more rapidly in adoptingchanges than those which do not.

Guy M. Hicks is the man-ager for business develop-ment and planning in theInternational BusinessGroup, Simulation Divisionof Evans and Sutherland, acomputer and simulationcompany located in Salt Lake City, Utah.Prior to his current position, he was asenior analyst in the Northrop GrummanCorporation Analysis Center in Washing-ton, D.C. from 1986 to 1993. He has heldseveral government positions with both theexecutive and legislative branches. From1981 to 1982, he was an intelligence ana-lyst in the Defense Intelligence Agency.From 1982 to 1986, he served as a staffmember of the Foreign Operations Sub-committee of the U.S. House of Representa-tives Appropriations Committee. Commis-sioned as an Infantry officer in 1978, heserved 10 years in the Army Reserve andheld various company and battalion posi-tions, including executive officer, trainingofficer and platoon leader. His last assign-ment while in the Army Reserve was as ateam leader in A Co., 2nd Battalion, 11thSF Group. He received a bachelor’s degreefrom the University of Utah and a master’sdegree from the University of Michigan.

October 1994 41

George E. Pickett Jr. iscurrently director of theNorthrop Grumman Corpo-ration Analysis Center inArlington, Va. A graduate ofYale University and the Har-vard Business School, heserved in the U.S. Army for 12 years invarious command and intelligence posi-tions. He was assigned to the NationalSecurity Council and the Office of the Sec-retary of Defense in the Net AssessmentOffice in the early 1970s and has pub-lished several articles on net assessment,competitive strategies and long-termdefense policy. In the mid-1970s he was thesenior staff member of the Senate Intelli-gence Committee responsible for the bud-gets of tactical and certain national-intelli-gence programs. For the past 14 years hehas held various positions in privateindustry as a systems engineer and sys-tems planner. At the Northrop GrummanCorporation, his principal responsibilitiesare in threat analysis, defense planningand industry strategy.

Notes:1C.L. Green, H. Thomson and P. Roots, The Ord-

nance Department: Planning Munitions for War(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,1955), pp. 169-70, 189-92.

2Dwight D. Eisenhower, At Ease (New York: Dou-bleday and Company, 1967), p. 173.

3G.F. Hofmann, “The Demise of the U.S. TankCorps and Medium Tank Development Program,”Military Affairs (February 1973):20.

4Arthur J. Alexander, Armor Development in theSoviet Union and the United States (Santa Monica,Calif.: RAND Corporation, at the request of theDirector of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary ofDefense, 1976), p. 67.

5Green, p. 195; and R.A. Miller, “The UnitedStates Army During the 1930s” (Ph.D. dissertation:Princeton University, 1973), p. 10, as quoted inAlexander.

6Green, pp. 278-87.7Bill Siuru, The Huey and Huey Cobra (Pennsylva-

nia: Tab Books, 1987), pp. 5-8.8Michael J. Taylor, History of Helicopters (New

York: Hamlyn Publishers, 1984), p. 111.9Siuru, pp. 9-16.

42 Special Warfare

Army leadership doctrine is definedin FM 100-5, Operations: “The mostessential dynamic of combat power

is competent and confident officer andnoncommissioned officer leadership. ... Nopeacetime duty is more important for lead-ers than studying their profession, under-standing the human dimension of leader-ship, becoming tactically and technicallyproficient and preparing for war.”

This doctrine is the foundation uponwhich the Army’s leader-developmenteffort was established. For the past 15years, the Army has used its MilitaryQualification Standards program to cap-ture the essence of what is critical to anofficer’s career development and to inte-grate it into the officer corps. The MQSconcept recognized the value of preserv-ing the wisdom and the experience of thecurrent generation, presenting it toemerging leaders early in their develop-ment, and providing junior officers withthe essentials for career progression.

Now MQS is changing to Officer Foun-dation Standards. More a redesign than arevision, the change is the first steptoward eventual improvement. We havechallenged our assumptions and havediscovered that although what we are

doing is right, we must improve themethods and the techniques by which wedo it.

MQS historyMQS resulted from a 1978 study, the

Review of Education and Training for Offi-cers, which determined that officersrequired a standard set of military skills,knowledge and education in order to besuccessful in the military. The study alsooutlined three MQS levels: MQS I for pre-commissioning, MQS II for lieutenantsand MQS III for captains.

During the next six years, the ArmyTraining and Doctrine Command devel-oped and fielded MQS I for commissioningcandidates. Two more years were requiredfor TRADOC to develop common-core sub-jects for officer basic and advanced cours-es. Both OBC and OAC common coresserved as foundations upon which theMQS II Common Manual was developed.The OAC common core also served as thefoundation of the MQS III Common Manu-al for captains.

In 1987, the deputy commandant of theArmy Command and General Staff Collegeconducted the Leader Development Study,the results of which became the Army’sLeader Development Action Plan. Underthis plan, MQS was further defined as asystem to qualify officers for branch-

MQS Evolves Into Officer Foundation Standards

by Lt. Col. Thomas G. Sterner and Carol M. Bushong

Based on Col. Sterner’s MQS article thatoriginally appeared in the Summer 1994issue of Army Trainer.

October 1994 43

required duties at particular grades and tointegrate the training and educationalefforts of officers, unit commanders andthe Army’s education system. It also modi-fied the MQS levels, combining lieu-tenants and captains into MQS II and rec-ommending that MQS III include majorsand lieutenant colonels.

Under the plan, MQS had two compo-nents, the military-task-and-knowledgecomponent to identify battle-focused tasks,and the professional-military-educationcomponent to set standards for profession-al development. The military-task-and-knowledge component for MQS II includescommon manuals for company-grade offi-cer critical tasks and branch manuals forbranch qualification. Two branch manu-als, Special Forces and Civil Affairs, arerelevant to Army SOF.

The SF branch manual describes bothSF and Infantry tasks critical in planningand executing SF missions. It comple-ments the training in officer advancedcourses and in the SF QualificationCourse. Originally distributed in 1991, theSF branch manual will begin its revisionprocess in May 1995. Revision will be com-pleted in September 1996.

The Civil Affairs branch manualdescribes those tasks critical for CA cap-tains and complements the CA OfficerAdvanced Course. Because CA units sup-port general-purpose forces across theoperational continuum, CA captains mustknow SOF tasks and retain the conven-tional skills of their accession branch. TheCA branch manual is scheduled for com-pletion in May 1995 and distribution inJune 1995.

By 1990, MQS responsibilities had shift-ed from the Combined Arms CommandTraining Activity to the Center for ArmyLeadership. TRADOC Regulation 351-12,Military Qualifications Standards SystemProducts, Policy, and Procedures (August1991) designated the Center for ArmyLeadership as the executive agent forMQS.

In August 1993, the MQS III manual formajors and lieutenant colonels was pub-lished. Unlike MQS I and II, MQS III doesnot contain tasks; it describes broad

knowledge areas required of majors andlieutenant colonels, based on the curriculaof courses at the Army Command andGeneral Staff College and the Army WarCollege.

But even as the MQS III manual wasbeing edited for publication, the Army’ssenior leadership expressed concerns thatunlike ARTEP mission-training plans, theSoldier’s Manual of Common Tasks, andthe family of how-to-fight manuals, MQSdid not seem to be making a difference toindividual officers and unit commanders.They directed a thorough study to deter-mine whether the Army should continueMQS.

MQS studyOnce the study was directed in June

1993, the Center for Army Leadershipbegan an internal evaluation of the MQSand developed an action plan to carry outand complete the study.

During the relook, 3,171 officers, fromlieutenants to lieutenant colonels, partici-pated in an MQS survey. The surveyexamined their understanding of MQS;their perceptions of its usefulness; andtheir opinions about the quality of MQSproducts, the importance of MQS and MQStasks, and the availability of manuals.

The last element of the study was aconference to examine what worked andwhat didn’t work about MQS and tomake recommendations to the Army chiefof staff. Attending the conference wererepresentatives from 19 service schools,the four commissioning sources, DA,TRADOC, the Army Training SupportCenter, CAL, the Warrant Officer CareerCenter and the U.S. Army SergeantsMajor Academy.

The group recommended that the Armyupdate MQS I and revise MQS II. It alsoadvised keeping the MQS II branch prod-ucts, but allowing each branch comman-dant to determine their content and whenthey should be revised. MQS III was toonew to evaluate. Next, the group recom-mended that MQS verification testing beeliminated and that a new purpose state-ment describe MQS as “A system that

44 Special Warfare

standardizes officer common institutionaltraining and provides a tool for use inoperational assignments and self-develop-ment. It supports officer training andleader development.”

The group also recommended a funda-mental shift of MQS’s equal emphasis onthe three pillars of leader development —institutional, operational and self-develop-ment — to the institutional pillar alone.The group determined that MQS could beuseful in assisting the other two pillars.

CAL added two additional proposals tothe recommendations on MQS: that theArmy use an electronic medium, such asCD ROM, to publish the next MQS prod-uct, and that the Army change the name“military qualification standards” to “offi-cer foundation standards.” The first rec-ommendation would offer reduced cost andelectronic linkage with other trainingproducts; the second recommendationwould more clearly identify the officeraudience and better describe the pro-gram’s intention to provide “foundation”studies.

OFSOFS will be more than simply made-

over MQS. Besides focusing on institution-al leader development, OFS will manageall common training within the officereducation system, combining the formerMQS common-core and the military com-mon training into a consolidated commoncore.

Programs of instruction for all officerbasic and advanced courses comprise sev-eral major subject groups, including com-mon-core tasks and professional-knowl-edge areas described in the MQS II Com-mon Manual; branch subjects defined byeach branch commandant; subjects com-mon to two or more service schools (sharedtasks); and other subjects which do not fallinto any of these categories. These sub-jects are collectively known as commonmilitary training.

During the March 1993 TRADOC Com-manders Conference, service schoolsexpressed concern about the manage-ment of common military training. With

the addition of new topics such as Armyfamily-team building and equal opportu-nity/sexual harassment, the number ofrequired subjects for training hadincreased, yet there was no single list ofrequired subjects or a means of manag-ing them.

With these concerns in mind, TRADOCdecided to use the MQS/OFS revision andredesign effort as an opportunity to reor-ganize under one system all of the com-mon military training.

The TRADOC OFS plan calls for devel-oping a single common-core list withinthe officer education system and desig-nating the CGSC as executive agent. TheWarrant Officer Career Center and theArmy Sergeants Major Academy willserve as executive agents for their educa-tional systems.

TRADOC Regulation 351-10, Institu-tional Leader Education and Training,will define each executive agent’s respon-sibilities. Until this regulation is pub-lished, scheduled for fiscal year 1995, theexecutive agents will be required toaccomplish the following:

• Conduct a task-site selection board toreview and validate the TRADOC-pro-posed common-core task list.

• Identify subjects on the list that arenot being trained.

• Recommend common-core changes.• Assess the quality of training-support

products developed by TRADOC-appoint-ed proponents and provide approval rec-ommendations to TRADOC headquarters.

The JFK Special Warfare Center andSchool has waited for an opportune timeto integrate Army special-operationsforces into conventional Army schools.This is being accomplished by makingARSOF integration part of common-coretraining for all officer advanced courses inTRADOC schools. A training supportpackage is being developed to explain SOFmissions, concepts of operation, and com-mand-and-control relationships, both inwar and in operations other than war.This training-support package, along witha videotape, will be sent to all officeradvanced courses for inclusion into theircommon-core curriculum. Active and

October 1994 45

National Guard ARSOF components willreceive an information copy of the video.

ChallengesThe challenges awaiting OFS are con-

siderable, but not unmanageable. The firsttask is to foster Armywide understandingof the change from MQS to OFS. The mes-sage should be continuously circulatedthrough many sources, beginning with theArmy’s senior leadership.

Changing any system is tough, but theMQS-to-OFS transformation will be eventougher in a downsized TDA Army. Whilethe TOE Army was methodically down-sized with a goal of not creating hollowunits, the TDA Army of TRADOC is stillbasically organized as it was when bud-gets and staffing matched authorizationdocuments. Yet many organizations aremore than 50 percent smaller than theywere when most existing training productswere developed.

Another concern is that DA civiliantraining developers have been virtuallyeliminated from many service schools. Thetraining-development mission, along withthe mission of writing doctrine, is now theresponsibility of military subject-matter-expert instructors. These circumstanceshave forced TRADOC to take advantage ofevery standardization and economy mea-sure available in developing and manag-ing training. After all, it requires as muchwork to develop a training product toteach 500,000 soldiers as it does to teach785,000.

As tasks are derived from subjects andas task lists are developed and approved,the resulting training products must berelevant, useful and high-quality.

OFS products must be developed forcompatibility with, and for use by, theAutomated Systems Approach to Training.This electronic, relational data base allowstraining products to be accessed by a vari-ety of users. More importantly, ASATtakes advantage of information-age tech-nology and moves our Army’s trainingmethods into the 21st century. For infor-mation on ASAT, contact the project man-ager, Maria R. Santillan, at DSN 927-4881

or commercial (804) 878-4881.OFS will provide TRADOC school com-

mandants with a central manager for allcommon-core tasks in the officer educationsystem. This should eliminate confusionconcerning what to teach without interfer-ing with a commandant’s prerogative todetermine how to teach. Subject-matterexperts will provide economical, standardtraining material to the schools.

By publishing OFS products in an elec-tronic format, TRADOC can distribute andrevise them at a fraction of the currentcost in time and money. Finally, as theArmy enters the information age, itstraining products will be readily availableboth to units and to individual officers.

For additional information, contact Lt.Col. Thomas Sterner at DSN 552-2127/2164 or commercial (913) 684-2127/2164.

Lt. Col. Thomas G. Stern-er is chief of the Leader Edu-cation and Training Develop-ment Division at the Centerfor Army Leadership, FortLeavenworth, Kan. His previ-ous assignments include ser-vice as an instructor at the Army Com-mand and General Staff College, as abrigade operations officer, as the G-3 andexecutive officer in the Berlin Brigade, asan Infantry company commander with the3rd U.S. Infantry (The Old Guard) and asa platoon leader with the 25th InfantryDivision. A graduate of the Army Com-mand and General Staff College, he holds abachelor’s degree from Old Dominion Uni-versity and a master’s degree from Spring-field College, Springfield, Mass.

Carol M. Bushong is aneducation specialist with theDirectorate of Training andDoctrine at the JFK SpecialWarfare Center and School.

H. Allen Holmes was sworn inon Nov. 18, 1993, as the AssistantSecretary of Defense for SpecialOperations and Low Intensity Con-flict. He had previously served asthe Ambassador at Large for Bur-densharing, responsible to thepresident for a more balancedsharing of security responsibilitiesand costs by NATO members,Japan, the Republic of Korea andother countries allied to the UnitedStates. He also served as AssistantSecretary of State for Politico-Mili-tary Affairs from June 1985 toAugust 1989. His foreign assign-ments include service as a politicalofficer in Rome from 1963 to 1967,as counselor for political affairs inParis from 1972 to 1974, as deputychief of mission in Rome from 1977to 1979 and as the U.S. ambas-sador to Portugal from 1982 to1985. Born in Bucharest of Ameri-can parents, he received a bache-lor’s degree from Princeton Univer-

sity and did graduate work at theInstitut d’Études Politiques of theUniversity of Paris. He served asan infantry officer in the MarineCorps from 1954 to 1957.

SW: What are your top prioritiesfor the office of the ASD-SO/LIC?Holmes: I think the number-onepriority from the standpoint of myoffice is to ensure that this extreme-ly valuable resource for our country,the SOF community, is properlyused in the pursuit of our nationalforeign-policy and security-policyobjectives in the new global envi-ronment. From the point of view ofsomeone who has spent most of hiscareer in the Foreign Service, butworking with the State Departmentand the Defense Department, I cansay that the talents and potentialcontributions of the SOF communi-ty have not been well-understood inthe past. That’s beginning tochange. I think that people

throughout our foreign-policy com-munity now understand that in thisnew global environment, special-operations forces are not only forcemultipliers in the military sense,but are also diplomacy multipliers.It is important that we make thecommunity well-understood as anational resource for modern, for-ward-looking diplomacy and thatwe ensure SOF are properlyemployed. We must also make peo-ple understand the limitations ofspecial-operations forces. Secondly,it’s extremely important that thespecial-operations community havethe resources to maintain the highstate of readiness and the talentsthat it now brings to the national-security arena. SOF must have suf-ficient resources to modernize theirplatforms, their equipment, theirweapons and the training for theirwarrior-diplomat missions. Here, Iwould place a strong emphasis oncultural-area training and language

46 Special Warfare

Interview:H. Allen Holmes,

Assistant Secretary of Defensefor Special Operations and

Low Intensity Conflict

training. Language training is veryexpensive, but given the require-ment for Special Forces, Psychologi-cal Operations forces and CivilAffairs forces to operate in foreignenvironments, I don’t think you canoveremphasize the importance oflanguage training.

SW: Do you think we need morelanguage and cultural training?Holmes: I would like to see more.I realize that in an era of shrink-ing resources, we don’t have muchslack. But to the extent possible, Iwould like to see a shift inresources to increase the trend wehave already started and to givespecial operators increased train-ing in language and area studies.

SW: Do you have other priorities?Holmes: I think another priority,in terms of the policy responsibili-ties of our office, is to fully inte-grate the two new mission areasfor which we have proponency.The first area is counterdrug poli-cy and operations, which is basi-cally the Defense Department’scontribution to the president’snational counterdrug strategy.The second is humanitarian andrefugee affairs. We now haveresponsibility for humanitarianand civic assistance, refugees, dis-aster relief and law-of-war issues.Once the new mission areas havebeen fully integrated, we mustensure that SOF missions conduct-ed in those areas are fully congru-ent with the policy.

SW: Do you think that in the futurewe’ll see any variations in the waySOF are used in humanitarian-assistance missions?Holmes: Yes, there’s one criticallyimportant humanitarian missionthat already has a high profile, andthat’s mine awareness and demin-ing operations. Various countriesare moving from a period of intense

civil warfare to a more stable kindof society — and I’m thinking ofplaces like Cambodia, Eritrea,Ethiopia and Mozambique. Thesecountries have been engaged incivil warfare for well over a genera-tion, and they are now groping toestablish a national identity andgoals of economic development andeducation for their people. Butthey’re finding it difficult to accom-plish this, with so much of theirarable land littered with dangerousantipersonnel land mines. It’s esti-mated that as many as 100 millionland mines are scattered across theearth’s surface; they kill or maiman estimated 1,200 people permonth, mostly civilians. This is oneof the most fundamental humani-tarian missions that the UnitedStates can be involved in, and spe-cial-operations forces are alreadyshowing that they have a role toplay. Psychological Operationsforces, with policy direction andoversight from my office, are con-ducting mine-awareness programsin several countries, and I thinkthis is an area where a handful ofvery dedicated and skilled SOFpeople can have a multiplier effect.They can train trainers in thesecountries who can then fan out tothe villages and schools and thecountryside to teach their peoplehow to clear those fields and trans-form them from killing fields intoplanting fields.

SW: Our troops would not actuallyperform the demining operations?Holmes: No, our people would notbe involved in the demining opera-tions. They would be there to trainin two phases: First, they wouldtrain local trainers to conductmine-awareness programs. Thenthey would train these trainers toconduct demining programs. Ithink the demining phase is anexample of how SOF would com-bine with conventional forces —

they would probably need someexplosive-ordnance-disposal peoplefrom our regular armed forces toassist in that training.

SW: What do you see as our great-est challenge in conducting opera-tions other than war?Holmes: Certainly one of the majorchallenges to this administration ispeacekeeping operations. With theend of the Cold War and the growthof regional conflicts based on reli-gious and ethnic differences andterritorial disputes, the world iswitnessing an increase in civil-mili-tary conflict. The United States isthe remaining superpower, but asuperpower with finite resourcescannot be the court of last resort forevery problem that comes beforethe world community. We mustwork with the United Nations andother regional organizations, bothto try to cope with the outbursts ofregional strife and to allow theUnited States to be selective inthose conflicts that we intervene in,either on our own or in combinationwith other countries and the Unit-ed Nations. We are already seeingthe results of regional conflict inplaces such as Somalia and Bosnia,and there will be many, manyopportunities for the United Statesto intervene. We have to be veryselective in how we intervene, andwe’ve got to be smart about work-ing with the United Nations andother regional organizations toshare the burden of trying to estab-lish regional stability.

SW: Do you see a possibility forincreased use of combined SOFand conventional forces duringoperations other than war?Holmes: Absolutely. A primarystrategic function of SOF is toexpand the range of options avail-able to decision-makers con-fronting crises and conflicts belowthe threshold of war. SOF can sel-

October 1994 47

dom perform these missions with-out close cooperation with conven-tional forces. In fact, larger opera-tions short of war, such as thehumanitarian and peace opera-tions that have dominated head-lines of late, are primarily handledby conventional forces supportedby SOF. I think the indispensableSOF role in these operations isbetter appreciated now than everbefore. The succinct comment by asenior Marine commander aboutthe value of PSYOP in Somalia isa good example. “Don’t leave homewithout them,” he said.

Not only are SOF operationsincreasingly “joint,” they are alsoincreasingly “interagency.” Opera-tions other than war require a uni-fied national effort to ensure suc-cess; they must be intimately andcarefully coordinated with a vari-ety of U.S. government agencies.So in addition to an increasingappreciation for the necessity ofclose cooperation between SOFand conventional forces in opera-tions other than war, I see anincreasing requirement for SOF tobe especially attuned to and adeptat interagency coordination andcooperation.

SW: You mentioned that one prior-ity is to make sure we have theright resources for equipment andtraining. Do you think SOF willface significant budget issues overthe next few years?Holmes: Yes, I think we will. Sofar, the special-operations forceshave done relatively well in termsof maintaining the budgetaryresources needed, but increasing-ly, as domestic claims on ournational budget increase, we willhave to be very careful in the waywe use our resources. The num-ber-one requirement, of course, isto maintain readiness. It’s alsoimportant to maintain the forcestructure that we need in order to

accomplish the missions thatwe’re assigned. The third require-ment is the investment strategyfor the future. Unless we main-tain a technological edge in theequipment our forces use, we willnot be in a position in futureyears to maintain the readinesswe have today. It’s a balance thathas to be constructed betweenreadiness, force structure andmodernization, and it is some-

times difficult to effect the rightbalance. But we have to strugglewith it and come up with the cor-rect balance, so that we are fullyequipped for the future and sothat our forces have the skillsthat are required and the protec-tion they need to accomplish theirmissions.

SW: Have you changed your per-ception or your evaluation of spe-

cial-operations forces since youcame to the office of the ASD-SO/LIC?Holmes: Well, I’ve learned a lotmore about them. I already knewabout the commando side of thespecial-operations forces and thesuperb training, dedication andattitude of the special operators.But what I’ve been mostimpressed by, what I’ve learnedmost about, is the maturity of theSpecial Forces, PSYOP and CivilAffairs people. They represent amost impressive array of fieldexperience and training thatmakes them very valuable to thenation. As I said earlier, they arewhat I call diplomacy multipliers.It’s because of the talent, the expe-rience and the maturity of theseindividuals that I think they willbe called upon more and more tohelp in the conduct of our foreignrelations.

SW: Is there a message or a par-ticular point you’d like to commu-nicate to the people of the SOFcommunity?Holmes: I wouldn’t be so arrogantas to advise them. I would justcomment on how fortunate we areas a nation to have the people ofthe SOF community and to be ableto call on their skills and theirdedication. I’m constantlyimpressed by the spirit of team-work and the camaraderie thatmotivates this community and bythe selflessness and the dedicationof its people. They represent amodel, I believe, of behavior andattitude toward each other andtoward their country that is reallyexemplary.

48 Special Warfare

“Unless we maintain atechnological edge in theequipment our forcesuse, we will not be in aposition in future years tomaintain the readinesswe have today.”

Officer Career NotesSpecial Warfare

October 1994 49

Acquisition Corps offerseducation, advancement

SF warrant officers neededin National Guard

Each year a small number of Special Forces captains can be accessed intothe Army Acquisition Corps, which conducts activities associated with theacquisition of new weapons systems and related items. SF Branch nomi-nees are reviewed by an Army selection board. Those selected receive fullyfunded civil schooling in fields such as business administration, computerscience and engineering. AAC members are assigned one of three function-al areas — research, development and acquisition; automation; or contract-ing. Following advanced civil schooling, they serve in repetitive acquisitionassignments. The AAC career path includes opportunities for selection asproduct manager (battalion-command equivalent) and project manager(brigade-command equivalent). AAC officers can expect favorable promo-tion and command-selection rates. The AAC goal is for its SF branch offi-cers to work on SOF-support projects such as the acquisition of new SFequipment. Officers selected will not return to operational SOF assign-ments. The payoff of being selected into the AAC is advanced civil school-ing, excellent promotion and command opportunities and a challengingcareer vital to national defense and the SOF community. Interested officersshould contact Capt. Ernie Benner, SF Branch, at DSN 239-3175/8.

Special Forces warrant officers should check their next officer evaluationreport to ensure that their principal duty title is correct. Principal dutytitles are “assistant detachment commander,” “company operations war-rant officer,” “battalion operations warrant officer,” “group intelligencewarrant officer” and “group operations warrant officer.” The correct MOStitle is “Special Forces Warrant Officer.” The word “technician” is nolonger used because of its confusing connotations in foreign and joint envi-ronments. MOS 180A is also the only warrant MOS in the Army that is adirect ground-combat role. This role is not traditional for a “technician.”

A recent Army functional review showed a lack of growth in MOS 180A inNational Guard SF groups. The SF proponent encourages commanders inthese units to select and recommend NCOs with the potential, experienceand leadership ability for this challenging field. Prerequisites include theSF Operations and Intelligence Course and a minimum of three years’ A-detachment experience. Applicants must not be older than 42 (36 afterNovember 1995). The SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office is devel-oping policies for National Guard recruitment, growth and sustainment ofMOS 180A. It will assist warrant-officer aspirants and their commandersin their efforts to build a strong MOS inventory in the Guard. The point ofcontact in SOPO is the MOS 180A manager, CWO 3 Shaun Driscoll, phoneDSN 239-2415/9002 or commercial (910) 432-2415/9002. For NationalGuard warrant-officer recruiting information, call 1-800-638-7600, ext. 40.

Warrant officer MOS, duty titles separate

Enlisted Career NotesSpecial Warfare

50 Special Warfare

Additional skill identifier W3, special-operations target-interdiction oper-ations, has been approved, effective Oct. 1, 1994. To be awarded the W3ASI, soldiers must be graduates of the Special Operations Target Inter-diction Course and hold an 18B3 or 18C3 slot on an SF A-detachment orone of several coded instructor positions in the SWCS. Local personneland administration centers can award the ASI with an approved DAForm 4187 and a copy of the soldier’s course diploma. Soldiers with MOSsother than 18B and 18C may still attend the SOTIC course. Approval forASI Q8, tactical air operations, is currently pending at the U.S. TotalArmy Personnel Command. To be awarded the ASI Q8 if it is approved,soldiers must be graduates of the Joint Firepower Control Course con-ducted at Hurlburt Field, Fla., and be slotted in an 18B or 18E position atthe A-detachment level. An exception to policy has already been approvedby PERSCOM to permit CMF 18 soldiers to attend the course; the ArmySpecial Operations Command currently has several school allocations forfiscal year 1995.

The Total Army Personnel Command has approved a change to ArmyRegulation 611-201, which authorizes the award of skill-qualificationidentifier “D,” Civil Affairs, to soldiers in the reserve components. TheSQI requires completion of the Civil Affairs Operations Course and isrestricted to soldiers assigned to Civil Affairs units in positions codedwith MOSs other than 38000, Civil Affairs specialist. The change will bepublished in the October 1994 edition of Military Occupational Classifica-tion and Structure, Update 12-5. The next publication of unit authoriza-tion documents will reflect positions requiring SQI “D” training. For moreinformation contact Maj. Ron Fiegle, Special Operations ProponencyOffice, at DSN 239-6406 or commercial (910) 432-6406.

The chief of the SF Enlisted Branch, Capt. Adrian A. Erckenbrack, is con-cerned that SF enlisted soldiers understand the need to be increasinglycompetitive for promotion. “Since the Special Forces Branch was estab-lished in 1984, it has experienced rapid growth and taken on manyresponsibilities worldwide,” he said. “Its growth was governed by thebranch personnel manning and authorization document, or PMAD, thatestablished limits on the number of SF soldiers allowed in the Army.Since 1984, soldiers in Special Forces Career Management Field 18 haveenjoyed more rapid promotions because CMF 18 has had an operatingstrength less than that authorized under the PMAD. In short, there weremore positions authorized than there were qualified 18-series soldiers tofill them.” Because of this situation, the DA-select objective (the numberof CMF 18-series soldiers to be promoted by rank and MOS) for promo-

Target interdiction ASIapproved; tactical air

ASI pending

Civil Affairs SQI approvedfor RC soldiers

SF enlisted chief explainspromotion outlook

October 1994 51

tions into most grades has been faster than for most of the other series inthe Army. CMF 18 usually far exceeded the Army’s promotion average inranks E-6 through E-9 during its growth years. Master-sergeant promo-tion-board results released in April 1994 show how soldiers in CMF 18compared to those in CMF 11 (Infantry):

CMF 11 CMF 18Education (Avg) 12.8 years 13.3 yearsTime in service (Avg)16.6 years 14.2 yearsTime in grade (Avg) 5.0 years 4.5 yearsAge (Avg) 36.1 years 33.8 years

“From these results,” Erckenbrack said, “we can conclude that the CMF18 soldier selected for master sergeant is better educated, has less time inservice and grade and is younger than his CMF 11 counterpart. Thatsame trend was established in most 18-series MOSs throughout the SFgrowth period.” Now that growth period has ended. In most cases, SFstrength matches authorizations, and there are more soldiers in eachMOS and grade competing for promotion. “This will make future promo-tion selection rates more in line with the Army average, and selection forcareer-enhancing jobs such as the Joint Readiness Training Center, JFKSpecial Warfare Center and School, and staff assignments more competi-tive,” he said. “The bottom line is that the Special Forces branch is full ofthe best soldiers that the Army has to offer, and to compete for promo-tions, soldiers must do their best every day. Quality time on an ODA andother competitive assignments all add up to a well-rounded soldier infront of the promotion board.”

DA Pamphlet 600-25, Noncommissioned Officer Professional DevelopmentGuide, is being staffed by the Combined Arms Command for minor revi-sions to maintain uniformity with both officer and warrant-officer profes-sional-development guides. Chapters 13, 14 and 15 of the pamphletspecifically discuss Special Forces, Psychological Operations and CivilAffairs, respectively. The pamphlet is scheduled to be fielded by the endof calendar year 1994.

Army updating DA Pamphlet 600-25

Foreign SOFSpecial Warfare

52 Special Warfare

While North Korea’s economic problems and isolation grow, long-standingcharges of official drug trafficking continue to receive attention. In thisregard, the North Korean expansion of opium-poppy cultivation reportedin late summer of 1993 was believed to be linked to the intensified effortsof the late Kim Il-sung and his son, current North Korean President KimChong-il, to acquire hard currency. Some reporting has charged that theestablishment of a North Korean opium-processing plant was intended toproduce heroin and morphine for sale and distribution by North Koreancitizens living abroad, particularly in Japan. Under this scheme, thereports charge, drugs would be transported abroad by North Koreandiplomats, official delegations, ship crews, etc., and sold though North

Indian security challengedby narcoterrorists

Mexico forms new counterterrorist group

Drug trafficking may fundNorth Korean regime

Indian Prime Minister Narashimha Rao, concerned that instabilities cre-ated by ethnic, religious and criminal violence were threatening India’seconomic reform programs, has called for the establishment of modern-ized state police forces that are less dependent on the central securityforces for support. While cautioning in his July 1994 remarks that securi-ty forces had to respect human rights and avoid excessive measures, hestressed that the national integrity of India was threatened by a varietyof subversive forces. In particular, he noted the need to break the linkagebetween “narcoterrorism and the mafia,” which has contributed substan-tially to the country’s instability. Prime Minister Rao was probably refer-ring to the penchant of a number of separatist and terrorist groups inIndia and around the periphery to use funds generated by drug traffick-ing to support their various agendas and infrastructure. India continuesto be a challenge for internal-security approaches and practices becauseof its location near heavily productive and active drug-trafficking centersin southwest and southeast Asia; the diverse mix of ethno-national-reli-gious groups in the region; a host of separatist aspirations; and the inter-nal Indian drug cultivation, processing and trafficking activities.

Reports from Mexico indicate that the forming Grupo Antiterrorista, orGAT, numbers about 300 personnel and draws its members from the Fed-eral Judicial Police, the so-called Zorros (foxes) counterterrorist unit, theMexican Army and other agencies. The new unit (reported in a Spanish-language periodical to be trained by U.S., Spanish and Argentine special-ists) is intended to perform a range of missions dealing with hostage-tak-ing, terrorist and guerrilla violence and associated problems. Given therash of bomb detonations around the country, GAT is emphasizing trainingin explosives. GAT members are also trained to infiltrate subversive orguerrilla groups such as the Revolutionary Workers Party and the Zap-atista Liberation Army. Elements of the force may deploy and operate inteams. In a recent operation, elements of GAT were thought to be deployedto the Mexican states of Guerrero, Michoacan, Oaxaca, Jalisco and Chiapis.

October 1994 53

Korean residents of the targeted countries. Other countries thought to beon the receiving end of North Korean drug trafficking include China,France, Indonesia and Sweden. More recently, in June 1994, some NorthKorean citizens were arrested in the Russian far east while attempting tosmuggle eight kilograms of heroin. They were identified as part of a Rus-sian-North Korean “joint venture,” which was conducted without officialRussian authorization (as a number of North Korean business ventures ofthis sort have been in the past). The incident suggests that through crimi-nal enterprises, Russia remains a “privatized” source of revenue and sup-port for the North Korean regime.

Even before the final disintegration of the USSR, legislation in the fall of1991 established a border-troop force in the emerging state of Belarus.Since then, the growing but still critically undermanned force has recruit-ed substantial numbers of “professional” troops (vs. conscripts) and hasattempted to arm and equip them with high-quality material. Among theprincipal border problems identified by Lt. Gen. Yawgen Bacharow, theborder-troop commander, are drug and arms trafficking. The quantities ofdrugs, weapons, hard currency, metals, and other contraband seized areincreasing rapidly. The border-troop chief expressed the view thatBelarus seemed to be changing from a transit area for drugs being mov-ing elsewhere to a drug market itself. He also identified illegal immigra-tion as a particularly important problem. “People smuggling” and otherforms of illegal population movements have become a serious concern fora number of former Soviet states.

An announcement during the summer indicated that counternarcoticsoperation Poppy 94 had begun in the proclaimed “Republic of Mountain-ous Karabakh,” or RMK, formerly the USSR’s Nagorno-KarabakhAutonomous Republic. Bearing the same name as similar operations incentral Asia, Russia and elsewhere, Poppy 94 was said to involve bothRMK Internal Ministry and “army” elements. The objective of the opera-tion was to arrest cultivators, processors and sellers of opium productsand cannabis. Given the extremely limited resources of the new republic,it is certain that RMK’s version of Poppy 94 is quite modest. The republichas been a center of Armenian-Azeri conflict for some years, and it wasreported that when Armenian forces pushed Azeri units out of the area,Armenian criminals were quick to restore deserted poppy fields in aneffort to re-establish what had been a brisk, lucrative drugs-for-armstrade. Given that opium and other drug sales may constitute a source ofrevenue and support for some RMK individuals or organizations, thevigor with which the operation was pursued is unclear.

Belarus forms border troopsto combat smuggling

Armenian operation targets drug trade

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. of the Foreign Military Studies Office,Combined Arms Command, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

UpdateSpecial Warfare

Garrison new commanderof SWCS

Maj. Gen. William F. Garrisontook command of the Special War-fare Center and School during aceremony at Fort Bragg’s JFKMemorial Plaza on Aug. 4.

His predecessor, Maj. Gen. Sid-ney Shachnow, who commandedSWCS for two years, retired fromthe Army after 39 years of service.

“Maj. Gen. Shachnow haddemonstrated leadership and visionto a degree seldom found,” said Lt.Gen. J.T. Scott, commanding gener-al of the Army Special OperationsCommand. “All over the world, thesoldiers trained to his standard,and sharing his vision, are trainingand helping allied and friendlynations and people.”

Garrison formerly commandedthe Joint Special Operations Com-mand at Fort Bragg. “Maj. Gen.Bill Garrison has major challengesahead as we continue shapingArmy special operations and moveinto the 21st century,” Scott said.“He has demonstrated the ability tothink beyond the here-and-now andto move an organization into itsfuture, ensuring its relevance infast-changing and turbulent times.”

Ground broken for SOFMedical Training Center

Leaders of special-operationsforces broke ground at Fort BraggJuly 7 at the site of what willbecome the Special OperationsMedical Training Center.

Construction of the $17 millionSpecial Operations Medical Train-ing Center, or SOMTC, is sched-uled for completion in the summer

of 1996. The complex will be locat-ed on Kedenburg Street in theSmoke Bomb Hill area.

The SOMTC will provide resi-dent medical instruction for allspecial-operations forces. Current-ly Army Special Forces medicalsergeants are trained at FortBragg and at Fort Sam Houston,Texas. Medics from Navy and AirForce special-operations unitsattend their own courses.

“Resources used for separate(medical) programs can be used forother projects and training. This isa cornerstone of special-operationsjoint thinking,” said Gen. Wayne A.Downing, commander in chief ofthe U.S. Special Operations Com-mand, MacDill Air Force Base, Fla.

Since the 55-week SpecialForces Medical Sergeant Coursewill no longer be split between twoinstallations, money will be saved

in moving costs. “We will savemore than $2.5 million (a year) inPCS (permanent change of station)costs,” said Col. Richard Sutton,SOMTC’s commander and dean.

The 73,738-square-foot facilitywill contain 10 classrooms with a20- to 200-student capacity each, amedical library, 10 operatingrooms and a 136-room barrackscomplex. — SSgt. Keith Butler,USASOC PAO

SOF reserve units inactivated

Several special-operations unitsin the Army Reserve have recentlybeen inactivated as part of thedownsizing of U.S. military forces.

Two units of the Army SpecialForces Command were affected —the 11th SF Group was inactivatedAug. 28, and the 12th SF Groupwas inactivated Sept. 11.

The Army Civil Affairs and Psy-chological Operations Commandhad five units inactivated effectiveSept. 15 — the Headquarters andHeadquarters Company, 5th Psy-chological Operations Group; the16th PSYOP Company; the 244thPSYOP Company; the 351stPSYOP Company; and the 360thPSYOP Company.

USASOC names NCO, soldier of the year

The U.S. Army Special Opera-tions Command recently announcedthe winners in its NCO and Soldierof the Year competitions.

The NCO of the Year is SSgt.Jaime E. Vazquez of the U.S.Army Special Forces Command, acommunications and medical

54 Special Warfare

The Special Operations Medical Training Center

File photo

sergeant on an A-detachment inthe 5th SF Group at Fort Camp-bell, Ky. The Soldier of the Year isSpec. Tiffany A. Mapp, an automa-tion logistician in Co. B, SupportBattalion, 1st Special WarfareTraining Group, JFK Special War-fare Center and School.

Runners-up were Sgt. Robert B.Rossow, 6th PSYOP Battalion, 4thPSYOP Group, U.S. Army CivilAffairs and Psychological Opera-tions Command; and Spec. VirnaL. Reynoso, PSYOP DisseminationBattalion, also from the 4thPSYOP Group, USACAPOC.

Other competitors were Sgt.Richard C. Ayala and Spec. JamesJ. Hamlett of the 160th SpecialOperations Aviation Regiment;SSgt. Robert A. Trivino and Spec.William M. Walker of the 75thRanger Regiment; SSgt. Joseph A.Clark, USAJFKSWCS; and Spec.Joseph J. Gutierrez, USASFC.

SWCS seeks comments on CA manual

The Special Warfare Center andSchool is looking for commentsfrom the field regarding necessarychanges to FM 41-10, Civil AffairsOperations.

According to an upcomingchange to TRADOC Regulation 25-30, Preparation, Production andProcessing of Armywide Doctrinaland Training Literature, Armydoctrinal publications will bereviewed and revised as needed,according to Capt. Dennis Cahill ofthe Doctrine Division of the SWCSDirectorate of Training and Doc-trine. The rewrite of a manual isjustified only if a certain percent-age of it can be documented asincorrect or outdated.

Since FM 41-10 was publishedin January 1993, the regionalalignment of CA units, the conceptof military operations other thanwar, and lessons learned fromoperations and exercises havemade some portions of the manual

outdated, Cahill said.To justify a rewrite and to

ensure that changes incorporate awide variety of operational experi-ence, the SWCS Doctrine Manage-ment Branch is requesting inputfrom field CA units, Cahill said.Input should be submitted on DAForm 2028, RecommendedChanges to Publications andBlank Forms.

For more information, contactCapt. Dennis Cahill at DSN 239-6035 or commercial (910) 432-6035.

3rd SF Group receives new commander

Col. Mark D. Boyatt took com-mand of the 3rd Special ForcesGroup July 22nd, replacing Col.Philip R. Kensinger.

Maj. Gen. Harley C. Davis, com-mander of the Army SpecialForces Command, told Boyatt, pre-viously the chief of staff for theJFK Special Warfare Center andSchool, “You are taking commandof a magnificent organization. ...There are no time-outs here. Youhave to hit the ground running.”Davis praised the outgoingKensinger as a warrior and ascholar. “He forged a reputation asa tireless planner,” Davis said.

Conference to examineroles of SOF

The Fletcher School of Law andDiplomacy of Tufts University willsponsor a conference Nov. 15 and16 on the roles and missions ofspecial-operations forces in theaftermath of the Cold War.

The conference, co-sponsored bythe U.S. Special Operations Com-mand and the Institute for ForeignPolicy Analysis, will be held inCambridge, Mass. Topics willinclude sources of instability andconflict, U.S. regional security pol-icy and emerging SOF roles andmissions.

For information on registration,contact Freda Kilgallen; Fletcher

School of Law and Diplomacy;International Security StudiesProgram; Medford, MA 02155;phone (617) 628-7010, extension2736; fax (617) 627-3933.

Review under way for CivilAffairs MTPs

The Special Warfare Center andSchool has begun the review proc-ess necessary to produce a newseries of ARTEP Mission TrainingPlans for Army Civil Affairs units.

The new series will be revised tobetter meet the needs of CA units,according to Capt. Tamara Mus-grave-Cotcher of the ARTEPBranch of the SWCS Unit Train-ing Division.

One major change will be theconsolidation of similar units intoshared manuals; for example, thesubordinate detachments of theCA FID/UW battalion could becombined into one manual, Mus-grave-Cotcher said. This willreduce the redundancy of taskscommon to all units and will alloweach unit to better understandhow its mission fits into the CAorganizational structure.

Another change will be theinclusion of the CA general-sup-port battalion in the series of man-uals, either combined with theFID/UW battalion or in a separatemanual. A third change will be thescaling back of the survivabilitytasks available in the CommonCollective Tasks manual.

Revision is expected to takeapproximately three years, withthe first manual scheduled for com-pletion in late 1996. In revising themanuals, UTD will solicit com-ments from CA field units andother interested users, to refine theMTPs to meet the evolving CivilAffairs missions and environments,Musgrave-Cotcher said.

October 1994 55

56 Special Warfare

Eastern Approaches. By FitzroyMaclean. London: Penguin Books,1991. ISBN: 0-14-013271-6(paper). 543 pages. $13.

This reprint of the classic 1949memoir by British foreign-serviceofficer and Special Air Service gen-eral Fitzroy Maclean is probablymore relevant today than at thetime of its original publication.The book depicts the author’sexperiences as a diplomat in theUSSR of the late 1930s, as an SASofficer in North Africa and asChurchill’s personal representa-tive in Yugoslavia.

Assigned to the Moscowembassy in early 1937, Macleanrepeatedly penetrated the off-lim-its Central Asian republics. Oftenin disguise or shadowed by agentsof the NKVD (the embryonicKGB), Maclean survived captureand imprisonment through a com-bination of guile and audacity. Hisencounters with these Sovietagents are often amusing andalways instructive.

Maclean’s observations on therelationship between the centralgovernment and the various peo-ple among whom he traveled domuch to explain the subsequentbreakup of the USSR and providean excellent context for the eth-nic strife we see today. It is inter-esting to reflect on the potentialdividends an enlightened civilaffairs policy would have paid theGermans following OperationBarbarossa.

Leaving the foreign service in1939 to join his father’s regiment,Maclean was commissioned andposted to Egypt where he was

recruited by David Stirling intothe then-platoon-sized SAS. Heprovides an excellent account ofdesert warfare and operationsbehind enemy lines, with someinteresting insights on the effectsof sleep deprivation.

The last third of the book detailsMaclean’s experiences as a liaisonofficer in Yugoslavia and as a mili-tary adviser to Tito. Chapter 8contains a particularly enlighten-ing thumbnail history of theBalkans, which is highly profitablereading for those interested inunderstanding present conditionsthere. Maclean also gives an insid-er’s account of Tito as a guerrillaleader, political organizer andstatesman.

Maclean’s keen analysis is com-bined with an astute eye fordetail and a flair for description.The book is filled with amusing,sometimes hilarious, anecdotes.

Eastern Approaches containsmuch information of value todayfor soldiers, particularly those inMilitary Intelligence and specialoperations.

Maj. (P) Neil R. Porter Jr.U.S. Army Special Operations CommandFort Bragg, N.C.

Point Man: Inside the Tough-est and Most Deadly Unit inVietnam. By Chief James Watsonand Kevin Dockery. New York:William Morrow and Co., 1993.ISBN: 0-688-12212-4. 336 pages.$22.

Point Man , by retired ChiefPetty Officer James Watson andKevin Dockery, is the personalaccount of a young man’s Navycareer and his role in the earlyhistory of the Navy’s Sea, Air,Land special-operations force.Decisively influenced by theWorld War II service of a favoreduncle in the U.S. Army Rangers,as well as the teamwork andesprit de corps portrayed in thefilm “The Frogmen,” young JamesWatson leaves New Jersey in1955 to enlist in the Navy. Deter-mined to become a member of thefamous underwater demolitionteams, the UDT, Watson persistsuntil he, too, is a frogman.

Watson’s earliest naval serviceis as a young sailor in the fleet, hisrecognized talent as a bugle playerinfluencing his assignments.Never losing sight of his goal, how-ever, Watson persistently pursuesattendance to Underwater Demoli-tion Team Replacement training

Book ReviewsSpecial Warfare

October 1994 57

until he was accepted in the win-ter of 1959. In 1960, he completesUDTR as one of 18 graduates (outof an original class of 126) andbecomes a member of UDT 21.

The book melds its autobio-graphical and historical tones atthe event of the creation of a forceof maritime commandos, theSEALs. Watson is selected to joinSEAL Team Two as an originalmember, along with other well-known SEAL personalities such asMaster Chief Rudy Boesch. Fromthat point on, the identity and per-sona of James Watson, as cap-tured in Point Man, becomesessentially synonymous with thatof the SEALs. Who he is becomeswhat he is, a SEAL operator. Welearn almost anecdotally that hisfirst marriage ends in divorce andthat later, in the twilight of hiscareer, he remarries. Apart fromthat, we learn very little about thekind of man James Watson reallyis. Accurately or otherwise, theresult is a one-dimensional pictureof the author.

For several chapters, Watsonrecounts the challenges and diffi-culties that SEAL Team Two facedin standing up a new unit andpreparing it for war. Experimenta-tion with weapon types, trainingwith atomic demolitions and clan-destine intelligence-gatheringagainst friendly nations are someof the experiences Watson high-lights from those earlier days.

The reader also begins to get afeel for the “attitude” and leader-ship styles of these early SEALs,at least as remembered by Wat-son. Consistent throughout thebook, this attitude reflects a self-assured cockiness, consequences-be-damned assertiveness that wasundoubtedly born of confidence inone’s skills and capabilities.

The “good old days” for ChiefWatson mixed admirable loyalty toone’s primary social/tactical group-ing with an unabashedly con-frontational attitude toward essen-

tially everyone else. As could beexpected, this did little to winfriends or to positively influencepeople. Unfortunately, Watsonmisses a chance to send a signal tofuture SEALs on the change intoday’s professional climate.

More than half of Point Mandeals with Watson’s Vietnamexperience in Vietnam as part ofTeam Two, which included threetours of duty there beginning in1967. During the course of thesetours, Watson participated in mostof, if not all of, the various types ofoperations that SEALs conductedduring the Vietnam War. His

experiences ranged from being amember of a SEAL squad conduct-ing riverine special operations, tobeing an adviser to the South Viet-namese SEAL counterparts, tobeing a participant with theprovincial reconnaissance units inthe war against the communistinfrastructure. At what wouldhave been the end of his secondtour, Watson was severely wound-ed by the detonation of a recoveredViet Cong water mine. He recov-ered and returned for his thirdtour.

An easy read, Point Man willprobably appeal foremost to those

with a background or interest inthe SEALs. Although it does notcontribute significantly to existingliterature of how the SEALsfought in Vietnam, it nonethelessprovides another primary perspec-tive on what it was like to be andto fight as a SEAL in the riverineenvironment. In this vein, PointMan dovetails well with otherexisting books on the SEAL/river-ine war in Vietnam.

While Lt. Cdr. Cutler’s BrownWater, Black Berets provides astrong macro view of the riverinewar, it only touches on associatedSEAL operations. Lt. Cdr. Bosilije-vac’s SEALS; UDT/SEAL Opera-tions in Vietnam narrows the focusby detailing those operations. Wat-son’s tale, in turn, joins existingworks such as Darryl Young’s TheElement of Surprise: Navy SEALSin Vietnam, which provide thosefirsthand details, feelings andimmediate consequences felt bythe SEAL operators and theirbrown-water Navy counterparts.

Watson is justifiably proud ofhis membership and associationwith the SEALs, and of hisundoubtedly well-earned reputa-tion as a “hunter,” a warrior eagerto seek out the enemy and toaccomplish the mission regardlessof personal cost. Point Man isworth reading by any soldier,sailor or airman for an insight intothat kind of dedication to duty.

Maj. John F. MulhollandFort Bragg, N.C.

Department of the ArmyJFK Special Warfare Center and SchoolATTN: AOJK – DTP – BFort Bragg, NC 28307 – 5000

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