Special WarfareThe Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

PB 80–96–3 August 1996 Vol. 9, No. 3

From the CommandantSpecial Warfare

There is much ongoing discussion of therevolution in military affairs and the impactit will have on our military forces and on ourdecisions about how we will wage war.

Certainly, advances in technology willhave profound effects on our operations,effects which we are only partially able toappreciate at this time. Other factors to con-sider are the effects that world politicaldevelopments will have on United Statesinterests and how the U.S. will respond. Thenumerous ongoing and potential changespresent a bewildering array of variables topolicy-makers and military planners.

In this issue, Brian Sullivan compares thecurrent situation to someone moving back-ward into the future, able to see clearly onlywhat has past, incompletely aware of what ishappening, and altogether unable to see intothe future. He suggests that the best one cando is to analyze current trends and drawanalogies from history. Regarding the currentrevolution in military affairs, Sullivan saysthat history contains many RMAs that haveproduced new theories, new weapons and newways of waging war. Although the currentRMA promises to greatly increase command-ers’ awareness, history is also replete withexamples of defeated commanders who werewell-supplied with information that theyfailed to understand.

The articles in this issue of Special Warfarecan increase readers’ understanding of a vari-ety of current issues and potential develop-ments. In addition to discussing the history ofrevolutions in military affairs, Sullivan exam-ines potential RMAs, including economicdevelopments in the Far East that could giverise to a more powerful and more influentialChina. Ambassador David Passage discussesissues in Latin America, such as the growth ofdemocracy and the increasing expectations ofthe lower classes, that could have a dramaticimpact on the U.S. Louis Beres shows howworldwide unrest, coupled with an increasedavailability of nuclear materials, could lead to

a deadlier form of terrorism.Should these developments require some

form of U.S. military operations, typicallythey will involve small-unit training, person-to-person contact, cultural awareness, intel-ligence collection or information dissemina-tion — the specialties that have alwaysmade SOF valuable.

As we anticipate developments and opera-tions, we must ensure that our special-oper-ations doctrine and structure are up-to-date.Steven Cook’s article explains how theARSOF capstone manual, FM 100-25, isbeing revised to include the latest evolutionsin SOF doctrine. But we must also remem-ber that some factors endure revolutions inmilitary affairs. Major Antulio Echevarriaargues that Clausewitz’s theories aredurable and adaptable to a changing envi-ronment. As we move into the future, ourunderstanding of events and the versatilityof SOF will allow us to find new ways ofemploying their unique capabilities.

Major General William P. Tangney

Features2 The Future National Security Environment: Possible

Consequences for Army SOFby Brian R. Sullivan

13 A New Approach to Latin America: The Role of SOFby Ambassador David Passage

22 Preventing Nuclear Terrorism Against the United States:10 Vital Questionsby Louis René Beres

30 A Wake for Clausewitz? Not Yet!by Major Antulio J. Echevarria II

36 Field Manual 100-25: Updating Army SOF Doctrineby Steven E. Cook

38 Logistics for Deployed Army Special Operations Forces: APathway to Supportby Lieutenant Colonel Philip E. Bradford, U.S. Army (ret.); MajorDavid C. Lawson; Chief Warrant Officer 4 John W. Fulcher; andSergeant Major Alvin Lester

Departments45 Letters48 Enlisted Career Notes50 Officer Career Notes52 Foreign SOF54 Update56 Book Reviews

PB 80–96–3 ContentsAugust 1996 Special Warfare Vol. 9, No. 3

Commander & CommandantMajor General William P. Tangney

EditorJerry D. Steelman

Associate EditorSylvia McCarley

Graphics & DesignBruce S. Barfield

Automation ClerkDebra Thomas

Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of theUnited States Army John F. Kennedy Special WarfareCenter and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its missionis to promote the professional development of special-operations forces by providing a forum for the examinationof established doctrine and new ideas.

Views expressed herein are those of the authors and donot necessarily reflect official Army position. Thispublication does not supersede any information presentedin other official Army publications.

Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited andshould be addressed to Editor, Special Warfare,USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000. Telephone:DSN 239-5703, commercial (910) 432-5703, fax -3147.Special Warfare reserves the right to edit all material.

Published works may be reprinted, except wherecopyrighted, provided credit is given to Special Warfareand the authors.

Official distribution is limited to active and reservespecial-operations units. Individuals desiring privatesubscriptions should forward their requests to:Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government PrintingOffice, Washington, D.C. 20402.

V E R I T A S

STREBIL

A

E T

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:Dennis J. ReimerGeneral, United States ArmyChief of Staff

Official:

Joel B. HudsonAdministrative Assistant to theSecretary of the Army

02669

Headquarters, Department of the Army

Predicting the national securityenvironment can be little morethan educated guessing. It is anenvironment influenced by devel-opments abroad, as well as bydomestic politics, the state of theUnited States economy, andchanges in American society. It isdifficult to understand such anenormously complicated set ofinterrelated factors, and to accu-rately predict how they will evolveinto a different state is impossible.About the best anyone can do is toguess which trends will continueand at what rates, to make analo-gies with events from history, andto rely on intuition.

We are taught to think of thefuture as being in front of us andthe past as being behind us, and we

picture ourselves walking into thefuture. But Marine LieutenantGeneral Paul Van Riper recentlypresented a view of the futurewhich may help us conceptualize ita bit better. He said that theancient Greeks thought of thefuture as behind them and pic-tured themselves backing into it.One cannot see directly behind, ofcourse, and the future is unseen.The Greeks imagined the immedi-ate past before them and the rest ofthe past in the background, grow-ing more hazy with increasing dis-tance. They thought of the presentas being around them, and theimmediate future as the vagueshapes perceptible in one’s periph-eral vision. They believed that peo-ple could best predict the future byattempting to ascertain its outlinesin the shapes of present events.What follows are the author’s pre-dictions based on the shapes in thepresent world.

Even though some sovereignstates are growing weaker, themost powerful actors in the futuresecurity environment are going tobe countries, not transnationalforces. Many of these states will beclustered in East Asia and SouthAsia. The economic growth rates ofChina, Korea, Taiwan, some of the

Southeast Asian countries and,most recently, India, are quiteimpressive — some have been inthe double digits for a decade orlonger. While such economicgrowth may eventually slowdown — as it has in Japan — itseems likely that it will continuefor a good number of years forthese “Asian tigers.” Meanwhile,the annual growth of the grossdomestic product, or GDP, of theU.S. has stayed in the 2-3 percentrange for more than 20 years. Inother words, the relative balance ofeconomic power is altering at arapid rate in favor of East Asia andagainst the U.S.

We need to stress the adjectiverapid. In the late 19th and early20th centuries, the U.S. and Ger-many enjoyed higher economicgrowth rates than did Britain. Thosehigher growth rates allowed theGermans to challenge the British fordomination of Europe in World WarI and allowed the U.S. to replaceBritain as the leader of the Westerndemocracies. But the difference inthose growth rates was minusculeby contemporary standards. From1870 to 1914, the British economygrew at a rate of about 2 percentper year, while the American andGerman economies grew at 3 per-

2 Special Warfare

The Future National Security Environment:Possible Consequences for Army SOF

by Brian R. Sullivan

This article is based on the paperpresented by the author at the 1996Special Forces Conference, held atFort Bragg in April 1996. It examinespast and future revolutions in mili-tary affairs and possible roles thatU.S. SOF could fill in the 21st centu-ry. The views expressed in this articleare those of the author and do notnecessarily reflect the policies of theUnited States government, theDepartment of Defense or the Nation-al Defense University. — Editor

cent. It was this 1 percent annualdifference, compounded, of course,that enabled the Germans and theAmericans to pull ahead of theBritish.

Our sense of the rate of historicalchange has been shaped by thoseevents. It is difficult for us to com-prehend that the balance of powercould be quickly overturned if thegrowth rate of a major power’seconomy surpassed our economy’sgrowth rate by 6, 7, 8 or 9 percent.But that may be happening. Theeconomy of the People’s Republic ofChina has been growing at 10-12percent per year for the past 15years or so. South Korea and Tai-wan are doing almost as well.Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia andeven Vietnam may soon be doingthe same.

Economic implicationsEven if the Chinese economic

growth rate slows to an averageannual rate of 7-9 percent, the PRCcould challenge the U.S. in econom-ic and military terms, and muchsooner than most of us might imag-ine. True, Chinese wealth would bedivided among more people thanours is — the average Chinese isunlikely to have a standard of liv-ing equal to that of the averageAmerican for a century or more.But what if the PRC economy con-tinues to grow at a rapid rate andBeijing devotes 5 or 6 percent of itsGDP to arms while we continue tospend 3 percent or less on defense?

Nazi Germany and the SovietUnion never had a GDP that wasmore than 40-50 percent of theGDP of the U.S., but by devotinga far larger percentage of theirnational wealth to armaments,they were able to challenge ourvery survival. By 1939, Hitlerwas putting about 25 percent ofthe German economy into warpreparations. In the 1970s and

1980s, the USSR was devoting15-18 percent — perhaps evenmore — to its military.

This is not to say that we aredoomed to an arms race with theChinese. Nor am I predicting thatthe PRC will follow a militaristicpath. The point is that sovereignstates will remain the primaryactors on the world stage andtheir interrelationships willchange at a speed far greater thanthat for which we are psychologi-cally prepared.

Domestic realitiesNot all Americans are attuned

to the security implications ofinternational economics, but themajority are acutely conscious ofeconomic realities at home. Per-haps most important is the grow-ing divide between the richest 20percent of the American popula-tion and the other 80 percent. Thelatter have had a stagnant ordeclining standard of living sincethe early 1970s. For the so-calledworking poor, working class and

lower middle class, life hasbecome increasingly difficult,even grim. Their understandableeconomic discontent is beginningto translate into social and politi-cal difficulties for the entire coun-try. Our political system, ourdomestic racial and ethnic rela-tions, our foreign and national-security policies, and our outlookon the world have been shaped bythe ever-rising prosperity thatmost Americans have enjoyedsince the founding of our republic.There have been exceptions, ofcourse. But even the GreatDepression lasted only 10 years.American history has had noprecedent of a prolonged incomestagnation or reduction stretch-ing more than 25 years.

How long can this continue untilsocial and political pathologieseven worse than those we havebeen witnessing begin to convulsethe U.S.? What political formmight the economic and social mis-eries of the majority of Americancitizens assume? Unless the aver-age American soon begins to enjoy

U.S. forces conduct a patrol in Somalia. American economic problems and reduced military budgets couldlead to a policy of isolationism that would make operations such as the one in Somalia less likely.

August 1996 3

Photo by Terry Mitchell

real improvement in his or herstandard of living, the unhappi-ness produced by prolonged eco-nomic stasis or decline will beginto affect our political system inunhealthy ways. We could witnessfar worse demagogues than wehave seen before. And demagogueshave a poor record of keeping thepeace — at home or abroad. Con-versely, we might see the return toisolationism and protectionism asan apparent solution to our eco-nomic problems.

Technology’s effectsTechnology is transforming our

lives at an increasingly rapidrate. Our personal lives have

been improved and disturbed bythe electronic devices that havebecome commonplace in ourhomes. Appliances invented tomake our lives easier and toincrease the pleasure of ourleisure time seem paradoxicallyto be adding to our anxiety. Inparticular, television has come torule our lives in a way that peo-ple in our grandparents’ daywould have found astonishing.Fewer and fewer of us seem toread or to think. Instead, we arepassively bombarded by thefrightening facts and fictionsprojected electronically into ourhomes. Objectively, we are farmore secure since the collapse ofthe Soviet empire, but many of usfeel more vulnerable as we wit-ness turmoil and distress in

much of the world around us.Our fears have been augment-

ed by intensified economic com-petition between domestic busi-nesses and between Americanand foreign companies. Here, too,we have turned to technology forhelp, but the technology that wassupposed to have increased pro-ductivity, incomes and the num-bers of jobs has often done theopposite. This is not meant toread like a diatribe by theUnabomber, but the pressures ofthe unprecedentedly rapidchange caused by technology doappear to be having seriouslynegative influences on Americansociety. Increasing cases of obesi-

ty, alcoholism, drug abuse,depression and hypertension aresome of the results.

Force reductionsThese influences on American

society pose a number of likely con-sequences for our military. Thedangers the U.S. may face in 15-20years are invisible to most Ameri-cans. On the other hand, currentproblems are not. Given the needto reduce the national debt and tolive within our national income,the resulting pressures on socialand welfare programs at a timewhen many Americans are in dis-tress, the absence of a major mili-tary threat, and the sense of mili-tary security brought about by theend of the Cold War and our victo-

ry in the Gulf War, another roundof reductions in defense spendingand force levels — possibly morethan one — is likely.

Already, Americans who canhardly be described as enemies ofthe U.S. armed forces are pri-vately advocating such cuts.Richard Perle has created abipartisan group (includingRichard Cheney, retired AdmiralWilliam Owens and JamesWoolsey) that will soon call for amodest reduction in defensespending and a less modestreduction in the size of thearmed forces. If the group’s rec-ommendations were accepted,the U.S. military would drop to1.2 million men and women —and the U.S. Army to 400,000 orso — over the next five years. Themoney saved as a result of per-sonnel cuts would be devoted toacquiring the fantastic butexpensive equipment associatedwith the so-called Revolution inMilitary Affairs, or RMA, basedon the concept of information-based warfare. Without dis-cussing the details of the propos-al, let’s consider the notion of theRMA and how the concept relatesto our concerns.

Let us, like the Greeks, look infront of us in order to peer intothe past, before we back into thefuture of the RMA. The outlinesof the past — those of centuriesago and those of the last 100years — indicate that the notionthat we are entering an informa-tion-based RMA whose basicconcepts are within the grasp ofthe U.S. military is dangerouslywrong-headed. First, let us con-sider the RMAs that most mili-tary historians agree occurredbetween the end of the MiddleAges and the beginning of the20th century. While there is nocomplete agreement on suchmatters, the following list is

4 Special Warfare

The outlines of the past — those of centuriesago and those of the last 100 years — indicatethat the notion that we are entering an informa-tion-based RMA whose basic concepts are with-in the grasp of the U.S. military is dangerouslywrong-headed.

within the general historicalconsensus.

1350-19001. Mid-14th century to early

15th century: English-Welsh, Swissand Burgundian infantry use longbows, pikes and compact tacticalformations to end the 1,000-yeardominance of armored cavalry. Thishelps bring about the collapse ofthe feudal system.

2. Mid-15th to mid-16th cen-turies: Sail-powered warships withbroadside artillery deployed inline-ahead formations end the2,000-year dominance of galleys.As a result, European explorersand conquerors dominate theworld’s coastal regions.

3. Early-to-mid-16th century:The introduction of the arquebus,field and siege artillery, regimentalinfantry formation and artilleryfortress begins the age of gunpow-der warfare. So armed, Europeanarmies defeat non-Europeanarmies in almost every instance.

4. Early to late 17th century:Linear infantry formations, lighterfield artillery, the socket bayonetand Vauban fortresses lead to mod-ern armies under bureaucratic con-trol and allow creation of the mod-ern sovereign state.

5. Mid-17th to mid-18th cen-turies: Improved navigation, ship-building and naval ordnance allowthe development of world-rangingnaval fleets and mercantile com-merce, and the creation of moderncapitalist colonial empires.

6. Late 18th century: The citizensoldier, levée en masse, mobile oper-ations, skirmisher and column tac-tics, and army corps create modernland war and introduce ideologyinto war. Clausewitz observesthese developments and conceivesof war as the continuation of poli-tics by violent means. Modern waris born.

7. Mid-to-late 19th century: Ri-fled repeating shoulder arms andartillery, shells, machine guns, rail-roads, telegraphy, improved explo-sives, barbed wire and food preser-vation, all based on industrialmass production, make it possibleto create armies of unprecedentedsize and power, creating total war.Civilians again become acceptabletargets of warfare. The defensegains the upper hand.

8. Mid-to-late 19th century:Coal-driven, steam-powered, all-steel armored warships, armedwith turret-mounted, shell-firingrifled cannon; torpedoes and torpe-do boats; reciprocating engines;and screw propellers combine tocreate “the Mahanian revolution”in naval warfare. Europeansacquire complete world dominanceas a result.

Thus, over the course of some550 years, there were eight RMAs.

1905-961. 1905-13: The all-big-gun

dreadnought battleship, employing

indirect fire, gunnery control andranging optics, increased main bat-tery range, wireless communica-tions and oil-burning turbineengines, sets off worldwide naval-armaments race. War between Ger-many and Britain becomes highlylikely.

2. 1910-18, 1935-43: Ocean-goingsubmersibles reintroduce the possi-bility of effective guerre de course.Britain is nearly defeated by suchweapons in both world wars.

3. 1915-18: Indirect artilleryfire, field telephones, wirelessradios, tanks, motor vehicles, poi-son gas, submachine guns, handgrenades, trench mortars, infiltra-tion tactics and new training tech-niques return advantage to theoffensive in land warfare.

4. 1917-44: The development oflong-range, heavy-load-bearing air-craft, incendiary bombs, navigationand aiming devices, aerial radar,combined with the ideas of Douhet,Trenchard and Mitchell, leads toeffective strategic bombing. Attackson cities become routine.

5. 1917-42: Carrier-based naval

August 1996 5

The U.S. involvement in Vietnam was part of the “People’s War” RMA that began in the 1930s and continued into the 1970s.

Courtesy Special Warfare Museum

aviation transforms warfare at sea.The U.S. is able to dominate thePacific and Atlantic oceans.

6. 1925-44: Effective amphibi-ous warfare and assault techniquesallow massive invasions from thesea. As a result, the U.S. rises topre-eminent world military andeconomic power.

7. 1933-43: Using World War Iinfantry tactical and operationalmethods supplemented by tanks,motor vehicles, close air supportand wireless radio, the Germansdevelop the Blitzkrieg. The conceptis adopted and improved by Sovietsand Americans, who add modernartillery and base their systems onmassive industrial production.After the defeat of Germany, U.S.-Soviet confrontation in Europeresults.

8. 1930s-1970s. “People’s War”allows colonial subjects and revolu-tionary forces with mass bases tooverthrow European rule bydefeating conventional armiesthrough guerrilla warfare. Most ofthe Third World regains its inde-pendence, ending 400 years ofEuropean dominance; U.S. isdefeated in Vietnam.

9. 1941-49: The U.S. and theUSSR create nuclear weapons tobe delivered by long-rangebombers. The concept of nucleardeterrence takes a central place inthe Cold War.

10. 1942-1960s: Strategic land-based and sea-based ballistic mis-siles, eventually tipped by nuclearwarheads; high-performance jetaircraft; powerful modern comput-ers; satellite reconnaissance;space-based global communica-tions; and manned space missionslead to the concept of mutualassured destruction. Total warbecomes virtually impossible.

11. 1950s-1980s: Nuclear-pow-ered attack submarines, thennuclear-powered ballistic-missilesubmarines, transform naval and

strategic warfare.12. 1970s-1990s: Precision-guided

munitions; improved space systems;improved communications and nav-igation techniques; highly effectivehelicopters; improved artillery andsupport systems; improved air-ground cooperation; computers ofgreat power and reduced size; sili-con chips; new sensor systems; newoperational ground-warfare con-cepts all lead to a “military techni-cal revolution” and suggest a com-ing information and information-based RMA. U.S. achieves domi-nance in conventional warfare andgains world semi-hegemony.

Thus, over the course of the past90 years there have been 12 RMAs.

And yet today, we hear talk of theRMA, meaning the one in point 12.Considering the foregoing list, doesit make sense to expect only one?The pattern of history points not toone but to several RMAs over thenext two or three decades. Geomet-ric increases in the rate of techno-logical innovation, combined withtruly revolutionary social, econom-ic and political changes, may meanthat RMAs will occur not over acentury, as was the case in the lateMiddle Ages and during the

Renaissance, but possibly severaltimes in a generation. Are we pre-pared for such stunning and con-tinual changes in warfare?

Assuming we have the psycho-logical and organizational abilityto deal with such frequent seismicshifts in the way we make war,what might we expect over thenext 20 to 30 years? Also, are theconjectures at all correct withregard to a current RMA based oninformation technologies?

Let’s answer the second questionfirst: The idea of an RMA based oninformation processing is profound-ly wrong-headed. The technologythat has emerged and that isemerging in these fields is and willbe highly useful to the Americanmilitary. We should try to maintainour lead in these areas and take fulladvantage of all the technologicaladvances. But the present worshipof information is mistaken becauseit confuses “information” withknowledge and “knowledge” withunderstanding.

Battlefield awarenessFor example, consider the con-

cept of “dominant battlefieldawareness.” Let us concede, forargument’s sake, that this RMAwill provide the kind of informa-tion that its proponents contendthat it will. Now let us gaze at thepast in front of us and imagine thatthe losers of the battles of Cannae,Austerlitz and Chancellorsvillehad such information. What goodwould it have done them?

At Cannae in 216 B.C., Hannibaland his Carthaginian army of40,000 not only defeated a Romanarmy of 60,000, they annihilated it.Virtually no Romans survived thebattle: It was the greatest defeat inRoman history. Perhaps the mostextraordinary feature of the battleis that the Roman consuls had com-plete information on Hannibal’s

6 Special Warfare

The technology that hasemerged and that is emerg-ing in these fields is andwill be highly useful to theAmerican military. … Butthe present worship ofinformation is mistakenbecause it confuses‘information’ with knowl-edge and ‘knowledge’with understanding.

peculiar convex battle formation.The nature of ancient warfare

required both sides to array on aflat field in full view of eachother. The Roman commandershad time to carefully observeHannibal’s deployment and tonote his strengths and the partic-ular placement of his variousunits. They had what we calldominant battlefield awareness,as well as an army 50 percentlarger and far better armed andequipped than Hannibal’s. Butthe Roman army was slaugh-tered. Why? Because the Romansdid not understand what theysaw. They marched into a trapwith their eyes wide open butwith their minds baffled by thegenius of one of the greatest tac-tical commanders of all time.Dominant battlefield awarenessis useless against an enemy thatknows what you expect and useshis understanding against you.

Let us now look at a part of thepast that lies closer before us: thebattlefield of Austerlitz, where onDec. 2, 1805, Napoleon’s outnum-bered army faced a combinedAustrian-Russian force. Thanksto their telescopes, the Austrianand Russian commanders wereable to observe the French armyeven more carefully than theRoman consuls could observetheir enemies at Cannae. Butwhile the Austrians and Russianshad all the information that onecould gather, they did not under-stand the meaning of Napoleon’sdeployment.

Only when the French Imperi-al Guard smashed through thecenter of their lines did the Aus-trians and Russians begin tounderstand Napoleon’s maneu-ver. At the end of that bitterlycold day, as the defeated emper-ors and their staffs were fleeingover the frozen swamp at theedge of the field, they finally

August 1996 7

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realized what had happened. Butit was too late for the troopsbehind them: As the routed Aus-trian and Russian forces fell backin panic, the French gunnersopened fire on the ice coveringthe swamp, plunging thousandsof men to a miserable death.Even though he fought nearly200 years ago, Bonaparte stillhas a great deal to teach us aboutthe difference between informa-tion and understanding.

Finally, let’s consider theevents of May 1863 at Chancel-lorsville. “Fighting Joe” Hooker,the commander of the Army ofthe Potomac, had a great deal ofinformation about his opponents,the Army of Northern Virginia.Hooker knew that he greatly out-

numbered the Confederates. Healso knew that his forces occu-pied a favorable position. In fact,all of Hooker’s information sug-gested that the only good optionavailable to Robert E. Lee was toretreat. So when Hooker learnedthat Jackson’s corps was passingin front of the Union army on theroad that led to Richmond, hereasonably assumed that theRebels had begun to withdraw.After all, why else would a badlyoutnumbered Lee divide hisforces in the face of a superiorfoe?

Of course, we know that Jack-son was not retreating. He andLee had taken the psychologicalmeasure of Hooker. They guessedcorrectly that Hooker would mis-

understand the information hehad about the Confederates. SoJackson’s corps was in factmarching to strike Hooker’s armyon the flank. When the Confeder-ates came whooping and holler-ing out of the woods, they caughtHooker and his whole army bysurprise. The right flank of theUnion army was driven in, and itwas Hooker who retreated in dis-order. So much for Hooker’s dom-inant battlefield awareness.

Human elementWhile information is essential

to winning battles and wars, it isnot enough. We must always keepin mind the human element —deception, surprise, uncertainty,fear, what Clausewitz calls “fric-tion” and the “fog of war,” and thecultural and psychological factorsthat separate our thinking fromthat of our enemy. Understandingthe human element is what truemilitary intelligence is all about.It is in this area that Army spe-cial-operations forces have anextremely important role to playin the future of war. Their special-ized training, experiences, knowl-edge of foreign languages andcultures, and contacts with for-eign militaries and peoples giveSOF a critical understanding ofthe human element. It is SOF’sresponsibility to provide thatintelligence to those Americancommanders who must trulyunderstand their opponents. Wecannot afford to suffer a Cannaeor an Austerlitz.

The current worship of informa-tion and information-based war-fare will cease only when the harshreality of war shows how mistakenits proponents are. Until then, wemust do our best to provide theunderstanding that informationalone cannot give, and to constant-ly stress that people, not smoothly

8 Special Warfare

Information is essential to warfare, but true military intelligence requires an understanding of thehuman element.

functioning machines, make war.My other question was “What

other RMAs might we expect overthe next 20-30 years?” Efforts toprevent the proliferation ofnuclear weapons and ballistic-missile technologies seem to be adistinct failure. Many mid-sizedpowers may acquire suchweapons in a decade or so, andsuch arms could be widely avail-able in 20-30 years. If this doeshappen, unless and until a trulyimpervious defense against bal-listic missiles is devised, totalwar will be virtually impossible.Such a development would repre-sent a true RMA, even though itwould be based on 40-year-oldtechnology. Any attempt to over-throw a nuclear-armed state —even by the use of purely conven-tional regular forces — would runthe risk of prompting a nuclearexchange. Limited war, perhapsvery limited, would be the onlyviable option for armed conflictbetween states.

SOF advantagesIn such warfare, special-opera-

tions forces could play a major role.Special Forces were created in the1950s to engage Soviet-bloc forcesin limited, unconventional warwhen total war was no longer feasi-ble. In a world of many nuclear pow-ers, Special Forces, along with Psy-chological Operations and CivilAffairs forces, would continue tooffer some of the few safe options forthe U.S. to battle its foes. While SOFcannot win wars on their own, theycan provide a valuable force multi-plier to conventional armed forces.In a security environment in whichthe U.S. may have few choices abouthow to wage war, such an advantagewould be extremely useful.

Information technologies couldproduce an RMA, but one witheffects that its proponents do not

anticipate. One effect might be areturn to an age of defense-domi-nant warfare. If whatever movedcould be observed, targeted, hit anddestroyed, then our variousweapons platforms would becomeobsolete. But without these plat-forms, how could the U.S. projectlarge conventional forces overseas,with acceptable casualty levels?

How might we fight during such aperiod? If we retained our domi-nance in the military applications ofspace, we might be able to strikeopponents from that dimension. Butwho would guide such weapons totheir destinations and report ontheir effects? To some extent, this

could be performed by “nationalmeans of reconnaissance.” But suchwarfare also would present a majorrole for Special Forces. Small SFteams might be inserted overseas,and with their links to precision-strike and space systems, they couldserve as forward observers on astrategic scale. Of course, in an ageof platform vulnerability, we wouldhave to invent new means of insert-ing such teams safely.

Another effect of information-technology developments might bean RMA in psychological warfare.Television is increasingly dominat-ing world consciousness and couldbe used by PSYOP units against anenemy population. New broadcast-ing techniques, combined withadvanced computer-generated videoand audio, might be used to projectblack propaganda on a target audi-ence’s televisions. Such propagandamight show leaders of a hostile gov-

ernment engaging in the most loath-some activities and making remarksabout those foolish enough to fightand die for them. Especially in coun-tries with state-controlled broad-casting, black-propaganda programscould have a devastating effect onmorale.

The U.S. is party to treatiesthat ban such interference in for-eign broadcasting, and U.S.statutes prohibit our governmentfrom engaging in some forms ofinformation distortion, but war-time necessity could override suchconsiderations. However, we couldnot broadcast invasive programswithout first removing regular

enemy broadcasts from the air.Eliminating that enemy potentialcould be a task for Special Forces,in conjunction with PSYOPteams.

Ideological RMAsSo far we have discussed RMAs in

the context of technological innova-tion. But an RMA is not necessarilydependent upon technology. “Peo-ple’s War,” one of the most impor-tant RMAs in the 20th century, wasbased on ideas, not on technology. Itis not coincidental that two Chinesethinkers, Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung, played a major role in devel-oping that new form of warfare.

The French Revolution alsounleashed an RMA based entirelyon ideology. By replacing the ideathat the French were subjects of theking with the idea that they werecitizens, the revolution created the

August 1996 9

While SOF cannot win wars on their own, they canprovide a valuable force multiplier to conventionalarmed forces. In a security environment in whichthe U.S. may have few choices about how to wagewar, such an advantage would be extremely useful.

concept of the citizen soldier. The cit-izen soldier did not fight as anunwilling conscript or as a merce-nary. He went into combat as apoliticized volunteer defending hishomeland and his new rights, andspreading the revolution to his fel-low Europeans enslaved by theirtyrant kings.

The French government tookadvantage of these new ideas and ofthe huge population of France, thenthe largest country in Europe, with25 million people. France built hugearmies that totaled more than 1 mil-lion men. With large forces motivat-ed by revolutionary zeal, Frenchcommanders could afford to use newtactics and to conduct new types ofoperations. From this came theRMA of the late 18th century, whichwe described previously as the birthof modern war.

Without fear of desertions, Frencharmies could march or fight at night,deploy skirmishers and snipers, andsend out scouts. French command-ers, certain that their men wouldreturn after the enemy was routed,could send out their cavalry andlight infantry in pursuit of fleeingenemies. French generals could hurlhuge battering-ram columns againstan enemy line without regard forcasualties and with a full reliance onthe élan of the assaulting infantry.These revolutionary warriors actu-ally chanted “La Marsaillaise” or“Ça Ira” as they marched intoenemy fire.

This RMA, especially when wield-ed by Napoleon, broke the armies ofthe old regimes and conquered all ofEurope. Only when the enemies ofimperial France adopted similarmethods of raising, motivating anddeploying armies was Napoleondefeated.

Democratic ChinaWe might see another non-tech-

nological RMA in our lifetime,

and it could come from China.There are those who believe thatif China does become a democrat-ic country, it might also become apeaceful nation. A democraticChina might prove instead to be adanger to its neighbors and evento the U.S. It would take a revolu-tion for China to become a democ-racy, and out of that revolutionaryupheaval a great military powermight be born. A rich, militarilypowerful and democratic Chinawould not necessarily be peaceful.

How might China behave if theChinese people were finally themasters of their own destinies andfilled with a sense of immensepride at what they had accom-plished? Already, observers note atremendous increase in nationalistfeeling among the mainlanders.Indeed, even those threatened bythe upsurge in the power of thePRC (for example, the residents ofTaiwan and Hong Kong) displayenormous satisfaction with thereturn of China to the role of agreat power.

For all Chinese, the last 150

years seem a shameful parenthe-sis in their nation’s history. Butthat brief period in the 2,000-yearhistory of united China has ended.The Chinese will no longer endurethe humiliations or insults of thepast. Today’s Chinese, whetherthey live in Beijing, Taipei or Sin-gapore, consider Tibet, Mongoliaand all the countries on the bor-ders of China to lie within therightful Chinese sphere of influ-ence. If these Chinese attitudesendure, a clash between Chineseinterests and the interests of theJapanese, the Russians, theIndonesians and even the Ameri-cans may be inevitable.

The Chinese people could evenpressure their own governmentinto war to defend what they con-sider their rights or to advancetheir interests, as the Americanpeople pressured President JamesMadison in 1812. Some of theissues over which the Chinesecontinue to nurture resentmentsor feel injured pride includereunification with Taiwan; accessto oil in the South China Sea;

10 Special Warfare

Many Chinese believe the countries that border China lie within its sphere of influence. A democratic andpowerful China could prove to be a threat to its neighbors and to the U.S.

Photo copyright American Databankers Corp.

political predominance inIndochina or Korea; showing theIndians who is the real master inAsia; and taking back from Russiathe territories the Czars extortedfrom the Chinese emperors in the19th century. (We, too, wouldsense deep national outrage if wehad been subjected to the kinds ofinjustices suffered by the Chinesepeople over the last 200 years.)

Dynamic forceIn any case, a country of 1.2 to

1.4 billion people, enriched by amodern economy and strength-ened by access to the latest tech-nology — and we may very wellsee such a China in 20 years orless — might prove as dynamic aforce as the France of the 1790s.Such a China might draw upon thegenius of its people to devise revo-lutionary tactical and operationalapproaches to war. Such a Chinacould build armed forces largeenough to endure casualties ofenormous magnitude by Americanstandards. It is doubtful that Rus-sia, Japan, India or Indonesia couldstand up to such a power, and anyof these countries might turn to theU.S. for protection. If we sensed ourinterests threatened, we might findourselves in a confrontation, per-haps a war, with a democratic butvery aggressive China.

In such a case, the U.S. SpecialForces might be called upon to fos-ter insurgency in Tibet, Sinkiangor Inner Mongolia; to train guer-rilla resistance fighters in South-east Asia (again), Central Asia orSiberia; to gather intelligenceinside China; or to conduct sabo-tage against Chinese forcesthroughout Eurasia. There arefew precedents for such operationsby U.S. forces. (The U.S. Office ofStrategic Services operated fairlysuccessfully in China against theJapanese in World War II. The

CIA carried out insurgency opera-tions in Tibet in the 1950s, butwith very little success. It mightbe wise to study and learn asmuch as we can from these experi-ences.) Such operations take placein extremely forbidding terrain;they would also require knowl-edge of languages quite remote tous. We should begin studyingNepali, Mongolian and Mandarinnow — not when a crisis breaks in10-15 years.

Another motivation for study-ing the attitudes, languages andhistory of East Asia is that Amer-icans have a poor record of antici-pating strategic events in that

region. Consider Pearl Harbor, theNorth Korean invasion of SouthKorea, the crossing of the Yalu bythe Chinese People’s LiberationArmy, the Sino-Soviet split, theTet offensive and a host of small-er shocks. We cannot afford tocontinue being taken by surprisein East Asia. Reorienting SOF toconcentrate on that region couldhelp us anticipate events there.

Even if these apocalyptic scenar-ios never take place, it seems rea-sonable that East Asia will be thefocus of American security con-cerns over the next few decades.Knowledge of its languages andcultures will likely be essential forSOF success. It also seems wise forthe Army to recruit Americans ofethnic East Asian extraction into

special operations. As we havelearned from our experiences inKorea and in Vietnam, it is quitedifficult for European Americansor African Americans to go unno-ticed in East Asia. The presence oflarger numbers of Asian Americansin SOF could prove a valuablenational asset in coming decades.

Popular supportWe have discussed the possible

consequences of different RMAs,but let’s return to the question ofspecific RMAs that may or maynot emerge in light of Americandomestic concerns. Whatever

valid reasons exist for us to pur-sue radically new methods of con-ducting war, we will not be able todo so without the support of theAmerican people. They will haveto pay the taxes to support thecost of such developments. Butbefore they will be willing to doso, they will have to be convincedthat a threat exists.

Furthermore, the nation’sleadership will have to formu-late a strategy for dealing withthe threat. And finally, the mili-tary will have to develop thestrategy and the operationalconcepts to put the products ofan RMA to effective use. Thereis no reason to believe that all ofthese steps will occur. Propo-

August 1996 11

We could see as many as three or four RMAs overthe next several decades, but they may be pro-duced by other countries. … In many ways, theycould offer SOF even greater challenges than U.S.-developed RMAs would: Waging war from a posi-tion of technological inferiority requires a greateremphasis on the human element in war. Thathuman emphasis is a SOF forte.

nents of what is called the RMAseem to think that technologicalfeasibility alone will lead to theRMA’s development, but theyoverlook the fact that an RMAwill require a political and astrategic basis. Whether boththese elements will fall intoplace remains to be seen.

We could see as many as threeor four RMAs over the next sev-eral decades, but they may beproduced by other countries.Obviously, as was the case withthe German development of theBlitzkrieg, the early Russianlead in space or the Maoist chal-lenge of “People’s War,” theseRMAs could present the U.S.with enormous dangers. In manyways, they could offer SOF evengreater challenges than U.S.-developed RMAs would: Wagingwar from a position of technolog-ical inferiority requires a greateremphasis on the human elementin war. That human emphasis isa SOF forte.

ImplicationsIn summary, what are the implica-

tions for SOF? In the short run, sayin the next 10 years or so, we mayhave to place more emphasis on peo-ple-to-people activities; training forlow-intensity-conflicts; and dealingwith humanitarian emergencies inLatin America, Africa, South Asia,Central Asia and possibly the PacificIslands. But during this same period,we must not lose sight of a dangerlooming beyond: possible confronta-tion with a peer competitor begin-ning about 2010. If such a threatshould arise, it might be in the formof a powerful, expansionist China.

SOF must begin now to stress thelearning of east- and central-Asianlanguages, preparing to operate insuch miserable terrain as that ofthe Gobi Desert, the TibetanPlateau, the Pamirs and the

Burmese jungle. Because of theincreasing urbanization of theworld population, SOF should pre-pare for extensive urban combatand non-combat operations, both forthe near term and for the long term.

We must seriously consider thatwe might have to fight from a posi-tion of technological inferiority, atleast in regard to some aspects ofwarfare. We should study the cir-cumstances under which forceswith low levels of military technolo-gy have defeated technologicallysuperior forces. We could learnmuch by analyzing the war in Viet-nam from the enemy’s perspective.But, above all, we should realizethat such an approach to warfareruns counter to our military her-itage and cannot be mastered quick-ly by Americans — it is a processthat requires decades of study,training and experience. Neverthe-less, it is clearly a type of warfare atwhich Special Forces might excel.

PSYOP units should be preparedfor the possibility of Americanforces becoming targets of sophisti-cated PSYOP. Although we are usedto engaging in such warfare, we arenot so well-prepared to counterPSYOP when it is aimed at our ownforces.

Finally, a few parting warnings:• Prepare for change that takes

place at unprecedented speed —the economic growth of othercountries, the emergence of apeer competitor, technologicaldevelopments;

• Emphasize thinking, imagina-tion and creativity as well asSOF’s traditional excellence in combat skills and physicalfitness;

• Expect to deal with an ongoingseries of RMAs;

• Study China, learn its strengthsand weaknesses. Hope for thebest, prepare for the worst.As Americans, we hold the view

that we are the best, the most pow-

erful and the richest. But the Chi-nese have also enjoyed all thoseattributes — and for more than1,000 years. China was a civilizedcountry when all of our European,African and Middle Eastern ances-tors were wholly illiterate. The Chi-nese believe that a hierarchicalrelationship between China andother countries is the natural orderof things. They expect a return tothat order. But when Americansand Chinese think of themselves asrightfully number one, we canexpect a collision. Let us do our bestto be prepared.

Brian R. Sullivan isa senior research pro-fessor at the Institutefor National StrategicStudies, NationalDefense University. Heserved as a Marineofficer in Vietnam, where he wasawarded the Silver Star and the Pur-ple Heart. After receiving a Ph.D.from Columbia University, he taughtmilitary history at Yale University,and strategy at the Naval War Col-lege. During the Gulf crisis and War,he was an adviser to the AssistantSecretary of Defense for SpecialOperations and Low-Intensity Con-flict. At INSS, Dr. Sullivan analyzesand writes documents on issues per-taining to U.S. defense strategy. He isalso the author of numerous articlesabout military history and nationalsecurity.

12 Special Warfare

The end of the East-West con-frontation — the defining charac-teristic of the Cold War — hasparticular meaning for the rela-tionship between the UnitedStates and its neighbors in theWestern Hemisphere.

In Europe, in the southern-tiercountries of the Middle East andsouth Asia, in Southeast Asia andin the northwest Pacific, the chal-lenge posed by an expansionistSoviet Union and its former ally,the People’s Republic of China,was sufficient to warrant a seriesof regional mutual securityarrangements. Hence, the cre-

ation of NATO; the Baghdad Pact(renamed the Central TreatyOrganization, or CENTO, in1956); the Southeast Asia TreatyOrganization, or SEATO; thebilateral security agreementsthat the U.S. has with Taiwan,South Korea and Japan; and theAustralia-New Zealand-UnitedStates Treaty, or ANZUS.

NATO, the strongest of these,bound its members to regard “anattack on one [as] an attack onall.” In the event of an attack onone member, the other memberswere pledged, by treaty, torespond. The CENTO and SEATOtreaties required “consultation”and agreement on appropriateresponses; the bilateral arrange-ments with Taiwan, South Koreaand Japan varied, but the guidingprinciple was that the U.S. andeach of the other signatoriesregarded the Soviet and commu-nist Chinese menace to be suffi-ciently direct and grave as toalmost certainly require anarmed response.

In the Western Hemisphere,the Rio Treaty, signed in Rio deJaneiro in 1947, addressed thesame issues. However, the likeli-hood of a direct military con-frontation between the Soviet

Union and countries in the West-ern Hemisphere south of the U.S.seemed sufficiently remote so asnot to require the organizationalapparatus of the other mutualsecurity agreements. Consulta-tions, accompanied by steps thatmembers could take in concertwith each other (to the extentthat individual national interestsso dictated), were agreed to besufficient.

Although the Rio Treaty’s con-sultative processes were exer-cised from time to time inresponse to various perceivedthreats, Cuba was the only coun-try in the Western Hemisphere tofall under Moscow’s sway. Howev-er, Cuba’s alignment with theSoviet Union occurred under cir-cumstances that didn’t lendthemselves to the consultativeand reactive processes envisionedby the Rio Treaty.

For unlike Eastern Europeancountries that fell to a combina-tion of political, economic andmilitary pressure from the USSR,Caribbean, Central and SouthAmerican countries did notreceive direct external militarypressure from the Soviet Union.The greatest threat to stability inthis hemisphere was internal

August 1996 13

A New Approach to Latin America:The Role of SOF

by Ambassador David Passage

This article discusses issues inLatin America and possible SOFroles in protecting U.S. interests.Views expressed are those of theauthor and do not reflect policies ofthe U.S. government, the Departmentof State or the Department ofDefense. The article was originallypresented at a conference hosted byTufts University’s Fletcher School ofLaw and Diplomacy. Papers fromthat conference have been collectedand published by the Fletcher Schooland USSOCOM as Roles and Mis-sions of Special Operations Forces inthe Aftermath of the Cold War. —Editor

upheaval: popular reactionsagainst self-centered ruling oli-garchies that had no interest inimproving the economic condi-tions and political participationof the campesinos and the work-ing classes. Revolutionary pres-sures in this hemisphere wereoccasionally aided and abetted bythe Soviet Union and its alliesand proxies. But the conclusiondrawn from any objective reviewof the past 50 years in the West-ern Hemisphere would be thatthe Soviet Union did not instigatea successful communist revolu-tion anywhere in this region(including Cuba). In fact, every

upheaval in the Western Hemi-sphere has been an unmistakableand undeniable reaction to home-grown causes.

Prevailing circumstancesWith the end of the Cold War,

what circumstances prevail asthe troubled countries of LatinAmerica approach the dawn ofthe next century?

First, no credible externalthreat exists to regional peace.Whatever Cuba may be or mighthave been, it is not now a threatthat necessitates conventionalsecurity or military measures.Furthermore, it is not likely tobecome one in the future.

Second, we have a hemispherewithout the threat of seriousarmed conflict between statescapable of upsetting the wider

peace (although numerous bilat-eral irritants and border squab-bles remain). Rivalries betweenthe larger regional powers aresubsiding rather than growing,and traditional historical ten-sions and problems between someof the smaller countries are beingdealt with through diplomaticmeans. Even armed clashes alongdisputed borders (e.g., the cur-rent spat between Ecuador andPeru) seldom last more than afew weeks before the partiesbegin negotiations. Particularlyimportant for stability in thesouthern-cone countries is themovement by Argentina and

Brazil to dismantle their nuclear-weapons development programs.

And third, the Western Hemi-sphere is populated by democrat-ically elected, civilian-run gov-ernments, void of military dicta-torships (except for Cuba).

If all of these observations areencouraging, we need to lookagain. Although the specter of anexternally supported militarythreat is absent, and democraticgovernments are theoretically incharge in every country in thehemisphere but one, many of theunderlying factors that fomentinstability (including bloody, vio-lent, revolutionary upheavals)are not only still with us, theyare increasing. Moreover, theresponses of the democratic civil-ian governments to these prob-lems are not encouraging. Atbest, they are inadequate; at

worst, they offer palliatives withno apparent intention of imple-menting the serious, even radi-cal, changes that are needed inpolitical, economic and socialgovernance.

And while the potential targetsof these upheavals are LatinAmerica’s reactionary (albeitcivilian and ostensibly “democra-tic”) governments, the ultimatelikely victim is the U.S., to whomthe dispossessed in Latin Ameri-ca turn for support or, ultimately,for refuge.

That is why the U.S. had nochoice but to intervene in Haiti.The U.S. has no intrinsic strate-gic, economic or political interestin that tortured country. Butwhen internal circumstances sothreaten our southern neighborsthat a significant percentage oftheir people feel their only alter-native is to try to reach ourshores, the U.S. has no option butto act.

The intervention in Haiti wasnot a course of action from whichthe U.S. should have shrunk (asit did for almost two years whileour economic embargo increas-ingly impoverished an already-crippled people and their econo-my). Nor should the U.S. feeldefensive about having inter-vened, with or without U.N. Secu-rity Council resolutions or “otherflags” willing to join us. The U.S.should, in fact, emphasize in itspolicy pronouncements what itrepresents: As Latin Americaheads toward the next century,the U.S. should place LatinAmerican governments and theruling structures of Latin Ameri-can countries on notice that iftheir refusal to confront the needfor change in their own societiesresults in their problems arriv-ing on our shores, the U.S. mayconclude that it has to intervene.In fact, public pressure in the

14 Special Warfare

Although the specter of an externally supportedmilitary threat is absent, and democratic govern-ments are theoretically in charge in every countryin the hemisphere but one, many of the underlyingfactors that foment instability … are not only stillwith us, they are increasing.

U.S. would likely force any Amer-ican administration to do so.

Root of the problemAlthough all countries in the

Western Hemisphere, includingthe U.S., can be described asbeing governed by “elites” (even apopulist like the late Huey Longor a determined democrat likePresident Harry Truman is still,by definition, part of an elite rul-

ing stratum), the segment of soci-ety that controls governments inmost countries in the developingworld is far narrower than thatsame segment of society in indus-trialized democracies. Indeed,many of the countries in thishemisphere to the south of the U.S.have very small ruling elites —ones that have historically been,and largely remain, resistant topressures for change emanatingfrom the dispossessed withintheir own societies.

A simple survey of the hemi-sphere — from the wake-up call

that burst into open flame in Chi-apas only two years ago, to theSendero Luminoso insurgency inPeru, to internal insurrections ofvarious sizes and dimensions inGuatemala, Colombia andBolivia, and potential problemsin other countries — is enoughfor us to conclude that truedemocracy and economic prosper-ity haven’t yet gained a foothold.When we proudly note that every

country in the hemisphere(except, of course, our permanentbête noire) is a “democracy,” whatwe see is a paper-thin veneer cre-ated by the semblance of a popu-larly elected government chosenthrough elections contested forthe most part by traditionalentrenched elites from a narrowspectrum within the body politic.Elections alone do not democra-cies make; we ignore this dictumat our peril.

And while in recent years onecould plausibly have dismissedthese discrepancies between factand fiction, along with the resul-

tant popular protests againstthem, denial will be insufficientto get us through the next sever-al decades.

The information revolutionthat has taken TV into theremotest village in the Andes(and even into the valleys of cen-tral Haiti) means that MarshallMcLuhan’s “global village” isupon us. The campesino (howeverhe is defined, whatever he iscalled) knows, as he never didbefore, what he and his familyare missing. Although the streetsof Los Angeles, Miami, New York,or Washington, D.C., may be morestrewn with garbage than pavedwith gold, try explaining that tothe campesino who has given uphope for meaningful change in hisown government and society. Hisdespair will ultimately lead to hisdeparture.

Virtually uniformly within theWestern Hemisphere, campesinosand laborers are aware that theU.S. is unwilling or unable toenforce its own immigrationlaws — a circumstance that isexpected to persist for the fore-seeable future. If the dispos-sessed are given the followingchoices — to continue to enduredeprivations and indignities; toexperience violent revolution; orto seek to remove oneself andone’s family from an unsatisfac-tory environment — they willquite likely select the thirdoption. (INS, please take note.)

Democratic phenomenonDemocracy, notwithstanding

American expressions of belief tothe contrary, is not for everyone:It is mostly a middle-class phe-nomenon; its principal beneficia-ry is the middle class.

Democracy is not for the rich.Typically, the rich are asked tobear the cost of social and eco-

August 1996 15

The refusal of Latin American countries to confront the need for change in their own societies can resultin their problems arriving on U.S. shores.

Photo by Alexander C. Hicks Jr.

nomic programs for the poor, whoseek to dethrone the rich.

Nor is democracy, as a political,social and economic system, espe-cially attractive to the poor. Thepeople at the bottom of the socio-economic stratum frequently seedemocracy as a diversion perpe-trated against them by othersseeking to perpetuate the statusquo — in other words, a distrac-tion from their real needs, whichare food for their families, jobs,housing, education and medicalcare.

When one lives at the bare sub-sistence level yet sees how theupper classes live, one’s interestscan be easily attracted to revolu-tionary efforts to seize power —not because of any attraction tothe principles of democracy, butsimply because of the chance toradically alter the status quo.

Democracy will appeal to thepoor only when it demonstratesthe likelihood of improving theirwretched conditions — and with-in a reasonable length of time.But even in the best-case sce-

nario, democracy offers hope forbetterment only in the long term.Democracy may be a viable polit-ical process, provided thecampesinos and the laborer class-es haven’t yet given up on theircountries. But once internal eco-nomic, social and political condi-tions have reached the boilingpoint, democracy isn’t particular-ly attractive.

Consider the situation in Haiti:Even under the best of circum-stances, Haiti will still be thepoorest country in the WesternHemisphere 20 years from now. Itwill still have the lowest per capi-ta income, the greatest spreadbetween the rich and the poor, thefewest number of telephones perhead, the fewest number of pavedroads per square kilometer, thesmallest daily caloric intake perhead, and so on. So what does“democracy” mean to the commonpeople of Haiti? We know that thereturn of Aristide meant a greatdeal to the Haitians, and many ofthem felt that his return to lead-ership would end the bestiality

inflicted upon them by the formerthugs in charge of the militaryand police forces. However, Aris-tide had the task of providing themore tangible fruits of democra-cy: jobs, housing, education, andmedical care. Will Haitians waitfor the supposed fruits of democ-racy to catch up with their reali-ty? My intent here is not to belit-tle democracy. It is simply to saythat democratization is a long-term process, with only long-termpractical prospects.

Guilt by associationThe unfortunate reality in the

Western Hemisphere is thatwhile the U.S. may representhope to those aspiring to reap thebenefits of democracy and eco-nomic development, we remain,in their eyes, largely associatedwith the ruling elites who haveresolutely prevented the poorfrom making progress towardtheir sought-after goals.

The reasons are historical. Atthe political level, elites have tra-ditionally controlled governmentsand politics in their own coun-tries (especially where we havehelped install them). Thus theyare the ones with whom we havealways dealt.

At the economic and commer-cial levels, we have always con-ducted business with the elites.They have the franchises and thedistributorships for U.S. goodsand services. They speak English;they take their vacations in theU.S.; they shop here; they sendtheir children here to be educat-ed; they keep their money in U.S.banks; and they purchase retire-ment condos here. They think andtalk the language of capitalism.And for the benefit of U.S. compa-nies that conduct business withthem, their governments haveenacted few of the curbs,

16 Special Warfare

Haitians at a garbage dump in Port-au-Prince. Even under the best of circumstances, Haiti will still be thepoorest country in the Western Hemisphere 20 years from now.

Photo by Alejandro Cabello

restraints, regulatory legislationsand other restrictions that havecluttered the economic and com-mercial landscape in the U.S. andWestern Europe. These elites,however, don’t think much ofdemocracy, especially if it threat-ens their lifestyle and their vastwealth and land holdings.

For the past two centuries, thethreat to the U.S. from countriessouth of its borders has been per-ceived by Americans as being“extra-hemispheric encroach-ment,” or trouble-making fromwithout. For the next quartercentury, the problem the U.S. willface is the disparity betweenwhat the populations living to thesouth of us perceive they can gainby coming here, and what theythink they may have to endure ifthey remain in their own coun-tries. The challenge for the U.S. isto help these countries effect thedesperately needed changes(especially economic progress) intime to stave off violent revolu-tion or massive migratory move-ments toward our borders.

SOF rolesMuch more could be said about

social, economic and politicalreform, but this article is not apolitical, social or economicanalysis. It is an attempt to iden-tify some areas where U.S. SOFmight be useful in helping oursouthern neighbors bring aboutchange in their own societies,including their military institu-tions. The foregoing analysis isintended to clarify fundamentalissues and to set the stage for adiscussion of possible courses ofaction.

If one had to identify the mostimportant near-term need forcontinued development of democ-racy and economic progress southof the Rio Grande, the response

would have to be honest govern-ment, as free as possible of graftand corruption. Citizens, particu-larly those from the lower class-es, expect their authorities toaddress the economic problems oftheir societies. They also expectto be treated with a modicum ofdecency and respect for theirhuman, civil and political rights.

Without replowing alreadywell-furrowed ground, we mightpoint out one incontestable factregarding the U.S. effort to bol-ster a South Vietnamese govern-ment in the 1960s and early

1970s: Of the many governmentsin Saigon during that epoch, notone could honestly have been saidto enjoy the active support of themajority of its own people. Thesame could be said about theimperial government of the lateShah of Iran as well as other gov-ernments the U.S. has supported.A sine qua non for the defense ofany government is that it mustgarner the active support of themajority of its people.

This is where SOF can be par-ticularly useful, for in additionto the broader processes of inter-

nal change, there are severalspecific areas in which SOF cancontribute:

• Training police forces to becompetent, respectable andrespected. In the countries andislands of Central and SouthAmerica and the Caribbean,there is, arguably, no greaterneed than for honest and compe-tent law enforcement and govern-ment administration.

Unlike the U.S., whose judicialsystem was founded upon Anglo-Saxon common law, most of thecountries of Latin America(though not of the English-speak-ing Caribbean) base their legalsystems on “code law,” stemmingfrom the Napoleonic era. A corol-lary is that virtually all LatinAmerican countries have nation-al police forces who are typicallyunder the direction of (and some-times under the control of) mili-tary officers who often are underthe authority of defense min-istries. Even when the policeanswer to a minister of the interi-or, the latter is not infrequently amilitary officer.

The U.S., on the other hand,does not have a national policeforce or a national police system(nor does it permit its militaryforces to perform domestic law-enforcement functions). There arestrong and deliberate, althoughpossibly archaic, legislative pro-hibitions against U.S. militarypersonnel training foreign policeforces. U.S. civilian agencies, suchas the Agency for InternationalDevelopment, are also underlegal proscriptions against help-ing to train Latin Americanpolice forces. But while the U.S. islegislatively incapable of assist-ing its southern neighbors inbuilding responsive and civillyresponsible national law-enforce-ment services, the U.S. militaryhas legislative authority to train

August 1996 17

For the next quartercentury, the problemthe U.S. will face isthe disparity betweenwhat the populationsliving to the south ofus perceive they cangain by coming here,and what they thinkthey may have toendure if they remainin their own countries.

Latin American militaries in tac-tics and techniques that they canemploy in their own countries.Our government would never per-mit U.S. military forces to employthe same tactics and techniquesin this country. It is time to askwhether the U.S. should continueto encourage the use of LatinAmerican military forces asdomestic internal law-enforce-ment agents, to the exclusion orthe diminution of civil policeforces.

If the U.S. hopes to help itssouthern neighbors acceleratethe process of democratic internalreform, it should make a vastly

greater effort to help Latin Amer-ican countries conduct trainingprograms aimed at raising theirpolice forces’ minimal standardsof honesty, decency and compe-tence. To accomplish this, the U.S.should remove the legislativeprohibitions and other restraintsthat prevent it from helpingLatin American democraciesimprove their police forces.

U.S. SOF would make excellenttrainers for Latin Americanpolice forces. The U.S. Army’sSpecial Forces, having beenselected through a rigorousscreening process, extensivelyexposed to and trained to dealwith foreign cultures, required tolearn foreign languages, andindoctrinated to respect humanand civil rights, are ideally

equipped to provide police train-ing, something no other U.S.national governmental institu-tion is capable of doing. The rela-tively recently established Inter-national Criminal InvestigativeTraining Assistance Program,composed largely of short-termcontract personnel who have nopermanent corporate memory orcompetence, is simply an ad hocmeans of offering assistance tospecific countries that U.S. policy-makers have determined meritsuch help.

The fundamental skills, tech-niques and principles that SOFcould teach the police forces are

precisely the ones so lacking inthe Latin American countries:collection and assessment ofinformation; valid and acceptableinterrogation techniques de-signed to elicit information fromhuman sources; methods of per-suading citizens to cooperate byconvincing them that their owninterests lie in helping the policeto bring criminal elements undercontrol; and proper respect forhuman and civil rights.

• Border protection/counteringsmuggling. Latin American bor-ders are truly permeable; no oneis hemmed in who doesn’t wish tobe. The illegal cross-border activ-ity of greatest concern to LatinAmerica is the smuggling ofarms, ammunition, contrabandand narcotics. Virtually every

study of Latin American policeand military forces points up theabsence of proactive patrolling aswell as the need for better equip-ment and training. SOF are profi-cient in teaching the specializedtechniques necessary for a nationto control its own borders and toprevent encroachments: nightoperations, the use of stealth,small-unit patrols, close-quarterscombat, and the use of technical-ly sophisticated equipment suchas night-vision devices andappropriate intelligence-gather-ing equipment.

• Riverine and coastal patrol.The U.S. should encourage LatinAmerica to forgo blue-waternavies and to seek effectivecoastal and riverine patrol forces.The Argentine navy’s heavycruiser, Almirante Belgrano,which was sunk during the Falk-lands War, was World War I vin-tage. Had Argentina not had ablue-water navy with heavy sur-face and undersea combatants, itmight not have been tempted todeal with the Falklands/Malvinasissue by force, to its regret.

In most South American coun-tries, naval forces are ill-equipped for the threats theyface. In a world of unconstrainedresources, aircraft carriers mightbe a valuable asset to SouthAmerica’s maritime nations. Butresources aren’t unconstrained,and issues of national pride andnaval tradition often handicapattempts to acquire more practi-cal forces. The U.S. is planning toreplace its Vietnam-era riverinecraft with newer and more mod-ern rigid-hull inflatable craft.These craft, powered by inexpen-sive and easy-to-maintain out-board motors, and durably con-structed for use in shallow riversand estuaries, would be ideal forthe anti-smuggling patrols thatLatin American countries should

18 Special Warfare

The U.S. Army’s Special Forces, having beenselected through a rigorous screening process,extensively exposed to and trained to deal withforeign cultures, required to learn foreign lan-guages, and indoctrinated to respect human andcivil rights, are ideally equipped to providepolice training.

be conducting to protect theirborders. SOF are ideally trainedand equipped to help our neigh-bors in this effort.

• Aviation. In much the sameway that they have insufficientlyequipped their navies, LatinAmerican countries have tradi-tionally laden their air forceswith second-hand, visibly agingand, frequently, only marginallyairworthy fighter and bomber air-craft whose purchase price theycan ill afford and whose operationand maintenance they cannotsustain. These aircraft are usefulmainly for independence-day fly-pasts. In conjunctionwith developing morefunctional police andmilitary forces targetedat legitimate objectives,such as performing bor-der patrols and combat-ing smuggling and nar-cotics traffickers, LatinAmerican countriesshould focus on acquir-ing mobility and trans-port aircraft that can beused in nation-building,in civil-engineering proj-ects and in borderpatrols. Helicopters,light observation air-craft and utility trans-ports would prove moreuseful than the squad-rons of elderly Bucca-neers, Skyhawks, Mir-age IIIs, F-5s and otheraircraft of similar vin-tage that Latin Ameri-can countries are usingto counter the threatsthey face.

• Civil Affairs, civilengineering and infor-mation activities. IfLatin American militaryforces hope to changethe image they evoke inthe minds of their own

citizens, they will have to beginby proving their relevance to theneeds of their own societies.There is much these militaryforces could do by way of nation-building that would help themestablish rapport with the people,whom they urgently need to sup-port military and police counter-smuggling efforts and, potential-ly, to combat insurgencies. Mili-tary forces could also form orenhance engineering brigades toconstruct or maintain secondaryroads; to build rudimentary cul-verts, drainage systems andsmall bridges; to dig wells; to con-

struct or improve sanitation sys-tems; to erect village clinics andother civil and civic facilities andinfrastructure. If these efforts aresuccessful, the Latin Americanmilitary forces could improvetheir standing with the peopleand perhaps form the basis forcooperation in strengtheningnational security. SOF forces arewell-equipped to train LatinAmerican military forces innation-building skills, includingvital information-disseminationactivities.

• Counternarcotics activities.No discussion of contemporary

U.S. relations with LatinAmerica would be com-plete without touchingon the issue of coun-ternarcotics activities,the “war against drugs,”because it plays such aprominent, if unfortu-nate, role in the overallrelationship.

At the outset, let thisauthor say that he con-siders the policy ofattempting to choke offthe flow of drugs intothe U.S. from the pro-ducer countries to be anutter and undiluted fail-ure, and that any sucheffort is doomed to fail.

The vegetation thatforms the starting pointfor cocaine and heroincan now be grown at vir-tually all elevations andin many climatic andtopographic regionshitherto impossible.Given the relative easeof cultivation, produc-tion and transshipment,any effort to curb orsqueeze production inone area leads more orless immediately toanother area’s picking

August 1996 19

Honduran soldiers learn small-unit tactics under the guidance of Special Forcesinstructors.

Photo copyright Hans Halberstadt

up the effort.The test of the efficacy of the U.S.

effort is not how many hectares ofvegetation have been destroyed,how many barrels of chemicalshave been poured into tributaries ofthe Amazon, how many kingpinshave been arrested, how manyfinancial transactions have beendisrupted, or how many laborato-ries have been destroyed. The onlyvalid test of a counterdrug strategyis its impact at the street-cornerlevel in the U.S. And by any test orstandard, drugs of choice havenever been more freely available,cheaper in price, or purer andstronger in quality on that streetcorner. Daily, weekly, monthly oryearly variations in consumption inthe U.S. are clearly and exclusivelybased on changes in consumertastes and preferences, not onchanges in supply and availability.

However, the U.S. remains offi-cially committed to combatingillicit narcotics production andtrafficking. The point of this arti-cle is not to argue for a sensiblenational drug policy, but to sug-gest a potential SOF contributionto the execution of our chosenpolicy.

Although neither U.S. nor LatinAmerican counternarcotics ef-forts have had any statisticallysignificant impact on the avail-ability of illicit narcotics in theU.S., these efforts have had somespillover effects that make themof limited value. We must expandour efforts to teach Latin Americathe importance of activelypatrolling its countryside andnational frontiers, the impor-tance of intelligence-gathering(developing human sources andbuilding technical systems forcollecting and assessing informa-tion), and the importance ofacquiring skills in the use ofadvanced technical equipmentsuch as night-vision devices and

other monitoring and communi-cations equipment.

Latin American nations clearlyare not in control of their ownborders, of the airstrips withinthem, or of the aircraft in theirnational registry. Improving themonitoring of their airspace anddeveloping a means of challeng-ing aircraft which fly through itare some of the activities thatLatin American countries shouldundertake in the name of theirown national sovereignty. SOFforces could make a powerful con-tribution to these efforts, particu-larly in the training of LatinAmerican law-enforcement, intel-ligence and military personnel inmore effective information-gath-ering, assimilation, assessmentand dissemination procedures.

Challenges, opportunitiesDespite a veneer of technologi-

cal sophistication at top levels(both political and commercial) inmany capitals throughout LatinAmerica, many of this region’s

societies, economies and politicalpractices lie deeply mired in thesemi-feudal attitudes of a centuryago. At the level of popular con-sciousness, more Latin Ameri-cans are now aware of whatthey’re missing; they are alsoaware that there are alternativesto the monotonous sameness andunresponsiveness of their govern-ments. The fundamental issueincreasingly at stake is that ofthe legitimacy of national govern-ments in the region.

This would be a nice theoreticalproblem if not for the fact that ifthe U.S. does not increasinglypress for economic, political andsocial change among our south-ern neighbors, increasing num-bers of Latin American citizenswill simply opt to vote with theirfeet. And by now, there should beno doubt as to which directiontheir feet will be pointed.

In the quest for those changes,American policy-makers possessa unique tool in U.S. SOF. Morethan a simple substitute fordiminishing economic assistance,

20 Special Warfare

The participation of U.S. forces in nation-building efforts, such as road-construction projects, helps coun-tries in Latin America to improve their standard of living.

Photo by Mike Edrington

SOF can bolster a country’snation-building efforts using thecountry’s own military forces,thereby salving the host coun-try’s national pride. This militarycooperation is a symbiotic proc-ess that can benefit Latin Ameri-can countries and provide atraining spin-off for U.S. SOF.That training spin-off can beinvaluable when the U.S. mili-tary is called upon to execute anational contingency (such as theintervention in Haiti) or to con-tribute to a multinational orinternational peacekeeping effort(such as that along the Ecuador-Peru border).

As the U.S. moves into the 21stcentury, one of its foremost chal-lenges will be to assist its LatinAmerican neighbors in breakingout of the political and socialenvironment of the 18th. SOFwill be an increasingly valuableresource in helping to meet thatchallenge.

Ambassador DavidPassage is the formerpolitical adviser tothe commander inchief, U.S. SpecialOperations Com-mand, MacDill AFB,Fla. A career Foreign Service offi-cer, he has served overseas tours inEurope, Asia and Africa, as well asEcuador and El Salvador in theWestern Hemisphere. He wasdeputy chief of mission/chargéd’affaires at the U.S. Embassy inSan Salvador from 1984 to 1986,during the most intense period ofthat country’s civil war. Among hisWashington assignments were spe-cial assistant to Secretary of StateHenry Kissinger (1975-76), StateDepartment spokesman (1979-81),and director for Africa on theNational Security Council staff atthe White House (1988-89). He

holds a bachelor’s degree from theUniversity of Denver and a master’sdegree from Georgetown Universi-ty; he is also a graduate of theNational War College. AmbassadorPassage is a frequent guest speakerand guest lecturer at U.S. militaryschools, including command andstaff colleges and senior service warcolleges.

August 1996 21

Despite the steadily expanding litera-ture on counterterrorism, little of realvalue has been produced for the benefit ofpolicy-makers who must create the founda-tions of a strategy for dealing with nuclearterrorism.1

Like all other adversarial groups, terror-ists acquire a repertoire of behavior accord-ing to the particular contingencies of rein-forcement to which they are exposed. Thetask for policy-makers now is to under-stand this repertoire and to use it to informpertinent preventive action.

In preparing for their task, policy-mak-ers must understand that terror has animpact beyond its incidence. Terror has adistinct quality, a potentially decisive com-bination of venue and destructiveness, thatmust be analyzed and anticipated. Linkedto a particular species of fear, this qualityof terror represents a crucial variable inconceptualizing the war against terrorism.

Writing about the fear that arises fromtragedy, Aristotle emphasized that suchfear “demands a person who suffers unde-servedly” and that the suffering must befelt by “one of ourselves.” This fear has lit-tle or nothing to do with our concern for animpending misfortune to others, but ratherwith our perceived resemblance to the vic-

tim: We feel terror on our own behalf.Terror, in other words, is fear referred

back to ourselves. Therefore, the quality ofterror is at its highest point when fear isespecially acute and when acute sufferingis especially likely. What could possibly cre-ate more acute fear of probable victimiza-tion than the threat of nuclear terrorism?

Let us consider, in this connection, thequalitative difference between the bomb-ing that occurred in Oklahoma City andthe potential lethal irradiation of tens ofthousands of Oklahomans, either by“small” nuclear explosions or by radiologi-cal contamination. Although it is certainlyconceivable that higher-order nucleardestruction could prove to be counterpro-ductive to the aims of the terrorists whowould employ it, this does not necessarilysuggest a corresponding reluctance ontheir part to undertake such an escalation.After all, if terrorists are strictly logical,they might not foresee such counterpro-ductiveness, and if they are strictly “pas-sionate,” they might not care.

The pain occasioned by terrorism, a painthat confers power upon the terrorist,begins within the private body and spillsout into the body politic. Wanting the tworealms to become indistinguishable, theterrorist generally understands that it isnot enough that the victims feel pain.Rather, the pain must also be felt, vicari-ously but palpably, by all those who mightstill become victims in the future. The

22 Special Warfare

Preventing Nuclear Terrorism Against the United States: 10 Vital Questions

by Louis René Beres

Opinions expressed in this article arethose of the author and do not necessarilyreflect policies of the Department of theArmy or of the Department of Defense.

intent of terrorism is to change a prospec-tive victim’s general awareness that “Allpersons must die” to a more specific aware-ness that “I must die — and maybe soon.”Resorting to more destructive forms of ter-rorism can increase the quality of terrorand hasten this change. When the pain hasits origins in nuclear explosives or radioac-tivity, it is apt to be “felt” with specialintensity. Such a prospect should be takenvery seriously in the United States.

To undertake acts of nuclear terror,insurgent groups would require access tonuclear weapons, nuclear power plants, ornuclear waste-storage facilities. Shouldsuch groups seek to manufacture their ownnuclear weapons, they would requirestrategic special nuclear materials and theexpertise to convert these materials intobombs or radiological weapons. Bothrequirements are well within the reach ofcertain terrorist organizations, especiallysince the breakup of the Soviet Union.

10 vital questionsEffective strategies for prevention of

nuclear terror must be extrapolated frommore generic strategies of counterterror-ism. The development of these more gener-al strategies is itself contingent upon awillingness and a capacity to ask the rightquestions.

Until we can understand the particular

terrorist stance on situational risk-takingand the vital differences between terroristgroups on this stance, we will not be able toidentify a policy for the prevention andcontrol of nuclear terrorism, nor will we beable to fashion an effective U.S. strategy tocounter nuclear terrorism.2 By asking 10vital questions, scholars and policy-makerscan achieve a fuller understanding of therisk calculations made by terrorist organi-zations and the factors most likely to affectthose calculations.

1. Is there a particular ordering of pref-erences common to many or to all terroristgroups, or is there significant variationfrom one group to another? If it can bedetermined that many or all terroristgroups actually share a basic hierarchy ofpreferences, we can begin to shape a gen-eral strategy of operations to counternuclear terrorism. Alternatively, if signifi-cant variations in preference orderings canbe detected between terrorist groups, wewill have to identify myriad strategies ofan individually tailored nature, includingthe use of proactive measures, known inlaw as expressions of anticipatory self-defense.3

2. Are there particular preferencesthat tend to occupy the highest positionsin the preference hierarchies of terroristgroups, and how might these preferencesbe effectively obstructed? In this connec-tion, it is especially important to exam-

August 1996 23

ine the widely held assumption that ter-rorists, like states and countries, aremost anxious to avoid negative physicalsanctions. In fact, large amounts ofsophisticated conceptual analysis andexperimental evidence now indicate thatin certain circumstances, such sanctionsare apt to be ineffective and may evenprove counterproductive.

3. Would the obstruction of terrorist-group preferences prove offensive to someof our principal national values? We mustbe concerned about the possibility thateffective measures to counter nuclear ter-rorism might be starkly injurious to socialjustice and civil liberties. The U.S. govern-ment and the American people mustdecide whether the anticipated benefits ofantiterrorist legislation or activity wouldbe great enough to outweigh the prospec-tive costs.4

4. Would the implementation of effectivemeasures to counter nuclear terrorismrequire special patterns of internationalcooperation,5 and how might such patternsbe created? In principle, the surest path to

success in averting nuclear terrorismagainst the U.S. lies in a unified oppositionto terrorism by all states.6 Yet for the fore-seeable future, such opposition is assured-ly not in the cards. We must therefore askourselves what cooperative patternsbetween particular states can help copewith the threat.7

5. Might the decisional calculi of terror-ist groups be receptive to positive cues orsanctions, as opposed to negative ones, andwhich rewards seem to warrant seriousconsideration? This is a most sensitivequestion, as we don’t wish to violate thelong-standing peremptory8 principle of lawknown formally as Nullum crimen sinepoena, “No crime without a punishment.”9

At the same time, we should weigh thevalue of this principle10 against that of sav-ing lives, perhaps even tens of thousands oflives. It will not be an easy equilibrium toreach.

6. Are the risk calculations made by ter-rorist groups affected by their geographicdispersion and intermingling with otherstates, including those states friendly and

24 Special Warfare

Soviet Military Power

Since the breakup of theSoviet Union, some Sovietwar materials have becomeavailable to terrorist groups,including nuclear materials.

those hostile to this country? Because ter-rorist groups do not occupy territory in themanner that states (countries) do, they arenormally not susceptible to the usualthreats of deterrence. How, then, mighteffective measures to counter nuclear ter-rorism be reconciled with the reality of ter-rorist geographic dispersion?

7. Are the risk calculations made by ter-rorist groups affected by their particularrelations with host states? Because terror-ist groups necessarily operate within theframework of states, the relationshipbetween visitor and host will affect theviability of measures to counter nuclearterrorism. How, then, might our govern-ment exploit what is known about suchrelationships in curbing the threat ofnuclear terrorism?

8. Are the risk calculations made by ter-rorist groups affected by their alignmentswith states or with other terrorist groups?How can we use what we know about theseeffects to devise a productive program tocounter nuclear terrorism? The U.S. mustpay special attention to prevailing align-ments between radical Islamic groups andvarious Arab/Islamic states, and betweenradical Islamic groups themselves. Regard-ing inter-terrorist alignments in the Mid-dle East, things are not always what theyseem. The PLO and Hamas, for example,are not adversaries in any meaningfulsense (this notion is a fiction surroundingthe so-called Middle East Peace Process);they are distinct allies in all matters ofconsequence.11

9. Are the risk calculations made by ter-rorist groups affected by their patterns ofrandom and suicidal violence? In askingthis question, we acknowledge that terror-ism is a crime of passion and of logic. Weshould also acknowledge that a terroristgroup’s orientation toward death can playa decisive role in the group’s preferredform of operation.12

10. Are the risk calculations made by ter-rorist groups affected by the degree towhich their policies evoke sympathy andsupport from others? Because almost allacts of terror are essentially propagandis-tic, we must seek to understand the terror-ist’s desired effects on selected publics in

order to prevent the escalation of terrorismto a nuclear option.13

Legal considerationsNormally, questions relating to the pre-

vention of domestic terrorism would bedirected toward pertinent law-enforcementagencies. U.S. military forces conduct com-bat or conflict operations on foreign territo-ry and in foreign air and sea space. Becausecivilian rule is at the heart of the U.S. gov-ernment, there is a long-standing interestin limiting military involvement within thecountry. This interest has been expressed in

the Declaration of Independence, the Con-stitution, certain acts of Congress and cer-tain decisions of the Supreme Court. It isessentially determined by law in the PosseComitatus Act of 1878 (18 U.S.C. Sec. 1385).

The literal meaning of the Latin termposse comitatus is “power or authority ofthe county.” It brings to mind a body of per-sons summoned by a sheriff to help pre-serve the peace or to help enforce the law.These persons might be civilian or military.The Posse Comitatus Act provides: “Whoev-er, except in cases and under circumstancesauthorized by the Constitution or Act ofCongress, willfully uses any part of theArmy or the Air Force as a posse comitatusor otherwise to execute the laws shall befined not more than $10,000 or imprisonednot more than two years, or both.”

Yet five insurrection statutes comprisean important exception to the Posse Comi-tatus authority. Codified at 10 U.S.C., Secs.331-35 (1988), the statutes authorize thepresident to provide military assistance tostate governments upon request, or to usethe armed forces or the federalized militiaupon his own initiative to suppress any

August 1996 25

U.S. military forces conduct combat or con-flict operations on foreign territory and in for-eign air and sea space. Because civilian ruleis at the heart of the U.S. government, there isa long-standing interest in limiting militaryinvolvement within the country.

rebellion that makes it “impracticable toenforce the laws of the United States … byordinary course of judicial proceedings.”Sec. 333 also permits military interventionwhen the constitutional rights of anystate’s citizens are threatened by insurrec-tion, domestic violence, unlawful combina-tion or conspiracy. Another exception to thePosse Comitatus authority is found inH.R.J. Res. 1292, Pub. L. No. 90-331, 82Stat. 170 (1968), which directs federal

agencies, including the Department ofDefense, to assist the Secret Service in theperformance of its protective duties.

In fact, the domestic use of armed forceshas been a feature of our government sinceGeorge Washington called out the militiain 1794 to suppress the Whiskey Rebellion.Express constitutional authority for suchuse is found in Article 1, Sec. 8, which states:“The Congress shall have the power … toprovide for calling forth the Militia to exe-cute the Laws of the Union, suppressInsurrections and repel Invasions.” Addi-tional authority is found in Article IV, Sec.4, which imposes on the federal govern-ment the obligation to protect each state“against Invasion, and on Application ofthe Legislature, or of the Executive (whenthe Legislature cannot be convened)against domestic Violence.” Authority isalso found for the president in his Article IIpowers to faithfully execute the laws andto act as commander in chief of the armedforces.

There are, therefore, well-establishedbases in law for intranational militaryoperations to counter nuclear terrorism.Indeed, the Department of Justice hasstated that domestic use of military forcesis unlikely “except in extreme cases ofhighly sophisticated, paramilitary terror-ist operations” that lie beyond the capa-bilities of nonmilitary federal personnel.14

In an age of possible nuclear terrorismagainst the U.S., such cases may well beplausible.

SOF roleWhat about a specific role for special-

operations forces, or SOF, in preventingnuclear terrorism? In the U.S. militaryoperations in foreign territories mentionedearlier, one of SOF’s missions is to conductrear-area operations, to collect intelligence,and to conduct reconnaissance, includingthe identification of targets for subsequentattack. In the July 1995 issue of SpecialWarfare,15 Christopher Lamb identifiedSOF’s strengths: unorthodox approaches;unconventional training and equipment;political context and implications; and spe-cial intelligence requirements.

Clearly, all of these strengths would haveadvantages, but one of SOF’s less obviousstrengths is the ability to support domesticauthorities.16 At times, the lines betweenforeign and domestic operations may beblurred; for example, SOF could play anextremely important role in coordinatedpre-emption operations here and abroad.(According to Lamb, the Secretary ofDefense “has refused to rule out pre-emp-tion as a counterproliferation option, andpotential SOF missions in a pre-emptionscenario would be most demanding.”)

During the 1970s and 1980s, NATOcountries added counterterrorism to themissions of their special-operationsforces. Although this addition resulted invarious misgivings, given that terrorismis largely a criminal activity — and onethat is generally believed more appropri-ately assigned to civilian police agencies— the prospect of chemical, biological ornuclear terrorism lent credibility toSOF’s participation in counterterrorismoperations. Terrorism is expected to dom-inate a significant portion of the spec-trum of conflict at least until the end ofthe millennium. It is a threat againstwhich SOF operations could prove formi-dable and necessary (currently, suchoperations include inducement and sup-port of resistance in conflict situations;intelligence collection and reconnais-

26 Special Warfare

One of SOF’s less obvious strengths is theability to support domestic authorities. …SOF could play an extremely important rolein coordinated pre-emption operations hereand abroad.

sance; rescue operations; certain com-mand, control and communications coun-termeasures; counterinsurgency; counter-revolution; and counterterrorism.

Terrorist aimsIn seeking answers to the 10 vital ques-

tions that have been presented, policy-mak-ers should ask themselves an antecedentquestion: What does the terrorist hope toachieve? Here is a partial answer: Above all,the terrorist hopes to transform pain intopower. That transformation is not alwayseasy, as the correlation is not always propor-tionate. In some situations, it is possible thatby inflicting the most excruciating and far-reaching pain (the sort of pain that would begenerated by nuclear terrorism), terroristscould actually inhibit their power, whileinflicting less overwhelming pain couldenhance their power.

The terrorist who seeks to transformpain into power has already learned fromthe torturer. He understands that pain, inorder to be purposeful, must point fixedlytoward death but not actually result indeath. This is not to suggest that terror-ists do not sometimes seek to produce asmany corpses as possible, but leaving wit-nesses — American witnesses, in our par-ticular range of concern — is an essentialpart of the drama.

In the fashion of the torturer, the terror-ist takes what is usually private andincommunicable, the pain contained withinthe boundaries of the sufferer’s own body,and uses it to affect the behavior of others.A grotesque form of theater that drawspolitical power from the depths of privacy,terrorism manipulates and amplifies painwithin the individual’s body to influenceothers living outside that body. Violatingthe inviolable, terrorism declares withunspeakable cruelty not only that no one isimmune, but also that everyone’s most pri-vate horror can be made public.

The terrorist and his victims experiencepain and power as opposites. As the suffer-ing of the victims grows, so does the powerof the terrorist. And as the power of the ter-rorist grows, so does the pain of the victims.For the bystanders — and this includes all

Americans who are not directly involved ina particular terrorist attack — each inflic-tion of pain represents a mock execution, areminder of American vulnerability and adenial of absolute government power.17

There is one last point. Policy-makersshould be aware that terrorists’ selection of“quality” will be determined not only by theexpected effects upon the victims but also bythe expected effects upon the perpetrators.From the start, all terrorists have acceptedthe idea of violence as purposeful, in partbecause of its effect upon themselves.

“Violence,” says Franz Fanon in TheWretched of the Earth, “is a purifying force.It frees the native from his inferiority com-plex and from despair and inaction. Itmakes him fearless and restores his self-respect.” Galvanized by what they have longdescribed as a “battle of vengeance” (a termused frequently by Yassir Arafat’s Fatah),terrorists have seen in their cowardlyattacks not merely a way to influence victimpopulations, but also the Fanonian logic of“purifying” the victimizer. In the MiddleEast, the idea of purification has long beenat the heart of Fatah doctrine and is nowvery much in fashion among Hamasactivists. An early Fatah pamphlet, “TheRevolution and Violence: The Road to Victo-ry,” informed the reader that violence servesnot only to injure the opposition but, just asimportant, to “transform the revolutionary.”It is, according to the pamphlet, “a healingmedicine for all our people’s diseases.”

How much more “healing,” we must ask,and how much better for the “self-respect”of the terrorists, if they kill thousands oreven tens of thousands of civilian “ene-mies” rather than dozens? Such underlyingqueries must be kept carefully in mind asscholars and policy-makers attempt toanswer the 10 vital questions.

Louis René Beres is a pro-fessor of political science andinternational law at PurdueUniversity. He was educatedat Princeton University,where he received his Ph.D.in 1971. Beres is the authorof many books and articles on nuclear ter-

August 1996 27

rorism. His 1980 book, Terrorism and Glob-al Security: The Nuclear Threat (secondedition, 1987), was the featured main selec-tion of the Macmillan Library of Publicand International Affairs. He has lecturedon nuclear terrorism at the Nuclear ControlInstitute, the U.S. Arms Control and Disar-mament Agency, the Defense NuclearAgency and the JFK Special Warfare Cen-ter and School.

Notes:1 See, however, Louis René Beres, “Confronting

Nuclear Terrorism,” The Hastings International andComparative Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 1, Fall 1990, pp.129-54; Louis René Beres, “The United States andNuclear Terrorism in a Changing World: A Jurispru-dential View,” Dickinson Journal of InternationalLaw, Vol. 12, No. 2, Winter 1994, pp. 327-66; and LouisRené Beres, “On International Law and Nuclear Ter-rorism,” Georgia Journal of International And Com-parative Law, Vol. 24, No. 1, 1994, pp. 1-36. For policy-oriented scholarship by this author, see Louis RenéBeres, “The Meaning of Terrorism — Jurisprudentialand Definitional Clarifications,” Vanderbilt Journal ofTransnational Law, Vol. 28, No. 2, March 1995, pp.239-49; and Louis René Beres, “The Meaning of Ter-rorism for the Military Commander,” ComparativeStrategy: An International Journal, Vol. 14, No. 3,July-September 1995, pp. 287-99. Here, counterterror-ism is linked analytically to irregular warfare, whichis sometimes called low-intensity conflict, or LIC, aterm covering a broad area of military and nonmili-tary operations below the level of conventional com-bat between regular military forces. The U.S. JointChiefs of Staff include terrorism in their operationaldefinition of LIC (U.S. Dept. of Defense, 1985).

2 It should be noted that such a strategy would beentirely consistent with the expectations of interna-tional law. From the standpoint of these particularexpectations, any use of nuclear explosives or radia-tion by a terrorist group would represent a seriousviolation of the laws of war. These laws have now beenbrought to bear upon nonstate actors in world politicsby Article 3, common to the four Geneva Conventionsof Aug. 12, 1949, and by the two protocols to the con-ventions. Protocol I makes the law concerning inter-national conflicts applicable to conflicts fought forself-determination against alien occupation andagainst colonialist and racist regimes. A product ofthe Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation andDevelopment of International Humanitarian LawApplicable in Armed Conflicts that ended on June 10,1977, the protocol brings irregular forces within thefull scope of the law of armed conflict. Protocol II, alsoadditional to the Geneva Conventions, concerns pro-tection of victims of non-international armed con-flicts. Hence, this protocol applies to all armed con-flicts that are not covered by Protocol I and that takeplace within the territory of a state between its armedforces and dissident armed forces.

3 Such measures would be rooted jurisprudentially inthe 1837 Caroline incident, which concerned theunsuccessful rebellion in Upper Canada againstBritish rule. Then-U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Web-ster outlined a framework for self-defense that did notrequire actual attack. Military response to a threatcould be judged permissible so long as the dangerposed was “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice ofmeans and no moment for deliberation.” See 2 J.Moore, Digest Of International Law (1906): pp. 409-14.

4 This sort of decision is already current concerningcontroversy over the Comprehensive Terrorism Pre-vention Act of 1995. See Calendar No. 102, 104th Con-gress, 1st Session, S. 735, U.S. Senate, April/May 1995.

5 Such patterns, under the direction of internationallaw, are enforceable in the domestic courts of individ-ual states. In this connection, the U.S. has alreadyreserved the right to enforce international law withinits own courts. See U.S. Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 8.Here, acknowledging the decentralized/Westphaliansystem of international law, the Constitution confersupon Congress the power “to define and punish pira-cies and felonies committed on the high seas, andoffenses against the law of nations.”

6 In principle, such unified opposition flows, interalia, from the expectations of international law. Underthe Supremacy Clause (Art. 6) of the U.S. Constitution,these expectations form part of the law of the U.S. Thisincorporation is reaffirmed and broadened by variousU.S. Supreme Court decisions. See The PaqueteHabana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). See also Tel-Oren v.Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F. 2d 774, 781, 788 (D.C.Cir., 1984) (per curiam) (Edwards, J. concurring) (dis-missing the action, but making several references todomestic jurisdiction over extraterritorial offenses)(cert. denied, 470, U.S. 1003 (1985); Von Dardel v.U.S.S.R., 623 F. Supp, 246, 254 (D.D.C., 1985) (statingthat the “concept of extraordinary judicial jurisdictionover acts in violation of significant internationalstandards has also been embodied in the principle of‘universal violations of international law’ ”).

7 A counterterrorism regime exists in internationallaw, but this regime is decidedly unpromising for rea-sons of Realpolitik. For those who might be interestedin the authoritative sources of criminalization underinternational law, see European Convention on theSuppression of Terrorism, Done at Strasbourg, Nov.10, 1976. Entered into force Aug. 4, 1978. Europ. T.S.No. 90, reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 1272 (1976).

8 According to Article 53 of the Vienna Convention ofthe Law of Treaties: “A peremptory norm of generalinternational law is a norm accepted and recognizedby the international community of States as a wholefrom which no derogation is permitted and which canbe modified only by a subsequent norm of generalinternational law having the same character.” SeeVienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22,1969, Art. 53, U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties,First and Second Sessions, Mar. 26-May 24, 1968; andApr. 9-May 22, 1969. U.N. Doc. A/CONF., 39/27, at 289(1969), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).

9 The earliest expressions of Nullum crimen sinepoena can be found in the Code of Hammurabi (c.

28 Special Warfare

1728-1686 B.C.), the Laws of Eshnunna (c. 2000 B.C.),the even earlier Code of Ur-Nammu (c. 2100 B.C.)and, of course, the Lex Talionis or law of exact retali-ation, presented in three separate passages of theJewish Torah, or Biblical Pentateuch. At Nuremberg,the words used by the Court, “So far from it beingunjust to punish him, it would be unjust if his wrongwere allowed to go unpunished,” represented anemphatic contemporary reaffirmation of Nullumcrimen sine poena.10 The generic imperative to punish crimes was reaf-firmed at Principle I of the Nuremberg Principles(1946): “Any person who commits an act which consti-tutes a crime under international law is responsibletherefore and liable to punishment.” This obligationapplies especially to crimes of terrorism.11 According to the Egyptian daily, Al-Aharam(9/20/95), PLO and Hamas have concluded a numberof understandings. Similarly, Yediot Achronot, anIsraeli newspaper, reports (10/10/95) that PLO andHamas are currently engaged in a variety of inter-Palestinian confidence-building measures.12 Consider, for example, a recent statement by JamalAbdel Hamid Yussef, explaining operations of the Izze-dine al-Qassam Brigades, military wing of Hamas,Gaza: “Our suicide operations are a message … thatour people love death. Our goal is to die for the sake ofGod, and if we live we want to humiliate Jews andtrample on their necks.” (Cited in published debatebetween Professor Louis René Beres and Maj. Gen.[IDF/Res.] Shlomo Gazit, “The Security and Future ofIsrael: An Exchange,” Midstream June/July, 1995, p.15). Combined with access to nuclear weapons, suchan orientation to death must be examined closely.13 Public authorities must also seek to prevent terror-ist escalation to other “higher-order” forms of violencein which chemical and/or biological weapons are used.Just as the prospect of nuclear terrorism is linked tothe spread of nuclear weapons and technology among

states, so is the risk of chemical/biological terrorismlinked, inter alia, to the spread of CBW weapons andtechnology among states. There already exists aregime of international treaties, declarations andagreements designed to control chemical and biologi-cal weapons. See Declaration on the Prohibition ofChemical Weapons, Jan. 11, 1989, Department Of StateBulletin, March 1989, at 9, 28 I.L.M. 1020 (adopted bythe Conference on the Prohibition of the Development,Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological [Biologi-cal] and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr.10, 1972), 26 U.S.T. 583, 111 I.L.M. 310 (entered intoforce Mar. 26, 1975); and Protocol for the Prohibition ofthe Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or OtherGases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65, 14 I.L.M. 49(entered into force Feb. 8, 1928).14 See U.S. Department of Justice, The Use of MilitaryForce Under Federal Law to Deal with Civil Disordersand Domestic Violence 28 (1980).15 See Christopher Lamb, “Perspectives on EmergingSOF Roles and Missions,” Special Warfare, July 1995,pp. 2-9.16 Lamb offers a contrary view arguing, “Any militaryorganization, including SOF, that assumes a majorrole in support of domestic authorities risks its readi-ness to participate in other missions.” (p. 6.)17 Over time, a government’s lack of power to controlterrorism can rob it of authority. This is because thevery essence of any government’s authority lies in itsassurance of protection for the citizenry. “The obliga-tion of subjects to the sovereign,” says Thomas Hobbesin Chapter XXI of Leviathan, “is understood to last aslong, and no longer, than the power lasteth by whichhe is able to protect them.” The political philosophersBodin and Leibniz expressed similar views. Wheregovernment can no longer provide security, it can nolonger expect obedience.

August 1996 29

In October 1995, Special Warfare pub-lished a review essay by Steven Metz enti-tled, “A Wake for Clausewitz: Toward a Phi-losophy of 21st-Century Warfare.”1 Echo-ing the opinions of John Keegan and Mar-tin van Creveld, Metz argued that futurewar “will be fought not to pursue nationalinterests, but to kill enemy leaders, to con-vert opponents to one’s religion, to obtainbooty, or, sometimes, for simple entertain-ment. Thus the core of Clausewitz’s philos-ophy of war — that states wage wars usingarmies in pursuit of political objectives —will disappear.”2

Similarly, other writers have maintainedthat nuclear weaponry, transnational con-stabulary warfare, counterterrorism, coun-ternarcotrafficking and the increased com-partmentalization of political and militaryleadership evident in modern states haverendered obsolete Clausewitz’s definitionof war as an act of policy, and with it histripartite conception of war.3 Still otherauthors argue that the value of Clause-witz’s masterwork, On War, is diminishedbecause of its failure to address war as acultural phenomenon: It not only fails to

explain why wars occur, it views war fromonly a single perspective, from within theWestern nation-state paradigm.4

This essay will argue two points:1) The above arguments are based on afundamental misunderstanding of whatClausewitz meant by politics; and 2) Despite the technological changes nowunder way as a result of the current revo-lution in military affairs, and those alreadyin place because of the advent of nuclearweapons, Clausewitz’s tripartite concep-tion of war remains valid.

War and ‘Politik’Clausewitz’s description of war as a “con-

tinuation of politics (Politik) by othermeans” is well-known. Unfortunately, hisdescription is interpreted to mean that waris merely an act of state policy brought forthto achieve a political aim. At least part ofthe confusion surrounding this misunder-standing stems from the ambiguity of theGerman term Politik, for it means both pol-icy and politics. But Clausewitz alsodeserves some blame, for he neglected todefine in simple language how he wantedthis multivalent term to be understood.Indeed, German scholars and soldiers alikehave puzzled over his use of the term sincethe late 19th century. Some have postulatedthat Clausewitz’s Politik consisted of subjec-tive and objective elements. Subjective ele-ments concern decisions regarding the type

30 Special Warfare

A Wake for Clausewitz? Not Yet !

by Major Antulio J. Echevarria II

This article is a continuation of a discus-sion of military doctrine that has includedSteven Metz’s “A Wake for Clausewitz,” inthe October 1995 issue of Special Warfare,and Lieutenant Colonel William Jacobs’“The Human Element of Battle,” in the May1996 issue. — Editor

of war (limited or unlimited) to wage andthe war’s specific aims. Objective elementsinvolve the ideas, emotions and politicalinterrelationships unique to a given timeand place that affect those decisions to wagewar.5

In fact, Clausewitz’s use of the termimplied three things: First, Politik meantpolicy, the extension of the will of the state,the decision to pursue a goal, whetherpurely political or otherwise. Second, Poli-tik referred to politics as a physical state ofaffairs — the strengths and the weakness-es afforded to a state by its geopoliticalposition, its resources, its alliances and itstreaties — and as an ongoing process ofinternal interaction between a state’s keydecision-making institutions and the per-sonalities of the state’s policy-makers.Last, Politik functioned as a historicallycausative force for Clausewitz, providingan explanatory pattern or framework forcoherently viewing the various manifesta-tions of war over time.

We find the first of these definitions inChapter 1, Book I, of On War, which dis-cusses the nature of war. Because Clause-witz’s undated prefatory note (presumablywritten in 1830) indicates that he consid-ered only this chapter to be in final form,we are tempted not to read further.Although we would like to grasp theessence of Clausewitz’s philosophy of warat the cost of reading 15 pages rather than600 (or more than 800 in the latest Ger-man edition), this is not possible.

In fact, strong (though circumstantial)evidence exists that On War is closer tocompletion than Clausewitzian scholarspreviously believed.6 In any case, onewould do well to read beyond On War, toinclude as many of Clausewitz’s other writ-ings as possible. His notes on history andpolitics and his essay on “Agitation”(Umtriebe), for example, show that histhought was continually evolving, and thehefty tome On War represents barely athird of it.7 Although Clausewitz is oftenclearer when we read him in his native lan-guage, the primary prerequisites forunderstanding this great thinker are real-ly patience and the will to reflect.

In the last three books of On War —

Defense, Attack, and War Plans — Clause-witz gives mature ideas regarding theinfluence of politics on war. In these chap-ters his thought becomes more historicist,interpreting historical eras on their ownterms. He sees individuals as governed byinstitutions, values, beliefs and customsunique to a specific time and place.

In particular, in Book VIII, Chapter 3B,“The Scale of the Military Objective and ofthe Effort to be Made,” Clausewitz broadenshis conception of Politik to encompass thesecond definition mentioned above. Herefers to policy-making as being more thana mere act of intelligence or a product ofpure reason: It is “an art in the broadestmeaning of the term — the faculty of usingjudgment to detect the most important and

decisive elements in the vast array of factsand situations.”8 Clausewitz recognizes“judgment” itself as highly subjective, influ-enced by the “qualities of mind and charac-ter of the men making the decision — of therulers, statesmen, and commanders,whether these roles are united in a singleindividual or not.”9

States, and societies too, were not limitedin form to the monarchies (whether consti-tutional or absolutist) or to the semi-rigidsocial hierarchies characteristic of Clause-witz’s day, but were “determined by theirtimes and prevailing conditions.” States, forexample, could be united, sovereign enti-ties, a “personified intelligence actingaccording to simple and logical rules,” ormerely “an agglomeration of loosely associ-ated forces.”10 Hence, Clausewitz’s defini-tion applies equally well to feudal lords,drug lords or terrorist groups. EvenEurope’s numerous military institutions(e.g., its armies and command structures),he explained, have “differed in the various

August 1996 31

Despite the technological changes now underway as a result of the current revolution inmilitary affairs, and those already in placebecause of the advent of nuclear weapons,Clausewitz’s tripartite conception of warremains valid.

periods” of history.11 In fact, in his laterbooks Clausewitz refers to the “military” asa living body of institutions, procedures,philosophies and values, not as a static reg-imental corpus, as Keegan maintains.

Historical examplesClausewitz used several historical exam-

ples to illustrate how policy and politicalforces have shaped war from antiquity tothe modern age. His discussions in “TheScale of the Objective” address the vastlydifferent yet profoundly similar wars ofconquest and plunder carried out by thesemi-nomadic Tartars (or Tatars) and warsof expansion prosecuted by Napoleon.Clausewitz’s selection of the Tartars todemonstrate how politics direct war is sig-

nificant, for according to Keegan and vanCreveld, Tartar “tribal societies” fall out-side the Western nation-state paradigm.12

The Tartar tribes, along with other Tur-kic peoples, originated in Central Asia. Inthe 12th and 13th centuries they wereovertaken by the Mongols. The Tartars par-ticipated in the Mongol invasions into east-ern Europe and the Middle East.13 Theyalso converted to Islam and participated inthe Ottoman Jihads, or holy wars of con-version, against the West. Tartar bandseven raided Prussia in 1656-57, burninghundreds of villages, killing more than23,000 people and taking 34,000 to serveas slaves.14 They thus fought for booty, forreligious conversion, and for simple enter-tainment — all motives for future war,according to Metz and van Creveld.

Yet these motives, all of which fell underthe rubric of political forces in Clausewitz’seyes, developed from resources available tothe Tartars, from their geopolitical positionas a composite of Turkish and Mongolnations located in Central Asia, from their

nomadic culture and traditions, and fromthe religious influence of Islam.

While the systems that the Tartars usedto formulate policy might seem less sophis-ticated than those of Frederick the Greator Napoleon Bonaparte, they proved noless effective in terms of their ability todevelop strategies and to direct militaryforce in pursuit of political objectives. “Theaims a belligerent adopts, and theresources he employs, will be governed bythe particular characteristics of his own[geo-political] position; but they will alsoconform to the spirit of the age and to itsgeneral character.”15

Clausewitz’s use of Politik thus gave hima perspective on war that was both trans-historical and trans-cultural. A view that,although integrative, respected both his-torical and cultural uniqueness. Hence,Clausewitz saw the elements that shapepolicy both as situational and cultural, andas objective and subjective, which accordswell with the rational, nonrational andirrational factors used by current political-scientific models.16

In short, Clausewitz’s mature thoughtdoes not insist that warfare serve a purelyrational political aim. In any case, the def-inition of a rational political aim is largelysubjective. Terrorist groups employ suicidebombings, which they consider completelyrational. With this understanding of whatClausewitz meant by the term Politik, wecan now turn to a more detailed considera-tion of his tripartite conception of war.

‘Remarkable trinity’Clausewitz’s “remarkable or paradoxical

trinity,” as it is sometimes called, consti-tutes his framework, or model, for under-standing war’s changeable and diversenature. It comprises three forces, or ten-dencies: blind emotional force, chance andpolitics. “These three tendencies,” he wrote,“are like three different codes of law, deeplyrooted in their subject and yet variable intheir relationship to one another.”17 They,in turn, correspond to three representativebodies — the character and disposition ofthe populace, the skill and prowess of themilitary, and the wisdom and intelligence

32 Special Warfare

Advances in technology will not alter Clause-witz’s framework of war, because suchadvances affect war’s grammar, not its logic.In other words, new technologies change onlythe form, not the nature, of war.

of the government.Despite revolutionary advances in tech-

nology, this trinity will continue to be rele-vant to future war. Advances in technologywill not alter Clausewitz’s framework ofwar, because such advances affect war’sgrammar, not its logic. In other words, newtechnologies change only the form, not thenature, of war. Clausewitz saw war as amultidimensional and “chameleon-like”phenomenon, composed of subjective andobjective natures. The subjective natureconsists of war’smeans, since theyvary according totime and place. Theobjective nature, onthe other hand,encompasses the ele-ments of violence,uncertainty, chanceand friction; andwhile they embodynumerous varietiesand intensities, theyremain a constantpart of war regard-less of time andplace. Moreover,because war is notan autonomousactivity, but a socialand human event, it possesses two tenden-cies, escalation and reciprocation, which,without the moderating influence of policyand the debilitating force of friction, tend topush warfighting itself toward a violentextreme. Thus for Clausewitz, war mightchange its color like a chameleon, but itsessential nature remains constant — vio-lent, unpredictable and prone to escalation.

Information technologyThe continually evolving information

and communication technologies of thecurrent revolution in military affairs willmerely expand the immediacy — by short-ening the response time and heighteningthe sensitivity — of each component in thetrinity as it interacts with the others.18

Information technology will require anincrease in the intelligence level of soldiers

and civilians, or at least require that theyprocess more information in less time. Butinformation technology will not change thefact that ruling bodies, whether recognizedgovernments, revolutionary cells, terroristleaders or drug lords, will make or attemptto make decisions regarding when, where,how and why to apply military power. Poli-tik, in the form of alliances and treaties(whether perceived or real); the efficacy ofinstitutions involved in the decision-mak-ing process; and the general assumptions,

beliefs and expecta-tions of policy-mak-ers, will continue toinfluence thesedecisions.

Evidence concern-ing the Cuban Mis-sile Crisis and theOctober 1973 Arab-Israeli War showsthat even in the mod-ern age, mispercep-tions continue to cre-ate or exacerbate cri-sis situations.19 Tech-nology will speed thedelivery of informa-tion (which isalready approachingreal time); it will

even provide information in new forms(e.g., satellite imagery); and it may,depending on the scenario, reduce orexpand the time available to make a deci-sion. But decision-makers will continue toreceive that vast quantity of informationthrough subjective filters. Consequently,their decisions will remain largely a mat-ter of subjective judgment, and that judg-ment will in turn be shaped by politicalforces.

Paradoxically, new military technologycan increase and decrease violence, chance,uncertainty and friction in unforeseen anduneven ways. New weapons systems makeit possible for antagonists to observe and tostrike simultaneously throughout thedepth of the battlefield, thus eliminating“safe” areas. The multidimensional battle-field means that commanders must consid-er defeating an attack or a counterattack

August 1996 33

POLITICS

EMOTION CHANCE

GOVERNMENT

POPULACE MILITARY

Clausewitz’s “Remarkable Trinity”

from any number of directions and at anytime. A general lack of immunity will pre-vail as units at all echelons of commandand control face greater risk.20

Precision-guided weapons systems andmunitions increase the certainty of a hit ora kill, but the weak link in their effective-ness is the difficulty in obtaining reliableand timely target data.21 Enemies will con-tinue to take measures and countermea-sures to interrupt that data, and as aresult, our tactics will continue to change.Hence, new technology alone will not provedecisive in future war. We will require aharness of sorts — a flexible and compre-hensive doctrine that fully integrates thetactical, operational, and strategic levels ofwar. Thus, Clausewitz’s concept of theobjective nature of war will remain rele-vant in the future.

Even the development of nuclearweaponry, the so-called absolute weapon,has not caused the “death” of Clausewitz,as some have claimed.22 The evolution ofU.S. nuclear strategy from “massive retali-ation” to “flexible response” during theCold War clearly reveals that Politikretained its influence even in a nuclearenvironment.23 Policy-makers respondedto the changing political situations, to thegrowing strike and counterstrike capabili-ties, and to the general will of the populacein determining that nuclear war did notsuit U.S. political objectives. Consequently,other more conventional forms of warreceived greater attention while nuclearweaponry assumed a deterrence role.

Although phenomena like “superconduc-tivity” — the elimination of friction byreducing the chain of events that mustoccur between the decision to launch andthe actual launch of a nuclear strike — andrunaway escalation might reduce or negateentirely the influence that policy-makershave on the conduct of a nuclear war, theserealities are merely products of thetimes.24 They constitute what Clausewitzin his historicist approach would havecalled the subjective elements of war — themeans selected for its prosecution — andwould serve to distinguish nuclear warfrom other forms of war. In fact, far fromlimiting the influence that Politik has

exerted over military action, the Cold Waractually increased it.

Moreover, nuclear weapons have not ren-dered irrelevant the intelligence of the gov-ernment, the skill of the military and theemotive force of the populace, as someauthors believe. Rather, each of the corre-sponding components of the trinity haschanged over time, adapting to an evolvingenvironment. Diplomacy has become moreaware that military action of any sortmight generate unintended consequencesand runaway escalation, and it has devel-oped systemic checks and precautions tolimit them. Indeed, in a world order inwhich a limited nuclear exchange mightoccur between states or groups possessingrelatively small arsenals, political influ-ence has increased.25

For its part, the military has graduallyaltered its age-old warrior ethos and nowprizes rather than eschews intelligenceand technical expertise. The populace, too,has changed, becoming more educated andmore politicized, and growing increasinglysensitive to the fact that its future rests inthe hands of a chosen few. Such develop-ments do not invalidate Clausewitz’s trini-ty, but speak instead to its lasting durabil-ity and intrinsic dynamism.

Of course, not all of Clausewitz’s militarythought has remained relevant. His visionof war, for example, did not include eco-nomic, air, sea and space dimensions. Buthis conception of war, his remarkable trin-ity, and his grasp of the relationshipbetween Politik and war will remain validas long as states, drug lords, warrior clansand terrorist groups have a mind to wagewar.

Major Antulio J. Echevar-ria II is the S3 for the 3rdSquadron, 16th Cavalry, FortKnox, Ky., and serves as anArmor School military histo-ry educator. A former assis-tant professor of history atthe U.S. Military Academy at West Point,Echevarria is the author of numerous arti-cles on European history and military the-ory. He holds a bachelor’s degree from West

34 Special Warfare

Point and a master’s and a Ph.D. fromPrinceton University.

Notes:1 Steven Metz, “A Wake for Clausewitz: Toward a

Philosophy of 21st-Century Warfare,” Special Warfare(October 1995): 22-28. The essay, which also appearedin Parameters 24, No. 4 (Winter 1994-95): 126-32,reviewed Alvin and Heidi Toffler’s War and Anti-War,John Keegan’s A History of Warfare, and Martin vanCreveld’s The Transformation of War.

2 Metz, “Wake for Clausewitz,” 26.3 John E. Sheppard, Jr., “On War: Is Clausewitz Still

Relevant?” Parameters (September 1990): 85-99; Mar-tin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (NewYork: Free Press, 1991), esp. 33-62.

4 John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York:Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 11ff.

5 E. Kessel, “Zur Genesis der modernenKriegslehren,” Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau 3,No. 9 (July 1953): 405-23, esp. 410-17. See also: Hnn.cRothfels, Carl von Clausewitz. Politik und Krieg. Eineideengeschichtliche Studie (Berlin: Dümmler, 1920).In its polemics with Hans Delbrück, the GermanGreat General Staff argued that war was indeed sub-ordinate to politics, but that political forces hadchanged since Clausewitz’s day. They saw politics as aSocial-Darwinistic struggle for national existencethat demanded war waged to the utmost.

6 Azar Gat, “Clausewitz’s Final Notes,” MilitArgeschichtliche Miffeitungen (1/89): 45-50. The essayalso appears in Azar Gat, The Origins of MilitaryThought from the Enlightenment to Clausewitz(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 255-63.

7 These and other essays can be found in Englishtranslation in Carl von Clausewitz, Historical andPolitical Writings, ed. and trans. by Peter Paret andDaniel Moran (Princeton: Princeton University Press,1992).

8 On War, VIII, 3B, 585.9 On War, VIII, 3B, 586.

10 On War, VIII, 3B, pp. 586 and 588.11 On War, VIII, 3B, 588.12 Keegan, esp. 11-40; and Creveld, esp. 33-62.13 Douglas S. Benson, The Tartar War (Chicago: Mav-erick Publishing, 1981).14 F.L. Carsten, The Origins of Prussia (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1954), 208.15 On War, VlII, 3B, 594.16 See the discussion by Christopher Bassford inClausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz inBritain and America 1815-1945 (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 1994), 22-24; and his essay, “JohnKeegan and the Grand Tradition of Trashing Clause-witz: A Polemic,” War in History I, No. 3 (1994), 319-36.17 On War, I, 1, 89.18 See also Jablonsky, 34.19 Robert B. McCalla, Uncertain Perceptions: U.S.Cold War Crisis Decision Making (Ann Arbor: Univer-sity of Michigan Press, 1992).20 Avrahanl Rotem, “The Land Battle of the 1990s,” inTechnology and Strategy: Future Trends, ed. ShaiFeldman (Jerusalem: The Jaffee Center for Strategic

Studies, 1989), 56.21 Shai Feldman, “Technology and Strategy: Conclud-ing Remarks,” in Technology and Strategy, 130.22 Sheppard, 88-91; and Martin van Creveld, NuclearProliferation and the Future of Conflict (New York:The Free Press, 1993), esp. 43-64.23 Of course, the development of U.S. nuclear strategydoes not end there. The strategies of the early 1960seventually gave rise to mutual-assured destruction,mutual-agreed assured destruction, Carter’s counter-vailing strategy, Reagan’s strategic defense initiative,etc. Donald M. Snow, National Security: EnduringProblems in a Changing Defense Environment, 2nded. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991); Henry S.Rowen, “The Evolution of Strategic Nuclear Doctrine,”in Strategic Thought in the Nuclear Age, ed. LaurenceMartin (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,1981), 131-56; and Fan Zhen Jiang, “Is War Obsolete?A Chinese Perspective,” in Essays on Strategy VI, ed.Thomas C. Gill (Washington, D.C.: National DefenseUniversity Press, 1989), 189-201.24 Stephen J. Cimbala, Force and Diplomacy in theFuture (New York: Praeger, 1992); and Richard N.Lebow, “Clausewitz and Crisis Stability,” Political Sci-ence Quarterly 1 (Spring 1988): 81-110.25 Jerome Kahan, Nuclear Threats from Small States(Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College,Strategic Studies Institute, 1994).

August 1996 35

Army Field Manual 100-25, Doctrine forArmy Special Operations Forces, is beingrevised and is tentatively scheduled for pub-lication in 1997. The capstone publicationfor Army special operations, FM 100-25 con-tains the fundamental principles, the con-cepts and the theory of Army special-opera-tions forces, or ARSOF. It focuses on thenature of Army special operations and onthe role of ARSOF in conducting and sup-porting the full range of SOF missions.

The revised edition will also address therole of ARSOF as part of a joint, combined,United Nations, or interagency task forcewhose mission is to conduct sophisticated,often sensitive, operations across the spec-trum of conflict. It will be consistent withUnited States national policy and strategyas well as with other joint publications andArmy 100-series doctrinal manuals.

In 1994, the Directorate of Training andDoctrine, or DOTD, U.S. Army John F.Kennedy Special Warfare Center andSchool, reorganized into functional areasand re-evaluated its doctrinal publicationsstructure. The chief of DOTD’s Joint andArmy Doctrine Division was designated pri-mary author and executive agent for therevised publication of FM 100-25.

The concept and production schedule forthe manual were approved in September1995. Authors from the JFKSWCS and theArmy Special Operations Command formedassessment, evaluation and writing teams.Traveling to various ARSOF units andmeeting with headquarters and staff per-sonnel, these teams assessed the units,addressed doctrinal issues, and drafted res-olutions. Upon returning to Fort Bragg, theauthors began writing a series of whitepapers that would become the nucleus of therevision to FM 100-25.

The white papers covered a variety of top-ics: ARSOF missions; logistics; command,control, communications and computers, orC4; Psychological Operations, or PSYOP;Civil Affairs, or CA; Special Forces, or SF;and Intelligence, Signal, Aviation, andRanger operations. After the director ofDOTD had approved the white papers, theJoint and Army Doctrine Division hosted aconference at the JFKSWCS in January1996 to promote discussion of the papersamong key operational commanders, staffs,and subject-matter experts.

After the authors had briefed their whitepapers, conference participants formed intoworking groups to identify and resolveARSOF issues. Each group consisted of amix of SF, PSYOP, CA, Intelligence, Signal,Logistics, Ranger and Aviation action offi-cers, enabling the participants to shareinformation from their various areas ofexpertise. Issues that could not be resolved

36 Special Warfare

Field Manual 100-25: Updating Army SOF Doctrine

by Steven E. Cook

This article explains the proceduresinvolved in planning, writing and approv-ing the content of the updated FM 100-25,Doctrine for Army Special OperationsForces. — Editor

were briefed back to the consolidated con-ference attendees and submitted to DOTDfor resolution.

Guided by feedback from field command-ers and subject-matter experts who hadattended the conference, the authorsrevised the white papers. The papers werestaffed to JFKSWCS and operational unitsin February 1996. In March, staffing com-ments were integrated into the whitepapers. Once the white papers were collatedand standardized, the authors began theprocess of revising FM 100-25.

The revised edition of FM 100-25 will con-tain eight chapters:

Chapter 1: Introduction and a conceptualstrategic landscape for the next seven years.

Chapter 2: ARSOF fundamentals.Chapter 3: ARSOF missions and collater-

al activities.Chapter 4: ARSOF command and con-

trol; ARSOF support to U.S. Ambassadorsand unified combatant commanders;overview of USSOCOM, theater special-operations commands, USASOC and vari-ous task forces.

Chapter 5: Army special-operations forces.Chapter 6: ARSOF intelligence-support

activities.Chapter 7: ARSOF C4 support.Chapter 8: ARSOF sustainment.Capstone and FM 100-series publications

describe the Army’s warfighting and train-ing principles that apply to the execution ofArmy missions in support of the nationalmilitary strategy, and they provide the foun-dation for all doctrinal and training publica-tions. Because FM 100-25 is a capstonemanual and a 100-series publication, itmust be evaluated by TRADOC’s Doctrineand Approval Group, or DRAG, process.During the DRAG process, which is tenta-tively scheduled for March 1997, theTRADOC commander and his staff, as wellas the majority of Army service-school andcenter commanders, will be able to reviewFM 100-25. The chief of the Joint and ArmyDoctrine Division will present an overviewof each chapter in the manual and discussany unresolved issues.

On March 4, 1983, in a speech titled, “TheRole of Special Operations in United StatesStrategy for the 1980s,” then-Secretary of

the Army John O. Marsh Jr. stated:“The development of doctrine is the cor-

nerstone upon which a special-operations-forces capability can be erected. It is my per-sonal view that our failure in the past tolink special operations with national strate-gy through the defense guidance — andthereby to develop doctrine — has prevent-ed special operations in the Army from gain-ing permanence and acceptability withinthe ranks of the military.”

The revised FM 100-25 will assist SOF ingaining that permanence and acceptabilityby complementing joint doctrine and by pro-viding the bridge from joint special-opera-tions doctrine to Army special-operationsdoctrine. It will provide the foundation forArmy service-school curricula and serve asthe basis for the development of ARSOFdoctrine, training, force structure andmateriel. It will offer operational, planningand functional guidance to commanders,staffs and trainers at the operational level.But most important, the new FM 100-25will will incorporate evolving doctrine andwill lead ARSOF into the 21st century.

Steven E. Cook is a civilianemployee assigned to theJoint and Army DoctrineDivision of the JFK SpecialWarfare Center and School’sDirectorate of Training andDoctrine. In other civilianassignments at SWCS, he has served as aninstructor on the Special Forces Operationsand Intelligence Committee and as a proj-ect officer in the Directorate of CombatDevelopments. His military service includesfour tours in Southeast Asia as an NCO inairborne infantry, pathfinder and recon-naissance units. As a Special Forces officer,he served as an A-detachment executiveofficer, detachment commander, companycommander and battalion executive officer.

August 1996 37

Since the creation of the TheaterArmy Special Operations Support Com-mand, or TASOSC, in the mid-1980s,there has been confusion over the pur-poses, capabilities and operating proce-dures of the regional elements that sup-port special-operations forces in theater.

Differences among the various regionalsupport elements, as well as a variety ofacronyms — TASOSC, SOTSE andSOSCOM, for example — have only addedto the confusion. And the lack of under-standing is not limited to conventionalcommands: The SOF community itselfshares different opinions about the func-tions that SOF support elements shouldaccomplish and the means by which thosefunctions should be executed.

It is imperative that we identify thespecific functions that the ARSOF sup-port structure should accomplish, thatwe organize it to perform those func-tions effectively, and that we allocateenough skilled personnel to perform theassigned tasks.

What follows is an attempt to describeand quantify what has worked forARSOF operators and supporters in theU.S. Central Command, or USCENT-COM. The observations presented arebased on the experience of personnelwho have been performing the supportplanning and the coordinating tasks forthe past five years. While it is not neces-sarily a prescription for all theaters, the

information may serve as a model forthe unification of direction and effortnecessary to properly support deployedARSOF around the world.

BackgroundPrior to the creation of the TASOSC,

support for deployed ARSOF was coordi-nated directly by the deploying ARSOFelement, whether it was a task force, anoperational detachment or a section. TheTASOSC was needed to address the lackof support from the conventional Armysupport structure within the varioustheaters.

The European theater provided theframework in which the TASOSCevolved. The mission of the U.S. ArmyEurope’s 7th TASOSC was to plan, tocoordinate and to monitor support andsustainment of personnel, intelligence,communications, and logistics re-sources for ARSOF. Since USAREURwas responsible for a forward-deployedSpecial Forces battalion in Germany,the 7th TASOSC, which was autho-rized 99 personnel, assumed addition-al responsibilities for command (lessoperational control) and support of thebattalion.

By 1990, every theater had aTASOSC, either assigned or attached.The TASOSCs ensured coordination ofsupport for ARSOF and provided a the-

38 Special Warfare

Logistics for Deployed Army Special Operations Forces: A Pathway to Support

By Lieutenant Colonel Philip E. Bradford, U.S. Army (ret.); Major David C. Lawson;Chief Warrant Officer 4 John W. Fulcher; and Sergeant Major Alvin Lester

ater-level point of contact for ARSOFsupport issues. The TASOSCs made sig-nificant improvements in identifyingsupport requirements and in elicitingsupport from the conventional supportstructure.

The TASOSC was designed to focuson administrative and logistics sup-port issues and to execute “commandless OPCON” guidance and oversightfor in-theater ARSOF. Those theaterswith forward-based Special Forcesunits or detachments soon becameinvolved in direct command-and-con-trol issues, which eventually escalatedto the general-officer level for resolu-tion. In certain theaters, Army person-nel from the TASOSC were directlycontrolled by the regional SpecialOperations Command, or SOC. Be-cause the TASOSC often lost control ofits personnel to SOC requirements, itseffectiveness in dealing with Armysupport issues diminished. In othertheaters, TASOSC operations wereperceived by the supported ARSOFelements as bureaucratic, unrespon-sive and not worth the diversion ofARSOF personnel into a dedicatedsupport role.

These conditions were not ignored bythe U.S. Army Special Operations Com-mand, or USASOC. In 1995, USASOCactivated the Fort Bragg-based SpecialOperations Support Command, orSOSCOM. SOSCOM, focusing on logis-tics issues and providing command andcontrol for the 528th Special OperationsSupport Battalion and for the 112th Sig-nal Battalion, became the support head-quarters for USASOC.

At the same time, the TASOSCswere inactivated and replaced by spe-cial-operations theater-support ele-ments, or SOTSEs, attached to eitherthe theater Army or the Army servicecomponent command, or ASCC. TheSOTSEs represent ARSOF’s logisticsinterests as an integral part of the G3or G4 staffs of the theater Army or ofthe ASCC. SOTSEs were designed tofocus strictly on logistics-supportissues and to be free of command

responsibilities and administrativeand intelligence functions.

ARCENT SOTSEThe SOTSE for the Army component

of USCENTCOM, or ARCENT, wasestablished in 1995 from the former 5thTheater Army Special Operations Sup-port Command, which had been estab-lished in 1990.

Although the ARCENT SOTSE islimited in its logistics planning andcoordination capability, its manninglevel is organized to provide a definitesupport structure to deployed ARSOFin the CENTCOM area of responsibili-ty, or AOR. The ARCENT SOTSE canadequately support all JCS-level andSOCCENT-sponsored exercises involv-ing the regionally aligned SpecialForces group, and it can support allARCENT training exercises and con-tingency operations in the AOR. How-ever, the ARCENT SOTSE routinelyfinds itself unable to provide simulta-neous support planning and coordina-

August 1996 39

Photo by Keith Butler

While the 112th Signal Bat-talion and the 528th SupportBattalion focus on logisticsand command-and-controlissues, SOTSEs representARSOF logistics interestsas part of the theater Armyor Army service componentcommand.

tion to other ARSOF (Rangers, SpecialOperations Aviation, Civil Affairsand/or PSYOP) exercising or operatingin the CENTCOM AOR.

FunctionsThe ARCENT SOTSE is integrated

into the ARCENT staff and operates asa separate division within the G4. Oneof its functions is to develop theatersupport plans. The SOTSE combinesthe ARSOF support requirements inSOCCENT and CENTCOM conceptplans and operations plans. TheSOTSE then incorporates those sup-port requirements into ARCENT sup-port plans and develops ARSOF sup-port appendixes for the logisticsannexes to each supporting war plan.

These appendixes define the specificresponsibilities and relationships withregard to the support of ARSOF desig-nated to participate in each war plan.The appendixes also provide informa-tion on the support structure, ARSOFunit flow into theater, and the typeand capabilities of each supportingunit.

ARCENT is responsible for the sup-port and sustainment of deployedARSOF in the CENTCOM AOR. TheARCENT SOTSE coordinates ARSOFstatements of requirements, or SORs,through the ARCENT G4. However,because of the lack of an Army supportstructure in all but two of the countriesin the AOR, the SOTSE must oftenplan for support from host-nationsources and then coordinate and moni-tor that support. In the countrieswhere Army support is available, the

SOTSE coordinates for logistics sup-port through the existing ASCC sup-port structure.

The ARCENT SOTSE must maintaina keen awareness of the current andfuture JCS-level and SOCCENT-spon-sored exercises and operations in theAOR to perform its logistics-supportplanning and coordination role. TheARCENT SOTSE maintains regular andclose coordination with the SOCCENTJ3/J4 staffs, the ARCENT Exercises andTraining Division/G3, the SOSCOMLogistical Operations Division, and theARSOF unit S3s and S4s. The SOTSEfocuses primarily on the regionallyaligned SF group, since the SF group isthe largest user of SOTSE assets andsupport.

When required to participate in exer-cises and operations within the AOR,detachments or task forces of the region-ally aligned SF group formally requestthe assistance of the ARCENT SOTSE.The ARCENT SOTSE also supports mis-sions at the SF B-detachment level andhigher. Personnel limitations have pre-vented SOTSE support to the missionsof individual A-detachments or of JointCombined Exchange Training, or JCET.

To ensure the timeliness of its supportto deployed ARSOF, the SOTSE continu-ally updates, reconciles and revises theexercise calendar, using information itreceives from ARSOF units, ARCENTand SOCCENT.

For each company-level operation, theARCENT SOTSE assigns one of itsmembers as the primary point of con-tact. The POC is either a special-opera-tions officer, a logistics officer, or a seniorNCO. The POC is teamed with anothermember of the SOTSE or with a memberof the SOSCOM, depending on theregional optempo and personnel con-straints. The team performs the supportplanning and the logistics coordinationfunctions so that ARSOF can conducttheir designated mission.

The ARCENT SOTSE POC coordi-nates with the ARSOF support POC toprovide country-clearance informationand to synchronize deployment sched-

40 Special Warfare

To plan effectively, the SOTSE must becomeinvolved in the early stages of the exerciseplanning process, conduct detailed supportplanning in conjunction with ARSOFdetachment planners, and conduct thor-ough logistics coordination.

ules. He forwards the information to theSOC for validation and consolidationbefore the SOTSE’s support team entersthe AOR. SOTSE personnel obtain anyrequired visas and prepare travelorders. Continual communicationbetween the SOTSE support team andthe ARSOF support POC is vital.

Before each deployment, the SOTSEsupport team presents the SOTSE chiefwith a detailed briefback on its planningand coordination efforts. The briefbackinformation is used by the ARSOFdetachment or task force in preparingcomprehensive support plans. Uponreturning from a mission, the SOTSEsupport team debriefs the SOTSE chiefand prepares an after-action review, orAAR. The AAR will serve as a record oflessons learned for future exercises andoperations.

Mission planningTo plan effectively, the SOTSE must

become involved in the early stages ofthe exercise planning process, conductdetailed support planning in conjunctionwith ARSOF detachment planners, andconduct thorough logistics coordination.Early deployment to the operation siteenables SOTSE personnel to conductproper ARSOF reception, staging,onward movement and integration func-tions when other theater assets areabsent. The SOTSE provides a smoothtransition into the AOR for the advanceparty of the ARSOF element. This allowsthe advance party to focus on prepara-tion and operational activities.

About 120 to 150 days before an exer-cise, the SOTSE POC, the ARSOFdetachment, the SOCCENT POCs, thehost-nation counterparts, and U.S.Embassy personnel perform the initialsupport-planning functions. The SOTSEPOC initiates contact with all partici-pants at this time. Also, the SOTSE sup-port team assists the ARSOF element informulating support plans and in draft-ing an SOR.

Approximately 90 days before theexercise, the participants conduct a mid-

planning conference/pre-deploymentsite survey. The SOTSE support team’smain function at this point is to help theARSOF element confirm its require-ments and to identify sources of support.Participants discuss the details of sup-port necessary for the exercise and com-plete critical host-nation and embassycoordination. Through the process, theygain an understanding of how theevent’s support requirements will becarried out; they also view the locationsof training and support facilities.

The final planning conference is usu-ally held within 30 days of the exercise.For the participants, this is the lastopportunity to resolve any remainingsupport issues and to effect final coordi-nation. The SOTSE makes sure that thedetachment’s support requirements arefully coordinated among all the support-ing agencies. The SOTSE also assists thedetachment in completing all supportagreements and support documentation.The SOTSE POC confirms all deploy-ment timetables and synchronizes thesupport schedule with the ARSOF ele-ment POC.

Exercise/Operation supportThe ARCENT SOTSE operation-sup-

port role revolves around the SOR con-solidation and coordination process. TheSOTSE ensures that each ARSOF unitcompiles a comprehensive and valid SORearly in the planning cycle. This taskusually requires the assistance andinvolvement of a SOTSE support team.The ARSOF element formulates a list ofrequirements, which is coordinatedthrough its higher-headquarters logisticsstaff and is then passed to the USASOCDCSLOG for tasking out. The SOTSEconducts simultaneous coordination withthe SOSCOM and the ASCC.

The ARCENT SOTSE and theARCENT G4 supply and services branchcoordinate an ARSOF element’s require-ments with the Army CENTCOM sup-port structure. Unfortunately, in theCENTCOM AOR there are only twocountries that have a support system in

August 1996 41

place; in all the other countries, ARSOFmust rely heavily upon host-nation andcontractual support.

Unfulfilled support requirements areforwarded to the SOC for validation.SOCCENT passes the validatedrequirements to CENTCOM, whichascertains whether support is availablethrough the host nation or whether fur-ther contract acquisition is necessary.Ideally, the ARSOF element’s require-ments are resolved before the finalplanning conference. Final supportplans will then accurately identifylogistics responsibilities and thesources and levels of support.

Once the ARCENT SOTSE hasdeployed in theater, the surroundingconditions and circumstances dictateits actions. Supported exercises andoperations require that the SOTSEsupport team deploy to the operationalarea as much as a week before thearrival of the ARSOF element’sadvance party. The support team facil-itates the arrival of the advance partyand helps integrate it into Army, host-

nation or contractual support. Thesupport team also assists the advanceparty in preparing to receive the mainbody; it identifies the locations of allcoordinated support services and sys-tems; and it provides any other assist-ance that time allows.

Once the main body arrives, theSOTSE assists the advance party andensures that the ARSOF element haslogistics support. The SOTSE ensuresthat all transportation requirements forpassengers and equipment are fullycoordinated. ARCENT SOTSE personnelare licensed to operate many differentmilitary and commercial vehicles andcan assist in the actual movement proc-ess in emergency situations.

The SOTSE support team also inter-faces with the SOC staff or with thestaff of a Joint Special Operations TaskForce, or JSOTF. In some rareinstances, it has performed the role ofthe J4/Director of Logistics, monitoringall host-nation support, including theflow of goods and services contractedthrough the contracting officer or

42 Special Warfare

SOR Process

INITIAL SOTSE INTERFACE

SOTSE RECEIVES

SOR

COORDINATION WITH THEATER LOG & SOSCOM

SOTSE IDENTIFIES SUPPORT

ARSOF UNIT/TF

IDENTIFIED

LOG ESTIMATE DEVELOPED

SOR PRODUCED

SOC RECEIVES MISSION

SOC J4

ARSOF CONFIRMATION OF SPT COORD

through contracts established by theU.S. Embassy. The support team moni-tors and assists in the coordination ofrequirements associated with all sup-port operations. The close workingrelationship that the support team fos-ters and maintains with the JSOTF orSOC staff, embassy support personnel,ARSOF task force and host-nation sup-port representatives plays a valuablerole in the success of the SOTSE’slogistics planning and coordinationfunctions.

The SOTSE support team alsoassists the ARSOF element in itspreparation for redeployment and inits integration into the appropriatereturn transportation system. The sup-port team maintains coordination withthe host nation, U.S. Embassy person-nel and any existing support structureto ensure that redeployment is smoothand effective.

The SOTSE support team redeploys toits home station after it has completedall departure activities. The team thencompiles a detailed debriefing, based onthe experiences gained during the oper-ation, and presents it to the chief andother members of the SOTSE. TheARCENT and SOSCOM staffs also haveaccess to the debriefing.

SummarySupport to deployed ARSOF is the

responsibility of the ASCC. Concertedefforts should be made to avoid dupli-cation of the conventional supportstructure provided by the ASCC. Sever-al well-placed and technically profi-cient personnel with the ability to per-form effective coordination and liaisonfunctions between ARSOF and conven-tional support planners and providerscan ensure that essential support isprovided in a timely manner and atsignificantly less expense than estab-lishing and operating a separate sup-port system.

As it performs its planning and coor-dination mission, the ARCENT SOTSEmust keep ARSOF operators and

ARSOF support requirements fore-most in mind. Over the past threeyears, the 5th TASOSC/ARCENTSOTSE has received positive feedbackfor every mission it has coordinated.This feedback has come from the SOC,the task force commander, and staffmembers. The ability of the ARCENTSOTSE to satisfy the needs of ARSOFin theater has been directly affected bythree factors: a specified method ofoperation that the supported ARSOFelement could understand; an ade-quate number of trained personnel toconduct the requisite liaison; andeffective coordination and communica-tion between the supported elementand the supporting elements. Althoughthe required/authorized strength levelof the ARCENT SOTSE remains apoint of discussion, the process bywhich ARSOF requirements have beencoordinated within established the-ater-support procedures clearly works.This success is a testament to the closecooperation and teamwork (at variouscommand and staff levels) between thesupported units and elements and thesupporting units and elements.ARCENT SOTSE operations serve asa pathway to effective support.

Lieutenant Colonel PhilipE. Bradford recently retiredfrom the Army as chief of theArmy Forces Central Com-mand Special OperationsTheater Support Element,assigned to the Special Oper-ations Support Command, USASOC. Hehas served in the 10th Special ForcesGroup as commander of ODA 045 and ofODB 070 and as executive officer of thesupport battalion. At the JFK Special War-fare Center and School, he served as theexecutive officer both for the 1st SpecialWarfare Training Group and for 3rd Bat-talion, 1st Special Warfare TrainingGroup. He also commanded the 5th SpecialOperations Support Command at FortMcPherson, Ga. Bradford graduated fromMichigan State University in 1974 and has

August 1996 43

a master’s degree in management fromWebster University.

Major David C. Lawson isthe support operations officerfor the ARCENT SOTSE. Hehas served as the S3 and asthe S4 for the 5th SpecialOperations Support Com-mand; as an armored cavalryplatoon leader, troop XO and squadron S3in the 1st Cavalry Division; and as a multi-functional logistics officer in a variety ofcommand and staff positions in Germanyand at Fort McPherson, Ga. Lawson gradu-ated from Louisiana State University.

Chief Warrant Officer 4John W. Fulcher is the main-tenance officer for theARCENT SOTSE. He hasserved as the property-bookofficer for the forward supportteam, 2nd Battalion, 7th Spe-cial Forces Group; HQ, 7th Special ForcesGroup; and the 5th Special Operations Sup-port Command. He has an associate’s degreein electronics from Fayetteville TechnicalCommunity College, Fayetteville, N.C.

Sergeant Major AlvinLester is assigned to theARCENT SOTSE, FortMcPherson, Ga. He has servedin logistics assignments inKorea; and completed twotours in Germany with the3rd Infantry Division, MMC, and with HHC,2nd Area Support Group. Lester has alsoserved in the Property Book Office, 82nd Air-borne Division, Fort Bragg, N.C. He gradu-ated from the Army Sergeants Major Acade-my at Fort Bliss, Texas, in 1994.

44 Special Warfare

Cable correct about FIDDr. Larry Cable’s article on

Special Forces and the indirect-action environment (January1996) was excellent. I have beena great fan of his since I heardhis presentation at the SpecialForces Conference in 1994.Over the past decade, SpecialForces efforts have often beenfocused on missions in directsupport of the big Army, but Iagree with Cable’s assessmentthat Special Forces plays itsmost valuable role in the indi-rect environment, working withindigenous forces. More impor-tantly, many of our senior mili-tary and civilian leaders arealso starting to understand thatreality. Cable’s observations onthe two cultural gaps that Spe-cial Forces have to bridge inFID missions are right on themoney, and I would like to addthe following comments frommy experience:

During the 19-year span thatI served in Special Forcesgroups, I studied the cultures ofEurope, Asia and Latin Ameri-ca. But I think that the focus ofthose studies, the history, thecustoms, the religion, the foodand the clothing, while they arevery tangible examples, areactually side issues of culture.We often overlook the centraland intangible issue that eachculture also represents aunique world view. Culture is aperceptual prism throughwhich each society of humanbeings experiences andresponds to the world. This

means that people with differ-ent cultural backgrounds willunderstand the same events inremarkably different ways. Forinstance, we like to think of theUnited States as a peacefulcountry, but many of our neigh-bors in Latin America, consider-ing Operations Urgent Furyand Just Cause, see this coun-try as an unpredictable behe-moth that is very willing to useits military power to achieve itsnational goals. Some wouldeven argue that the U.S. is awarlike country.

Therefore I am convinced thatwe should not study foreign cul-tures in an attempt to becomefull-fledged members of thosecultures. That is not an attain-able goal, and we risk alienat-ing our counterparts by tryingto explain their culture andtheir problems to them. Ameri-cans aren’t the only ones guiltyof this. I have seen Spaniardssuffer from their “expertise” inexplaining the problems inLatin America to Latin Ameri-cans, and I have watched Rus-sians alienate the Serbs withthe explanation: “Russians andSerbs are all Slavs, and there-fore Russians understand theproblems in the formerYugoslavia better than anyoneelse.” No matter how much youknow, let your counterpart bethe cultural expert. You can winjust by being interested andbeing willing to listen.

But more important, whenSpecial Forces are sent on FIDmissions, we are there to helphost countries effect change. We

normally focus on the tangibleaspects of change, but the mostimportant and long-lastingaspects of change have to dowith values, which are thedefining element of each cul-ture. It is important that werepresent our culture and ourvalues, since they are impor-tant catalysts for change in thethird world.

Colonel John Waghelstein,who was commander of the 7thSpecial Forces Group from 1985to 1987, often talked of thethree long-term phases of cul-tural orientation. When firstexposed to a different societyand culture, we are often enam-ored, and enjoy a “honeymoon,”during which all we can see arethe positive aspects of the cul-ture. As time goes by, we startto see some hidden problems,and we enter the “disillusion-ment” phase. But with the pas-sage of years, some of usachieve a “clear vision” in whichwe can see the strengths andthe weaknesses of the othersociety and its culture.

Our purpose in studying cul-ture should be to attain a clearvision, so that we can see thevalidity of the other society’sperceptual prism without losingour own. Success in FID hasrepeatedly been found in com-promise between the in-countrystatus quo and the alternativeperspective that we represent.Therefore we must identify thecentral issues, and we must beready to compromise with host-country forces on the smallissues in order to get the cen-

August 1996 45

LettersSpecial Warfare

tral issues accepted (and youoften don’t win on the centralissues the first time you intro-duce them). We also have tounderstand the rate of changethat can be supported in-coun-try. Although the pace may feellike slow motion to us, when itis accelerated too much, thesociety can fragment, as it didin Iran in the 1970s. Therefore,intelligent compromise andpatience are critical virtues inFID.

Although I agree with Cable’spoints about the differencebetween regular and irregularforces, I think the most impor-tant issue for Special Forces inFID operations is establishingtrust with our indigenous coun-terparts. Cable refers to thepossibility of being able to usecultural knowledge, specificallyknowledge of the definingmythologies of the two cultures,to pursue U.S. policy goals. Buthost-country officers are oftenhypersensitive about beingmanipulated by the gringos, sowe need to go slowly. If you aregoing to be effective in influenc-ing your counterpart, you mustbuild trust, and the startingpoint lies in helping him toachieve the goals on his agenda.This process of influencing yourcounterpart is like judo — findsome momentum (organization-al) that is going in a directionthat makes sense and takeadvantage of it by offering tohelp him achieve success.

Effectiveness in FID, or asCable refers to it, indirect-action environments, is muchmore an art than a science.What I have described aboveare not my inventions, but whatI have been taught by otherSpecial Forces soldiers over thelast two decades. I don’t knowhow or where they learned all ofthis, but they are amazing arti-sans and I am proud to have

been their student and to havebeen one of them.

COL Ranger RoachU.S. Army (ret.)

Military confuses CMO, CA

There appears to be a greatdeal of confusion throughout themilitary concerning civil-mili-tary operations, or CMO, andCivil Affairs, or CA. This confu-sion has been promulgated indoctrine and through incorrectuse throughout the military.CMO is a generic term that cov-ers all areas of the civiliandimension which may affect mil-itary operations directly or indi-rectly. CMO is a function of com-mand; it is the responsibility ofthe commander and is delegatedto the CMO staff officer(G-5/S-5). The CMO staff officerhas the responsibility for plan-ning and executing civil-militaryoperations that support overallmission accomplishment. CMO isdefined in Joint Pub 3-57, Doc-trine for Joint Civil Affairs, as“the decisive and timely applica-tion of military capabilities toenhance the relationshipbetween the military and civil-ian populace in order to ensureaccomplishment of the com-mander’s mission.”

CA is a tool the commandermay use in accomplishing CMOin support of the overall mission.CA forces are normally attachedto the supported unit to assist inensuring that civilian interfer-ence is minimized and that thecommander meets his legal andmoral obligations to the civilianpopulace in his area of opera-tions. CA support may be in theform of CA generalists workingat the tactical and operationallevels, or CA functional special-ists operating as the mission dic-tates. The CA force can greatly

reduce the burden that may beplaced on military forces in deal-ing with situations concerningthe civilian dimension.

CMO and CA are not synony-mous — they are separate anddistinct entities. Unfortunately,in most joint and Army publica-tions, they appear to be the sameand are used interchangeably.CMO is a command responsibili-ty, as are operations, intelli-gence, personnel administration,and logistics. Future operationswill inherently include a signifi-cant civilian dimension. Thecommander’s efforts to recognizeand plan for these scenarios maymean the difference betweenmission success and failure.Commanders must be aware ofthe significant drain the civilianpopulace could place on hisavailable resources because ofpoor planning. CMO will play avital role in all future opera-tions. CA forces can be a valu-able resource to the commanderin successfully navigating thecivilian dimension and accom-plishing the mission.

Commanders are responsiblefor CMO and can utilize CAforces to meet that responsibili-ty. Doctrine must be clear andconcise. It is imperative thatdoctrine developers at the jointand Army levels understand thedifference between CMO and CA.

MAJ Tim HowleUSAJFKSWCSFort Bragg, N.C.

Sullivan article short on strategies

Brian Sullivan’s article, “Spe-cial Operations and LIC in the21st Century: The Joint Strate-gic Perspective” (May 1996)entices readers, but it quicklyleaves us hanging.

From the beginning of the arti-cle, the reader is bombarded

46 Special Warfare

with apocalyptic doom. Sullivanasserts that the U.S. will notbecome involved in a majorregional conflict, but that is notrealistic. Current military plan-ning envisions two MRCs. Giventhe world situation today(Korea, China, etc.) and past his-tory of recurring major conflicts,it is a safe assumption that theU.S. will be involved in a majorconflict within the next 10-15years.

Sullivan’s assertion thatorganized crime poses a threatto the security of the U.S. and tothe stability of internationalorder is not based on the situa-tion as it exists. While drugtrafficking has posed a domesticthreat to the U.S., it is improba-ble that a nation-state might betaken over by criminal gangs.Even in a country like Colom-bia, whose government wasthreatened by the Medellín car-tel, that scenario did not occur.If U.S. interests are involved,then the U.S. will take action, asit did in Panama.

Sullivan speaks of a number ofways in which SOF can be uti-lized; he speaks very highly ofSOF’s individual skills, but hefinishes by stating that SOF“still require enhancement andrestructuring to deal with likelyfuture challenges more effec-tively.” He doesn’t tell us whatthat enhancement and restruc-turing should be, except to men-tion the need for more CivilAffairs units. Unfortunately,USSOCOM planning calls for

cuts in the current Civil Affairsstructure.

These are only some examplesof cases in which Sullivan’sthoughts are subject to debate.After reading the article, I wasleft wondering what specialoperations will do in the 21stcentury, because he never reallygives us a strategy.

MAJ Caesar A. JaimeUSAJFKSWCSFort Bragg, N.C.

August 1996 47

Special Warfare is interested in hearing from readers who would like to comment on articles they have readin Special Warfare and elsewhere, or who would like to discuss issues that may not require a magazinearticle. With more input from the field, the “Letters” section could become a true forum for new ideas andfor the discussion of SOF doctrinal issues. Letters should be approximately 250 words long, but they mayhave to be edited for length. Please include your full name, rank, address and phone number. We will with-hold an author’s name upon request, but we will not print anonymous letters. Address letters to Editor, Spe-cial Warfare; Attn: AOJK-DT-MDM; JFK Special Warfare Center and School; Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000.

48 Special Warfare

Enlisted Career NotesSpecial Warfare

E8 promotion board givesanalysis of CMF 18 records

The CY 96 master-sergeant promotion selection board has produced the fol-lowing analysis of the records of 1,309 CMF 18 SFCs who were considered forpromotion:• The NCOER is critical for measuring soldiers’ performance and potential.• Vague senior-rater comments detracted from evaluations’ effectiveness. Rec-

ommendations on the soldier’s potential for greater responsibility wereimportant.

• Concise bullets justifying “success” ratings gave a clearer picture and car-ried more weight than did the “excellence” comments that were general.

• Raters missed opportunities for dynamic and forceful bullets when theywrote comments such as “participated in OCONUS MTT,” without furtherelaborating on the contribution of the soldier.

• Ethical shortfalls were considered major deficiencies.• All primary-zone SFCs were working in their primary MOS and had served

as SFODA or SMU team members. Almost no soldiers were assigned awayfrom an operational group for more than four years. Lengthy assignmentsto one SF group or SMU were not viewed negatively.

• All primary-zone SFCs had attended ANCOC. Nearly all had attendedjumpmaster school. All had attended some type of professionally enhanc-ing courses. Demanding courses such as Ranger School, Combat Diver andMFF were viewed as indicators of drive and determination. Languagequalification was very important. Academic failure or removal from acourse for disciplinary reasons had a negative impact on the panel.

• Nearly 80 percent of the SFCs had one or more years of college.• Bullet comments showed many soldiers consistently scoring 300 on the

APFT. These, along with comments on completion of endurance events,were helpful to CMF 11 panel members not familiar with the USASFCcertification program or CMF 18 environmental training.

• NCOERs for secondary-zone SFCs were very high overall. As a group, sec-ondary-zone SFCs received above-average ratings before and after enter-ing CMF 18.

• Most secondary-zone SFCs were on their initial tour with an operationalgroup. Detachment time varied by as much as two years.

• Overall, CMF 18 is doing a good job of ensuring that SFCs have the opportu-nity to serve in the proper assignments and that they receive the appropriateschooling for selection to master sergeant.NCOs are seeking challenging jobs,meeting NCOES milestones and enhancing their civilian education.

• Outdated photos displaying SSG rank detracted from the overall qualityof the file. Some records contained photos showing undocumented awards;other records contained documentation for awards that were not shown inthe photos.

• College credits, awards, military education and assignments become dis-criminators when all other factors are equal. Every soldier should ensurethat his DA Form 2-1 is readable and accurate.

August 1996 49

E8 promotion board praisesquality of CMF 37 NCOs

The CY 96 master-sergeant promotion selection reviewed records for CMF37SFCs recommended for promotion and provided the following analysis:• The quality of CMF 37 NCOs was exceptional. More than 80 percent of the

SFCs in the zone of consideration were considered qualified for promotion.• NCOs in the primary zone had very high marks, but they tended not to

have all the key leadership positions they will need to remain competitivein the future.

• CMF 37 secondary-zone NCOs in leadership positions tended to have highmarks on performance and strong senior-rater comments recommendingimmediate selection for promotion. Secondary-zone NCOs in jobs such asstaff and SWCS also tended to have high marks for performance and poten-tial, but they lacked the leadership experience that board membersweighed heavily.

• Inflated NCOERs were easily identified; vague bullets conveyed a negativemessage. “Excellence” marks with weak comments were considered “suc-cess.” Senior-rater bullets on potential carried a lot of weight.

• Primary- and secondary-zone NCOs appeared to have either all tactical orall regional experience. The board viewed jobs outside the 4th PSYOPGroup positively as long as the NCOs returned to the 4th Group at the endof their tour.The board looked favorably on SFCs who had successfully heldfirst-sergeant positions.

• Approximately 60 percent of the primary- and secondary-zone NCOs hadone or more years of college. More than 50 percent had completed the Jump-master Course; less than 10 percent had completed the First SergeantCourse.

• The overall fitness of the 37 CMF is extremely good. All personnel consid-ered had a current APFT and met the height/weight standards IAW AR600-9. More than 60 percent had scores above 275 on the APFT.

• Photos were current, demonstrating that PSYOP NCOs wished to presentthemselves with their most current awards and decorations. A small per-centage had photos showing an incorrect display of awards and decorations,missing awards, or improperly fitting uniforms.

• Overall, records are being maintained in an exceptional manner.• CMF 37 is doing a marginal job of ensuring that all SFCs considered for

promotion have served in key positions. The overall quality of the person-nel is excellent; it appears that quality soldiers are being retained.

• With promotions extremely competitive, raters and senior raters shouldreserve “among the best” and “1” blocks for the very best in the field.

• All NCOs in the primary zone should examine their records and evaluatetheir assignments against those of their junior peers. They should continueto compete for the few tough leadership positions.

• Senior leaders and the branch manager should continue to place qualitysoldiers in strategic and tactical assignments, and to ensure that NCOsbeing assigned outside the 4th Group first spend at least 18 months in akey PSYOP leadership position such as senior PSYOP sergeant.

• Promotions within CMF 37 are very competitive and will continue to be so.The review of records showed that the best-qualified NCOs were selectedfor promotion. Unfortunately NCOs in the secondary zone who were con-sidered “ready for promotion” could not be promoted because of the limitednumber of promotions available.

50 Special Warfare

Officer Career NotesSpecial Warfare

The Total Army Personnel Command has approved both the addition of sixnew skill identifiers, or SIs, for the Civil Affairs Branch and the revision ofthe five current CA SIs. Update 12-7 to AR 611-101, Commissioned OfficerClassification System, will reflect these changes. Personnel actions to awardthese SIs should cite Notice of Future Change, HQ, USTAPC, 14 Nov 95, asthe authority, according to Major Ron Fiegle, Civil Affairs Branch managerin the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office. The CA SIs and qualifi-cations are as follows:Civil defense officer, SI 5Y (revision) — Completion of the Federal EmergencyManagement Agency’s nonresident instruction course HS-1, Emergency Pro-gram Manager; HS-2, Emergency Preparedness, USA; HS-3, RadiologicalEmergency Management; HS-4, Preparedness Planning for a Nuclear Crisis;HS-5, Hazardous Materials: A Citizen’s Orientation; and HS-7, A Citizen’sGuide to Disaster Assistance; or equivalent experience as a regional civil-defense director; or certification as a Red Cross disaster-relief manager.Economist, SI 6C (revision) — A master’s degree in economics, finance, interna-tional business or business administration; or five years’ experience in econom-ics, banking, public finance, foreign or domestic development, or a related field.Agricultural officer, SI 6U (revision) — A bachelor’s degree in an agriculturaldiscipline; or five years’ experience in an agricultural-related profession, prefer-ably in a county or state agricultural-extension position or with the Depart-ment of Agriculture.Archivist, SI 6W (revision) — A bachelor’s degree in library science, politicalscience or history; or five years’ equivalent training in one of those fields.Cultural affairs officer, SI 6V (revision) — Requires professional knowledge orexperience with the ethnography, culture sociology, institutions and religiousheritage of the people of the areas of assignment or potential assignment.Public education officer, SI 6D (new) — A master’s degree in education oreducation administration (with an emphasis on public-school administra-tion or vocational education), or five years’ experience in school-districtadministration or in state or national department-of-education activities.Civil supply officer, SI 6E (new) — A bachelor’s degree in economics or businessadministration (with an emphasis on supply management and distribution), orfive years’ experience in the management of food or product-distribution systems.Public transportation officer, SI 6F (new) — A bachelor’s degree in civil engi-neering or transportation or equivalent experience in the management ordesign of public or private transportation systems; or three years’ experiencein the development of plans and policy at the state or national department-of-transportation level.Public facilities officer, SI 6G (new) — A bachelor’s degree in civil, electrical,mechanical, waste or water-management engineering; or five years’ experi-ence in the management, design or operation of public or private works andutilities. Officers holding a professional engineering license in any disciplineare considered highly qualified.

PERSCOM adds, revises CAskill identifiers

August 1996 51

SF major promotionsexceed Army average

SF warrants provide technical expertise

Board selects 80 FA 39s for promotion to major

The Special Forces Warrant Officer, MOS 180A, provides tactical and tech-nical expertise necessary for effectively conducting SF missions worldwide.An applicant for 180A must:• Be serving as a staff sergeant or above.• Possess a Career Management Field 18 MOS.• Be a graduate of the Special Forces Operations and Intelligence Sergeant

Course (nonresident or resident) or be a graduate of SF ANCOC after Oct. 1, 1994.

• Have a minimum of three years’ experience at the SF-ODA level.• Have a current 1+/1+ language proficiency, or have a score of at least 85

on the Defense Language Aptitude Battery.• Meet the medical-fitness standards for SF duty and for the SERE Level-

C Course according to AR 40-501.• Pass the Army Physical Readiness Test by completing a minimum of 50

pushups and 60 situps within two minutes and a two-mile run in 14:54 orless, regardless of age.

• Have at least a secret security clearance.• Have recommendations of company commander and battalion commander.• Have an endorsement by his servicing personnel office verifying that he is

not under a suspension of favorable action or a bar to re-enlistment.The SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office also requires letters of recom-mendation from the applicant’s SF group commander and a senior SF warrantofficer. An applicant who is not currently assigned to an SF group must furnishtwo letters of recommendation from his former SF company chain of command.Active-duty applicants can be no older than 36; National Guard applicants canbe no older than 42. For more information, contact CW4 Wayne Searcy, 180Amanager in SOPO, at DSN 239-2415/8423 or commercial (910) 432-2415/8423.

The FY96 major selection board considered 252 FA 39 captains, of which 80were selected. The board selected 26 FA 39Bs, 21 FA 39Cs and 33 FA 39Xs —officers who have not completed an area-of-concentration course. The selec-tion rate for FA 39 was 78 percent; the overall Army selection rate was 80.1percent.

During the FY96 major promotion board, the Special Forces selection ratewas 88.2 percent, versus 80.1 percent for the Army. The low number of SFcaptains selected for major (67) is the result of an understrength year group(1986). The SF Branch needs to maintain a population of 580 majors andpromotable captains. The current inventory is 375. As larger year groups ofSF captains enter the zone of consideration for promotion, the number pro-moted will increase, hastening the growth of the officer population.

Public safety officer, SI 6H (new) — A bachelor’s degree in criminology, fire sci-ence, police science, corrections management or public administration; orthree years’ experience in a supervisory or management position in a govern-ment-related public-safety field or in an equivalent private-industry position.Public communications officer, SI 6R (new) — A bachelor’s degree in elec-tronic or electrical engineering, communications management or computerscience; or five years’ experience in engineering or management in a relatedcommunications position.

52 Special Warfare

Foreign SOFSpecial Warfare

South African mercenary firmextends influence in Africa

Russia specialists perceive‘Islamic propaganda’ targeting

Long-standing Russian concerns about an Islamic threat from thesouth have sharpened in the post-Cold War period. Some Russian secu-rity specialists believe that the drug trade, arms trafficking and sim-mering conflict along Russia’s southern borders and in Central Asia areintended to serve Muslim extremist agendas. Others perceive also aheightened struggle for the minds of heretofore peaceful Muslim popu-lations in the region. Determined “ideological recruitment” and “psy-chological warfare” by Islamic extremists are increasingly judged to be

Executive Outcomes, the mercenary firm based in Pretoria, South Africa,and manned mostly by former members of the South African DefenseForce, has proven to be a decisive factor in the outcome of some civil warsin Africa. Involved most recently in forcing rebels to the negotiating tablein Sierra Leone and more well-known for contributing to the Angolangovernment’s success in forcing UNITA to accept the Lusaka Protocol in1994, Executive Outcomes reportedly has a web of influence in Uganda,Botswana, Zambia, Ethiopia, Namibia, Lesotho and South Africa. Eventhough the firm’s expertise lies in fighting bush wars, it has diversifiedand reportedly operates 32 companies, whose interests range from com-puter software to adult education. The firm’s tactic of quickly regainingcontrol of a client country’s mineral-rich regions is well-documented.Within a month of Sierra Leone’s hiring of Executive Outcomes in May1995, government forces had regained control of the diamond-rich Konodistrict, which produces two-thirds of Sierra Leone’s diamonds. In Ango-la, oil- and diamond-producing regions were the first areas secured bygovernment forces trained by Executive Outcomes. The firm also report-edly mines gold in Uganda, drills boreholes in Ethiopia and has a vari-ety of interests in the other countries noted above. Executive Outcomesclaims that its sole purpose is to bring stability to the region by sup-porting legitimate governments in their defense against armed rebels.Nevertheless, rumors persist that the firm is connected to either theSouth African DeBeers Diamond Corporation or the South African gov-ernment. These claims are denied by all parties, and the South Africangovernment has tried to restrict Executive Outcomes’ business ventures.The intermixing of paramilitary and commercial ventures makes it diffi-cult to determine the number of mercenaries involved in various coun-tries. Most reports indicate there were between 150 and 200 in SierraLeone, while reports from Angola vary, indicating between 500 and 4,000members in that country. At any rate, Executive Outcomes has proven tobe a sound investment for the governments of Angola and Sierra Leone.Those successes may help to persuade other countries in the region toemploy the firm’s services. Increased involvement in regional securityproblems and an expanded portfolio of affiliated businesses suggest thatExecutive Outcomes will play a periodically visible role in sub-SaharanAfrican affairs.

August 1996 53

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. and Major Mark Mills of the Foreign MilitaryStudies Office, U.S. Army DUSA-IA, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

Indonesia reorganizes special forces

It was announced this summer that the Indonesian Army’s SpecialForces Command, KOPASSUS, would reorganize and increase in size,and that its commander, the son-in-law of the Indonesian president,would be promoted to two-star rank. With its headquarters in Cijan-tung, East Jakarta, KOPASSUS is considered to be an elite force thathas traditionally emphasized its small size and its quick-strike poten-tial. It has been involved in numerous military actions in response tointernal Indonesian unrest. In an interview, the KOPASSUS com-mander downplayed the extent of the force’s expansion, emphasizinginstead improvements in training and expected increases in profes-sionalism. The reorganization of KOPASSUS, he stressed, would besmall compared with Indonesia’s population, the area that has to bedefended, and the security challenges in Aceh, Irian Jaya, and EastTimor. In addition, the commander noted that neighboring Thailandhas special forces numbering 10,000 men, and that in the post-ColdWar period, other countries, including the U.S. and some NATOnations, have reduced their heavier forces significantly while retainingtheir special forces. Because of the kinds of threats that are appearingaround the world, the general anticipates greater needs for Indonesia’sspecial forces in the future; he expressed the view that these specialforces must operate jointly with other military components.

a threat to Russian interests and the integrity of the state. The lost warin Afghanistan, the continuing conflict in Tajikistan and the embar-rassing defeats of Chechnya — the first self-declared Muslim state toessentially leave Russian control — are asserted to be instances inwhich Russia has struggled with dimensions of Islamic extremism.Some Russians identify Saudi Arabia and Iran as sources of Islamicmilitancy in Russian Shiite and Sunni variants. They judge that effortsto radicalize their largely Sunni populations are aimed at incorporat-ing Central Asian and Russian Muslim populations into the greaterIslamic world. Many religious and educational organizations workingopenly in Central Asia and Russia are asserted to be nothing more thanelaborately organized and heavily financed disseminators of militantIslam — some of these reportedly provide out-of-country training forindividuals who then return to Russia to serve as militant recruitingcadre and as agitators.

Schoomaker takes command of USASOC

Lieutenant General Peter J.Schoomaker became the fourthcommander of the U.S. Army Spe-cial Operations Command in achange-of-command ceremony heldat Fort Bragg’s Special OperationsMemorial Plaza Aug. 29.

Schoomaker received the com-mand from Lieutenant General J.T.Scott, who retired from the Armywith more than 30 years of service.Scott had commanded USASOCsince May 1993.

Schoomaker relinquished com-mand of the Joint Special Opera-tions Command to Major GeneralMichael A. Canavan Aug. 28.

Schoomaker’s special-operationsassignments include command atthe Special Forces detachment,company, battalion and group lev-els. He also served as operationsofficer for the Joint Special Opera-tions Command.

In his other general-officer assign-ments, Schoomaker served as assis-tant division commander, 1st Caval-ry Division, Fort Hood, Texas; and asdeputy director for operations, readi-ness and mobilization, Departmentof the Army, Office of the DeputyChief of Staff for Operations. He is agraduate of the Marine CorpsAmphibious Warfare School, theCommand and General Staff Collegeand the National War College.

USASOC NCO, Soldier of the Year selected

The U.S. Army Special Opera-tions Command announced thewinners in its NCO and Soldier ofthe Year competition Aug. 23.

The NCO of the Year is StaffSergeant Seth T. Lucente of Compa-ny B, 2nd Battalion, 75th RangerRegiment. The Soldier of the Year isSpecialist William D. Dixon II ofHeadquarters Support Company,1st Battalion, 1st Special ForcesGroup.

Runners-up were Staff SergeantGregory J. Green of Company B,1st Battalion, 1st SF Group; andSpecialist Rodney H. Hastings ofCompany B, 1st Battalion, 75thRanger Regiment.

Other competitors were StaffSergeant Felicia M. Alvarez of Com-pany B, 3rd Battalion, 1st SpecialWarfare Training Group; StaffSergeant Jared M. Zick of CompanyA, 9th PSYOP Battalion, 4th PSYOPGroup; Sergeant Samuel Rivera ofCompany B, 2nd Battalion, 160thSpecial Operations Aviation Regi-

ment; Corporal Christopher R.Shonk of Company C, 3rd Battalion,1st Special Warfare Training Group;Specialist James T. Bear of Compa-ny B, 3rd Battalion, 160th SOAR;and Private First Class David M.Cade of Company C, 9th PSYOPBattalion, 4th PSYOP Group.

Three SF groups receive new commanders

Three active-duty Special Forcesgroups have recently held change-of-command ceremonies.

Colonel Leslie L. Fuller tookcommand of the 10th SpecialForces Group at Fort Carson, Colo.,Aug. 1, replacing Colonel GeoffreyC. Lambert.

Fuller was previously the seniorspecial-operations observer/con-troller for the Battle CommandTraining Program at Fort Leaven-worth, Kan. He has also served asa detachment commander in Com-pany A, 3rd/7th SF Group; as theexecutive officer for the 10th SFGroup; and as commander of the3rd Battalion, 5th SF Group.

Lieutenant Colonel Joseph B.McMillan took command of the 1stSpecial Forces Group at FortLewis, Wash., July 30, replacingColonel Russell D. Howard.

Howard is now assigned to Har-vard University’s Center for Inter-national Affairs as the Chief ofStaff of the Army fellow.

McMillan was formerly at Har-vard on a U.S. Army War Collegesenior service fellowship. His otherSpecial Forces assignments were inthe 10th SF Group, where heserved as a detachment command-er and as executive officer in Com-

54 Special Warfare

UpdateSpecial Warfare

Lieutenant General Peter J. Schoomaker (center)accepts the USASOC colors from General DennisJ. Reimer, the chief of staff of the Army.

Photo by Mike Brantley

pany C, 3rd Battalion; as com-mander of Company B, 2nd Battal-ion; and as commander of the 1stBattalion.

Lieutenant Colonel David E.McCracken accepted the colors ofthe 3rd Special Forces Group fromthe outgoing commander, ColonelMark D. Boyatt, in a ceremony atFort Bragg’s Special OperationsForces Memorial Plaza July 19.

McCracken, a native of Con-nellsville, Pa., was formerly chief ofthe Special Forces Branch, OfficerPersonnel Management Direc-torate, U.S. Total Army PersonnelCommand in Alexandria, Va. Hehas served in numerous SpecialForces assignments, including twoin Panama with the 3rd Battalion,7th SF Group; two in the 1st Spe-cial Warfare Training Group, JFKSpecial Warfare Center and School;and two in the National CapitalRegion.

Boyatt is now the deputy chief ofstaff for the U.S. Army SpecialOperations Command.

PSYOP specialist receivesSoldier’s Medal

A soldier from the 4th PSYOPGroup has received the Soldier’sMedal for his lifesaving efforts dur-ing Operation Uphold Democracyin Haiti.

Corporal Robert E. Pelc Jr.received the medal from Lieu-tenant General J.T. Scott July 17.Pelc, a PSYOP specialist assignedto the 1st PSYOP Battalion, savedthe life of a Haitian child Aug. 15,1995.

The Soldier’s Medal is the highestmedal awarded during peacetime.

Pelc, who was assigned to aremote site near Port-au-Prince,noticed three children playing neara road. The youngest, about 18months old, wandered into theroad. “I started to walk toward thechild to make sure he’d get out ofthe road,” Pelc said. “About then Iheard … a truck engine revving up.

I looked up and the truck was com-ing around the corner. The kid …suddenly decided to sit down in themiddle of the road. That’s when Ireally started to run. As I got to thekid, I kind of scooped him up in onearm, put the other hand on thehood of the truck and leaped out ofthe way.”

Pelc and the child were unhurtin the incident.

“This is the level of performance …that we have come to expect from ourfellow special-operations soldiers,”Scott said. “We’re all prepared to riskour lives or even to die for our fellowsoldiers. … But there’s an uncom-mon part of valor that deals withrisking your life for someone you donot know.” — SPC Daniel L. Savol-skis, USASOC PAO

Support battalions change commanders

Lieutenant Colonel Albert E.Ballard Jr. took command of the528th Special Operations SupportBattalion from Lieutenant ColonelRichard C. Burmood in a ceremonyat Fort Bragg’s Special OperationsForces Memorial Plaza July 18.

Ballard’s previous assignmentsinclude parachute rigger platoonleader, 612th Quartermaster Com-pany, 1st Corps Support Command;chief of resource management, U.S.Army Chemical School; and seniorU.S. military observer and force-operations officer for the UnitedNations Mission for the Referen-dum in Western Sahara.

Burmood is now assigned asbranch chief, Deputy Chief of Stafffor Logistics, U.S. Army SpecialOperations Command.

The 528th traces its lineage tothe 528th Quartermaster ServiceBattalion, activated Dec. 15, 1942,at Camp McCain, Miss. DuringWorld War II, the battalion provid-ed combat service support to Euro-pean theater forces, including the1st Special Service Force. The bat-talion, which underwent several

redesignations, inactivations andactivations in the 1950s and 1960s,deployed to the Republic of Viet-nam Sept. 25, 1969. Upon return-ing from Vietnam, the battalionwas inactivated April 15, 1971. Fol-lowing its consolidation with the13th Support Battalion May 16,1987, the battalion was activatedand redesignated the 528th SpecialOperations Support Battalion (Air-borne). The 528th provided supportto special-operations forces duringOperations Just Cause and Pro-mote Liberty in Panama, and dur-ing Operations Desert Shield andDesert Storm in Saudi Arabia.

Lieutenant Colonel Howard I.Cohen took command of the 112thSpecial Operations Signal Battal-ion from Lieutenant ColonelWilliam E. (Bronco) Lane July 12.

Cohen has held assignments asdeputy inspector general, XVIIIAirborne Corps; detachment com-mander and operations officer,Joint Communications Unit; andcompany commander, 112th SignalBattalion. He is a graduate ofLafayette College.

Lane’s new assignment is at theNaval War College in Newport, R.I.

The 112th provides operationaland tactical communications forcommanders of joint special-opera-tions task forces, in support of delib-erate and crisis-action operations ofthe regional commanders in chief.Soldiers of the 112th continue toprovide communications in supportof Operation Provide Comfort II andOperation Joint Endeavor. In thepast year the 112th has participatedin such contingency operations asUphold Democracy in Cuba/Haiti;Assured Response in SierraLeone/Liberia; and in a deminingmission in Rwanda.

August 1996 55

Chinese Intelligence Opera-tions. By Nicholas Eftimiades.Annapolis, Md.: The Naval Insti-tute Press, 1994. ISBN 1-55750-214-5 (hardback). 169 pages.$31.95.

Much has been written onalmost every aspect of the ongoingrelationship between the UnitedStates and the People’s Republic ofChina. However, precious little hasbeen written on the topic of China’sintelligence operations or capabili-ties. The most recent addition tothis limited body of work is ChineseIntelligence Operations, byNicholas Eftimiades.

Eftimiades describes his bookas an attempt “to identify China’snational intelligence structure,objectives, and collection opera-tions … focusing primarily onhuman-source intelligence opera-tions.” But perhaps more impor-tant is his explanation of whatthe book is not: He cautions thereader not to “interpret this workas some kind of call to arms toprevent waves of Chinese spiesfrom subverting the Westernworld.”

Using a crisp, uncluttered styleof writing, Eftimiades succeeds inhis intent. A former analyst withseveral intelligence agencieslocated in the Washington, D.C.,area, Eftimiades outlines hisarguments with the clarity ofpurpose and focus of a veterananalyst. In a straightforwardmanner, he describes China’s for-eign and domestic intelligenceobjectives and operations.

Outlining the working infra-structure and the interaction

between China’s military andpolitical intelligence agencies,Eftimiades examines the trade-craft and the methodology uti-lized by the various departments.Charts and schematics help thereader to more fully understandthe departments’ mutual depend-ency. Relating real-life examples,the author describes how Chineseintelligence operatives persuadeand at times coerce fellow Chi-nese citizens either at home orabroad to assist in intelligence-gathering activities. He alsodetails how China’s intelligenceservices target foreigners and for-eign businesses located in China.His use of examples, which for themost part provide an accuratedescription in illustrating howChina’s intelligence services oper-ate, can also lead to certain gener-alizations that are not necessarilycorrect.

As stated previously, Chinese

Intelligence Operations is themost current and so far the bestpublication on China’s intelli-gence services. Fully realizingthe inherent difficulties faced byEftimiades in attempting such abook, this reviewer must reluc-tantly criticize the author on twopoints. The first criticism con-cerns Eftimiades’ description ofthe monitoring of foreign jour-nalists by Chinese intelligence.This reviewer’s personal experi-ences with Chinese intelligencewhile he worked as a journalistin China in the mid-to-late 1980sand in 1996 were quite differentfrom what Eftimiades describes.

The second criticism concernsthe author’s use of sources. Whilehe cites (and should be com-mended for) his personal effort atattribution of secondary sources,there are many instances (bothreferred to and footnoted in thebook) that did not happen exact-ly as written or that were usedout of context. It should come asno surprise that since much ofthe best material on Chineseintelligence services is still clas-sified, authors of unclassifiedpublications must depend solelyon data that has previously beencited and vetted.

In spite of these criticisms,Nicholas Eftimiades’ Chinese Intel-ligence Operations is still the bestand most current publicationregarding this very importanttopic.

1LT Gene J. Del Bianco411th CA BattalionDanbury, Conn.

56 Special Warfare

Book ReviewsSpecial Warfare

War in the Shadows: The Guer-rilla in History (Revised andUpdated). By Robert B. Asprey. NewYork: William Morrow & Company,1994. ISBN: 0-688-12815-7. 1,279pages. $40.

Nineteen years have elapsedsince Robert Asprey wrote the firstWar in the Shadows. Persuaded byhis editors to revise the book,Asprey has spent four years updat-ing and abridging his earlier work.The latest version (now one volume)includes the period 1973-1993.

When the original War in theShadows was published, Aspreycame under intense criticism for hisdenunciation of the conduct of high-ranking American officers in theVietnam War. Asprey claims thatthey lost the war because of theirtotal ignorance of unconventionaland guerrilla warfare. Thoughblackballed by military schools foralmost a decade, Asprey refused toretract his accusations, citing 2,000years of guerrilla warfare tactics,operations and strategy as proofthat the United States violatedmost of the principles of unconven-tional warfare, if not all of them.

The revised version, still the mostdefinitive study of guerrilla warfareavailable, continues to remind themilitary of the requirement to under-stand fully the capabilities and limi-tations of unconventional warfare.Asprey updated his book for threereasons. First, to complete the storyof the Indochina nightmare as besthe could, even though millions ofdocuments still await declassifica-tion. Second, to bring readers up todate on the status of 20 additionalyears of ongoing and new guerrillawars. Third, to warn the Americanpeople about the dangers of military“revisionists” rewriting the history ofthe Vietnam War. He does not wantAmericans to forget “The 57,000dead, the 380,000 wounded and theveterans’ children who are afflictedby defoliant-responsible birthdefects.” Even more important,

Asprey does not want us to forgetguerrilla wars, period. “So long asWestern governments fail to workwith less democratically minded gov-ernments in trying to eradicate inwhole or in part the basic reasons forregional insurgencies,” he warns,“these will continue to burst forth.”As with the first War in the Shad-ows, Asprey does not trust conven-tionally trained military command-ers to meet the challenges presentedby guerrillas. His 2,000-year historydemonstrates repeatedly that guer-rilla warfare is different, requiringthe skills, techniques and persever-ance that only trained special forcespossess.

Of immediate and particular rele-vance are the chapters regarding theBalkans. The chapters on the historyof Balkan guerrilla warfare are par-ticularly instructive, since the inhabi-tants of that region have been mas-ters of unconventional warfare sincethe 14th century.Guerrilla leader Titoused UW to successfully keep nineWehrmacht, 10 Italian and numerousBulgarian divisions pinned down inYugoslavia, preventing them fromfighting on the Allied and Russianfronts. In conducting his research forthe Balkans chapters, Asprey made astaff ride to the Balkans and wrote aMETT-T analysis that is relevant

today. Commanders and future com-manders of American forces in Bosniashould read these chapters closely,since involvement in the Balkans“always turns out to be longer thanexpected and a whole lot bloodierthan imagined.”

For Vietnam war researchers andscholars, War in the Shadows is animportant source of information,since approximately one-fifth of thebook is about U.S. involvement inSoutheast Asia and our doctrinal,organizational and leadership fail-ures there. As an aid to understand-ing the Viet Minh’s guerrilla-war-fare theories, readers should con-sult Chapter 59, one of the mostsuperb summaries of the NationalLiberation Front’s political and mil-itary aims in print. Asprey’s workshows a clear and superior under-standing of the interconnectivityamong military, political and diplo-matic struggles. Let readers withthin skins be forewarned — hiswords about our “criminal military-political strategy” are even morevitriolic than those in his earlieredition.

Overall, Asprey’s work is edifying.His 30 years of research brilliantlyimpart lessons of guerrilla warfare,its causes and effects, and its victo-ries and defeats. His reminders tothe military about going off to anunconventional war half-cockedcontain some of the most valuablemilitary thinking of our time. Warin the Shadows is far more than justa history book. It is a useable doc-trinal text of historical events thatcontinue to speak to the contempo-rary experience of unconventionalwarfare. Every unconventional war-rior should have War in the Shad-ows on his bedside table.

LTC David G. BradfordAir UniversityMaxwell AFB, Fla.

August 1996 57

Special Warfare

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