peace and security moving beyond soliloquylibrary.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/zypern/16918.pdf · 2020....

PEACE AND SECURIT Y

Youth’s low level of interest in politics is not solely related to their political apathy, but to their inadequate representation in politics and lack of confidence in politician and political parties.

Turkish Cypriot youth are more disposed to the idea of friendship with Greek Cypriot youth than their counterparts are.

The negative narratives targeting the other community — as the ‘enemy’ or ‘untrustworthy’ — do not dominate the mindsets of any Cypriot youth on both sides.

More than half of Cypriot youth respondents on either side reported that they believe the Cyprus problem will never be solved.

Cihan Dizdaroğlu

ANALYSE

MOVING BEYOND SOLILOQUYYouth Perceptions on Politics, Peace and Inter-Communal Contacts

PEACE AND SECURIT Y

MOVING BEYOND SOLILOQUY Youth Perceptions on Politics. Peace and Inter-Communal Contacts

Contents

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

1. DEFINING CYPRIOT YOUTH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

2. UNSC RESOLUTION 2250 AS A LEGAL FRAMEWORK . . . . . . . . . 6

3. YOUTH PERCEPTIONS TOWARD POLITICS, INTER-COMMUNAL CONTACTS AND PEACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

3.1 Political Attitudes of Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot Youth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73.2 Youth Perception Toward Inter-communal Contacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103.3 Youth Perceptions of Peace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

4. DISCUSSION & RECOMMENDATIONS ..................................22

5. METHODOLOGY ................................................................... 24

References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Annex I: Questionnaire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

1

Table of Figures

FIGURE 1. Vote in the European Parliament Elections, 2019 ........................................................... 7FIGURE 2. Political interest among Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot youth ...................................8FIGURE 3. Representation in Politics ................................................................................................8FIGURE 4. Confidence Level in Political Institutions and Persons ......................................................9FIGURE 5. Confidence Level in Various Institutions and Persons ....................................................10FIGURE 6. Confidence Level in International Third Parties ..............................................................10FIGURE 7. Support Level for Opening More Check-Points ..............................................................11FIGURE 8. Frequency of Crossing the Other Side ............................................................................11FIGURE 9. Reasons for Crossing the Check-Points ......................................................................... 12FIGURE 10. Reasons for NOT Crossing the Check-Points .................................................................. 12FIGURE 11. Having Friends from the Other Community ................................................................... 12FIGURE 12. Reasons for NOT Having Friends from the Other Community (G/Cs) ............................. 13FIGURE 13. Reasons for NOT Having Friends from the Other Community (T/Cs) .............................. 14FIGURE 14. Frequency of Contact with Other Community .............................................................. 15FIGURE 15. Place of Contact with Other Community ...................................................................... 15FIGURE 16. Acceptability of Interactions with Turkish Cypriots ......................................................... 16FIGURE 17. Acceptability of Interactions with Greek Cypriots .......................................................... 16FIGURE 18. Whether Negotiations will Lead to an Agreed Solution (%) ...........................................17FIGURE 19. Time When Expect Cyprus Problem will be Solved ........................................................18FIGURE 20. Support Level for Various Solution Types (G/Cs) ............................................................18FIGURE 21. Support Level for Various Solution Types (T/Cs) ............................................................. 19FIGURE 22. Likely Way to Vote in a New Referendum ...................................................................... 19FIGURE 23. The Dependence of a Solution on the Encouragement from the International Parties .. 20FIGURE 24. Impact and Responsibility of Youth in a Peaceful Settlement to the Problem ............... 21FIGURE 25. Employment Status ....................................................................................................... 25

2

INTRODUCTION

This report focuses on a under-researched but important top-ic: the perception and opinions of the youth of Cyprus in re-gard to politics, peace and inter-communal contact. Al-though the potential of youth has recently become a subject of the growing scholarly research agenda –in parallel to youth mobilisation around the world– the voices of Cypriot youth continue to be ignored in their respective communities as well as across the country. I suggest the term ‘soliloquy’1 that refers the ‘act of ‘talking to oneself’ to describe the situ-ation of Cypriot youth. There has been, and continues to be, a tendency towards underestimating the political, social and economic agency of Cypriot youth.

Cypriot youth have been marginalised largely because of the nationalist education system, intergenerational transmission, nationalist discourse in media and politics, and physical barri-ers in common spaces. And they continue to live between the past legacies and present realities of a divided society. Despite the failures of countless peacebuilding initiatives and criticism of the elite-level, closed-door, ‘nothing is agreed un-til everything is agreed’ format of negotiations, there is a constant hesitation to include the wider public—including youth and women—in the peace process (Lordos, 2009; Lor-dos, Kaymak and Tocci, 2009; Jarraud, Louise and Filippou, 2013; Pimond et al., 2019). Community leaders have contin-ued to act on the assumption that an agreement acceptable to them would respond to the needs of all Cypriots. However, as McEvoy-Levy (2001, p. 5) suggests, ‘A peace agreement’s endurance depends on whether the next generations accept or reject it, how they are socialized during the peace process, and their perceptions of what that peace process has achieved.’ Youth is the generation that builds social trust and social cohesion in the community through their activities, di-alogue and social engagement in their daily lives.

Five years ago, Hatay and Charalambous (2015), in their re-port published by the PRIO Cyprus Centre and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, drew attention to the ‘radically differing voting pat-terns’ of Cypriot youth on the two sides of the island during the Annan Plan referendum and the post-Annan periods. The youth of that era have become the adults of today, so it

1 The etymology of soliloquyue stems from late Latin soliloquium ‘a talking to oneself,’ from Latin solus ‘alone’ + loqui ‘to speak’. Also used in translation of Latin ‘Liber Soliloquiorum,’ a treatise by Augus-tine (Etymonline, 2020).

is critical that we periodically investigate the trends in youth perceptions to observe whether there have been any shifts in hopes for the future, perceptions towards the other commu-nity, readiness for the peace process, and willingness to coex-ist.

Ironically, due to the long-lasting deadlock in the island, al-most every aspect of the ‘Cyprus Problem’ can boast a sub-stantial literature; yet the role of Cypriot youth has received scant attention apart from rare instances (Hadjipavlou and Kanol, 2008; Lordos, Kaymak and Tocci, 2009; UNDP, 2009; Kanol, 2013; Hatay and Charalambous, 2015; Özgür, Köprülü and Reuchamps, 2017). Cyprus is not, of course, alone in this regard. Although discussion of youth roles and contributions has recently begun and demonstrated the importance of the topic, the agency and voice of the youth are often ignored or underutilised (Dizdaroğlu, 2020b). This trend has slowly been replaced by critical studies — particularly in peacebuilding — that focus instead on the positive contributions of youth in post-conflict situations. Such contributions are also reflected in the UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and in the re-ports of other institutions such as the United Nations Devel-opment Programme (UNDP) and United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The UNSC Resolution 2250 on ‘Youth, Peace and Conflict’, which was adopted on 9 December 2015, is the outcome of all these efforts and a significant step towards recognising youth agency in conflict and post-conflict settings.

Notwithstanding the progress made since the adoption of the landmark UNSC Resolution 2250, there remains much to be done in many countries to effectively incorporate youth voices; this is because such an endeavour necessi-tates a general mindset shift towards youth as well as a parallel shift in the national political will (Dizdaroğlu, 2020a). Cyprus is one such country that must do more to utilise the contributions and experiences of youth. As re-flected in the first-ever United Nations Human Develop-ment Report (HDR) for Cyprus conducted over ten years ago, politicians have not given youth any opportunity to take part in the peace process — moreover, they do not even consider their perceptions and demands. Instead, Cypriot youth have been relegated to the role of passive bystanders (UNDP, 2009, pp. 12 and 164). There has been only limited progress since then, and this report will focus on the tremendous amount of work that remains to be

INTRODUCTION

3

CIHAN DIZDAROĞLU – MOVING BEYOND SOLILOQUY

done in this area--not only in regard to the peace process, but also to decision-making at every level.

This policy report focuses on the neglected Cypriot youth with the aim of outlining a strategy to include the youth in the decision-making and peace processes. The first section briefly concentrates on identifying Cypriot youth, while the next sec-tion introduces UNSC Resolution 2250 as a legal framework for youth engagement. Then it presents the survey findings based on the survey findings within three sub-sections includ-ing politics, inter-communal contacts and peace. The last part covers the discussion and recommendations, with the aim of devising a strategy for action. I hope that this report, which suggests how to more effectively engage youth in these pro-cesses—in accordance with the pillars of UNSC Resolution 2250 (2015)—will foster debate among academics, policy ex-perts, civil society organisations and international third parties actively working on the ground.

4

DEFINING CYPRIOT YOUTH

The term youth has no universally accepted definition; it re-volves around age, social and cultural roles, and psychologi-cal factors (Özerdem and Podder, 2015, pp. 1–3). The United Nations Security Council’s (UNSC) landmark Resolution 2250 (2015) on ‘Youth, Peace and Security’ established youth as those aged between 18 and 29, while also acknowledging the discrepancy between definitions, and noting that ‘varia-tions of definition of the term that may exist on the national and international levels’ (S/RES/2250, 2015). As there is no standard age range for youth, this range can drop, for in-stance, to as low as 12 in Jordan and rise to 35 in several countries, including Cyprus. The National Youth Strategy of Cyprus,2 which was prepared by the Youth Board of Cyprus and adopted in 2017, defines youth as individuals aged be-tween 14 and 35. However, it should be noted that, as in many other countries and national and international organi-sations, several different age ranges are in effect for the Cyp-riot youth population.3

These conflicting—or overlapping—age-defined boundaries are inconsistent and largely depend on a country’s social and cultural contexts. In fact, some scholars argue that youth is a ‘socially-constructed’ concept that relates to categories that are unnatural and embedded in personal relationships, social prac-tices, politics, laws and public policies (Honwana, 2012, p. 11). Youth are characterised by assorted social attributes that differ-entiate them from other social groups, such as age, authority, social position, power, ability, rights, dependence/independ-ence, knowledge and responsibility (Durham, 2004, p. 593).

Considering who is a youth from a ‘psychological perspective’ relates to the period of transition between childhood and adulthood. This perspective entails no clear-cut transition,

2 The Youth Board of Cyprus, which was founded in 1994, comprises representatives from the youth wings of the political parties rep-resented in the parliament and operates under the auspices of the Ministry of Education and Culture. However, it is not inclusive, as it mainly focuses on Greek Cypriot youth and does not include the Turkish Cypriot youth in its strategy, activities or reports.

3 For instance, the National Action Plan for Youth Employment defines youth as between 15–29 years old, while a 2007 Council of Europe report on youth policy in Cyprus states that ‘the international review team accepted a working definition of ‘youth’ in Cyprus as those be-tween the ages of 10 and 25’. The Human Development Report of Cyprus has adopted the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) narrow age range of 15–24.

though there are some markers such as marital status, child-birth, land ownership, and ritual or spiritual initiation. Ac-cordingly, a person may still be considered a youth even after having outgrown the official age range. In some African countries, this period of transition can be prolonged: Honwa-na (2013) defines this phase as ‘waithood’, and even a 40-year-old unemployed or unmarried person can still be considered a ‘youthman’.

In addition to these definitional challenges, there is also an-other difficulty in presenting a clear picture of the Cypriot youth: the imprecise demographic data due to the ongoing division of the island.4 Nevertheless, it is possible to conclude that the Greek and Turkish Cypriot youth collectively consti-tute an estimated 20–25 percent of the island’s total popula-tion.5 Cypriot youth represent an important demographic dividend in their country, but this is not all: they are active agents who believe that they also have a responsibility to find a peaceful solution to the seemingly endless Cyprus problem.

4 The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) is only recognised by the Republic of Turkey. While for Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, Mustafa Akinci serves as President of the TRNC, the international community considers him the communal leader of the Turkish Cyp-riots. As the government of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) remains internationally recognised as the government of the whole of the island, the entire island is now considered to be a member of the Eu-ropean Union. However, the acquis communautaire is suspended in Northern Cyprus pending a political settlement to the Cyprus prob-lem (see Protocol no. 10 of the Accession Treaty).

5 While the RoC announces the population results based on the gov-ernment controlled area, the population of the northern part has been a source of a controversary. For a detailed account of the pop-ulation issue, see Mete Hatay (2017), Population and Politics in North Cyprus: An Overview of the Ethno-demography of North Cyprus in the Light of the 2011 Census. PRIO Cyprus Centre and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

1

DEFINING CYPRIOT YOUTH

5


On 9 December 2015, after years of lobbying and advocacy, the UNSC adopted Resolution 2250 (2015), ‘Youth, Peace and Security’, acknowledging earlier youth-led efforts in ‘cre-ating a foundation that promotes young people’s inclusive participation and positive contribution to building peace in conflict and post-conflict situations’. The resolution identified five pillars to enable youth participation, especially in peace processes (S/RES/2250, 2015):

PARTICIPATION: This urges member states to consider ways to increase youth representation at all levels of decision-mak-ing for the prevention and resolution of conflict. It also calls on all relevant actors to consider the participation and views of youth when negotiating and implementing peace agree-ments.

PROTECTION: This refers to the guaranteed protection of civilians, particularly the youth, from all forms of sexual and gender-based violence during periods of armed conflict as well as post-conflict.

PREVENTION: This urges member states to facilitate an en-vironment in which youth are recognised and to adequately support them in their efforts and activities for violence pre-vention and social cohesion. This pillar includes promoting a culture of peace, tolerance, as well as intercultural and inter-religious dialogue involving youth.

PARTNERSHIP: Member states should increase their politi-cal, financial, technical and logistical support systems to meet the needs of the youth and to ensure their participation in peace efforts in conflict and post-conflict situations. Member states are asked to engage with the relevant local communi-ties and non-governmental actors to develop strategies to counter violent, extremist narratives.

DISENGAGEMENT AND REINTEGRATION: This encourag-es all actors engaged in disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration activities to consider the needs of youth impact-ed by armed conflict. It also stresses the importance of invest-ing in youth capabilities and skills through relevant education opportunities designed to prevent the marginalisation of youth and to promote a culture of peace.

The UNSC reaffirmed its commitment to implement this

resolution by adopting the subsequent UNSC Resolution 2419 (2018), which promotes the inclusion of youth in con-flict prevention and resolution. Since Resolution 2250 was adopted there has been significant progress, at least in rec-ognising the ‘essential role’ of youth as well as increasing their visibility in areas of peace and security. However, as reflected in the UN Secretary-General’s report on the im-plementation of the resolution, some core challenges re-main to be addressed. These include the ‘structural barriers limiting the participation of young people and their capac-ity to influence decision-making; violations of their human rights; and insufficient investment in facilitating their inclu-sion, in particular through education’ (UN Secretary Gener-al, 2020, para. 10).

Though no solution applies universally to all cases, the best approach is to consider particular cases, such as this evalua-tion of the youth and their role in Cyprus. The Resolution and its five pillars may not be clear-cut for the Cyprus case, but they underline the necessity of creating mechanisms to in-clude the experiences and needs of youth in creating a cul-ture of peace. The comparative findings in this report high-light the youth’s perception of politics, peace and inter-communal contact. It will thus help us to prioritise the necessary points of action in order to recognise the econom-ic, political and social agency of youth as well as to effective-ly integrate them in decision-making and peace processes.

2

UNSC RESOLUTION 2250 AS A LEGAL FRAMEWORK

6

YOUTH PERCEPTIONS TOWARD POLITICS, INTER-COMMUNAL CONTACTS AND PEACE

This policy report details the findings of a telephone survey conducted simultaneously in the two communities of Cy-prus, by Noverna Analytics in the south and Lipa Consultan-cy in the north. The survey commenced on 30 November 2019 in the north and 3 December 2019 in the south and concluded for both sides on 10 January 2020. The Ethical Board of Coventry University provided the necessary ethical approval for the survey, which is a part of the research pro-ject ‘The Role of Youth in Peacebuilding: The Cyprus Case | YOUPEACEBUILDER’. The project has received funding from the EU Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie grants.

The sample included 250 Greek Cypriot youth and 250 Turkish Cypriot youth; male and females were equally represented. Although the National Youth Strategy of Cyprus defines youth as between the range of 14 and 35 years old, survey respond-ents were between 18 and 35 years old. Details about the survey and sample are available in the methodology section.

A comparative analysis of the survey findings will be pre-sented according to the three areas of focus: the political attitudes of youth, youth perceptions of inter-communal contact and youth perceptions of peace.

3.1 POLITICAL ATTITUDES OF GREEK-CYPRIOT AND TURKISH-CYPRIOT YOUTH

The political participation of the younger generation is dismal in most places around the globe. Analysis of voter turnout, which is one of the most common methods of political partic-ipation, reveals that this is lower among the youth than all other age groups. For instance, although in the May 2019 European elections, youth turnout (aged under 25) had grown since 2014, it remained the lowest among age groups (European Parliament, 2019b). This abysmal rate of electoral participation likely applies to Cyprus, especially with previous European elections (Kanol, 2013). However, this youth voting trend resembled that in Europe in the latest election, as was reflected in the survey results. When Cypriot youth were asked whether they voted in the most recent European Parlia-ment elections, which had a total turnout of 44.99 percent, 40.8 percent of Greek Cypriot youth (Figure 1) said they had cast ballots (European Parliament, 2019a). This is only 5.2 per-cent among Turkish Cypriot youth. Nonetheless, this lower turnout among Turkish Cypriots youth is normal considering the total number of registered Turkish Cypriots — 81,611 — represents just 2 percent of the total voter turnout (Andreou, 2019).

Figure 1Vote in the European Parliament Elections, 2019

59.2

40.8

No, did not vote Yes Voted

Greek Cypriots Turkish Cypriots

Yes Voted No, did not vote

94.8

5.2

3


7


As Figure 2 below demonstrates, 63.6 percent of Turkish Cypriot youth and 46 percent of Greek Cypriot youth are generally ‘not interested’ or ‘a little bit’ interested in politics. Yet the low interest does not reflect solely the political apathy of the youth. Not only do the Cypriot youth of both commu-nities feel underrepresented in politics (Figure 3), they also clearly have no confidence politicians’ and political parties’ ability to effect change (Figure 4). While youth harbour neg-ative attitudes towards politics, it is conceivable to argue that Greek Cypriot youth are more interested in politics than Turk-ish Cypriot youth.

As seen more specifically in figure 3, 70 percent of Greek Cypriot youth and 58.8 of Turkish Cypriot youth feel inade-quately represented in politics; only a very small percentage of

both Greek and Turkish young Cypriots feel that their rep-resentation is sufficient. This is also reflected in the statement of a 21-year old Turkish Cypriot: ‘Political parties are hesitant to encourage youth candidates in politics, and they don’t have any intention to open the doors to youth, either.’ In Cyprus, the domination of politics by older men prevents youth from participating in any governmental body (Dizdaroğlu, 2020b).

On both sides of the island, the youth express very low levels of confidence in institutions and persons (Figure 4). The levels of confidence in Mustafa Akıncı (35.2 percent) and Nicos An-astasiades (16.8 percent), the two community leaders, are the highest on both sides in comparison with other institu-tions/persons, including the government, the parliament, po-litical parties and politicians. It is politicians --among all polit-

Figure 2 Political interest among Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot youth

44.0%

22.8% 23.2%20.8%

22.4%

10.4%

19.6%17.2%

14.4%

4.8%

0%

20%

40%

10%

30%

50%

Greek CypriotsTurkish Cypriots

Not at all A little bit Somewhat Quite a bit Very much

Definitely agree

Agree

Neither agree nor disagree

Disagree

Definitely disagree

2.4%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%

20.4%

18.4%

36.8%

22.0%

4.8%

6.4%

18.8%

42.4%

27.6%

Figure 3Representation in Politics

Turkish Cypriots Greek Cypriots

T/Cs – 22.8%

G/Cs – 11.2%

T/Cs – 58.8%

G/Cs – 70.0%

8


ical institutions/persons—who are awarded the lowest level of confidence on both sides, with 49.2 percent of Greek Cyp-riot and 47.6 percent of Turkish Cypriot youth stating that they have no confidence whatsoever in politicians. The politi-cians are followed by the political parties and the govern-ments on both sides.

These rankings change when evaluating various institutions and persons all together (see Figure 5). While the three most trusted institutions/persons in the south are the uni-versities (70.4 percent), the military (33.6 percent) and the judicial system (33.2 percent), in the north they are the military (60.8 percent), the police (40 percent) and the pres-ident (35.2 percent). The high confidence in the military is perhaps a reflection of the youth’s security concerns, which are much higher in the north. The politicians, political par-ties and the governments are the least trusted institutions/persons among the various others in both communities, reading figures 4, 5 and 6 all together. These figures can be evaluated among the reasons behind the low voter turnouts on both sides.

Comparing with all institutions/persons, imams are the least trusted, which corroborates an earlier study (Hatay and Charalambous, 2015, p. 7) that revealed how much Turkish Cypriots value secularism.

Looking at Figure 6, among the international actors, the European Union (EU) is the most trusted entity amongst all Cypriot youth. Almost one in three Greek Cypriot youths declare confidence in the EU; this level is about one in four for Turkish Cypriot respondents. After the EU, Turkish Cyp-riots are most confident in the UN mission in Cyprus (18.4 percent) and the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres (18 percent). In contrast, for Greek Cypriot youth, the UN Secretary-General (16 percent) is more trusted than the UN Mission in Cyprus (13.6 percent).

Figure 4Confidence Level in Political Institutions and Persons

Pres

iden

t

Sum of positive views

The

parli

amen

tTh

e go

verm

ent

Polit

icia

nsPo

litic

al p

artie

s

T/Cs 35.2%

16.6%

14.4%

11.2%

14.0%

10.4%

8.8%

3.6%

8.4%

4.2%

21.6% 12.0% 29.6% 20.0% 15.2%

3.2%

4.8%

2.0%

4.8%

1.2%

4.0%

0.8%

2.8%

1.0%

13.6%

9.6%

9.2%

9.2%

9.2%

4.8%

2.8%

5.6%

3.2%

32.0% 23.6% 27.6%

18.4% 38.8%

30.4% 25.2%

15.6% 33.2%

28.4% 26.4%

21.6% 20.8%

27.6% 19.6%

21.2% 28.8%

31.6% 18.2%

27.2%

33.2%

36.0%

34.8%

47.6%

49.2%

40.0%

46.0%

T/Cs

G/Cs

G/Cs

T/Cs

T/Cs

T/Cs

G/Cs

G/Cs

G/Cs

0% 25% 50% 75% 100%

Not at all A little bit Somewhat A lot Completely

9


Figure 5 Confidence Level in Various Institutions and Persons

Uni

vers

ities


The

m

ilita

ryTh

e

judi

ciar

yTh

e po

lice

Prie

sts/

Im

ams

Med

ia

T/Cs 28.4%

70.4%

60.8%

33.6%

32.0%

33.2%

40.0%

31.6%

18.0%

17.2%

21.2%

11.4%

24.0% 18.0% 28.8% 16.8% 11.6%

12.8%2.8% 21.2%5.6% 57.6%

31.6%29.2%7.2% 22.0%9.6%

7.2%26.4%23.2% 27.2%16.0%

9.6%22.4%15.2% 26.8%24.8%

6.8%26.4%22.8% 28.0%16.0%

17.6%22.4%9.6% 32.4%17.2%

3.6%28.0%20.4% 33.2%14.8%

9.2%8.8%16.4% 13.6%50.8%

7.2%14.0%15.2% 25.6%37.2%

5.6%11.6%20.8% 22.0%40.0%

0.8%9.6%29.2% 32.8%27.6%

T/Cs

G/Cs

G/Cs

T/Cs

T/Cs

T/Cs

T/Cs

G/Cs

G/Cs

G/Cs

G/Cs

0% 25% 50% 75% 100%


3.2 YOUTH PERCEPTION TOWARD INTER-COMMUNAL CONTACTS

The youth of Cyprus were born and raised in a divided coun-try. Most of them have no or few memories of the years of no contact between the two communities. It has been more than 17 years since Turkish Cypriot authorities lifted the re-strictions on the UN-administered Buffer Zone, also known as the Green Line, and allowed crossings between the north and south. As such, the overwhelming majority of Cypriot youth today have the right to visit the other side. The excep-tion is Turkish nationals who live in the north.

Earlier studies identified significant improvement in the breadth of trust between the two communities since the checkpoints were opened after decades of separation. As Yücel and Psaltis (2019, pp. 2–13) deduced, intergroup con-tact is associated with positive outcomes: decreased preju-dice, increased trust and a willingness to peacefully coexist. However, another report identified a need to focus on specif-ic groups, including the Greek Cypriot youth and older Turk-ish Cypriots, as these groups were most resistant to reconcil-iation; at the same time. the report noted a need to improve the quantity and quality of contact (Lordos, Kaymak and Tocci, 2009). Nevertheless, it is impossible to underestimate the positive impact of opening the checkpoints for furthering trust between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.

Figure 6 Confidence Level in International Third Parties

The

Euro

pean

U

nion


UN

Mis

sion

in

Cyp

rus

UN

Sec

reta

ry

Gen

eral

T/Cs 26,4%

29.6%

18.4%

13.6%

18.0%

16.0%

35.6% 12.4% 23.2% 18.8% 7.6%

4.0%22.8% 16.8% 25.6%30.8%

6.4%12.0%18.8% 28.0%31.6%

2.0%11.6%22.4% 36.4%27.6%

6.4%11.6%17.2% 29.2%33.6%

2.0%14.0%20.4% 36.8%26.8%

T/Cs

G/Cs

G/Cs

T/Cs

G/Cs

0% 25% 50% 75% 100%


10


As reflected in Figure 7, the two communities diverge sub-stantially in their support for opening new checkpoints be-tween the two sides. While half of Turkish Cypriot youth ‘support’ or ‘definitely support’ opening more checkpoints, half of the Greek Cypriot youth feel the opposite and ‘do not’ or ‘definitely do not’ support this idea. The same difference also appears in the survey findings regarding the frequency of crossings (Figure 8) and maintaining inter-community friendships (Figure 11). These negative trends among Greek Cypriot youth clearly demonstrate the importance of focus-ing on their attitudes to increase the dialogue between the two communities. It is notable that the positive trend among

Turkish Cypriot youth relates not just to coexistence, but it also includes accessing opportunities in the RoC that stem from the state’s EU membership.

There is also a remarkable discrepancy in the frequency of checkpoint crossings between Greek and Turkish Cypriot youth. A total of 41.4 percent of Turkish Cypriot youth say that they cross the checkpoints every day, a few times each week or at least once in a month. Only 7.2 percent of Greek Cypriot youth reported the same frequency of checkpoint crossings (Figure 8). Another key point is the percentage of youth who have never crossed to the other side of the island.

T/Cs – 50.4%

G/Cs – 20,4%

T/Cs – 28,8%

G/Cs – 53,6%

Definitely support

Support

Neither support nor do not support

Do not support

Definitely do not support

29,6%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%

20,8%

18,8%

12,8%

16,0%

8,4%

12,0%

25,6%

21,2%

32,4%

Figure 7Support Level for Opening More Check-Points


Everyday/Few times a week

Once a month

Once every 2 to 3 months

Once every 4 to 6 months

Once a year

Less often

Only been once or twice

Never

21,3%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%

20,1%

6,4%

5,6%

5,2%

4,4%

2,8%

0,8%

4,0%

9,2%

12,0%

8,4%

4,4%

32,4%

24,9%

38,0%

Figure 8Frequency of Crossing to the Other Side


11


Figure 11Having Friends from the Other Community

0%

50%

100%

48.8%

16.8%

51.2%

83.2%

25%

75%

Yes No


Figure 9Reasons for Crossing the Check-Points

Shopping/recreation

For a walk/for coffee

Work related (trade,

passport etc.)

Personal reasons

To see friends

17.0% 17.0%

11.3% 11.3% 11.3%10.9%

4.8%2.7%

43.5%

50.3%

To see my grandfather's

house/our place of origin

For a walk/for coffee

Cultural events with TCs/historic sites/church

visits

Shopping/recreation

Cheap fuel/cigarettes

0%

20%

40%

10%

30%

50%


Figure 10Reasons for NOT Crossing the Check-Points

Turkish nationals

No specific reason

Parents are from Turkey

Not interested/ no reason

to go

Different perceptions

(racism, enmity)

44.7%

14.7%

8.6%7.6%

6.1%

16.8%

13.7%

6.3%

27.4%

29.5%

Not interested/ no reason

to go

Do not want to show ID card

(recognize to north)

Turkey took our land/

our enemies/ our land is occupied

Do not want to subsidize the north

For ethical reasons

0%

20%

40%

10%

30%

50%


12


While 38 percent of Greek Cypriot youth say they have never crossed the other side, 24.9 percent of the surveyed Turkish Cypriots say that they have not yet crossed. It is relevant, how-ever, that included in the percentage of Turkish Cypriots who have not crossed the checkpoints are Turkish nationals who are not allowed to do so. The percentage of respondents who have crossed the checkpoints just once or twice is quite high among Greek Cypriots. As many as seven in ten Greek Cypri-ot youth are disinterested in the other side of the island.

When respondents were asked about their most recent crossing, one in five Turkish Cypriots say that they had crossed the checkpoints this week. Again, this percentage for Greek Cypriots is considerably lower.

Those who indicated that they cross the checkpoints at least once a year — a percentage that includes 53 respondents from the south and 147 from the north — were asked a fol-low-up question on their reasons for crossing. The free re-sponse section reveals that Greek Cypriots mainly visit the other side for things such having a walk or a coffee (17 per-cent) or to visit family or previous homes (17 percent).

In comparison, Turkish Cypriot youth visited mainly for shop-ping and recreation (50.3 percent), taking a walk or having a coffee (43.5 percent), as well as work-related visits such as trade, acquiring a passport or travelling from Larnaca airport. The Greek Cypriot youth who cross the checkpoints indicate that shopping and recreation, cheap fuel and cigarettes, cul-tural events with TCs and historic site visits are among their prominent motivations for crossing the checkpoints.

Figure 10 reveals the reasons for not crossing to the other side. The question was asked of those who reported their frequency of crossing the checkpoints as ‘less often’, ‘never’

and ‘only once or twice’ (the total number of respondents who gave these answers were 197 in the south and 103 in the north). In response to an open-ended question on the reasons for not crossing the other side, respondents from the south said that they were not interested in going or had no reason to go (44.7 percent), did not want to show an ID (14.7 percent) and were angered by the occupation of their land (8.6 per-cent). Following these top reasons are ‘do not want to subsi-dize the north’ (7.6 percent) and ‘ethical reasons’ (6.1 percent).

The reasons for respondents from the north were quite dif-ferent from those of their counterparts in the south. Accord-ingly, most respondents noted that either they are ‘Turkish nationals’ (29.5 percent) or ‘children of settlers’ (16.8 per-cent) — meaning they do not have the right to cross the checkpoints. The other reasons Turkish Cypriot youth gave for not crossing include ‘no specific reason’ (27.4 percent), ‘not interested/no reason to go’ (13.7 percent) and ‘different perceptions of Greek Cypriots’ (6.3 percent).

When questioned on attitudes to friendship with the members of the other community, Turkish Cypriot youth are more open to such relationships than are Greek Cypriot youth. As reflect-ed below in Figure 11, of the Turkish Cypriot respondents 48.4 percent say that they have Greek Cypriot friends, while this percentage drops to 16.8 for the Greek Cypriot youth. Regard-less of the meaning of friendship, what this finding important-ly reveals is that most of the Turkish Cypriot youth and over-whelming majority of the Greek Cypriot youth do not have friends across the checkpoint. These findings highlight the weak communication between the youth of both communities — and this a reality for the broader population as well.

Figures 12 and 13 list the reasons given by respondents for lack of friends from the other community. Greek Cypriot

It just has not happened

Nothing specific

I do not go/have contact with the other side

They cannot be trusted

Ideological reasons/ It is not right to be friends with TCs

The current political situation/ division on the island

Because of the past history/ what they have done to us

Because they are TCs

I specifically do NOT want to have TC friends

Different language

They are our enemies/ nationalist reasons

I have not pursued it

Different perceptions

We have nothing in common

Not familiar with them

They occupy our land

0 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%

Figure 12Reasons for NOT Having Friends from the Other Community

Greek Cypriots

14.0%

51.0%

3.4%

1.4%

1.4%

3.9%

2.4%

1.9%

1.4%

10.6%

1.0%

2.9%

2.9%

1.0%

0.5%

0.5%

13


youth (208 out of 250 youth) most commonly responded with: ‘it just has not happened’ (51 percent), ‘nothing specif-ic’ (14 percent) and ‘do not have contact with the other side since they don’t visit’ (10.6 percent). This trend differs greatly for Turkish Cypriots (128 of 250 youth without Greek Cypriot friends), who indicated the same initial two responses, though in different order. Thus, the highest percentage of those without friends from the opposite community re-sponded with ‘nothing specific’ (39.1 percent), ‘it just has not happened’ (11.7 percent) or ‘different language’ (9.7 per-cent). These figures show clearly that the negative narratives against the other community — ‘enemy’ and ‘untrustworthy’ — do not dominate the mindset of the youth. It is, therefore, possible to argue that this issue pertains solely to creating common and safe spaces to foster these relationships be-tween the two communities. This may increase youth’s will-ingness to meet with other community.

Figure 14 confirms our conclusion that communication be-tween the two communities is lacking. When asked about the frequency of contact with other community, very few youth respondents said that they ‘often’ or ‘very often’ have contact. Although the percentage of Turkish Cypriot youth seems higher than that of Greek Cypriot, this figure does not inspire much hope in terms of creating meaningful dialogue be-tween the two communities. Further establishing this conclu-sion are the reasons Cypriots visit the other side of the island: shopping, leisure and work. What is significant is the percent-age of respondents in both communities who indicated that they have never had contact with the other community: 39.2 percent in the north and 69.2 percent in the south (Figure 14).

Regardless of frequency — excepting those who have never had contact — Figure 15 below reflects the location of in-ter-communal contact. In response to an open-ended ques-tion, the Greek Cypriots (77 out of 250 respondents) who have contact with Turkish Cypriots listed the locations of this contact as work (35.8 percent), social settings such as cafes and shops (23.9 percent), home (11.9 percent) and university (10.5 percent). Turkish Cypriots responded in much the same way: Turkish Cypriots (152 out of 250 respondents) indicated that they meet with Greek Cypriots in social settings (41.7 percent), at places of work (16.3 percent), on social media (10.8 percent) or in their neighbourhoods (10.2 percent).

The series of abovementioned figures demonstrate the low-est level of interaction between the two communities. In ad-dition to the degree of contact, it is also important to ques-tion how acceptable respondents view interaction between the communities. The data in Figures 16 and 17 highlight the different modes of interaction between the Greek and Turk-ish Cypriot communities, and it also supports the conclusion that there are no serious ideological factors preventing great-er contact or interaction between the youth. The figures be-low are promising, as more than half of all Cypriot youth re-spondents find most types of interactions with the other community acceptable. The weak spot for each community, as reflected in Figures 16 and 17, is having a president from the other community: 64.4 percent of youth in the south and 67.2 percent of youth in the north find this idea unaccept-able. In the south, having a Turkish Cypriot president gar-nered the lowest level of acceptability, followed by ‘employed by’ (37.2 percent) and having ‘a family member to be married to’ (32.8 percent) a Turkish Cypriot. For the north, ‘employed

Nothing specific

It just has not happened 11.7%

39.1%

I do not go/have contact with the other side 7.0%

They cannot be trusted 2.3%

Ideological reasons/ It is not right to be friends with GCs 3.1%

The current political situation/ division on the island 7.8%

Because of the past history/ what they have done to us 3.1%

Because they are GCs 3.1%

I specifically do NOT want to have GC friends 3.1%

Different language 9.4%

They are our enemies/ nationalist reasons 0.8%

I have not pursued it 3.9%

Different perceptions 4.7%

We have nothing in common 0.8%

Not familiar with them 0.0%

They occupy our land 0.0%

0 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%

Figure 13Reasons for NOT Having Friends from the Other Community

Turkish Cypriots

14


by a Greek Cypriot’ (40.4 percent) and ‘having a Greek Cyp-riot business partner’ (33.2 percent) earned the second and third lowest levels of acceptability. It is well-known that most of these modes of interaction are still rare across the island, yet these figures reveal that this has the potential for radical transformation.

Figure 14Frequency of Contact with Other Community


100%

75%

50%

25%

0%

Very often Often Occasionally Rarely Never

Figure 15Place of Contact with Other Community

At a social atmosphere (cafes, shops, restaurants, shopping malls etc)

At work/ workplace

On social media (twitter,

facebook)

In my neighborhood

35.8%

23.9%

11.9% 10.5%10.8%10.2%

16.3%

41.7%

At work/ workplace

At a social atmoshere

(cafes, shops, restaurants,

shopping malls etc)

At home At university0%

20%

40%

10%

30%

50%


8%4% 4% 4.4%

24.4%

9.2%

24.4%

13.2%

39.2%

69.2%

15


Figure 17Acceptability of Interactions with Greek Cypriots

Not Acceptable Acceptable Don't know

Figure 16Acceptability of Interactions with Turkish Cypriots

15.2% 83.6% 1.2%

1.6%

2.0%

1.6%

1.6%

3.2%

2.8%

3.6%

4.4%

2.8%

4.4%

81.2%

80.8%

80.8%

76.4%

72.8%

67.6%

66.4%

62.8%

60.0%

31.2%

17.2%

17.2%

17.6%

22.0%

24.0%

29.6%

30.0%

32.8%

37.2%

64.4%

Work in the same place with T/Cs

Go to the same cafes/bars with T/Cs

Children to go to same school

Live in the same town with T/Cs

Live in the same neighbourhood with T/Cs

Have a close T/C friend

Hace a T/C business partner

A member of your family to have a T/C girlfriend/boyfriend

A member of your family to be married with a T/C

Be employed by a T/C

President of Cyprus to be T/C

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Not Acceptable Acceptable Don't know

12.8 84.8 2.4

1.2

2.8

3.2

2.4

2.4

1.2

3.6%

3.6

2.8%

9.6

83.2

78.8

75.2

76.0

75.2

72.8

68.4

63.2

56.8

23.2

15.6

18.4

21.6

21.6

22.4

26.0

28.0

33.2

40.4

67.4

Go to the same cafes/bars with G/Cs

Have a close G/C friend

Work in the same place with G/Cs

Live in the same town with G/Cs

A member of your family to have a T/C girlfriend/boyfriend


A member of your family to be married with a G/C

Live in the same neighbourhood with G/Cs

Hace a T/C business partner

Be employed by a G/C

President of Cyprus to be G/C

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Greek Cypriots

Turkish Cypriots

16


3.3 YOUTH PERCEPTIONS OF PEACE

The lasting separation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots on the small island of Cyprus has long been a contentious issue in the Eastern Mediterranean. Greek and Turkish Cypri-ot communities have been living on an island that has been politically divided for more than 55 years, and physically di-vided for more than 45 years. Much effort and energy has been spent in search of a comprehensive solution to eth-no-national dispute,6 but the parties have yet to find such a solution. Therefore, the questionnaire also investigates youth perceptions of the never-ending peace negotiations , the possible solution scenarios, as well as how they are likely to vote in a future referendum.

Figure 18 reveals how the youth view the peace negotiation process, and it should be noted that there were no ongoing negotiations during the time of fieldwork of survey. However, all Cypriot youth are accustomed to the term ‘negotiations’, as the Cyprus problem is inevitably entwined in their daily lives and profoundly impacts both communities. It is there-fore important to discover youth perceptions of the issue. As the figures below clearly reveal, youth respondents are not optimistic about the negation process between their leaders. The survey data demonstrate that only 10 percent of youth in the south and 19.2 percent in the north think that negotia-tions will produce a solution. On the contrary, the over-

6 The most recent UN-facilitated negotiations, held in July 2017 in Crans Montana, Switzerland, between Nicos Anastasiades and Mustafa Akinci, the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders, respectively, failed. More recently, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres convened leaders from both communities at an informal meeting in Berlin on 25 November 2019. But the parties have yet to agree to the ‘terms of reference’ to initiate settlement talks.

whelming majority of Greek Cypriot youth and most Turkish Cypriot youth believe that the negotiations are futile, and cannot produce a viable solution.

Figure 19 confirms this pessimistic scenario. In answer to a question about the Cyprus problem, more than half of all Cypriot youth respondents stated that they expected it would never be solved. A mere 29.2 percent of youth in the north think the problem will be solved within 10 years and only 18 percent in the south. These figures are quite under-standable, as negotiations between the two communities have failed to reach a permanent solution since 1968, when they initially agreed to meet to solve the Cyprus problem (Sözen, 2007).

Asking about the various solution options, ranging from con-tinuing the status quo to the indefinite partition of the island, is an inescapable component of surveys conducted in Cyprus. It is well-known that Greek and Turkish Cypriots have been at odds, with Greek Cypriots mainly supporting a unitary state, and Turkish Cypriots favouring two separate internationally recognised states. The most recent survey, conducted by the World Bank and the EU in May 2019, reported that over 60 percent of respondents on both sides support these options (World Bank and EU, 2019, p. 12). It should also be noted that, in this survey, Turkish Cypriots considered the bi-zonal and bi-communal federation models to be the most acceptable.

Figure 18Whether Negotiations will Lead to an Agreed Solution (%)

84.4%

10.0%5.6%

Greek Cypriots

Unsure

No, will not lead to solution

Yes, will lead to solution

51.2%

19.2%29.6%

Turkish Cypriots

Unsure

No, will not lead to solution

Yes, will lead to solution

17


This trend does not vary substantially among the island’s youth. The findings of this survey mirror their degrees of sup-port the different solution models, and, as shown in Figure 20 and 21, the most favoured solution models for Greek and Turkish Cypriot youth are exactly the opposite. While 54 per-cent of Greek Cypriot youth ‘support’ or ‘definitely support’ the notion of a unitary state, 62.4 percent of Turkish Cypriot youth favour two separate and internationally recognised states.. The second most acceptable solution model, for all Cypriots, is the bi-zonal and bi-communal federation, al-though support among Greek Cypriot respondents (18 per-cent) is low relative to the north (54 percent). It is worth to mention that the support level toward bi-zonal and bi-com-

munal federation solution is not significantly differed among Turkish Cypriot youth of mainland Turkish descent. These fig-ures also demonstrate the greater extent to which Greek Cypriot youth are unified about their preferred solution; Turk-ish Cypriot youth, in contrast, paint a more fragmented pic-ture, as the survey findings depict.

Interestingly, however, the percentage of Greek Cypriot youth (61.6 percent) who ‘do not support’ or ‘definitely do not support’ the continuation of the status quo is much high-er than the percentage of Turkish Cypriot youth who re-sponded similarly (38.8 percent).

Figure 19Time When Expect Cyprus Problem will be Solved

0%

20%

40%

10%

30%

50%

60%

2.0% 2.0%

9.6%

4.0%

17.6%

12.0%

6.4%8.8%

10.4%

6.0%

50.8%54.4%

3.2%

12.8%

In less than 2 years

In 2 to 4 years 5-10 years later 11-20 years later In more than 20 years

Never Do not know/ Cannot say


Figure 20Support Level for Various Solution Types (G/Cs)

Definatily do not support Do not support Neither support nor do not support Support Definitely support


29.2%

4.4%

6.4%

3.2%

3.2%

24.8%

13.6%

10.8%

6.8%

6.8%

17.2% 12.8% 16%

37.2%

21.2%

18.4%

11.6%

18.8%

22.4%

28.8%

17.2%

26%

39.2%

42.8%

61.2%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

One unitary state and central goverment for the whole of Cyprus

Two separate and internationally recognized states

A confederation with two sovereign states

Continuation of the current situation.status quo

Bi-zonal, bicommunal federation

54%

10%

10%

17,2%

18%

18


Another common survey question in Cyprus relates to voting behaviour in potential referenda about a solution to the en-during Cyprus problem. More than half of the Turkish Cypriot respondents indicated that they would vote ‘yes’ in such a referendum, against 16.8 percent who would vote ‘no’. These voting patterns among youth, when compared to the World Bank-EU survey, nearly mirror those of the general Turkish Cypriot population. The Greek Cypriot youth, on the other hand, seem generally willing to vote in the opposite direction; 37.6 percent responded that they would vote ‘no’. In actual fact, however, the difference between voting ‘yes’

and ‘no’ are not very drastic: 34 percent affirming they would vote ‘yes’. In contrast, the World Bank-EU survey reported the opposite result for the wider Greek Cypriot population, re-vealing only a 15 percent difference between ‘yes’ and ‘no’ votes, and suggesting that overall the population was more inclined to favour a referendum (World Bank and EU, 2019)

The percentage of undecided Greek and Turkish youth Cypri-ot respondents was similar, with one in four being unsure. These numbers resemble those of the wider population as shown in the World Bank-EU survey.

9.6%

8.8%

12.0%

19.6%

19.6% 24.8% 25.6%

18.8% 19.2%

18.4% 19.6%

23.6% 13.6%

14% 14% 21.2%41.2%

39.6% 14.4%

11.6%37.6%

31.6% 11.2%

7.2%22.6%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%


62.4%

29.6%

42.4%

49.2%

54%


Bi-zonal, bicommunal federation

A confederation with two sovereign states

Continuation of the current situation.status quo

One unitary state and central goverment for the whole of Cyprus

Figure 21Support Level for Various Solution Types (T/Cs)

Definatily do not support Do not support Neither support nor do not support Support Definitely support

Figure 22Likely Way to Vote in a New Referendum

75%

58.0%

34.0%

16.8%

37.6%

25.2%

28.4%

50%

25%

0%

Yes (in favor) No (against) Unsure


19


While youth are generally pessimistic about the negotiation process between Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders, in Figure 23 we see that almost half of all Cypriot respondents believe that a solution depends on the encouragement of internation-al actors. In fact, 51.2 percent of youth in the north and 44.2 percent of youth in the south respond that they either ‘agree’ or ‘definitely agree’ that international encouragement is nec-essary to a solution. This can be evaluated as yet another re-flection of the appallingly low level of confidence the youth have in their community leaders to initiate negotiations. More-over, all earlier negotiation processes confirm that parties re-main hesitant to discuss issues regarding a solution without the involvement of international parties, especially the UN.

Perusing the endless stream of news about the Cyprus prob-lem, one could easily interpret countless peace-building ef-forts over time as the ‘last chance for Cyprus’. It is well known that this never-ending cycle of ‘last chances’ in Cyprus has precipitated the failure of countless negotiation processes. Despite the criticism of the closed-door and elite style of ne-gotiations, community leaders have been reluctant to en-gage the wider public (Lordos, 2009). However, as seen be-low in Figure 24, Cypriot youth on both sides — 48.8 percent in the north and 54.4 percent in the south — believe that they have a responsibility to find a peaceful settlement to the problem. It should also be noted that one in three Turkish Cypriot youths do not feel that they share this responsibility.

Regarding the responsibility of youth to influence a peaceful settlement, more than half of the Greek Cypriot youth re-spondents agree or definitely agreed, while only 34 percent of Turkish Cypriot youth felt that they had an impact. This di-vide stresses the need for further research into these two questions in order to understand the minutiae of youth im-pact and responsibility: (1) What kind of responsibility do youth have? (2) What kind of impact do youth have? (3) Is the impact of youth at individual or societal level? (4) What are the obstacles that hinder the impact of youth on the solution?

Figure 23The Dependence of a Solution on the Encouragement from the International Parties

Definitely agree

Agree

Neither agree nor disagree

Disagree

Definitely disagree

17.2%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%

34.4%

16.4%

22%

10%

18%

26.8%

29.2%

14%

12%


T/Cs – 51.2%

G/Cs – 44.2%

T/Cs – 32.0%

G/Cs – 26.0%

20


Figure 24Impact and Responsibility of Youth in a Peaceful Settlement to the Problem

11.6%37.2%

31.6% 22.8%

14.0%39.6%

23.6% 10.8%

14.0%T/Cs

T/Cs

G/Cs

G/Cs

22.4%

13.6% 11.6%

10.4% 22.4%

15.2% 24.8%

14.4%

20.4%

12.8%

26.0%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Yout

h ha

ve a

resp

onisi

bily

to

find

a pe

acef

ul s

ettle

men

tYo

uth

hace

impa

ct o

n pe

acef

ul

sett

lem

ent t

o th

e pr

oble

m


48,8%

34,0%

53,6%

54,4%

21


The aim of this policy report is present Cypriot youth’s per-ceptions based on a survey taken on both sides of the island. Analysis of the data has led to draw below conclusions, which will foster a debate, in order to move beyond soliloquy of youth:

1. The findings in this report highlight the diminished inte-rest that youth have in politics, though the underlying reason should not be associated with the broad notion of youth political apathy. Despite the lack of obst-acles for youth to run as candidates in an election — a 21-year-old in the south and 25-year-old in the north can run for office — youth political representa-tion is still meagre all around the island. Figure 3 demonstrates that most Cypriot youth feel they are un-derrepresented in politics. This is not merely a sentiment shared by youth, but reflects the reality of the situation: the average age of MPs (after the most recent parlia-mentary election) is 49.5 in the south and 50.6 in the north. Furthermore, parliamentary representation by individuals under the age of 35 is 2 percent in the north and 9 percent in the south. These figures confirm how imperative it is to engage youth in decisi-on-making processes—as noted in the UNSC 2250’s first pillar. This may start with the with the creation of safe spaces for youth in local and national decisi-on-making mechanisms and the temporary designati-on of a youth quota.

2. The negligible level of youth representation spa-wns collective mistrust in political institutions and figures. The youth have no confidence in either politici-ans or existing political parties to actuate change. Apart from the youth wings of political parties, Cypriot youth have limited influence and little voice in de-cision-making processes. While Greek Cypriot youth have an advisory body called the Youth Board of Cyprus, no such mechanism exists in the north for Turkish Cypri-ot youth. This implies that Greek Cypriot youth have a more unified body than Turkish Cypriot youth (Dizda-roğlu, 2020a). As they lack confidence in the existing institutions to effect change, youth participate actively in civil society organisations or platform creation to amplify their voices. Therefore, in addition to the traditional me-thods of increasing youth representation in the parlia-ment, there exists a need to consider what youth

say and want.7 Cypriot youth are more than capable of suggesting ways to encourage political engagement—that is, if anyone is willing to listen.

3. Regarding inter-communal contact, communication between the youth of both communities is very weak. Variables such as support for opening new checkpoints, the frequency of crossing checkpoints and friendships with members of the opposite community reveal that Turkish Cypriots are more inclined to po-sitive attitudes. As noted previously, Turkish Cypriot youth’s support for opening more checkpoints and the frequency of crossings do not inherently correlate to in-teraction with the Greek Cypriot community — the rea-sons for crossing relate primarily to shopping and recre-ation, going for a walk or having a coffee, and work. In contrast, Greek Cypriot youth are more reluctant to cross to the other side and to make friends from the Turkish Cypriot community. Thus, the level of support for opening new checkpoints is, expectedly, lo-wer than that of their Turkish Cypriot counterparts. A myriad of factors, including an unwillingness to show an ID, subsidising the north, a lack of interest in crossing and the occupation of their land, result in fewer cros-sings by Greek Cypriot youth. These results are not promising in terms of reconciliation and establis-hing meaningful dialogue between the two com-munities. Intergroup contact, as earlier studies (Yücel and Psaltis, 2019) have shown, is associated with positive outcomes: prejudice reduction, trust-building and willingness for a peaceful co-existence. More efforts to foster trust, reconciliation and cooperation are necessary to address this issue. The initiative ‘Imagine’, which the Bi-communal Technical Committee on Education has been implementing with

7 For instance, four of the youth associations in the north (including the Nicosia Youth Association, the Federation of Turkish Cypriot Students in the UK, Youth Initiative in Education and Famagusta Youth Centre) organized a Turkish Cypriot Youth Congress in 2019 in order to discuss youth-related issues. The Congress’s concluding report has been shared with all political parties as well as Turkish Cypriot community leader Mustafa Akinci. Likewise, a recent project entitled ‘House of Youth Rep-resentatives’, a joint initiative of the Cyprus Youth Council and Cyprus Youth Diplomacy, has been shortlisted in May 2020 among best projects in Europe regarding youth empowerment and youth participation in deci-sion-making (See at https://cyc.org.cy/en/house-of-youth-representatives-shortlisted-for-salto-pi-award/).

4

DISCUSSION & RECOMMENDATIONS

22

DISCUSSION & RECOMMENDATIONS

children, represents a good example of how to increase the willingness of all Cypriots to explore the other side of the island.

4. Given the conclusion that there are no significant barriers to the establishment of friendship with the members of the other community, increasing the frequency of inter-communal visits could increase dialogue in informal spaces, such as cafes, restaurants and pubs. Reinforcing a culture of peace among children and youth through education will also help to promote inter-communal dialogue by eliminating prejudices. Safe spaces, such as the Home for Cooperation in the Buffer Zone, and dialogue and collaboration activities hosted by civil society organisations play crucial roles in enhancing contact between the two communities. Although the number of initiatives has to date been inconse-quential, individual and collective youth-led initia-tives are enormously important. Some recent ex-amples include ‘Lead Cyprus’, which was started by two youth-led organisations in Cyprus and sought to ensure reconciliation through economic dialogue and coopera-tion, and the ‘Bicommunal Network of Cypriot Students UK’, which helps Greek and Turkish Cypriots studying in the UK foster connections between the two communi-ties off the island. Thus, supporting and encouraging these kinds of initiatives financially, politically, technically and logistically will improve chances for coexistence.

5. Youth perceptions of the endless peace negotiations, possible scenarios for a solution and potential voting patterns in a future referendum constitute invaluable in-puts for practitioners to determine a road map to a solu-tion that responds to the needs of youth. As earlier stu-dies (Pimond et al., 2019, p. 7) have shown, ‘the creation of linkages and information flows between negotiation teams, civil society and the wider public can help to fos-ter inclusive and constructive dialogue.’ The lack of such information flows with the wider community, as well as the insistence on ignoring youth’s agency in peace processes, will damage the legitimacy and sustain-ability of the overall process. Youth have the po-tential to play different roles — as observers or chro-niclers in the room or as activists outside the room — in preserving peace if they are included and actively participate in the process (Altiok and Grizelj, 2019). Many Cypriot youth stated that they feel a responsibility to find a peaceful solution — 48.8 percent in the north and 54.4 percent in the south. It is the duty of practitio-ners to engage these youth.

6. Cypriot youth’s influence on peace negotiations is minimal considering the current format of the negotia-tion process in Cyprus. There are no direct mechanisms that deliver youth messages to community leaders. It would be good starting point to establish a ‘Bi-communal Technical Committee on Youth’, which would be responsible for dealing with the everyday problems of the youth and work to nurture cooperation and trust between the two communities (Dizdaroğlu, 2020a). None of the existing bi-communal technical communities or Cypriot youth bodies represent, or work with, all Cypriot youth-- a co-

hort that would also include Maronite, Armenian and Latins. Such a body would, therefore, greatly empower youth voices on the island.

7. The overlap of the issues of youth, women and children has devalued youth priorities in discussi-ons of their unique contributions. Bi-communal technical committees on education and gender equality have already devoted significant energy to enhancing the roles of women and children in peacebuilding (De-metriou and Hadjipavlou, 2018). Therefore, there re-mains a need to change the mentality in Cyprus in order to recognise the social, economic and political agency of youth. If youth agency can be recognised through equal rights, they can contribute meaningfully and become powerful agents of change. Otherwise, their contributions to peacebuilding will continue to be ignored or underutilised.

8. These recommendations and points of action will also lead to the successful implementation of UNSC Resolution 2250 (2015). Increasing youth repre-sentation in decision-making mechanisms, providing them with platforms to amplify their voices, hearing what they say and establishing a special youth technical committee will respond to the first pillar of Resolution 2250: participation. The resolution’s pillar on protecti-on refers equally to the young peacebuilders and human rights defenders, who might be targeted because of their activities. Support for individual and collective pea-cebuilding activities at the local level will bolster commu-nity ownership and prevent these youths from being blamed by their respective communities. Encouraging efforts at trust-building, reconciliation and cooperation would help to promote a culture of ‘peace, tolerance, intercultural and interreligious dialogue that involve youth’, as is emphasised by the resolution’s third pillar, prevention. Such an environment across the island will preclude the engagement of Cypriot youth with far-right and ultra nationalist groups, and will culminate in social cohesion. In doing so, Cyprus may set an example for other countries by becoming a rare instance where UNSC Resolution 2250 is implemented suc-cessfully.

23


This study is a part of a research project entitled ‘The Role of Youth in Peacebuilding: The Cyprus Case | YOUPEACEBUILD-ER’, which has received funding from the EU’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Sklo-dowska-Curie grant agreement, No. 796053. The survey was conducted in both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communi-ties, with ethical approval from Coventry University in the United Kingdom. Two identical telephone surveys were con-ducted by Noverna Analytics and by Lipa Consultancy, in the south and north, respectively.

The sampling was drawn from both urban and rural areas in each district on both sides of the island (Table 1). There was a total of 500 respondents, 250 respondents from each community in a gender-equal sample. The National Youth Strategy of Cyprus defines the lower age limit for youth as 14 years old. However, for ethical reasons, all survey participants were over 18 years old and had the right to vote. The upper limit was set at 35, also the same as the Youth Strategy. A more detailed categorisation of the respondents by gender, education level, location and refugee status can be found in table below and the map.

The employment status of the respondents can be seen be-low. As reflected in Figure 25, almost three-fourths of the youth on both sides work part-time, full-time or are self-em-

ployed. There were 20 percent students on each side, while the rate of unemployment on both sides is fairly equal, around 5-6 percent. The unemployment rate in the survey is quite low considering the actual unemployment rate among youth which is above 20 percent.

The questionnaire was written in English and then translated into both Greek and Turkish to administer the survey in each community’s native languages. The English version of the questionnaire can be found in Annex I. Earlier fieldwork ob-servations and face-to-face interviews with Cypriot youth for the YOUPEACEBUILDER project were used as guidance to develop the questionnaire, which was fine-tuned using the inputs of Harris Papageorgiou from Noverna, and Eliz Tefik from Lipa Consultancy. Additionally, the aforementioned studies ‘Human Development Report of Cyprus’ (2009) and ‘The Post-Annan Generation: Student Attitudes towards the Cyprus Problem’ (2015) inspired the researcher to conduct a follow-up youth survey for this study.

The telephone survey was conducted using CATI software, with which both companies randomly generated mobile numbers with the prefixes of the respective country. In order to attain the sample size of 250, a total of 724 people in the south and 759 people in the north were contacted. The sur-vey was completely voluntary, and respondents had the right to opt out. Reading off a verbal script, surveyors asked re-spondents for explicit consent to conduct the survey.

The survey commenced on 30 November 2019 in the north, and on 3 December 2019 in the south. The surveys were completed on 10 January 2020 on both sides of the island. Each survey lasted approximately 11 to 13 minutes. The mar-gin of error of the results is 5 percent for both sides.

5

METHODOLOGY

24

METHODOLOGY

GREEK CYPRIOTS(n= 250)

TURKISH CYPRIOTS(n= 250)

GENDER n % n %

Male 127 50,8 129 51,6

Female 123 49,2 121 48,4

EDUCATION LEVEL n % n %

Up to high school 97 38,8 116 46,4

Up to undergraduate 85 34,0 113 45,2

Masters/PhD 68 27,2 21 8,4

AREA n % n %

Rural 72 28,8 101 40,4

Urban 178 71,2 149 59,6

REFUGEE STATUS n % n %

From Refugee Family 119 47,6 98 39,2

Not from Refugee Family 131 52,4 152 60,8

Table 1Demographic Categorisation of the Sample

Figure 25Employment Status

0%

46,8%

60%

19.2%

18,0%

16,0%

7,6%

5,2%

6,0%

8,0%

6,0%

2,8%

1,6%

2%

0,8%

25% 50% 75%

Full-time employment

Student

Self-employed

Unemployed

Part-time employment

Army service

Other


25


REFERENCES

Altiok, A. and Grizelj, I. (2019) We Are Here: An Integrated Approach to Youth-inclusive Peace Processes. United Nations Office of the Secretary-General’s Envoy on Youth.

Andreou, E. (2019) ‘Turkish Cypriot MEP hails Bicommunual Cooperation’, Cyprus Mail, 27 May. Available at: https://cyprus-mail.com/2019/05/27/turkish-cypriot-mep-hails-bicommunual-cooperation/.

Demetriou, O. and Hadjipavlou, M. (2018) ‘The Impact of Women’s Activism on the Peace Negotiations in Cyprus’, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 24(1), pp. 50–65.

Dizdaroğlu, C. (2020a) ‘Do You Hear the Youth Sing?’, Turkish Policy Quarterly, 19(1), pp. 105-114.

Dizdaroğlu, C. (2020b) ‘Young people are campaigning for political change worldwide - but their voices are too often ignored’, The Conversation, 1 April.

Durham, D. (2004) ‘Disappearing Youth: Youth as a Social Shifter in Botswana’, American Ethnologist, 31(4), pp. 589–605.

Etymonline (2020). Available at: https://www.etymonline.com/word/soliloquy (Accessed: 15 May 2020).

European Parliament (2019a) 2019 European election results, European Parliament. Available at: https://europarl.europa.eu/election-results-2019/en/national-results/cyprus/2019-2024/ (Accessed: 19 March 2019).

European Parliament (2019b) 2019 European elections: Record turnout driven by young people, European Parliament News. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20190923IPR61602/2019-european-elections-record-turnout-driven-by-young-people (Accessed: 1 April 2020).

Hadjipavlou, M. and Kanol, B. (2008) The Impacts of Peacebuilding Work on the Cyprus Conflict. Cambridge, MA: CDA Collaborative Learning Projects.

Hatay, M. and Charalambous, G. (2015) The post-Annan generation: Student attitudes towards the Cyprus problem. Nicosia: PRIO Cyprus Centre and Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung.

Honwana, A. (2012) The Time of Youth: Work, Social Change and Politics in Africa. Sterling VA: Kumarian.

Honwana, A. (2013) ‘Youth, Waithood, and Protest Movements in Africa’, African Arguments, 12 August. Available at https://africanarguments.org/2013/08/12/youth-waithood-and-protest-movements-in-africa-by-alcinda-honwana/.

Jarraud, N., Louise, C. and Filippou, G. (2013) ‘The Cypriot Civil Society movement: a legitimate player in the peace process?’, Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, 8(1), pp. 45–59.

Kanol, D. (2013) ‘To Vote or Not to Vote? Declining Voter Turnout in the Republic of Cyprus’, The Cyprus Review, 25(2), pp. 59–72.

Lordos, A. (2009) ‘From Secret Diplomacy to Public Diplomacy: How the Annan Plan Referendum Failure Earned the Cypriot Public a Seat at the Negotiating Table’, in A. Varnava and H. Faustmann (eds) Reunifying Cyprus: The Annan Plan and Beyond. New York: I.B. Tauris, pp. 163–179.

Lordos, A., Kaymak, E. and Tocci, N. (2009) A People’s Peace in Cyprus: Testing Public Opinion on the options for a comprehensive settlement, Centre for European Policy Studies.

McEvoy-Levy, S. (2001) ‘Youth as Social and Political Agents: Issues in Post-settlement Peace Building’, Kroc Institute Occasional Paper, pp. 1–40.

Özerdem, A. and Podder, S. (2015) Youth in Conflict and Peacebuilding: Mobilization, Reintegration and Reconciliation. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Özgür, E., Köprülü, N. and Reuchamps, M. (2017) ‘Drawing Cyprus: Power-sharing, identity and expectations among the next generation in northern Cyprus’, Mediterranean Politics 24(2) , pp. 1–23.

Pimond, M. et al. (2019) Breaking the pattern of deadlock in the Cyprus Peace Process: Lessons learned from the Security Dialogue Initiative in Cyprus. Geneva. Available at: https://www.interpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/PiP_5_Cyprus-web.pdf.

Sözen, A. (2007) ‘The Cyprus Negotiations and the Basic Parameters: From the 1963 Inter-communal Negotiations to the Annan Plan’, A paper presented at the conference The Cyprus Conflict:Looking Ahead in Eastern Mediterranean University, 7-8 May, pp. 1–21.

UN S/RES/2250 (2015) UN Security Council Resolution 2250 (2015). Available at: https://undocs.org/S/RES/2250(2015).

UN S/RES/2419 (2018) UN Security Council Resolution 2419 (2018). Available at: https://undocs.org/S/RES/2419(2018).

UN Secretary General (2020) Report of the Secretary-General on youth and peace and security.

UNDP (2009) Cyprus Human Development Report: Youth in Cpyrus.

World Bank and EU (2019) The Pulse of Reunification: Thinking Behaviorally in Cyprus. Available at: https://www.abbilgi.eu/en/assets/docs/eu-funded-wb-survey-the-pulse-of-reunification-may-2019.pdf.

Yücel, D. and Psaltis, C. (2019) ‘Intergroup contact and willingness for renewed cohabitation in Cyprus: Exploring the mediating and moderating mechanisms’, Group Processes and Intergroup Relations 23(4), pp. 578-597.

26

https://cyprus-mail.com/2019/05/27/turkish-cypriot-mep-hails-bicommunual-cooperation/

https://cyprus-mail.com/2019/05/27/turkish-cypriot-mep-hails-bicommunual-cooperation/

https://www.etymonline.com/word/soliloquy

https://www.etymonline.com/word/soliloquy

https://europarl.europa.eu/election-results-2019/en/national-results/cyprus/2019-2024/

https://europarl.europa.eu/election-results-2019/en/national-results/cyprus/2019-2024/

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20190923IPR61602/2019-european-elections-record-turnout-driven-by-young-people



https://africanarguments.org/2013/08/12/youth-waithood-and-protest-movements-in-africa-by-alcinda-honwana/



https://www.interpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/PiP_5_Cyprus-web.pdf

https://www.interpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/PiP_5_Cyprus-web.pdf

https://undocs.org/S/RES/2250

https://undocs.org/S/RES/2419

https://www.abbilgi.eu/en/assets/docs/eu-funded-wb-survey-the-pulse-of-reunification-may-2019.pdf

https://www.abbilgi.eu/en/assets/docs/eu-funded-wb-survey-the-pulse-of-reunification-may-2019.pdf

METHODOLOGY

ANNEX I: QUESTIONNAIRE

DEMOGRAPHYGender

Male 1

Female 2

How old are you?

POLITICS

1. To what extent are you generally interested in politics?

Not at all 1

A little bit 2

Somewhat 3

Quite a bit 4

Very much 5

2. Did you vote in the most recent national parliamentary elections

in the RoC/TRNC?

Yes 1 Continue with 2.1

No 2 Continue with 3

2.1. FOLLOW UP FOR THOSE WHO ANSWERS ‘YES’ | Which party did you vote for?

Democratic Rally - DISY 1

Progressive Party of Working People – AKEL 2

Democratic Party - DIKO 3

Movement for Social Democracy – EDEK 4

Movement of Ecologists - KOSP 5

National Popular Front - ELAM 6

Citizen’s Alliance - SYPOL 7

Solidarity Movement - KA 8

Other 9

Republican Turkish Party - CTP 1

National Unity Party - UBP 2

Democratic Party - DP 3

Communal Democratic Party – TDP 4

People’s Party - HP 5

Rebirth Party - YDP 6

United Cyprus Party - BKP 7

Communal Liberation Party – TKP-YG 8

Nationalist Democracy Party – MDP 9

Other 10

3. Did you vote in the 2019 European Parliament election in Cyprus?

Yes 1 Continue with 3.1

No 2 Continue with 4

3.1. FOLLOW UP FOR THOSE WHO ANSWERS YES | Which party did you vote for?

Democratic Rally - DISY 1

Progressive Party of Working People – AKEL 2

Democratic Party - DIKO 3

Movement for Social Democracy – EDEK 4

Movement of Ecologists & Citizen’s Alliance KOSP/SYPOL

5

National Popular Front - ELAM 6

Democratic Alignment - Dipa 7

Other 9

4. To what degree are you confident in each of the following insti-tutions/persons (please read out in rotation)?

Not at all

A little bit

Somewhat A lot Completely

The President 1 2 3 4 5

The government

1 2 3 4 5

The parliament

1 2 3 4 5

Political parties

1 2 3 4 5

Politicians 1 2 3 4 5

The judiciary 1 2 3 4 5

Priests/imams 1 2 3 4 5

The police 1 2 3 4 5

The military 1 2 3 4 5

Universities 1 2 3 4 5

Media 1 2 3 4 5

Social media 1 2 3 4 5

UN Secretary General

1 2 3 4 5

UN Mission in Cyprus

1 2 3 4 5

The European Union

1 2 3 4 5

27


CHECKPOINTS/CONTACTS WITH THE OTHER COMMUNITY

5. To what extent do you support opening more checkpoints be-tween the two parts of the island?

Definitely do not support 1

Do not support 2

Neither support nor do not support 3

Support 4

Definitely support 5

No opinion 99

6. How often do you cross the other side of the island?

DO NOT READ OUT OPTIONS

Everyday 1

Continue with 6.1

Once in a week 2

A few times in a week 3

Once a month 4

Once every 2-3 months 5

Once every 4-6 months 6

Once a year 7

Less often 8

Continue with 6.3Have only been once or twice

9

Never 10

6.1. When was the last time you went to the other side?

DO NOT READ OUT OPTIONS

Today 1

Continue with 6.2

Yesterday 2

This week 3

Last week 4

Last month 5

Within last 2-3 months 6

Within last 4-6 months 7

Last year 8

6.2. Which are the reasons why you personally visit the other side? You may mention more than one reason. (Free text answer)

6.3. FOLLOW UP FOR THOSE WHO ANSWER ‘RARELY’ AND ‘NEVER’ Which are the reasons why you do not personally visit the other side? You may mention more than one reason. (Free text answer)

7. Do you have friends from the other community?

Yes 1 Continue with 8

No 2 Continue with 7.1

7.1. FOLLOW UP - FOR THOSE WHO ANSWER IN THE NEGATIVEWhat prevents you from having G/C | T/C friends? (Free text answer)

8. How frequently do you have contact with G/Cs | T/Cs?

Never 1 Continue with 9

Rarely 2

Continue with 8.1Occasionally 3

Often 4

Very often 5

8.1. Where have you recently established contact with G/Cs | T/Cs?

MULTIPLE ANSWERS POSSIBLE

At home 1

At bi-communal gatherings/events 2

In my neighbourhood 3

At work/workplace 4

At university 5

In a social atmosphere (cafes, shops, restaurants, shopping malls etc.)

6

On social media (twitter, facebook) 7

Other (Please specify) 8

9. I will read out some statements and I would like you to tell me for each one if it is acceptable or not acceptable to you.

Not Acceptable Acceptable Don’t know

A member of your family to have a G/C or T/C girlfriend/boyfriend

1 2 99

A member of your family to be married with a G/C or T/C

1 2 99

Have a close G/C or T/C friend

1 2 99

Live in the same neighbourhood with G/C or T/C

1 2 99

Live in the same town with G/Cs or T/Cs

1 2 99

Work in the same place with G/Cs or T/Cs

1 2 99

Have a G/C or T/C business partner

1 2 99

Be employed by a G/C or T/C

1 2 99


1 2 99

Go to the same cafes/bars with G/Cs or T/Cs

1 2 99

President of Cyprus to be G/C or T/C

1 2 99

28

METHODOLOGY

PEACE IN CYPRUS

10. Do you expect that the attempts/negotiations for the solution of the Cyprus problem will lead to a solution of the problem or not?’

Yes 1

No 2

Unsure 3

11. When do you think the Cyprus problem will be solved?

12. To what extent do you agree with the following statements:

Definitely disagree

DisagreeNeither agree no

disagreeAgree Definitely agree

Young people are interested in building bridges between G/C and T/Cs

1 2 3 4 5

Young people are sufficiently represented in politics

1 2 3 4 5

Young Cypriots have a responsibility to find a peaceful settlement to the problem

1 2 3 4 5

Young Cypriots have impact on peaceful settlement to the problem

1 2 3 4 5

The progress regarding a solution depends on the encouragement from the international parties

1 2 3 4 5

13. To what extent do you support the following solution for the political problem of Cyprus?READ OUT POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS. ROTATE ORDER

Definitely do not support

Do not support

Neither support nor do

not supportSupport

Definitely Support

One unitary state and central government for the whole of Cyprus

1 2 3 4 5

Bi-zonal, bicommunal federation 1 2 3 4 5

Continuation of the current situation/status quo 1 2 3 4 5

A confederation with two sovereign states 1 2 3 4 5


1 2 3 4 5

14. Based on what you know today, if a referendum was agreed by the leaders of the two communities, would you vote in favour (that is YES) or against (that is NO) the proposed solution.

Yes 1

No 2

Unsure 3

29


FOLLOW UP DEMOGRAPHY QUESTIONS

What is the highest level of education you have achieved?

Finished primary school 1

Finished Lower Secondary (i.e, 3rd class of high school) 2

High-school graduate 3

Undergraduate 4

Master 5

PhD 6

In which district do you live?

Nicosia 1

Limassol 2

Larnaca 3

Paphos 4

Famagusta 5

Type of district

Urban 1

Rural 2

Which of the following describes your current employment status?

Full-time employment 1

Part-time employment 2

Student 3

Self-employed 4

Unemployed 5

Army service 6

Other 7

Are either or both of your parents a refugee/displaced person(s)? By this, I mean that did they use to live in the north/south before

1974

Yes 1

No 2

Don’t know 99

Below questions only pertain to the T/C side

Where are your parents from?

Are you a citizen of …?

TRNC 1

Turkey 2

Other 3

FOLLOW UP FOR THOSE WHO ANSWERS 1 |

Do you also hold citizenship of RoC?

Yes 1

No 2

30

The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Fried-rich-Ebert-Stiftung or of the organizations for which the authors work.

IMPRINT

IMPRINT

PRIO Cyprus Centre P.O. Box 25157 | 1307 Nicosia, Cyprus Email: [email protected] www.prio.org/cyprus

PRIO encourages its researchers and research affiliates to publish their work in peer-reviewed journals and book series, as well as in PRIO‘s own Report, Paper and Policy Brief series. In editing these series, we undertake a basic quality control, but PRIO does not as such have any view on political issues. We encourage our researchers actively to take part in public debates and give them full freedom of opinion. The responsibility and honour for the hypotheses, theories, findings and views expressed in our publications thus rests with the authors themselves.

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung | Cyprus Office 20 Stasandrou, Apt. 401 | 1060 Nicosia | CyprusResponsible: Hubert Faustmann | DirectorTel. +357 22377336Email: [email protected] www.fescyprus.org

The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung or of the organizations for which the authors work

© Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) and Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), 2020All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying. recording, or otherwise, without permission in writing from the copyright holder(s).

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Dr Cihan Dizdaroğlu is a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions (MSCA) fellow and assistant professor at the Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations (CTPSR) at Coventry University. He retains a lecturer position in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at Kadir Has University and serves as an associate editor of the Journal of International Relations (Uluslararası İlişkiler), a leading Turkish journal in-dexed in the Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI).

Dr Dizdaroğlu holds PhD in International Relations from Kadir Has University. He previously served as the Director of the Center for Turkish Studies at Kadir Has University from 2017 to 2018 and as the Project Coordinator to the International Relations Council of Turkey (IRCT) between 2009 and 2018.

His academic interests include Peace and Conflict Studies, Cyprus, Youth, Turkish Foreign Policy—particularly Tur-kish-EU relations, Turkish-Greek relations and the Cyprus problem—and the NATO-EU Relations.

http://www.prio.org/cyprus

MOVING BEYOND SOLILOQUYYouth Perceptions on Politics, Peace and Inter-Communal Contacts

Youth is the generation that builds so-cial trust and social cohesion in their respective communities through their activities, dialogue and engagement in their daily lives. In order to understand youth demands, the periodic investiga-tion of youth attitudes and trends is critical to observe any shifts in hopes for the future, perceptions towards the other community, readiness for the

peace process or willingness to co-exist. This report thus examines the neglect-ed Cypriot youth’s perceptions of poli-tics, peace and inter-communal contact through telephone surveys conducted simultaneously both sides of the island.

Based on the findings of the survey, this report presents extensive policy recommendations and action points

that will enable Cypriot youth’s partici-pation into decision-making and peace processes. The implementation of these action points will portray Cyprus as example for other countries and a rare instance of the successful imple-mentation of UNSC Resolution 2250 (2015) on ‘Youth, Peace and Security’.

peace and security moving beyond soliloquylibrary.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/zypern/16918.pdf · 2020....

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