peking and brezhnev

8/9/2019 Peking and Brezhnev

1/10

Peking and the Brezhnev DoctrineAuthor(s): Kenneth W. ReaSource: Asian Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Sep. - Oct., 1975), pp. 22-30Published by: Heldref PublicationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30171400

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2/10

e k i n g

n d

t h

r e z h n e v

D o c t r i n e

KENNETH W. REA

HE

INVASION

of Czechoslovakia

by

WarsawPact forces

in

August

1968

produced

harp

reactionsaround he world. The

Western

nations,

led

by

the

United

States,

were

quick

to

denouncethe

event,

which was so reminiscent f the

Hungarian

nvasionof the mid-1950s.

The Brezhnev

doctrine,

which

was used to

justify

the

invasion,

also

constituteda threat to other Communist

ountries

seeking greater

n-

dependence

rom Moscow.

Among

them was the

People'sRepublic

of

China. The intense

ideological

debate that characterized he Sino-

Soviet schism

in

the

early

1960s mushroomed

after Czechoslovakia

to the brink of a full

military

confrontation.

China refused to

accept

the Soviet contention

hat

Moscow

had the

right

to intervene n

any

country

wheresocialism

might

be threatened.

China's initial

response

was a massive

propagandacampaign

againstthe Brezhnevdoctrine.The firstmajordeclaration ame from

Premier Chou En-lai on

August

23.

Speaking

to a

banquet

at the

Rumanian

Embassy,

he

charged

the Soviet

Union

with

practicing

Fascist

politics,

great

power

chauvinism,

national

egoism,

and social-

imperialism.

He

equated

the invasion

with

Hitler in

the

1930s,

and

with the American

ntervention

n Vietnam.

On

this and

subsequent

occasions,

Chou

virtually

called

upon

the

Czechoslovak

and

Russian

peoples

to rebel

against

their leaders and

establish he

dictatorship

f

the

proletariat.

Socialist

countries,

he

argued,

should bolster

their

de-

fenses

to

thwart imilarSoviet ntervention.1n

support

of Chou'sstate-

ments,

the invasionwas

condemned

by

the

Eighth

CentralCommittee

of the CCP on October 31.

2

The

Chinese

rejected

he

Soviet

argument

hat the

invasion

was

necessary

in

order to

protect

Socialist

gains

and

strengthen

he So-

1

New

China News

Agency,

August

23,

1968;

September

30,

1968.

2

Ibid.,

November

1,

1968.

22


3/10

Peking

and the

Brezhnev

Doctrine

23

cialist commonwealth.The commonwealth

espoused

by

the

Soviet

Union was comparedto Japan's GreaterEast Asia Co-Prosperity

Sphere,

Hitler's New Order n

Europe,

and America's FreeWorld

Community.

The Soviet

Union

was

practicing

socialism n

words,

imperialism

n

deeds. 3

The

Socialist

unity

that

existed

during

he

early

1950s had been

destroyedby

the revisionism

of

Soviet leaders. So-

cialist

gains,

whether n the

Soviet

Union

or in

Czechoslovakia,

had

long

been forfeited

by

their

leaders,

and could

only

be

regained

by

the

masses.4

While

criticizing

Dubcek's

capitulation

to

Moscow,

the

Chinese

sought

to

place

the burden of

responsibility

n

Soviet

ideo-

logical leadership.

Dubcek,

they

maintained,

was

merely emulating

policiesalreadypracticed

n Moscow. The

dispute

between Brezhnev

and Dubcek was

compared

to a

quarrel

between

dogs

of the same

breed;

and

moreover,

the revisionismof

the Soviet Union was

far

greater

and more

dangerous

han that

practicedby

Czechoslovakia.5

Developments

n both countries

supported

Mao's assertion hat a So-

cialist

country

would become revisionist f the

dictatorship

f the

pro-

letariatand

class

struggle

were

forgotten.

In his

writings,

Mao has

emphasized

he existence of contra-

dictions

within Socialist countries.Such contradictions ften

develop

between the

people

and their leaders because the latter isolate them-

selves

from

the masses.

In their

analysis

of

developments

n the

Soviet

Union and Czechoslovakia, he Chinese maintained that the basic

contradiction

n both countrieswas between the

bourgeoisie

and

the

proletariat.

Only by applying

Mao's

theory

of mass

struggle

and the

mass line could the

people

expose

revisionistswho had

gained

leader-

ship positions.

The mass

struggle

which

had

engulfed

China

since

1965 could be emulated

by

othersto drive

the revisionists

rom office.

Until

such

a

struggle

was

waged

in the Soviet

Union,

the Russian

leadership

would

continue

to

practice imperialism

under the

guise

of

proletariannternationalism. 7

3

Lin

Piao,

Report

to the Ninth

National

Congress

of the Communist

Party

of

China,

The

Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (Documents) (Peking: Foreign

Language Press, 1969),

pp.

89-90.

4

NewChina News

Agency,

September

9,

1968.

During

the

Hungarian

crisis,

Communist

China

supported

Soviet intervention on the belief that its own

security

was linked with con-

tinued

Socialist

unity.

By 1968,

Socialist

unity

as

directed

by

Moscow was considered a threat

to China's

security.

5

Ibid., September

2,

1968.

6

Lin

Piao,

loc.

cit.,

pp.

22-23.

7

Ibid.,

p.

83.


4/10

24

Asian

Affairs

Internationalism,

s

interpreted

by Peking,

did not demand

or

assume the loss of nationalindependenceor territorialntegrity.The

Chinese

thus

renewed their

charge

that

Moscow was

using

inter-

nationalism

o subvert he

independence

of Socialist states. The

chief

instruments f

subversionwere

COMECONand the Warsaw

Pact.8

n

an

editorial

attack on the Warsaw

Pact,

People's

Daily

charged

hat

it

enabled Moscow

to

manipulate

he East

European

countries

politi-

cally

and

militarily,

and to

push

(its)

social-imperialist

olicy

of

ag-

gression. 9

A memberof the

WarsawPact has no

guarantee

hat

its

sovereignty

and territorial

ntegrity

will

be

respected.

In

reality,

the

Soviet Union was

attempting

o create an international

dictatorship

by limiting

the

sovereignty

of other

states.

The

concept

of

limited

sovereignty

embodied in

the

Brezhnev

doctrine

was

repugnant

o the

Chinese,

and

revived memoriesof

the

semicolonial

status that had

been

forced

upon

China in the

19th

century

by

the

Western

powers,

including

Tsarist

Russia. It

also

challenged

China's view

of

the

proper

relations

that should subsist

between

Socialist

states.Mao has

consistently

arguedagainst

the

patri-

archal

relationship

hat

Soviet

leaders were

attempting

o

establish.

During

the

Sino-Soviet

polemics

of

1963,

Peking

declared: '

The relations

among

fraternal

parties

should under no

cir-

cumstancesbe likethe relationsbetweena leadingPartyand

the

led,

and

much less like the

relations between a

patri-

archal

father and his son

. . . What we

desire

is

merely

the

independent

nd

equal

status of the

fraternal

parties.

Speaking

at

the Ninth

Party

Congress

n

April

1969,

Lin Piao reiter-

ated

China's

position

that

relationsbetween

Socialist states must be

built

on the

principle

of

equality

and

noninterferencen

each other's

internal

affairs.

He also

emphasized

he

Maoist

belief

that

the

people

should

settle

their

own

domestic

struggles.

Lin's

speech

indicated he

concern of

Chinese

leaders that

the

Soviet

Union would

try

to

intervene

overtly

in

China'saffairs.

8

lenmin lihpao,

August

23,

1968; September

12, 1968;

January

9, 1969;

New

China

News

Agency,

November

9,

1968;

February

5,

1968.

9

Jenmin

lihpao,

September

12,

1968.

o10

The

Origin

and

Development

of the

Differences Between

the

Leadership

of the

CPSU and

Ourselves,

in The Polemic on

the General Line

of

the

International

Communist

Movement

(Peking: Foreign

Language Press, 1965),

pp.

102-103.

11

Lin

Piao,

loc.

cit.,

p.

97.


5/10

Peking

and the

BrezhnevDoctrine

25

While

launching

a verbal attack on

the Brezhnev

doctrine

and

its application,the Chinese also became alarmed about their own

security

and that of China's

European ally,

Albania. Their

anxiety

was increased

by

the

build-up

of Sovietforces

along

the

borderand

the

installation

of missiles

in Outer

Mongolia.

The intrusion

of

Soviet

military

aircraft

into

Chinese

airspace sharply

increased

after

the

invasion

of Czechoslovakia.

On

August

26 and

September

5, 1968,

respectively,

China

lodged

official

complaints against

these

provo-

cations

and the

treatmentof Chinese

Embassypersonnel

n

Czecho-

slovakia.12

China's

concern for its own

security

and for the

safety

of

Al-

bania was

reflected

n

top-levelmilitarymeetingsheld in Peking in

early

October.

Chinese

newspapers

arried

numerous

ditorials

empha-

sizing

the

militant

olidarity

between

the two

countries,

which was

further

evidenced

by

Huang

Yung-sheng's

isit to Albania

in

Decem-

ber.

According

o one

report,

Huang

concludeda

defense

pact

allow-

ing

Chinato

establishand

operate

missile and naval

bases in

Albania.

It

was

also

during

Huang's

visit

that the Chinese

detonated

a

hydrogen

bomb,

and

stressed ts

importance

or

both

China

and

Albania.'3

This

was in

line with

Chou's

promise

to

assist

countries

willing

to

oppose

social-imperialism.

Calling

for

a

unitedfront

against

the

Soviet

Union,

Peking praised

Albania's

decision to

withdraw rom

the

War-

saw Pact and calledupon otherEast Europeannationsto follow this

positive

example. '

China now

began

to

cultivate

better

relations

with

Rumaniaand

Yugoslavia,

which

were also

threatened

y

the

Brezhnev

doctrine. In

an

effort

to divert

Soviet

attention

away

from

China,

Peking

also

began

to

revise

ts attitude

oward

he

European

Economic

Community

and

the

maintenanceof

a

strong

NATO,'5

although

the

Chinese

leadership

doubtless

recognized

the

limitations of

these

policies.

The

ominous

mplications

of

the

Brezhnev

doctrine

forced Mao

2lNew

China News Agency, September 16, 1968; September 30, 1968; Denver Post, April

28,

1968.

The Soviet

Union

denied

these

charges.

See Protest

Against

Hostile

Action

of

Chinese

Authorities,

Pravda,

November

1, 1968,

in

Current

Digest

of

Soviet

Press,

vol.

20,

no. 43

(November

20,

1968),

p.

17.

1a

New

China

News

Agency,

September

28,

1968;

October

2,

1968;

December

2, 1968;

December

31,

1968.

M

Ibid.,

September 28,

1968.

5

Dick

Wilson,

China and the

European

Community,

China

Quarterly,

No.

56

(October-

December

1973),

pp.

647-666.


6/10

26

Asian

Affairs

to

end the

CulturalRevolution.

The

Chinese

feared

that the

Soviet

action in Czechoslovakiawas a prelude to similar intervention n

China. If Dubcek's

policies

were

a threat to

socialism,

then

Mao's

would,

of

course,

all into the

same

category.

Mao

seems to have

been

concerned

that Moscow

would

intervene

to

restore Liu

Shao-ch'i

o

power.

Although

Liu

had been

the

main

target

of

the Cultural

Revo-

lution,

he had

been able to

retain his

offices n the

Party

and

govern-

ment. In

the

aftermath

of

the

Czechoslovakian

nvasion,

Mao

hastily

called the

Twelfth

Enlarged

Plenum of the

Eighth

Central

Committee

to

discuss

the

international ituation

and Liu's removal

from

office.

In

his

address,

Mao

assertedthat

China had

more to

fear from

the

Soviet

Union that

from

the United

States,althoughthe communique

issued at

the

close of the

session

maintained hat the

United

States

had

tacitly

approved

Soviet

actions n

Czechoslovakia.'6

Peking's

concern

deepened

when

Sino-Soviet orces

clashed

along

the

Ussuri

River

in

March

1969. The

Chinese

leadership quickly

acted to

defuse the

explosive

border issue

by

emphasizing

that

it

shouldbe

settled

through

negotiations. 7

hinese eaders

watchedwith

considerable

anxiety

as the

International

Conference

of

Communist

and

Workers

Parties

convenedin

Moscow in

June,

and

they

must

have

been

greatly

relieved

when

Brezhnev ailed to

obtain a

blanket

indictmentof

the

Maoists. The

possibility

of

overt Soviet

interference

in Chinese affairswas therebysignificantlyreduced.Brezhnev next

called for

the

creation

of

an Asian

collective

security

system, 's

which

implied

that

Moscow

would

now

attempt

to

establish its

own

Chinese

containment

policy.

To

counterthis new

development,

China

launcheda

diplomatic

offensive

of

its

own,

and

in

particular

ought

better

relationswith the

United

States.

II

The

Nixon

Administrationwas

responsive

o

China's

desire to

upgrade

its

limited and

irregular

contacts

with

Washington

with more

mean-

ingful

relations. Even

before his

election,

President

Nixon's attitude

toward

China and its

role in

Asia had

changed

from

earlier

years.

In

16

Peking

Review, no. 44

(November

1,

1968),

Supplement,

p. viii;

Far

Eastern Economic

Review,

(January 30, 1969),

p.

175.

17

Lin

Piao, loc.

cit.,

p.

91.

18

See Oton

Ambroz,

The Moscow

Summit

Conference,

East

Europe,

vol.

19,

nos.

8-9

(August-September

1969),

p.

16.


7/10

Peking

and the

Brezhnev

Doctrine

27

a 1967

article,

he

pointed

out the need

to

recognize

the

reality

of

China, and to help bring the PRC into the familyof nations.' US

government

pecialists

were also

convinced hat

the time

was

propitious

for a

change

in

policy

towardthe

mainland.

In the aftermathof

the Czechoslovakian

nvasion,

the

Chinese

Foreign Ministry

announced ts

willingness

o

improve

relations

with

the

United

States,

and even to

sign

a

coexistence

treaty.

Moscow

quickly

denounced his new

departure

as a deal

being

concocted

at

the

expense

of the Socialist commonwealth. 20

he threat

inherent

n

this Soviet

response

was

apparently

sufficient

o

prompt

Peking

to

cancel

talks with the United

States that were

scheduled

to

convene

shortly

in

Warsaw. But as the

possibility

of

Soviet

militaryaction

against

China

dissipated

after

the Moscow

conference n the

Summer

of

1969,

Peking

felt that the time

was

right

to

seek

an

improvement

in its

relationswith the

United

States.

Mao's

decision to

opt

for

better

relations

with the

United

States

was

undoubtedly

difficult n

the

light

of

past

history;

nor

did it meet

with universal

support

within

the

Party.

The decision

produced

deo-

logical confusion,

and

contributed o

the

schism between Mao

and

Lin

Piao,

the heir

apparent.

Lin refused

o

support

Mao's

revolution-

ary

diplomacy,

and

reportedly

avored the

alternative

of

reducing

tensions

with the

Soviet

Union.

Peking

has admitted

hat

bitter

oppo-

sition developedamongthose who questioned he ideologicalbasis

for

a

detentewith

the

United

States;

and

the

emphasis

which

continues

to be

placed

on

explaining

the detente in

ideological

terms indicates

the

degree

to

which this

feeling permeated

he

Party.

Opponents

of the

detente

said

that it was

similar o

the relation-

ship

that

existedbetween

the

United

States

and

the

Soviet Union.2

The

difference,

according

o

Chou

En-lai,

was

that the

Chinese initi-

ative

was a

necessary

ompromise,

nlike the

sinister

ompromise

of

the

two

imperialist

nations.

Quoting

from

Lenin,

Chou

maintained

that

one

must

learn to

distinguish

between

a

man

who

gave

the

bandits

money

and

firearms

n

order

to

lessen the

damage hey

can do

19

Richard M.

Nixon,

Asia After

Vietnam,

Foreign

A

flairs,

vol.

46,

no. 1

(October

1967),

p.

121.

20

Izvestia,

December

1968,

in Current

Digest of

Soviet

Press,

vol.

20,

no. 49

(December

25,

1969), p.

18.

21

Reference

Materials

Concerning

Education

on

Situation,

No.

43,

in

Chinese

Communist

Internal Politics

and

Foreign

Policy

(Taipei:

Institute of

International

Relations,

1974),

p.

133.


8/10

28 Asian

Affairs

and facilitate their

capture

and

execution,

and a man who

gives

ban-

ditsmoneyand firearmsn order o share n the loot. 22 ekingadmitted

that its tactics in

dealing

with the United States had

changed,

but in-

sisted that the

principle

of

struggle

remained he same.

Nixon's visit

to China was in line with

the

Maoist dictum

of

exploiting

ontradic-

tions,

winning

over the

majority,opposing

he

minority,

and

destroying

them

one.

by

one. The Sino-American etente

has,

according

o the

Maoists,

fostered contradictions etweenthe two

imperialist

nations,

and

complicated

he

decisionmaking rocess

n the Soviet

Union.23

While both the

United

States

and the

Soviet

Union

are considered

to

be

imperialistic, nly

the latter is seen as

aggressive

oward

China

at the presenttime. The detente simplymeans that China's contra-

dictions

with the United States are no

longer given top priority.

But

coexistence

does not

mean

an

end

to

struggle.

Socialist ountries

are

able to coexist

peacefully

with the

imperialist

countries

at

particular

times

throughstruggle

and

through struggle

alone;

what

is

more,

sharp

complex struggles

continue under conditions of

peaceful

co-

existence. 24 he detentewith the

United States

was

necessary

n order

that China could concentrate on the

principal

enemy---the

Soviet

Union.

Imperialist

nations,

according

o

the Maoist

belief,

should be

classifiedas either

primary

or

secondary

enemies,

depending

on

their

policies

toward

China. The current

view of

the

United

States as a

secondaryenemyis similarto that taken toward the Kuomintangon

two

previous

occasions. The first

compromise

with the

Kuomintang

came with the

United

Front

(1923-27),

when

the

Party

treated

the

warlordsand

imperialists

s the

primary

nemies.At the end of

1936,

the

Party

elevated the

Japanese

to that

position

and

downgraded

contradictions ith the

Kuomintang.

In

periods

of

compromise,

he

CCP

has taken

advantage

of the

opportunity

o

strengthen

tself and broaden ts base

of

support.

The

new detente affords China similar

advantages.

Thus,

the

tributary

appearance

of

PresidentNixon's visit carried enormous

mplications

for Asian

international

elations;

and the visit

greatly

assisted China

22

Chou

En-lai,

Report

to the Tenth National

Congress

of the Communist

Party

of

China,

Peking

Review,

nos. 35-36

(September

7,

1973),

p.

23.

23

Reference

Materials

Concerning

Education on

Situation,

No.

43,

loc.

cit.,

p.

136.

24

Red

Flag, April

30,

1965.


9/10

Peking

and

the

Brezhnev

Doctrine

29

in

gaining

formal

diplomatic

recognition

rom

numerouscountries

at

the expenseof Taiwan.The legitimacy hat accompanied uch recog-

nition

also

strengthenedPeking's

claim over

Taiwan. In the

Shanghai

Communique,

he

United States

acknowledged

hat all

Chinese

on

either side of

the

Taiwan Strait

maintain

here is but

one

China,

and

that Taiwan is

a

part

of China. 25

eking

could

readily

nterpret

his

statement

as tantamount o

recognizing

ts

claim

to the island.

What

remainedto be solved

was

merely

the

time

and nature

of

a

final

solution. The

existence of

Liaison Offices n

Washington

and

Peking

also reinforces

the

belief that the

liberation of Taiwan

is

making

progress;

and in their

approach

to the

Chinese on

Taiwan,

Peking

has

usedthe

ShanghaiCommunique

nd the

existence of

the Liaison

Offices

to indicate

the

foolhardiness

of

depending

upon

the

United

States.

III

The Brezhnev

doctrine

proved

to be

a

catalyst

prompting

China to

abandon ts

self-imposed

slation

and

become an

active

memberof the

international

ommunity.

t

was seen as a

direct

threat to

Maoist

as-

cendancy

n

China

and,

indeed,

to

China's

national

security.

The ava-

lanche of

criticism rom

Peking

in

response

to the

doctrine

reflected

the

importance

hat

the

Chinese

regime

attaches o

ideological

eader-

ship. By exposingMoscow'sideologicalcorruption,Pekinghopedto

prove

the

validity

of

Mao's

thought.

But

while

they

were

obviously

deeply

concerned over

the

ideological

implications

of

the

doctrine,

China's

eaders were

perhaps

even

more

alarmed

by

what

they

con-

sidered

to be

a

threat

to China's

ndependence.

Thus the

natural

re-

sponse

was to

seek

detentewith

the

United

States.

From

the

Maoist

perspective,

he

detente has

been

successful

n

creating

contradictions

etween he

United

States,

the

Soviet

Union,

and

Japan.

It

has

strengthened

China's

position

n

international

ffairs,

reduced

he

possibility

of

a Soviet

invasion,

and

opened

new

avenues

for

acquiring

much-needed

echnology.

It

is

impossible

o

know how

long

the

United

States will be

relegated

o

the

position

of a

secondary

enemy.

The

detente

has had

the

approval

of

both

Mao

and

Chou,

25

Department

of

State

Bulletin,

vol.

66,

no.

1708

(March

20,

1972), pp.

437-438.


10/10

30

Asian

Affairs

both of whom

will, however,

probably

fade from the

political

scene

in the next few years. Duringhis visit to the United Nations, Teng

Hsiao-p'ing

eportedly

assured

Secretary

of

State

Kissinger

hat Sino-

American

relations

were

not

in

jeopardy.

This is

understandable,

nas-

much

as the

factors that

prompted

he detente still

prevail.

China's

deep feelings

of

insecurity

will be a

major

factor in the

continuation

of

the Sino-American

etente.