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Multi-Paradigmatic Perspectives on a

Business Transformation Programme

Sergio Pellegrinelli

Lucidus Consulting Ltd, Holmfirth, UK

Ruth Murray-Webster

Lucidus Consulting Ltd, Holmfirth, UK

Abstract

The study of projects and programmes, and their management, is seen as becoming an

increasingly vibrant and pluralistic academic field, having transcended its pragmatic and

functionalist roots. Drawing upon Burrell and Morgan‟s (1979) four paradigms of

sociological research, we briefly review research set within each paradigm. This plurality of

perspectives has informed and sensitised our analysis and sense-making of a major business

transformation programme within a European retail bank. This paper presents key findings

and insights from our inductive research. We argue that the research adds to our knowledge

and understanding of programme-based transformational change and in particular the

functioning, identity and symbolism, sources of power, and structural properties of

programmes. The research brings to light facets often overlooked by the dominant

functionalist paradigm, and adds depth, richness and perspectives useful to practitioners.

Further work is required to understand programmes as they become more prominent features

of our organisational landscapes.

Key words: programmes, programme management, business transformation, organisational

change, paradigms

Introduction

Since its emergence at the end of Second World War as a formal and codified method for

bringing about specific, time and scope bound undertakings (Morris 1994, 2011) projects and

project management have become increasingly common. Attracting practitioners from the

construction industry in the 1970s, and those within IT and new product development in the

1980s, the last two decades has seen a rapid expansion, popularization and use of project

management across different sectors and functions (Morris, 2011). The development of

project, and more latterly programme, management has undoubtedly been driven by

pragmatic concerns of practitioners to accomplish tasks. It has also been influenced by the

desire of the professional associations, primarily the US-based Project Management Institute

(PMI) and the European-based International Project Management Association (IPMA), to

codify what they consider „best‟ or „good‟ practice to guide practitioners and to provide a

basis for professional qualifications. The resulting focus on processes, frameworks and

techniques has led to the field being criticized for being mainly atheoretical and promoting

simplistic explanation for complex issues. While the development of project and programme

management, may have been largely grounded, arguably implicitly and unreflectively, in a

functionalist paradigm, circa two decades ago research into projects drawing on different

perspectives and often grounded in organizational theory started to flourish (Blomquist &

Soderlund, 2002). A wide range of research, drawing on different ontological and

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epistemological commitments, is now presented at the leading academic conferences on

project management (e.g. International Research Network of Organizing by Projects

(IRNOP); PMI Research and Educational Conference). Project and programme management

as sets of strictures in a professional sense, or conceived and studied from within a tightly

bounded paradigm in an academic sense, are giving way to greater plurality of practices,

perspectives and insights.

This paper seeks to draw and build upon the plurality of perspectives by analysing a business

transformation programme using multiple lenses. Specifically we use the sociological

paradigms proposed by Burrell and Morgan (1979) to explore the multiple aspects of a

complex process of change within an organisation. Our aim is to give voice to subjective

experience, to bring to the fore tensions and conflicts, and to describe structural forces

shaping the change process, which otherwise might be obscured or overlooked by research

set within the still predominant functional paradigm.

In the remainder of this paper, we offer a brief review of the paradigms proposed by Burrell

and Morgan (1979) and point to extant research into project and programme management set

within each of the four paradigms. Our intention is to evidence the range and plurality of

scholarly work over the last twenty years or so. The examples are inevitably partial and

selective, and some authors may argue that we have misconstrued their work, for which we

apologise unreservedly. Also, while we recognise important distinctions between projects

and programmes, we adopt the position proposed by Pellegrinelli et al. (2011) that they are

related and form part of a wider field of purposeful and structured change. We thus treat, for

the purposes of this paper, research into projects and programmes, and their management, as

a single, broad literature. Following our brief review of the literature, we address the research

aims and methods and provide a summary of the case studied. We then highlight key themes

and insights from the transformation programme when explored from the constructs of the

four paradigms. The implications and limitations of the research are discussed and the need

for further research addressed.

Sociological Paradigms

Burrell and Morgan (1979) propose a way of analysing, mapping and understanding the

multiple and diverse theories of society and organisation – the conduct of collective human

activity. The first dimension synthesises the assumptions about the nature of social science.

This subjective - objective dimension encapsulates different assumptions in respect of

ontology, epistemology, human nature and the appropriate methodology for the conduct of

scientific inquiry. The second dimension deals with the assumptions about the nature of

society. The regulation – radical change dimension contrasts assumptions of society as

being defined by order, consensus, cohesion and integration, with assumptions of society

being characterised by conflict, domination, contradiction and the drive for emancipation.

The two orthogonal dimensions generate four quadrants that provide a heuristic schema for

conceptualising theories of society and organisations. The four paradigms derived from this

model are: functionalist, interpretive, radical humanist and radical structuralist as shown in

Figure 1.

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The functionalist paradigm is characterised by a realist ontology, a positivist epistemology, a

determinist view of human nature and a nomothetic approach to methodology, and is

concerned with the order and regularities that underpin collective human activities. The

interpretive paradigm also focuses on the sociology of regulation, but holds a nominalist

ontology, an anti-positivist epistemology, a voluntarist view of human nature and an

ideographic approach to methodology. The radical humanist paradigm shares the interpretive

paradigm‟s subjective underpinnings but deems society to be characterised by conflict,

domination, and contradiction, with a consequent emphasis on realising human emancipation

and potential. The radical structuralist paradigm is grounded in the notions of radical change

set within objective ontological and epistemological assumptions that predicate (a degree of)

structural determinism.

Functionalist Roots

Functionalist assumptions have underpinned the early manifestations and development of

project management where traditional project management methodology has been

underpinned by notions of objectivity, reductionism and predictability. The emerging

methodology was infused, at a deep and tacit level, with prevailing theories of bureaucracy

and scientific management. The early development of the field was not so much atheoretical

as pre-theoretical – theory unreflectively incorporated into models of practice. Arguably, the

project management methodology can and should be seen as an operationalisation, albeit

often tacit and in some instances unsophisticated, of these functionalist theories. The

caricature of project management as a methodology, rather than a field of enquiry that

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warrants serious academic research may have been justified decades ago. However,

academics and practitioners have since been more interested in looking, through and beyond

the methodological prescriptions and bureaucracy, to study the actuality of projects and

programmes. In keeping with a spirit of applied management science, many academics

within the field have kept close to practice and practitioners. Whether driven by personal

philosophical beliefs, or a desire to continue to engage with the pragmatic roots of the

discipline, many scholars adopt and retain a functionalist paradigm for their work. Their

choice of paradigm is largely aligned with the common sense understanding of project

management‟s leading practitioners and of the increasingly active professional bodies.

Much work within this tradition has tried to understand the sources of success and failure

(e.g. Laufer and Hoffman, 2000), and critical success factors (e.g. Clark, 1999). Typically

using quantitative methods and statistical techniques to infer regularities and shed light on

recurring factors, this research informed developments in practice and contributed to a better

understanding on project and project management work. Similar work has been done in

relation to programmes and programme management (e.g. Shehu & Akintoye, 2009, 2010)

A further defining characteristic of project management in the functionalist tradition is the

conception of the project (or programme) as a temporary organisation (Cleland and Kerzner,

1985; Turner and Muller, 2003). Building from literature to build a behavioural theory of the

firm, these authors suggest that the temporary separation of project-based work from

„business-as-usual‟ is necessary to accomplish objectives. They go on to suggest that

temporary project-based endeavours have features that warrant their existence as a specific

type of organisational form that is distinct and separate from the nature of the work to be

achieved, and the influence of stakeholders involved in accomplishing the work. Lundin and

Soderholm (1995) called for the temporary project organisation to be analysed from the

perspective of organisational theory, rather than from an entirely functionalist „production‟

mindset. While their theorising opened up possibilities to study projects from other

paradigmatic perspectives, they conceptualised the project as an objective form, designed to

bring about agreed, tangible outcomes.

More recently, researchers have challenged the implied „one size fits all‟ of normative project

management methodologies and have argued for a situational approach. Shenhar & Dvir

(1996) drew on contingency theory to study the relationship between project management

approach and project type. Other academics became interested in what makes projects

different one another. For instance, Besner and Hobbs (2004) studied the different project

management tools used in different types of projects. Tatikonda (1999) studied different

product platforms in R&D projects. Andres and Zmud (2001) looked at how goal conflict,

coordination strategies and task interdependence influence productivity and satisfaction in

software projects. In keeping with developments in other fields, complexity theory has also

become a lens for studying how projects unfold (e.g Williams 1999, Jaafari 2003, Cicmil et

al. 2009). The tradition of researching projects through the lens of the functionalist

paradigm continues with the majority of published work adopting this perspective. However,

despite this dominant influence, alternative traditions have emerged and are adding new

insights and enriching the debate within the field (Williams, 2005).

Interpretive Tradition

The 1995 special issues of the Scandinavian Journal of Management brought into stark relief

changing perspectives in the field, especially amongst scholars in Scandinavia where

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humanist philosophies of science were more widespread. Packendorff (1995) set out an

interpretive critique of, and challenge to, the prevailing pragmatism and functionalist

conceptions, arguing that:

“Project management has become a scientific field in its own right, a field

defined not by its theories or its origins, but by the habit of human beings to

label a variety of coordinated, time-limited undertakings as "projects". The

field is obviously held together by certain conceptions on process rationality;

differences in outcome and process are disregarded in favor of alleged

similarities in the planning and implementing of projects. But is there really a

single, consistent, unambiguous empirical phenomenon that can be labeled

"the project"?” (1995: 324)

The theme and role of labelling is echoed in Kreiner‟s (1995) paper in the same issue.

Kreiner (1995) argued that labelling something a project: “implies general meaning,

aspirations and propositions about what needs to be done…. Depending on the contents of the

project label we choose, we will come to approach reality differently and to draw different

inferences for action…” (1995: 336). More recently, Lineham and Kavanagh (2006) have

argued that a particular weakness of the prevailing functionalist conception of projects is a

„being‟ ontology (Chia, 1995) that casts projects as discrete, concrete entities, privileging a

reified conception of a project – „out there‟, objective and independent of the observer. They

argue that a „becoming‟ (Chia, 1995) ontology draws attention to the social processes that

initiate and sustain a project, to the sense-making that shapes understanding and action, and

to the emergent, socially negotiated outcomes of projects.

A key theme in the interpretive tradition has been to locate the “project” within it historical,

cultural and institutional context, and to explore it through the lived experiences of those

involved - an enacted view of projects. Engwall‟s (2003) comparative case based study of

two major construction projects highlighted the importance of contextual cognisance and

cultural compatibility of the project managers in facilitating project performance. The work

convincingly dispels the notion that adherence to prescribed good practice leads to better

performance. Grabher (2002), using network theory, took a macro view and proposed the

concept of „project ecology‟; the temporary networks of agents and institutions involved in

forming and sustaining projects as forms of organised economic activity. Flyvberg and

colleagues highlighted the complex, socio-political dimensions of projects, showing that

„guesses‟ of time and cost are consistently overly optimistic, despite the availability of

estimation tools and experience that should have aided decision-makers to develop better or

more balanced estimations (Flyvbjerg et al., 2002; 2003).

Cicmil (2006) adopted interpretive and critical research perspectives to highlight how project

managers engage with organisational members to accomplish sophisticated cooperative

activity, cope with multiple voices, ambiguous goals and equivocal performance criteria.

Cicmil‟s research contrasted the functionalist view of project managers as “rational

technicians”, facing an objective reality and skilfully applying prescribed processes in a value

neutral manner. She observed project managers continually negotiating direction and plans,

thinking on their feet, understanding the social and political context, dealing with emotions,

and reflecting and balancing rational objectives with considerations of legitimacy and equity.

Manning‟s (2008) analysis of projects‟ embeddedness in multiple contexts was based on a

structuration perspective. Jackson and Klobas (2008) used social constructivist theories in

researching the creating and sharing of knowledge. Söderlund‟s (2005) study of two high

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profile product development projects brought to the fore the importance of a knowledge

perspective and a time perspective in analysing project work. Pitsis et al. (2003) draw on

„Future Present‟ theory, the human ability of abstract visualization and projection into the

future of present intentions, to explore building projects from idea to realization, and how

stakeholders shape and converge on tangible, concrete ideas required for action.

The interpretive paradigm has also underpinned recent scholarly work on programmes and

programme management. Partington et al. (2005) used the phenomenographic method to

explore programme managers‟ different conceptions of and approaches to their work,

elucidating theories-in-use in the performance of their work. Martinsuo and Lehtonen (2006)

describe the sense-making processes within a public consortium in relation to the initiation,

and subsequent early termination, of a programme originally intended to support the

realisation of its strategy. Lehtonen and Martinsuo (2008) analyse the work done by key

programme players in: defining and shaping programme boundaries; representing the

programme and engendering legitimacy; information scouting and negotiating; ensuring

continuity; and guarding and isolating the programme. Lehtonen and Martinsuo (2009)

extend their earlier work to find that both integration and isolation are present and concurrent

in the two organisational change programmes studied. Pellegrinelli (2011) proposes a social

constructionist ontology for programmes as a way of differentiating them from projects,

deemed lodged within, and as components of a programme usefully approached from, a

functionalist perspective, so offering practitioners an alternative perspective on the

management of complex societal and organisational changes.

Radical Humanist or Critical Perspective

Project management has also been studied from a critical perspective embedded in a radical

humanist paradigm, highlighting the (predominantly functionalist) methodology‟s

naturalisation within management rhetoric and its elevation to the status of unquestionable

ideology:

“Critical authors suggest the need for a wider picture of what goes on in projects and

project management by focusing on who is included in and who is excluded from the

decision-making process, analyzing what determines position, agendas, and power of

different participants, and how these different agendas are combined and resolved in

the process by which the decisions are arrived at.” (Cicmil and Hodgson, 2006, pp.

12).

Hodgson and Cicmil (2006) have argued that the concept of a „project‟ and the discipline of

project management have been socially constructed, a „false concreteness‟ attributed to

projects. Projects management‟s purported capability to harness the skills and energy of

otherwise (relatively) autonomous knowledge workers and deliver, in a controlled and

efficient way, complex customised solutions has been valued with organisations facing rapid

and unpredictable change. Hodgson and Cicmil (2006) argued that an „iron cage‟ of

unquestioned project rationality has emerged and taken on ideological status. Project

management bodies of knowledge and standards, subtly positioned as quasi-universal „best

practice‟, can and do implicitly take on the status of natural laws rather than pedagogical aids.

The dominance of this view of projects and project management deters deconstruction and

critique, marginalises other voices and exerts unacknowledged coercive forces (Hodgson and

Cicmil, 2006, 2007; Hodgson, 2002, 2004). Critical authors „problematise‟ project

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management, rather than accepting and augmenting its instrumental value in the service of a

managerial agenda.

Other authors have studied the rhetoric of project management from individuals‟

perspectives. Lindgren and Packendorff (2006) analysed the narrative of project team

members and found a contradiction between a masculine rhetoric in one-off, and therefore

outside the norms, projects (e.g. rationality, efficiency, control, devotion to work) and a

feminine rhetoric of „family friendliness‟ prevalent in permanent organizations. The gender

perspective was also used as instrument of deconstruction and reflexivity of the field itself, in

its methodological guidelines and the discourses of its practitioners (Buckle & Thomas, 2003;

Thomas & Buckle-Henning, 2007). Clegg and Courpasson (2004) examined the narratives of

project managers and unfolded other instruments of control perceived by project managers

including reputational control, calculative control (administration as instrument of power)

and professional control.

Radical Structuralist Paradigm

It would be a great stretch of the imagination to suggest that the field of project management

has a radical structuralist tradition. Some authors and researchers, though, have touched upon

the themes and tenets of this paradigm. Midler (1995) described the „projectification‟ of the

firm, drawing on the example of the car manufacturer Renault. He highlighted the changes

brought about by the introduction and increasing dominance of projects as permanent features

of organisation structure. While positioned in evolutionary terms, the account alludes to

shifts in power relationships and status, upheaval of the hierarchical decision-making

processes, communicative difficulties (if not overt conflict) between projects and functional

departments. Gareis (2004) has proposed „management by projects‟, whereby activities can

be translated into sets of projects and managed through project management methodologies,

overhauling traditional hierarchical structures and ways of working. Maylor et al. (2006)

extended the notion of projectification to „programmification‟, reflecting the transition in

many organisations to predominantly „projectise‟ work and the consequent need for structural

and sense-making frameworks.

The study of project management offices (PMOs) as formal organisational arrangements for

the promulgation of project management methods, tools and professional discipline has also

surfaced structural tensions and struggles for dominance. Aubry et al. (2007; 2008) and

Hobbs et al. (2007) offered a contextual, historical approach to the study of PMOs,

highlighting their precarious, often short-lived existence. They incorporated the dynamic

relationships between organisational structure, strategy and organisational politics in their

analyses and suggest that changes to PMOs‟ form and function “can fruitfully be seen as an

historical process of creative destruction and co-evolution” (Aubry et al., 2008, p. 43).

The increasing diversity of theories and research lenses used to study projects and

programmes speaks for their importance as constructs for undertaking work and bringing

about change. Yet, our knowledge and understanding is not commensurate with the

pervasiveness and centrality of projects and programmes in today‟s organisations and

societies.

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Research Objectives, Methodology and Case Summary

The aim of research described in this paper was to add to our knowledge of the actuality of

programmes, and their management, by exploring the actions and practices of managers

involved in bringing about a significant organisational change. A single case was selected as

it offered an opportunity for unusual access and because it was expected to be particularly

revelatory (Yin, 2008) given it is a major transformational change conceived and organised

explicitly as a programme. In conducting this longitudinal case study we were able to track,

via the narratives of those involved supported by documentary evidence, an unfolding

programme in the context of on-going strategic developments in a difficult and turbulent

economic and social environment. This is an example of an instrumental case study (Stake,

1994), where the case is used to provide insight into a particular programme-based

transformational change, with the purpose of advancing our understanding of programme

management in general, not the organization in particular.

An opportunity arose in 2008 to study a business transformation programme under way in a

retail bank in a European country (referred to as CFS and Eurostat in this paper to maintain

confidentiality). The CFS retail bank in Eurostat formed part of a large banking and

insurance Group with retail and commercial banking operations in Europe and various other

parts of the world, but operated with a degree of local autonomy and accountability. We had

been working in a management development capacity for the Group for over three years, and

knew the Programme Director. We formally requested and were granted permission to

research the programme, subject to conditions of confidentiality and non-disclosure. The

Programme Director and Board of the CFS Retail Bank saw our research as a way for them

personally to reflect on their experiences and to glean insights from whatever analyses we

might undertake. While we had some general knowledge of the Group, its strategy and how

it managed its programmes, this was to be the first in-depth investigation of a major

programme.

The first set of in-depth (60 – 90 minutes) semi-structured interviews took place in May and

early June 2009. A range of confidential documents, including the papers submitted by the

Board for Group funding approval were provided for us to study and use in our analyses. (In

the case description that follows, some of the business case numbers have been disguised

while retaining the sense of scale of the programme.) The Programme Director (interviewed

twice – at the beginning and the end of our 2 days visit to CFS), the General Manager of the

Retail Bank, the Operations Director and the Director of Products and Processes were

interviewed face to face at the bank‟s offices. A little later the Director of Marketing was

interviewed on the telephone. Participants were briefed in advance in writing that the

purpose of the interview was to provide them with a chance to share their perspectives on the

change – how it was conceived, how it has progressed, and what it has taken to make change

happen. An outline interview guide was developed to help provide a broad structure for the

interviews and a check list for the information to be collected, including: role within the

bank; drivers for the programme; stakeholders; governance; benefits achieved to date; general

reflections on progress of the programme. The intention was to encourage participants to

share their thoughts freely, and the interview guide was not designed to be used rigidly other

than for the formalities at the start (e.g. introductions, permissions, confidentiality).

Interviews were recorded with permission and then transcribed by third parties. The

transcriptions were checked and edited by us whilst listening to the tapes. The edited

transcripts were read further prior to starting to code with the help of NVIVO software. We

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coded the transcripts independently, then met to discuss the codes and emergent themes. The

codes and constructs were inductively derived, though it is important to recognise the

influence of our professional experiences and knowledge of various literatures (e.g.

programme management methods, change leadership, practices and routines). A case study

(composite narrative) of the change programme, its origin, and the activities that sustained

and shaped it was drafted based on our analysis and sent to the Board of the Retail Bank for

their comments at the end of June. A final draft, with only minor amendments, was agreed

by the Board of the Retail Bank late in 2009.

We recognised that we had only gained the views of the Retail Board members and that this

limited the validity of our findings given the potential for narrative biased by retrospective

sense-making (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). According to Eisenhardt and Graebner, this

potential bias can be mitigated by working with “highly-knowledgeable participants who

view the focal phenomena from diverse perspectives” (2007:28). Accordingly, we asked

whether we could interview some of the managers reporting to the Retail Board members. A

second set of face-to-face interviews was undertaken in March 2010 with this second layer of

managers. The Head of Private Banking and the Head of IS, both on the Retail Board, were

also interviewed at this time. As before, participants were informed of the nature and

objectives of our research. We received documents (e.g. notes of Programme Board

meetings, governance structures) in advance of the interviews. This set of interviews offered

different perspectives and the opportunity to compare and contrast the different accounts,

deepen our understanding of the programme and explore new questions. The interview guide

was augmented to incorporate some of the themes that had emerged from the first stage of the

study. Three themes were explored in particular:

How the programme had unfolded (e.g. actual vs. planned, nature of changes, processes

for setting direction, links to strategy and to business plans and priorities);

The programme management processes and structures, their impact and effectiveness and

their „fit‟ with and influence on with the organisational culture and routines;

The connections/ interplay between the programme and the standing organisation and

if/how it had changed and was changing.

The interviews were recorded, transcribed and coded. Emergent themes and questions for

further exploration were identified.

A third set of face-to-face interviews was conducted in June 2010 with the Programme

Director, the General Manager of the Retail Bank, the Director of Products and Processes and

the Head of Internet Offerings. Telephone interviews were conducted in early July with the

Operations Director and the Director of Marketing. The interview guide was again

augmented to incorporate some of the themes that had emerged from the first and second

stages of the study. In particular, three themes were explored:

The transformation over the previous 15 months;

Reflections of how the programme has unfolded and its impact on the organisation;

The future role and purpose of the programme and its relation with the standing

organisation.

A second instalment of the case study (composite narrative) of the change programme was

drafted based on the second and third sets of interviews and sent to the Board of the Retail

Bank for their comments in December 2010.

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This combination of interviews and documentary information taken at different times

provided a longitudinal element to the research, and the opportunity to compare the accounts

of the same individuals at two points in time and to explore questions emerging from our

analyses. To the extent that we are granted access, our intention is to continue tracking the

evolution of the programme. The following sub-section provides a summary of the

programme‟ history and key themes, and is drawn from the two instalments of the case

prepared for the Retail Bank.

The CFS Retail Transformation Programme

In October 2007, the CFS Group Board approved an investment of €130m over five years to

transform the CFS Eurostat retail banking operation from a traditional bank to a modern,

integrated distribution channel combining a new branch format with state-of-the-art internet

banking. The combination of “Face and Click” was intended to transform CFS Eurostat

Retail Bank, overcoming the scale disadvantages of being the number four player in the

Eurostat market with 11% share, and positioning it as a major player for the future. The

vision of the CFS Eurostat Retail Board was encapsulated in the strap-line: “Direct when

possible, advice when needed”.

The business case submitted for Group approval was the articulation of a vision that had

emerged and been crafted over many years. At the heart of the vision was a plan to re-

structure most of the traditional bank branches into open, accessible environments (proxi

branches) where customers could deal with their own (cash) transactions and could get advice

from branch staff on new products or services. The target, by 2012, was to sell 50% of

products direct and to generate 2/3 of the leads for the branch staff via the internet. The

revenue growth was to be spearheaded by dedicated personal bankers in the retail segment, a

new streamlined approach to professional banking and the introduction of predominantly

direct insurance products. These changes were expected to have a significant impact,

generating circa €90m in net new revenue from sales of banking and insurance products and

savings of circa €30m per annum from efficiency improvements and lower cost branch

operations, by 2012. The investment was expected to payback in three years (at the end of

2010) with the business having a positive net cash flow in 2009 and thereafter.

The changes would affect over 4,500 staff employed across more than 550 of CFS Eurostat‟s

own retail branches (a further 250 branches being franchised operations), and lead to a

significant reduction, retraining and redeployment of branch staff. The goal was for the

strategy and anticipated benefits to be realised without compulsory redundancies.

The Eurostat Retail Transformation Programme was broken into three phases:

Build capabilities and showcase them gaining credibility: 2007 - 2008

Out the new positioning; loud and clear: 2009

Refine: 2010 – 2012

The CFS Group Board approval and funding marked the formalisation of a transformation

process that had started some years before. The submission to the CFS Group Board

reflected a need to make bolder, more public changes, and ultimately to overhaul the dated

and uncompetitive Information Technology (IT) platforms provided by the Group Operations

& IS Division. Over the previous years the General Manager of CFS‟s retail banking

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operation in Eurostat had become convinced that in Europe the cycle of falling interest rates

was coming to an end, and when they started to rise it would signal more difficult times for

the banking sector. Something significant needed to happen to deal with the cost

disadvantages from the dated and expensive IT platform provided by OPS&IS Banking. He

assembled a like-minded management team willing to embark on a programme of radical

change.

Each Friday was put aside for the Retail Board meeting, where the team reviewed what they

had done, the status of the business and the detail of the future operating model. The scale

and complexity of the change soon became clear. However, the organisation did not have the

necessary discipline and maturity to define, coordinate and deliver specific elements of the

change. The culture of the organisation was not supportive of such a big, embedded change.

CFS Eurostat was staffed by nice, creative people who lacked execution discipline, felt

empowered to make “negative decisions” (i.e. to stop work or not comply) and liked to

dabble in internal politics. A Programme Director was recruited to sit on the Retail Board

and to run the programme office and lead a small team of experienced change professionals.

The programme office was tasked with helping the members of the Retail Board to manage

the business and change the business at the same time. The Retail Board needed to win over

hearts and minds, so the changes would be done by rather than done to managers and staff in

the bank.

The Net Account (internet-based savings account) launched in June 2007 was the first

opportunity to test the market‟s reaction to a direct product from CFS Eurostat Retail Bank.

Attracting 20,000 new customers by the end of 2007, it offered the first signs of success for

the strategy. The decision was taken to transform the branch structure and to create 120 proxi

branches by January 2009. New people were recruited in marketing to build the skills and

processes needed by the new direct marketing operation: moving from about 50 direct market

campaigns per year to a rate of 900-1000 highly targeted campaigns by the end of the year,

focused on generating actual sales. Over the course of 2008, the rhythm of work in

marketing picked up and “industrialised” processes were developed to allow them to manage

the volume of campaigns. The central retail sales team was completely restructured and

strengthened from January 2008 onwards. The new organisation was set up to support the

future implementation of uniform product sales and fulfilment processes across all channels.

It would, as of the 2nd

January 2009, take over the steering of the entire salesforce in the

branch network.

In September 2008, a global financial crisis on a scale not experienced for decades unfolded

suddenly and unexpectedly. Customers sought to spread their risks and benefit from

government guarantees on retail deposits. CFS Eurostat, unlike some of its rivals, was

perceived as relatively safe and a further €2bn of new money was invested in CFS‟s high-

interest direct savings Net Account. CFS Eurostat rode its luck and capitalised on the market

conditions. CFS Eurostat‟s rivals found it difficult to react. Some were in financial

difficulty. Others appeared not to have, nor to be prepared to invest in, the IT platform and

process changes to facilitate a (more) direct business. The work done by CFS Eurostat over

the previous years was not as easy to replicate as the interest rate changes and new product

launches that had defined the nature of competition in previous decades. By the end of 2008,

55,000 more new customers were using the Net Account with up-take increasing month on

month. Yet, sales through branches were not reduced, providing compelling evidence that

direct sales were on top of the existing business and that the “Face and Click model” was

really working.

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By the middle of 2009, the Eurostat Retail Transformation Programme had been largely

financed through cost reductions and revenue growth. Some of the structural changes in the

programme, such as branch conversions, had been “industrialised” with each conversion

project having precise time, cost and quality parameters. Processes and routines had been

adapted or created to serve the Direct where possible, advice when needed strategy,

encapsulated in the high tempo direct marketing campaigns and proxi branch format. The

sometimes long and gruelling Friday Retail Board meetings had ensured coherence and

transparency. But CFS Eurostat had still to move from the “quick and smart” patching of

existing processes and systems to robust, low cost “straight through processing” to sustain an

increasingly direct business in the future. The scope for incrementally improving existing

systems was reducing rapidly.

By the Summer of 2010, the retail transformation was well under way with 320 smaller

branches converted to the proxi format and a further 180 to be converted by 1/1/2012. The

intention was then to convert the much larger, full-service branches to the proxi format that

was proving to be widely appreciated by both customers and staff. The possibility of

decoupling sales activity from the branches, so making further rationalisations and cost

savings, was also being investigated. Over the previous three years CFS‟s market share in

savings had increased by over 2.5%, and over the previous two years the business had grown

its base of active customers by 160,000, a significant number given the size of the market and

a history of static market share. The marketing team were running 3 to 4 targeted and

tracked campaigns per days, and winning industry awards for direct marketing. Call centres

became more prominent as the Face and Click approach was broadened and subtly reshaped

as Face, Click and Call. The Retail Transformation Programme had become part of the fabric

of organisational life, part of the routines and the language. The boundaries between planned

programmatic change and evolutionary (business-as-usual) change blurred with the same

managers responsible for both. The mirroring of the future senior management structures to

the programme roles a year in advance of the change to the organisational structure on 1st

January 2009, had facilitated this seamless integration. Business targets and business results

had been turned into performance targets and measures for the programme. The business was

simultaneously implementing elements of the Retail Transformation Programme and

improving elements already implemented.

Yet, shadows loomed over the future of the Retail Transformation Programme, and its

continued ability to bring about the changes that would transform the competitive position of

CFS‟s Retail business and ensure its longer term viability and prosperity. The Retail

Transformation Programme was being absorbed by a bigger, emergent programme, the One

Bank Programme, intended to transform the whole of CFS Eurostat, including Corporate and

mid-Corporate banking, and led by CFS Eurostat‟s Executive Committee. The strong

coalition that had driven forward the Retail Transformation Programme was being replaced

by a senior management group, half of whose members were expected to retire within 18

months, including General Manager of CFS‟s retail banking operation, the architect of the

Retail transformation. A compelling vision had yet to crystallise and it was not clear that the

existing Executive Committee had the expertise, drive and commitment to realise the scale of

change required to create a “Direct Universal Bank” capable of serving all clients via direct

and traditional channels.

The One Bank Programme has also closed off the possibility of the Retail business

outsourcing its information systems or buying third party solutions. A CFS-wide solution

13

was chosen, and would entail overhauling the systems in Eurostat over the next 5 - 10 years.

Prospects of success were not good – the IS/IT was still proving a bottleneck and lacked the

depth of cutting-edge expertise in new technologies that would support the exploitation of the

internet as a channel through self-service and straight-through processing. Moreover, the

discipline imposed by the Retail Transformation Programme processes and governance

arrangements was increasingly perceived within the Retail business as bureaucratic.

Undercurrents of resentment could be felt. How the other parts of CFS in Eurostat would

react to a programmatic approach to change, given their existing culture of providing

responsive, personal and bespoke services, was still unknown.

It was unclear whether the Retail Transformation Programme would become a beacon of

direction and inspiration for CFS Eurostat, as hoped, or lose its focus and energy as part of a

wider, slower process of change, lacking clarity of vision, unity of purpose and steadfast

commitment.

Views from the Paradigmatic Lenses

The Retail Transformation Programme represents a significant, complex and multi-faceted

undertaking, which has, and continues to have, a profound effect on virtually every aspect of

CFS Eurostat Retail Banking. The interviews and documents have inevitably provided an

immense amount of data, which was compounded by our desire to be open to emergent

themes and to participants‟ own views, conceptions and experiences. Our iterations of

inquiry and inductive analysis have thrown up findings and questions, which we have sought

to explore and make sense of using different paradigmatic lenses. In this section we highlight

what we consider salient themes and insights, rather than attempt to answer specific research

questions – the task we have set ourselves in drafting other, more focused papers. Our aim,

thus, is to share our findings and reflections, and so sensitise scholars, researchers and

practitioners to possible ways of analysing and understanding organisational change projects

and programmes.

Functionalist Analysis

Given the perceived lack of embedded capability for planned change within the Retail Bank,

and CFS as a whole, the Retail Board took the decision to introduce and strictly enforce

formal project and programme management approaches. The programme started with six

basic work-streams, each one allocated to a value chain (a horizontal, process or product

based slice of the organisation) to plan and deliver. The project and activities contained

within each work-stream were underpinned by rigorous planning and quantitative cost/

benefit analysis, and were managed tightly. From a functionalist programme management

perspective, three themes emerged as central to the success of the Retail Transformation

Programme that may provide insights and/or guidance for other programmes.

First, there was an insistence on a business case for each project within the programme which

articulated a clear rationale for the project and was underpinned by thorough and

comprehensive plans: “every project needs to have its financials, not all have a positive

business case...but a proposal is not a hope for an idea, it‟s a plan which has to be nailed

down”. This promoted rationality and rigour “we run a pretty rational programme, we like

mathematics”, and did not allow a schism to develop between the financial analysis, formerly

undertaken primarily to secure authorisation to proceed and funding, from the execution

strategy that was going to realise the anticipated benefits within the envisaged costs and

14

timescales. The return on all aspects of the programme was scrutinised: “if you cannot

explain to me how I am going to make my money back (on this investment), you don‟t get

the cheque”. In terms of the affordability, of IT in particular, the line taken was “increase the

functionality on the platform we have rather than dreaming of new platforms that we don‟t

have the money to pay for anyway”.

Second, there was strong and unified governance of the programme and the on-going

business. The existing Retail Board meetings, which took place every Friday, were extended

and used for managing the programme and the business as an integrated entity:

“We need to change the hearts and minds of the people who are in it living the

business day by day and the only way to do that is to build a capability inside rather

than next to it... every week we sit all day and we do the change, we are managing the

programme but we are also managing the business as usual. The decision to basically

do it together implied that anything which is out there is immediately back in the

transformation plan... our strategic mindset is everyday change”

At these meetings the risk, and achievability, of certain initiatives was carefully weighed. In

relation to the launch of the Net Account in June 2007, there was much deliberation over the

organisation‟s ability to deliver and the possibility of cannibalisation of the Bank‟s branch-

based business:

“How much risk will we take to make this work - we knew we‟d have a year of pretty

tight deadlines on one hand and pretty anxious people on the other. The question was:

Dare we do that?”

Third, the vision was of a self-financing, as far as practicable, programme and hence the

focus on incremental benefit realisation. The investment of €130m over five years was

intended to be a re-investment of cost savings rather than from the CFS Group. This, in part,

influenced the choice and pace of developments, especially the decision first to transform the

customer facing elements of the retail bank (e.g. branches and products), which generated

early and tangible benefits, rather than embark on major IT systems up-grades, which would

have consumed resources with no immediate payback.

While the component projects in the Retail Transformation Programme were planned and

managed rigorously, the programme itself did not exhibit rigidity nor a conformity to plans

set out in October 2007 submission to the CFS Group Board. Rather, the programme was

characterised by continuous trade-offs between different possible approaches with different

benefit/cost/risk profiles and improvisation to make the best of the current situation:

“It‟s amusing to me to read the kind of business story that we wrote three and a half

years ago, because in our heads we executed straight forwardly what we had thought,

and if you look in bullet points we did. But then if you read the story that we had

written on how this was going to work and so on, it‟s already extremely out-dated. I

would be embarrassed at it being published, but at the time it looked great.”

In many ways the experience of CFS and approach taken by its senior management

conformed to the step posited by Kotter (1995) in relation to leading transformational change

in organisations. General Manager of CFS‟s retail banking operation in Eurostat had

generated a sense of urgency and built a strong coalition around a vision of transforming the

15

Retail business, which was communicated ceaselessly throughout the organisation.

Critically, it was a committed coalition, rather than an assembled or nominated Steering

Group, able to communicate a vision, which had been discussed and elaborated in detail:

“They (Retail Board members) keep the vision, the unity about the vision and the

implementation, for me it‟s one of the crucial keys in the success.” Kotter‟s notion of

empowering others to act on the vision, though, is much more circumscribed. The Retail

Board orchestrated actions closely and at a micro level:

“We are in the strategy because we are making this change, but at the same time we

are in the details because all this requires a lot of energy and knowing details means

we can sort problems for people”.

The programme framework, through the focus on business cases, plans, and strict governance

and control, channelled, delegated and directed the developments, complementing the

evangelism of senior managers. The focus on incremental benefits realisation helped to

ensure that the short-term wins generated tangible returns as well as evidence of progress,

morale boosters and momentum.

The financial performance and reactions of customers and staff suggest the change is unlikely

to be reversed indeed more change is envisaged. The Retail Transformation Programme is

expected to be subsumed within the One Bank Programme intended to bring about even more

profound change to CFS Eurostat.

Interpretive Perspective

The prospective absorption of the Retail Transformation Programme by the One Bank

Programme reminds us that an organisational construct, such as a programme, only exists and

is sustained through a fragile consensus that it represents the best way of realising strategic

goals or coordinating and deploying resources. Any construct operates within wider

processes of sense-making, evaluation, politics and resource allocation. Its goals and

existence may be contested and, given the exercise of sufficient power and influence, its

boundaries may be dissolved and mission redefined. Once absorbed, the Retail

Transformation Programme will inevitably lose a degree of its coherence, identity and

concreteness, and therefore its potency, as its work-streams are reshaped and pan-CFS

Eurostat decisions are taken, especially in relation to IT/IS:

“... I am somewhat afraid that we will somewhat lose our identity within this new One

Bank... We will be obliged to import some complexity in our way of working. Retail

is about simplicity and quality of execution and streamlining processes and making

them client friendly for the masses - for thousands, ten thousands, hundreds thousands

of customers, not for one specific customer, which is more the approach of Wholesale

and Corporate banking.”

In this case, the notion of identity relates simultaneously to the programme and the on-going

business. The Retail Transformation Programme illustrates a duality of structure, present to

varying degrees in projects, programmes and other constructs. They are simultaneously

separate from and embedded within organisational (or societal) norms, processes and

routines. In this case, the programmatic change elements were inextricably and seamlessly

integrated into the on-going routines and decision making processes, and not just at senior

management level:

16

“I have a program manager working for me now. But I made him part of my

management team. I changed the management. He is now my deputy, in charge of

IT, the process and change management team and quality management. That works

fine because then you have the discussions in the management team and not

separately in a project board. So the management understands what is happening and

can create together the vision of what we are doing.”

The perceived ineffectiveness of the CFS Eurostat Executive Committee in directing the One

Bank Programme becomes of paramount importance in this situation. The permeability of

the Retail Transformation Programme‟s boundaries, that have enabled reciprocal influence,

through information exchange, advocacy, sense-making and sense-giving, risks becoming a

threat to, rather a source of, success. For most programmes, a degree of organisational

separation is seen to be important to safeguard transformational visions, to shelter embryonic

concepts from potential suffocation by the prevailing culture, and to protect time and effort

allocated to programme activities from the demands of day-to-day priorities. We are yet to

discover whether in this case the managers within the Retail Bank, engulfed within the One

Bank Programme, will erect boundaries and strive to ring-fence the projects and

developments they consider vital.

Concerns over the effectiveness of the CFS Eurostat Executive Committee, despite the fact

that three of its eight members were also on the Retail Board, also highlight that a programme

is collectively enacted by key managers, and other contributors and collaborators. Their

expertise, maturity and commitment are deemed fundamental by those who have lived

through the Retail Transformation Programme:

“Is there a sufficient level of maturity at the Executive Committee to manage it the

way it has been managed in the Retail Board? In all honesty, they are not even at the

beginning of understanding what would be needed.”

“Our Retail Board, we have each Friday, we start at ten and go on till seven o‟clock in

the evening. This is completely missing at the level of the Executive Committee...

everyone in their corner just looking after their own interests, and some of them are

listening more to what the Group headquarters want...”

The transfer of „good‟ practice, as encapsulated in documents, templates and formal

processes, provides guidance and discipline:

“We will need to work even harder than we did with the Retail Transformation. So

we are setting up now the same framework: our weekly coordination, strict

governance where the decisions are being made with those core teams. So we are

setting that up as well for the One Bank because that‟s the only way this can work. If

we don‟t have discipline, it won‟t work.”

Programme processes, governance structures, templates and techniques are resources to be

drawn upon. They complement, rather than substitute for, the individual and collective

understanding, learning, perspectives, judgement and commitment of those involved as they

navigate a course through shifting strategic priorities towards desired outcomes. The case

illustrates the centrality of the individuals, rather than the holders of organisational roles, in

17

effecting transformations: sensing the need for, and direction of, change, crystallising a vision

and embarking united on the journey.

Widespread belief in the appropriateness of a course of action sustains legitimacy and a

willingness on the part of organisational members to act, to discover, to adapt. The success

associated with the Retail Transformation Programme, especially the Net Account and the

feedback of customers in relation to the proxi branches, undoubtedly helped the Retail Board

to implement changes that were perceived as necessary, albeit in some cases undesired:

“On the one hand the people who have a management function... are believers. The

people in the branches, they say: „OK we were sceptics, but it was the way that we

should work as a bank, so it‟s a good thing that the bank did this, now we‟ve seen the

results... We were very sceptic, but OK you‟re right... but we‟re not engaged‟.”

If we conceive all projects and programmes as transformational, albeit on different scales and

with variable levels of complexity we argue that some of the insights from the case of the

Retail Transformation Programme may prove fruitful in shaping future practice.

Radical Humanist Critique

The Retail Transformation Programme has brought about a centralisation which may have

pleased some but disempowered many others outside the Retail Board and the management

tiers of the Bank:

“The fact that we‟re really organised in a central way... The danger is that they see

themselves as, or they think we see them as, robots: „Now you have to do that, but

nothing else, and if you see a client, you first have to say „hello‟, then you have to

smile‟... In the past every branch organised themselves as they liked. In the new

structure is not possible. The direct approach has to be aligned with your sales

approach in the branches. You don‟t want to have those different approaches in the

branches. But the people say: „We agree, we‟re going to do that, but nothing else...

this is not fun anymore.‟ It‟s one of the things we have to work on a lot. The people

say: „OK, you‟re right, we didn‟t believe you, but point taken, the fact that we had

RTP was OK, because when we went into crisis, into trouble, CFS Eurostat performed

very well. But I don‟t feel involved‟. Unfortunately.”

The attribution of improved business performance to the Retail Transformation Programme

has been incorporated into the managerial narrative for its need and for the necessary

compliance to the changes it has brought, and continues to bring, about. Arguably, much of

the initial business improvement associated with the Net Account in particular, could be

viewed as CFS simply riding a wave of change triggered by the global economic crisis.

Investors may have been less interested in CFS and the Net Account per se, and more in

spreading their investments and benefiting from government guarantees in case of bank

failures. This success story has served to lessen resistance and create the aura of self-evident

correctness of the programme and what it was doing.

The Retail Transformation Programme was not only the vehicle for creating a more rigid,

prescribed and mechanistic way of working within the branches and central functions, such as

marketing, it also modelled this new way of working through its formal processes and strict

governance:

18

“CFS Eurostat used to be in a position where we could do an ad-hoc re-organisation

and manage the collateral damage because we had fat.... Now we‟re too thin to cater

for accidents, so you need to install something to make sure that you‟re always right

even in your change, before you put it in production... And that‟s also governance -

the fact that people have to come up with plans. We‟re not good at it. But it has been

chosen as part of how we want the Bank to be: the planned machine.”

The detailed workflows and routines, predictability and control, characteristic of a direct

banking operation striving for minimal or no human intervention, was imposed upon the staff

in the proxi branches in the form of detailed scripts and scenarios for dealing with customers.

Those working in the programme have been subjected to exacting scrutiny and sometimes

harsh criticism: “if you are not a quant and you go in there (governance board) you die”.

Tiers of governance were introduced to coordinate the work and to ensure adequate analysis

and planning. The increasing burden of the Retail Transformation Programme‟s processes

and governance, though, was also being experienced and resented by many tasked with

programme work. Even some of its supporters by early 2010 were finding the bureaucracy

excessive:

“One of the big traps is that you end up doing governance and not the project. If I

look now at what is happening, governance is getting too important... all the

paperwork and the bureaucracy, which has to be done, but it shouldn‟t get in the way

of the result.... I understand why we are exaggerating a bit in IT, because we are lousy

at implementing projects and programs... The pendulum - to get them in the middle,

you need to go a bit more to the right, and that‟s what we are doing now... But we

shouldn‟t do it too long. Let it (go) back to the middle, then keep on track”.

The managerial justification for processes and governance, supported by examples of failures

and shortcomings, point the finger at individuals and their limitations:

“The more you lack know-how, the more paperwork you end up with, because

everybody needs to write it down to understand it... Some of them use it because they

see it as a way to get in control of their own destiny and some others use it to

complain... Whenever somebody complains about governance, I think it‟s always

important to understand what exactly it is they are complaining about. Is it

governance, or is it lack of know-how, or is it lack of risk taking and decision

making?”

Such a narrative positions processes and governance as pedagogical aids, yet ignores the

debilitating effects of suffocating governance. It offers the possibility of stepping outside the

process, but implicitly aligns governance with considered decision making. To by-pass the

governance is to take a personal „risk‟, and the consequences such an action implies within a

financial institution after the banking crisis of 2008.

Yet, what were seen, and tolerated, as discipline and governance earlier in the programme,

were being experienced, and described, as strictures and bureaucracy by 2010. The

programme facilitating the transformation of CFS Retail Bank is at the same time creating

rigidities through the suppression of human autonomy and expression. Individuals‟ desire to

shrug off oppressive control may limit the life of any top-down transformation, for if it

19

endures the organisation may be condemned to a lingering death as the flame of creativity

and enterprise is extinguished.

Radical Structuralist Overview

The subordination of individual discretion to the smooth and efficient running of the whole

operation is a structural consequence of the on-going transformation of retail financial

services, impelled by competitive forces, enabled by developments in information and

communications technology, and shaped by inter-generational shifts in consumer attitudes

and behaviour. Integrated, low cost, multi-channel retail banking will replace traditional

branch banking, with even the change brought about by the Retail Transformation

Programme being recognised as a brief respite:

“800 branches and who would believe that we can maintain that over the next decade?

Hmmm... maybe, for a while, but not necessarily, not given the fact that by then, who

is now 30 will be 40 and who is 20 will be 30.”

The next steps explored are an extension of this transformation – the decoupling of sales

activities from the branches, which would enable CFS Eurostat to install its advanced ATMs

(automated teller machines) in many diverse retail locations, both saving costs and increasing

its physical presence. This novel fusion of static transactions processing, mobile face-to-face

advice (sales), telephone based support and internet banking offering will undoubtedly also

be subjected to powerful, and as yet unforeseen, forces of change.

The Retail Transformation Programme serves as a coordinating mechanism, a structural form

that not only directs the work of multiple workstreams, and the many projects contained

therein, but importantly also marshals and integrates the on-going operations with the change

activities:

...”what the programme did very well last year was to really structure, for example,

the agendas for the value chains... you discuss the run; how are things running, every

day, what are your costs, what are your incidents.”

The Programme‟s attributes of enterprise-wide vision, rigorous planning and strict

governance are also exerting pressure to turn the CFS Eurostat‟s operations into a smooth

running machine:

“...branches where people can repair not completely smooth running things, and also

in back offices and other places in the banks... The moment you are on the internet or

you are servicing your customers via a call centre, in essence it has to be perfect.

That means then that you have to design it and set it up... requires that you not only

know your own area well, but that you know the whole chain well, or at least that you

are capable... get all the parties from the whole chain working together to make the

whole perfect, instead of everybody defending his own piece...”

Changing external forces have caused CFS, like other retail financial services firms, to adopt

new structural forms to address the challenges posed. The value chain structure replaced

more bureaucratic organisational models to streamline processes and to encourage innovation

and targeted offerings. As the economic imperative has moved from customer-centric service

to customer anticipation and empowerment, the Retail Transformation Programme, as a

20

structural form, has supervised and enforced the management of the value chains

simultaneously to change and to „perfect‟ their processes, and integrate their work. The

Programme has become the dominant mechanism of control within CFS Eurostat Retail

Bank. Programme structures capable of sustaining and optimising both continuity and

transformation will increasingly replace or overlay current organisational arrangements. In

the case of the Retail Transformation Programme, structural tensions between on-going

operations and a temporary organisational framework have, in part, been contained by the

duality of roles performed by the Retail Board.

Despite its success as an organisational structure, the Retail Transformation Programme is

exposed to wider organisational development, as illustrated by its prospective absorption of

by the One Bank Programme. Programmes are subjected to change, their temporality may

not defined by the achievement of a pre-determined objective, but by a superior way of

organising. Societal and economic forces are combining to turn the „punctuated equilibrium‟

of previous decades into „pulsed change‟. The recursive interactions of the increasingly

temporary „on-going‟ operations and the more enduring „temporary‟ structures that structure

and support their continuity and transformation have yet to be explored.

Discussion, Limitations and Further Research

The analysis, perspective, critique and overview depicted above from the paradigmatic lenses

offer different glimpses into a multi-faceted phenomenon. Our aim has been to tell an

unfolding story, as we moved from one paradigmatic lens to another, highlighting what the

lens shows us, or enables us to perceive, that complements or offers an alternative

explanation or narrative. We have chosen not to labour the obvious tensions that emerge

from exploring a phenomenon from diametrically opposed paradigms. For instance, the

discipline, order and control in the service of an organisation goal, seen from a functionalist

paradigm, are construed as a form of subjugation and disempowerment from a radical

humanist perspective. The centrality of agents such as the General Manager of CFS‟s retail

banking operation in Eurostat, in perceiving changes in the market and driving forward the

transformation, set within an interpretive paradigm is counterbalanced by the a more

structural analysis.

This plurality of explanations or conceptions, we believe, adds depth and richness. They hint

at what we might overlook, or pay insufficient attention to, when lodged within our own

paradigmatic assumptions and methodological preferences. Individually and collectively

they add to our knowledge and understanding of programmes and programme management.

From a practitioner perspective, the explanations or conceptions can inform their actions,

provide different points of views and alert them to typically obscured consequences of the

dominant functionalist paradigm. They may even help practitioners voice, as yet

unarticulated, insights, doubts and concerns.

We have used Burrell and Morgan‟s (1979) analytical grid, given its wide-spread diffusion

though not necessarily unanimous acceptance, to position research and schools of thought

and the paradigms as lenses to analyse and make sense of our data. We have sought to make

our inductive research methodology as inclusive as possible. Without wishing to enter a

debate on paradigm commensurability or incommensurability, we acknowledge the need to

adopt fundamentally different ontological and epistemological assumptions in conducting the

research, and the challenge that this entails. We also acknowledge that our methodology,

based on in-depth semi-structured interviews supported by documentary evidence may be

21

deemed a compromise when scrutinised from within each of the paradigms, indeed reflecting

our own philosophical preferences. The paucity of data that we could draw upon in

undertaking our analyses from a radical structuralist perspective has highlighted to us the

tendency to overlook the socio-historical context, even if we recognise the importance of

organisational and cultural contexts, when we study project and programmes Clearly, a

single case provides limited basis for analytical generalisation, and we do not claim that the

case is representative. Yet, we argue that the analyses, insights or themes should not be

dismissed out of hand as anecdotal or idiosyncratic. Rather, they should be a springboard for

further, more detailed and comprehensive research, whether set within one paradigm or

multiple paradigms. We offer our work as a multi-paradigmatic exploration of the narratives

of managers at multiple-levels from within one case. In so doing we aim to sensitise future

researchers to develop their work with an explicit acknowledgement of different ontological

and epistemological perspectives.

Our scholarly knowledge of project and programmes is out of line with their increasing use

and centrality in bringing about purposeful and structured change. From a practitioner

perspective, our research and other research to follow may motivate practitioners to be more

reflective, more ethically aware, and more context sensitive. For instance, our work has

hinted at the importance of identity, ascribed success or failure and the symbolism of project-

based work. This and further work might add richness to the functionalist notions of

communication and organisational change management. Adoption of a truly holistic

stakeholder perspective and corporate social responsibility demands critical self-scrutiny to

expose unreflective commitment to a shareholder or managerialist agenda and the implicit

disempowerment and coercive tendencies of project and programme management practices.

Even accepting the legitimacy of a managerial agenda, incongruence between rhetoric and

practice is likely to generate resistance and resentment. Attention to the socio-historical

context, from subjectivist (e.g. the „baggage‟ from previous initiatives) and objectivist (e.g.

external forces) paradigms appears important in navigating a course in uncertain times and

circumstances.

Final Thoughts

Our personal ontological and epistemological commitments shape what we study, what we

observe and how we account for it. Adopting alien commitments, however difficult and

temporary, enables us to see anew. We return to our „ontological and epistemological home‟

enriched, perceiving previous limitations and blind spots, and stimulated to ask different

questions. As scholars and practitioners, we may appreciate more and accept we know less.

Perhaps „multi-paradigmatism‟ is the new form of pragmatism in our ever more complex and

ambiguous world?

22

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