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- IV.B Evolution of the War (26 Vols.)Counterinsurgency: The Kennedy Commitments, 1961-1963 (5 Vols.)2. Strategic Hamlet Program, 1961-63


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I V. B. 2 .

St ra tegic Hamle.! . P r ~ g r ~ _ ~ 9 _ 6 _ 1 __36]

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STRliTEGIC Hfl.ELET PROGRAI-1

A specif ic s t ra tegy by 1!lhich the U. S. and GV J:l would at temp t to endthe i n s u ~ n c y in South Vietnarn had never been agreed upon at the t imetha t the U.S, decided, l ate in 1961, to :i..ncrease mater ia l ly i t s ass i s t ance to GVW an d to expand i t s advisory ef for t into one which vlOuldimplement a " l imit ed par tnership ." By ear ly 1962, hOl.reve r, there "I-rasapparent consensus among the p rinc ipa l par t ic ip ants tha t the Stra tegicHamlet Program, as it c arD.e to be cal le d , represented the unifying conceptfor a s t ra tegy des i gn ed to pacif;y- rura l Vie tn am ( the Viet Cong I s chosenb a t t leground ) and to develop support among the peasants for the cen t ra lgovernment.

The Stra tegic Hamlet Program VT8.S much broader than the construct ionof s t r a teg ic hamlets p er see I t envisioned sequent ia l phases which,beginn ing vri th clear ing the in surgents from an area and protect ing ther u r a l populace, progressed through the establish.ment of GVW infras t ructureand thence to the provision of services vThicn Hould le ad the peasants toident i fy wi th t he i r government . The s t rateg ic hamlet program "I,raS , inshor t , an attempt to t r ans la t e the nevTly ar t icu la ted theory of co unter -i n s u ~ g e n c y into operat ional rea l i ty . The objectj.ve was polit: i.cal thoughthe means to i t s r ea l i za t ion "IJe re a mixture of mili tary , socia l , psycholog ica l , economic and po l i t i c a l m e a s u ~ e s

'I'he effect of these sequent ia l steps to pacif ica t ion 'tTas to make itvery d i f f i cu l t to make interTtlediate assessments of progress . One couldnot r ea l ly be sure hO'N one was doing un t il one \'Tas done . Physicalsecur i ty by i t s e l f (the so-cal led ' Iclear and hold" in i t ia l s tep ) was anecessary condit ion for pac i f ica t ion , not a su f f ic ien t one. The es tabl ishment of governmental functions was not , by i t s e l f , ne cessar i ly conduciveto a successful e f fo r t ; the qua l i t y of those funct ions and the i r respon-siveness to loca l ly f e l t needs "lvas c r i t i c a l . This inherent di f f icu l ty inassessi.ng progress did not simply mean tha t it VIas d i f f i cu l t to ident i fyproblems an d to make improvements as one went along - - which it v!as. I talso meant tha t it was qui t e poss ible to conclude that the program as awhole "lms progressing well (or badly) according to evidence relat ing onlyto a s ingle phase or a par t of a phase.

A related problem arose from the uniaueness of th i s program inAmerican experience - - paci f ica t ion-by pr;xy. The theory of se quen t ia l

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phases could be var ious ly in t erpre ted. This i s not the problem of thethree bl ind men describing the elephant; it i s the prob l em of men vIithd i f fe ren t perspect ives each moul ding his olm conception of a properbody to the same sk e le ton. I f the f ina l product vTere to hav e some semb lance of coherence and mutual sat i sfact ion it \\Tas necessary th a t thesh apers came to agreement on substa.nce an d opera t iona l procedure, notjus t th at they agree on the proper skeleton upon which to work .

The problem "lith the apparent consensus hich emerged ear ly in 1962was tha t t he pr inc ipa l par t i c ipants did view it with d i ffe rent perspectives and expectat ions. On the U.S. s ide , mili tary advisors had a se tof preferences which affected t he i r approach to the Strategic Ha...11l1etProgram. They wanted to make RVNAF more mobile , more aggressive, an db e t t org a.nized to take the offensive agains t the Viet Cong o They vrere ,consequent ly , extremely l eery of proposals which might l ead it to be t ieddOlm in s t rategic defenses ("holding" af ter liclearing" had been completed )or diverted too much to mil i tary civic act ion undertakings .

The American pol i t i c a l leadership , insofar as a generalizat io n maybe attempted , may be said to have b een most concerned with the l ate rphases of the program .. . those in which GVH services vTere provided,local government s establ ished, and the economy bols te red. Mi litaryclear ing opera t ions were , to them, a dis tas tefu l , expensive, but necessary precondit ion to the r ea l ly cr i t ic a l and important phases of thee f for t .

Both of these U.S. groups had perspect i ves different from those ofthe Diem administrat ion. In the U.S . view the i nsurgents were onl y oneof Diem s enemies ; he himself vTaS the othe r . I n th i s view the p roc ess ofpaci f icat ion cou l d proceed successful ly only if Diem reformed his OvlDgovernment . It was precise ly to achieve t hese goals simul taneously t ha tth e U. S. agreed to enter a !!limited par tnership !! with GVF in the cOUllterin surgent ef for t . The s t r a teg ic Hrunl e t Program became the operat iona lsymbol of th i s ef for t .

President Diem -. , unsurpris i ng ly - - had a very d ifferent viev! . Hisneed, as he saw i t , was to get the U. S. commi t t ed to South Vietnam ( an dto his administrat ion ) 'without surrendering his i ndependence . He knewth at h is nat ion vTOuld f all without U. S. support; he feared th at hisgovernmen t ,wuld f a l l i f he ei ther appeared to toady to U. S. vris hes oral lo wed an y single group too much pot en t ial power - - p ar t i cu lar ly coercive povTer. The Stra tegic Hamlet Program offered a veh i cle by vrhichcould di rec t the counterinsurgent ef for t as he thought it should bed irected and 1'Tithout giving up e i the r his prerogat ives to th e U. S or hismantle to h is res t le s s generals .

The p r o g r a ~ , i n the form of a plan fo r pacif ica t ion of the Del t a ,)Vas form a l ly propos ed to Diem in November 1961 by R. G. K. Thompson ,head of the ne.v ly ar r ived Bri t i sh Adv i sory Mi ssion . U. S. mili tary

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advisors favored a t tha t time an ARV":{ penetrat ion of the VC redoubt inHal' Zone D pr ior to an y opere,t ions aimed speci f ical ly a t paci f icat ion.But UoS. po l i t i c a l desires to s t a r t some lo cal operation which couldachieve concrete gains combined vrith Die..rn ' s preference for a pacif icat io n ef for t in an area of s t r a teg ic importance led to the i n i t i a l ef for ti n Harch 1962, 1T0pers,t ion SmmISE, II in Binh Duong Province north ofSaigon. This was a heavily VC-inf i l t ra ted area ra ther than one ofminimal penetra t ion, as Thompson had urged. But planning .. - as dis t inc tfrom operations - - continued on the Delta p lan and st rategic hamlets wereconstruc ted in a var iegated , uncoordinated pat tern throughout the spring Ian d early summer. The U. S. had l i t t l e or no i nfluence over these act ivi-t i e s ; the primary impetus vms traceable direct ly to the Pres ident ' sbrother an d po l i t i c a l counsellor , Lgo Dinh ?lhu .

'In August 1962, GVN produced i t s long aI>Ja i t ed nat ional pacif ica t ionpleD with four pr ior i ty areas an d specified pr io r i ie s vrith in each area.At the same t ime, however, it indicated tha t over 2,500 st rategic hamletshad already been completed and tha t vlork was already undenvay on moreth an 2 ,5 00 more. Although it viaS not un t i l October 1962, tha t GVSexpl icit ly annou.nced the s t ra teg ic Ham l e t Program to be the unifyingconcept of i t s paci f icat ion an d counterinsurgent ef for t it 'tTaS clearear l ie r tha t the program had assumed th i s central posi t ion.

Three import ant impl ica t ions of th is early progress (o r , more precisely, reported progress ) are also clee,r in retros:pect. These implications seem not to have impressed themselves acutely upon U. S. observersat the time . Firs t , the program viaS t ru ly one of GVH i n i t ia t ive ratherthan one embodying pr ior i t ies and t ime phasing recommend ed by the U. S.Diem was runn ing -.;dth h is ovm ba l l in programmatic terms , no matter vihoar t iculated the theory of the approach. The geographic dispersion ofhamlets already reported to be completed indica ted tha t there was, inf act , a conscious ef for t to implement th is phase almost simultaneouslythroughout the ent i re nation r athe r than to bui ld slowly as Di em ' sfo reign advisors (both U. S. an d Br i t i sh) recommended.

Final ly, the physical aspects of Die..:m ' s program 'I>Jere s imilar i f notident i cal to ear l ie r population reset t lement and contro l ef for t s pract ic ed by the French an d by Diem. The l ong hi s tory of these effor ts wasmarked by consistency in r esu lt s as well as i n techniques: a l l fa i l eddi smally because they ran i nto resentment i f not active res is tance onth e par t of the peasants at whose contro l an d safe ty, t he n loyalty, theywere aimed. U.S . desires to begin an effec t ive process of pac i f icat ionhad fastened onto secur i ty as a necessary precondition an d s l ighted thehis to r i c record of rura l res is tance to resett lement . President Di em andhi s brother , for the i r par t , had decided to emphasize contro l of theru ra l popula t ion as the precondition to vTinning loyal ty. The record isi nconclusive 'I'lith res pect to t he i r v:eighing the record of the past buti t appears tha t they, too, paid i t scant at tent ion . Thus the ear lyopera t ional effor ts indicated a danger of peasant res is t ance , on on e hand ,

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and of divergent approaches between, in the i nit ia,l steps, th e U.S .(focused on secur i ty measures) and Diem (conce rned more vl i th controlme asures ) . Since the physica l act ions to achieve security and thoseto impose control are in many respects the same, there was generatedyet another area in vlhich assessments of progress 'Ivould be inconclus iveand d i f f i cu l t to m a J ~ e .

U.S. at tent ion, once an apparent consensus had been forged concentra ted on program management effor ts in t iro categories: to convinceGVN to proceed a t a more measured, coherent pace vlith a qual i tat iveimprovement in the physical construct ion of st rategic hamlets; and toschedule mater i a l assis tance ( for t i f ica . t ion mater ia ls , etc . ) and t ra in-ing for loca l defense forces to match the rate of desired hamlet const ruct io n .

U.S. assessment s , a t the same t ime, concentrated on the physicalas p ects of the program an d on VC ac t iv i ty in areas 'I-There st rategichamlets ha d been constructed. Assessments tended to be favor able froma security (or con t ro l ) viewpoint an d uneven wi th respect to po l i t i c a ldevelopment. The general conclusion was almost abmys one of cautiousop timism when security (cont ro l ) vms emphasized, one of hopeful pess imism vThen po l i t i ca l follow-up vIas s tressed. The impression in Hashing,ton vms typic al ly slanted tOl-lard the more optimist ic appraisals i f forno other reason than tha t hamlet construct ion and security arrangements'\ITere the f i r s t chronological s teps in the long process to pacif ica t ion .Ha.s it not , af te r a l l , "progress" to have moved from doing nothing todoing something even though the something was being done imperfect ly?

These U.S. assessments changed only marginally throughout the l i feof the program. By the time , in 1963, tha t the hopeful pessimist voiceswere clearer , it 'Has also much clearer t hat the Ngo brothers ha d madethe Stra tegic Ham l e t Program i nto one closely ident i f ied with the i rregime and with Diem ' s r athe r esoter ical ly phrased "personal i s t revolut ion. 11 Fears grew tha t Diem vTas attempting to impose loyal ty from thetop through control ra ther than to build i t from the bottom by deeds.These fears 'I


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A number of contributory reasons can be cited for the fa i l ure of theStrategic Hamlet Program. Over-expansion of construction and poorqual i ty of defenses forms one category. This r eason concentrates onlyon the in i t i a l phase of the prograil1, however . ' l h i l e valid, i t does l i t t l eto explain why the entire program collapsed ra ther than only some hamletsv!i thin i t . Rural antagonisms l'lhich identified the program with i tssponsors in the centra l government are more suggestive of the bas is for ,-t he complete collapse as Diem and Nhu departed the scene. The reasonswhy they departed are t raceable in part to the di fferent expectationswhich combined in the apparent consensus at the program ' s beginning: toDiem's insistence on material assis tance and independence, to U. S. willing-ness to prov id e assistance only i f i ts advice was heeded, and to thef ailure to re solve th is question either by persuasion or l everage .

Having said th is , i t does not automat ica l ly fo llo't1 that the programwould have succeeded even i f Diem had met U.S. demands for change. Topoint to the causes of failure is one thing; to assume that changes ofstyle v10uld have led to success is c;uite another . I t may well be thatthe program was doomed from the out;e t because of peasant resis tance tomeasures yrhich changed the pattern of rura l l i fe .. whether aimed atsecurity or control. I t might have been possible, on the other hand, fora well - executed program eventually to have achieved some measure of success.The early demise of the program does not permit a conclusive evaluation.The weight of evidence suggests that the Strategic Hamlet Program wasfatal ly fla'tred in i t s conception by the unintended consequence of al i enati ng many of those whose loyal ty i t aimed to 'tri n .

This inconclusive finding, i n turn, suggests that the sequentia lphases embodied i n the doctrine of counte rinsurgency may sl ight somevery important problem areas. The evidence i s not sufficient f or ani ndictment ; s t i l l less i s one able to val idate the counterin surgent doc t r ine with reference to a program that failed. The only verdict thatmay be given at this time wi th respect to t h e ~ l i d i t y of th e doctrine isthat used by Scots courts - - !I case not proved ;"

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IV.B.2.

DATE1953-1959

1959

Late 1960Early 1961

May 1961J uly 1961

15 September 1961

18 October 1961

27 October 1961

3 li[ovember 1961

13 Fovember 1961

15 November 1961

22 November 196115 December 196 12 February 19623 February 1962

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French and GVE early attempts at popul ation r esett le ment int o defended communities to create secure zones.Hural Community Development Centers (Agroville ) Program ini t iate d by GVf.LU S M N ~ G Counterinsurgency Plan Vietnam completed.Agroville Pro gram modified by construction of "AgroHarnlets I to meet peasant ob j ections.Vice President Johnson s vis i t to RVN .Staley Gro'up report on i ncreased economic aid andi ncrease in R V = ~ A F strength.USVlALiG Geographically Phased I,rational Level OperationPla.n for Counterinsurgency .Genera.l Taylor arrives i n R V I ~ President Diem declaresnat i onal emergency.R.G.K . Thompson submits to President Diem hi sAppreciation of Vietnam, .November 1961-April 1962.General Taylor submits his report and r ecommendationsto President Kennedy .RoG.K. Thompson submits his draft plan for pacificationof the Delta to Pres i dent Di em .NSC drafts FSJ:":f 111. Cable to .JiJnbassador No l t ing,i nstructing hi.lll to meet ,,7ith Diem, l ays out pr oposedU. S. assistance and expected GVN effor t .NSA.vl 111.Firs t Secretary of Defense Conference , Honolul u .Roger Hilsman I S A strategic Concept for South Vietnam.Di em creates Inter-Min i steria l Committee on StrategicHamlets.

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DATE19 Harch 196222 Narch 19628 August 196228 October 19628 May 196224 August 196310 September 19632 October 19631 November 1963

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OCCU.HREl'fCEDiem approves Thompson's "Delta Plan ll for execution."Opera,tion SliHRISE tl corolUences in Binh Duong Province.G V ~ Nat ional Stra tegic Hamlet Construction Plan.GYii devotes ent i r e is sue of The Times of Vietnam to"The Year of the Strategic Hamlet . IrBuddhist con troversy erupts I'Then GVh troops f ire ondemonstrators i n HUe.State to Lodge, Me ssage 24.], says tha t U, S. c an nol onger tolerate Fhu ' s continuation in po ''.'"er .General Krulak and Mr . Mendenhall give cont radictoryr eports on progress of war to I\"SC .Secretary McNamara repor ts to President Kennedy fo l loVl-i ng his v i s i t to RVH vlith General Ta yl or.Coup d ' e ta t by group of generals ag a i nst President Diem.

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TIlli STRATEGIC ~ l l i E T PROGRAM1961 - 1963

TABLE OF CONTENTS AND OUTLINE

INTRODUCTION........................ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1A. Scope and Terminology eo " " 0 1B. .Arltecedents o. e I 0.. o . e 0....... 1C. The Situation in Late 1961 . . . . . 3Tllli FORMUlATION OF TIlE STRATEGIC H A M L E ~ PROGRAM . . 4A. U. S. -GVN Consul ta t ions . " 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (I ... ... 4B. "L imited Partnership" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7C. U.S.-Proposed National Plans . . 7D. Ini t ia l Vietname se Reactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8E. Thompson ' s Counterproposals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10DEVELOPING A CONSENSUS AMONG THE ADVISORS . . . . . . 12A. Ini t ia l Reaction of UoS. Military Advisors.... . . . . . . 12B. Reactions in Washington . . . . . . . . . 13C. The Advisors Reach Agreement... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

IV. . THE ADVISORS "SELL" DIEM (OR VICE-VERSA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15A. W b . ~ r e to Begin? 0 e..... ........... 15B. Concurrent GVJIif Activi ty. . . . . . 16C. Early Signs of GVN Expectations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

V. DIFFERING PERSPECTIVES AND EXPECTATIONS . . . 18A. U.S. Military Advisors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18B. U.S. Poli t ical Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

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VI.

VII.

VIII .

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Pres ident Di em e "

The Central Issue . .. 0 0 The Problem of Assessment . co.c ..

TEE NATION_AL PLAN EMERGES . . . A. Awareness of the Unifying Potent ia l . B. tfOperation Sunrise f .. " " .0 e " CI C. Other Early Progra.rn.s ......... ". . c ...... " " " "D. At Las t - - A National Plal"l " 0 E. Effec t on U. S. Perception s . F. Di fferences Begin to Emerge TIrE PAT1-1 TO TEE EN])....... ..". .. ........ " ... A. Di em t s Posi t ion Hardens .... .... .... . .. " . ... " .....B. The Program Dies With the =Tgos .AN INCONCLUSIVE SUMMARy . .

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I . Il\lTR ODUCTION

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THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM, 1961-1963:AN APPRAISAL

A. cope and TerminologyTh e Strategic Hamlet Program in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) - articulated and carried forward from late 1961 unt i l la te 1963 -- has created some confus ion because of terminology . One source of confusion stemsfrom the similari ty betvTeen the physical aspects of the program and earlierfort i f ied communities of one kind or another. Another source of confusionrises because of the loose usage of I1hamlet l1 as compared to I1 village l1 andbecause of the pract ice of referring to these communities as I1 defended, 11I1secure ,11 and fort if ied l1 as well as I1 s t rategic. 11 But the greatest sourceof confusion l ies in the distinction between a strategic hamJ_et }!er seand th e strategic hamlet program.Th e hamlet is the smallest organized community in rural South Vietnam . Several hamlets (typically 3-5) comprise a village . During the s t rategic hamlet program both hamlets and vil lages were fort i f ied . The distinc t ion is unimportant for the present analysis , except as i t bears on thedefensibil i ty of the c o m ~ l m i t y protected. The several adjectives coupledwith hamlet or vil lage were occasionally us ed to different iate communitiesaccord:i..ng to the extent of the i r defenses or the in i t ia l presumed loyaltyof their inhabitants . More often no such distinction was made; th e termswere used interchangeably . Where a distinction exists , the follo\


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years . As the in t el lectual godfather of the Strategic H ~ m l e t Program hasput i t , the concept 's use as one of the measures to defeat communist insurgency " . . . has only meant that the lessons of the past had to be relearn"; ." 2:.,/The aruninistration of President Diem had relearned thFse lessonsmuch ear l i er than la t e 1961. There I'Tas, in fact , no need to r.elearn thembecause they had never been forgotten . The French had made resettlementand the development of "s ecure zones" an important element in the i r effortnear the end of the war with the Viet Minh. The government of newly-createdSouth Vietnam, headed since 1 9 5 ~ by President Diem, had continued res et t le ment schemes to accofimodate displaced persons, to control suspected ruralpopulations, and to safeguard loyal peasants in the threatened areas .None of these effor ts i nvolv ing resettlement had succeeded . Each had in spired antagonism among the peasants who were moved from their ancest ral

lands and away from family burial plots.Diem ' s actions in la te 1961 'were thus inescapably t ied to ear l ie ractions by proximi ty in time, place, and the personal experiences of manypeasants . Chief among the ear l ie r programs was that of the so-calledAgrovilles or "Rural Community Develo"pment Centers," launched in 1959 The Agrovilles, groupments of 300-500- families, were designed to afford thepeasantry the social benefi ts of ci ty l i fe (schools and services), to increase their physical securi ty, and to control certain key locations bydenying them to th e communists.?J They were designed to improve simultaneously the securi ty and well-being of their inhabitants and the government'scontrol over the rua l population and rura l areas .The Agroville program was generally un successful . The pea,sa nts

had many complaints about i t ranging from clumsy, dishonest administrationto the physical hardship of being too far from their fields and the psychologica l wrench of being separated from ancestral home s and burial plots . ;JBy 1960, President Di em had slowed the program in response to peasant complaints and the Viet Cong ' s abil i ty to exploit this dissatisfaction . !!JThe t ransi t ion from Agrovilles to strategic ha.mlets in 1961 wasmarked by the so-called "Agro-hamlet " "lvhich attempted to meet some of the

peasants ' objections :The smaller 100 family Agro-hamlet wa s located moreclosely to lands t i l led by the occupants . Construction vmscarried ou t a t a slower pace f i l led to th e peasant ' s plant ing and harvesting schedule . . . By the end of 1961, th e Agrohamlet had become the prototype of a vast c iv i l defensescheme known as s t ra tegic hamlets, Chien Luoc . 21

I t was inevitable, given this l ineage , that the strategic hamlet programbe regarded by th e peasants as old wine in ne\'I"ly-labelled bottles . Thesuccesses and failures of th e past were bound to condition i t s acceptance- and by l ate 1961 the Diem government "l8,S ha,ving more fai lures than successes .

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C. The Situat ion i n Late 1961By late 1961, i f not ear l ier , i t had become clear in both Siagon

and Washington that th e yellow s tar of the Viet Cong \Va s in th e ascendancy .Following the 1960 North Vietnamese announcement of the twin goals of ousting President Diem and reunifying Vietnam under communist rule, th e VietCong began sharply to i ncrease i t s guerri l la , subversive, and poli t icalwarfare . / Viet Cong regular forces, nOl'T estimated to have grown to25,000, had been organized into larger formations and employed with increasing f r e ~ u e n c y . The terrorist -guerr i l la organization had grown to an es t i mated 17,000 by November 1961. 11 During the f i rs t hal f of 1961, terrori s ts and guerri l las had assassinated over 500 local off icials and civi l ians,kidnapped more than 1,000, and killed almost 1,500 RVNAJI'" personnel . /The VC continued to hold the in i t ia ive in the 'countrys ide , controllingmajor portions of the populace and drawing an increasingly t ight cincharound Saigon . 21 The operative ~ u e s t i o n was not whether th e Diem government as i t was then moving could defeat the insurgents, but whether i t couldsave i t se l f .

Much of this deterioration of the situation in RVN vTas at tr ibutable,in U. S. eyes, to the manner in which President Diem had organized his government . The struggle -- vlhether viewed as one to gain loyalty or simply toasser t control -- was focused in and around the v i l lages and hamlets in thecountrys ide. I t was p r e c i s ~ " in those areas that the bi l ineal GVN organization (ARVN and civi l ian province chiefs) most lacked the capabil i ty forconcerted and cohesive action. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN)was developing a potentially effective insti tutional framework under U.S.tu telage, but that effectiveness against the VC, Diem real ized, could po-tent ially be t ransferred into effectiveness against himself . The abortivecoup of late 1960 had made Diem even more reluctant than he had ear l ierbe en to permit power (especial ly coercive power) to be gathered into oneset of hands other than his own. St i l l , the establishraent of an effectivemili tary chain of command which could operate where necessary in the countryside remained the prime objective of U. S. military advisors .

A unitary chain of command had recently been ordered into effectwithin ARVN, but this had not solved the operational problems, for military operations were inescapably conducted in areas under the control ofan independent poli t ical organiza t i on with i t s own military forces and in fluence on operations of a l l kinds -- military, paramilitary, and civicaction . The province chiefs, personally selected by President Diem andpresumably lo ya l to him,controlled poli t ical ly the terr i tory in disputewith the VC and within which ARVN must operate . They also controlled te r r i to r ia l forces comprising the Civil Guard (CG) and Self Defense Corps (SDC) .

For President Diem ' s purposes this bi l ineal organization offeredan opportunity to counterbalance the pOvler (and coup potential) of thegenerals by the power of the province chiefs . I t was a device for survival .But the natural by-product of this duali ty, in terms of the effectivenessof actions against the VC, was poor coordination and imperfect cooperation



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in in telligence collect ion and production, in planning, and in operationalexecution in the countryside, where the bat t les ~ r e r e fought - - both the"batt le for men's minds" and the more eas i ly understood batt les for cont ro l of the hamlets, villages, dis t r ic t s , and provinces . (The U.S. and GVN were agreed that in order to defeat the insurgencyi t wa s necessary that the rura.l populace identif 'y with a t lea.s t the localrepresentatives of the central government. They were agreed, too , thatsome measure of physical security must be provided the rural populationi f th i s end were to be achieved. Both agreed that the GVN must be theprincipal agent to carry out the actions which 1vould bring the insurgencyto an end.

The high leve l U. S. -GVN discussions held during President Kennedy ' sf i r s t year in office focused on wha.t the U. S. could provide GVN to assistthe l a t t er 's counterinsurgency effor ts and on Ivhat GVN should do organizationally to make i t s efforts more effective . A subsidiary and relateddiscussion revolved around the U.S. advisory organization to paral le l theGVN reorganization. The problem of how addit ional resources jn some improved organizational framework were to be applied operationally was fragmented into many sub-issues ranging from securing the border to buildingsocial infrastructure.The story of the Strategic Hamlet Program, as i t came to be called,is one in which an operatj.onal concept specif'ying a sequence of concretestep s was introduce d by an articulate advocate, nominally accepted by allof the principal actors, and advanced to a position of apparent cent ra l i tyin which i t became the operational bluepr in t for ending the insurgency .But i t is also the story of an apparent consensus bui l t on differing , sometimes competin& expectations and of an effort which was, in retrospect ,doomed by the failure to resolve in one context th e problem i t was designedto al leviate in another -- the .pr09lem of GVN stabi l i ty .

I I . THE FORMULATION OF THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAMA. U. S. -GVN Consultations

Beginning in May 1961, th e U.S . and GVN conducted a series of highl evel conferences to fashion r esponses to the insurgen t challenge . Thefirst. of these was the vi s i t to Saigon by th e Vice President , Lyndon B.Johnson. The Vice President ' s consultations were designed to reinforcethe U. S. commitment to RVN and to improve the image of President Diem ' sgovernment .In a comm1.mique issued jo int ly in Saigon, i t was agreed that theRVNAF was to be increased to 150 , 000 men, that the U.S . would support theentire Civil Guard I'd th mili tary ass i stance funds, that Vietname se andU. S. military specia l i s t s would be used to support village-level hea l thand public works act ivi t ies , a,nd that the two governments vTould "discuss

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new economic and social measures to be undertaken in rural areas toaccompany the anti-guerri l la effort . . . ."!Y These discussions impliedthat more GVN effort should be devoted to rural pacif icat ion and civic actionand acknowledged that more regular mili tary forces were needed, but theydid l i t t l e to clarify the relation ships of these parts to the whole or toan overall scheme by which the process i.,rQuld develop.

The Staley group, a joint economic and f inancial committee cocbaired by Dr . A. Eugene Staley, Stanford Research Ins t i tute , and Vu Q,uocTuc, GVN, followed much the same pattern . Meeting in Saigon in June 1961,the corrrmittee agreed that RVNAF strength should be increased to 200,000during CY 1962 and that U. S. funding should be provided to various emergencyeconomic and social programs . But the group di d noghing to t ie togetherthe strands of what i t recognized as the central problem : to achieve asimultaneous "breakthrough" on both the military-internal securi ty frontand th e economic - social front. 13/ I ts recormnendat ions "\-Tere restr ic ted( in part , no doubt, because of i ts limited charter) to specific pro gramincreases and to a restatement of th e dimensions of the problem .

The devastation caused by the September monsoonal floods (320 ,000r efugees, 1,000 kilometers of road destroyed, 10 million acres of rice andother crops los t ) , combined with the losses attributable to increased insurgent 8.ctivity , led President Diem to declare a state of national emergencyon 19 October 1961 . This declaration coincided with the vis i t to SoutheastAsia (15 October - 3 November) of General Maxwell D. Taylor, heading amission asked by President Kennedy to appraise the si tuation in South Vietnam . The President stated the scope of Taylor ' s mission in the broadestterms :

While the military part of th e problem is of greatimportance in South Viet-Nam, i ts pol i t ica l , social , andeconomic el ements are equally signif icant , and I shal l ex pect your appraisal and your recormnendations to take ful laccount of them .I n his report to th e President, General Taylor sketched out thenature and aims of the Viet Cong threat and assessed the strengths and

weaknesses of the Diem government . He proposed a U.S . strategy for " turni ng the t ide and for assuming the offensive in Vietnam ." 15/ The reportwarrants summarizing in some deta i l , not because i t outlined the mainthrust of the pacif icat ion effor t (it did not ) , but because i tr 'epresentst he bes t document to portray the range of U. S. concerns a t the time theU. S. was making a major comrnitment to South Vietnam and because i t laysout th e major el ements of the U. S. strategy of response .

The Viet Cong, Taylor judged, vTere mili tar i ly powerful and becomi ng more powerful . But they were not yet ready to move to the third ,climactic phase of I ~ a o s classic format for guerr i ll a warfare :The mili tary stra.tegy being pursued is , evidently , topi n down the ARVN on defensive missions ; to create a per vasive sense of insecuri ty and f rustra t ion by h it - and-runraids on self-defense corps and mil i t ia units , ambushing

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the reserve forces i f possible as they come up to defend;a,nd to dramatize the inability of the GVN to govern or tobuild, by the assassination of off icials and th e sabotageof public works .

The purpose of this military strategy, Taylor asserted, was apparently no tto capture the nation by force. Rather, in concert with non -military means ,i t was to produce a pol i t ica l cris is which would topple the goverrnnentand bring to power a group willing to contemplate th e unificat ion of Vietnam on Hanoi s terms. };])I t was in the U. S. in terest , Taylor reasoned, to act vigorously -with advice as i'Tell as aid -- in order to buy the necessary time for Vi etnamto mobilize and to organize i t s real assets so that the Vietnamese themselve s might "turn th e t ide " and assume the offensive . 18/ But U. S. aidand U. S. advice on where to us e i t were not enough . TheDiem Government

i t s e l f had to be reformed in order to permit it to mobilize the nation .Diem had, in Tay l or ' s assessment, allowed two vicious circles to developwhich vit ia ted goverrnnent effectiveness . In the f i r s t of these circlespoor military intel l igence led to a defensive stance designed primarily toguard against attacks , which in turn meant that most of the military forcescam e under the control of the province chiefs whose responsibili ty i t wasto protect th e populace and insta l la t ions . This control by province chiefsmeant that reserves could not , because of tangled l ines of command andcontrol, be moved and controlled qui ckly enough to be effective . The effectof high losses in unsuccessful defensive batt les served further to dry upthe ba sic sources of i.ntelligence . WThe second vicious circle stemmed from Diem's instinctive attempts

to centralize pow er in his own hands while fragmenting i t be neath him .His excessive mistrLlst of mB,ny intel lectuals and younger Vietnamese , i.ndiv iduals badly needed to give his administration vi ta l i ty , served onlyto a l i enate them and led them to stand aside from constructive participationthereby further increasing Diem' s mistrust . This administrative style"fed back, too, into the military equation and through i t , created anotherpotentia l ly explosive poli t ica l-mil i tary problem :

The inabi l i ty to mobilize in te l l igence effective ly foroperational purposes directly flows from this fact LDiem ' sadministrative practici7 as do the generally poor relationsbetween the Province Chiefs and th e military conwanders,the former being Diem s r el iable agents , the la t ter a pmverbase he fears. Th e consequent frustration of Diem s mili tary commanders -- a frustration we ll-knoi'm to Diem andheightened by the November 1960 coup -- l eads him to ac t ions which further complicate his problem ; e . g . , his un willingness to del egate military operations clearly to hisgenerals. 21/

General Taylor ' s recommended actions for th e U. S. were designedto demonstrate U.S . commitment in order to strengthen Diem ' s stand and ,TOP SECRET - Sensitive6


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simultaneously, to broaden U. S. participation in the hope of bringingabout necessary reforms in Diem's regime. The President ' s emissary rejectedthe alternatives of a military takeover which would make the generalsdominant in a l l fields . He rejected, too, the alternative of r eplacingDiem with a weaker figure l'lho l'lould be vlilling to delegate authori ty toboth military and civ i l leaders . 22/ The f i r s t course l'lould emphasizethe solution to only one set of problems while sl ighting others; th esecond would permit action, but not coordinated action .

B "L;Ynlted Fa t ".wu r nershipIn order to move in a coordinated way on th e intermingled military,pol i t i cal , economic , and social problems facing South Vietnam, GeneralTaylor reconunended that the U. S. ini t iate a " limited partnership" ,'lhichwould stop short of direct U. S, action but would also, through persuasion

a t many levels judiciously mixed vlith U,S. leverage , " . . . force the Vietnam es e to get their .house in order in one area after another. " ?J.! Increased material assistance from the U. S. would be accompanied l'lith increasedU. S. participation a t a l l l evels of government in which the American advisorsmust " . . . as friends and partners -- not as arms-length advisors -- showthem how the job might be done -- not t e l l them or do i t for them ." I fstrongly motivated, tactful Americans were assigned primarily outsideSaigon, thus avoiding the establishment of large headquarters not actuallyengaged in operational tasks, Taylor thought that this increased U. S.participation would not be "counter-productive" ; e .g . , lend substance toclaims of U. S. imperialism and dominance of the Diem Government .

Thus, Taylor consciously opted for a U. S. cours e of action in whichthe major thrust of effort would be to i nduce Diem to do the things thatthe U. S. thought should be done : to dravl the disaffected into th e nationaleffort and to organize and equip so that effective action would be possible .General Taylor did not argue explicitly that success would follovl automatic -al ly i f Diem ' s practices could be r eformed and his operational capabili t iesupgraded, but he implied this outcome . The question of an overall strategy. to defeat th e insurgency came very close to being regarded as a problemin the organization and management of resources . Since GVN had no nationalplan,efforts were concentrated on inducing them to produce one . Th ere wasmuch less concern about the substance of the non- existent GVN plan. I twas almost as though there had to be something to endorse or to cri t icizebefore substantive issues could be t reated as relevant .

C. U.S.-Propo sed National PlansThis priori ty of business is r eflected in the U. S. ple,ns whichwere proposed to GVN for adoption by the la t ter . In l ate 1960 th e U.S .

Country Team in Saigon produced an agreed "C ounterinsurgency Plan forVi et - Nam" (CIP). The plan was an attempt to specify roles and relat ionships within GVN in the counterinsurgency effort , to per suade Diem toabandon his bi l ineal chain of conunand in favor of a single command l inewith integrated effort a t a l l levels within the government, and to createthe governmental machinery for coordinated national planning . I t



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was recognized that these recommendations were not palatable to PresidentDiem, but reorganization along the l ines specif ied was regarded as essentialto successful accomplisl1ment of the counterinsurgent effort . .The CIP 1-laS an indi ctment of GVN fai lure to organize effectivelyand to produce coordinated nationa.l plans . ?:JJ I t advanced no operationalconcepts for adoption by GVN . This obvious omission ,TaS corrected in the"Geographically Phased National J.Jevel Operation Plan for Counterinsurgency"

which MAAG Vietnam published on 15 September 1961 . ?:} Not only did th isplan specify the areas of primary in terest for pacif icat ion operations --as i ts t i t l e indicates - - i t also set forth a conceptual outline of thethre e sequential phases of actions 1-Thich must be undertaken . In th e f i r s t ,"preparatory phase, " the intel l igence effort "ras to be concentrated in thepriori ty target areas , surveys were to be made to pinpoint needed economicand poli t ical reforms , plans were to be drawn up , and mili tary and pol i t i cal cadres were to be t rained for th e specif ic objective area . ?!1I Thesecond, or "military phase, " would be devoted to clearing the objective areawith regular forces, then handing local securi ty responsibili ty over to theCivil Guard (CG) and to establishing GVN presence. 30/ In the f inal ,"security phase, " the Self Defense Corps (SDC) "lYOuldassmne the civ i laction-local security mission, the populace was to be "reoriented ," pol i t i cal control was to pass to civil ian hands, and economic and social pro-grams 'were to be in i t iated to consolidate government control. Militaryunits would be withdrawn as securi ty was achieved and the target areawould be "secured " by the loyalty of i t s inhabitants - - a l oyalty attr ibutable to GVN!s successful responses to the fe l t needs of th e inhabitant s .

First prior i ty in th i s plan (1962 operations) was to go to sixprovinces around Saigon and to the Kontum area. Second priori ty (1963 )would be given to expansion southvrard into the Del ta and southward in th eCentral Highlands from Kontum. Third priori ty (1964 ) would continue thespread of GVN control in the highlands and shif t the emphasis in the southto the provinces north and east of Saigon . Bef ore any of these priori tyac t ions were undertaken, however , i t wa s proposed to conduct an ARVN sweepin War Zone D, in the jungles northeast of Saigon , to r educe the dangerto th e capi ta l and to increase ARVN !s self- confidence . 2 (See Map 1.)The geographically phased plan comp l emented the earl ier CIP.Together , these two U. S. efforts consti tuted an outline blueprint fora ction . I t i s , of course, arguable that th is was the best conceivable

blueprint , but i t was at leas t a comprehensive bas i s for r efi nement -for arguments for different prior i t ies or a changed "series of events "in the process of pacification .D. In i t ia l Vietnamese React i ons

Thi s is not h01-7 matters proceeded, in the event . AmbassadorDurbrow, Gen eral McGarr , and others urged acceptance of the CIP uponPr esident Diem, but with only part ial success . Diem stoutly resistedthe adoption of a sing l e , i ntegrated cha in of operat i onal cormnand , show'edno enthusiasm for detai l ed prior plamling, continued hi s practice of cent ralized decision -making (sometimes tantamount to decision piegonholing),



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U.s. MAAG Geographica l ly Phase'd P lan, ..

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and continued to playof f th e provin:::8 chiefs against the generals . Someaspect p of the eIP were accepted, b u ~ the basic organizational issuesremained unresolved and the strategic approach QDresolved by default .The unsuccessful U.S . atter::."Jts to secure organizational reformswi thin the Diem goverr1.1nent had a s s l J r : : ~ d psychological pr:Lrnacy by the timeof General Taylor ' s October 1961 mis3ion to Saigon . The Ameri.can posit ion ,'ras essent ia l ly that no operaticnal plan could succeed unless GVN

were reorganized to permit-effective i.mplementation . I t was reorganiza t ion that Taylor emphasized, as d e t a ~ l e d above . But General Taylor didbring up the need for some coordinated operational plan i n his talks withPresident Diem . Diem's r es pons e is :::escribed in a cable to Washingtonby Ambassador Nolting :Taylor several times stre3sed importance of overallplan -- military, poli t ica.l , ecc::1omic, psychological , etc .

for dealing with guerri l las. D ~ e m tended avoid clear response th is suggestion but fine.=-ly indicated that he hasa new strategic plan of his ovl::1 . Since i t was not very clearin spite efforts to dra"T him 0 1 : . ~ Ivhat th is plan i s , Ta.ylorasked him to le t us have a copy in vTri t ing . WE. Thompson ' s CounterRroposals

President Diem may have e ~ ' " l vlhistling in the dark about a newplan of his own . I t is l ikely , howe-,cer, that he I'Tas already conversantwith the ideas of a new high level 6.:::visor "Tho had been in Saigon forseveral weeks and whose .approach to prosecuting th e war he would soon endorse official ly as his own . The ad-,-isor vTas RGK Thompson, a Bri t ish civ i lservant who had come from the posit ion of Permanent Secretary of Defensei n Malaya . Thompson ' s Brit ish Advis cry Mission VTas in Saigon in responseto Diem ' s r e ~ u e s t for experienced t t ~ r d country nationals to assist himin his counter insurgent operations . There had been some i ni t i a l U.S. obj ection to British "advice without r espons ib i l i ty ," but fears had beentemporarily alla.yed when i t was agreed that Thompson ' s charter would belimited to civic action matters .

Thompson provided Diem his i n i t i a l "appreciation" (or , i n U. S.terminology, "estimate of the si tuation") in October 1961. 22.1 His assessment was well received by the Presi c.ent , I'rho asked him to fo l lov7 i t up witha specif ic plan . Thompson ' s response , an outline plan for the pacif ica t ion of th e Delta area, was given to the ~ r e s i d e n t on 13 November . Thus ,Thompson was in the process of ar t iculat ing one potentiall y comprehensivestrategic approach a t th e same time that the U. S. was deeply involved infashioning a major new phase in U. S.-Gv}T re l ations in which major new U. S.a id would be t ied to Diem ' s acceptance of specified reforms and , inferentially,t o his willingness to pursue some agreed, coordinated strategy . Thompson ' splan was, in short, a potential r iva l to the American- advanced plans repre sented by the CIP and the geographically phased IVlAAG plan of September 1961.

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In order to assess the similari t ies and differences between t:reU. S. plans and that advanced by the Brit ish Advisory Mission , i t is neces-sary to summarize Thompson ls argument and proposals. Like Taylor (withwhom he talked and to whom he gave a copy of his i n i t i a l "apprecj.ation"a t the la t ter l s request) , Thompson saw the VC objective to be one of pol i t i -ca l denouement by combined mili tary and poli t ical action rather than a mili t ary takeover of the entire nation . Like McGarr and the other U.S. militaryadvisors, he recognized the probabil i ty and danger of VC attempts to con-t r ol the unpopulated areas and to us e them both as a base form which to pro j ect an image of pol i t ica l strength and as secure areas from vlhich (inthe case of War Zone D, northeast of Saigon ) to threaten th e capital .But unlike the U:S : m i l i t a r ~ ~ d v i s o r s , Thompson viewed the primarj threatt o be to the polltJ..cal s tab l l l ty of th e populated rura l areas . 36 Consequently, he regarded McGarr I s proposed in i i a l operation in Wa,r Zone Dto be a step in the wrong direction .

The main government target, Thompson argued , should no t be simplythe destruction of VC forces . Rather, i t should be to offer an attract iveand constructive alternative to communist appeals . This could only be doneby empha,sizj.ng national reconstruction and development in the populatedrura l areas . To do so would r equire extensive and str ingent secu.rity measures, to be sure, but these measures required primarily police ratherthan regular milj.tary forces . The police could establish a close rapportwith th e populace; the army could not . The army should have the missionto keep the VC off balance by mobile action in order to prevent insurgenta t tacks on the l imited areas in which GVN would concentrate i t s i ni t ia lpacification efforts . J1I

This l ine of argwnent vIas more ful ly developed i n Thompson s draftp lan fo r the pacification of the De l ta area, given to President Diem on11 November.]I The objective of th e plan was to win l oyalt i es r atherthan to k i l l i nsurgents . For that reason Thompson selected a populous areawith r elat ively l i t t l e VC main force act ivi ty . The thrust of his proposalwa s that "c lear and hold " operations should r eplace "search and destroy"sweeps . ARVN might be used to protect the vi l lages while th e vi l lages wereorganizing to protect themselves and mobile ARVN forces must be availableto re inforce local defense units , but the process should be abandoned of" sweeping" through an area - - and then l eaving i t . The peasants must begiven the assurance of physical securi ty so that economic and social improvements , the r ea l object of the plan, could procced without in terruption.

The means by which the villagers would be protected was the II stra tegic hamle t ," a l ightly guarded vil lage because i t was -- by definjtion -in a re la t ively low r isk area . More heavily defended centers , ca,lled "de_fended hamlets" and involving more relocation, Ivould be employed i n areasunder more VC influence, part icular ly along th e Cambodian border .

To control this effort i n the De l ta , Thompson r ecommended thatthe ARVN I I I Corps Headquarters be r einforced with paramilitary and civ i lcomponents, relieved of i t s r esponsibil i ty for th e area around and northof Saigon , and function under th e immediate supervision of t he NationalSecurity Council - - presided over by Pr esident Diem . Th e province chiefs ,11 TOP SECRET - Sensitive


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a lr eady under Diem ' s personal direction, would be responsible on a l lemergency matters to the r einforced I I I Corps Headquarters (to be calledthe Combined Headquarters), but continue as before with respect to r outineadministra t ion . J2/

Thompson presented th is Delta plan as a program of wide potential :. . . I t should lead by stages to a reorganization ofth e government machinery for directing and coordinatinga l l action against th e communists and to the production ofan overall strategic operational plan for the country asa whole dehning responsibil i t ies, tasks and prior i t ies .At the same time it wil l lead to th e establishment of a stat icsecuri ty framewo rk which can be developed eventually intoa National Police force into which can b e incorporated as ingle securi ty in te l l igence organization for the direction

and coordinat ion of a l l intel l igence act ivi t ies against th ecommunists . I agree with Your Excellency that i t would beto o disruptive a t the present moment to try to achieve theseimmediately and that they should be developed gradually .Using a medical analogy, the remedy should be clinicalr ather than surgical .

III . DEVELOPING A CONSENSUS AMONG THE ADVISORSA. In i t i a l Reaction of U. S. Military Adviso rs

I t is not diff icul t to imagine the shocked r eaction t o Thomp son ' sproposals , especial ly in U. S. military circles . In fact , one need notimagine them; General McGarr ha s recorded a detailed rejoinder to Thompson ' sproposals . He was , to begin with, upset about th e lack of prior coordina t ion :

Following Mr . Thompson ' s medical analogy . . .we have th ecase of a doctor cal led in for consultation on a clinicalcas e , actually performing an amputation without consul tingthe r esident physician - - and without being required toa ssume th e overall responsibili ty for th e patient .General McGarr ' s unhappiness with Thompson was not simply a caseof injured feelings . He had four r e la ted categories of disagreements with

th e plan proposed by the British Advisory Mission . Firs t , Thompson ' se c o ~ m e n d e d command arrangements , i f adopted, would demo l ish th e prospectof a unitary chain of command within ARVN , an obj ective tOY-lard which McGarrha d been working for over a year . Additionally, the Thompson proposa l swould l eave Diem as the ultimate manager of an operation dealing with onlya portion (th e Delta ) of RVN. Th e el imination of practices such as thishad been an expl ic i t ot j ective of th e entire U. S. advisory effor t for al ong time .



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Second, the proposed priori ty in th e Delta clashed with MCGarr ' spriori t ies which placed War Zone D f i r s t , the area around Saigon second,and the Delta th ird . There was a lack of unanimity among th e U. S. advisorsabout the re la t ive importance of the War Zone D operation but the military,in particular, were looking for an important operation to help the (hope-fully) revitalized ARVN demonstrate i t s offensive sp i r i t and mobile capabil i-t ies . This desire gave r is e to th e third and fourth objections -- or fears.

Th e II static securi ty frame"Tork" in th e villages to which Thompsonre ferred struck Genera l McGarr as an unwarranted dOlmgrading of the needfor a sizeable conventional military force to play an important role inpacif icat ion. Thompson's stated desire to emphasize police forces in l ieuof regular military forces was regarded by the U.S. military advisory chiefas unrealistic -- a t ransferra l of Malayan experience to a locale in whichthe exist ing tools of policy were very different .

Related to th is obj ection "Tas a f inal set of disagreements.Thompson had wanted to go slowly and to le t a ne"T GVN organization growfrom the effort . The U. S. military advisory chief also wanted to go slow'lybut not that SlO"Tly . Not only would the Viet Cong not wait, it was simplyunsound policy not to use the tools a t hand. I t would not do to reduce theARVN and increase police forces while th e VC continued th ier successes .I t was necessary, in sum , to act in a l imited area but to act ~ u i c k l y . Thompson ' s recommendations did not look to ~ u i c k action, emphasized the wrongarea, were designed to emphasize th e wrong operational agency, and proposedunacceptable c o r o ~ a n d l i nes .I t is important to note that in 'spi te of these explicit disagree-

ments there "Tere broad areas of apparent agreement between Thompson andhis U.S. counterparts . (Apparent, because th e "areas of agreement" concealed 'differences, too .) The U.S . MAAG was amenabl e to the development of strate-gic hamlets, General McGarr claimed . Indeed, MAAG ' s long, diffuse doc-t r inal "handbook" for advisors in the field did devote three pages - - withoutany particular emphasis -- to the "secure vil lage concept ." 44/ MAAG didnot stress the centra l i ty of s trategic h a r o ~ e t s per se, bu t neither didThompson . Strategic hamlets were to Thompson a ,.:ray station enroute tohi s real objective -- winning the loyalty of the rural peasants . Thiswas apparently compatible with the s e ~ u e n t i a l steps to pacitication out-lined in MAAG ' s own Geographically Pha se d Counterinsurgency Plan . I f thecompeting approaches of the U. S. and British advisors had not been madecompatible, th ere was , at l east , some agreed ground from which to launchth e effort to make them compatible.

B. Reactions in WashingtonThat such ground existed was fortunate, for Thompson ' s evolutionaryplan was not only finding a warm reception at the Presidential Palace,i t was also winning an attentive ear in Washington. As already mentioned,Thompson talked with General Taylor during the la t te r ' s October 1961 missionto Saigon and provided Taylor a copy of the in i t i a l British "appreciation ."



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Copi es of the Thompson memorandmfi on the Delta were also forwarded toTaylor a t the l a t t e r ' s request. Th en in January 1962 , Thompson, againr esponding to Taylor's request, sent the l at ter a long l e t t e r outlininghis views. In l ess than a month, General Taylor could present to President Kennedy a plan ent itled "A Strategic Concept for South Vietnam" byRoger Hilsman which was an unabashed restatement of most of Thompson ' sma jo r points and to\vard which President Kennedy had, not incidental ly,a lr eady expressed a favorable disposit ion.Hilsman ' s "stra tegic concept" avowedly flowed from three basicprinciples : tha t the problem in Vietnam presented by the VC was pol i t icalrather than military in i t s essence; that an effective counterinsurgencyplan must provide the people and vil lages with protection and physicalsecuri ty; and that counter guerri l la forces must adopt th e same ta cticsas those use d by the guerri l la himself.To t ranslate these principles into operational real i ty, Hilsmancal led for "s t rategic vil lages" and "d efended villages" a la Thompson,with f i rs t priori ty to the most populous areas; i . e . , the Delta and in thevicini ty of Hue. 48/ ARVN would, much as in Thompson ' s proposal, securethe in i t ia l effort , when necessary, and be employed to keep the VC offbalance in those areas already under Viet Cong control. The plan envisageda three-phase process by which GVN control would progressively be expandedfrom th e leas t heavily VC-penetrated provinces wi th large populat ions(phase I ) , into the more heavily penetrated population centers (phase I I ) ,and f inal ly into the areas along the I,aotian and Cambodian borders (phaseI I I ) . ! t1 / Hilsman eschewed us e of the "o il spot" analogy but the processand rat ionale he put forth were the same . His plan moved "stra tegic v i l lages " to a place of prominence greater than that in Thomp son 's Delta plan

and far in excess of the offhanded acceptance which had thus far beenafforded them by U. S. military advisors . Strategic hamJ.ets were no t theheart of the Hilsman plan -- civic action was that - - but they were the symb cl ,the easily recogni zable, easily grasped in i t i a l step by which GVN could begin, following Hilsman ' s second principle, to "provide th e people and th evi l lage s with protection and physical securi ty ." zY

C. The Advisors Reach AgreementThompson's bas ic ideas were gaining wide dissemination a t thehighest level within the U. S. government in early 1962 . What of his r el a t ions with the U. S. MAAG in Saigon? These had been significantly improvedas the resll1t of a meeting between Thompson, Ambassador Nolting, and

British Ambassador Hohler . Thompson agreed to revise his paper so as toremove the objection to his proposed command arrangements. AmbassadorNolting r epor ted that Thompson 'i'laS nOlV' working "closely and amicably" withMAAG. This took care of one of MCGarr ' s objections . Thompson hadapparently decided, too, to allow the issue to drop for th e time be ingof police primacy in pacification vis -a-vis ARVN . I t was not, after al l ,a change that could be made quickly; President Diem was convinced thatsome s tar t was needed to save his administration . Tha,t had been his reason, after al l , in reluctantly invit ing increased American participationin the war.

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Secretary McNama.ra played an important role in disposing of s t i l lanother issue in dispute -- that of ,;here to begin . In mid-December 1961,af ter President Kennedy had decided to adopt essentia l ly a l l of GeneralTaylor ' s November r e c o m ~ e n d a t i o n s except the introduction of major U.S .forces into Vietnam, Secretary McNamara met in Honolulu with th e U. S.principal s in Vietnam to discuss futuxe plans. A central question was thatof what could be done in th e short term future. The Sec retary of Defensemade i t clear that RVN had "number one prior i ty ." 5JJ... McNamara urg edconcentration on one province : "I ' l l guarantee i t7 the money and equipmenyprovided you have a plan ba s ed on one province . Take one place, sweep i tand hold i t in a plan ." 2J./ Or , put another W8.y, le t us demonstrate thati n some place, in some way, we can achieve demonstrable gains .

General McGarr , immediately upon his return to Saigon, wrote toSecretary Thuan and passed on this proposal :I would l ike to suggest that you may wi sh to set asideone specif ic area, say a province, and us e i t as a "testarea, " in establishing this type "pacif icat ion infrastruc ture . " My thinking is th8.t a l l the various elements of thisanti-VC groundwork be designated i mmed ia te ly by your government and t rained as a team or te ams for th e actual reoccupat ion and holding of the designated commlmist inf i l tra tedarea wh en i t has been cleared by RVN.A.F military action . 2!3J

Such teams would embrace, McGarr suggested, police, intelligence , f inancial ,psychological, agricul tural , medical, civic action, and civi l pol i t icalfunctions . 55/IV. THE ADVISORS "SELL" DIEM (OR VICE-VERSA).

A. Where to Begin?GVN did indeed have a province in mind . I t was not a Delta province ,however . Nor 1-laS i t a province re la t ively secure from VC inf i l t rat ion .

~ u i t e to th e contrary, Binh Duong Province , extending north and northwestof Saigon, had been heavily inf i l t rated. I ts main communications axis(National Highw'ay 13, extending north\-Tard from Saigon into Cambodia ) sl iceddi r ectly between War Zone D and War Zone C. The province was crossedby important routes of communications , l iaison , and supply between twoi nsurgen redoubts . Hardly th e logical place to begin , one might say,but "logic " was being driven by events and desires more than by abstractr easoning .

One desire was the widely held wish to do something concreteand productive as a symbol of U. S. determination and GVN vi ta l i ty . Anotherdesire was GVN ' s ,vish to commit the Amer icans to support of Diem ' s government on terms which would be in fact acceptable to that government andwould -- equally important -- aEpear to be U. S. support for GVN-initiatedactions . I f one were Vietnamese one might reason that Binh Duong was an



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ar ea of unquestionable strategic importance -- and one in which GVN hadalready ini t ia ted some pacification efforts . I f th e Americans wish toconcentrate in one province and i f they are willing to underwrite the effortwith r esources , why not begin in an important strategic ar ea where work .is already underway?

GVN had i n i t i a ted , in August 1961, a "Rural Reconstruction Cam-paign" in th e Eastern Region of South Vietnam to secure the provinces ofTay Ninh, Binh Duong, and Phuoc TUy. 2fJ Most of the effort prj_or toDec ember 1961 had bee n concentrated in the Cu Chi Distr ict of Binh Duong .Xom Hue Hamlet of Tan An Hoi was , during December , in the process of beingfor t i f i ed as a strategic hamlet . 211 General McGarr was under the impression that " conSiderable progress " had already been made in these threeprovince s in the establishment of the GVN village level act ivi t ies sonecessary to winning popular support . 2/

In mid-January General McGarr met (just prior to his departurefor Honolulu ) with President Di em and Secretary Thuan to dis cuss pacificat ion plans . As McGarr told Secretary McNamara , Diem stressed that theIf.tAAG-endorsed military operation in War Zone D might merely close thestring on an empty bag . Such a failure would be detrimental to ARVN morale .Besides, the President observed echoing Thompson, "sweeps" solved nothing;the problem was to bold an area and to separate the VC from th e res t of thepopulace . Diem preferred a concentrated effort in Binh Duong, a heavilyinf i l t rated province , close to Saigon, of great strategic importance , andin ''i'hich only 10 of 46 villages were under GVN control -- bu t in which thegroundwork for a sound governnlent infrastructure had already be en la id .Th e di scussions a t th e Secretary of Defense ' s Conference in

Honolulu turned on whether or not the War Zone D operation offered morehope f or a concrete gain than a "single province" pacification scheme .McNamara concluded that i t did not. General McGarr dissented mildly fromthe se l ec t ion of Binh Duong . He would have favored Phuoc Tuy (wh ere U.S.troops were scheduled to land i f a decision we r e ever made to commit them ).But Bi nh Duong was GVN ' s plan and the " l imited partners " finally agreedto back Diem ' s preferred attempt . 2/ Thus, th e U. S. cmae to a roundaboutdecision t o support as a " test" of vlha t would l ater be called the "strategichamJ_et program" an operation about whose details they kne'\v l i t t le , in anarea that a l l recognized to be diff icul t , because i t allegedly r epresenteda long-sought example of GVN i ni t i a t ive in planning and civi l-mil i tarypreparation . Much of th e public i mage of th e strategic hamlet program wasto be established by th i s operation , as i t turned out . I t s name was"Operation Sunri se ., t But i t was not -- U.S. desires to th e contrary --the only strategic hamlet effort to be carr i ed fOY'\'i'ard during this per i od .I t was only one of several - - and several grew very quickly in to many .

B. Concurrent GVN Activi tyI t has a l ready been suggested that President Diem responded wi thsome enthusiasm to the early proposals from Thompson ' s Brit i sh AdvisoryMission. In mid-February 1962 , President Diem approved orally Thompso n ' s



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"Del ta Pacif icat ion Plan" and said he would l ike to se e i t executed without delay. Earl ier , on 3 February, he had created by presidentialdecree the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Strategic Hamlets (IMCSH),comprising the heads of various ministr ies (Defense, Interior , Education,Civic Action, Rural Affairs, etc . ) . 62/ The IMCSH was, as i t s membershipindicates , a coordinating body designed to give national direction andguidance to the program . I ts importance is not in i t s work - - for i tapparently did very l i t t l e -- but as an indicator of Diem's early 1962thinking of strategic hamlets as a national program and of the centralrole which his brother , Ngo Dim1 Nhu , would play in th is program .1 ~ u was the rea l driving force behind GVN ' s uneven but discerniblemovement toward adoption of the strategic hamlet theme as a unifying concept in i t s pacification efforts . In the early period under discussionhe masked his central role , however. He was no t announced as th e Chairman

of the IMCSH (nobody was), but the committee was responsible to him. 63/He did not, hO'trever, lead i t actively . As two American observers remarkedat th e time, "Nhu seems to have consulted th e committee seldom and to haveshared his policy-making power with i t even less frequently ." 64/C. Early Signs of GVN Expectations

But although brother Nhu was behind th e scenes in la te 1961 andearly 1962, an occasional fleeting glimpse of his thinking and the directionin which he was hea,ding has s t i l l managed to show through. A CIA reportfrom Saigon summarized Nhu ' s instructions to a dozen province chiefs fromthe Delta in a meeting held on 14 December 1961. Primary emphasis was tobe placed on the strategic hamlet program, Nhu said, and this program wasto be coupled with a "social revolution" against "Viet-Nam ' s three enemies :divisive forces, low standard of l iving, and communism ." 65/ The CIATask Force - Vietnam observed , in forwarding th is report , that Nhu ' s "socialrevolution and s trategic hamlets appear to be fuzzy concepts with l i t t levalv.e in the f ight against the Communists ." f!J

No doubt these concepts seemed fuzzy a t th e end of 1961. Butwithin another twelve months, as events would prove, they would be widelyrecognized as the twin spearheads of GVN's counterinsurgent effort , fuzzyor not . The s t ra teg ic hamlet program would have broad support within theU.S. g o v e r ~ ~ e n t and financia l resources to underpin that support. The"social revolution" to which Nhu referred in December 1961 would be surfacedas Diem ' s "personalism" drive. The important thing for th e present analysisis that a l l of th e expectations of the several part icipant groups -- bothU.S. and GVN -- were identif.iable by very early 1962 a t the la tes t , and thatth e concept of the strategic hamlet prograrn in the broad sense had beenfully adumbrated. The skeleton -- the rat ionale -- was complete; the body - operational programs -- had not yet taken form. Each group could, however,work tOvlard construction of a s l ight ly different body (and for differingrea sons ) and claim ,v i th some plausibil i ty to be 'Ivorking from the sameskeleton .

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V. DIFFERING PERSPECTIVES AND EXPECTATIONSThree somewhat different views may be categorized which are of interestto the present inq,uiry: those of the U. S. military advisors, of the U. S.

pol i t i cal leadership, and of the Diem government ' s leaders . Such general ization s are admittedly risky and easily overdrawn ; ther e were, of course,differ ences betvleen th e perceptions and expectations of, say, the U. S.military advisors . For example , those farthest from Saigon tended to beless patient -- 'Ivith Diem and in expecting results -- than were those closerto the area of operations . St i l l , discernible differences of outlook andexpectations may be said to represent the prevailing views in each of thesethree groups .A. U. S. Military Advisors

The U.S. military advisors mistrusted arguments which stressedthe Vietnamese struggle as essential ly poli t ical rather than military .They were q,uite willing to concede that the struggle was multi-di.mensionalbut they feared inst inct ively any l in e of reasoning which might appear toargue that mili tary considerations were relat ively unimpo r tant in Vietnam .So, too, they were wary of schemes which might lead ARVN to perpetuate i t sdefensive t ac t ical stance . Both dangers were present in the strategichamlet program . The same military advisors were more forceful than othersin stressing the need for the Diem regime to rat ional ize i t s c o m ~ a n d arrange ments and to plan comprehensively and in detai l from the highest to lmrestlevels . Their operational interest concentrated on making ARVN no t justmore mobile but more aggressive . Their creed , deve l oped through years ofexper ience and training (or vicarious experience ) was to "cl ose with anddestroy the enemy ." One could expect them, then, to be more than willingto turn over the jo b of s ta t ic defense to the CDC and CG at the ear l ies topportunity, to keep a weather eye ou t for opportunities to engage majorVC format i ons in decisive ba t t le , and to chafe under th e painful ly slowevolutionary proces s which was implicit even in their own 1961 geographicallyphased plan .

B. U.S. Pol i t ical LeadershipThe D. S. poli t ical l eadership , and to varying degrees the l eadersi n the Saigon Embassy and in USOM, were more attuned to the pol i t ica lproblems -- both with r espect to GVN-U.S . r elat ions and t o the problemof winning broad support among th e Vietnamese for the Diem administration .This made members of this group i nherently more sympathetic t o proposalssuch as th e Thompson pl an for the Delta than they were , for i nstance , toi ncreasing ARVN ' s size and capabili t ies . They found compe l l ing the logicof analyses such as Hilsman ' s which cut to the poli t ical root rather thant r eating only th e military symptoms . One suspects -- though documentationwould never be found to support i t - - that they were attracted by an argument which did suggest some hope for "demilitarizing " the wa r , de - emphasiz i ngU. S. operational participation, and increasing GVN ' s abil i ty to so l ve i t s

ovlD. interna l problems using primarily i t s own human resources .18

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C. President DiemNgo Dinh Diem's perspective and expectations were the most

d ifferent of a l l . U.S. groups differed in dregre; Diem's e A ~ e c t a t i o n s weredifferent in kind. He vmnted, f i r s t of 8.11, to obtain uneCluivocal U. S.support, not just to his nation but to his administration . I t was e s s e n t i a l ~ in his eyes , that th is support not cc:npromise his authority or Vietnamesesovereignty. He did not want to give credence to communist claims thathe was a puppet of the U.S., on one tand, or concentrate the coercive instruments of power in the hand of poc.;entia l antagonists, on the other.

A r evealing assessment of Diem ' s frame of mind is provided byAmbassador Nolting . Diem invited increased U.S. aid and U. S. participat ion because he feared that , especia2.1y vith an impending settlement inLaos, South Vietnam would come under increasing communist pressures.I f Diem ' s government could not win o-rer these pressures -- and Diem fearedi t could not -- i t had only the c h o i ~ e of going down fighting or of beingoverthrovTn by a coup . Thus, in reCluesting addit ional U. S. help, Diem had"adopted an expedient which runs ag2.inst his O"Tn convictions, and he isapparently willing to accept the att2ndant diminution of his own stature. as an independent and self-rel iant nc.tional leader ." J}

But when Ambassador Nolting presented to Diem the U. S. Cluid proCluO for i t s " l imited partnership," this apparent acceptance of decreasedstature and independence suddenly s e e ~ e d less apparent . j Then, asNolting reported, President Diem feared th e reaction even among his owncabinet aides . 69/ Secretary Thuan, in whom Diem did confide, said thatth e President was brooding over the fa.ct that th e U. S. was asking greatconcessions of GVN in th e realm of i ts sovereignty in exchange for littleaddit ional help . 121 Diem argued that U. S. influence over his government , once i t was known, would play directly into th e communists ' hands.The f i r s t priori ty task, he added, ,;c.s to give the people securi ty, notto make the government more popular. To try i t the other way around wasto place th e cart before the horse. 71/ .

Diem sa"l himself caught in a dilemma in which he was doomed i f hedid not get outside assistance and doomed i f he got i t only a t the priceof surrendering his in dependence . To him the t r ick was to get the U.S.committ ed without surrendering hi s independence. One possible solutionlay in gett ing U.S. material aid for a program that would be almost whollyGVN-implemented . The strategic h a m ~ e t program offered a convenient vehic le for this purpose and one which ,;as also appealing for other reasons .I t put achieving securi ty before "liL1.ing loyalty -- in an operational context in vlhich i t "las diff icult to di:::ferentiate between security for ther ural populace and control of that populace, since many of th e actionsto achieve one were almost id entical to the acts to realize the other .

D. The Central IssueThe U. S., for i t s part , was asking Diem to forego independence by

accepting the wisdom of th e American r ecommendations for reform . The19 TOP SECRET - Sensitive


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Later the same month, the U.S. Inter-Agency Committee for ProvinceRehabili tation concurred in this plan (with minor reservations ) as abasis for planning and ut i l izat ion of U.S. assistance . 75/ By October,the Diem government had made the Strategic Hamlet Program the explici tfocus and unifying concept of i t s ' pacificat ion effort . The government controlled Times of Viet Nam devoted an entire issue to !l1962 : The Yearof Strategic Hamlets .!I 76/ Ngo Dinh Nhu was unveiled as the !larchitectand prj.rne mover!l of th e program which was the Vietnamese answer tocommunist strategy. As Nhu proclaimed : !lStrategic hamlets seek toassure the securi ty of the people in order that the success of the pol i t ical , social , and military revolution might be assured by the enthusiast icmovement of sol idari ty and sel f - sufficiency ." 77/ President Diem hadear l ier put the same thought to an American vis i tor in clearer words:

The importance of the strategic hamlets goes beyond theconcept of hamlet sel f defense . They are a means to ins t i tutebasic democracy in Vietnam. Through the Strategic HamletProgram, the government intends to give back to the hamletthe r ight of self-government with i t s own charter and systemof community law. This "l-Till realize the ideas of the consti tut ion on a local scale which the people can understand. 78/By this time, too, inf luential American circ les regarded theStrategic Hamlet Program as the shorthand designation for a process whichrepresented a sensible and sound GVN effort . Roger Hilsman ha d said soin February to President Kennedy, and found the la t ter highly receptive.He continued to say so . 79/ As he advised Assistant Secretary of StateAvere l l Harriman in la te 1962, "The government of Vietnam has f inal lBeveloped , and is now acting upon, an effect ive strategic concept.!I ..52/Even so lukewarm an enthusiast as the CJCS, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer

could report that " the Strategic Hamlet Program promises solidbenefit s , and may well be the vi ta l key to success of the pacificat ionprogram. !I 81/The public rec ord also shows early support from high U.S. off ic ia lsfor th e Strategic Hamlet Program and recognition of i t s cent ral role inGVN!s pacificat ion campaign. Speaking in la te April 1962, Under Secretaryof State George W Ball , commented favorably in the progressive develop

ment of strategic hamlets throughout RVN as a method of combatinginsurgency and as a means of bringing the entire nation "under controlof the government." 82/ Secretary McNamara told members of the press ,upon his return to Washington from a Pacific meeting in July 1962, thatth e Strategic Hamlet Program was the !lbackbone of President Diem !s .program for countering subversion directed against his state .1f 83/

I t i s reasonable to conclude from the evidence that official U. S.awareness kept abreast of Diem ! s progressive adoption of the StrategicHamlet Program as the Ifunifying conceptlf in his counterinsurgent effor t .The same off ic ia ls were constantly bombarded by a series of r epo r tsfrom a variety of sources describing the progress of the hamlet programand assessing i t s efficacy .

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TOP SECRET - SensitiveB. 1I0peration Sunrise ll

The f i r s t operational effor t in which the U.S. had a hand,1I0perat ion Sunrise,1I got under way in Binh Duong Province on 22 March 1962when work commenced on Ben Tuong, the f i r s t of five hamlets to be con-structed for relocated peasants in th e Ben Cat Distr ict in and around theLai Khe rubber plantation. ( See Map 2. ) Phase I of the operation - - themilitary clearing phase - - was condu.cted by forces of th e 5th ARVN Divi-sion reinforced by ranger companies, a reconnaissance company, t' iw rein-forced CG companies, and a psychological "Tarfare company . The Viet Congsimply melted into the jungles.

With the Viet Cong out of th e way -- at leas t for the time be;Lngthe :::elocation and construction of th e new hamlet commenced . The newprogram got off to a bad s tar t . The government was able to persuade onlyseventy families to volunteer for resettlement. The 135 other families inthe half dozen se t tl ements "rere herded forcibly from the i r homes . 84/Li 't t le of the $300,000 in local currency provided by USOM had reached thepeasants ; the money was being withheld unt i l th e reset t led families indi-cated they Imuld not bolt the new hamlet. Some of them came ,v ith most ofthe i r meager belongings. Others had l i t t l e but the clothe s on their backs.Their old dwellings -- and many of thei r possessions - - were burned behindthem. 85/ Only 120 males of an age to bear arms were found among the morethan 200 families - - i n d i c a t i n ~ very clearly that a ~ a r ~ e . n u m ~ e r had epneover to the VC, whether by cholce or as a resul t of lntlIDldat lon. 86/

. C. Other Early ProgramsProgress in Binh Duong continued a t a steady pace, beset by dif f i cult ies . By midsummer 2900 persons had been regrouped into three strategichamlets. 87/ Elsewhere , the pace quickened. Although th e Delta Plan, as

a coordinated effort , had not been implemented by th e summer of 1962,Secretary McNamara found in Mayan agg ressive effor t under way without U.S.help near Ca Mao:Here the commander of the 31st Infantry Regiment had goneinto an area 95% controlled by the VC, declared martial I m,r, andr esettled 11 , 000 people ( some under duress) i n 9 strategic hamlets ,while f ightin g the VC wherever he found them. Since inceptionof the program , none of his vi l lages have been attacked, and thefreedom from VC taxa t io n ( extortion ) i s proving most appealing tothe people. I t i s the commander fs hope ( doubtless optimistic)that he will be able to turn th e whole area over to th e civil guardand sel f defense corps iv i thin 6 months. 88/

Thes e resettlement efforts in areas which had been under VC dominationwere not the extent of the early hamlet ttprogram,tt however . Manyex i s t i ng hamlets and vil lages were ttfort if ied tt in one degree or a..YJ.other earlyin 1962 follmung no discernible pattern . This appears to have been thenatura l product of the varied response to Nhu ' s i njunction to emphasizes t rategic hamlets. In April, th e GV"N Ministry of the Inte

pentagon papers part iv b 2

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