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JOHNSTON VS REPUBLICFACTS:

petitioner-appellant Isabel Valdes Johnston, filed a petition for the adoption of oneAna Isabel Henriette Antonia Concepcion Georgiana, 2 years and 10 months old

The petition shows that petitioner-appellant is 48 years old, married to RaymondArthur Johnston, Filipino

that the couple are childless; that the consent of the mother Superior of the orphanage and the husband of

petitioner-appellant was obtained.

Notice of the hearing of the petition was issued and duly the petition is granted by the lower court, declaring the child Ana Isabel HenrietteAntonia Concepcion Georgiana freed from all legal obligations and obedience and

maintenance with respect to its natural parents and is, to all legal intents andpurposes, the child of the petitioner, with the corresponding change of surnameVALDES, which is the surname of petitioner."

The petitioner-appellant filed a motion, praying that the surname given to the minorbe "Valdes Johnston", instead of "Valdes" only,

but this motion was denied by the lower court in its order of Hence, this appeal. Petitioner-appellant argues that since she is now using the surname of her husband

and because that is the surname, (Valdes Johnston) she used in filing the petition inthe present case, and under which she is now known to all her relatives, friends andacquaintances, she had ceased to be known by her maiden surname, and the lowercourt should have decreed that the minor whom she adopted should be allowed tobear the surname she is now using.

She also argues that the use of the surname "Valdes" by the adopted child, asprescribed by the lower court, will create the impression that she is the illegitimatechild of petitioner- appellant begotten before her marriage, a situation which ishumiliating to both adopter and adopted.

The Solicitor General in reply argues that while it is true that a married woman ispermitted to add to her surname her husband's surname, the fact remains thatappellant's surname is Valdes and not Johnston; that a married woman has a surnameof her own to which may be added her husband's surname if she so chooses; that ifthe minor be permitted to use the surname Valdes Johnston, much confusion wouldresult because the public would be misled into believing that she was adopted byappellant's husband also, which is not true in this case.

ISSUE: WON the child may use the surname JOHNSTONHELD: NO

We agree with the decision of the lower court authorizing or prescribing the use of thesurname Valdes by the adopted child.

The provision of law (Art. 341, par. 4, Civil Code) which entitles the adopted minor tothe use of the adopter's surname, refers to the adopter's own surname and not to hersurname acquired by virtue of marriage.

Petitioner-appellant's real surname is Valdes and not Johnston, and as she made theadoption singly without the concurrence of her husband, and not as a marriedwoman, her name as adopter was her maiden name.

The adoption created a personal relationship between the adopter and the adopted,and the consent of Raymond Johnston, Isabel Valdes' husband, to the adoption by herindividually, did not have the effect of making him an adopting father, so as to entitlethe child to the use of Johnston's own surname.

Since adoption gives the person adopted the same rights and duties as if he were alegitimate child of the adopter (Art. 341, par. 1, Civil Code), much confusion wouldindeed result,

if the minor child herein were allowed to use the surname of the spouse who did notjoin in the adoption.

to allow the minor to adopt the surname of the husband of the adopter, wouldmislead the public into believing that she had also been adopted by the husband,which is not the case.

And when later, questions of successional rights arise, the husband's consent to theadoption might be presented to prove that he had actually joined in the adoption.

this Court is inclined to apply strictly the provision of the Civil Code to the effect thatan adopted child use the surname of the adopter himself or herself, and not thatwhich is acquired by marriage.

FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the order of the court below prescribing the use of thesurname "Valdes" by the adopted minor Ana Isabel Henriette Antonia Concepcion

Georgiana, is hereby affirmed

LLANETA VS AGRAVAFACTS:

Teresita's mother, one Atanacia Llaneta, was once married to Serafin Ferrer withwhom she had but one child named Victoriano Ferrer.

In 1942 Serafin Ferrer died, and about four years later Atanacia had relations with another man out of which Teresita

was born. Shortly after Teresita's birth, Atanacia brought her and Victoriano to Manila where all

of them lived with Atanacia's mother-in-law, Victoria vda. de Ferrer. Teresita was raised in the household of the Ferrers, using the surname of Ferrer in all

her dealings and throughout her schooling. When she was about twenty years old, she applied for a copy of her birth certificate in

Irosin, Sorsogon, where she was born, as she was required to present it in connectionwith a scholarship granted to her by the Catholic Charities.

It was then that she discovered that her registered surname is Llaneta not Ferrer and that she is the illegitimate child of Atanacia and an unknown father.

On the ground that her use thenceforth of the surname Llaneta, instead of Ferrerwhich she had been using since she acquired reason, would cause untold difficultiesand confusion, Teresita petitioned the court below for change of her name fromTeresita Llaneta to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer.

After trial duly had, the respondent judge denied her petition; hence the present recourse. ISSUE: WON PETITIONER CAN USE THE SURNAME FERRER

HELD: YES The petitioner has established that she has been using the surname Ferrer for as long

as she can remember; that all her records, in school and elsewhere, put her name down as Teresita Ferrer; that her friends and associates know her only as Teresita Ferrer; and that even the late Serafin Ferrer's nearest of kin (who apparently have kept Teresita's

illegitimacy a secret from her) have tolerated and still approve of her use of thesurname Ferrer.

a sudden shift at this time by the petitioner to the name Teresita Llaneta (in order toconform to that appearing in her birth certificate) would result in confusion among thepersons and entities she deals with and entail endless and vexatious explanations ofthe circumstances of her new surname.

In her official dealings, this would likewise mean a lifelong fending with the necessaryaffidavits.

Moreover, it is a salutary law that would allow Teresita, inspite of her illegitimatebirth, to carry on in society without her unfortunate status being bandied about atevery turn. 2

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The respondent court places reliance on the doctrine, expounded in three decisions ofthis Court, that disallows such change of name as would give the false impression offamily relationship.

The principle remains valid but only to the extent that the proposed change of namewould in great probability cause prejudice or future mischief to the family whosesurname it is that is involved or to the community in general.

In the case at bar, however, the late Serafin Ferrer's widowed mother, Victoria, andhis two remaining brothers, Nehemias and Ruben, have come forward in earnestsupport of the petition.

Adequate publication of the proceeding has not elicited the slightest opposition fromthe relatives and friends of the late Serafin Ferrer.

Clearances from various Government agencies show that Teresita has a spotlessrecord.

And the State (represented by the Solicitor General's Office), which has an interest inthe name borne by every citizen within its realm for purposes of identification,interposed no opposition at the trial after a searching cross-examination, of Teresitaand her witnesses.

Whether the late Serafin Ferrer, who died some five years before Teresita was born,would have consented or objected to her use of his surname is open to speculation.

One thing, however, is beyond cavil: those living who possess the right of action toprevent the surname Ferrer from being smeared are proud to share it with her.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is reversed, and the petition of Teresita Llanetafor change of her name to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer is hereby granted.

TELMO VS REPUBLICFACTS:

Milagros Llerena was admitted to the bar in 1923. In her attorney's oath in 1946 (on file in the Bar Confidant's office) she used the name

Milagros Llerena-Telmo. In 1930 or 1931 she married Pedro M. Telmo. They begot four sons, now all of age, who were baptized with the surname "Telmo"

but who since kindergarten days have been using the surname "Thelmo".

When the Telmo spouses sojourned in the United States, Pedro M. Telmo, followingthe American style, changed the spelling of his name to "Thelmo".

In his diploma as mechanical and marine engineer issued by the University ofMichigan, his surname is allegedly spelled as "Thelmo".

Mrs. Telmo was appointed justice of the peace She was later appointed "midnight" Judge of the Court of First Instance but she was

not able to exercise the functions of that office She admitted that in the administrative cases filed against her when she was a justice

of the peace some complainants used the name "Telmo" and others used "Thelmo". She declared that in the administrative case which resulted in the termination of her

tenure as justice of the peace, she used the name "Thelmo"

she filed a petition praying that her husband's surname "Telmo" be changed to"Thelmo"

Her husband did not join her as a co-petitioner. But he executed an affidavit wherein he manifested that he interposed no objection to

his wife's petition Two of her four sons, Agapito L. Thelmo, a lawyer, and Bennett Ll. Thelmo, a

businessman, executed a joint affidavit expressing conformity to their mother'spetition

The order setting the petition for hearing was published for three consecutive weeksin the Zamboanga Times

At the hearing Mrs. Telmo presented the following documentary, evidence:

(1) The certificates of the Board of Medical Examiners attesting thather sons Doctors Franklin L. Thelmo and William L. Thelmo, wereadmitted to practice as physicians

(2) The high school diploma issued by the San Sebastian College toher son, Benito Thelmo);

(3) The diploma of merit issued to her son Franklin Ll. Thelmo(4) The diploma issued by the University of Santo Tomas to her son,

William Ll. Thelmo(5) A telegram sent by Mesdames Balboa, Legarda and Corpus to

Atty. Milagros Thelmo

(6) The articles of incorporation of Pyramid Insurance Co., Inc. andthe articles of incorporation of Milathel Corporation wherein thepetitioner, as an incorporator, used the name Milagros Ll. Thelmo

Although Mrs. Telmo in her petition and testimony alleged that in some titles anddeeds and in her visas and passports, she used the surname "Thelmo", she did notpresent them in evidence.

She testified that she wanted to legalize her use of the surname "Thelmo". she alleged that she initiated the addition of the letter "h" to her husband's surname

"Telmo" in order "to distinguish her sons from other Telmos who are the illegitimatechildren of the relatives of her husband".

The City Fiscal of Zamboanga City in his opposition contended that the real party ininterest is the husband and that the couple's four sons, who are of age, should havebeen impleaded as co-petitioners.

The lower court granted the petition. It declared that petitioner's surname should be "changed from Telmo to Thelmo." The City Fiscal in his notice of appeal to this Court stated that the lower court's order

granting the petition "is contrary to law and the evidence". The Solicitor General argues that the lower court erred in holding that the reasons

adduced by the petitioner justify the change of her husband's surname. It should be clarified that the City Fiscal did not present any evidence. This appeal should be decided solely on the basis of Mrs. Telmo's evidence. The Solicitor General contends that the fact that Mrs. Telmo has been using "Thelmo"

for a long time is not a sufficient justification for authorizing a change of name He points out that Mrs. Telmo's desire to distinguish her sons from her husband's

illegitimate relatives surnamed "Telmo" concerns her sons, who are of age, and notherself, and that to allow her to change her husband's surname without granting asimilar judicial authorization to her husband and sons would generate confusion sincethe latter "may still legally use the family name Telmo."

The State's counsel further observes that the petitioner. "left the judiciary as a result"of some administrative cases which were brought against her under the name"Telmo" and that surname has become objectionable to her for reasons other thanthose alleged in her petition.

the petitioner counters that the contentions of the Solicitor General involve a changeof theory because in the lower court the City Fiscal opposed the petition merely onthe ground that there was no joinder of the real parties in interest, namely, thehusband and sons of Mrs. Telmo.

ISSUE: WON there is ample justification to allow Mrs. Telmo to change the spelling of herhusband's surname.HELD: NO

Mrs. Telmo in the title of her petition did not indicate that she wanted her surname tobe changed to "Thelmo".

The published order setting her petition for hearing reproduced the defective titlethereof.

That publication was invalid and ineffective A change of name is a proceeding in rem.

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Jurisdiction to hear and determine the petition for change of name is acquired afterdue publication of the order containing certain data, among which is the name soughtto be adopted, which should be indicated in the title of the petition

The reason for the rule is that the ordinary reader "glances fleetingly at the captionsof the published orders or the titles of the petitions.

Only if the caption or the t itle strikes him does the reader proceed to read on. And the probability is great that the reader does not at all notice the other names

and/or aliases of the applicant if these are mentioned only in the body of the order orpetition.

The noninclusion of all the names and/or aliases of the applicant in the caption of theorder or the title of the petition defeats the very purpose of the required publication."

As the title of the petition in this case and the order setting it for hearing weredeficient, the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the proceeding

A married woman may use her husband's surname (Art. 370, Civil Code). It is axiomatic that if she desires judicial authorization to change the spelling of his

surname, her husband should initiate the proceeding. In the instant case, the anomaly is that the husband did not ask for judicial authority

to change the spelling of his surname. It was his wife who filed the petition. The irregularity in the petition is obvious. The lower court sanctioned the wife's change of the spelling of her husband's

surname but no similar authority was granted to the husband because he did not filea petition for that purpose.

It is true that the wife submitted to the court her husband's affidavit of conformity tothe change in the spelling of his surname.

But, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, that would not prevent him and theirchildren from using the old spelling.

And in that event, confusion and error might arise. Moreover, after a careful evaluation of the reasons advanced by Mrs. Telmo for

changing the spelling of her husband's surname, the Court has arrived at theconclusion that those reasons are not substantial and cogent enough to sustain herpetition.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's order is reversed and the petition is dismissed.TOLENTINO VS CAFACTS:

The petitioner is the present legal wife of Arturo Tolentino in 1945 The union produced three children. Respondent Consuelo David was legally married to Arturo Tolentino in 1931. Their marriage likewise produced children. The marriage was dissolved and terminated pursuant to the law during the Japanese

occupation in 1943 by a decree of absolute divorce The trial court granted the divorce on its finding that Arturo Tolentino was abandoned

by Consuelo David for at least three (3) continuous years. Thereafter, Arturo Tolentino married a certain Pilar Adorable, who however, died soon

after their marriage. Tolentino subsequently married Constancia Consuelo David, on the other hand, continued using the surname Tolentino after the

divorce and up to the time of the filing of this complaint. The third party defendant, in his answer, admitted that the use of the surname

Tolentino by the private respondent was with his and his family's (brothers andsisters) consent.

A complaint was filed by petitioner Constancia C. Tolentino against Consuelo David forthe purpose of stopping and enjoining her by injunction from using the surname

Tolentino.

The complaint also contained a claim for damages which the petitioner, however,waived.

An application for a writ of preliminary injunction was filed as well. respondent Consuelo David filed her answer admitting she has been using and

continues to use the surname Tolentino. The application for the writ was heard with both parties presenting evidence in

support of their respective claims.

the trial court issued an order granting the petitioner's action for a writ of preliminaryinjunction with the actual writ being issued on January 20, 1972. The order grantingsaid writ reads:

The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner Constancia respondent Consuelo filed a motion for leave to file a third party complaint against her

former husband. The motion was granted After the hearings, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner. The private respondent appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals raising several

issues, among them, the prescription of the plaintiff's cause of action and the absenceof a monopolistic proprietary right of the plaintiff over the use of the surnameTolentino.

the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows: Hence, this appeal by the petitioner.

ISSUE: whether or not a woman who has been legally divorced from her husband may beenjoined by the latter's present wife from using the surname of her former husband.HELD:

The petitioner's contention that her cause of action is imprescriptible is without merit. In fact, it is contradictory to her own claim. The petitioner insists that the use by respondent Consuelo David of the surname

Tolentino is a continuing actionable wrong and states that every use of the surnameconstitutes a new crime.

The contention cannot be countenanced because the use of a surname by a divorcedwife for a purpose not criminal in nature is certainly not a crime.

The rule on prescription in civil cases such as the case at bar is different. Art. 1150 ofthe Civil Code provides: "The time for prescription for all kinds of actions, when thereis no special provision which ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the day theymay be brought."

All actions, unless an exception is provided, have a prescriptive period. Unless the lawmakes an action imprescriptible, it is subject to bar by prescription and the period ofprescription is five (5) years from the time the right of action accrues when no otherperiod is prescribed by law (Civil Code, Art. 1149).

The Civil Code provides for some rights which are not extinguished by prescription butan action as in the case before us is not among them.

Neither is there a special law providing for imprescriptibility. Moreover, the mere fact that the supposed violation of the petitioner's right may be a

continuous one does not change the principle that the moment the breach of right orduty occurs, the right of action accrues and the action from that moment can belegally instituted

The respondent Court of Appeals, on the o ther hand, is of the opinion that the periodof prescription should be four (4) years, since it appears to be an action based onquasi-delict.

Whatever the period, it cannot be denied that the action has long prescribed whetherthe cause accrued on April 21, 1945 when the petitioner and Arturo Tolentino got

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married, or on August 30, 1950, when the present Civil Code took effect, or in 1951when Constancia Tolentino came to know of the fact that Consuelo David was stillusing the surname Tolentino.

It is the legal possibility of bringing the action which determines the starting point forthe computation of the period of prescription

The petitioner should have brought legal action immediately against the privaterespondent after she gained knowledge of the use by the private respondent of thesurname of her former husband.

As it is, action was brought only in November 23, 1971 with only verbal demands inbetween and an action to reconstitute the divorce case.

The petitioner should have filed her complaint at once when it became evident thatthe private respondent would not accede to her demands instead of waiting fortwenty (20) years.On the principal issue of whether or not a divorced woman may continue using thesurname of her former husband, Philippine law is understandably silent.

We have no provisions for divorce in our laws and consequently, the use of surnamesby a divorced wife is not provided for.

There is no merit in the petitioner's claim that to sustain the private respondent'sstand is to contradict Articles 370 and 371 of the Civil Code.

It is significant to note that Senator Tolentino himself in his commentary on Art. 370of the Civil Code states that "the wife cannot claim an exclusive right to use thehusband's surname. She cannot be prevented from using it; but neither can sherestrain others from using it."

Art. 371 is not applicable to the case at bar because Art. 371 speaks of annulmentwhile the case before us refers to absolute divorce where there is a severance of validmarriage ties.

The effect of divorce is more akin to the death of the spouse where the deceasedwoman continues to be referred to as the Mrs. of her husband even if the latter hasremarried rather than to annulment since in the latter case, it is as if there had beenno marriage at all.

The private respondent has established that to grant the injunction to the petitionerwould be an act of serious dislocation to her.

She has given proof that she entered into contracts with third persons, acquiredproperties and entered into other legal relations using the surname Tolentino.

The petitioner, on the other hand, has failed to show that she would suffer any legalinjury or deprivation of legal rights inasmuch as she can use her husband's surnameand be fully protected in case the respondent uses the surname Tolentino for illegalpurposes.

There is no usurpation of the petitioner's name and surname in this case so that themere use of the surname Tolentino by the private respondent cannot be said to haveinjured the petitioner's rights.

"The usurpation of name implies some injury to the interests of the owner of thename. It consists in the possibility of confusion of identity . . . between the owner andthe usurper. It exists when a person designates himself by another name. . . . .

The following are the elements of usurpation of a name:1) there is an ac tual use of another's name by the defendant;2) the use is unauthorized; and3) the use of another's name is to designate personality or identify aperson"

None of these elements exists in the case at bar and neither is there a claim by thepetitioner that the private respondent impersonated her.

In fact, it is of public knowledge that Constancia Tolentino is the legal wife of ArturoTolentino so that all invitations for Senator and Mrs. Tolentino are sent to Constancia.

Consuelo never represented herself after the divorce as Mrs. Arturo Tolentino butsimply as Mrs. Consuelo David-Tolentino. The private respondent has legitimatechildren who have every right to use the surname Tolentino.

She could not possibly be compelled to use the prefix "Miss" or use the name Mrs.David, different from the surnames of her children.

The records do not show that she has legally remarried. Considering the circumstances of this petition, the age of the respondent who may be

seriously prejudiced at this stage of her life, having to resort to further legalprocedures in reconstituting documents and altering legal transactions where sheused the surname Tolentino, and the effects on the private respondent who, while still

not remarried, will have to use a surname different from the surnames of her ownchildren, we find it just and equitable to leave things as they are, there being noactual legal injury to the petitioner save a deep hurt to her feelings which is not abasis for injunctive relief.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of theCourt of Appeals is AFFIRMED

LEGAMIA VS IACFACTS:

Corazon Legamia lived with Emilio N. Reyes until Emilio died During their live-in arrangement they produced a boy who was named Michael

Raphael Gabriel L. Reyes. From the time Corazon and Emilio lived together until the latter's death, Corazon was

known as Corazon L. Reyes; s he styled herself as Mrs. Reyes; and Emilio introduced her to friends as Mrs. Reyes. shortly after Emilio's death, Corazon filed a letter claim in behalf of Michael with the

Agricultural Credit Administration (where Emilio work as a branch manager) for deathbenefits.

The letter was signed "Corazon L. Reyes." The voucher evidencing payment of Michael's claim in the amount of P2,648.76 was

also signed "Corazon L. Reyes."

Felicisima Reyes who was married to Emilio filed a complaint which led to Corazon'sprosecution.

Parenthetically, the amount paid to Michael is "equivalent to 2/5 of that which is dueto each legitimate child

Corazon Legamia was accused of using an alias in violation of Commonwealth Act No.142, as amended. The information against her reads:

, the said accused did then and there wilfully and unlawfully use the substitute or aliasname CORAZON L. REYES, which is different from Corazon Legamia y Rivera withwhich she was christened or by which she has been known since childhood, nor as apseudonym for literary purpose and without having been previously authorized by acompetent Court to do so;

The trial court ruled against the petitioner On appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court, the sentence was affirmed in toto. Hence the instant petition. The law: Commonwealth Act No. 142 provides in Section 1: "Section 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television,

radio or other entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use ofpseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person shall use any name differentfrom the one with which he was registered at birth in the office of the local civil

registry, or with which he was baptized for the first time, or in case of an alien, withwhich he was registered in the Bureau of Immigration upon entry; or such substitute

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name as may have been authorized by a competent court: Provided, That persons,whose births have not been registered in any local civil registry and who have notbeen baptized, have one year from the approval of this act within which to registertheir names in the civil registry of their residence. The name shall comprise thepatronymic name and one or two surnames." (As amended by R.A. No. 6085.)

ISSUE: WON the petitioner violate the law in the light of the facts abovestatedHELD: NO

It is not uncommon in Philippine society for a woman to represent herself as the wifeand use the name of the man she is living with despite the fact that the man is

married to another woman. The practice, to be sure, is not encouraged but neither is it unduly frowned upon. A number of women can be identified who are living with men prominent in political,

business and social circles. The woman publicly holds herself out as the man's wife and uses his family name

blithely ignoring the fact that he is not her husband.

And yet none of the women has been charged of violating the C.A. No. 142 becauseours is not a bigoted but a tolerant and understanding society.

It is in the light of our cultural environment that the law must be construed. In the case at bar, Corazon had been living with Emilio for almost 20 years. He introduced her to the public as his wife and she assumed that role and his name

without any sinister purpose or personal material gain in mind. She applied for benefits upon his death not for herself but for Michael who as a boy of

tender years was under her guardianship. Surely, the lawmakers could not have meant to criminalize what Corazon had done

especially because some of them probably had their own Corazons. WHEREFORE, the decision under review is hereby set aside; the petitioner is acquitted

of the chargeREPUBLIC VS ABADILLAFACTS:

Gerson Abadilla and Luzviminda Celestino have been living together as husband andwife without the benefit of marriage.

During their cohabitation, Luzviminda begot two children, Emerson and Rafael. In the Certificates of Birth of these two children, they were registered with the

surname "Abadilla" and the name of their father was entered as "Herson" Abadilla.

Moreover, the entry in the date and place of marriage of the children's parentsappeared as June 19, 1987 at Dingras, Ilocos Norte.

Thereafter, an Amended Petition for Correction/Cancellation of Entries was filed byGerson Abadilla, Luzviminda Celestino and their two minor children, Emerson and

Rafael, seeking to have the following corrections made in the Certificates of Birth ofEmerson and Rafael:a. ordering that the entries as to the date and place of marriage of petitionerGERSON R. ABADILLA and LUZVIMINDA M. CELESTINO appearing in the certificatesof birth of Emerson C. Abadilla and Rafael C. Abadilla be deleted;b. ordering that the entry as to the first name of petitioner Gerson C. Abadillaappearing in the certificates of birth of (sic) Emerson C. Abadilla and Rafael C.Abadilla be corrected as GERSON;

During the hearing of the petition, both Gerson Abadilla and Luzviminda Celestinotestified that they are not yet married to each other despite bearing two children.

the trial court granted the petition It ordered to issue an Amended Birth Certificate and Change an Entry therein by

deleting the first name HERSON in the column "Name of Father" and substitute it withGERSON, and also to delete the entry appearing the column "Date of Marriage of

Parents" and "Place of Marriage of Parents and leave it blank, after payment of therequired fees.

the Office of the Solicitor General appealed on the ground that the trial courtcommitted a reversible error when it allowed the deletion of the "date and place ofmarriage of parents" from the birth certificates of minors Emerson C. Abadilla andRafael C. Abadilla but failed to order the change of the minors' surname from"Abadilla" to "Celestino."

ISSUE: WON THE SURNAMES OF THE MINORS BE CHANGED TO CELESTIONO(MOTHERS SURNAME)

HELD: YES There is no dispute that Emerson C. Abadilla and Rafael C. Abadilla are illegitimate

children, their parents, Spouses Herson and Luzviminda not being married to each

other even up to now. During the birth of Emerson 6 and Rafael, the Family Code was already the governing

law and Article 176 of which explicitly provides as follows: "Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the

parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity withthis Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one half of thelegitime of a legitimate child."

Thus, as illegitimate children, Emerson and Rafael should bear the surname of theirmother, Luzviminda Celestino. Resultingly, with the correction of the entries in theirbirth certificates which deleted the entry in the date and place of marriage of parents,the corresponding correction with respect to their surname should have also beenmade and changed to Celestino, their mother's surname.

ACCORDINGLY, the ASSAILED Decision is hereby MODIFIED. The Civil Registrar ofSan Nicolas, Ilocos Norte is hereby ordered to change the entry in the Amended BirthCertificates of respondent-minors Emerson C. Abadilla and Rafael C. Abadilla withrespect to their surname, and enter instead therein the surname "Celestino".

VALENCIAFacts: Leonor Valencia in behalf of her minor children Bernardo and Jessica Go filed a petitionfor the cancellation and/or correction of entries of their birth in the Civil Registry in the City ofCebu. The TC issued an order directing the publication of the petition and the date of hearing ina newspaper of general circulation in the city and province of Cebu once a week for threeconsecutive weeks and notice was duly served on the SolGen, the Local Civil Registrar and GoEng. The petition seeks to change the nationality or citizenship of Bernardo and Jessica fromChinese to Filipino and their status from Legitimate to Illegitimate and changing also the statusof the mother from married to single. The Local Civil Registrar avers that the corrections soughtare not merely clerical but substantial, involving as they do the citizenship and status of theminors and the status of the mother.The TC granted the petition.Issue: WON the proceedings that took place could be regarded as proper suit or

appropriate action for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil register.Held: Yes.Ratio: The persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation orcorrection of an entry in the civil register are-(1) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who haveor claim any interest which would be affected thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it becomesthe duty of the court to-(l) issue an order fixing the time and place for the hearing of thepetition, and (2) cause the order for hearing to be published once a week for three (3)consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. The following arelikewise entitled to oppose the petition: (I) the civil registrar, and (2) any person having orclaiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought.If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/orcancellation of entries in the record of birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of theRevised Rules of Court can no longer be described as "summary". There can be no doubt thatwhen an opposition to the petition is filed either by the Civil Registrar or any person having or

claiming any interest in the entries sought to be cancelled and/or corrected and the opposition isactively prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become adversary proceedings.

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The decision of the TC was affirmed by the SC

MARCOSRepublic v Marcos182 SCRA 223Facts: Pang Cha Quen, a Chinese national married Alfredo De la Cruz, a Filipino citizen. She hada previous marriage to a Chinese citizen Sia Bian who fathered her child, May Sia alias ManmanHuang. She registered her daughter as an alien under the name Mary Pang, which is hermaternal surname because the childs father has abandoned them. Now Pang Cha Quen praysthat her daughters name be changed to Mary Pang De la Cruz since Alfredo has grown to love

her as his own daughter. Judge Marcos granted such petition.WON the name of Mary Pang can be changed to Mary Pang De la CruzHeld: No. Firstly, the republic pointed out that the petition to change the name did not includeMary Pang but only May Sia and Manman Huang. The omission of her other alias "MaryPang" in the captions of the court's order and of the petition defeats the purpose of thepublication. The general rule is that a change of name should not be permitted if it will give afalse impression of family relationship to another where none actually exists. Furthermore, MaryPang is the only one who can pray for the change of her name. This cannot be done by hermother for her.

LABAYOFacts: Emperatriz Labayo-Rowe filed a petition for the correction of entries in the civil registrywith the then Court of First Instance of Pampanga. She asked the court to order the Local CivilRegistrar of San Fernando, Pampanga to correct the entries in the birth certificates of herchildren Vicente L. Miclat, Jr. and Victoria Miclat especially with regard to petitioner's namewhich appears in both certificates as "Beatriz Labayo-Labayu and as regards her civil status anddate of marriage which appears in the birth certificate of Victoria Miclat as "married" with theyear appearing "1953 Bulan." She claimed that she was never married to Vicente Miclat and thatshe was now married to an American citizen, William Rowe. Her petition was granted changingher civil status from married to single in the birth certificate of Victoria.WON Emperatriz can change her civil status from married to single in Victorias birth certificateHeld: No. The petition for correction of entries in the civil registry does not only involve thecorrection of petitioner Labayo's name and surname registered as "Beatriz Labayo/BeatrizLabayo in the birth certificates of her children. The petition also seeks the change of her statusfrom "married" to "not married" at the time of her daughter's birth, thereby changing the statusof her child Victoria Miclat from "legitimate" to "illegitimate." The right of the child Victoria toinherit from her parents would be substantially impaired if her status would be changed from"legitimate" to "illegitimate." Moreover, she would be exposed to humiliation andembarrassment resulting from the stigma of an illegitimate

VELEZCustody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving brothers andsisters (the Vargases). Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:

"Sec. 1103. Persons charged with duty of burial. The immediate duty of burying thebody of a deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense thereof, shalldevolve upon the persons hereinbelow specified:

"(b) If the deceased was an unmarried man or woman, or a child, and left any kin, theduty of burial shall devolve upon the nearest of kin of the deceased, if they be adults and withinthe Philippines and in possession of sufficient means to defray the necessary expenses."

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED