ROWENA PADILLA-RUMBAUA, Petitioner, vs.EDWARD RUMBAUA, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

BRION, J.:

Petitioner Rowena Padilla-Rumbaua (petitioner) challenges, through her petition for review on certiorari,1 the decision dated June 25, 20042 and the resolution dated January 18, 20053 of the Court   of   Appeals   (CA)   in   CA-G.R.   CV   No.   75095.   The   challenged   decision   reversed   the decision4 of   the   Regional   Trial   Court   (RTC)   declaring   the   marriage   of   the   petitioner   and respondent   Edward   Rumbaua   (respondent)   null   and   void   on   the   ground   of   the   latter’s psychological   incapacity.  The assailed resolution, on the other hand, denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

ANTECEDENT FACTS

The present petition traces its roots to the petitioner’s complaint for the declaration of nullity of  marriage   against   the   respondent   before   the  RTC,   docketed   as   Civil   Case  No.   767.   The petitioner   alleged   that   the   respondent   was   psychologically   incapacitated   to   exercise   the essential  obligations of  marriage as  shown by the  following circumstances:   the respondent reneged on his promise to live with her under one roof after finding work; he failed to extend financial support to her; he blamed her for his mother’s death; he represented himself as single in his transactions; and he pretended to be working in Davao, although he was cohabiting with another woman in Novaliches, Quezon City.

Summons  was   served  on   the   respondent   through   substituted   service,   as   personal   service proved  futile.5 The RTC ordered  the provincial  prosecutor   to  investigate   if   collusion existed between the parties and to ensure that no fabrication or suppression of evidence would take place.6 Prosecutor Melvin P. Tiongson’s report negated the presence of collusion between the parties.7

The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition.8 The OSG entered its appearance and deputized the Provincial Prosecutor of Nueva Vizcaya to assist in all hearings of the case.9

The petitioner presented testimonial and documentary evidence to substantiate her charges.

The petitioner related that she and the respondent were childhood neighbors  in Dupax del Norte,  Nueva Vizcaya.  Sometime in 1987, they met again and became sweethearts but the respondent’s   family  did  not  approve of   their   relationship.  After  graduation  from college   in 1991, the respondent promised to marry the petitioner as soon as he found a job. The job came in 1993, when the Philippine Air Lines (PAL) accepted the respondent as a computer engineer. 

The respondent proposed to the petitioner that they first have a "secret marriage" in order not to antagonize his parents. The petitioner agreed; they were married in Manila on February 23, 1993. The petitioner and the respondent, however, never lived together; the petitioner stayed with   her   sister   in   Fairview,  Quezon   City,  while   the   respondent   lived  with   his   parents   in Novaliches.

The petitioner and respondent saw each other every day during the first six months of their marriage. At that point, the respondent refused to live with the petitioner for fear that public knowledge of their marriage would affect his application for a PAL scholarship. Seven months into their  marriage, the couple’s daily meetings became occasional visits to the petitioner’s house in Fairview; they would have sexual trysts in motels.  Later that year, the respondent enrolled at FEATI University after he lost his employment with PAL.10

In  1994,  the parties’  respective families  discovered their  secret  marriage.  The respondent’s mother   tried   to  convince  him to  go   to   the  United  States,  but  he   refused.  To  appease  his mother, he continued living separately from the petitioner. The respondent forgot to greet the petitioner during her birthday in 1992 and likewise failed to send her greeting cards on special occasions. The respondent indicated as well in his visa application that he was single.

In April 1995, the respondent’s mother died. The respondent blamed the petitioner, associating his mother’s death to the pain that the discovery of his secret marriage brought. Pained by the respondent’s   action,   the   petitioner   severed   her   relationship   with   the   respondent.   They eventually   reconciled   through   the   help   of   the  petitioner’s   father,   although   they   still   lived separately.

In 1997, the respondent informed the petitioner that he had found a job in Davao. A year later, the petitioner and her mother went to the respondent’s house in Novaliches and found him cohabiting with one Cynthia Villanueva (Cynthia). When she confronted the respondent about it,  he  denied  having  an  affair  with  Cynthia.11 The  petitioner  apparently  did  not  believe   the respondents and moved to to Nueva Vizcaya to recover from the pain and anguish that her discovery brought.12

The petitioner disclosed during her cross-examination that communication between her and respondent had ceased. Aside from her oral testimony, the petitioner also presented a certified true copy of their marriage contract;13 and the testimony, curriculum vitae,14 and psychological report15 of clinical psychologist Dr. Nedy Lorenzo Tayag (Dr. Tayag).

Dr.  Tayag  declared  on   the  witness   stand   that   she  administered   the   following   tests  on   the petitioner:   a   Revised  Beta   Examination;   a   Bender  Visual  Motor  Gestalt   Test;   a   Rorschach Psychodiagnostic   Test;   a   Draw   a   Person   Test;   a   Sach’s   Sentence   Completion   Test;   and MMPI.16 She thereafter prepared a psychological report with the following findings:

TEST RESULTS AND EVALUATION

Psychometric tests data reveal petitioner to operate in an average intellectual level. Logic and reasoning remained intact. She is seen to be the type of woman who adjusts fairly well into most   situations  especially   if   it   is  within  her   interests.  She   is  pictured   to  be   faithful   to  her commitments and had reservations from negative criticisms such that she normally adheres to social norms, behavior-wise. Her age speaks of maturity, both intellectually and emotionally. Her one fault lies in her compliant attitude which makes her a subject for manipulation and deception such that of respondent. In all the years of their relationship, she opted to endure his irresponsibility largely because of the mere belief that someday things will be much better for them. But upon the advent of her husband’s infidelity, she gradually lost hope as well as the sense of self-respect, that she has finally taken her tool to be assertive to the point of being aggressive and very cautious at times – so as to fight with the frustration and insecurity she had especially regarding her failed marriage.

Respondent in this case, is revealed to operate in a very self-centered manner as he believes that the world revolves around him. His egocentrism made it so easy for him to deceitfully use others for his own advancement with an extreme air of confidence and dominance. He would do actions without any remorse or guilt feelings towards others especially to that of petitioner.

REMARKS

Love happens to everyone. It is dubbed to be boundless as it goes beyond the expectations people tagged with it. In love, "age does matter." People love in order to be secure that one will share his/her life with another and that he/she will not die alone. Individuals who are in love had the power to let love grow or let love die – it is a choice one had to face when love is not the love he/she expected.

In   the  case  presented  by  petitioner,   it   is   very  apparent   that   love   really  happened  for  her towards the young respondent – who used "love" as a disguise or deceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence she extended towards him. He made her believe that he is responsible, true, caring and thoughtful – only to reveal himself contrary to what was mentioned. He lacked the commitment, faithfulness, and remorse that he was able to engage himself to promiscuous acts that  made   petitioner   look   like   an   innocent   fool.  His   character   traits   reveal   him   to   suffer Narcissistic   Personality   Disorder   -   declared   to   be   grave,   severe   and   incurable.17 [Emphasis supplied.]

The RTC Ruling

The RTC nullified the parties’ marriage in its decision of April 19, 2002. The trial court saw merit in the testimonies of the petitioner and Dr. Tayag, and concluded as follows:

x x x x

Respondent was never solicitous of the welfare and wishes of his wife. Respondent imposed limited   or   block   [sic]   out   communication   with   his   wife,   forgetting   special   occasions,   like petitioner’s  birthdays  and Valentine’s  Day;  going  out  only  on  occasions  despite   their   living separately and to go to a motel to have sexual intercourse.

It would appear that the foregoing narration are the attendant facts in this case which show the psychological incapacity of respondent, at the time of the celebration of the marriage of the parties, to enter into lawful marriage and to discharge his marital responsibilities (See Articles 68 to 71, Family Code). This incapacity is "declared grave, severe and incurable."

WHEREFORE,   in   view   of   the   foregoing,   the   marriage   between   petitioner   Rowena   Padilla Rumbaua and respondent Edwin Rumbaua is hereby declared annulled.

SO ORDERED.18

The CA Decision

The Republic, through the OSG, appealed the RTC decision to the CA.19 The CA decision of June 25, 2004 reversed and set aside the RTC decision, and denied the nullification of the parties’ marriage.20

In its ruling, the CA observed that Dr. Tayag’s psychiatric report did not mention the cause of the respondent’s so-called "narcissistic personality disorder;" it did not discuss the respondent’s childhood and thus failed to give the court  an  insight  into the respondent’s  developmental years. Dr. Tayag likewise failed to explain why she came to the conclusion that the respondent’s incapacity was "deep-seated" and "incurable."

The CA held that Article 36 of the Family Code requires the  incapacity to be psychological, although its manifestations may be physical. Moreover, the evidence presented must show that the incapacitated party was mentally or physically ill so that he or she could not have known the marital obligations assumed, knowing them, could not have assumed them. In other words, the   illness  must   be   shown   as   downright   incapacity   or   inability,   not   a   refusal,   neglect,   or difficulty to perform the essential obligations of marriage. In the present case, the petitioner suffered because the respondent adamantly refused to live with her because of his parents’ objection to their marriage.

The petitioner moved to reconsider the decision, but the CA denied her motion in its resolution of January 18, 2005. 21

The Petition and the Issues

The petitioner argues in the present petition that –

1.   the  OSG   certification   requirement   under   Republic   v.  Molina22 (the  Molina   case) cannot   be   dispensed   with   because   A.M.   No.   02-11-10-SC,   which   relaxed   the requirement, took effect only on March 15, 2003;

2. vacating the decision of the courts a quo and remanding the case to the RTC to recall her   expert   witness   and   cure   the   defects   in   her   testimony,   as  well   as   to   present additional evidence, would temper justice with mercy; and

3. Dr. Tayag’s testimony in court cured the deficiencies in her psychiatric report.

The petitioner prays that the RTC’s and the CA’s decisions be reversed and set aside, and the case be remanded to the RTC for further proceedings; in the event we cannot grant this prayer, that the CA’s decision be set aside and the RTC’s decision be reinstated.

The Republic maintained in its comment that: (a) A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC was applicable although it took effect after the promulgation of Molina; (b) invalidating the trial court’s decision and remanding the case for further proceedings were not proper; and (c) the petitioner failed to establish respondent’s psychological incapacity.23

The parties simply reiterated their arguments in the memoranda they filed.

THE COURT’S RULING

We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit.

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is applicable

In Molina, the Court emphasized the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the OSG; they are to appear as counsel for the State in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages:

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case  is deemed submitted for resolution of the court.  The Solicitor General  shall  discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi  contemplated under Canon 1095. [Emphasis supplied.]

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC24 -- which this Court promulgated on March 15, 2003 and duly published -- is geared towards the relaxation of the OSG certification that Molina required. Section 18 of this remedial regulation provides:

SEC.   18.  Memoranda.   –   The   court  may   require   the   parties   and   the   public   prosecutor,   in consultation with the Office of   the Solicitor  General,   to  file  their   respective memoranda  in support of their claims within fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated.lawphil.net It may require the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the State. No other pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of the period herein provided, the case will be considered submitted for decision, with or without the memoranda.

The petitioner argues that the RTC decision of April 19, 2002 should be vacated for prematurity, as it was rendered despite the absence of the required OSG certification specified in Molina. According to the petitioner, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which took effect only on March 15, 2003, cannot overturn the requirements of Molina that was promulgated as early as February 13, 1997.

The petitioner’s argument lacks merit.

The amendment introduced under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is procedural or remedial in character; it  does not create or remove any vested right,  but only operates as a remedy  in aid of  or confirmation of already existing rights. The settled rule is that procedural laws may be given retroactive effect,25 as we held in De Los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat:26

Procedural Laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule  against   the retroactive operation of  statues   -   they  may be given retroactive effect  on actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, insomuch as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.

A.M.  No.  02-11-10-SC,  as  a   remedial  measure,   removed   the  mandatory  nature  of  an  OSG certification and may be applied retroactively to pending matters. In effect, the measure cures in any pending matter any procedural lapse on the certification prior to its promulgation. Our rulings in Antonio v. Reyes27 and Navales v. Navales28 have since confirmed and clarified that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC has dispensed with the Molina guideline on the matter of certification, although Article 48 mandates the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal to ensure that no collusion between the parties would take place. Thus, what is important is the presence of the prosecutor in the case, not the remedial requirement that he be certified to be present. From this perspective, the petitioner’s objection regarding the Molina guideline on certification lacks merit.

A Remand of the Case to the RTC is Improper

The petitioner maintains that vacating the lower courts’ decisions and the remand of the case to the RTC for further reception of evidence are procedurally permissible. She argues that the inadequacy of her evidence during the trial was the fault of her former counsel, Atty. Richard Tabago, and asserts that remanding the case to the RTC would allow her to cure the evidentiary 

insufficiencies. She posits in this regard that while mistakes of counsel bind a party, the rule should be liberally construed in her favor to serve the ends of justice.

We do not find her arguments convincing.

A remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings amounts to the grant of a new trial that is not procedurally proper at this stage. Section 1 of Rule 37 provides that an aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside a judgment or final order already rendered and to grant a new trial within the period for taking an appeal. In addition, a motion for new trial may be filed only on the grounds of (1) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence that could not have been guarded against by ordinary prudence, and by reason of which the aggrieved party’s   rights   have   probably   been   impaired;   or   (2)   newly   discovered   evidence   that,   with reasonable diligence, the aggrieved party could not have discovered and produced at the trial, and that would probably alter the result if presented.

In   the  present  case,   the  petitioner  cites   the  inadequacy  of   the  evidence  presented by  her former counsel as basis for a remand. She did not, however, specify the inadequacy. That the RTC   granted   the   petition   for   declaration   of   nullity prima   facie shows   that   the   petitioner’s counsel had not been negligent in handling the case. Granting arguendo that the petitioner’s counsel   had   been   negligent,   the   negligence   that   would   justify   a   new   trial   must   be excusable, i.e. one that ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against. The negligence that the petitioner apparently adverts to is that cited in Uy v. First Metro Integrated Steel Corporation where we explained:29

Blunders and mistakes in the conduct of the proceedings in the trial court as a result of the ignorance, inexperience or incompetence of counsel do not qualify as a ground for new trial. If such were to be admitted as valid reasons for re-opening cases, there would never be an end to litigation so long as a new counsel could be employed to allege and show that the prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, experienced or learned. This will put a premium on the willful and intentional commission of errors by counsel, with a view to securing new trials in the event of conviction, or an adverse decision, as in the instant case.

Thus, we find no justifiable reason to grant the petitioner’s requested remand.

Petitioner   failed   to   establish   the respondent’s psychological incapacity

A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which provides that "a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of its celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization." In Santos v. Court of Appeals,30 the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. The defect should refer   to   "no   less   than   a  mental   (not   physical)   incapacity   that   causes   a   party   to   be   truly 

incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage." It must be confined to "the most serious cases of personality disorders   clearly   demonstrative   of   an   utter   insensitivity   or   inability   to   give   meaning   and significance to the marriage."

We laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code in Republic v. Court of Appeals where we said:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and   our   laws   cherish   the   validity   of   marriage   and   unity   of   the   family.   Thus,   our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the   nation."   It   decrees  marriage   as   legally   "inviolable,"   thereby   protecting   it   from dissolution   at   the   whim   of   the   parties.   Both   the   family   and   marriage   are   to   be "protected" by the state.

The   Family   Code   echoes   this   constitutional   edict   on  marriage   and   the   family   and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2)  The root cause of the psychological   incapacity  must be (a)  medically  or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of   the provision under   the principle  ofejusdem generis,  nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully  explained.  Expert  evidence  may  be  given  by  qualified  psychiatrists  and  clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.   The   evidence  must   show   that   the   illness  was   existing  when   the   parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4)   Such   incapacity  must  also  be   shown  to  be  medically  or   clinically  permanent  or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. x x x

(5)  Such   illness  must  be  grave  enough to  bring  about   the  disability  of   the  party   to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness  must  be shown as  downright   incapacity  or   inability,  not  a   refusal,  neglect  or difficulty,  much less  ill  will.   In other words,  there is a natal or supervening disabling factor   in   the  person,   an   adverse   integral   element   in   the  personality   structure   that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the   same Code   in   regard   to  parents  and   their   children.   Such  non-complied  marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church   in   the   Philippines,  while   not   controlling   or   decisive,   should   be   given   great respect by our courts…

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095.

These Guidelines incorporate the basic requirements we established in Santos. To reiterate, psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability.31 These requisites  must be strictly  complied with,  as  the grant of  a petition for nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity must be confined only to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Furthermore, since the Family Code does not define "psychological incapacity," fleshing out its terms is left to us to do so on a case-to-case basis through  jurisprudence.32 We emphasized   this  approach   in   the  recent  case  of  Ting  v.  Velez-Ting33 when we explained:

It  was   for   this   reason   that  we   found   it  necessary   to  emphasize   in  Ngo Te   that  each  case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

In the present case and using the above standards and approach, we find the totality of the petitioner’s   evidence   insufficient   to   prove   that   the   respondent   is   psychologically   unfit   to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband.

a. Petitioner’s testimony did not prove the root cause, gravity and incurability of respondent’s condition

The petitioner’s evidence merely showed that the respondent: (a) reneged on his promise to cohabit with her; (b) visited her occasionally from 1993 to 1997; (c) forgot her birthday in 1992, and did not send her greeting cards during special occasions; (d) represented himself as single in his visa application; (e) blamed her for the death of his mother; and (f)  told her he was working in Davao when in fact he was cohabiting with another woman in 1997.

These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of the "psychological incapacity" that the law requires, and should be distinguished from the "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations that characterize some marriages. In Bier v. Bier,34 we   ruled   that   it   was   not   enough   that   respondent,   alleged   to   be   psychologically incapacitated,   had  difficulty   in   complying  with  his  marital   obligations,   or  was  unwilling   to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor – an adverse integral element   in   the   respondent's   personality   structure   that   effectively   incapacitated   him   from complying with his essential marital obligations – had to be shown and was not shown in this cited case.

In   the  present   case,   the   respondent’s   stubborn   refusal   to  cohabit  with   the  petitioner  was doubtlessly irresponsible, but it was never proven to be rooted in some psychological illness. As the petitioner’s testimony reveals, respondent merely refused to cohabit with her for fear of jeopardizing  his  application  for  a   scholarship,  and  later  due  to  his   fear  of  antagonizing  his family. The respondent’s failure to greet the petitioner on her birthday and to send her cards during special occasions, as well as his acts of blaming petitioner for his mother’s death and of representing himself as single in his visa application, could only at best amount to forgetfulness, insensitivity  or  emotional   immaturity,  not necessarily  psychological   incapacity.  Likewise,   the respondent’s   act   of   living   with   another   woman   four   years   into   the   marriage   cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of marriage. In fact, petitioner  herself  admitted  that   respondent  was  caring  and  faithful  when  they  were  going steady and for a time after their marriage; their problems only came in later.

To be sure, the respondent was far from perfect and had some character flaws. The presence of these   imperfections,   however,   does   not   necessarily   warrant   a   conclusion   that   he   had   a psychological malady at the time of the marriage that rendered him incapable of fulfilling his duties and obligations. To use the words of Navales v. Navales:35

Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations. Mere "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of marital 

obligations or "ill will" on the part of the spouse is different from "incapacity" rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage and not due to some psychological illness that is contemplated by said rule.

b. Dr. Tayag’s psychological report and court testimony

We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag’s conclusions about the respondent’s psychological incapacity were based on the information fed to her by only one side – the petitioner – whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted. While this circumstance alone does not disqualify the   psychologist   for   reasons   of   bias,   her   report,   testimony   and   conclusions   deserve   the application   of   a   more   rigid   and   stringent   set   of   standards   in   the   manner   we   discussed above.36 For, effectively, Dr. Tayag only diagnosed the respondent from the prism of a third party account; she did not actually hear, see and evaluate the respondent and how he would have reacted and responded to the doctor’s probes.

Dr.  Tayag,   in  her   report,  merely   summarized   the  petitioner’s  narrations,  and  on   this  basis characterized the respondent to be a self-centered, egocentric, and unremorseful person who "believes that the world revolves around him"; and who "used love as a…deceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence [petitioner] extended towards him." Dr. Tayag then incorporated her own   idea   of   "love";   made   a   generalization   that   respondent   was   a   person   who   "lacked commitment, faithfulness, and remorse," and who engaged "in promiscuous acts that made the petitioner look like a fool"; and finally concluded that the respondent’s character traits reveal "him to suffer Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial  Personality Disorder declared to be grave and incurable."

We  find   these   observations   and   conclusions   insufficiently   in-depth   and   comprehensive   to warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that prevented the respondent from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. It failed to identify the root cause of the respondent's narcissistic personality disorder and to prove that it existed at the inception of the marriage. Neither did it explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor show that the respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological,   not   physical,   nature.   Thus,  we   cannot   avoid   but   conclude   that   Dr.   Tayag’s conclusion in her Report – i.e., that the respondent suffered "Narcissistic Personality Disorder with   traces  of  Antisocial  Personality  Disorder  declared   to  be  grave  and   incurable"  –   is   an unfounded   statement,   not   a   necessary   inference   from   her   previous   characterization   and portrayal of the respondent. While the various tests administered on the petitioner could have been used as  a   fair  gauge to assess  her  own psychological  condition,   this   same statement cannot   be   made   with   respect   to   the   respondent’s   condition.   To   make   conclusions   and generalizations on the respondent’s psychological condition based on the information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.

Petitioner   nonetheless   contends   that   Dr.   Tayag’s   subsequent   testimony   in   court   cured whatever deficiencies attended her psychological report.

We do not share this view.

A careful reading of Dr. Tayag’s testimony reveals that she failed to establish the fact that at the time the parties were married, respondent was already suffering from a psychological defect that deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties and responsibilities of marriage. Neither did she adequately explain how she came to the conclusion that respondent’s condition was grave and incurable. To directly quote from the records:

ATTY. RICHARD TABAGO:

Q: I would like to call your attention to the Report already marked as Exh. "E-7", there is a statement to the effect that his character traits begin to suffer narcissistic personality disorder with traces of antisocial personality disorder. What do you mean? Can you please explain in layman’s word, Madam Witness?

DR. NEDY LORENZO TAYAG:

A: Actually,   in a  layman’s term, narcissistic personality  disorder cannot accept that there  is something wrong with his own behavioral manifestation. [sic] They feel that they can rule the world; they are eccentric; they are exemplary, demanding financial and emotional support, and this is clearly manifested by the fact that respondent abused and used petitioner’s love. Along the line, a narcissistic person cannot give empathy; cannot give love simply because they love themselves more than anybody else; and thirdly, narcissistic person cannot support his own personal need and gratification without the help of others and this is where the petitioner set in.

Q: Can you please describe the personal [sic] disorder?

A: Clinically, considering that label, the respondent behavioral manifestation under personality disorder [sic] this is already considered grave, serious, and treatment will be impossible [sic]. As I say this, a kind of developmental disorder wherein it all started during the early formative years and brought about by one familiar relationship the way he was reared and cared by the family. Environmental exposure is also part and parcel of the child disorder. [sic]

Q: You mean to say, from the formative [years] up to the present?

A: Actually, the respondent behavioral manner was [present] long before he entered marriage. [Un]fortunately,   on   the   part   of   the   petitioner,   she   never   realized   that   such   behavioral manifestation of the respondent connotes pathology. [sic]

x x x x

Q:   So   in   the   representation  of   the  petitioner   that   the   respondent   is   now   lying   [sic]  with somebody  else,  how will   you  describe   the  character  of   this   respondent  who  is   living  with somebody else?

A: This is where the antisocial personality trait of the respondent [sic] because an antisocial person is one who indulge in philandering activities, who do not have any feeling of guilt at the expense of  another  person,  and this   [is]  again a  buy-product  of  deep seated psychological incapacity.

Q: And this psychological incapacity based on this particular deep seated [sic], how would you describe the psychological incapacity? [sic]

A: As I said there is a deep seated psychological dilemma, so I would say incurable in nature and at this time and again [sic] the psychological pathology of the respondent. One plays a major factor of not being able to give meaning to a relationship in terms of sincerity and endurance.

Q:  And  if   this  psychological  disorder exists  before the marriage of  the respondent and the petitioner, Madam Witness?

A: Clinically, any disorder are usually rooted from the early formative years and so if it takes enough   that   such   psychological   incapacity   of   respondent   already   existed   long   before   he entered marriage, because if you analyze how he was reared by her parents particularly by the mother, there is already an unhealthy symbiosis developed between the two, and this creates a major emotional havoc when he reached adult age.

Q: How about the gravity?

A: This is already grave simply because from the very start respondent never had an inkling that his   behavioral  manifestation   connotes   pathology   and   second  ground   [sic],   respondent  will never  admit  again   that  such  behavior  of  his  connotes  again  pathology  simply  because   the disorder   of   the   respondent   is   not   detrimental   to   himself   but,  more   often   than  not,   it   is detrimental to other party involved.

x x x x

PROSECUTOR MELVIN TIONGSON:

Q: You were not able to personally examine the respondent here?

DR. NEDY TAYAG:

A: Efforts were made by the psychologist but unfortunately, the respondent never appeared at my clinic.

Q:  On  the  basis  of   those  examinations  conducted  with   the  petitioning  wife   to  annul   their marriage with her husband in general, what can you say about the respondent?

A:  That   from  the  very   start   respondent  has  no  emotional   intent   to  give  meaning   to   their relationship. If you analyze their marital relationship they never lived under one room. From the very start of the [marriage], the respondent to have petitioner to engage in secret marriage until   that   time   their   family   knew  of   their  marriage   [sic].   Respondent   completely   refused, completely relinquished his marital obligation to the petitioner.

x x x x

COURT:

Q:   Because   you   have   interviewed   or   you   have   questioned   the   petitioner,   can   you   really enumerate the specific traits of the respondent?

DR. NEDY TAYAG:

A: One is the happy-go-lucky attitude of the respondent and the dependent attitude of the respondent.

Q: Even if he is already eligible for employment?

A: He remains to be at the mercy of his mother. He is a happy-go-lucky simply because he never had a set of responsibility. I think that he finished his education but he never had a stable job because he completely relied on the support of his mother.

Q: You give a more thorough interview so I am asking you something specific?

A: The happy-go-lucky attitude; the overly dependent attitude on the part of the mother merely because respondent happened to be the only son. I said that there is a unhealthy symbiosis relationship   [sic]  developed  between   the   son  and   the  mother   simply  because   the  mother always pampered completely, pampered to the point that respondent failed to develop his own sense of assertion or responsibility particularly during that stage and there is also presence of the simple lying act particularly his responsibility in terms of handling emotional imbalance and it is clearly manifested by the fact that respondent refused to build a home together with the petitioner when in fact they are legally married. Thirdly, respondent never felt or completely ignored the feelings of the petitioner; he never felt guilty hurting the petitioner because on the part of the petitioner, knowing that respondent indulge with another woman it is very, very traumatic on her part yet respondent never had the guts to feel guilty or to atone said act he committed in their relationship, and clinically this falls under antisocial personality. 37

In terms of incurability, Dr. Tayag’s answer was very vague and inconclusive, thus:

x x x x

ATTY. RICHARD TABAGO

Q: Can this personally be cured, madam witness?

DR. NEDY TAYAG

A: Clinically, if persons suffering from personality disorder curable, up to this very moment, no scientific   could   be   upheld   to   alleviate   their   kind   of   personality   disorder;   Secondly,   again respondent   or   other   person   suffering   from   any   kind   of   disorder   particularly   narcissistic personality will never admit that they are suffering from this kind of disorder, and then again curability will always be a question. [sic]38

This testimony shows that while Dr. Tayag initially described the general characteristics of a person suffering from a narcissistic personality disorder, she did not really show how and to what   extent   the   respondent   exhibited   these   traits.   She   mentioned   the   buzz   words   that jurisprudence requires for the nullity of a marriage – namely, gravity, incurability, existence at the time of the marriage, psychological incapacity relating to marriage – and in her own limited way, related these to the medical condition she generally described. The testimony, together with her report, however, suffers from very basic flaws.

First, what she medically described was not related or linked to the respondent’s exact condition except in a very general way. In short, her testimony and report were rich in generalities but disastrously short on particulars, most notably on how the respondent can  be  said   to  be  suffering   from narcissistic  personality  disorder;  why  and  to  what extent the disorder is grave and incurable; how and why it was already present at the time of the marriage; and the effects of the disorder on the respondent’s awareness of and his capability to undertake the duties and responsibilities of marriage. All these are critical to the success of the petitioner’s case.

Second, her testimony was short on factual basis for her diagnosis because it was wholly based on what the petitioner related to her. As the doctor admitted to the prosecutor, she did not at  all  examine the respondent,  only the petitioner.  Neither  the  law nor jurisprudence requires, of course, that the person sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated   should   be   personally   examined   by   a   physician   or   psychologist   as   a condition sine qua non to arrive at such declaration.39 If a psychological disorder can be proven by independent means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted   and   given   credit.40 No   such   independent   evidence,   however,   appears   on record to have been gathered in this case, particularly about the respondent’s early life and   associations,   and   about   events   on   or   about   the   time   of   the   marriage   and immediately thereafter. Thus, the testimony and report appear to us to be no more than a diagnosis that revolves around the one-sided and meager facts that the petitioner related, and were all slanted to support the conclusion that a ground exists to justify the 

nullification   of   the  marriage.  We   say   this   because   only   the   baser   qualities   of   the respondent’s life were examined and given focus; none of these qualities were weighed and   balanced   with   the   better   qualities,   such   as   his   focus   on   having   a   job,   his determination to improve himself through studies, his care and attention in the first six months   of   the   marriage,   among   others.   The   evidence   fails   to   mention   also   what character and qualities the petitioner brought into her marriage, for example, why the respondent’s   family  opposed   the  marriage  and  what  events   led   the   respondent   to blame the petitioner for the death of his mother, if this allegation is at all correct. To be sure,   these are  important  because not  a   few marriages  have  failed,  not  because of psychological   incapacity   of   either   or   both   of   the   spouses,   but   because   of   basic incompatibilities   and   marital   developments   that   do   not   amount   to   psychological incapacity. The continued separation of the spouses likewise never appeared to have been   factored   in.  Not   a   few  married   couples  have   likewise  permanently   separated simply because they have "fallen out of   love," or  have outgrown the attraction that drew them together in their younger years.

Thus, on the whole, we do not blame the petitioner for the move to secure a remand of this case to the trial courts for the introduction of additional evidence; the petitioner’s evidence in its present state is woefully insufficient to support the conclusion that the petitioner’s marriage to   the   respondent   should   be   nullified   on   the   ground   of   the   respondent’s   psychological incapacity.

The Court commiserates with the petitioner’s marital predicament. The respondent may indeed be unwilling to discharge his marital obligations, particularly the obligation to live with one’s spouse.   Nonetheless,   we   cannot   presume   psychological   defect   from   the   mere   fact   that respondent refuses to comply with his marital duties. As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be  incapable of doing so due to some psychological   illness.  The psychological   illness   that  must  afflict  a  party  at   the  inception of   the marriage should  be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive the party of his or her awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was then about to assume.41

WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals dated June 25, 2004 and January 18, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 75095.

MA. SOCORRO CAMACHO-REYES, Petitioner, vs.RAMON REYES, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

NACHURA, J.:

This case is, again, an instance of the all-too-familiar tale of a marriage in disarray.

In this regard, we air the caveat that courts should be extra careful before making a finding of psychological incapacity or vicariously diagnosing personality disorders in spouses where there are   none.   On   the   other   hand,   blind   adherence   by   the   courts   to   the   exhortation   in   the Constitution1 and in our statutes that marriage is an inviolable social

institution,   and   validating   a   marriage   that   is   null   and   void   despite   convincing   proof   of psychological incapacity, trenches on the very reason why a marriage that is doomed from its inception should not be forcibly inflicted upon its hapless partners for life.

At bar is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA -G.R. CV No. 897612 which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 89, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854.3

First, we unfurl the facts.

Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon Reyes at the University of the Philippines (UP),  Diliman,  in 1972 when they were both nineteen (19) years old. They were simply classmates then in one university subject when respondent cross-enrolled from the UP Los Baños campus. The casual acquaintanceship quickly developed into a boyfriend-girlfriend relationship. Petitioner was initially attracted to respondent who she thought was free spirited and   bright,   although  he   did   not   follow   conventions   and   traditions.4 Since   both   resided   in Mandaluyong   City,   they   saw   each   other   every   day   and   drove   home   together   from   the university.

Easily impressed, petitioner enjoyed respondent’s style of courtship which included dining out, unlike other couples their age who were restricted by a university student’s budget. At that time, respondent held a job in the family business, the Aristocrat Restaurant. Petitioner’s good impression of the respondent was not diminished by the latter’s habit of cutting classes, not even by her discovery that respondent was taking marijuana.

Not surprisingly, only petitioner finished university studies, obtaining a degree in AB Sociology from the  UP.  By  1974,   respondent  had  dropped  out  of   school  on  his   third  year,  and   just continued to work for the Aristocrat Restaurant.

On  December   5,   1976,   the   year   following   petitioner’s   graduation   and  her   father’s   death, petitioner and respondent got married. At that time, petitioner was already five (5) months pregnant and employed at the Population Center Foundation.

Thereafter, the newlyweds lived with the respondent’s family in Mandaluyong City. All living expenses were shouldered by respondent’s parents, and the couple’s respective salaries were spent solely for their personal needs. Initially, respondent gave petitioner a monthly allowance of P1,500.00 from his salary.

When their first child was born on March 22, 1977, financial difficulties started. Rearing a child entailed   expenses.   A   year   into   their   marriage,   the   monthly   allowance   of P1,500.00   from respondent  stopped.  Further,   respondent  no   longer  handed  his   salary   to  petitioner.  When petitioner mustered enough courage to ask the respondent about this, the latter told her that he had resigned due to slow advancement within the family business. Respondent’s game plan was to venture into trading seafood in the province, supplying hotels and restaurants, including the Aristocrat Restaurant. However, this new business took respondent away from his young family   for  days  on end without  any  communication.  Petitioner  simply  endured the  set  up, hoping that the situation will change.

To  prod   respondent   into  assuming  more   responsibility,  petitioner   suggested   that   they   live separately from her in-laws. However, the new living arrangement engendered further financial difficulty.  While petitioner struggled to make ends meet as the single-income earner of the household,   respondent’s   business   floundered.   Thereafter,   another   attempt   at   business,   a fishpond   in   Mindoro,   was   similarly   unsuccessful.   Respondent   gave   money   to   petitioner sporadically.   Compounding   the   family’s   financial   woes   and   further   straining   the   parties’ relationship was the indifferent attitude of respondent towards his family. That his business took him away from his family did not seem to bother respondent; he did not exert any effort to remain in touch with them while he was away in Mindoro.

After two (2) years of struggling, the spouses transferred residence and, this time, moved in with petitioner’s mother. But the new set up did not end their marital difficulties. In fact, the parties  became more  estranged.  Petitioner  continued   to   carry   the  burden  of   supporting  a family not just financially, but in most aspects as well.

In 1985, petitioner, who had previously suffered a miscarriage, gave birth to their third son. At that time, respondent was in Mindoro and he did not even inquire on the health of either the petitioner or the newborn.  A week later,  respondent arrived in Manila,  acting nonchalantly while  playing with the baby,  with nary an attempt to find out  how the hospital  bills  were settled.

In   1989,   due   to   financial   reverses,   respondent’s   fishpond   business   stopped   operations. Although without any means to support his family, respondent refused to go back to work for the family business.  Respondent came up with another business venture,  engaging  in scrap paper and carton trading. As with all of respondent’s business ventures, this did not succeed 

and added to the trail of debt which now hounded not only respondent, but petitioner as well. Not surprisingly, the relationship of the parties deteriorated.

Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent was having an extra-marital affair. She overheard respondent talking to his girlfriend, a former secretary, over the phone inquiring if the latter liked respondent’s gift to her. Petitioner soon realized that respondent was not only unable   to  provide  financially   for   their   family,  but  he  was,  more   importantly,   remiss   in  his obligation to remain faithful to her and their family.

One of the last episodes that sealed the fate of the parties’ marriage was a surgical operation on  petitioner   for   the   removal  of   a   cyst.  Although  his  wife  was  about   to  be  operated  on, respondent   remained   unconcerned   and  unattentive;   and   simply   read   the   newspaper,   and played dumb when petitioner requested that he accompany her as she was wheeled into the operating room. After the operation, petitioner felt that she had had enough of respondent’s lack of concern, and asked her mother to order respondent to leave the recovery room.

Still, petitioner made a string of "final" attempts to salvage what was left of their marriage. Petitioner approached respondent’s siblings and asked them to intervene, confessing that she was   near   the   end   of   her   rope.   Yet,   even   respondent’s   siblings  waved   the  white   flag   on respondent.

Adolfo Reyes, respondent’s elder brother, and his spouse, Peregrina, members of a marriage encounter   group,   invited   and   sponsored   the   parties   to   join   the   group.   The   elder   couple scheduled counseling sessions with petitioner and respondent, but these did not improve the parties’ relationship as respondent remained uncooperative.

In 1997, Adolfo brought respondent to Dr. Natividad A. Dayan for a psychological assessment to "determine benchmarks of current psychological  functioning." As with all  other attempts to help   him,   respondent   resisted   and   did   not   continue   with   the   clinical   psychologist’s recommendation to undergo psychotherapy.

At about this time, petitioner, with the knowledge of respondent’s siblings, told respondent to move out of their house. Respondent acquiesced to give space to petitioner.

With the de facto separation, the relationship still did not improve. Neither did respondent’s relationship with his children.

Finally, in 2001,5 petitioner filed (before the RTC) a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage   with   the   respondent,   alleging   the   latter’s   psychological   incapacity   to   fulfill   the essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Traversing the petition, respondent denied petitioner’s allegations that he was psychologically incapacitated. Respondent maintained that he was not remiss in performing his obligations to his family—both as a spouse to petitioner and father to their children.

After   trial   (where   the   testimonies  of   two  clinical  psychologists,  Dr.  Dayan  and  Dr.   Estrella Magno, and a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas, were presented in evidence), the RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage between the parties null and void on the ground of their psychological incapacity. The trial court ruled, thus:

Wherefore, on the ground of psychological incapacity of both parties, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly,   the   marriage   between   petitioner   MA.   SOCORRO   PERPETUA   CAMACHO   and respondent RAMON REYES contracted on December 4, 1976 at the Archbishop’s Chapel Villa San Miguel Mandaluyong, Rizal, is declared null and void under Art. 36 of the Family Code, as amended. Henceforth, their property relation is dissolved.

Parties are restored to their single or unmarried status.

Their children JESUS TEODORO CAMACHO REYES and JOSEPH MICHAEL CAMACHO REYES, who are already of age and have the full  civil  capacity and legal rights to decide for themselves having finished their studies, are free to decide for themselves.

The Decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen (15) days from notice to the parties. Entry of Judgment shall be made if no Motion for Reconsideration or New Trial or Appeal is filed by any of the parties, the Public Prosecutor or the Solicitor General.

Upon finality of this Decision, the Court shall forthwith issue the corresponding Decree if the parties have no properties[.] [O]therwise, the Court shall observe the procedure prescribed in Section 21 of AM 02-11-10 SC.

The Decree of Nullity quoting the dispositive portion of the Decision (Sec. 22 AM 02-11-10 SC) shall be issued by the Court only after compliance with Articles 50 & 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rules on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Property (Sections 19 & 21, AM 02-11-10 SC) in a situation where the parties have properties.

The   Entry   of   Judgment   of   this   Decision   shall   be   registered   in   the   Local   Civil   Registry   of Mandaluyong and Quezon City.

Let [a] copy of this Decision be furnished the parties, their counsel, the Office of the Solicitor General, the Public Prosecutor, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar, Mandaluyong City, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar, Quezon City and the Civil Registrar General at their respective office addresses.

SO ORDERED.6

Finding   no   cogent   reason   to   reverse   its   prior   ruling,   the   trial   court,   on   motion   for reconsideration of the respondent, affirmed the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage.

Taking exception to the trial  court’s   rulings,   respondent  appealed to the Court  of  Appeals, adamant on the validity of his marriage to petitioner. The appellate court, agreeing with the respondent,   reversed   the  RTC   and  declared   the   parties’  marriage   as   valid   and   subsisting. Significantly, a special division of five (two members dissenting from the majority decision and voting to affirm the decision of the RTC) ruled, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 23, 2007 and Order dated July 13, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89 in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Amended Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.7

Undaunted by the setback, petitioner now appeals to this Court positing the following issues:

I

THE  COURT  OF  APPEALS  ERRED   IN  NOT  RULING  THAT  RESPONDENT   IS   PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE.

II

THE   COURT   OF   APPEALS   ERRED   IN   NOT   RULING   THAT   PETITIONER   IS   LIKEWISE PSYCHOLOGICALLY   INCAPACITATED   TO   COMPLY   WITH   THE   ESSENTIAL   OBLIGATIONS   OF MARRIAGE.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE TESTIMONIES OF THE EXPERT WITNESSES PRESENTED BY PETITIONER.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE BINDING ON IT.

V

THE   COURT   OF   APPEALS   ERRED   IN   NOT   RULING   THAT   THE   TOTALITY   OF   THE   EVIDENCE PRESENTED   DULY   ESTABLISHED   THE   PSYCHOLOGICAL   INCAPACITIES   OF   THE   PARTIES   TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE.

VI

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITIES OF THE   PARTIES   TO   COMPLY   WITH   THE   ESSENTIAL   OBLIGATIONS   OF   MARRIAGE   WERE ESTABLISHED, NOT MERELY BY A TOTALITY, BUT BY A PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE.

VII

THE COURT OF APPEALS  ERRED  IN  NOT RULING THAT THE PARTIES’  MARRIAGE,  WHICH  IS UNDOUBTEDLY VOID AB INITIO UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE, DOES NOT FURTHER THE INITIATIVES OF THE STATE CONCERNING MARRIAGE AND FAMILY AND THEREFORE, NOT COVERED BY THE MANTLE OF THE CONSTITUTION ON THE PROTECTION OF MARRIAGE.

VIII

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE AMENDED PETITION WAS VALIDLY AMENDED TO CONFORM TO EVIDENCE.8

Essentially, petitioner raises the singular issue of whether the marriage between the parties is void ab initio on the ground of both parties’ psychological incapacity, as provided in Article 36 of the Family Code.

In declaring the marriage null and void, the RTC relied heavily on the oral and documentary evidence obtained from the three (3) experts i.e., Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas. The RTC ratiocinated, thus:

After   a   careful   evaluation  of   the   entire   evidence  presented,   the  Court   finds  merit   in   the petition.

Article 36 of the Family Code reads:

"A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after solemnization."

and Art. 68 of the same Code provides:

"The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support."

Similarly, Articles 69-71 further define the mutual obligations of a marital partner towards each other and Articles 220, 225 and 271 of the Family Code express the duties of parents toward their children.

Article 36 does not define what psychological incapacity means. It left the determination of the same solely to the Court on a case to case basis.

x x x x

Taking   into   consideration   the   explicit   guidelines   in   the   determination   of   psychological incapacity   in   conjunction   to   the   totality  of   the  evidence  presented,  with  emphasis  on   the pervasive pattern of behaviors of the respondent and outcome of the assessment/diagnos[is] of expert witnesses, Dra. Dayan, Dra. Mango and Dra. Villegas on the psychological condition of the respondent, the Court finds that the marriage between the parties from its inception has a congenital   infirmity  termed "psychological   incapacity"  which pertains  to the  inability  of   the parties   to  effectively   function emotionally,   intellectually  and socially   towards  each other   in relation to their essential duties to mutually observe love, fidelity and respect as well as to mutually render help and support, (Art. 68 Family Code). In short, there was already a fixed niche in the psychological constellation of respondent which created the death of his marriage. There   is  no   reason  to  entertain  any  slightest  doubt  on  the   truthfulness  of   the  personality disorder of the respondent.

The   three   expert   witnesses   have   spoken.   They   were   unanimous   in   their   findings   that respondent is suffering from personality disorder which psychologically incapacitated him to fulfill his basic duties to the marriage. Being professionals and hav[ing] solemn duties to their profession, the Court considered their assessment/diagnos[is] as credible or a product of an honest evaluation on the psychological status of the respondent. This psychological incapacity of the respondent, in the uniform words of said three (3) expert witnesses, is serious, incurable and exists before his marriage and renders him a helpless victim of his structural constellation. It   is  beyond   the   respondent’s   impulse  control.   In   short,  he   is  weaponless  or  powerless   to restrain himself from his consistent behaviors simply because he did not consider the same as wrongful. This is clearly manifested from his assertion that nothing was wrong in his marriage with the petitioner and considered their relationship as a normal one. In fact, with this belief, he lent deaf ears to counseling and efforts extended to them by his original family members to save  his  marriage.   In   short,   he  was  blind   and   too   insensitive   to   the   reality  of   his  marital atmosphere.  He   totally  disregarded   the   feelings  of  petitioner  who appeared   to  have  been saturated already that she finally revealed her misfortunes to her sister-in-law and willingly submitted to counseling to save their marriage. However, the hard position of the respondent finally constrained her to ask respondent to leave the conjugal dwelling. Even the siblings of the respondent were unanimous that separation is the remedy to the seriously ailing marriage of the parties. Respondent confirmed this stand of his siblings.

x x x x

The process of an ideal atmosphere demands a give and take relationship and not a one sided one. It also requires surrender to the fulfillment of the essential duties to the marriage which must naturally be observed by the parties as a consequence of their marriage. Unfortunately, the more than 21 years of marriage between the parties did not create a monument of marital integrity,   simply   because   the   personality   disorder   of   the   respondent   which   renders   him psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his basic duties to his marriage, is deeply entombed in his 

structural system and cure is not possible due to his belief that there is nothing wrong with them.

The checkered life of the parties is not solely attributable to the respondent. Petitioner, too, is to be blamed. Dra. Villegas was firm that she, too, is afflicted with psychological incapacity as her personality cannot be harmonized with the personality of the respondent. They are poles apart. Petitioner is a well-organized person or a perfectionist while respondent is a free spirited or carefree person. Thus, the weakness of the respondent cannot be catered by the petitioner and vice-versa.

Resultantly,   the   psychological   incapacities   of   both   parties   constitute   the   thunder   bolt   or principal culprit on their inability to nurture and reward their marital life with meaning and significance. So much so that it is a pity that though their marriage is intact for 21 years, still it is an empty kingdom due to their psychological incapacity which is grave, incurable and has origin from unhealthy event in their growing years.

Both parties to the marriage are protected by the law. As human beings, they are entitled to live in a peaceful and orderly environment conducive to a healthy life. In fact, Article 72 of the Family Code provides remedy to any party aggrieved by their marital reality. The case of the parties is already a settled matter due to their psychological incapacity. In the words of Dra. Magno,   their   marriage,   at   the   very   inception,   was   already   at   the   funeral   parlor.   Stated differently, there was no life at all in their marriage for it never existed at all. The Court finds that with this reality, both parties suffer in agony by continuously sustaining a marriage that exists in paper only. Hence, it could no longer chain or jail the parties whose marriage remains in its crib with its boots and diaper due to factors beyond the physical, emotional, intellectual and social ability of the parties to sustain.9

In a complete turnaround, albeit disposing of the case through a divided decision, the appellate court diverged from the findings of the RTC in this wise:

On the basis of the guidelines [in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina] vis-à-vis the totality of   evidence   presented  by  herein   [petitioner],  we  find   that   the   latter   failed   to   sufficiently establish the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband, as well as of herself. There is thus no basis for declaring the nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

[Petitioner]  presented several expert witnesses to show that [respondent]   is  psychologically incapacitated. Clinical psychologist Dayan diagnosed [respondent] as purportedly suffering from Mixed Personality Disorder (Schizoid Narcissistic and Anti-Social Personality Disorder). Further, clinical psychologist Magno found [respondent] to be suffering from an Antisocial Personality Disorder with narcissistic and dependent features, while Dr. Villegas diagnosed [respondent] to be suffering from Personality Disorder of the anti-social type, associated with strong sense of Inadequacy especially along masculine strivings and narcissistic features.

Generally, expert opinions are regarded, not as conclusive, but as purely advisory in character. A court may place whatever weight it chooses upon such testimonies. It may even reject them, if it finds that they are inconsistent with the facts of the case or are otherwise unreasonable. In the instant case, neither clinical psychologist Magno nor psychiatrist Dr. Villegas conducted a psychological examination on the [respondent].

Undoubtedly,  the assessment and conclusion made by Magno and Dr.  Villegas are hearsay. They are "unscientific and unreliable" as they have no personal knowledge of the psychological condition of the [respondent] as they never personally examined the [respondent] himself.

x x x x

[I]t   can  be   gleaned   from  the   recommendation  of  Dayan   that   the  purported  psychological incapacity of [respondent] is not incurable as the [petitioner] would like this Court to think. It bears   stressing   that   [respondent]  was   referred   to   Dayan   for   "psychological   evaluation   to determine benchmarks of current psychological functioning." The undeniable fact is that based on   Dayan’s   personal   examination   of   the   [respondent],   the   assessment   procedures   used, behavioral   observations   made,   background   information   gathered   and   interpretation   of psychological data, the conclusion arrived at is that there is a way to help the [respondent] through individual therapy and counseling sessions.

Even granting arguendo that the charges cast by the [petitioner] on [respondent], such as his failure to give regular support, substance abuse, infidelity and "come and go" attitude are true, the   totality   of   the   evidence  presented   still   falls   short   of   establishing   that   [respondent]   is psychologically   incapacitated   to   comply   with   the   essential   marital   obligations   within   the contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code.

x x x x

In the case at bar, we hold that the court a quo’s findings regarding the [respondent’s] alleged mixed   personality   disorder,   his   "come   and   go"   attitude,   failed   business   ventures, inadequate/delayed   financial   support   to   his   family,   sexual   infidelity,   insensitivity   to [petitioner’s] feelings, irresponsibility, failure to consult [petitioner] on his business pursuits, unfulfilled promises, failure to pay debts in connection with his failed business activities, taking of drugs, etc. are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but on serious marital difficulties/differences and mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. [Respondent’s] "defects" were not present at the inception of marriage. They were even able to live in harmony in the first few years of their marriage, which bore them two children xxx.   In   fact,   [petitioner]  admitted  in  her  Amended Petition that   initially   they   lived comfortably   and   [respondent]  would  give  his   salary   in   keeping  with   the   tradition   in  most Filipino households, but the situation changed when [respondent] resigned from the family-owned Aristocrat  Restaurant and thereafter,   [respondent]   failed  in his  business ventures.   It appears, however, that [respondent] has been gainfully employed with Marigold Corporation, Inc. since 1998, which fact was stipulated upon by the [petitioner].

x x x x

As regards the purported psychological incapacity of [petitioner], Dr. Villegas’ Psychiatric Report states that [petitioner] "manifested inadequacies along her affective sphere, that made her less responsive to the emotional needs of her husband, who needed a great amount of it, rendering her   relatively   psychologically   incapacitated   to   perform   the   duties   and   responsibilities   of marriage.

However,  a  perusal  of   the  Amended  Petition  shows   that   it   failed   to  specifically  allege   the complete facts showing that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of celebration [thereof] even if such incapacity became manifest only after its celebration xxx. In fact, what was merely prayed for in the said Amended Petition is that judgment be rendered "declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent solemnized on 04 December 1976 to be void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent at the time of the celebration of marriage x x x.

x x x x

What is  evident  is that [petitioner]  really encountered a lot of difficulties in their marriage. However, it is jurisprudentially settled that psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty,"  a  "refusal"  or  a  "neglect"   in   the performance of  some marital  obligations,   it   is essential   that   they must  be shown to  be incapable of  doing  so,  due  to  some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

While   [petitioner’s]  marriage  with   [respondent]   failed  and  appears   to  be  without  hope  of reconciliation, the remedy, however,  is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. No less than the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of the family; it decrees marriage as legally "inviolable" and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the State.

Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, it must be read in conjunction with, although to be taken as distinct from Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would likewise, but for different reasons, render the marriage void ab initio, or Article 45 that would make   the   marriage   merely   voidable,   or   Article   55   that   could   justify   a   petition   for   legal separation.  Care must  be observed so that   these various circumstances  are not  applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter. Article 36 should not be confused with   a   divorce   law   that   cuts   the  marital   bond   at   the   time   the   causes   therefor  manifest themselves. x x x

It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition of the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family 

as a basic autonomous social institution. Hence, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.10

After a thorough review of the records of the case, we cannot subscribe to the appellate court’s ruling   that   the  psychological   incapacity  of   respondent  was  not   sufficiently  established.  We disagree with its decision declaring the marriage between the parties as valid and subsisting. Accordingly, we grant the petition.

Santos v. Court of Appeals11 solidified the jurisprudential foundation of the principle that the factors characterizing psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations are: (1) gravity, (2) juridical antecedence, and (3) incurability. We explained:

The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the   ordinary   duties   required   in  marriage;   it   must   be   rooted   in   the   history   of   the   party antedating   the   marriage,   although   the   overt   manifestations   may   emerge   only   after   the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.12

As   previously   adverted   to,   the   three   experts  were   one   in   diagnosing   respondent  with   a personality disorder, to wit:

1. Dra. Cecilia C. Villegas

PSYCHODYNAMICS OF THE CASE

[Petitioner] is the second among 6 siblings of educated parents. Belonging to an average social status, intellectual achievement is quite important to the family values (sic). All children were equipped with high intellectual potentials (sic) which made their parents proud of them. Father was disabled,  but despite his  handicap,  he was able to assume his  financial  and emotional responsibilities to his family and to a limited extent, his social functions (sic). Despite this, he has been described as the unseen strength in the family.

Mother [of petitioner] was [actively involved] in activities outside the home. Doing volunteer and   community   services,   she  was   not   the   demonstrative,   affectionate   and   the   emotional mother (sic).  Her  love and concern came in the form of positive attitudes, advices (sic)  and encouragements (sic), but not the caressing, sensitive and soothing touches of an emotional reaction (sic). Psychological home environment did not permit one to nurture a hurt feeling or depression, but one has to stand up and to help himself (sic). This trained her to subjugate (sic) emotions to reasons.

Because of her high intellectual endowment, she has easy facilities for any undertakings (sic). She is organized, planned (sic), reliable, dependable, systematic, prudent, loyal, competent and has a strong sense of duty (sic). But emotionally, she is not as sensitive. Her analytical resources and strong sense of objectivity predisposed her to a superficial adjustments (sic). She acts on 

the dictates of her mind and reason, and less of how she feels (sic). The above qualities are perfect for a leader, but less effective in a heterosexual relationship, especially to her husband, who has deep seated sense of inadequacy, insecurity, low self esteem and self-worth despite his intellectual assets (sic). Despite this, [petitioner] remained in her marriage for more than 20 years, trying to reach out and lending a hand for better understanding and relationship (sic). She was hoping for the time when others, like her husband would make decision for her (sic), instead   of   being   depended   upon.   But   the   more   [petitioner]   tried   to   compensate   for [respondent’s] shortcomings, the bigger was the discrepancy in their coping mechanisms (sic). At the end, [petitioner] felt unloved, unappreciated, uncared for and she characterized their marriage as very much lacking in relationship (sic).

On the other hand, [respondent] is the 9th of 11 siblings and belonged to the second set of brood (sic),  where there were less bounds (sic) and limitations during his growing up stage. Additionally, he was acknowledged as the favorite of his mother, and was described to have a close relationship with her. At an early age, he manifested clinical behavior of conduct disorder and was on marijuana regularly. Despite his apparent high intellectual potentials (sic), he felt that he needed a "push" to keep him going. His being a "free spirit", attracted [petitioner], who adored him for being able to do what he wanted, without being bothered by untraditional, unacceptable norms and differing ideas from other people. He presented no guilt feelings, no remorse, no anxiety for whatever wrongdoings he has committed. His studies proved too much of a pressure for him, and quit at the middle of his course, despite his apparent high intellectual resources (sic).

His marriage to [petitioner] became a bigger pressure. Trying to prove his worth, he quit work from his family employment and ventured on his own. With no much planning and project study, his businesses failed. This became the sources (sic) of their marital conflicts, the lack of relationships (sic)  and consultations (sic)  with each other,  his negativistic attitudes (sic)  and sarcasm, stubbornness  and  insults,  his   spitting at  her   face which  impliedly  meant  "you are nothing as compared to me" were in reality, his defenses for a strong sense of inadequacy (sic).

As described by [petitioner], he is intelligent and has bright ides. However, this seemed not coupled with emotional attributes such as perseverance, patience, maturity, direction, focus, adequacy, stability and confidence to make it work. He complained that he did not feel the support of his wife regarding his decision to go into his own business. But when he failed, the more he became negativistic and closed to suggestions especially from [petitioner]. He was too careful not to let go or make known his strong sense of inadequacy, ambivalence, doubts, lack of drive and motivation or even feelings of  inferiority,  for fear of rejection or loss of pride. When things did not work out according to his plans, he suppressed his hostilities in negative ways, such as stubbornness, sarcasm or drug intake.

His  decision  making   is   characterized  by  poor   impulse  control,   lack  of   insight  and  primitive drives. He seemed to feel more comfortable in being untraditional and different from others. Preoccupation  is centered on himself,   (sic)  an unconscious wish for the continuance of the gratification of his dependency needs, (sic) in his mother-son relationship. From this stems his 

difficulties in heterosexual relationship with his wife, as pressures, stresses, (sic) demands and expectations  filled  up   in   (sic)  up   in   their  marital   relationship.  Strong  masculine   strivings   is projected.

For an intelligent person like [respondent],  he may sincerely want to be able to assume his duties and responsibilities  as  a  husband and  father,  but  because of  a  severe  psychological deficit, he was unable to do so.

Based   on   the   clinical   data   presented,   it   is   the   opinion   of   the   examiner,   that   [petitioner] manifested   inadequacies  along  her  affective   sphere,   that  made  her   less   responsive   to   the emotional needs of her husband, who needed a great amount of it, rendering her relatively psychologically   incapacitated   to   perform   the   duties   and   responsibilities   of   marriage. [Respondent],  on   the  other  hand,  has  manifested  strong clinical  evidences   (sic),   that  he   is suffering from a Personality Disorder, of the antisocial type, associated with strong sense of Inadequacy along masculine strivings and narcissistic features that renders him psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. This is characterized by his inability to conform to the social norms that ordinarily govern many aspects of adolescent and adult behavior. His being a "free spirit" associated with no remorse, no guilt feelings and no anxiety, is distinctive of this clinical condition. His prolonged drug intake [marijuana] and maybe stronger drugs lately, are external factors to boost his ego.

The root cause of the above clinical conditions is due to his underlying defense mechanisms, or the unconscious mental processes, that the ego uses to resolve conflicts. His prolonged and closed attachments to his mother encouraged cross identification and developed a severe sense of   inadequacy   specifically   along   masculine   strivings.   He   therefore   has   to   camouflage   his weakness,   in   terms   of   authority,   assertiveness,   unilateral   and   forceful   decision   making, aloofness   and   indifference,   even   if   it   resulted   to   antisocial   acts.   His   narcissistic   supplies rendered by his mother was not resolved (sic).

It  existed before marriage,  but  became manifest  only  after   the celebration,  due to marital demands and stresses. It is considered as permanent in nature because it started early in his psychological development, and therefore became so engrained into his personality structures (sic). It is considered as severe in degree, because it hampered, interrupted and interfered with his normal functioning related to heterosexual adjustments. (emphasis supplied)13

2. Dr. Natividad A. Dayan

Adolfo and Mandy[, respondent]’s brothers, referred [respondent] to the clinic. According to them, respondent has not really taken care of his wife and children. He does not seem to have any direction in life. He seems to be full of bright ideas and good at starting things but he never gets to accomplish anything. His brothers are suspecting (sic) that until now [respondent] is still taking drugs. There are times when they see that [respondent] is not himself. He likes to bum around   and   just   spends   the   day   at   home   doing   nothing.   They   wish   that   he’d   be   more responsible and try to give priority to his family. [Petitioner,] his wife[,] is the breadwinner of 

the family because she has a stable  job.   [Respondent]’s  brothers  learned from friends that [petitioner] is really disappointed with him. She has discussed things with him but he always refused to listen. She does not know what to do with him anymore. She has grown tired of him.

When [respondent] was asked about his drug problem, he mentioned that he stopped taking it in 1993. His brothers think that he is not telling the truth. It is so hard for [respondent] to stop taking drugs when he had been hooked to it for the past 22 years. When [respondent] was also asked what his problems are at the moment, he mentioned that he feels lonely and distressed. He does not have anyone to talk to. He feels that he and his wife [have] drifted apart. He wants to be close to somebody and discuss things with this person but he is not given the chance. He also mentioned that one of his weak points is that he is very tolerant of people[,] that is why he is taken advantage of most of the time. He wants to avoid conflict so he’d rather be submissive and compliant. He does not want to hurt anyone [or] to cause anymore pain. He wants to make other people happy.

x x x x

Interpretation of Psychological Data

A. Intellectual / Cognitive Functioning

x x x x

B. Vocational Preference

x x x x

C. Socio Emotional Functioning

x x x x

In his relationships with people, [respondent] is apt to project a reserved, aloof and detached attitude. [Respondent] exhibits withdrawal patterns. He has deep feelings of inadequacy. Due to a low self-esteem, he tends to feel inferior and to exclude himself from association with others. He feels that he is "different" and as a result is prone to anticipate rejections. Because of   the   discomfort   produced   by   these   feelings,   he   is   apt   to   avoid   personal   and   social involvement, which increases his preoccupation with himself and accentuates his tendency to withdraw from interpersonal contact. [Respondent] is also apt to be the less dominant partner. He feels better when he has to follow than when he has to take the lead. A self-contained person[,] he does not really need to interact with others in order to enjoy life and to be able to move on. He has a small need of companionship and is most comfortable alone. He, too[,] feels uncomfortable in expressing his more tender feelings for fear of being hurt. Likewise, he maybe very angry within but he may choose to repress this feeling. [Respondent’s] strong need for social approval,  which could have stemmed from some deep seated insecurities makes him 

submissive and over [compliant]. He tends to make extra effort to please people. Although at times[, he] already feels victimized and taken advantage of, he still tolerates abusive behavior for fear of interpersonal conflicts. Despite

his [dis]illusion with people, he seeks to minimize dangers of indifference and disapproval [of] others. Resentments are suppressed. This is likely to result in anger and frustrations which is likewise apt to be repressed.

There   are   indications   that   [respondent]   is[,]   at   the   moment[,]   experiencing   considerable tension and anxiety. He is prone to fits of apprehension and nervousness. Likewise, he is also entertaining feelings of hopelessness and is preoccupied with negative thought. He feels that he is up in the air but with no sound foundation. He is striving [for] goals which he knows he will never be able to attain. Feeling discouraged and distressed, he has difficulty concentrating and focusing on things which he needs to prioritize. He has many plans but he can’t accomplish anything because he is unable to see which path to take. This feeling of hopelessness is further aggravated by the lack of support from significant others.

Diagnostic Impression

Axis I : Drug Dependence

Axis II : Mixed Personality Disorder

[Schizoid, Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder]

Axis III : None

Axis IV : Psychosocial and Environmental Problems:

Severe

He seems to be very good at planning and starting things but is unable to accomplish anything; unable to give priority to the needs of his family; in social relationships.

Axis V : Global Assessment of Functioning – Fair (Emphasis supplied)14

3. Dr. Estrella T. Tiongson-Magno

Summary and Conclusion

From   the   evidence   available   from   [petitioner’s]   case   history   and   from   her   psychological assessment,  and despite the non-cooperation of the respondent,   it   is  possible to  infer with certainty the nullity of this marriage. Based on the information available about the respondent, he suffers from [an] antisocial  personality disorder with narcissistic and dependent features 

that   renders   him   too   immature   and   irresponsible   to   assume   the   normal   obligations   of   a marriage. As for the petitioner, she is a good, sincere, and conscientious person and she has tried her best to provide for the needs of her children. Her achievements in

this   regard  are  praiseworthy.  But   she   is  emotionally   immature  and  her   comprehension  of human situations is very shallow for a woman of her academic and professional competence. And this explains why she married RRR even when she knew he was a pothead, then despite the abuse, took so long to do something about her situation.

Diagnosis for [petitioner]:

Axis I Partner Relational Problem

Axis II Obsessive Compulsive Personality Style with Self-Defeating features

Axis III No diagnosis

Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord (spouse’s immaturity, drug abuse, and infidelity)

Severity: 4-severe

Diagnosis for [respondent]

Axis I Partner Relational Problem

Axis   II   Antisocial   Personality   Disorder   with   marked   narcissistic,   aggressive   sadistic   and dependent features

Axis III No diagnosis

Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord (successful wife)

Severity: 4 (severe)

x x x x

One has to go back to [respondent’s] early childhood in order to understand the root cause of his antisocial personality disorder. [Respondent] grew up the ninth child in a brood of 11. His elder siblings were taken cared of by his grandmother. [Respondent’s] father was kind, quiet and blind and [respondent] was [reared] by his mother. Unfortunately, [respondent’s] mother grew up believing that she was not her mother’s favorite child, so she felt "api, treated like poor relations." [Respondent’s] mother’s reaction to her perceived rejection was to act out—with 

poor impulse control and poor mood regulation (spent money like water, had terrible temper tantrums, etc.). Unwittingly, his mother became [respondent’s] role model.

However, because [respondent] had to get on with the business of living, he learned to use his good looks and his charms, and learned to size up the weaknesses of others, to lie convincingly and to say what people wanted to hear (esp. his deprived mother who liked admiration and attention, his siblings from whom he borrowed money, etc.). In the process, his ability to love and to empathize with others was impaired so that he cannot sustain a relationship with one person for a long time, which is devastating in a marriage.

[Respondent’s] narcissistic personality features were manifested by his self-centeredness (e.g. moved to Mindoro and lived there for 10 years,  leaving his family in Manila); his grandiose sense   of   self-importance   (e.g.   he  would   just   "come   and   go,"  without   telling   his  wife   his whereabouts, etc.); his sense of entitlement (e.g. felt entitled to a mistress because [petitioner] deprived him of his marital rights, etc.); interpersonally exploitative (e.g. let his wife spend for all the maintenance needs of the family, etc.); and lack of empathy (e.g. when asked to choose between his mistress and his wife, he said he would think about it, etc.) The aggressive sadistic personality features were manifested whom he has physically, emotionally and verbally abusive [of] his wife when high on drugs; and his dependent personality features were manifested by his need for others to assume responsibility for most major areas of his life, and in his difficulty in doing things on his own.

[Respondent],   diagnosed   with   an   antisocial   personality   disorder   with   marked   narcissistic features and aggressive sadistic and dependent  features,   is  psychologically   incapacitated to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage: to love, respect and render support for his spouse and children. A personality disorder is not curable as it is permanent and stable over time.

From a psychological viewpoint, therefore, there is evidence that the marriage of [petitioner] and [respondent is] null and void from the very beginning. (emphasis supplied)15

Notwithstanding   these   telling   assessments,   the  CA   rejected,  wholesale,   the   testimonies  of Doctors  Magno   and  Villegas   for   being   hearsay   since   they   never   personally   examined   and interviewed the respondent.

We do not agree with the CA.

The   lack   of   personal   examination   and   interview   of   the   respondent,   or   any   other   person diagnosed with personality disorder, does not per se invalidate the testimonies of the doctors. Neither do their findings automatically constitute hearsay that would result in their exclusion as evidence.

For one, marriage, by its very definition,16 necessarily involves only two persons. The totality of the behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other. In this case, the experts testified on their individual assessment 

of the present state of the parties’ marriage from the perception of one of the parties, herein petitioner.   Certainly,   petitioner,   during   their  marriage,   had   occasion   to   interact  with,   and experience, respondent’s pattern of behavior which she could then validly relay to the clinical psychologists and the psychiatrist.

For another, the clinical psychologists’ and psychiatrist’s assessment were not based solely on the narration or personal interview of the petitioner. Other informants such as respondent’s own son,  siblings and  in-laws,  and sister-in-law (sister  of  petitioner),   testified on their  own observations of respondent’s behavior and interactions with them, spanning the period of time they knew him.17 These were also used as the basis of the doctors’ assessments.

The recent case of Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim,18 citing The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,   Fourth   Edition   (DSM   IV),19 instructs   us   on   the   general   diagnostic   criteria   for personality disorders:

A.  An enduring  pattern  of   inner  experience  and behavior   that  deviates  markedly   from the expectations of the individual's culture. This pattern is manifested in two (2) or more of the following areas:

(1) cognition (i.e., ways of perceiving and interpreting self, other people, and events)

(2)   affectivity   (i.e.,   the   range,   intensity,   liability,   and   appropriateness   of   emotional response)

(3) interpersonal functioning

(4) impulse control

B. The enduring pattern is inflexible and pervasive across a broad range of personal and social situations.

C.   The   enduring   pattern   leads   to   clinically   significant   distress   or   impairment   in   social, occupational or other important areas of functioning.

D.  The pattern  is  stable and of   long duration,  and  its  onset can be traced back at   least  to adolescence or early adulthood.

E. The enduring pattern is not better accounted for as a manifestation or a consequence of another mental disorder.

F. The enduring pattern is not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (i.e., a drug of abuse, a medication) or a general medical condition (e.g., head trauma).

Specifically, the DSM IV outlines the diagnostic criteria for Antisocial Personality Disorder:

A. There is a pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others occurring since age 15 years, as indicated by three (or more) of the following:

(1) failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors as indicated by repeatedly performing acts that are grounds for arrest

(2) deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or conning others for personal profit or pleasure

(3) impulsivity or failure to plan ahead

(4) irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physical fights or assaults

(5) reckless disregard for safety of self or others

(6) consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to sustain consistent work behavior or honor financial obligations

(7)   lack of   remorse as   indicated by being  indifferent   to or   rationalizing  having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from another

B. The individual is at least 18 years.

C. There is evidence of conduct disorder with onset before age 15 years.

D. The occurrence of antisocial behavior is not exclusively during the course of schizophrenia or a manic episode.20

Within their acknowledged field of expertise, doctors can diagnose the psychological make up of a person based on a number of factors culled from various sources. A person afflicted with a personality   disorder   will   not   necessarily   have   personal   knowledge   thereof.   In   this   case, considering that a personality disorder is manifested in a pattern of behavior, self-diagnosis by the respondent consisting only in his bare denial of the doctors’ separate diagnoses, does not necessarily evoke credence and cannot trump the clinical findings of experts.

The CA declared that, based on Dr. Dayan’s findings and recommendation, the psychological incapacity of respondent is not incurable.

The appellate court is mistaken.

A   recommendation   for   therapy   does   not   automatically   imply   curability.   In   general, recommendations   for   therapy   are   given  by   clinical   psychologists,   or   even  psychiatrists,   to manage   behavior.   In   Kaplan   and   Saddock’s   textbook   entitled   Synopsis   of Psychiatry,21 treatment,   ranging   from psychotherapy   to  pharmacotherapy,   for   all   the   listed 

kinds of personality disorders are recommended. In short, Dr. Dayan’s recommendation that respondent should undergo therapy does not necessarily negate the finding that respondent’s psychological incapacity is incurable.

Moreover,   Dr.   Dayan,   during   her   testimony,   categorically   declared   that   respondent   is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.22 As aptly stated by Justice Romero in her separate opinion in the ubiquitously cited case of Republic v. Court of Appeals & Molina:23

[T]he professional  opinion of  a  psychological  expert  became  increasingly   important   in  such cases. Data about the person’s entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to give professional  opinions about a party’s  mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.

… [Because]  of  advances made  in psychology during the past  decades.  There was now the expertise   to  provide   the  all-important  connecting   link  between a  marriage  breakdown and premarital causes.

In sum, we find points of convergence & consistency in all three reports and the respective testimonies of Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas, i.e.: (1) respondent does have problems; and (2) these problems include chronic irresponsibility; inability to recognize and work towards providing the needs of his family; several failed business attempts; substance abuse; and a trail of unpaid money obligations.

It is true that a clinical psychologist’s or psychiatrist’s diagnoses that a person has personality disorder   is   not   automatically   believed   by   the   courts   in   cases   of   declaration   of   nullity   of marriages.   Indeed,  a clinical  psychologist’s  or  psychiatrist’s  finding of a personality disorder does not exclude a finding that a marriage is valid and subsisting, and not beset by one of the parties’ or both parties’ psychological incapacity.

On more than one occasion, we have rejected an expert’s opinion concerning the supposed psychological   incapacity  of  a  party.24 In   Lim v.   Sta.  Cruz-Lim,25 we   ruled   that,  even  without delving   into   the   non-exclusive   list   found   in   Republic   v.   Court   of   Appeals   &  Molina,26 the stringent requisites provided in Santos v. Court of Appeals27must be independently met by the party  alleging   the  nullity  of   the  marriage  grounded  on  Article  36  of   the  Family  Code.  We declared, thus:

It was folly for the trial court to accept the findings and conclusions of Dr. Villegas with nary a link   drawn  between   the   "psychodynamics   of   the   case"   and   the   factors   characterizing   the psychological   incapacity.   Dr.   Villegas'   sparse   testimony   does   not   lead   to   the   inevitable conclusion that  the parties were psychologically   incapacitated to comply  with the essential marital obligations. Even on questioning from the trial court, Dr. Villegas' testimony did not 

illuminate on the parties' alleged personality disorders and their incapacitating effect on their marriage x x x.

Curiously,   Dr.   Villegas'   global   conclusion   of   both   parties'   personality   disorders   was   not supported  by  psychological   tests  properly  administered  by   clinical  psychologists   specifically trained in the tests' use and interpretation. The supposed personality disorders of the parties, considering that such diagnoses were made, could have been fully established by psychometric and neurological tests which are designed to measure specific aspects of people's intelligence, thinking, or personality.

x x x x

The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at after a maximum of seven (7) hours of interview, and unsupported by separate psychological tests, cannot tie the hands of the trial court and prevent it from making its own factual finding on what happened in this case. The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of his theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that he can render to the courts in showing the facts that serve as a basis for his criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of his conclusion is founded.

In the case at bar, however, even without the experts’ conclusions, the factual antecedents (narrative   of   events)   alleged   in   the   petition   and   established   during   trial,   all   point   to   the inevitable conclusion that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.

Article 68 of the Family Code provides:

Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.

In this connection, it is well to note that persons with antisocial personality disorder exhibit the following clinical features:

Patients with antisocial personality disorder can often seem to be normal and even charming and  ingratiating.  Their  histories,  however,   reveal  many areas of  disordered  life   functioning. Lying, truancy, running away from home, thefts, fights, substance abuse, and illegal activities are   typical   experiences   that   patients   report   as   beginning   in   childhood.   x   x   x   Their   own explanations  of   their   antisocial  behavior  make   it   seem mindless,  but   their  mental   content reveals the complete absence of delusions and other signs of irrational thinking. In fact, they frequently have a heightened sense of reality testing and often impress observers as having good verbal intelligence.

x x x Those with this disorder do not tell the truth and cannot be trusted to carry out any task or adhere to any conventional standard of morality. x x x A notable finding is a lack of remorse for these actions; that is, they appear to lack a conscience.28

In the instant case, respondent’s pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his: (1) sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed business attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not connected with the family businesses; and (7) criminal charges of estafa.

On the  issue of the petitioner’s purported psychological   incapacity,  we agree with the CA’s ruling thereon:

A perusal of the Amended Petition shows that it failed to specifically allege the complete facts showing that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital   obligations   of   marriage   at   the   time   of   the   celebration   of   marriage   even   if   such incapacity became manifest only after its celebration x x x. In fact, what was merely prayed for in the said Amended Petition is that judgment be rendered "declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent solemnized on 04 December 1976 to be void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent at the time of the celebration of the marriage x x x

At   any   rate,   even   assuming   arguendo   that   [petitioner’s]   Amended   Petition   was   indeed amended to conform to the evidence, as provided under Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court,   Dr.   Villegas’   finding   that   [petitioner]   is   supposedly   suffering   from   an   Inadequate Personality [Disorder] along the affectional area does not amount to psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Such alleged condition of [petitioner] is not a debilitating psychological   condition   that   incapacitates   her   from   complying   with   the   essential   marital obligations   of  marriage.1avvphi1 In   fact,   in   the   Psychological   Evaluation   Report   of   clinical psychologist  Magno,   [petitioner]  was given a glowing evaluation as  she was  found to be a "good, sincere, and conscientious person and she has tried her best to provide for the needs of her children. Her achievements in this regard are praiseworthy." Even in Dr. Villegas’ psychiatric report, it was stated that [petitioner] was able to remain in their marriage for more than 20 years "trying to reach out and lending a hand for better understanding and relationship." With the foregoing evaluation made by no less than [petitioner’s] own expert witnesses, we find it hard to believe that she is psychologically incapacitated within the contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code.29

All told, it is wise to be reminded of the caveat articulated by Justice Teodoro R. Padilla in his separate statement in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina:30

x x  x  Each case must be  judged,  not on the basis  of  a  priori  assumptions,  predilections or generalizations  but  according   to   its  own facts.   In   the  field  of  psychological   incapacity  as  a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court."

In fine, given the factual milieu of the present case and in light of the foregoing disquisition, we find ample basis to conclude that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations at the time of his marriage to the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA -G.R. CV No. 89761 is REVERSED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 89, Quezon City in Civil Case No.  Q-01-44854 declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code is REINSTATED. No costs.

DAVID B. DEDEL, Petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and SHARON L. CORPUZ-DEDEL a.k.a. JANE IBRAHIM, Respondents.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Petitioner David B. Dedel met respondent Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel while he was working in the advertising business of his father. The acquaintance led to courtship and romantic relations, culminating in the exchange of marital vows before the City Court of Pasay on September 28, 1966.1 The civil marriage was ratified in a church wedding on May 20, 1967.2

The union produced four children, namely: Beverly Jane, born on September 18, 1968;3 Stephanie Janice born on September 9, 1969;4 Kenneth David born on April 24, 1971;5 and Ingrid born on October 20, 1976.6 The conjugal partnership, nonetheless, acquired neither property nor debt.

Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and immature wife and mother. She had extra-marital affairs with several men: a dentist in the Armed Forces of the Philippines; a Lieutenant in the Presidential Security Command and later a Jordanian national.

Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila Medical City for treatment by Dr. Lourdes Lapuz, a clinical psychiatrist. Petitioner alleged that despite the treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship with the Jordanian national named Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she married and with whom she had two children. However, when Mustafa Ibrahim left the country, Sharon returned to petitioner bringing along her two children by Ibrahim. Petitioner accepted her back and even considered the two illegitimate children as his own. Thereafter, on December 9, 1995, Sharon abandoned petitioner to join Ibrahim in Jordan with their two children. Since then, Sharon would only return to the country on special occasions.

Finally, giving up all hope of a reconciliation with Sharon, petitioner filed on April 1, 1997 a petition seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of psychological

incapacity, as defined in Article 36 of the Family Code, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 149. Summons was effected by publication in the Pilipino Star Ngayon, a newspaper of general circulation in the country considering that Sharon did not reside and could not be found in the Philippines.7

Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, who testified that she conducted a psychological evaluation of petitioner and found him to be conscientious, hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist who wants all tasks and projects completed up to the final detail and who exerts his best in whatever he does.

On the other hand, Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse, even bringing with her the two children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of Anti-Social Personality Disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage.8

After trial, judgment was rendered, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the civil and church marriages between DAVID B. DEDEL and SHARON L. CORPUZ celebrated on September 28, 1966 and May 20, 1967 are hereby declared null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent to perform the essential obligations of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of gains existing between the parties is dissolved and in lieu thereof a regime of complete separation of property between the said spouses is established in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Family Code, without prejudice to rights previously acquired by creditors.

Let a copy of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property registries in accordance with Article 52 of the Family Code.

SO ORDERED.9

Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, appealed alleging that –

I

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF A VALID GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE CHURCH MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER IS NULL AND VOID.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A DECISION WITHOUT A CERTIFICATION HAVING BEEN ISSUED BY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AS REQUIRED IN THE MOLINA CASE.

The Court of Appeals recalled and set aside the judgment of the trial court and ordered dismissal of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.10

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated January 8, 2002.11 Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner contends that the appellate court gravely abused its discretion and manifestly erred in its conclusion that the: (1) respondent was not suffering from psychological incapacity to perform her marital obligations; (2) psychological incapacity of respondent is not attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and permanence or incurability; and (3) totality of evidence submitted by the petitioner falls short to prove psychological incapacity suffered by respondent.

The main question for resolution is whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding that respondent is psychologically incapacitated. More specifically, does the aberrant sexual behavior of respondent adverted to by petitioner fall within the term "psychological incapacity?"

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,12 it was ruled:

x x x "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity of inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."

The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.

Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinion of psychiatrists, psychologists and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.13

The difficulty in resolving the problem lies in the fact that a personality disorder is a very complex and elusive phenomenon which defies easy analysis and definition. In this case, respondent’s sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that she could not have known the obligations she was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given a valid assumption thereof.14 It appears that respondent’s promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception of the marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the records is a blissful marital union at its celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and which produced four children.

Respondent’s sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity.15 It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity16 or sexual promiscuity.

At best, the circumstances relied upon by petitioner are grounds for legal separation under Article 5517 of the Family Code. However, we pointed out in Marcos v. Marcos18 that Article 36 is not to be equated with legal separation in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. In short, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.

We likewise agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court has no jurisdiction to dissolve the church marriage of petitioner and respondent. The authority to do so is exclusively lodged with the Ecclesiastical Court of the Roman Catholic Church.

All told, we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the appellate court. 1âwphi1 We cannot deny the grief, frustration and even desperation of petitioner in his present situation. Regrettably, there are circumstances, like in this case, where neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to every individual problem.19 While we sympathize with petitioner’s marital predicament, our first and foremost duty is to apply the law no matter how harsh it may be.20

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60406, which ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 97-467 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, is AFFIRMED. No costs.

JUANITA CARATING-SIAYNGCO, petitioner, vs.MANUEL SIAYNGCO, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 01 July 2003, reversing the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 102, Quezon City, dated 31 January 2001, which dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by respondent herein Judge Manuel Siayngco ("respondent Manuel").

Petitioner Juanita Carating-Siayngco ("Petitioner Juanita") and respondent Manuel were married at civil rites on 27 June 1973 and before the Catholic Church on 11 August 1973. After discovering that they could not have a child of their own, the couple decided to adopt a baby boy in 1977, who they named Jeremy.

On 25 September 1997, or after twenty-four (24) years of married life together, respondent Manuel filed for the declaration of its nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of petitioner Juanita. He alleged that all throughout their marriage, his wife exhibited an over domineering and selfish attitude towards him which was exacerbated by her extremely volatile and bellicose nature; that she incessantly complained about almost everything and anyone connected with him like his elderly parents, the staff in his office and anything not of her liking like the physical arrangement, tables, chairs, wastebaskets in his office and with other trivial matters; that she showed no respect or regard at all for the prestige and high position of his office as judge of the Municipal Trial Court; that she would yell and scream at him and throw objects around the house within the hearing of their neighbors; that she cared even less about his professional advancement as she did not even give him moral support and encouragement; that her psychological incapacity arose before marriage, rooted in her deep-seated resentment and vindictiveness for what she perceived as lack of love and appreciation from her own parents since childhood and that such incapacity is permanent and incurable and, even if treatment could be attempted, it will involve time and expense beyond the emotional and physical capacity of the parties; and that he endured and suffered through his turbulent and loveless marriage to her for twenty-two (22) years.

In her Answer, petitioner Juanita alleged that respondent Manuel is still living with her at their conjugal home in Malolos, Bulacan; that he invented malicious stories against her so that he could be free to marry his paramour; that she is a loving wife and mother; that it was respondent Manuel who was remiss in his marital and family obligations; that she supported respondent Manuel in all his endeavors despite his philandering; that she was raised in a real happy family and had a happy childhood contrary to what was stated in the complaint.

In the pre-trial order,3 the parties only stipulated on the following:

1. That they were married on 27 June 1973;

2. That they have one son who is already 20 years old.

Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. Respondent Manuel first took the witness stand and elaborated on the allegations in his petition. He testified that his parents never approved of his marriage as they still harbored hope that he would return to the seminary.4 The early years of their marriage were difficult years as they had a hard time being accepted as husband and wife by his parents and it was at this period that his wife started exhibiting signs of being irritable and temperamental5 to him and his parents.6 She was also obsessive about cleanliness which became the common source of their quarrels.7 He, however, characterized their union as happy during that period of time in 1979 when they moved to Malolos as they were engrossed in furnishing their new house.8 In 1981, when he became busy with law school and with various community organizations, it was then that he felt that he and his wife started to drift apart.9 He then narrated incidents during their marriage that were greatly embarrassing and/or distressing to him, e.g., when his wife quarreled with an elderly neighbor;10 when she would visit him in his office and remark that the curtains were already dirty or when she kicked a trash can across the room or when she threw a ballpen from his table;11 when she caused his office drawer to be forcibly opened while he was away;12 when she confronted a female tenant of theirs and accused the tenant of having an affair with him;13 and other incidents reported to him which would show her jealous nature. Money matters continued to be a source of bitter quarrels.14 Respondent Manuel could not forget that he was not able to celebrate his appointment as judge in 1995 as his wife did not approve it, ostensibly for lack of money, but she was very generous when it came to celebrations of their parish priest.15 Respondent Manuel then denied that he was a womanizer16 or that he had a mistress.17 Lastly, respondent Manuel testified as to their conjugal properties and obligations.18

Next, LUCENA TAN, respondent Manuel’s Clerk of Court, testified that petitioner Juanita seldom went to respondent Manuel’s office.19 But when she was there, she would call witness to complain about the curtains and the cleanliness of the office.20 One time, witness remembered petitioner Juanita rummaging through respondent Manuel’s drawer looking for his address book while the latter was in Subic attending a conference.21 When petitioner Juanita could not open a locked drawer she called witness, telling the latter that she was looking for the telephone number of respondent’s hotel room in Subic. A process server was requested by petitioner Juanita to call for a locksmith in the town proper. When the locksmith arrived, petitioner Juanita ordered him to open the locked drawer. On another occasion, particularly in August of 1998, witness testified that she heard petitioner Juanita remark to respondent Manuel "sino bang batang bibinyagan na yan? Baka anak mo yan sa labas?"22

As his third witness, respondent Manuel presented DR. VALENTINA GARCIA whose professional qualifications as a psychiatrist were admitted by petitioner Juanita.23 From her psychiatric evaluation,24 Dr. Garcia concluded:

To sum up, Manuel de Jesus Siayngco and Juanita Victoria Carating-Siayngco contributed to the marital collapse. There is a partner relational problem which affected their capacity to sustain the marital bond with love, support and understanding.

The partner relational problem (coded V61/10 in the Fourth Edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders or DSM IV) is secondary to the psychopathology of both spouses. Manuel and Juanita had engaged themselves in a defective communication pattern which is characteristically negative and deformed. This affected their competence to maintain the love and respect that they should give to each other.

Marriage requires a sustained level of adaptation from both partners who are expected to use healthy strategies to solve their disputes and differences. Whereas Juanita would be derogatory, critical, argumentative, depressive and obsessive-compulsive, Manuel makes use of avoidance and suppression. In his effort to satisfy the self and to boost his masculine ego to cover up for his felt or imagined inadequacies, he became callused to the detrimental effects of his unfaithfulness and his failure to prioritize the marriage. Both spouses, who display narcissistic psychological repertoire (along with their other maladaptive traits), failed to adequately empathize (or to be responsive and sensitive) to each other’s needs and feelings. The matrimonial plot is not conducive to a healthy and a progressive marriage. Manuel and Juanita have shown their psychologically [sic] incapacity to satisfactorily comply with the fundamental duties of marriage. The clashing of their patterns of maladaptive traits, which warrant the diagnosis of personality disorder not otherwise specified (PDNOS, with code 301.9 as per DSM IV criteria) will bring about more emotional mishaps and psychopathology. These rigid sets of traits which were in existence before the marriage will tend to be pervasive and impervious to recovery.25

In her defense, petitioner Juanita denied respondent Manuel’s allegations. She insisted that they were a normal couple who had their own share of fights; that they were happily married until respondent Manuel started having extra-marital affairs26 which he had admitted to her.27 Petitioner Juanita professed that she would wish to preserve her marriage and that she truly loved her husband.28 She stated further that she has continuously supported respondent Manuel, waiting up for him while he was in law school to serve him food and drinks. Even when he already filed the present case, she would still attend to his needs.29 She remembered that after the pre-trial, while they were in the hallway, respondent Manuel implored her to give him a chance to have a new family.30

DR. EDUARDO MAABA, whose expertise as a psychiatrist was admitted by respondent Manuel,31 testified that he conducted a psychiatric evaluation on petitioner Juanita, the results of which were embodied in his report. Said report stated in part:

Based on the clinical interviews and the results of the psychological tests, respondent Juanita Victoria Carating-Siayngco, was found to be a mature, conservative, religious and highly intelligent woman who possess [sic] more than enough psychological potentials for a mutually satisfying long term heterosexual relationship. Superego is strong and she is respectful of traditional institutions of society like the institution of marriage. She was also found to be a loving, nurturing and self-sacrificing woman who is capable of enduring severe environmental stress in her social milieu. Finally, she is reality-oriented and therefore capable of rendering fair and sound decision.

In summary, the psychiatric evaluation found the respondent to be psychologically capacitated to comply with the basic and essential obligations of marriage.32

CRISPINA SEVILLA, a friend of the spouses Siayngco since 1992 described the Siayngcos as the ideal couple, sweet to each other.33 The couple would religiously attend prayer meetings in the community.34 Both were likewise leaders in their community.35 Witness then stated that she would often go to the house of the couple and, as late as March 2000, she still saw respondent Manuel there.36

On 31 January 2001, the trial court denied respondent Manuel’s petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to petitioner Juanita holding in part that:

The asserted psychological incapacity of the defendant is not preponderantly supported in evidence. The couple [was] happily married and after four years of marital bliss [was] blest with a son. Their life together continued years thereafter in peace and prosperity.

The psychiatric finding that defendant has been critical, depressed and obsessive doubtless arose later in the parties’ relationship sometime in the early 90’s when the defendant-wife started receiving letters that the plaintiff is playing footsy.

x x x           x x x           x x x

The present state of our laws on marriage does not favor knee-jerk responses to slight stabs of the Pavlovian hammer on marital relations. A wife, as in the instant case, may have succumbed, due to her jealousy, to the constant delivery of irritating curtain lectures to her husband. But, as our laws now stand, the dissolution of the marriage is not the remedy in such cases. In contrast to some countries, our laws do not look at a marital partner as a mere refrigerator in the Kitchen even if he or she sometimes may sound like a firetruck.37

A motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied in an order dated 04 May 2001.38

On 01 July 2003, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision, relying mainly on the psychiatric evaluation of Dr. Garcia finding both Manuel and Juanita psychologically incapacitated and on the case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals.39 Thus:

The report clearly explained the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity of plaintiff Manuel and defendant Juanita. It appears that there is empathy between plaintiff and defendant. That is – a shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each other’s feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who view the relationship with love "amore gignit amorem", sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise conscious of its value as a sublime social institution (Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 324).

This court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less, but reverse and set aside the decision of the lower court. Plaintiff Manuel is entitled to have his marriage declared a nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity, not only of defendant but also of himself.40

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred –

I. IN ITS FINDINGS THAT PETITIONER JUANITA IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED

II. IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT THAT PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT SEPARATED ON MARCH 1997, THE TRUTH IS THAT THEY ARE STILL LIVING TOGETHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE AT THE TIME OF THE FILING OF THE PETITION UP TO THE PRESENT

III. WHEN IT DID NOT FOLLOW THE GUIDELINES LAID DOWN BY THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF REPUBLIC V. MOLINA

IV. IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF HEREIN PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT NULL AND VOID ON GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE

The Court’s Ruling

Our pronouncement in Republic v. Dagdag41 is apropos. There, we held that whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage depends crucially on the facts of the case. Each case must be closely scrutinized and judged according to its own facts as there can be no case that is on "all fours" with another. This, the Court of Appeals did not heed.

The Court of Appeals perfunctorily applied our ruling in Chi Ming Tsoi despite a clear divergence in its factual milieu with the case at bar. In Chi Ming Tsoi, the couple involved therein, despite sharing the same bed from the time of their wedding night on 22 May 1988 until their separation on 15 March 1989, never had coitus. The perplexed wife filed the petition for the declaration of the nullity of her marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity of her husband. We sustained the wife for the reason that an essential marital obligation under the Family Code is procreation such that "the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity."

On the other hand, sexual intimacy for procreation is a non-issue herein. Rather, we have here a case of a husband who is constantly embarrassed by his wife’s outbursts and overbearing ways, who finds his wife’s obsession with cleanliness and the tight reign on his wallet "irritants" and who is wounded by her lack of support and respect for his person and his position as a Judge. In our book, however, these inadequacies of petitioner Juanita which led respondent Manuel to file a case against her do not amount to psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations.

It was in Santos v. Court of Appeals42 where we declared that "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It should refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.43 In Republic v. Court of Appeals44 we expounded:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state. The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a) medically or clinically identified, b) alleged in the complaint, c) sufficiently proven by experts and d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological – not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.45

With the foregoing pronouncements as compass, we now resolve the issue of whether or not the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity against petitioner Juanita and/or respondent Manuel.

A. RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF RESPONDENT MANUEL

We reiterate that the state has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition of the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution.46 With this cardinal state policy in mind, we held in Republic v. Court of Appeals47 that the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff (respondent Manuel herein). Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.

In herein case, the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in holding that respondent Manuel is psychologically incapacitated. The psychological report of Dr. Garcia, which is respondent Manuel’s own evidence, contains candid admissions of petitioner Juanita, the person in the best position to gauge whether or not her husband fulfilled the essential marital obligations of marriage:

She talked about her spouse, "My husband is kind, a good provider, cool, intelligent but a liar, masamang magalit at gastador. In spite of what he has done to me, I take care of him whenever he is sick. He is having extra marital affairs because he wants to have a child. I believe that our biggest problem is not having a child. It is his obsession to have a child with his girl now. He started his relationship with this girl in 1994. I even saw them together in the car. I think that it was the girl who encouraged him to file the petition." She feels that the problems in the relationship is [sic] "paulit-ulit," but, that she still is willing to pursue it.

x x x. Overall, she feels that he is a good spouse and that he is not really psychologically incapacitated. He apparently told her, "You and Jeremy should give me a chance to have a new family." She answered and said, "Ikaw tinuruan mo akong to fight for my right. Ipaglalaban ko ang marriage natin."48

What emerges from the psychological report of Dr. Garcia as well as from the testimonies of the parties and their witnesses is that the only essential marital obligation which respondent Manuel was not able to fulfill, if any, is the obligation of fidelity.49 Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code.50 It must be shown that respondent Manuel’s unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality which makes him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state51 and not merely due to his ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and blood. In herein case, respondent Manuel has admitted that: "I had [extra-marital] affairs because I wanted to have a child at that particular point."52

B. RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF PETITIONER JUANITA

As aforementioned, the presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. In the case at bar, respondent Manuel failed to prove that his wife’s lack of respect for him, her jealousies and obsession with cleanliness, her outbursts and her controlling nature (especially with respect to his salary), and her inability to endear herself to his parents are grave psychological maladies that paralyze her from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. Neither is there any showing that these "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.53 In fact, Dr. Maaba, whose expertise as a psychiatrist was admitted by respondent Manuel, reported that petitioner was psychologically capacitated to comply with the basic and essential obligations of marriage.54

The psychological report of respondent Manuel’s witness, Dr. Garcia, on the other hand, does not help his case any. Nothing in there supports the doctor’s conclusion that petitioner Juanita is psychologically incapacitated. On the contrary, the report clearly shows that the root cause of petitioner Juanita’s behavior is traceable – not from the inception of their marriage as required by law – but from her experiences during the marriage, e.g., her in-laws’ disapproval of her as they wanted their son to enter the priesthood,55 her husband’s philandering, admitted no less by him,56 and her inability to conceive.57 Dr. Garcia’s report paints a story of a husband and wife who grew professionally during the marriage, who pursued their individual dreams to the hilt, becoming busier and busier, ultimately sacrificing intimacy and togetherness as a couple. This was confirmed by respondent Manuel himself during his direct examination.58

Thus, from the totality of the evidence adduced by both parties, we have been allowed a window into the Siayngcos’s life and have perceived therefrom a simple case of a married couple drifting apart, becoming strangers to each other, with the husband consequently falling out of love and wanting a way out.

An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. Mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.59 As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos:60

Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifests themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.

We are not downplaying the frustration and misery respondent Manuel might be experiencing in being shackled, so to speak, to a marriage that is no longer working. Regrettably, there are situations like this one, where neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to every individual problem.61

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated 01 July 2003 of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated 31 January 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102 is reinstated and given full force and effect. No costs.

JORDAN CHAN PAZ, Petitioner, vs.JEANICE PAVON PAZ, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review1 of the 9 August 20042 and 26 November 20043 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80473. In its 9 August 2004 Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner Jordan Chan Paz’s (Jordan) appeal of the 13 May 2003 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 69 (trial court), which granted respondent Jeanice Pavon Paz’s (Jeanice) petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. In its 26 November 2004 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied Jordan’s motion for reconsideration.

The Facts

Jordan and Jeanice met sometime in November 1996. Jeanice was only 19 years old while Jordan was 27 years old. In January 1997, they became a couple and, on 10 May 1997, they were formally engaged. They had their civil wedding on 3 July 1997, and their church wedding on 21 September 1997. They have one son, Evan Gaubert, who was born on 12 February 1998. After a big fight, Jeanice left their conjugal home on 23 February 1999.

On 15 September 1999, Jeanice filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Jordan. Jeanice alleged that Jordan was psychologically incapable of assuming the essential obligations of marriage. According to Jeanice, Jordan’s psychological incapacity was manifested by his uncontrollable tendency to be self-preoccupied and self-indulgent, as well as his predisposition to become violent and abusive whenever his whims and caprices were not satisfied.

Jeanice alleged that Jordan had a tendency to lie about his whereabouts and had the habit of hanging out and spending a great deal of time with his friends. Since Jordan worked in their family business, Jordan would allegedly just stay home, tinker with the Play Station, and ask Jeanice to lie to his brothers about his whereabouts. Jeanice further alleged that Jordan was heavily dependent on and attached to his mother. After giving birth to their son, Jeanice noticed that Jordan resented their son and spent more time with his friends rather than help her take care of their son. Jordan also demanded from his mother a steady supply of milk and diapers for their son.

At the early stage of their marriage, Jeanice said they had petty fights but that the quarrels turned for the worse and Jordan became increasingly violent toward her. At one point, Jordan threatened to hurt her with a pair of scissors. Jeanice also alleged that on 22 February 1999, Jordan subjected her to verbal lashing and insults and threatened to hit her with a golf club. Jeanice added that Jordan has not provided any financial support or visited their son since she left their conjugal home.

Psychologist Cristina R. Gates (Gates) testified that Jordan was afflicted with "Borderline Personality Disorder as manifested in his impulsive behavior, delinquency and instability."5 Gates concluded that Jordan’s psychological maladies antedate their marriage and are rooted in his family background. Gates added that with no indication of reformation, Jordan’s personality disorder appears to be grave and incorrigible.

Jordan denied Jeanice’s allegations. Jordan asserted that Jeanice exaggerated her statements against him. Jordan said that Jeanice has her own personal insecurities and that her actions showed her lack of maturity, childishness and emotional inability to cope with the struggles and challenges of maintaining a married life.

Jordan also objected to the psychological report offered by Jeanice. Jordan pointed out that he was not subjected to any interview or psychological tests by Gates. Jordan argued that Gates’ conclusions were mere speculations, conjectures and suppositions from the information supplied by Jeanice. Jordan alleged that it was patently one-sided and is not admissible in evidence as it was based on hearsay statements of Jeanice which were obviously self-serving. Jordan said he wants Jeanice back and prayed for the dismissal of the petition.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

On 13 May 2003, the trial court granted Jeanice’s petition. The trial court declared that Jordan’s psychological incapacity, which was specifically identified as "Borderline Personality Disorder," deprived him of the capacity to fully understand his responsibilities under the marital bond. The trial court found that Jordan was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage, particularly Articles 686 and 707 of the Family Code. The trial court also declared that Jordan’s psychological incapacity, being rooted in his family background, antedates the marriage and that without any sign of reformation, found the same to be grave and incurable.

The dispositve portion of the trial court’s 13 May 2003 Decision reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between petitioner Jeanice Pavon Paz and respondent Jordan Chan Paz celebrated on July 3, 1997 and September 21, 1997 as null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code with all the effects provided by law. The couple’s absolute community of properties [sic] shall be dissolved in the manner herein provided. And the custody over Evan shall remain with the petitioner, without regard to visitation rights of the respondent as the father of the child. Furthermore, the parties are jointly responsible for the support of their minor child Evan Guabert Pavon Paz.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrars of Quezon City and Pasig City respectively as well as the National Statistics Office (NSO, CRP, Legal Department) EDSA, Quezon City.

SO ORDERED.8

On 6 June 2003, Jordan filed a Notice of Appeal.9 The trial court promptly approved Jordan’s appeal.

On 10 February 2004, Jeanice filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal with the Court of Appeals.10 In her motion, Jeanice sought the immediate dismissal of Jordan’s appeal on the ground that Jordan failed to comply with Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC11 which provides:

Sec. 20. Appeal.

(1) Pre-condition. No appeal from the decision shall be allowed unless the appellant has filed a motion for reconsideration or new trial within fifteen days from notice of judgment.

On 9 August 2004, the Court of Appeals dismissed Jordan’s appeal. According to the Court of Appeals, the rules state in mandatory and categorical terms that the filing of a motion for reconsideration or new trial is a pre-condition before an appeal from the decision is allowed. The

Court of Appeals added that when the law is clear and unambiguous, it admits no room for interpretation but merely for application.

Jordan filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 26 November 2004 Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed the motion.

Hence, this petition.

In a minute Resolution dated 22 June 2005, we denied Jordan’s petition for failure to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in the challenged resolutions as to warrant the exercise by this Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction.12

On 18 August 2005, Jordan filed a motion for reconsideration. While Jordan admits that he failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s 13 May 2003 Decision, Jordan submits that Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC should not have been strictly applied against him because it took effect only on 15 March 2003, or less than two months prior to the rendition of the trial court’s 13 May 2003 Decision. Moreover, Jordan enjoins the Court to decide the case on the merits so as to preserve the sanctity of marriage as enshrined in the Constitution.

Jeanice also filed an Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration on 1 September 2005.13

In a minute Resolution dated 19 September 2005, we granted Jordan’s motion for reconsideration and reinstated the petition.14

Jeanice filed a motion for reconsideration. In a minute Resolution dated 5 June 2006, we denied Jeanice’s motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.15

On 7 August 2006, Jeanice filed a second motion for reconsideration.

In a minute Resolution dated 20 September 2006, we denied Jeanice’s second motion for reconsideration for lack of merit and reminded Jeanice that a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading.16

The Issue

The only issue left to be resolved is whether Jordan is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has merit.

Jeanice Failed to Prove Jordan’s Psychological Incapacity

Jeanice’s petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which provides:

A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,17 the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) judicial antecedence; and (c) incurability. It must be confined "to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage."18

In Dimayuga-Laurena v. Court of Appeals,19 the Court explained:

(a) Gravity – It must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;

(b) Judicial Antecedence – It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and

(c) Incurability – It must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.20

In granting Jeanice’s petition, the trial court gave credence to the testimony of Gates to support its conclusion that Jordan was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. Gates declared that Jordan was suffering from "Borderline Personality Disorder" as manifested by his being a "mama’s boy" and that such was "grave and incurable," "rooted in his

family background, [and] antedates the marriage."

Although there is no requirement that a party to be declared psychologically incapacitated should be personally examined by a physician or a psychologist, there is nevertheless a need to prove the psychological incapacity through independent evidence adduced by the person alleging said disorder.21

Correspondingly, the presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.22

In this case, the Court notes that the report and testimony of Gates on Jordan’s psychological incapacity were based exclusively on her interviews with Jeanice and the transcript of stenographic notes of Jeanice’s testimony before the trial court.23 Gates only diagnosed Jordan from the statements of Jeanice, whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted. Gates did not actually hear, see and evaluate Jordan. Gates testified:

Q- As a last question Madam witness. So all in all your conclusions here on page 1 to page 5 of your Report are all based on the statement and perception of the petitioner (Jeanice) on the respondent (Jordan)?

A- Yes Mam.24

Consequently, Gates’ report and testimony were hearsay evidence since she had no personal knowledge of the alleged facts she was testifying on.25 Gates’ testimony should have thus been dismissed for being unscientific and unreliable.26

Moreover, contrary to the ruling of the trial court, Jordan’s alleged psychological incapacity was not shown to be so grave and so permanent as to deprive him of the awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond. At best, Jeanice’s allegations showed that Jordan was irresponsible, insensitive, or emotionally immature. The incidents cited by Jeanice do not show that Jordan suffered from grave psychological maladies that paralyzed Jordan from complying with the essential obligations of marriage.

What the law requires to render a marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity is downright incapacity, not refusal or neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.27 The mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" does not constitute psychological incapacity.28

In Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris,29 we said:

As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly a doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to marriage.30

Furthermore, Gates did not particularly describe the "pattern of behavior" which showed that Jordan indeed suffers from Borderline Personality Disorder. Gates also failed to explain how such a personality disorder made Jordan psychologically incapacitated to perform his obligations as a husband.

Likewise, Jeanice was not able to establish with certainty that Jordan’s alleged psychological incapacity was medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Gates’ testimony on the matter was vague and inconclusive. Gates testified:

Q - Now is this disorder curable?

A - If it’s continuing to the present therefore its persevererative behavior. Then the possibility of countering the same might be nil.31

Gates did not adequately explain how she came to the conclusion that Jordan’s condition was incurable.

In sum, the totality of the evidence presented by Jeanice failed to show that Jordan was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations and that such incapacity was grave, incurable, and existing at the time of the solemnization of their marriage. 1avvphi1

In Republic v. Cabantug-Baguio,32 we said:

The Constitution sets out a policy of protecting and strengthening the family as the basic social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Marriage, as an inviolable institution

protected by the State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties. In petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies on the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.33

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 9 August 2004 and 26 November 2004 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals. We REVERSE the 13 May 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 69. The marriage of Jeanice Pavon Paz to Jordan Chan Paz subsists and remains valid.

SILVINO A. LIGERALDE, Petitioner, vs.MAY ASCENSION A. PATALINGHUG and the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA, J.:

This petition seeks to set aside the November 30, 2004 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City (RTC) declaring the marriage between petitioner Silvino A. Ligeralde (Silvino) and private respondent May Ascension A. Patalinghug (May) null and void.

Silvino and May got married on October 3, 1984. They were blessed with four children. Silvino claimed that, during their marriage, he observed that May had several manifestations of a negative marital behavior. He described her as immature, irresponsible and carefree. Her infidelity, negligence and nocturnal activities, he claimed, characterized their marital relations.

Sometime in September 1995, May arrived home at 4:00 o’clock in the morning. Her excuse was that she had watched a video program in a neighboring town, but admitted later to have slept with her Palestinian boyfriend in a hotel. Silvino tried to persuade her to be conscientious of her duties as wife and mother. His pleas were ignored. His persuasions would often lead to altercations or physical violence.

In the midst of these, Silvino’s deep love for her, the thought of saving their marriage for the sake of their children, and the commitment of May to reform dissuaded him from separating from her. He still wanted to reconcile with her.

The couple started a new life. A few months after, however, he realized that their marriage was hopeless. May was back again to her old ways. This was demonstrated when Silvino arrived home one day and learned that she was nowhere to be found. He searched for her and found her in a nearby apartment drinking beer with a male lover.

Later, May confessed that she had no more love for him. They then lived separately.

With May’s irresponsible, immature and immoral behavior, Silvino came to believe that she is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.

Prior to the filing of the complaint, Silvino referred the matter to Dr. Tina Nicdao-Basilio for psychological evaluation. The psychologist certified that May was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations; that the incapacity started when she was still young and became manifest after marriage; and that the same was serious and incurable.3

On October 22, 1999, the RTC declared the marriage of Silvino and May null and void. Its findings were based on the Psychological Evaluation Report of Dr. Tina Nicdao-Basilio.

The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision. It ruled that private respondent’s alleged sexual infidelity, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility do not constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code and that the psychologist failed to identify and prove the root cause thereof or that the incapacity was medically or clinically permanent or incurable.

Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

The core issue raised by petitioner Silvino Ligeralde is that "the assailed order of the CA is based on conjecture and, therefore, issued without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction."4

The Court required the private respondent to comment but she failed to do so. Efforts were exerted to locate her but to no avail.

Nevertheless, the petition is technically and substantially flawed. On procedural grounds, the Court agrees with the public respondent that the petitioner should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 instead of this petition for certiorari under Rule 65. For having availed of the wrong remedy, this petition deserves outright dismissal.

Substantially, the petition has no merit. In order to avail of the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court,5 the petitioner must clearly show that the public respondent acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess in jurisdiction. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. In sum, for the extraordinary writ of certiorari to lie, there must be capricious, arbitrary or whimsical exercise of power.6

In this case at bench, the Court finds no commission of a grave abuse of discretion in the rendition of the assailed CA decision dismissing petitioner’s complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. Upon close scrutiny of the records, we find nothing whimsical, arbitrary or capricious in its findings.

A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which provides:

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage. It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.7 The Court likewise laid down the guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, in Republic v. Court of Appeals.8 Relevant to this petition are the following:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision; (3) the incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of the celebration" of the marriage; (4) such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable; and (5) such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.1avvphi1

Guided by these pronouncements, it is the Court’s considered view that petitioner’s evidence failed to establish respondent May’s psychological incapacity.

Petitioner's testimony did not prove the root cause, gravity and incurability of private respondent’s condition. Even Dr. Nicdao-Basilio failed to show the root cause of her psychological incapacity. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully explained and established by the totality of the evidence presented during trial.9

More importantly, the acts of private respondent do not even rise to the level of the "psychological incapacity" that the law requires. Private respondent's act of living an adulterous life cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of marriage. Petitioner must be able to establish that respondent's unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality, which makes her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.10

Doubtless, the private respondent was far from being a perfect wife and a good mother. She certainly had some character flaws. But these imperfections do not warrant a conclusion that she had a psychological malady at the time of the marriage that rendered her incapable of fulfilling her marital and family duties and obligations.11

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

ROSALINO L. MARABLE, Petitioner, vs.MYRNA F. MARABLE, Respondent.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

On appeal is the Decision1 dated February 12, 2007 and Resolution2 dated July 4, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 86111 which reversed and set aside the Decision3 dated January 4, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 72, Antipolo City, in Civil Case No. 01-6302. The RTC had granted petitioner’s prayer that his marriage to respondent be declared null and void on the ground that he is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage.

The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:

Petitioner and respondent met in 1967 while studying at Arellano University. They were classmates but initially, petitioner was not interested in respondent. He only became attracted to her after they happened to sit beside each other in a passenger bus. Petitioner courted respondent and they eventually became sweethearts even though petitioner already had a girl friend. Later, respondent discovered petitioner’s other relationship and demanded more time and attention from petitioner. Petitioner alleged that he appreciated this gesture like a child longing for love, time and attention.

On December 19, 1970, petitioner and respondent eloped and were married in civil rites at Tanay, Rizal before Mayor Antonio C. Esguerra. A church wedding followed on December 30, 1970 at the Chapel of the Muntinlupa Bilibid Prison and their marriage was blessed with five children.

As the years went by, however, their marriage turned sour. Verbal and physical quarrels became common occurrences. They fought incessantly and petitioner became unhappy because of it. The frequency of their quarrels increased when their eldest daughter transferred from one school to another due to juvenile misconduct. It became worse still when their daughter had an unwanted teenage pregnancy. The exceedingly serious attention petitioner gave to his children also made things worse for them as it not only spoiled some of them, but it also became another cause for the incessant quarrelling between him and respondent.

Longing for peace, love and affection, petitioner developed a relationship with another woman. Respondent learned about the affair, and petitioner promptly terminated it. But despite the end of the short-lived affair, their quarrels aggravated. Also, their business ventures failed. Any amount of respect remaining between them was further eroded by their frequent arguments and verbal abuses infront of their friends. Petitioner felt that he was unloved, unwanted and unappreciated and this made him indifferent towards respondent. When he could not bear his lot any longer, petitioner left the family home and stayed with his sister in Antipolo City. He gave up all the properties which he and respondent had accumulated during their marriage in favor of respondent and their children. Later, he converted to Islam after dating several women.

On October 8, 2001, petitioner decided to sever his marital bonds. On said date, he filed a petition4 for declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent on the ground of his psychological incapacity to perform the essential responsibilities of marital life.

In his petition, petitioner averred that he came from a poor family and was already exposed to the hardships of farm life at an early age. His father, although responsible and supportive, was a compulsive gambler and womanizer. His father left their family to live with another woman with whom he had seven other children. This caused petitioner’s mother and siblings to suffer immensely. Thus, petitioner became obsessed with attention and worked hard to excel so he would be noticed.

Petitioner further alleged that he supported himself through college and worked hard for the company he joined. He rose from the ranks at Advertising and Marketing Associates, Inc., and became Senior Executive Vice President and Chief Finance Officer therein. But despite his success at work, he alleged that his misery and loneliness as a child lingered as he experienced a void in his relationship with his own family.

In support of his petition, petitioner presented the Psychological Report5 of Dr. Nedy L. Tayag, a clinical psychologist from the National Center for Mental Health. Dr. Tayag’s report stated that petitioner is suffering from "Antisocial Personality Disorder," characterized by a pervasive pattern of social deviancy, rebelliousness, impulsivity, self-centeredness, deceitfulness and lack of remorse. The report also revealed that petitioner’s personality disorder is rooted in deep feelings of rejection starting from the family to peers, and that his experiences have made him so self-absorbed for needed attention. It was Dr. Tayag’s conclusion that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations.

After trial, the RTC rendered a decision annulling petitioner’s marriage to respondent on the ground of petitioner’s psychological incapacity.

Upon appeal by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the CA reversed the RTC decision as follows:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is GRANTED and the assailed Decision hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the marriage between the parties is declared valid and subsisting. No costs.

SO ORDERED.6

The CA held that the circumstances related by petitioner are insufficient to establish the existence of petitioner’s psychological incapacity. The CA noted that Dr. Tayag did not fully explain the root cause of the disorder nor did she give a concrete explanation as to how she arrived at a conclusion as to its gravity or permanence. The appellate court emphasized that the root cause of petitioner’s psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. In addition, the incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the petitioner to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

On July 4, 2007, the CA denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal.

Essentially, petitioner raises the sole issue of whether the CA erred in reversing the trial court’s decision.

Petitioner claims that his psychological incapacity to perform his essential marital obligations was clearly proven and correctly appreciated by the trial court. Petitioner relies heavily on the psychological evaluation conducted by Dr. Tayag and quotes the latter’s findings:

Petitioner had always been hungry for love and affection starting from his family to the present affairs that he [has]. This need had afforded him to find avenues straight or not, just to fulfill this need. He used charm, deceit, lies, violence, [and] authority just so to accom[m]odate and justify his acts. Finally, he is using religions to support his claim for a much better personal and

married life which is really out of context. Rebellious and impulsive as he is, emotional instability is apparent that it would be difficult for him to harmonize with life in general and changes. Changes must come from within, it is not purely external.

Clinically, petitioner’s self-absorbed ideals represent the grave, severe, and incurable nature of Antisocial Personality Disorder. Such disorder is characterized by a pervasive pattern of social deviancy, rebelliousness, impulsivity, self-centeredness, deceitfulness, and lack of remorse.

The psychological incapacity of the petitioner is attributed by jurisdictional antecedence as it existed even before the said marital union. It is also profoundly rooted, grave and incurable. The root cause of which is deep feelings of rejection starting from family to peers. This insecure feelings had made him so self-absorbed for needed attention. Carrying it until his marital life. Said psychological incapacity had deeply marred his adjustment and severed the relationship. Thus, said marriage should be declared null and void by reason of the psychological incapacity.7

According to petitioner, the uncontradicted psychological report of Dr. Tayag declared that his psychological incapacity is profoundly rooted and has the characteristics of juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability. Moreover, petitioner asserts that his psychological incapacity has been medically identified and sufficiently proven. The State, on the other hand, never presented another psychologist to rebut Dr. Tayag’s findings. Also, petitioner maintains that the psychological evaluation would show that the marriage failed not solely because of irreconcilable differences between the spouses, but due to petitioner’s personality disorder which rendered him unable to comply with his marital obligations. To the mind of petitioner, the assailed decision compelled the parties to continue to live under a "non-existent marriage."

The Republic, through the OSG, filed a Comment8 maintaining that petitioner failed to prove his psychological incapacity. The OSG points out that Dr. Tayag failed to explain specifically how she arrived at the conclusion that petitioner suffers from an anti-social personality disorder and that it is grave and incurable. In fact, contrary to his claim, it even appears that petitioner acted responsibly throughout their marriage. Despite financial difficulties, he and respondent had blissful moments together. He was a good father and provider to his children. Thus, the OSG argues that there was no reason to describe petitioner as a self-centered, remorseless, rebellious, impulsive and socially deviant person.

Additionally, the OSG contends that since the burden of proof is on petitioner to establish his psychological incapacity, the State is not required to present an expert witness where the testimony of petitioner’s psychologist was insufficient and inconclusive. The OSG adds that petitioner was not able to substantiate his claim that his infidelity was due to some psychological disorder, as the real cause of petitioner’s alleged incapacity appears to be his general dissatisfaction with his marriage. At most he was able to prove infidelity on his part and the existence of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities." These, however, do not constitute psychological incapacity.

Respondent also filed her Comment9 and Memorandum10 stressing that psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage should contemplate downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the essential marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.

The appeal has no merit.

The appellate court did not err when it reversed and set aside the findings of the RTC for lack of legal and factual bases.

Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, provides:

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage.11 These are the disorders that result in the utter insensitivity or inability of the afflicted party to give meaning and significance to the marriage he or she has contracted.12 Psychological incapacity must refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.13

In Republic v. Court of Appeals,14 the Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36. The Court held,

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.1avvphi1

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly

stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.

In the instant case, petitioner completely relied on the psychological examination conducted by Dr. Tayag on him to establish his psychological incapacity. The result of the examination and the findings of Dr. Tayag however, are insufficient to establish petitioner's psychological incapacity. In cases of annulment of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, the psychological illness and its root cause must be proven to exist from the inception of the marriage. Here, the appellate court correctly ruled that the report of Dr. Tayag failed to explain the root cause of petitioner’s alleged psychological incapacity. The evaluation of Dr. Tayag merely made a general conclusion that petitioner is suffering from an Anti-social Personality Disorder but there was no factual basis stated for the finding that petitioner is a socially deviant person, rebellious, impulsive, self-centered and deceitful.

As held in the case of Suazo v. Suazo,15 the presentation of expert proof in cases for declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and an in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity. Here, the evaluation of Dr. Tayag falls short of the required proof which the Court can rely on as basis to declare as void petitioner’s marriage to respondent. In fact, we are baffled by Dr. Tayag’s evaluation which became the trial court’s basis for concluding that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated, for the report did not clearly specify the actions of petitioner which are indicative of his alleged psychological incapacity. More importantly, there was no established link between petitioner’s acts to his alleged psychological incapacity. It is indispensable that the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.16

For sure, the spouses’ frequent marital squabbles17 and differences in handling finances and managing their business affairs, as well as their conflicts on how to raise their children, are not manifestations of psychological incapacity which may be a ground for declaring their marriage void. Petitioner even admitted that despite their financial difficulties, they had happy moments together. Also, the records would show that the petitioner acted responsibly during their marriage and in fact worked hard to provide for the needs of his family, most especially his children. Their personal differences do not reflect a personality disorder tantamount to psychological incapacity.

Petitioner tried to make it appear that his family history of having a womanizer for a father, was one of the reasons why he engaged in extra-marital affairs during his marriage. However, it appears more likely that he became unfaithful as a result of a general dissatisfaction with his marriage rather than a psychological disorder rooted in his personal history. His tendency to womanize, assuming he had such tendency, was not shown to be due to causes of a psychological nature that is grave, permanent and incurable. In fact, the records show that when respondent learned of his affair, he immediately terminated it. In short, petitioner’s marital infidelity does not appear to be symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of performing his spousal obligations. It has been held in various cases that sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity.18 It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which make petitioner completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.19 That not being the case with petitioner, his claim of psychological incapacity must fail. It bears stressing that psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty,"

"refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Rather, it is essential that the concerned party was incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. In Santos v. Court of Appeals,20 the intention of the law is to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.21

All told, we find that the CA did not err in declaring the marriage of petitioner and respondent as valid and subsisting. The totality of the evidence presented is insufficient to establish petitioner’s psychological incapacity to fulfill his essential marital obligations.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The February 12, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86111 and its Resolution dated July 4, 2007 are hereby AFFIRMED.

LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner, vs.MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

TINGA, J.:

Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has unsettled many a love transformed into matrimony. Any sort of deception between spouses, no matter the gravity, is always disquieting. Deceit to the depth and breadth unveiled in the following pages, dark and irrational as in the modern noir tale, dims any trace of certitude on the guilty spouse’s capability to fulfill the marital obligations even more.

The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals dated 29 November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals had reversed the judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati declaring the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null and void. After careful consideration, we reverse and affirm instead the trial court.

Antecedent Facts

Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married before a minister of the Gospel4 at the Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent church wedding5 at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December 1990.6 Out of their union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.

On 8 March 1993,7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondent’s incapacity existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the present.8

As manifestations of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things, 9 to wit:

(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son,10 and instead introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth about the boy’s parentage when petitioner learned about it from other sources after their marriage.11

(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her when in fact, no such incident occurred.12

(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of her friends that she graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither.13

(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities with the group. In the same vein, she postulated that a luncheon show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and even presented an invitation to that effect14 but petitioner discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel that no such occasion had taken place.15

(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as the "number one moneymaker" in the commercial industry worth P2 million.16 Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was the one who wrote and sent the letters to him when she admitted the truth in one of their quarrels.17 He likewise realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only figments of her imagination when he discovered they were not known in or connected with Blackgold.18

(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it appear that she earned a higher income. She bought a sala set from a public market but told petitioner that she acquired it from a famous furniture dealer.19 She spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up borrowing money from other people on false pretexts.20

(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November 1991.21

In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V.

Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed that respondent’s persistent and constant lying

to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect.22 They further asserted that respondent’s extreme jealousy

was also pathological. It reached the point of paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair with another woman. They concluded based on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.23

In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital obligations by attending to all the needs of her husband. She asserted that there was no truth to the allegation that she fabricated stories, told lies and invented personalities.24 She presented her version, thus:

(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was afraid of losing her husband.25

(2) She told petitioner about David’s attempt to rape and kill her because she surmised such intent from David’s act of touching her back and ogling her from head to foot.26

(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been teaching psychology at the Pasig Catholic School for two (2) years.27

(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of Channel 9 and she had done three (3) commercials with McCann Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank. She told petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although she was not under contract with the company, yet she reported to the Blackgold office after office hours. She claimed that a luncheon show was indeed held in her honor at the Philippine Village Hotel on 8 December 1979.28

(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the writers thereof were not fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan was a resident of the United States while Babes Santos was employed with Saniwares.29

(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred that she merely asked the latter in a diplomatic matter if she was the one asking for chocolates from petitioner, and not to monitor her husband’s whereabouts.30

(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten people from her monthly budget of P7,000.00.31

In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to their marriage, the other lies attributed to her by petitioner were mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance was that the totality of the evidence presented is not sufficient for a finding of psychological incapacity on her part.32

In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a psychiatrist, to refute the allegations anent her psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the series of tests conducted by his assistant,33together with the screening procedures and the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led him to conclude that respondent was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. He postulated that regressive behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and poor control of impulses, which are signs that might point to the presence of disabling trends, were not elicited from respondent.34

In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not the one who administered and interpreted respondent’s psychological evaluation, and (ii) he made use of only one instrument called CPRS which was not reliable because a good liar can fake the results of such test.35

After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner’s evidence and held that respondent’s propensity to lying about almost anything−her occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her income, among others−had been duly established. According to the trial court, respondent’s fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage.36 The trial court thus declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void.

Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack of due discretion on the part of the parties.37 During the pendency of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan Tribunal’s ruling was affirmed with modification by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, which held instead that only respondent was impaired by a lack of due discretion.38 Subsequently, the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the Roman Rota of the Vatican.39

Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic tribunals. Still, the appellate court reversed the RTC’s judgment. While conceding that respondent may not have been completely honest with petitioner, the Court of Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of the evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondent’s psychological incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals40 governing the application and interpretation of psychological incapacity had not been satisfied.

Taking exception to the appellate court’s pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case to this Court. He contends herein that the evidence conclusively establish respondent’s psychological incapacity.

In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by the credence accorded by the RTC to the factual allegations of petitioner.41 It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their candor or lack thereof.42 The Court is likewise guided by the fact that the Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity of the evidence presented by petitioner. Instead, the appellate court concluded that such evidence was not sufficient to establish the psychological incapacity of respondent.43

Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the operative facts. Still, the crucial question remains as to whether the state of facts as presented by petitioner sufficiently meets the standards set for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. These standards were definitively laid down in the Court’s 1997 ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals44 (also known as the Molina case45), and indeed the Court of Appeals cited the Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC in the case at bar.46 Since Molinawas decided in 1997, the Supreme Court has yet to squarely affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.47 In fact, even before Molina was handed down,

there was only one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,48 wherein the Court definitively concluded that a spouse was psychologically incapacitated under Article 36.

This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that the remedy afforded by Article 36 of the Family Code is hollow, insofar as the Supreme Court is concerned.49 Yet what Molina and the succeeding cases did ordain was a set of guidelines which, while undoubtedly onerous on the petitioner seeking the declaration of nullity, still leave room for a decree of nullity under the proper circumstances. Molina did not foreclose the grant of a decree of nullity under Article 36, even as it raised the bar for its allowance.

Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36

Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."50 The concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage is novel in our body of laws, although mental incapacity has long been recognized as a ground for the dissolution of a marriage.

The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage persons "who are not in the full enjoyment of their reason at the time of contracting marriage."51 Marriages with such persons were ordained as void,52 in the same class as marriages with underage parties and persons already married, among others. A party’s mental capacity was not a ground for divorce under the Divorce Law of 1917,53 but a marriage where "either party was of unsound mind" at the time of its celebration was cited as an "annullable marriage" under the Marriage Law of 1929.54 Divorce on the ground of a spouse’s incurable insanity was permitted under the divorce law enacted during the Japanese occupation.55 Upon the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, a marriage contracted by a party of "unsound mind" was classified under Article 85 of the Civil Code as a voidable marriage.56 The mental capacity, or lack thereof, of the marrying spouse was not among the grounds for declaring a marriage void ab initio.57 Similarly, among the marriages classified as voidable under Article 45 (2) of the Family Code is one contracted by a party of unsound mind.58

Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent, just like insanity impinges on consent freely given which is one of the essential requisites of a contract.59 The initial common consensus on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did not constitute a specie of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of the Family Code revision committee that drafted the Code, have opined that psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent, and conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a marriage but was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations.60 Dr. Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this "psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations does not affect the consent to the marriage."61

There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as phrased by the Family Code committee. Tolentino opined that "psychologically incapacity to comply would not be

juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the marriage, which makes the marriage only voidable under Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code x x x [and thus] should have been a cause for annulment of the marriage only."62 At the same time, Tolentino noted "[it] would be

different if it were psychological incapacity to understand the essential marital obligations, because then this would amount to lack of consent to the marriage."63 These concerns though were answered, beginning with Santos v. Court of Appeals,64 wherein the Court, through Justice Vitug, acknowledged that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage."65

The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them, was further affirmed in the Molina66 case. Therein, the Court, through then Justice (now Chief Justice) Panganiban observed that "[t]he evidence [to establish psychological incapacity] must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereto."67 Jurisprudence since then has recognized that psychological incapacity "is a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume."68

It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity deviates from the literal wording of Article 36, with its central phase reading "psychologically incapacitated to comply

with the essential marital obligations of marriage."69 At the same time, it has been consistently recognized by this Court that the intent of the Family Code committee was to design the law as to allow some resiliency in its application, by avoiding specific examples that would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle ofejusdem generis. Rather, the preference of the revision committee was for "the judge to interpret the provision ona case-to-case basis, guided by experience, in the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on

the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law."70

We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:71

Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.72

The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as intended by the revision committee, was not cast in intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed by evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, current trends in psychological and even canonical thought, and experience. It is under the auspices of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the Court has developed the Molina rules, which have been consistently applied since 1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful in providing a unitary framework that guides courts in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the same time, the Molina guidelines are not set in

stone, the clear legislative intent mandating a case-to-case perception of each situation, and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary understanding of Article 36. There is no cause to disavow Molina at present, and indeed the disposition of this case shall rely primarily on that precedent. There is need though to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.

Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then in Molina, of the considered opinion of canon law experts in the interpretation of psychological incapacity. This is but unavoidable, considering that the Family Code committee had bluntly acknowledged that the concept of psychological incapacity was derived from canon law,73 and as one member admitted, enacted as a solution to the problem of marriages already annulled by the Catholic Church but still existent under civil law.74 It would be disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic Church doctrine in the formulation and subsequent understanding of Article 36, and the Court has expressly acknowledged that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the local Church, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.75 Still, it must be emphasized that the Catholic Church is hardly the sole source of influence in the interpretation of Article 36. Even though the concept may have been derived from canon law, its incorporation into the Family Code and subsequent judicial interpretation occurred in wholly secular progression. Indeed, while Church thought on psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the trial courts, judicial decisions of this Court interpreting psychological incapacity are binding on lower courts.76

Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total developmen[t]," and that "[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State." These provisions highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional protection accorded to the institution of marriage.

But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a social institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper, and subject of course to the qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it may appear that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the only constitutional considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity.

Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation

of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or comply with the essential obligations of marriage.

These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present petition.

Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case

As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in the judicial disposition of petitions for nullity under Article 36. The Court has consistently applied Molina since its promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines therein operate as the general rules. They warrant citation in full:

1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected"’ by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological–not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle ofejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing

medicine to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally—subject to our law on evidence—what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.77

Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General issue a certification stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition to the petition.78 This requirement however was dispensed with following the implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.79 Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Obviously, collusion is not an issue in this case, considering the consistent vigorous opposition of respondent to the petition for declaration of nullity. In any event, the fiscal’s participation in the hearings before the trial court is extant from the records of this case.

As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this Court, owing to the great weight accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute the veracity of these facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent had consistently lied about many material aspects as to her character and personality. The question remains whether her pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes her psychological incapacity, consistent with Article 36 and generally, the Molina guidelines.

We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.

First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wife’s behavior, and certifications from Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondent’s claims pertinent to her alleged singing career. He also presented two (2) expert witnesses from the field of psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of respondent was tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event, both courts below considered petitioner’s evidence as credible enough. Even the appellate court acknowledged that respondent was not totally honest with petitioner.80

As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 must be able to establish the cause of action with a preponderance of evidence. However, since the action cannot be considered as a non-public matter between private parties, but is impressed with State interest, the Family Code likewise requires the participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor General, to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the petitioner is able establish the psychological incapacity of respondent with preponderant evidence, any finding of collusion among the parties would necessarily negate such proofs.

Second. The root cause of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial court’s decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and inventing personalities and situations," of writing letters to petitioner using fictitious names, and of lying about her actual occupation, income, educational attainment, and family background, among others.81

These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to medical or clinical causes by expert witnesses from the field of psychology. Petitioner presented two (2) such witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist who had headed the department of psychiatry of at least two (2) major hospitals,82 testified as follows:

WITNESS:

Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to me, I can say that there are a couple of things that [are] terribly wrong with the standards. There are a couple of things that seems (sic) to be repeated over and over again in the affidavit. One of which is the persistent, constant and repeated lying of the "respondent"; which, I think, based on assessment of normal behavior of an individual, is abnormal or pathological. x x x

ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)

Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations of the respondent she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of her marriage?

A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards another. The lack of concern, the lack of love towards the person, and it is also something that endangers human relationship. You see, relationship is based on communication between individuals and what we generally communicate are our thoughts and feelings. But then when one talks and expresse[s]

their feelings, [you] are expected to tell the truth. And therefore, if you constantly lie, what do you think is going to happen as far as this relationship is concerned. Therefore, it undermines that basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect.

Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the respondent in constantly lying and fabricating stories, she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of the marriage?

x x x

ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)

Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the third witness for the petitioner, testified that the respondent has been calling up the petitioner’s officemates and ask him (sic) on the activities of the petitioner and ask him on the behavior of the petitioner. And this is specifically stated on page six (6) of the transcript of stenographic notes, what can you say about this, Mr. witness?

A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid, which means that there is no actual basis on her suspect (sic) that her husband is having an affair with a woman, if carried on to the extreme, then that is pathological. That is not abnormal. We all feel jealous, in the same way as we also lie every now and then; but everything that is carried out in extreme is abnormal or pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the fact that the husband is having an affair with another woman and if she persistently believes that the husband is having an affair with different women, then that is pathological and we call that paranoid jealousy.

Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered psychologically incapacitated to perform the basic obligations of the marriage?

A- Yes, Ma’am.83

The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the psychological incapacity of respondent, but also the psychological capacity of petitioner. He concluded that respondent "is [a] pathological liar, that [she continues] to lie [and] she loves to fabricate about herself."84

These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on the case record, particularly the trial transcripts of respondent’s testimony, as well as the supporting affidavits of petitioner. While these witnesses did not personally examine respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v. Marcos85 that personal examination of the subject by the physician is not required for the spouse to be declared psychologically incapacitated.86 We deem the methodology utilized by petitioner’s witnesses as sufficient basis for their medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and Lopez’s common conclusion of respondent’s psychological incapacity hinged heavily on their own acceptance of petitioner’s version as the true set of facts. However, since the trial court itself accepted the veracity of petitioner’s factual premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by petitioner’s expert witnesses.

Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court explicated its finding of psychological incapacity in its decision in this wise:

To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage. It has been shown clearly from her actuations that respondent has that propensity for telling lies about almost anything, be it her occupation, her state of health, her singing abilities, her income, etc. She has this fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities. She practically lived in a world of make believe making her therefore not in a position to give meaning and significance to her marriage to petitioner. In persistently and constantly lying to petitioner, respondent undermined the basic tenets of relationship between spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As concluded by the psychiatrist presented by petitioner, such repeated lying is abnormal and pathological and amounts to psychological incapacity.87

Third. Respondent’s psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well before she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her natural child’s real parentage as she only confessed when the latter had found out the truth after their marriage.

Fourth. The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had shared only a little over a year of cohabitation before the exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever such circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of petitioner, it likewise supports the belief that respondent’s psychological incapacity, as borne by the record, was so grave in extent that any prolonged marital life was dubitable.

It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false pretenses in order to induce petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioner’s witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on respondent’s inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to them, were revelatory of respondent’s inability to understand and perform the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments.

The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly tried her best to effect a reconciliation, she had amply exhibited her ability to perform her marital obligations. We are not convinced. Given the nature of her psychological condition, her willingness to remain in the marriage hardly banishes nay extenuates her lack of capacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations. Respondent’s ability to even comprehend what the essential marital obligations are is impaired at best. Considering that the evidence convincingly disputes respondent’s ability to adhere to the truth, her avowals as to her commitment to the marriage cannot be accorded much credence.

At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states that a marriage may be annulled if the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances constituting fraud under the previous article, clarifies that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage." It would be improper to draw linkages between misrepresentations made by respondent and the

misrepresentations under Articles 45 (3) and 46. The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who is lied to, and does not allude to vitiated consent of the lying spouse. In this case, the misrepresentations of respondent point to her own inadequacy to cope with her marital obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity under Article 36.

Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect.

Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed this detail totally inconsequential as no reference was made to it anywhere in the assailed decision despite petitioner’s efforts to bring the matter to its attention.88 Such deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which held that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila decreed the invalidity of the marriage in question in a Conclusion89 dated 30 March 1995, citing the "lack of due discretion" on the part of respondent.90Such decree of nullity was affirmed by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal,91 and the Roman Rota of the Vatican.92 In fact, respondent’s psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause93was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting respondent from contracting another marriage without the Tribunal’s consent.

In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal pronounced:

The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is considered ontologically defective and wherefore judicially ineffective when elicited by a Part Contractant in possession and employ of a discretionary judgment faculty with a perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the practical understanding of the conjugal Covenant or serious impaired from the correct appreciation of the integral significance and implications of the marriage vows.

The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by law that based on the depositions of the Partes in Causa and premised on the testimonies of the Common and Expert Witnesse[s], the Respondent made the marriage option in tenure of adverse personality constracts that were markedly antithetical to the substantive content and implications of the Marriage Covenant, and that seriously undermined the integrality of her matrimonial consent in terms of its deliberative component. In other words, afflicted with a discretionary faculty impaired in its practico-concrete judgment formation on account of an adverse action and reaction pattern, the Respondent was impaired from eliciting a judicially binding matrimonial consent. There is no sufficient evidence in the Case however to prove as well the fact of grave lack of due discretion on the part of the Petitioner.94

Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by the trial court, but also by canonical bodies. Yet, we must clarify the proper import of the Church rulings annulling the marriage in this case. They hold sway since they are drawn from a similar recognition, as the trial court, of the veracity of petitioner’s allegations. Had the trial court

instead appreciated respondent’s version as correct, and the appellate court affirmed such conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic Church on this matter would have diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual findings of the judicial trier of facts, and not that of the canonical courts, that are accorded significant recognition by this Court.

Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such psychological incapacity be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It was on this score that the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court, the appellate court noting that it did not appear certain that respondent’s condition was incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not testify to such effect.95

Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he returned to her, desiring to make their marriage work. However, respondent’s aberrant behavior remained unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate stories, and maintained her excessive jealousy. From this fact, he draws the conclusion that respondent’s condition is incurable.

From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that respondent’s condition is incurable? It would seem, at least, that respondent’s psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof a remarkable feat. Certainly, it would have been easier had petitioner’s expert witnesses characterized respondent’s condition as incurable. Instead, they remained silent on whether the psychological incapacity was curable or incurable.

But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts’ taciturnity on this point.

The petitioner’s expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court rendered its decision on 10 August 1995. These events transpired well before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and made explicit the requirement that the psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such requirement was not expressly stated in Article 36 or any other provision of the Family Code.

On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995, began its discussion by first citing the deliberations of the Family Code committee,96 then the opinion of canonical scholars,97 before arriving at its formulation of the doctrinal definition of psychological incapacity.98 Santos did refer to Justice Caguioa’s opinion expressed during the deliberations that "psychological incapacity is incurable,"99 and the view of a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila that psychological incapacity must be characterized "by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."100 However, in formulating the doctrinal rule on psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any reference to incurability as a characteristic of psychological incapacity.101

This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial court came out with its own ruling that remained silent on whether respondent’s psychological incapacity was incurable. Certainly, Santos did not clearly mandate that the incurability of the psychological incapacity be established in an action for declaration of nullity. At least, there was no jurisprudential clarity at the time of the trial of this case and the subsequent promulgation of the trial court’s decision that required a medical finding of incurability. Such requisite arose only with Molina in 1997, at a time when this case was on appellate review, or after the reception of evidence.

We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,102 the Court countered an argument that Molina and Santos should not apply retroactively

with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the courts of a law constitutes a part of that law as of the date the statute in enacted.103 Yet we approach this present case from utterly practical considerations. The requirement that psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot be divined without expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no categorical averment from the expert witnesses that respondent’s psychological incapacity was curable or incurable simply because there was no legal necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and the appropriate question was not accordingly propounded to him. If we apply Pesca without deep reflection, there would be undue prejudice to those cases tried before Molina or Santos, especially those presently on appellate review, where presumably the respective petitioners and their expert witnesses would not have seen the need to adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in those cases, as in this case, that the psychological incapacity of a spouse is actually incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the trial court level.

We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily on a case-to-case perception. It would be insensate to reason to mandate in this case an expert medical or clinical diagnosis of incurability, since the parties would have had no impelling cause to present evidence to that effect at the time this case was tried by the RTC more than ten (10) years ago. From the totality of the evidence, we are sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been established by the petitioner. Any lingering doubts are further dispelled by the fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider incurability as an integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were sufficiently convinced that respondent was so incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree that annulment was warranted.

All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court.

There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does the marital bond as having been inexistent in the first place. It is possible that respondent, despite her psychological state, remains in love with petitioner, as exhibited by her persistent challenge to the petition for nullity. In fact, the appellate court placed undue emphasis on respondent’s avowed commitment to remain in the marriage. Yet the Court decides these cases on legal reasons and not vapid sentimentality. Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more than the legitimatization of a desire of people in love to live together.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10 August 1995, declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code, is REINSTATED. No costs.

LENI O. CHOA, petitioner, vs.ALFONSO C. CHOA, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Though interlocutory in character, an order denying a demurrer to evidence may be the subject of a certiorari proceeding, provided the petitioner can show that it was issued with grave abuse of discretion; and that appeal in due course is not plain, adequate or speedy under the circumstances. Indeed, when the plaintiff’s evidence is utterly and patently insufficient to prove the complaint, it would be capricious for a trial judge to deny the demurrer and to require the defendant to present evidence to controvert a nonexisting case. Verily, the denial constitutes an unwelcome imposition on the court’s docket and an assault on the defendant’s resources and peace of mind. In short, such denial needlessly delays and, thus, effectively denies justice.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the March 16, 2000 Decision1 and the May 22, 2000 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 53100. The decretal portion of the Decision reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit."3

The assailed Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.4

The Facts

Petitioner and respondent were married on March 15, 1981. Out of this union, two children were born, Cheryl Lynne and Albryan. On October 27, 1993, respondent filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Branch 51, a Complaint5 for the annulment of his marriage to petitioner. The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 93-8098. Afterwards he filed an Amended Complaint6 dated November 8, 1993 for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to petitioner based on her alleged psychological incapacity.

The case went to trial with respondent presenting his evidence in chief. After his last witness testified, he submitted his Formal Offer of Exhibits7 dated February 20, 1998. Instead of offering any objection to it, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss (Demurrer to Evidence)8 dated May 11, 1998. The lower court then allowed a number of pleadings to be filed thereafter.

Finally, the RTC issued its December 2, 1998 Order9 denying petitioner’s Demurrer to Evidence. It held that "[respondent] established a quantum of evidence that the [petitioner] must controvert."10 After her Motion for Reconsideration11 was denied in the March 22, 1999 Order,12 petitioner elevated the case to the CA by way of a Petition for Certiorari,13 docketed as CA-GR No. 53100.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA held that the denial of the demurrer was merely interlocutory; hence, certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was not available. The proper remedy was for the defense to present evidence; and if an unfavorable decision was handed down later, to take an appeal therefrom.14 In any event, no grave abuse of discretion was committed by respondent judge in issuing the assailed Orders.15

The CA also ruled that "the propriety of granting or denying a demurrer to evidence rests on the sound exercise of the [trial] court’s discretion."16 Further, the "[p]etitioner failed to show that the issues in the court below [had] been resolved arbitrarily or without basis."17

Hence, this Petition.18

The Issues

In her Memorandum,19 petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:

"1) Upon the denial of petitioner’s demurrer to evidence under Rule 33 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is she under obligation, as a matter of inflexible rule, as what the Court of Appeals required of her, to present her evidence, and when an unfavorable [verdict] is handed down, appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law, despite the palpably and patently weak and grossly insufficient or so inadequate evidence of the private respondent as plaintiff in the annulment of marriage case, grounded on psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of The Family Code? Or under such circumstances, can the extraordinary remedy of certiorari be directly and immediately resorted to by the petitioner; and

"2) In upholding the lower court’s denial of petitioner’s demurrer to evidence, did the Court of Appeals wantonly violate, ignore or disregard in a whimsical manner the doctrinal pronouncements of this Court in Molina (G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997, 268 SCRA 198) and Santos (G.R. No. 112019, January 14, 1995, 58 SCRA 17)?"20

Simply stated, the issues are: (1) is certiorari available to correct an order denying a demurrer to evidence? and (2) in its denial, did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion by violating or ignoring the applicable law and jurisprudence?

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

First Issue:

Resort to Certiorari

Petitioner argues that the RTC denied her Demurrer to Evidence despite the patent weakness and gross insufficiency of respondent’s evidence. Thus, she was entitled to the immediate recourse of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. Echoing the CA, respondent counters that appeal in due course, not certiorari, is the proper remedy.

We clarify. In general, interlocutory orders are neither appealable nor subject to certiorari proceedings.

However, this rule is not absolute. In Tadeo v. People,21 this Court declared that appeal -- not certiorari -- in due time was indeed the proper remedy, provided there was no grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction or oppressive exercise of judicial authority.

In fact, Rules 41 and 65 of the Rules of Court expressly recognize this exception and allow certiorari when the lower court acts with grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of an interlocutory order. Rule 41 provides:

"No appeal may be taken from:

x x x           x x x           x x x

(c) An interlocutory order;

x x x           x x x           x x x

"In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65." 22

In turn, Section 1 of Rule 65 reads as follows:

"SEC. 1. Petition for certiorari -- When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require."23

Thus, a denial of a demurrer that is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction may be assailed through a petition for certiorari.24 In Cruz v. People, this exception was stressed by the Court in this wise:

"Admittedly, the general rule that the extraordinary writ of certiorari is not available to challenge interlocutory orders of the trial court may be subject to exceptions. When the assailed interlocutory orders are patently erroneous or issued with grave abuse of discretion, the remedy of certiorari lies."25

Second Issue:

Denial of Demurrer to Evidence

Having established that a writ of certiorari may be issued in exceptional circumstances, this Court is now tasked to determine whether the present case falls under the exception; that is, whether the RTC indeed committed a "patent error" or grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s Demurrer to Evidence.

A demurrer to evidence is defined as "an objection or exception by one of the parties in an action at law, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law (whether true or not) to make out his case or sustain the issue."26 The demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence to sustain a verdict.27 In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is merely required to ascertain

whether there is competent or sufficient proof to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt.28

We have thoroughly reviewed the records of the present case, and we are convinced that the evidence against respondent (herein petitioner) is grossly insufficient to support any finding of psychological incapacity that would warrant a declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage.

First. Respondent claims that the filing by petitioner of a series of charges against him are proof of the latter’s psychological incapacity to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. These charges included Complaints for perjury,29 false testimony,30 concubinage31 and deportation.32 According to him, the filing and the prosecution of these cases clearly showed that his wife (herein petitioner) wanted not only to put him behind bars, but also to banish him from the country. He contends that this "is very abnormal for a wife who, instead of protecting the name and integrity of her husband as the father of her children, had acted to the contrary."33

We do not agree. The documents presented by respondent during the trial do not in any way show the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife. It is the height of absurdity and inequity to condemn her as psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her marital obligations, simply because she filed cases against him. The evidence presented, even if taken as true, merely establishes the prosecution of the cases against him. To rule that the filings are sufficient to establish her psychological incapacity is not only totally erroneous, but also grave abuse of discretion bordering on absurdity.

Second. Neither is the testimony of respondent, taken by itself or in conjunction with his documentary offerings, sufficient to prove petitioner’s alleged psychological incapacity. He testified in these words:

"Q Will you please tell us or explain to the Court what do you mean by ‘psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.’ What do you mean by that?

A Because before our marriage she was already on the family way, so at that time she even want it aborted by taking pills. She was even immature, carefree, and she lacked the intention of procreative sexuality.34

x x x           x x x           x x x

ATTY. CHUA:

And you consider her that she was carefree, she is psychologically incapacitated? Will you please elaborate on this what you mean by ‘carefree’ approximating psychologically incapacitated?

ATTY. MIRANO:

I think we better ask the witness what he means by ‘carefree.’

ATTY. CHUA:

Okay.

COURT:

Witness may answer.

WITNESS:

She does not help in the household chores, she does not take care of the child, she wants me to hire an attendant in order to take care of the child. Even when the children were sick she does not bother to let the children see a doctor.35

x x x           x x x           x x x

"STENOGRAPHER (reads back the question of Atty. Chua):

‘ATTY. CHUA:

Now. From the time of courtship up to the time of your marriage to the defendant, did you notice any characteristic or traits which you consider as psychological incapacity?’

WITNESS:

Sometimes when I cannot visit at her house she gets mad at me, and she won’t talk to me when I call her up by telephone. So, all she wanted for me to visit her everytime and even at the time when I am busy with some other things. So, I think that is all."36

Even if taken as true, the testimony of respondent basically complains about three aspects of petitioner’s personality; namely, her alleged (1) lack of attention to their children, (2) immaturity and (3) lack of an "intention of procreative sexuality." None of these three, singly or collectively, constitutes "psychological incapacity." Far from it.

In Santos v. CA,37 this Court clearly explained that "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability."38 Said the Court:

"It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase ‘psychological incapacity’ under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's ‘Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law,’ quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's ‘Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases’). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, ‘psychological incapacity’ should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.

There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of ‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated."39

Furthermore, in Republic v. Molina,40 we ruled that the psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," a "refusal" or a "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. We stressed that a mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.

In the case at bar, the evidence adduced by respondent merely shows that he and his wife could not get along with each other. There was absolutely no showing of the gravity or juridical antecedence or incurability of the problems besetting their marital union.

Sorely lacking in respondent’s evidence is proof that the psychological incapacity was grave enough to bring about the disability of a party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. In Molina, we affirmed that "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes and occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes of psychological incapacity. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there should be a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage."41

Respondent’s pious peroration that petitioner "lacked the intention of procreative sexuality" is easily belied by the fact that two children were born during their union. Moreover, there is absolutely no showing that the alleged "defect" was already existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

Third. Most telling is the insufficiency, if not incompetency, of the supposed expert testimony presented by respondent. His witness, Dr. Antonio M. Gauzon, utterly failed to identify and prove the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. Specifically, his testimony did not show that the incapacity, if true, was medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Neither did he testify that it was grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The pertinent portions of his testimony are quoted thus:

"ATTY. CHUA:

And then finally and ultimately you reached the conclusion that both parties, meaning the husband and the wife in the present case have a personality which is normal. That is your conclusion?

WITNESS:

They are normal, but they cannot mix together.

Q. So as a general proposition, both of them are of normal personality, only that they are not compatible with each other?

A. Yes.

Q. And by normal personality, you mean that neither of them suffer from any personality disorder, bordering on abnormality?

A. Yes.

Q. But Doctor, is not a fact or a fact of life, that no couple could be or are perfectly match?

A. Precisely, if there is a problem, marital problem, there should be somebody who knows how to handle marriage, that should try to intervene.

Q. You mean expert advise or services should be needed by the couple?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, if the couple are mature enough and each of them practises what we call maximum tolerance and give and take, will that serve the purpose?

A. That would served the purpose of getting well.

Q. Yes?

A. Yes.

Q. Meaning to say that the incompatibility could be harmonized?

A. Yes, because they are supposedly normal, but both of them are personally disordered. It cannot be harmonized. So this case, if only they have tried professional help to take care of their marital problem, it could have been solved.

Q. Or the situation could have been remedied?

A. Yes. But I would like to say that it must be somebody who is an expert. Not just any from Tom, Dick and Harry could handle this. That means from the very beginning they have personalities which they were incompatible. So if anybody would handle that, they will not mix, they will be always quarreling with each other. They should not have got married.42

x x x           x x x           x x x

Q. Yes. So in this present case, your expert opinion was sought by the plaintiff, and you found out that both are normal?

A. With different personalities. So that they were incompatible.

Q. Normal, simply incompatible.

A. Yes, with personalities different from each other, which I mentioned there in my last page. That they are like oil and water, immiscible. Like oil and water, they will not mix.

Q. You also mentioned that the plaintiff. Meaning to say the husband told you about the frequent quarrels had with the wife. Did he ever tell you that was a serious or major quarrel?

A. Actually there was no major quarrel. It was all petty quarrels.43

x x x           x x x           x x x

Q. So the problem of this couple is fundamentally a conflicting personalities?

A. Yes.44

x x x           x x x           x x x

Q. Now, you mentioned that you maybe able to make them reconcile?

A. Yes.

Q. You mean that given the time and opportunity, things could be worked out?

A. Yes.

Q. You mean reconciliation at this stage with expert services, and the advise of those who possess the necessary [expertise] could be worked out?

A. Yes, as I said it can be done by therapy. Family therapy.45

x x x           x x x           x x x

Q. Doctor, you draw your conclusion that there is psychological inc[a]pacity existing in this case?

A. Yes.

Q. Because of the …

A. The incompatibility.

Q. Incompatibility.

A. Yes.46

His testimony established merely that the spouses had an "incompatibility," a "defect" that could possibly be treated or alleviated through psychotherapy. We need not expound further on the patent insufficiency of the expert testimony to establish the psychological incapacity of petitioner.

Furthermore, the assessment of petitioner by Dr. Gauzon was based merely on descriptions communicated to him by respondent. The doctor never conducted any psychological

examination of her. Neither did he ever claim to have done so. In fact, his Professional Opinion47 began with the statement "[I]f what Alfonso Choa said about his wife Leni is true, x x x."48 The expert witness testified thus:

"ATTY. CHUA

Q Doctor, in this professional opinion of yours, you gathered most of your material data from the plaintiff who is the husband?

WITNESS

A Yes. By the way, I requested the husband Alfonso, if it was possible for me to interview Leni, and he said, he doesn’t know.

ATTY. CHUA

Q He doesn’t know. Now, Doctor if we were to request you to conduct the same personal interview and written psychological examination on the part of the wife, [w]ould you be willing to do that?

WITNESS

A Sure for a fee. I maybe able to make them reconcile."49

Obviously, Dr. Gauzon had no personal knowledge of the facts he testified to, as these had merely been relayed to him by respondent. The former was working on pure suppositions and secondhand information fed to him by one side. Consequently, his testimony can be dismissed as unscientific and unreliable.

Dr. Gauzon tried to save his credibility by asserting that he was able to assess petitioner’s character, not only through the descriptions given by respondent, but also through the former’s at least fifteen hours50 of study of the voluminous transcript of records of this case. Even if it took the good doctor a whole day or a whole week to examine the records of this case, we still find his assessment of petitioner’s psychological state sorely insufficient and methodologically flawed.

As to respondent’s argument -- that because Dr. Gauzon’s testimony had never been objected to, the objection raised thereafter was deemed waived -- the Supreme Court has already ruled on the matter. It held that although the question of admissibility of evidence could not be raised for the first time on appeal, hearsay or unreliable evidence should be disregarded whether objected to or not, because it has no probative value.51

We are, of course, mindful of the ruling that a medical examination is not a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity, so long as the totality of evidence presented is enough to establish the incapacity adequately.52 Here, however, the totality of evidence presented by respondent was completely insufficient to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity -- more so without any medical, psychiatric or psychological examination.

The trial court should have carefully studied and assessed the evidence presented by respondent and taken into account the prevailing jurisprudence on the matter. It could then have easily concluded, as we conclude now, that it was useless to proceed further with the tedious process of hearing contravening proof. His evidence was obviously, grossly and clearly insufficient to support a declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Withal, it was grave abuse of discretion for the RTC to deny the Demurrer and to violate or ignore this Court’s rulings in point. Indeed, continuing the process of litigation would have been a total waste of time and money for the parties and an unwelcome imposition on the trial court’s docket.

We have already ruled that grave abuse of discretion may arise when a lower court or tribunal violates or contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.53 Any decision, order or resolution of a lower court tantamount to overruling a judicial pronouncement of the highest Court is unmistakably a very grave abuse of discretion.54

There is no reason to believe that an appeal would prove to be a plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the case at bar. An appeal would not promptly relieve petitioner from the injurious effects of the patently mistaken Orders maintaining the baseless action of respondent. It would only compel her to go needlessly through a protracted trial, which would further clog the court dockets with another futile case.55

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed CA Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent’s Demurrer to Evidence is GRANTED, and the case for declaration of nullity of marriage based on the alleged psychological incapacity of petitioner is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.