persons and family relations case digest batch 3
DESCRIPTION
Persons and Family Relations Case Digest Batch 3TRANSCRIPT
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25. PADILLA vs CA
NATURE: Petition of certiorari to revise the decision of the Court of Appeals
FACTS
Petitioners, on or about February 8, 1964, went to the public market to execute an alleged order of the
Mayor to clear the public market of stalls which were considered as nuisance per se. The stall of
one Antonio Vergara was demolished pursuant to this order. In the process however the stock in trade
and certain furniture of Vergara were lost and destroyed. The petitioners were found guilty of grave
coercion after trial at the CFI and were sentenced to five months and one day imprisonment and
ordered to pay fines.- On appeal, the CA reversed the findings of the CFI and acquitted the appellants
based on reasonable doubt but nonetheless ordered them to pay P9,600.00 as actual damages. The
decision of the CA was based on the fact that the petitioners were charged with coercion when they
should have been more appropriately charged with crime against person. Hence, the crime of grave
coercion was not proved in accordance with the law. The petitioner filed the appeal to the SC
questioning the grant of actual damages despite a no guilty verdict.
ISSUE
WON the CA committed a reversible error in requiring the petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the
complainants after acquitting them from the criminal charge
HELD
NO. The SC, quoting Section 3 (C) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court and various jurisprudence including
PNB vs Catipon, De Guzman vs Alvia, held that extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in the final judgment that the
facts from which the civil action might arise did not exist. In the case at bar, the judgment of not guilty
was based on reasonable doubt. Since the standard of proof to be used in civil cases is preponderance of
evidence, the court express a finding that the defendants¶ offenses are civil in nature.- The Court also
tackled the provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code to larify whether a separate civil action is required
when the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt. The SC took the position that the said provision merely emphasizes that a civil
action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act. The acquittal extinguishes
the criminal liability but not the civil liability particularly if the finding is not guilty based on reasonable
ground
26. People v. Bayotas
G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994 236 SCRA 239
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FACTS:
Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted. Pending appeal of his
conviction, Bayotas died at the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to
hepatic encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. The Supreme Court in its
Resolution, dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal, however, it required the Solicitor General to file
its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged. .
The Solicitor General, relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego insists that the appeal should still be
resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability is
based. On the other hand, counsel for the accused-appellant, argued that the death of the accused
while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties
invoking the case of Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia which held that the civil
obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished
if accused should die before final judgment is rendered.
Issue:
Whether or not death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his civil liability?
Held:
The Supreme Court held that death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this
regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates hiscriminal liability and only the
civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto
in senso strictiore." That the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil
liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed
without qualification.
Judgment Dismissed with costs de oficio.
27. Frias vs. San Diego-Sison
BOBIE ROSE FRIAS v. FLORA SAN DIEGO-SISON
2007 / Austria-Martinez
FACTS:
On 7 Dec 1990, Bobie Rose Frias and Dr. Flora San-Diego Sison entered into a MOA over Frias’property
MOA consideration is 3MSison has 6 months from the date of contract’s execution to notify Frias of her
intention to purchase the property with the improvements at 6.4M Prior to this 6 month period, Frias
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may still offer the property to other persons, provided that 3M shall be paid to Sison including interest
based on prevailing compounded bank interest + amount of sale in excess of 7M [should the property be
sold at a price greater than 7M] In case Frias has no other buyer within 6 months from the contract’s
execution, no interest shall be charged by Sison on the 3M In the event that on the 6th month, Sison
would decide not to purchase the property, Frias has 6 months to pay 3M (amount shall earn
compounded bank interest for the last 6 months only) 3M treated as a loan and the property considered
as the security for the mortgage Upon notice of intention to purchase, Sison has 6 months to pay the
balance of 3.4M (6.4M less 3M MOA consideration) Frias received from Sison 3M (2M in cash; 1M post-
dated check dated February 28, 1990, instead of 1991, which rendered the check stale). Frias gave Sison
the TCT and the Deed of Absolute Sale over the property. Sison decided not to purchase the property, so
shenotified Frias through a letter dated March 20, 1991 [Frias received it only on June 11, 1991],and
Sison reminded Frias of their agreement that the 2M Sison paid should be considered as a loan payable
within 6 months. Frias failed to pay this amount.
Sison filed a complaintfor sum of money with preliminary attachment. Sison averred that Frias tried to
deprive her of the security for the loan by making a false report of the loss of her owner’s copy of TCT,
executing an affidavit of loss and by filing a petition[1] for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy.
RTC issued a writ of preliminary attachment upon the filing of a 2M bond.
RTC found that Frias was under obligation to pay Sison 2M with compounded interest pursuant to their
MOA. RTC ordered Frias to pay Sison:
2M + 32% annual interest beginning December 7, 1991 until fully paid
70k representing premiums paid by Sison on the attachment bond with legal interest counted from the
date of this decision until fully paid
100k moral, corrective, exemplary damages [liable for moral damages because of Frias’ fraudulent
scheme]
100k attorney’s fees + cost of litigation
CA affirmed RTC with modification—32% reduced to 25%. CA said that there was no basis for Frias to say
that the interest should be charged for 6 months only. It said that a loan always bears interest;
otherwise, it is not a loan. The interest should commence on June 7, 1991 until fully paid, with
compounded bank interest prevailing at the time [June 1991] the 2M was considered as a loan (as
certified by the bank).
ISSUES & HOLDING:
Ratio only discusses topic of INTEREST (as per syllabus)
1. WON compounded bank interest should be limited to 6 months as contained in the MOA. NO
2. WON Sison is entitled to moral damages. YES
3. WON the grant of attorney’s fees is proper, even if not mentioned in the body of the decision.
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HELD:
NO. CA committed no error in awarding an annual 25% interest on the 2M even beyond the 6-month
stipulated period. In this case, the phrase “for the last six months only” should be taken in the context of
the entire agreement.
SC notes that the agreement speaks of two (2) periods of 6 months each (see FACTS—words in bold &
underline). No interest will be charged for the 1st 6-month period [while Sison was making up her mind],
but only for the 2nd 6-month period after Sison decided not to buy the property. There is nothing in the
MOA that suggests that interest will be charged for 6 months only even if it takes forever for Frias to pay
the loan.
The payment of regular interest constitutes the price or cost of the use of money, and until the principal
sum due is returned to the creditor, regular interest continues to accrue since the debtor continues to
use such principal amount. For a debtor to continue in possession of the principal of the loan and to
continue to use the same after maturity of the loan without payment of the monetary interest
constitutes unjust enrichment on the part of the debtor at the expense of the creditor.
CA DECISION AND RESOLUTION AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION—Award of attorney’s fees deleted
[1] At first, Frias’ petition was granted, but it was eventually set aside, since RTC granted Sison’s petition
for relief from judgment (as Sison was in possession of the owner’s duplicate copy).
28. EMERALD GARMENT MANUFACTURING CORPORATION vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, BUREAU OF
PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER and H.D. LEE COMPANY, INC.
G.R. No. 100098, December 29, 1995
FACTS:
On 18 September 1981, private respondent H.D. Lee Co., Inc. filed with the Bureau of Patents,
Trademarks & Technology Transfer (BPTTT) a Petition for Cancellation of Registration No. SR 5054 for
the trademark "STYLISTIC MR. LEE" used on skirts, jeans, blouses, socks, briefs, jackets, jogging suits,
dresses, shorts, shirts and lingerie under Class 25, issued on 27 October 1980 in the name of petitioner
Emerald Garment Manufacturing Corporation.
Private respondent averred that petitioner's trademark "so closely resembled its own trademark, 'LEE'
as previously registered and used in the Philippines cause confusion, mistake and deception on the part
of the purchasing public as to the origin of the goods.
On 19 July 1988, the Director of Patents rendered a decision granting private respondent's petition for
cancellation and opposition to registration. The Director of Patents, using the test of dominancy,
declared that petitioner's trademark was confusingly similar to private respondent's mark because "it is
the word 'Lee' which draws the attention of the buyer and leads him to conclude that the goods
originated from the same manufacturer. It is undeniably the dominant feature of the mark.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not a trademark causes confusion and is likely to deceive the public is a question of
fact which is to be resolved by applying the "test of dominancy", meaning, if the competing trademark
contains the main or essential or dominant features of another by reason of which confusion and
deception are likely to result.
HELD:
The word "LEE" is the most prominent and distinctive feature of the appellant's trademark and all
of the appellee's "LEE" trademarks. It is the mark which draws the attention of the buyer and leads him
to conclude that the goods originated from the same manufacturer. The alleged difference is too
insubstantial to be noticeable. The likelihood of confusion is further made more probable by the fact
that both parties are engaged in the same line of business.
Although the Court decided in favor of the respondent, the appellee has sufficiently established its right
to prior use and registration of the trademark "LEE" in the Philippines and is thus entitled to protection
from any infringement upon the same. The dissenting opinion of Justice Padilla is more acceptable.
29. Reynaldo Tuanda, etc., petitioners vs The Honorable Sandiganbayan, Bartolome Binaohan and
Delia Estrellanes, respondents
G.R. No. 110544 October 17, 1995
Ponente: Kapunan
Facts:
Petitioners institute this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court to set aside the resolution of Sandiganbayan and its orders denying petitioners' motion
for suspension of their arraignment.
Fabruary 9, 1989 Delia Estrellanes and Bartolome Binaohan were designated as industrial labor sectoral
representative and agricultural labor sectoral representative for the Sangguniang Bayan of Jimalalud,
Negros Oriental by DILG Secretary Santos. They both took their oath of office on February 16 and 17,
1989.
Then, petitioners filed a petition with the Office of the President for review and recall of said
designations. This was denied and enjoined Tuanda to recognize private sectoral representatives.
Estrallanes and Binaohan then filed a petition for mandamus with RTC Negros Oriental for recognition as
members of the Sangguniang Bayan. It was dismissed.
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The matter was then brought to RTC Dumaguete City accusing Tuanda and others of taking advantage of
their official functions and unlawfully causing undue injury to Estrellanes and Binaohan.
Petitioners filed a motion with Sandiganbayan for suspension of the Criminal Case on the ground that a
prejudicial question exists. The RTC rendered a decision declaring null and void ab initio the designations
issued by DILG for violation of the provisions saying that the Sanggunian itself must make a
determination first of the number of sectors in the city/municipality to warrant representation.
Meanwhile, the Sandiganbayan has issued a resolution saying that the private respondents have
rendered such services and the said appointments enjoy the presumption of regularity; for these
reasons, the private respondents were entitled to the slaries attached to their office. Even if the RTC
later declare the appointments null and void, they would still be given salaries because of the period
they acted as representatives has made them a de facto officers.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution in view of the RTC nullification of the
appointments. But it was likewise denied along with the cancellation of their arraignment, instead
Sandiganbayan required Tuanda and the others to submit a written show cause why they should not be
cited for contempt of court for their failure to appear in court today for the arraignment.
Hence, this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition where petitioners attribute to respondent
Sandiganbayan the following errors:
A. The Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners' motions for the
suspension of the proceedings in Criminal Case
B. The Respondent Court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in refusing to suspend the
proceedings that would entail a retrial and rehearing by it of the basic issue involved
C. The Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion and/or acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in effectively allowing petitioners to be prosecuted under two alternative theories that
private respondents are de jure and/or de facto officers in violation of petitioners' right to due process.
Issue:
The legality of private respondents' designation as sectoral representatives.
Held:
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. 14 It has
two essential elements:
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action;
and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. 15
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Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bench, we find that the issue in the civil case, CA-G.R. CV
No. 36769, constitutes a valid prejudicial question to warrant suspension of the arraignment and further
proceedings in the criminal case against petitioners.
All the elements of a prejudicial question are clearly and unmistakably present in this case. There is no
doubt that the facts and issues involved in the civil action (No. 36769) and the criminal case (No. 16936)
are closely related. The filing of the criminal case was premised on petitioners' alleged partiality and
evident bad faith in not paying private respondents' salaries and per diems as sectoral representatives,
while the civil action was instituted precisely to resolve whether or not the designations of private
respondents as sectoral representatives were made in accordance with law.
Private respondents insist that even if their designations are nullified, they are entitled to compensation
for actual services rendered. We disagree. As found by the trial court and as borne out by the records,
from the start, private respondents' designations as sectoral representatives have been challenged by
petitioners. They began with a petition filed with the Office of the President copies of which were
received by private respondents on 26 February 1989, barely eight (8) days after they took their oath of
office. Hence, private respondents' claim that they have actually rendered services as sectoral
representatives has not been established.
Finally, we find unmeritorious respondent Sandiganbayan's thesis that even in the event that private
respondents' designations are finally declared invalid, they may still be considered de facto public
officers entitled to compensation for services actually rendered.
The conditions and elements of de facto officership are the following:
1) There must be a de jure office;
2) There must be color of right or general acquiescence by the public; and
3) There must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith.
Sandiganbayan Resolution was set aside.
30. Beltran vs People
Beltran vs. PP/Judge Juazon
GRN 137567 334 SCRA 106
Buena, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage against her wife for 24 years. Wife answered
that it was petitioner who left the family house and lived with a paramour. A concubinage case was filed
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by wife and petitioner argued that the pendency of a case for declaration of nullity of marriage posed a
prejudicial question.
ISSUE:
Whether or not pendency of the case for nullity of marriage a prejudicial question to the
concubinage case.
RULING:
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two
essential elements: 1) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the criminal action; and 2) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action
may proceed.
In the criminal case of concubinage, the accused need not present a final judgment declaring his
marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than
proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void.
31. Yap vs Cabales
YAP VS. CABALES G.R. NO. 159186 JUNE 5, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner Jesse Y. Yap and his spouse Bessie Yap are engaged in the real estate business through their
company Primetown Property Group. Yap purchased several real properties from a certain Evelyn Te.
Inconsideration of said purchases, petitioner issued several BPI postdated checks to Evelyn. Thereafter,
spouses Orlando and Mergyl Mirabueno and spouses Charlie and Jovita Dimalanta, rediscounted the
checks from Evelyn. Some of the checks were dishonor by reason of account closed.
Despite of the demand, Yap failed to pay the amounts represented by the said checks. Spouses
Mirabueno filed a civil action for collection of sum of money against Yap. Subsequently, the Office of the
City Prosecutor of General Santos City filed several in formations for violation of BP 22 against the
petitioner. In the 22criminal cases, Yap filed separate motions to suspend proceedings on account of the
existence of a prejudicial question. The MCTC denied the motions for lack of merit. On appeal, the RTC
likewise denied the petition. CA rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit. The CA
opined that Civil Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 did not pose a prejudicial question to the prosecution of the
petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Hence, this appeal.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not there exists a prejudicial question that necessitates the suspension of the proceedings in
the MTCC.
HELD:
None. A prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are
both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the
latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The rationale
behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential
elements: (i) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal action; and (ii) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed. If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues, or the issue in one is intimately related to
the issues raised in the other, then a prejudicial question would likely exist, provided the other element
or characteristic is satisfied. It must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon
which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the
civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. If the resolution
of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal
action based on the same facts, or if there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before
taking up the criminal case, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question. Neither is there a
prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently
of each other.
32. Dreamwork vs Janiola
Dreamwork Construction, Inc. vs Cleofe Janiola and Hon. Arthur Famini, GR No 184861, June 30, 2009
FACTS
Petitioner, filed a Complaint Affidavit against private respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Las Piñas City for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Afterwards, private respondent, together
with her husband, filed a complaint against petitioner for the rescission of an alleged construction
agreement between the parties, as well as for damages. Thereafter, private respondent filed for a
Motion to Suspend proceedings alleging that for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement
between the parties, as well as for damages.
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ISSUE:
WON the court seriously erred in not perceiving grave abuse of discretion on the part of the inferior
court when the latter ruled to suspend proceddings in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 on the basis o f
“prejudicial question” in Civil Case No. LP-06-0197.[
RULING:
Private respondent cites Article 36 of the Civil Code. The Court does not agree with private respondent’s
argument that a prejudicial question exists when the civil action is filed either before the institution of
the criminal action or during the pendency of the criminal action and that there is an apparent conflict in
the provisions of the Rules of Court and the Civil Code in that the latter considers a civil case to have
presented a prejudicial question even if the criminal case preceded the filing of the civil case.
it is a basic precept in statutory construction that a “change in phraseology by amendment of a
provision of law indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of the provision from that it
originally had.” In the instant case, the phrase, “previously instituted,” was inserted to qualify the nature
of the civil action involved in a prejudicial question in relation to the criminal action. This interpretation
is further buttressed by the insertion of “subsequent” directly before the term criminal action. There is
no other logical explanation for the amendments except to qualify the relationship of the civil and
criminal actions, that the civil action must precede the criminal action.
Additionally, it is a principle in statutory construction that “a statute should be construed not only to be
consistent with itself but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a
complete, coherent and intelligible system.” This principle is consistent with the maxim, interpretare et
concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus or every statute must be so construed and
harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.[17]In other words, every
effort must be made to harmonize seemingly conflicting laws. It is only when harmonization is
impossible that resort must be made to choosing which law to apply.
In the instant case, Art. 36 of the Civil Code and Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are susceptible
of an interpretation that would harmonize both provisions of law. The phrase “previously instituted civil
action” in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 is plainly worded and is not susceptible of alternative interpretations. The
clause “before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed” in Art. 36 of the Civil Code
may, however, be interpreted to mean that the motion to suspend the criminal action may be filed
during the preliminary investigation with the public prosecutor or court conducting the investigation, or
during the trial with the court hearing the case.
This interpretation would harmonize all the mentioned laws. Thus, under the principles of statutory
construction, it is this interpretation of Art. 36 of the Civil Code that should govern in order to give effect
to all the relevant provisions of law.
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33. Pimentel vs Pimentel
PIMENTEL vs. PIMENTEL, G.R. No. 172060, September 13, 2010
Facts:
Respondent, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel, filed an action for frustrated parricide against petitioner,
Joselito R. Pimentel. The Information for Frustrated Parricide was dated 30 August 2004 and was raffled
to RTC Quezon City on 25 October 2004. The pre-trial and trial was set on 14 February 2005. She also
filed on 5 November 2004, a petition, dated 4 November 2004, for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity Petitioner received
summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City on 7 February 2005, for the pre-trial
and trial of the Civil Case. He then filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC
Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question asserting that the relationship
between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of Civil Case would have
a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City. The RTC Quezon City held
that the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the
suspension of the criminal case before it. The Court of Appeals also denied the petition holding that the
issue in the criminal case for frustrated parricide differs from the issue in the civil action for annulment
of marriage. It ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be declared
void, it would be immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged
acts constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had already been committed. At the time of the
commission of the crime, the marriage is still subsisting.
Issue:
Whether or not the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that
warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide.
Ruling:
The elements of a prejudicial question under Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, which are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed, were not met. Civil action must be
instituted first before the filing of the criminal action. In this case, the civil case for annulment was filed
after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. Further, the resolution of the civil action is
not a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the criminal action. There is a prejudicial
question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the civil action an
issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because howsoever
the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case. The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in
the crime of parricide. However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately
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related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and
the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. The issue in the civil case for
annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the
accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is
whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence
but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioner’s will. At the
time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent
dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case is granted, will have no effect on the
alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the
marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable
since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.
34. Reyes vs Rossi
TEODORO A.
REYES vs. ETTORE ROSSI G.R. No. 159823
February 18, 2013
FACTS:
On October 31, 1997, petitioner Teodoro A. Reyes (Reyes) and Advanced Foundation Construction
Systems Corporation (Advanced Foundation), represented by its Executive Project Director, respondent
Ettore Rossi (Rossi), executed a deed of conditional sale involving the purchase by Reyes of equipment
consisting of a Warman Dredging Pump HY 300A worth P10,000,000.00. The parties agreed therein that
Reyes would pay the sum of P3,000,000.00 as downpayment, and the balance of P7,000,000.00 through
four post-dated checks. Reyes complied, but in January 1998, he requested the restructuring of his
obligation under the deed of conditional sale by replacing the four post-dated checks with nine post-
dated checks that would include interest at the rate of P25,000.00/month accruing on the unpaid
portion of the obligation on April 30, 1998, June 30, 1998, July 31, 1998, September 30, 1998 and
October 31, 1998.
Advanced Foundation assented to Reyes’ request, and returned the four checks. In turn, Reyes issued
and delivered the following nine postdated checks in the aggregate sum of P7,125,000.00 drawn against
the United Coconut Planters Bank Rossi deposited three of the post-dated checks (i.e., No. 72807, No.
79125 and No. 72808) on their maturity dates in Advanced Foundation’s bank account at the PCI Bank in
Makati. Two of the checks were denied payment ostensibly upon Reyes’ instructions to stop their
payment, while the third (i.e., No. 72802) was dishonored for insufficiency of funds.
Rossi likewise deposited two more checks (i.e., No. 72809 and No. 72801) in Advanced Foundation’s
account at the PCI Bank in Makati, but the checks were returned with the notation Account Closed
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stamped on them. He did not anymore deposit the three remaining checks on the assumption that they
would be similarly dishonored. In the meanwhile, on July 29, 1998, Reyes commenced an action for
rescission of contract and damages in the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City (RTC). Rossi charged Reyes
with five counts of estafa and five counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Makati for the dishonor of checks and another criminal charge for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 was lodged against Reyes in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City for the
dishonor of Check No. 72802.
On September 29, 1998, Reyes submitted his counter-affidavit in the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Makati, At the same time, Reyes assailed the jurisdiction of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati
over the criminal charges against him on the ground that he had issued the checks in Quezon City; as
well as argued that the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati should suspend the proceedings because
of the pendency in the RTC of the civil action for rescission of contract that posed a prejudicial question
as to the criminal proceedings. On November 20, 1998, the Assistant City Prosecutor handling the
preliminary investigation recommended the dismissal of the charges of estafa and the suspension of the
proceedings relating to the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 based on a prejudicial question
On January 5, 1999, the City Prosecutor of Makati approved the recommendation of the handling
Assistant City Prosecutor. Rossi appealed the resolution of the City Prosecutor to the Department of
Justice, but the Secretary of Justice, , denied Rossi’s petition for review.
After the denial of his motion for reconsideration, Rossi challenged the resolutions of the Secretary of
Justice by petition for certiorari in the CA.
CA granted the appeal of Rossi in so far as the issue of the existence of prejudicial question is
concerned but the dismissal of the complaint for estafa was affirmed.
ISSUE:
WON there is a prejudicial question
HELD:
The rescission of a contract of sale is not a prejudicial question that will warrant the suspension of the
criminal proceedings commenced to prosecute the buyer for violations of the Bouncing Checks Law
(Batas Pambansa Blg. 22) arising from the dishonor of the checks the buyer issued in connection with
the sale. A prejudicial question generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a
criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that must first be determined
before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would
be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.16 The
rationale for the suspension on the ground of a prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting decisio.
Reyes states that if the contract would be rescinded, his obligation to pay under the conditional deed of
sale would be extinguished, and such outcome would necessarily result in the dismissal of the criminal
proceedings for the violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.It is true that the rescission of a contract
results in the extinguishment of the obligatory relation as if it was never created, the extinguishment
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having a retroactive effect. The rescission is equivalent to invalidating and unmaking the juridical tie,
leaving things in their status before the celebration of the contract.However, until the contract is
rescinded, the juridical tie and the concomitant obligations subsist.
To properly appreciate if there is a prejudicial question to warrant the suspension of the criminal
actions, reference is made to the elements of the crimes charged. The violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 requires the concurrence of the following elements, namely: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of
any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the
time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the
check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid
cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.21 The issue in the criminal actions upon the violations of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 is, therefore, whether or not Reyes issued the dishonoured checks knowing
them to be without funds upon presentment. On the other hand, the issue in the civil action for
rescission is whether or not the breach in the fulfilment of Advanced Foundation’s obligation warranted
the rescission of the conditional sale. If, after trial on the merits in the civil action, Advanced Foundation
would be found to have committed material breach as to warrant the rescission of the contract, such
result would not necessarily mean that Reyes would be absolved of the criminal responsibility for issuing
the dishonored checks because, as the aforementioned elements show, he already committed the
violations upon the dishonor of the checks that he had issued at a time when the conditional sale was
still fully binding upon the parties. His obligation to fund the checks or to make arrangements for them
with the drawee bank should not be tied up to the future event of extinguishment of the obligation
under the contract of sale through rescission. Indeed, under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the mere issuance
of a worthless check was already the offense in itself. Under such circumstances, the criminal
proceedings for the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 could proceed despite the pendency of the civil
action for rescission of the conditional sale. As defined, a prejudicial question is one that arises in a case,
the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the
court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It
is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it
that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it
must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case,
the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. It comes into play generally in a
situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an
issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because howsoever
the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal case.
35. Capili vs People
700 SCRA 443 – Civil Law – Family Code – Void Marriages – A Void 2nd Marriage is not a Defense in
Bigamy Criminal Law – Bigamy – Elements
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FACTS:
In September 1999, James Capili married Karla Medina. But then, just three months later in December
1999, he married another woman named Shirley Tismo.
In 2004, Karla Medina filed an action for declaration of nullity of the second marriage between Capili
and Tismo. In June 2004, Tismo filed a bigamy case against Capili.
Before a decision can be had in the bigamy case, the action filed by Karla Medina was granted and
Capili’s marriage with Tismo was declared void by reason of the subsisting marriage between Medina
and Capili. Thereafter, Capili filed a motion to dismiss in the bigamy case. He alleged that since the
second marriage was already declared void ab initio that marriage never took place and that therefore,
there is no bigamy to speak of.
The trial court agreed with Capili and it dismissed the bigamy case. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed the dismissal and remanded the case to the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a declaration of nullity of the second marriage avoids a prosecution for bigamy.
HELD:
No. The elements of bigamy are:
1. That the offender has been legally married;
2. That the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
When Capili married Tismo, all the above elements are present. The crime of bigamy was already
consummated. It is already immaterial if the second (or first marriage, see Mercado vs Tan) was
subsequently declared void. The outcome of the civil case filed by Karla Medina had no bearing to the
determination of Capili’s guilt or innocence in the bigamy case because all that is required for the charge
of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is
contracted. He who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
The Supreme Court also notes that even if a party has reason to believe that his first marriage is void, he
cannot simply contract a second marriage without having such first marriage be judicially declared as
void. The parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the
same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage
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is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that
the marriage exists.
36. Consing, Jr. vs People
G.R. No. 148193 January 16, 2003PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,vs.RAFAEL JOSE CONSING, JR.,
respondent.
Facts:
Sometime in February 1997, respondent Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. and his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz,
represented to Plus Builders, Inc. (PBI) that they are the true and lawful owners of a 42,443 square
meter lot situated in Imus, Cavite and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 687599 in the name of
Cecilia de la Cruz. They further represented that they acquired said lot, which was previously covered by
TCT No. 191408 from Juanito TanTeng and Po Willie Yu. Relying on the representations of respondent
and his mother, PBI purchased the questioned lot. On April 1999, PBI discovered that respondent and
his mother did not have a valid title over the subject lot. PBI came to know that Juanito Tan Teng and Po
Willie Yu never sold said lot to respondent and his mother and that TCT No. 191408 upon which TCT No.
687599 was based is not on file with the Register of Deeds. In August 1999, PBI was ousted from the
possession of the disputed lot by Juanito Tan Teng and Po Willie Yu. Despite written and verbal
demands, respondent and his mother refused to return the amount of P13,369,641.79alleged to have
been initially paid by PBI. On July 22, 1999, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 68, an action for "Injunctive Relief" docketed as Civil Case No. SCA 1759, against PBI, Unicapital
Inc, Unicapital Realty Inc., Jaime Martires, Mariano D. Martinez, Cecilia de la Cruz and 20 other John
Does.
Respondent sought a declaration that he was merely an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz, and
therefore was not under any obligation to PBI and to the other defendants on the various transactions
involving TCT No. 687599.On October 13, 1999, PBI filed against respondent and his mother a complaint
for "Damages and Attachment, "docketed as Civil Case No. 99-95381, with Branch 12 of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila.
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum shopping and pendency of Civil Case No.
SCA 1759.
On January 21, 2000, a criminal case for estafa through falsification of public document was filed
against respondent Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. and his mother with the RTC of Imus, Cavite.
Issue:
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Whether or not the pendency of Civil Case Nos. SCA 1759 and 99-95381, for Injunctive Relief and
for Damages and Attachment, is a prejudicial question justifying the suspension of the proceedings in
the criminal case for estafa through falsification of public document, filed against the respondent.
Held:
If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues or the issue in one is intimately related to the issues
raised in the other, then a prejudicial question would likely exist, provided the other element or
characteristic is satisfied. It must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which
the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil
action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. If the resolution of
the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal
action based on the same facts, or there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before
taking up the criminal case, therefore, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question.
In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that would justify the suspension of the proceedings
in the criminal case.
37. Continental Steel vs Montano
603 SCRA 621 – Labor Law – Labor Standards – Death Benefits for the Death of a Dependent – A Fetus is
a Dependent
Civil Law – Civil Personality – When does civil personality start – When does life begin
FACT:
In January 2006, the wife of Rolando Hortillano had a miscarriage which caused the death of their
unborn child. Hortillano, in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement, then filed death
benefits claim from his employer, the Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation which denied the
claim. Eventually, the issue was submitted for arbitration and both parties agreed to have Atty.
Allan Montaño act as the arbitrator. Montaño ruled that Hortillano is entitled to his claims. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of Montaño.
On appeal, Continental Steel insisted that Hortillano is not entitled because under the CBA, death
benefits are awarded if an employee’s legitimate dependent has died; but that in this case, no “death”
has occurred because the fetus died inside the womb of the mother, that a fetus has no juridical
personality because it was never born pursuant to Article 40 of the Civil Code which provides a
conceived child acquires personality only when it is born; that the fetus was not born hence it is not a
legitimate dependent as contemplated by the CBA nor did it suffer death as contemplated under civil
laws.
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ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the fetus is a legitimate dependent?
2. Whether or not a person has to be born before it could die?
HELD:
1. Yes. In the first place, the fact of marriage between Hortillano and his wife was never put in question,
hence they are presumed to be married. Second, children conceived or born during the marriage of the
parents are legitimate. Hence, the unborn child (fetus) is already a legitimate dependent the moment it
was conceived (meeting of the sperm and egg cell).
2. No. Death is defined as “cessation of life”. Certainly, a child in the womb has life. There is no need to
discuss whether or not the unborn child acquired juridical personality – that is not the issue here. But
nevertheless, life should not be equated to civil personality. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly
provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those
who have acquired juridical personality could die. In this case, Hortillano’s fetus had had life inside the
womb as evidenced by the fact that it clung to life for 38 weeks before the unfortunate miscarriage.
Thus, death occurred on a dependent hence Hortillano as an employee is entitled to death benefit
claims as provided for in their CBA.
38. Romualdez, Marcos vs COMELEC
Facts:
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of
the First District of Leyte, stating that she is 7-months resident in the said district. Montejo, incumbent
Representative and a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification, alleging that Imelda did not meet the constitutional one-year residency requirement.
Imelda thus amended her COC, changing “seven” months to “since childhood.” The provincial election
supervisor refused to admit the amended COC for the reason that it was filed out of time. Imelda, thus,
filed her amended COC with Comelec's head office in Manila.
On April 24, 1995, the Comelec Second Division declared Imelda not qualified to run and struck off the
amended as well as original COCs. The Comelec in division found that when Imelda chose to stay in
Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as a voter there and
expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City,
where she spent her childhood and school days, as her place of domicile. The Comelec en banc affirmed
this ruling.
During the pendency of the disqualification case, Imelda won in the election. But
the Comelec suspended her proclamation. Imelda thus appealed to the Supreme Court.
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Imelda invoked Section 78 of B.P. 881 which provides that a petition seeking to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy must be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than 15 days
before the election. Since the Comelec rendered the resolution on on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days
before the election, Comelec already lose jurisdiction over her case. She contended that it is the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the Comelec which has jurisdiction over the election
of members of the House of Representatives.
Issues:
Was Imelda a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the
time of the May 9, 1995 elections.
Does the Comelec lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case after the
elections?
Does the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the question
of Imelda's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections?
Held:
1. Imelda was a resident of the First District of Leyte for election purposes, and therefore possessed the
necessary residence qualifications to run in Leyte as a candidate for a seat in the House of
Representatives for the following reasons:
a. Minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is
gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her
domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was established when her father brought his family
back to Leyte.
b. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate:
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be
deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the
presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and
deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time. Petitioner held
various residences for different purposes during the last four decades. None of these purposes
unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte.
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c. It cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result
of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. A wife does not automatically gain
the husband’s domicile. What petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. She did not lose
her domicile of origin. The term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and
quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-
affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife — the term residence should only be
interpreted to mean "actual residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil
law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept her
domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium.
d. Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her marriage
and only acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts following her
return to the country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of
origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally
expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to
"rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte ... to make them livable for the
Marcos family to have a home in our homeland." Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence
certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brother's house, an act which supports the
domiciliary intention clearly manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman.
2. With the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881, it is evident
that the Comelec does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under
Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.
Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Moreover, it is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is
generally construed to be merely directory, "so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the
judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such result it would have clearly indicated it.
3. HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications
of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of
Representatives. Imelda, not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the
HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question. (Romualdez-Marcos vs Comelec, G.R. No.
119976, September 18, 1995)
- See more at: http://legalvault.blogspot.com/2014/07/romualdez-marcos-vs-comelec-
digest.html#sthash.p6AH7GBj.dpuf