persons & family relations case digests

P E R S O N S & F A M I L Y R E L A T I O N S | A T T Y . V A R G A S | C A S E D I G E S T S

1 A R A N E T A C A C H A P E R O D E N I L L A L A T M A A L A M A R A S I G A N

P A S C U A L S A G U N S A L T E R A S V A L L E C R U Z V I L L A N U E V A

CASE 1. De La Pena v. Avila, G.R. No. 187490, Feb. 8, 2012 (What Constitutes CPG) Facts:

1. Antonia Dela Pena, who was married to Antegono Dela Pena, obtained a loan in the sum of Php 250,000.00 from Aguila (Aguila Sons and Co.)

a. As a security for the payment of the said loan, Antonia executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage in favour of Aguila on their 277m2

residential lot in Marikina 2. However, Antonia also executed a Deed Of absolute sale in favour of

Gemma Avila (Gemma, the herein respondent) of the same property. The sale was made because of Antonias failure to pay her obligation from Aguila.

a. To which, Gemma also mortgaged the same property to Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC-BPI) to secure a loan from the bank.

3. Antonia, together with his son Alvin John, filed against Gemma praying for the annulment of the said deed of sale. She claims that the said property was conjugal property and was sold without the consent of his husband who already died by that time. She also invokes the presumption of Conjugality under Art. 160 of the Civil Code.

4. The RTC ruled in favour of Antonia and upheld the presumption of conjugality. The CA ruled otherwise. Thus, this petition.

Issue: WON the said property that was sold is part of the Conjugal Partnership Ruling: The said property cannot be presumed to be part of the Conjugal Partnership. Ratio: The presumption mentioned in the Art. 160 of the Civil Code applies only for the property acquired during marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to when the property was acquired. Moreover, the presumption in favour of the conjugality is rebuttable, but only with strong, clear and convincing proof of exclusive ownership.

1. As the parties invoking the presumption of conjugality under Art. 160 of the Civil Code, the Dela Penas did not even come close to proving that the subject property was acquired during the Marriage between Antonia and Antegono. The record is bereft of evidence that from which the actual acquisition of the property by Antonia was during the Marriage.

2. Although the title stated in its registration that it is under the name of, Antonia Dela Pena, married to Antegono dela Pena, such is merely a description of the civil status of the wife and and cannot mean that the husband is also a registered owner. The reason for the inconclusiveness of the said description is that it is possible that the property was acquired when she was single but only registered when she got married.

CASE 2. Quiao v. Quiao, G.R. No. 183622, July 4, 2012 (What constitutes CPG Definition, FC 106 & Presumption of CPG, FC 116) FACTS

Brigido Quiao (petitioner) and Rita Quiao (respondent) contracted marriage in 1977.

o Had no separate properties prior to their marriage. o During the course of said marriage, produced four children.

In 2000, Rita filed a complaint against Brigido for legal separation (for cohabiting with another woman).

Subsequently, the RTC rendered a decision in 2005 declaring the legal separation of the parties pursuant to Article 55.

o Save for one child (already of legal age), the three minor children remains in the custody of Rita, who is the innocent spouse.

o The properties accrued by the spouses shall be divided equally between them subject to the respective legitimes of their children; however, Brigidos share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership shall be forfeited in favor of their children in accordance to par. 9 of Article 129 of the FC.

A few months thereafter, Rita filed a motion for execution, which was granted by the trial court. By 2006, Brigido paid Rita with regards to the earlier decision; the writ was partially executed.

After more than 9 months later, Brigido filed a motion for clarification asking the RTC to define Nets Profits Earned. In answer, the court held that the phrase denotes the remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each of the spouses and debts.

Upon a motion for reconsideration, it initially set aside its previous decision stating that NET PROFIT EARNED shall be computed in accordance with par. 4 of Article 102 of the FC. However, it later reverted to its original Order, setting aside the last ruling.

ISSUE

Whether or not the regime of conjugal partnership of gains governs the couples property relations.

HELD

Yes. Brigido and Rita tied the knot on January 6, 1977. Since at the time of exchange of martial vows, the operative law was the NCC and since they did not agree on a marriage settlement, the property relations between them is the system of relative community or the conjugal partnership of gains.

Under this property relation, the husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work and industry. The husband and wife also own in common all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains.

Article 119, NCC. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon the absolute or relative community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and wife.


2

A R A N E T A C A C H A P E R O D E N I L L A L A T M A A L A M A R A S I G A N P A S C U A L S A G U N S A L T E R A S V A L E C R U Z V I L L A N U E V A

CASE 3.Villanuevav. Court of Appeals,G.R. No. 143286 | April 14, 2004 (What are included in CPG) FACTS:

1. On 13 October 1988, Eusebia Retuya filed a complaint before the trial court against her husband Nicolas Retuya, Pacita Villanueva and Nicolas son with Pacita, Procopio Villanueva. Eusebia sought the reconveyance from Nicolas and Pacita of several properties (subject properties), claiming that such are her conjugal properties with Nicolas.

2. Plaintiff Eusebia, is the legal wife of defendant Nicolas, having been married on October 7, 1926. Out of the lawful wedlock, they begot five (5) children. Spouses Retuya resided at Mandaue City.

3. During their marriage, they acquired real properties and all improvements situated in Mandaue City, and Consolacion, Cebu

4. Nicolas is the co-owner of a parcel of land situated in Mandaue City which he inherited from his parents Esteban Retuya and Balbina Solon as well as the purchasers of hereditary shares of approximately eight (8) parcels of land in Mandaue City.

5. Some of the properties earn income from coconuts leased to corporations 6. In 1945, Nicolas no longer lived with his legitimate family and cohabited

with defendant, Pacita Villanueva, wherein Procopio Villanueva, is their illegitimate son. Nicolas, then, was the only person who received the income of the properties.

7. Pacita, from the time she started living in concubinage with Nicolas, has no occupation; She had no properties of her own from which she could derive income.

8. From the time Nicolas suffered stroke until the present, his illegitimate son is already the one who has been receiving the income of his properties

9. Settlement between parties was asked but not met 10. Trial court in favor of Eusebia Natuya; Petitioners appealed; Eusebia died,

and was then substituted by her heirs; CA upheld trial courts decision ISSUE: Whether or not the subject properties acquired during the marriage between Eusebia and Procopio are conjugal HELD: YES, they are conjugal. Petition denied; decision of CA affirmed RATIO:

The Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships govern the property relations between Nicolas and Eusebia even if they were married before the effectivity of Family Code.

Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the Family Code shall apply to conjugal partnerships established before the Family Code without prejudice to vested rights already acquired under the Civil Code or other laws. Thus, under the Family Code, if the properties are acquired during the marriage, the presumption is that they are conjugal. The burden of proof is on the party claiming that they are not conjugal. This is counter-balanced by the requirement that the properties

must first be proven to have been acquired during the marriage before they are presumed conjugal.

Nicolas and Eusebia were married on 7 October 1926. Nicolas and Pacita started cohabiting in 1936. Eusebia died on 23 November 1996. Pacita and Nicolas were married on 16 December 1996. Petitioners themselves admit that Lot No. 152 was purchased on 4 October 1957. The date of acquisition of Lot No. 152 is clearly during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia.

Since the subject properties, including Lot No. 152, were acquired during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia, the presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code is that all these are conjugal properties of Nicolas and Eusebia.

CASE 4. Mendoza v. Reyes, 124 SCRA 154 (What are included in CPG, FC 117, 115, 118, 119, 120) FACTS:

Ponciano and Julia were married in 1915. The properties in question consisting of Lots 5 and 6, were bought on installment basis. Thus, the spouses jointly obtained a loan to pay their balance. The corresponding deed of absolute sale was executed where the vendee named is 'Julia de Reyes'. Her signatures appear over the caption vendee and those of Ponciano under the phrase: 'with my marital consent. As a result of these sales, TCTs were issued in the name of "JULIA REYES married to PONCIANO REYES."

While Ponciano was absent attending his farm in Pampanga, Julia sold absolutely the lots in question Efren V. Mendoza and Inocencia R. De Mendoza, as vendees, without the knowledge and consent of Ponciano. At the same time the spouses were living separately and were not in speaking terms.

Ponciano filed a complaint for the annulment of a deed of sale of two parcels of land contending that said properties were conjugal properties of himself and his wife and that she had sold them to petitioners "all by herself" and without his knowledge or consent.

Petitioner Mendozas alleged that the properties were paraphernal properties of Julia and that they had purchased the same in good faith and for adequate consideration.

Julia testified that she bought the two parcels of land on installment basis and that the first payment came from her personal funds.

The CFI declared the properties exclusive and paraphernal properties of Julia and ruled that she could validly dispose of the same without the consent of her husband.

ISSUE: WON the disputed properties are conjugal properties. HELD: Yes. The deed of sale is declared null and void with respect to one- half share of Ponciano. Article 153 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 153. The following are conjugal partnership property:




That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;

It is sufficient to prove that the property was acquired during the marriage in order that the same may be deemed conjugal property. There is no question that the disputed property was acquired by onerous title during the marriage.

Records show that the funds came from loans obtained by the spouses. Under Article 161 of the Civil Code, all debts and obligations contracted by the husband and the wife for the benefit of the conjugal partnership are liabilities of the partnership.

Julias claim of exclusive ownership is belied by the Income Tax Returns which she herself prepared and filed in behalf of the conjugal partnership wherein she made the statement that the rentals paid to her were income of the conjugal partnership, and she made to appear the properties in question as capital assets of the conjugal partnership.

Property acquired during a marriage is presumed to be conjugal and the fact that the land is later registered in the name of only one of the spouses does not destroy its conjugal nature. If the fact that property acquired during marriage was registered in the name of the husband alone does not affect its conjugal nature, neither does registration in the name of the wife.

CASE 5.Aguete v. PNB, G.R. No. 170166 | 2011-04-06 Facts:

Spouses Jose Ros and Estrella Aguete filed a complaint for the annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage and all legal proceedings taken thereunder against PNB, Laoag Branch before the CFI of Ilocos Norte.

The information disclosed that Jose Ros (petitioner) obtained a loan of P115,000 from ONB and executed a real estate mortgage involving a parcel of land as security thereof.

Upon maturity, the loan remained unpaid and as a result, PNB initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the said property. After which, the lot was sold to PNB as the highest bidder.

Petitioner claims that she had no knowledge of the loan incurred by her husband nor did she consent to the mortgage instituted on their conjugal property. She then filed a complaint to annul the proceedings pertaining to the mortgage, sale and consolidation of the property (after the lapse of 1 year).

The trial court rendered its decision in favor of petitioners but was later reversed by the appellate court upon appeal.

Issue: WON the property is considered as redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Held:Yes. Petition is DENIED.

Ratio

The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the consent, express or implied, of the wife. Should the husband do so, then the contract is voidable.17 Article 173 of the Civil Code allows Aguete to question Ros encumbrance of the subject property. However, the same article does not guarantee that the courts will declare the annulment of the contract. Annulment will be declared only upon a finding that the wife did not give her consent.

It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

Ros loan from PNB redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Hence, the debt is chargeable to the conjugal partnership.

CASE 6.Jovellanos v. CA, G.R. No. 100728 June 18, 1992 If property bought by installments (FC 118) Facts:

Daniel Jovellanos contracted with Philamlife a (lease and conditional sale agreement) of a property. When the agreement took place, Daniel was still married to his first wife, Leonor, with whom he had three children.

Leonor died on January 2, 1959.

May 30, 1967, Daniel was remarried to Annette (respondent).

December 18, 1971, Mercy (daughter from first marriage) and her husband, built an extension at the back of the said property.

January 8, 1975, the lease was paid and Philamlife executed a deed of absolute sale to Daniel. The following day, he then donated the said property to his children in the first marriage (petitioners).

September 8, 1985, Daniel died.

Annette now claims that the said property is the conjugal property belonging to the second marriage due to the fact that the deed of absolute sale was dated during the celebration of their marriage (Jan. 8, 1975).

Issue/s:

To which marriage does the property belong to as conjugal property? Held:

The Court held that the said property belongs to the second marriage, but also proclaims that reimbursements should be made to the children of the first marriage (in line with ART 118 of the FC).

Ratio:

The contract entered into by Daniel and Philamlife is specifically denominated as a "Lease and Conditional Sale Agreement" with a lease period of twenty years. During the twenty-year period, Daniel had only the right of possession over the property. The lessor transfers merely the temporary use and enjoyment of the thing leased. Generally, ownership is


4


transferred upon delivery, however, the ownership may still be with the seller until full payment of the price is made.

Only at the time when the payments are made in full will the deed of absolute sale be given, entitling the buyer (Daniel) as the true owner, rather than just having inchoate rights to the property. The time when he was able to pay the remaining balance, he was already married to his second wife, Annette, which makes the said property as their conjugal property.

ART 118: any amount advanced by the partnership or by either or both spouses shall be reimbursed Depriving the children from the first will be unfair due to the fact that the lease was contracted during the first marriage, wherein a portion of the payment came from.

CASE 7.Tarrosa v. De Leon, G.R. No. 185063, July 23, 2009 (If property bought by installments, FC Art. 118) FACTS: On July 20, 1965, Bonifacio De Leon, then single, and the Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) entered into a Conditional Contract to Sell for the purchase on installment of a lot situated in Quezon City. On April 24, 1968, Bonifacio married Anita de Leon. They had two children, Danilo and Vilma. On June 22, 1970, PHHC executed a Final Deed of Sale in favor of Bonifacio upon full payment of the price of the lot. TCT was issued on February 24, 1972 in the name of Bonifacio, single. On January 12, 1974, Bonifacio sold the lot to his sister, Lita, and her husband, Felix Tarrosa. The Deed of Sale did not bear the written consent and signature of Anita. On February 29, 1996, Bonifacio died. Three months later, Tarrosa spouses registered the Deed of Sale. Anita, Danilo, and Vilma filed a reconveyance suit allegeing that Bonifacio was still the owner of the lands. Tarrosa spouses averred that the lot Bonifacio sold to them was his exclusive property because he was still single when he acquired it from PHHC. They further alleged that they were not aware of the marriage between Bonifacio and Anita at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale. The RTC ruled in favor of Anita De Leon et al stating that the lot in question was the conjugal property of Bonifacio and Anita. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: W/N the property that Bonifacio has purchased on installment before the marriage although some installments were paid during the marriage would be considered conjugal property HELD: Yes. The subject lot which was once owned by PHHC and covered by the Conditional Contract to Sell was only transferred during the marriage of Bonifacio and Anita. The title to the property was only passed to Bonifacio after he had fully paid the purchase price on June 22, 1970. This full payment was made more than 2 years after his marriage to Anita on April 24, 1968. In effect, the property was acquired during the existence of the marriage. Hence, ownership to the property is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership. CASE 8. Munoz, Jr. v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 156125 (2010)

(What constitutes CPG; Improvements on the CPG Property, FC 120) FACTS:

Spouses Erlinda Ramirez and Eliseo Carlos (respondents) had a lot which was actually registered in the name of the wife only.

1989: Eliseo, with Erlindas consent, mortgaged the property with GSIS in exchange for a loan of PHP 136,000.00 with which they had their residential house built on said property. (Eliseo is a BIR Employee, so he was able to get a loan with GSIS). The loan is payable via monthly salary deductions from Eliseo.

1993 (July): the property was transferred to Francisco Muoz Jr. (petitioner) through a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Erlinda (for herself and as attorney-in-fact of Eliseo) for a consideration of PHP 602,000.00 (as stated in the document).

1993 (Sep): the spouses filed a petition with the RTC for the nullification of the deed of absolute sale, claiming that there was no sale but only a mortgage transaction, and the documents transferring the title to Munozs name were falsified

Erlinda and Eliseos story: Erlinda and Eliseo alleged that in 1992, Munoz granted them a

P600,000 loan to be secured by a first mortgage on the land;

That Munoz gave Erlinda a P200,000 advance to pay the GSIS loan, and made her sign a document purporting to be the Mortgage Contract;

That Munoz promised to give the remaining P402,000 balance when Erlinda surrenders to him the title of the land and after the GSIS mortgage had been cancelled, and after submitting an affidavit executed by Eliseo stating that he is waiving all his rights to the property;

That in the same year, Erlinda gave Munoz the title of the land but failed to get Eliseos signature on the affidavit, and because of this, Munoz refused to give the balance of P402,000 and instead, required Erlinda to return the P200,00 advance. However, she was unable to do so because it was already used to pay for the GSIS debt. Munoz then kept the title of the land and after a year, (1993), they discovered that a new title had already been issued in the name of Munoz, and that their original title (named after Erlinda) had already been cancelled.

Munozs story: There is a valid contract of sale. Munoz allegedly refused to agree to a

mortgage and loan because Erlinda and Eliseo lacked the capacity to pay, and were unwilling to cover the incidental charges of the loan. The sale was with the implied promise to repurchase the land within one year, during which period Erlinda and Eliseo would pay a rent to Munoz every month (P500).

When Erlinda and Eliseo failed to repurchase the property after one year, Munoz had the title transferred in his name, and when they failed to pay the monthly rentals despite his demands, he filed an ejectment case with the MeTC.




During the pendency of the RTC case, the MeTC ordered Erlinda and Eliseo to vacate the property, surrender the house to Munoz and pay the overdue rentals.

Eliseo and Erlinda presented evidence (scientific examination) from the NBI attesting to their claim that the signatures of Eliseo in the Affidavit (waiving his rights over the land) were forged.

Munoz presented evidence that the property is paraphernal (that it is solely the wifes property, not conjugal) since it was registered in the name of Erlinda. Munoz averred that the land was previously owned by Erlindas parents, and there was in fact a civil case filed by the surviving heirs of Erlindas father against another heir (Erlindas brother), and as a result of a compromise agreement, Erlindas brother agreed to transfer to the other compulsory heirs of the father, including Erlinda, the rightful shares of the land.

RTC RULING: Erlinda and Eliseos petition, dismissed. There is a valid sale. Eliseos approval of it (through the waiver) is not required because the property is also found to be paraphernal. RTC disregarded the NBI examination results because, anyway, Eliseos signature is not needed for a valid sale.

CA RULING: RTC ruling is reversed; the deed of sale is void; CA applied NCC 158. The property, although paraphernal in the beginning, became conjugal property when it was used as a collateral for the loan made with GSIS, which was in fact paid thru conjugal funds (recall that the loan was payable thru Eliseos monthly salary deductions). Therefore, the property cannot be validly sold or mortgaged without Eliseos consent, pursuant to FC 124(25).

ISSUE: W/N the property in question is paraphernal and conjugal (Note:resolution of this issue will subsequently lead to the answer to w/n there was a valid sale without Eliseos consent) HELD: It is parphernal property, not conjugal. Thus, Eliseos consent is not needed. There was a valid and equitable mortgage. (The petition of Munoz is denied; CA decision upheld but with modifications: Munoz is ordered to reconvey the property to Eliseo and Erlinda upon payment of the debt, including interests, within 90 days from the finality of the decision.) RATIO DECIDENDI:

SC SAYS: As a general rule, all property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved.

In this case, there is clear evidence that Erlinda inherited the property from her parents. Pursuant to FC 92 and FC 109, properties acquired by gratuitous title by either spouse, during the marriage, shall be excluded from the community property and be the exclusive property of each spouse.

CA held that it became conjugal property when it was mortgaged with GSIS because the loan was payable through monthly deductions from Eliseos salary. Wrong.

CA misapplied NCC 158. Although Eliseo and Erlinda were married under the NCC (and therefore, there is CPG and not ACP), the FC already superseded the NCC provisions on CPG. This is why FC 105 states that the provisions on CPG shall also apply to CPGs already established before FC took effect, without prejudice to vested rights. CA should have referred to the FC provisions on CPG, instead of those in the NCC.

FC 120 superseded NCC 158. It provides the solution in determining the OWNERSHIP OF IMPROVEMENTS that are made on the separate property of spouses, at the expense of the CPG. It provides:

When the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in value are more than the value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the improvement.

In this case, Eliseo paid a portion only of the GSIS loan through monthly salary deductions. This totalled at P60,000 only and not the entire amount of P136,000. The rest were in fact paid by Erlinda. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the value of the lot is more than the amount paid by Eliseo. Hence, it remained paraphernal property pursuant to FC 120, despite the improvements made thereon.

Subsequently, Eliseos approval of a sale/mortgage is not required. CASE 9. Mariano v. CA, 174 SCRA 59 (Charges Upon and Obligations of CPG, FC 121, 122) FACTS:

Respondent Daniel Sanchez wife, Esther Sanchez filed a suit against Petitioner Lourdes Mariano in the Court of First Instance at Caloocan City, for recovery of the value of ladies' ready made dresses allegedly purchased by and delivered to the latter.

A writ of preliminary attachment issued at Esther Sanchez' instance, upon a bond posted by Veritas Insurance Company in the amount of P 11,000.00, and resulted in the seizure of Lourdes Mariano's property worth P 15,000.00 or so.

Petitioners motion for the discharge of the attachment having been denied, Petitioner Mariano went up to the Court of Appeals on certiorari.

The Court of Appeals ordered the Trial Court to receive evidence on whether or not the attachment had been improvidently or irregularly issued.

The Trial Court did so, came to the conclusion that the attachment had indeed been improperly issued, and consequently dissolved it.

Trial then ensued upon the issues arising from the complaint as well as Petitioner Lourdes Mariano's answer with counterclaim-which included a claim for damages resulting from wrongful attachment.


6


Thereafter judgment was rendered in favor of defendant Lourdes Mariano and against plaintiff Esther Sanchez.

Respondent Daniel Sanchez, Esther's husband filed a complaint for annulment of the execution in the Court of First Instance at Quezon City in his capacity as administrator of the conjugal partnership.

Respondent Daniel Sanchez alleged that the conjugal assets could not validly be made to answer for obligations exclusively contracted by his wife, and that, moreover, some of the personal property levied on, such as household appliances and utensils necessarily used in the conjugal dwelling, were exempt from execution. He also applied for a preliminary injunction pending adjudication of the case on the merits.

The Quezon City Court issued an order setting the matter of the injunction for hearing, and commanding the sheriff, in the meantime, to desist from proceeding with the auction sale of the property subject of Daniel Sanchez' claim.

PetitionerLourdes Mariano filed a motion to dismiss the action; this, the Court denied.

Petitioner instituted a special civil action of certiorari in the Court of Appeals where she initially enjoyed some measure of success: her petition was given due course, and the Quezon City Court was restrained by the Appellate Court's Seventh Division from further proceeding with the case. Eventually, however, the Eighth Division came to the conclusion that there was no merit in her cause and dismissed her petition.

Hence, this petition. ISSUE: WON the conjugal partnership of the Respondent is liable for his wifes liability in connection with her business. HELD: Yes. Under Art. 121 paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines. RATIO: In any case, whether by intervention in the court issuing the writ, or by separate action, it is unavailing for either Esther Sanchez or her husband, Daniel, to seek preclusion of the enforcement of the writ of possession against their conjugal assets. For it being established that Esther had engaged in business with her husband's consent, and the income derived therefrom had been expended, in part at least, for the support of her family, the liability of the conjugal assets to respond for the wife's obligations in the premises cannot be disputed. CASE 10. Ayala V. CA, 289 SCRA 272 (Charges upon and obligations of CPG, FC 121, 122) FACTS:

Philippine Blooming Mills (hereinafter referred to as PBM) obtained a P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (hereinafter referred to as AIDC).

As added security for the credit line extended to PBM, respondent Alfredo Ching, Executive Vice President of PBM, executed security agreements on December 10, 1980 and on March 20, 1981 making himself jointly and severally answerable with PBM's indebtedness to AIDC.

PBM failed to pay the loan. Thereafter, AIDC filed a case for sum of money against PBM and respondent-husband Alfredo Ching with the then Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig).

The CFI of Rizal (Pasig) rendered judgment ordering PBM and respondent-husband Alfredo Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount of P50,300,000.00 with interests. Pending appeal to the judgment, a writ of execution granting upon respondents-spouses of a notice of sheriff sale on three (3) of their conjugal properties. Petitioner Magsajo then scheduled the auction sale of the properties levied. private respondents filed a case of injunction against petitioners alleging that petitioners cannot enforce the judgment against the conjugal partnership levied on the ground that, among others, the subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership.

The case was lifted to the Court of Appeals by the petitioner but rendered judgment in favour of the respondent granting the auction sale.

Hence, the appeal before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE/S: WONa surety agreement or an accommodation contract entered into by the husband in favor of his employer are considered "for the benefit of the conjugal partnership" which are chargeable against the conjugal partnership HELD: NO Article 121, paragraph 3, of the Family Code is emphatic that the payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except to the extent that they redounded to the benefit of the family. Here, the property in dispute also involves the family home. The loan is a corporate loan not a personal one. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession nor an act of administration for the benefit of the family. CASE 11. Ching v. CA, 423 SCRA 356, February 23, 2004 (Charges upon and obligations of CPG, FC 121, 122) FACTS:

Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained two loans from the Allied Banking Corporation (ABC).

(PBMCI) Executive Vice-President Alfredo Ching executed a continuing guaranty with the ABC for the payment of the said loan.

The PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its loans so ABC filed a complaint for sum of money against the PBMCI

.

Trial court issued a writ of preliminary attachment against Alfredo Ching requiring the sheriff of to attach all the properties of said Alfredo Ching to answer for the payment of the loans.

Encarnacion T. Ching, wife of Alfredo Ching, filed a Motion to Set Aside the levy on attachment allegeing inter alia that the 100,000 shares of stocks levied on by the sheriff were acquired by her and her husband during their marriage out of conjugal funds.




Petitioner spouses aver that the source of funds in the acquisition of the levied shares of stocks is not the controlling factor when invoking the presumption of the conjugal nature of stocks under Art. !21 and that such presumption subsists even if the property is registered only in the name of one of the spouses, in this case, petitioner Alfredo Ching.

According to the petitioners, the suretyship obligation was not contracted in the pursuit of the petitioner-husbands profession or business.44

ISSUE: WON 100,000 shares of stocks may be levied on by the sheriff to answer for the loans guaranteed by petitioner Alfredo Ching HELD: No. RATIO: The CA erred in holding that by executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the private respondent for the payment of the PBMCI loans, the petitioner-husband was in the exercise of his profession, pursuing a legitimate business.

The shares of stocks are, thus, presumed to be the conjugal partnership property of the petitioners. The private respondent failed to adduce evidence that the petitioner-husband acquired the stocks with his exclusive money.

The appellate court erred in concluding that the conjugal partnership is liable for the said account of PBMCI.

Article 121 provides: The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (1) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership.

For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone, there must be a showing that some advantages accrued to the spouses.

In this case, the private respondent failed to prove that the conjugal partnership of the petitioners was benefited by the petitioner-husbands act of executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the private respondent for and in behalf of PBMCI. The contract of loan was between the private respondent and the PBMCI, solely for the benefit of the latter. No presumption can be inferred from the fact that when the petitioner-husband entered into an accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would thereby be benefited. The private respondent was burdened to establish that such benefit redounded to the conjugal partnership.

Case 12.Homeowners v. Dailo, G.R. No. 153802, Mar.11, 2005

Charges upon obligations of CPG

Facts: 1. Miguela Dailo (respondent) and Marcelino Dailo Jr. got married and

purchased a house a lot in San Pablo City. a. The sold lot was from one Sandra Dalida. However, the Deed of

Absolute Sale was executed only in favour of Marcelino Dailo as vendee to the exclusion of his wife.

2. Marcelino executed a Special Power of Attorney in favour of Gesmundo which authorized the latter to secure a loan from Homeowners Saving and Loan Bank (petitioner) to be secured by the said house and lot property of the Dailos.

a. All these transactions were without the consent of the respondent Miguela

3. The loan from the petitioner was not paid upon maturity and the petitioner instituted an extrajudicial foreclosure to which the same was highest bidder in the public auction.

4. Then on December 1995, Marcelino died. 5. The respondent prayed for the nullity of the mortgage and ownership

because the subject property was conjugal in nature and was sold without her consent.

6. The RTC and the CA ruled in favour of the respondent declaring the nullity prayed for.

ISSUE: WON the Conjugal partnership should be liable for the payment of the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Ruling: No. Other than the petitioners bare allegation that the loan redounded to the benefit of the family, there was no other evidence supporting such claim. Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the principal obligation. Ratio:

1. Art. 121 of the Family Code states that [T]he conjugal partnership shall be liable for: . . . (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited; . . . .

2. For the subject property to be held liable, the obligation contracted by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. There must be the requisite showing then of some advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses.

3. Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the new Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit.

4. Petitioners sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. to finance the construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his family, without adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this Court.

How it was established that the property regime was CPG:


8


The marriage was celebrated under the Civil Code (marriage was on Aug. 1967). In the absence of the marriage settlement governing the property relations of the spouses, the Conjugal partnership of gains became the property regime.

CASE 13. Ando v. Campo, G.R. No. 184007, February 16, 2011 (Charges upon and obligations of CPG, FC 121, 122) FACTS

Paquito Ando (petitioner) was the president of Premier Allied and Contracting Services, Inc. (PACSI), an independent labor contractor.

Andresito Campo and the other respondents were hired by PACSI as pilers or haulers.

Respondents were dismissed from employment. Consequently filing a case for illegal dismissal and some money claims with the NLRC.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in respondents favor. PACSI and Ando were directed to pay a total of P422,702.28 (for separation pay and award of attorneys fees).

PACSI and Ando appealed to NLRC, which affirmed the Labor Arbiters decision. Respondents moved for its execution.

To answer for the reward, the NLRC acting sheriff issued a Notice of Sale on Execution of Personal Property over a property in the name of Paquito V. Ando xxx married to Erlinda S. Ando.

Prompting Ando to file an action for prohibition before the RTC. Ando claims that the property belonged to him and his wife and not the

corporation, and hence, could not be the subject of the execution sale. RTC denied the prayer for TRO and directed him to file a claim with the

NLRC Sheriff. Instead, Ando filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. Ando argued

that the property to be levied belonged to him and his wife in their personal capacity and thus the execution should not prosper. It was likewise denied.

ISSUE

WON the property owned by Ando and his wife could be levied for reason of a debt incurred by him, in his representative capacity and his company, PACSI.

HELD

No. The power of the NLRC to execute its judgment extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone. Thus, a sheriff has no authority to attach the property of any person except that of the judgment debtor.

The property in question belongs not only to Ando, but his wife as well. She stands to lose the property subject to execution without ever being a party to the case which is tantamount to deprivation of property without due process.

CASE 14. G-Tractors, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-57402, February 28, 1985

(Charges upon and obligations of CPG: with consent) FACTS:

1. Luis R. Narciso, legally married to Josefina Narciso, is a businessman engaged in business as a producer and exporter of Philippine mahogany logs and operates a logging concession at del Gallego, Camarines Sur.

2. G-Tractors, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged primarily in the business of leasing heavy equipments such as tractors, bulldozers, and the like.

3. Luis entered into a Contract of Hire of Heavy Equipment with G-Tractors under the terms of which the latter leased to the former tractors for the purpose of constructing switchroads and hauling felled trees at the jobsite of Narciso's logging concession at del Gallego, Camarines Sur. The contract provided for payment of rental for the use of said tractors.

4. Luis Narciso failed to pay; G-Tractors instituted an action urging Luis to pay a certain amount (P155,410.25), representing the unpaid rentals

5. G-Tractors accepted his offer for a compromise agreement, stating the mode of payment (installment plan); Luis failed to comply; G-Tractors filed a motion for execution; Luis asked for suspension of the motion stating that he still has a pending loan with a banking institution; request for suspension denied

6. Levy was accordingly made by the City Sheriff of QC on certain personal properties of the spouses at their residence in Quezon City. Auction sale was held, and G-Tractors was awarded with the sale of such.

7. Luis then offered to redeem such properties for the same amount; accepted; a Deed of Reconveyance was executed by G-Tractors

8. On February 12, 1975, the Sheriff of Quezon City made a levy on "all rights, interest, title, participation which the defendant Luis R. Narciso" may have over a parcel of residential land of the Registry of Deeds of QC which parcel of land is allegedly the conjugal property of the spouses Luis and Josefina.

9. Sheriff sold at public auction to the highest bidder for cash 10. Certificate of Sale was then issued to G-Tractors as the highest bidder for

P180,000 11. On March 31, 1976, Josefina and Luis filed a complaint in CFI of Quezon

City for "declaration of nullity of levy on execution and auction sale of plaintiff's conjugal property with damages and injunction", claiming that the conjugal property of the plaintiffs-spouses could not be made liable considering that the subject matter was never used for the benefit of the conjugal partnership or of the family

ISSUE: Whether or not the conjugal property of the spouses can be held answerable for the debt of the husband HELD: YES, the conjugal property of the spouses can be held answerable for the debt of the husband. CAs decision reversed and set aside RATIO:

Article 161 of the New Civil Code provides that the conjugal partnership shall be liable for:




(1) All the debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership

His account with petitioner G-Tractors, Inc. represents rentals for the use of petitioner's tractors which he leased for the purpose of constructing switchroads and hauling felled trees at the jobsite of the logging concession at del Gallego, Camarines Sur which is not his exclusive property but that of his family. There is no doubt then that his account with the petitioner was brought about in order to enhance the productivity of said logging business, a commercial enterprise for gain which he had the right to embark the conjugal partnership.

It is very clear, therefore, that the obligations were contracted in connection with his legitimate business as a producer and exporter in mahogany logs and certainly benefited the conjugal partnership.

The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership and as long as he believes he is doing right to his family, he should not be made to suffer and answer alone. So that, if he incurs an indebtedness in the legitimate pursuit of his career or profession or suffers losses in a legitimate business, the conjugal partnership must equally bear the indebtedness and the losses, unless he deliberately acted to the prejudice of his family.

The sale at public auction belonging to the conjugal partnership of gains of the Narcisos in order to satisfy the judgment debt of the private respondent Luis R. Narciso was validly and legally made in accordance with law.

CASE 15. Ong v. CA, 204 SCRA 297 (Charges upon and obligations of CPG, FC 121, 122 With consent) FACTS:

Teodora B. Ong conducted her own logging business. In furtherance of her business operation, she secured from Francisco Boix a loan but defaulted in her obligation. This prompted Boix to file a complaint to collect the sum legally due against Teodora and Ramon Ong, the latter being joined as husband of the former.

The Sheriff levied and attached a parcel of land declared under Tax No. 05378 in the sole name of Teodora B. Ong. In the Public Auction, defendant Boix was adjudged highest bidder and a corresponding Certificate of Sale was also issued in favor of Boix.

Ramon sought to annul the auction sale on the ground that the property was conjugal and thus could not be held liable for personal debts contracted by the wife, and considering that the indebtedness was contracted by the wife only, the levy of the subject property not owned exclusively by the wife owned jointly with the husband is improper.

ISSUE: WON the property was conjugal and thus could be held liable for personal debts contracted by the wife. HELD: YES.

The mere use of the surname of the husband in the tax declaration of the subject property is not sufficient proof that said property was acquired during the marriage and is therefore conjugal. It is undisputed that the subject parcel was declared solely in the wife's name, but the house built thereon was declared in the name of the spouses. Under such circumstances, coupled with a careful scrutiny of the records of the present case, the court holds that the lot in question is paraphernal, and is therefore, liable for the personal debts of the wife.

Even assuming for the sake of argument that the property in dispute is conjugal, the same may still be held liable for the debts of the wife in this case. Under Art. 117 of the Civil Code, the wife may engage in business although the husband may object (but subject to certain conditions).

It is clear from the records that the wife was engaged in the logging business with the husband's knowledge and apparently without any objection on his part. The acts of the husband show that he gave his implied consent to the wife's engagement in business.

According to Justice Ameurfina-Herrera in her concurring opinion, the rule that should govern in that case is that the wife's paraphernal properties, as well as those of their conjugal partnership, shall be liable for the obligations incurred by the wife in the course of her business. After all, whatever profits are earned by the wife from her business go to the conjugal partnership. It would only be just and equitable that the obligations contracted by the wife in connection with her business may also be chargeable not only against her paraphernal property but also against the conjugal property of the spouses.

CASE 16. Ayala Investment v. CA, G.R. No. 118305, 1998-02-12 (Charges upon and obligations of CPG, FC 121, 122) Facts:

Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a P50,300,000 loan from petitioner Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). Respondent Alfredo Ching made himself jointly answerable to the debt as added security. Upon PBMs failure to pay the loan, AIDC filed a case for sum of money against PBM and respondent Ching in the CFI of Pasig.

After trial, the court rendered decision in favor of AIDC ordering PBM and Alfredo Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount of the loan with interests.

Pending the appeal of the judgment, RTC issued a writ of execution and thereafter, the deputy sheriff caused the issuance and service upon respondent spouses of the notice of sheriff sale on three of their conjugal properties.

Respondent spouses then filed an injunction contending that subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Nevertheless, a certificate of sale was issued to AIDC, being the only bidder for the property.

Issue:


10


WON the debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone is considered for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

Held:

No. Petition is DENIED. Ratio:

The loan obtained by the husband from AIDC was for the benefit of PBM and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of Ching.

PBM has a personality which is distinct from that of Chings family despite their being stockholders of the said company. The debt incurred by Ching is a corporate debt and the right of recourse to respondent as surety is only to the extent of his corporate stocks.

If the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. No presumption can be inferred that, when a husband enters into a contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it is for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Proof must be presented to establish benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership.

CASE 17. Security Bank v. Mar Tiera Corp., G.R. No. 143382, Nov. 29, 2006 (Charges upon and obligations of CPG, FC 121, 122) CASE 18. Aguete v. PNB, G.R. No. 170166, April 6, 2011 (Charges upon and obligations of CPG, FC 121, 122) FACTS: Spouses Jose A. Ros and Estrella Aguete filed a complaint for the annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage and all legal proceedings taken thereunder against PNB. The spouses averred that Joe A. Ros obtained a loan of P115,000.00 from PNB. As security for the loan, he executed a Real Estate Mortgage involving a parcel of land and all improvements thereon. Upon maturity, the loan remained unpaid and an extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding on the mortgaged property was instituted by PNB. After the lapse of a year, the property was consolidated and registered in the name of PNB. Estrella Aguete contested the transactions and filed for an annulment of the proceedings claiming that she had no knowledge of the said loan nor the mortgage constituted on the land which is part of their conjugal property. She also claimed that the signatures affixed on the documents were forged and that the proceeds of the loan did not redound to the benefit of the family. RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Ros and declared that Estrella had no knowledge of the loan and mortgage, thus, under the Civil Code, Ros could not encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without Aguete's consent. RTC also held that Aguete may, during their marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of the contract her husband entered into without her consent, especially in the case at bar where her consent is required.

CA reversed the decision of the trial court and held that the trial court concluded forgery without adequate proof and assuming for the sake of argument that Aguete did not give her consent to Ros' loan, the conjugal partnership is still liable because the loan proceeds redounded to the benefit of the family. The records of the case reveal that the loan was used for the expansion of the family's business. Therefore, the debt obtained is chargeable against the conjugal partnership. ISSUES: 1. W/N the evidence of Spouses Ros sufficiently proved that Estrella did not consent nor signed the loan and the Real Estate Mortgage? 2. W/N the debt obtained by Jose is chargeable against the conjugal partnership? HELD: 1. No. Although it is true that a suit for annulment of a contract will prosper if the wife did not consent to it, in the case at bar, the SC finds that Aguete gave her consent. The documents disavowed by Aguete are acknowledged before a notary public, hence they are public documents. The execution of a document that has been ratified before a notary public cannot be disproved by the mere denial of the alleged signer. Petitioners did not present any corroborating witness, such as a handwriting expert, who could authoritatively declare that Aguete's signatures were really forged. 2. Yes. From the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. CASE 19. Costuna v. Domondon, 180 SCRA 333 (1989) (Charges upon and obligations of the CPG, FC 121/122; Without consent) FACTS:

Spouses Amadeo and Estela Costuna acquired three parcels of land during their marriage.

1976: Aged 68, Amadeo made his last will and testament. After this, Amadeo and Estela were beset with marital problems.

1977: Amadeo sustained third degree burns and had to be treated in different hospitals. His relatives requested that he be brought to his hometown in Samar because his signatures are needed (re: his other properties there). Amadeo never returned to his wife Estela, despite demand, even a petition for habeas corpus.

Amadeo filed a petition for the partition of properties, with the Juvenile Domestic and Relations Court. Because he failed to get Estelas consent to the partition despite repeated demands/requests, Amadeo was constrained to sell half of the undetermined portion of the conjugal property, without the wifes consent. It was sold to Laureana Domondon.

1978: Amadeo died.

Estela instituted a special proceeding for the allowance of Amadeos Will. However, Domondon opposed it, claiming that half of the conjugal property




was already sold to her by Amadeo prior to his death. The probate court did not rule on this, but it allowed the will.

Domondon filed a case with the RTC to compel Estela to comply with the Deed of Sale executed by Amadeo before his death, that is, to convey to Domondon the properties already sold to her. The RTC ruled in favour of Domondon. Estela appealed to the CA, but the CA ruled the same. Ergo, the present case.

Estela argues that the sale of the half of the conjugal properties (not yet determined what properties because the Court was not able to proceed with the partition due to lack of Estelas consent) was prejudicial to her rights as sole heir of Amadeo and as spouse.

ISSUES: (a) W/N the sale of 1/2 of the conjugal property by Amadeo is valid without Estelas consent (b) W/N the CPG should be made liable for the payment of the hospital and medical expenses of Amadeo who allegedly abandoned the conjugal home and his wife HELD: (a) The sale is declared valid and (b) yes, the CPG is liable. RATIO DECIDENDI:

SC SAYS: As a general rule, the other spouses consent is necessary. However, in this case, the consent of Estela was unreasonably withheld by her. The Court is constrained to relax the application of the law, and consider the sale falling within the legal exceptions to the general rule.

The Court cannot overlook the vital fact that Amadeo executed a last will and testament designating Estela as his sole heir. In this connection, we find merit in Damondon's assertion that no other motive could be attributed to Estela but her greed.

NCC 161 (now FC 121) provides that the conjugal partnership shall be liable for all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership.

In this case, the shares of Amadeo was sold by him to cover the hospitalization, medical and other expenses necessary for his survival. He was old and gravely ill. His other relatives in Samar are also not that well in financial resources.

SC SAYS: The health and well-being of both or either of the spouses would undeniably redound to the benefit of their conjugal partnership. The advancement of the interests of the conjugal partnership depends in great measure on the soundness of the body and mind of the partners.

Ergo, the cost of the hospitalization of Amadeo is chargeable to the CPG, it being to the benefit of their conjugal partnership.

CASE20. Carlos v. Abelardo, 380 SCRA 361 (Charges Upon and Obligations of CPG, FC 121, 122 (b) Without Consent)

FACTS:

Petitioner Honorario L. Carlos averred in his complaint filed on October 13, 1994 that in October 1989, respondent Manuel T. Abelardo and his wife Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo approached him and requested him to advance the amount of US$25,000.00 for the purchase of a house and lot located at #19952 Chestnut Street, Executive Heights Village, Paranaque, Metro Manila.

To enable and assist the spouses conduct their married life independently and on their own, Petitioner Carlos, in October 31, 1989, issued a check in the name of a certain Pura Vallejo, seller of the property, who acknowledged receipt thereof.The amount was in full payment of the property.

When Petitioner Carlos inquired from the spouses in July 1991 as to the status of the amount he loaned to them, the latter acknowledged their obligation but pleaded that they were not yet in a position to make a definite settlement of the same.

Thereafter, respondent Abelardo expressed violent resistance to petitioners inquiries on the amount to the extent of making various death threats against Petitioner Carlos.

On August 24, 1994, Petitioner Carlos made a formal demand for the payment of the amount of US$25,000.00 but the spouses failed to comply with their obligation.

Thus, on October 13, 1994, Petitioner Carlos filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money and damages against respondent and his wife before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 172, docketed as Civil Case No. 4490-V-94. In the complaint, petitioner asked for the payment of the US$25,000.00 or P625,000.00, its equivalent in Philippine currency plus legal interest from date of extra-judicial demand. Petitioner likewise claimed moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit from respondent.

On June 26, 1996, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of Petitioner Carlos.

On November 10, 2000, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial courts decision and dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence to show that the subject amount was indeed loaned by petitioner to respondent and his wife.

The Court of Appeals found that the amount of US$25,000.00 was respondents share in the profits of H.L. Carlos Construction.

ISSUE: WON conjugal property should pay for the loan of US$25,000.00 even when acknowledgement executed and signed by the Respondent wife was not signed by the Respondent husband. HELD: Yes. The loan is the liability of the conjugal partnership pursuant to Article 121 of the Family Code. RATIO: As gleaned from the records, the following facts are undisputed: (1) there was a check in the amount of US$25,000.00 issued by petitioner; (2) this amount was received by respondent and his wife and given to a certain Pura Vallejo for the


12


full payment of a house and lot located at #19952 Chestnut Street, Executive Heights Village, Paranaque, Metro Manila; (3) this house and lot became the conjugal dwelling of respondent and his wife; and (4) respondents wife executed an instrument acknowledging the loan but which respondent did not sign.

Respondent failed to substantiate his claim that he is entitled to the

profits and income of the corporation. There was no showing that respondent was a stockholder of H.L. Carlos Construction. His name does not appear in the Articles of Incorporation as well as the Organizational Profile of said company either as stockholder or officer.Not being a stockholder, he cannot be entitled to the profits or income of said corporation. Neither did respondent prove that he was an employee or an agent so as to be entitled to salaries or commissions from the corporation.

Respondent did not and refused to sign the acknowledgment executed and

signed by his wife, undoubtedly, the loan redounded to the benefit of the family because it was used to purchase the house and lot which became the conjugal home of respondent and his family. Hence, notwithstanding the alleged lack of consent of respondent, under Art. 21 of the Family Code, he shall be solidarily liable for such loan together with his wife.

The Court finds sufficient basis for the award of damages to petitioner,

contrary to the findings of the Court of Appeals that petitioner is not entitled thereto.

CASE 21. Villanueva v. Chiong, G.R. No. 59889, June 5, 2008 (B. Without consent, Charges upon and obligations of CPG, FC 121, 122) FACTS:

Respondents Florentino and Elisera Chiong were married sometime in January 1960 but have been separated in fact since 1975. During their marriage, they acquired Lot situated at Poblacion, Dipolog City.

Sometime in 1985, Florentino sold the one-half western portion of the lot to petitioners forP8,000, payable in installments. Thereafter, Florentino allowed petitioners to occupy the lot and build a store, a shop, and a house thereon. Shortly after their last installment payment on December 13, 1986 petitioners demanded from respondents the execution of a deed of sale in their favor. Elisera, however, refused to sign a deed of sale.

Respondent Elisera filed with the RTC a Complaint for Quieting of Title with Damages. Also, petitioners filed with the RTC a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages. Respondent Florentino executed the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale n favor of petitioners.

The RTC annulled the deed of absolute sale and ordered petitioners to vacate the lot and remove all improvements. The RTC likewise dismissed but ordered Florentino to return to petitioners the consideration of the sale with interest.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC's decision:

Hence, this appeal before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE/S: WONthe subject lot an exclusive property of Florentino or a conjugal property of respondents HELD: No. The subject lot was a conjugal property.

Petitioners' contention that the lot belongs exclusively to Florentino because of his separation in fact from his wife, Elisera, at the time of sale dissolved their property relations, is bereft of merit. Respondents' separation in fact neither affected the conjugal nature of the lot nor prejudiced Elisera's interest over it.

Under Article 178 of the Civil Code, the separation in fact between husband and wife without judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership. The lot retains its conjugal nature. Likewise, under Article 160 of the Civil Code, all property acquired by the spouses during the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership of gains, unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.

Petitioners' mere insistence as to the lot's supposed exclusive nature is insufficient to overcome such presumption when taken against all the evidence for respondents. On the basis alone of the certificate of title, it cannot be presumed that the lot was acquired during the marriage and that it is conjugal property since it was registered "in the name of Florentino Chiong, Filipino, of legal age, married to Elisera Chiong ." But Elisera also presented a real property tax declaration acknowledging her and Florentino as owners of the lot. In addition, Florentino and Elisera categorically declared in the Memorandum of Agreement they executed that the lot is a conjugal property Moreover, the conjugal nature of the lot was admitted by Florentino in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 13, 1992, where he declared his capacity to sell as a co-owner of the subject lot.

CASE 22. Ravina v. Villa-Abrille, G.R. No. 160708, Oct. 16, 2009 (Charges upon and obligations of CPG, FC 121, 122, without consent) FACTS:

Respondent Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro Villa Abrille are husband and wife. They have four children, who are also parties to the instant case and are represented by their mother, Mary Ann.

Spouses acquired a 555-square meter parcel of land (LOT 7) located in Davao City. Said lot is adjacent to a parcel of land which Pedro acquired when he was still single and which is registered solely in his name.

Through their joint efforts and the proceeds of a loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), the spouses built a house on Lot 7 and Pedros lot.

Pedro got a mistress and began to neglect his family.

By himself, Pedro offered to sell the house and the two lots to herein petitioners Ravina. Mary Ann objected and notified the petitioners of her




objections, but Pedro nonetheless sold the house and the two lots without Mary Anns consent.

While Mary Ann was outside the house and the four children were in school, Pedro together with armed members of the (CAFGU) began transferring all their belongings from the house to an apartment. They were also stopped from entering it.

Respondents Mary Ann and her children filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale, against Pedro and herein petitioners (the Ravinas).

Petitioners assert that the subject lot was the exclusive property of Pedro having been acquired by him through barter or exchange. They allege that the subject lot was acquired by Pedro with the proceeds of the sale of one of his exclusive properties.

ISSUES: (1) Whether the subject property is an exclusive property of Pedro or conjugal property (2) Whether its sale by Pedro was valid considering the absence of Mary Anns consent. HELD: The subject property is a conjugal property of Pedro and Mary Ann and therefore its sale by Pedro without Mary Anns consent is void. RATIO: Lot 7 was acquired in 1982 during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann. No evidence was adduced to show that the subject property was acquired through exchange or barter. The presumption of the conjugal nature of the property subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the subject property is exclusively owned by Pedro. Likewise, the house built thereon is conjugal property, having been constructed through the joint efforts of the spouses, who had even obtained a loan from DBP to construct the house. Significantly, a sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, is governed by Article 124 of the same Code that now treats such a disposition to be void if done (a) without the consent of both the husband and the wife, or (b) in case of one spouses inability, the authority of the court. Article 124 of the Family Code. The alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal partnership property by the husband without the consent of the wife is null and void. Hence, just like the rule in absolute community of property, if the husband, without knowledge and consent of the wife, sells conjugal property, such sale is void. If the sale was with the knowledge but without the approval of the wife, thereby resulting in a disagreement, such sale is annullable at the instance of the

wife who is given five (5) years from the date the contract implementing the decision of the husband to institute the case. CASE 23. Fuentes v. Roca (Charges upon CPG- Obligation Without Consent) FACTS:

1. On Oct 11, 1982, Tarciano Roca bought a 358-square meter lot in Zambales from his mother, Sabina.

2. Six years later in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to the petitioners Manuel and Leticia Fuentes spouses through the help of Atty. Plagata who would prepare the documents and requirements to complete the sale. Since Tarciano and Rosario had been estranged spouses already and the latter was already living in Manila and the former still in Zamboanga, the lawyer said that he saw and notarized Rosarios affidavit manifesting her consent to the sale in one of his trips to Manila.

3. Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario filed a case to annul the sale and to reconvey the property on the ground that the sale was void absent the consent of Rosario and her signature was a mere forgery

4. The RTC ruled in favour of the Fuenteses because of prescription of 4 years but the CA decided otherwise.

o The CA concluded that the property relation between Tarciano and Rosario was governed by Conjugal Partnership of Gains as it was celebrated under the Civil Code. Under such law, an action for annulment of sale on the ground of lack of spousal consent may be brought by the wife during the marriage within the 10 years of the 1989 sale.

ISSUE: WON the sale of the conjugal property is still valid absent the consent of Rosario (her signature being forged). RULING: No. the sale of the conjugal property is invalid. Absent the consent of the other spouse, there can be no disposition or encumbrance on conjugal property. RATIO:

1. The CA erred in the applying the provisions of the Civil Code because the Family Code already took effect at the time the sale was made. The latter stated that the law should apply to marriages whose CPG property regime was established under the Civil Code without prejudice to rights already conferred upon.

2. Nevertheless, the action by the children does not fall outside the prescription period may it be under the Civil Code (which was 10 years from the discovery of the fraud) or under the Family Code (wherein Art. 124 did not mention any prescription period)

3. Since the couple had already been estranged for 30 years and the wife has not at all participated in the giving of consent, the sale was invalid.

o Art. 124. States that x x x In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other


14


spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. x x x

4. Under the provisions of the Civil Code governing contracts, a void or inexistent contract has no force and effect from the very beginning. And this rule applies to contracts that are declared void by positive provision of law as in the case of a sale of conjugal property without the other spouses written consent. A void contract is equivalent to nothing and is absolutely wanting in civil effects. It cannot be validated either by ratification or prescription.

Note: the Court ordered the Rocas to pay the Fuenteses the amount the latter paid

Tarciano with interest as well as the improvements they have introduced into the said property.

CASE 24. People v. Lagrimas, G.R. No. L-25355, August 28, 1969 (Charges upon and obligations of CPG, FC 121, 122 Personal debts, FC 122, RPC 108) FACTS

Froilan Lagrimas was charged for the murder of Pelagio Cagro. Thereafter, the heirs of Cagro filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of

preliminary attachment on the property of the accused, which was granted.

Lagrimas was convicted and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the appellants.

The judgment became final. The lower court issued a writ of execution to cover the civil indemnity. A

levy was had on 11 parcels of land declared for tax purposes in the name of the accused and the sale thereof at public auction was scheduled.

However, the wife of the accused, Mercedes Lagrimas, filed a petition to quash the said attachment contending that the property belonged to the conjugal partnership and could not be held liable for pecuniary indemnity the husband was required to pay. Her petition was granted.

Another judge set aside the said order. But upon Mercedes filing a motion for reconsideration, a third judge revived the original order, declaring such attachment and the writ of execution thereafter issued null and void.

ISSUE

WON properties from the conjugal properties of Mercedes and Froilan can be held liable for the pecuniary indemnity incurred by the latter.

HELD

Yes. Fines and indemnities imposed upon either husband or wife may be enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities

enumerated in article 161 have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient; xxx.

It is quite plain, therefore, that the period during which such a liability may be enforced presupposes that the conjugal partnership is still existing for the law speaks of partnership assets. That upon complying with the responsibilities enumerated in article 161, the fines and indemnities imposed upon a party of the conjugal partnership will be satisfied.

If the appealed order were to be upheld, Froilan would be in effect exempt therefrom and the heirs of the offended party being made to suffer still further; that for a transgression of the law by either husband or wife, the rest of the family may be made to bear burdens of an extremely onerous character.

CASE 25. Buado and Buado v. Court of Appeals & Nicol, G.R. No. 145222, April 24, 2009 (Charges and upon the obligations of CPG: Personal debts) FACTS:

1. On 30 April 1984, Spouses Roberto and Venus Buado (petitioners) filed a complaint for damages against ErlindaNicol (Erlinda) with Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacoor, Cavite, docketed as Civil Case No. 84-33. Said action originated from ErlindaNicols civil liability arising from the criminal offense of slander filed against her by petitioners.

2. On 6 April 1987, the trial court rendered a decision ordering Erlinda to pay damages.

3. Said decision was affirmed, successively, by the Court of Appeals and this Court. It became final and executory on 5 March 1992.

4. Trial court issued a writ of execution

commanded that of the goods and chattels of ErlindaNicol, or from her estates or legal heirs, you cause the sum in the amount of P40,000, representing the moral damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses and exemplary damages

if sufficient personal property cannot be found to satisfy this execution and lawful fees, then you are commanded that of the lands and buildings of said defendant you make the said sum of money in the manner required by the Rules of Court

5. Finding ErlindaNicols personal properties insufficient to satisfy the judgment, the Deputy Sheriff issued a notice of levy on real property on execution addressed to the Register of Deeds of Cavite.

6. On 20 November 1992, a notice of sheriffs sale was issued. 7. Two days before the public auction sale, an affidavit of third-party claim

from Arnulfo F. Fulo was received by the deputy sheriff prompting Buados to put up a sheriffs indemnity bond. The auction sale proceeded with Buados as the highest bidder.

8. On 4 February 1993, a certificate of sale was issued in favor of petitioners. 9. Romulo Nicol, the husband of ErlindaNicol, filed a complaint for annulment

of certificate of sale and damages with preliminary injunction against Buados and the deputy sheriff.




Buados connived and directly levied upon and execute his real property without exhausting the personal properties of ErlindaNicol.

No proper publication and posting of the notice of sale.

His property was only sold at a "very low price" whereas the judgment obligation of ErlindaNicol was only P40,000

10. Buados filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and that they had acted on the basis of a valid writ of execution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal liability is chargeable to the conjugal partnership HELD: No, it is not chargeable to the conjugal property RATIO:

There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature. Article 122 of the Family Codeexplicitly provides that payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.

Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse.

Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be concluded that the civil obligation arising from the crime of slander committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

To reiterate, conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation contracted by one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to the conjugal partnership

CASE 26. Pana v. Heirs of Juanite, G.R. No. 164201, Dec. 10, 2012 (Personal debts, FC 122, RPC 108) FACTS:

Petitioner EfrenPana (Efren), his wife Melecia, and others were accused of murder. Efren was acquitted but Melecia and another person was found guilty and was sentenced to the penalty of death and to pay each of the heirs of the victims, jointly and severally for civil indemnity and damages.

Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC ordered the issuance of the writ, resulting in the levy of real properties registered in the names of Efren and Melecia. Subsequently, a notice of levy and a notice of sale on execution were issued.

Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of execution, claiming that the levied properties were conjugal assets, not paraphernal assets of Melecia.

ISSUE: WON the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia can be levied and executed upon for the satisfaction of Melecias civil liability in the murder case. HELD: Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal properties partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the partnership.

The payment of fines and indemnities imposed upon the spouses may be enforced against the partnership assets if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient.

Since Efren does not dispute the RTCs finding that Melecia has no exclusive property of her own, the above applies. The civil indemnity that the decision in the murder case imposed on her may be enforced against their conjugal assets after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code have been covered.

persons & family relations case digests

Documents