persons, property, ltd, wills mrc

PERSONS, PROPERTY, LTD, WILLS MRC| 1

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS Tanada vs Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985) Article 2 of the NCC does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Tanada vs Tuvera,146 SCRA 446 (1986) If the law provides for its own effectivity date, then it takes effect on the said date, subject to the requirement of publication. The clause “unless otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not the to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. LA BUGAL-B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC. v. RAMOS, G.R. No. 127882, January 27, 2004 While the effectivity clause of E.O. No. 279 does not require its publication, it is not a ground for its invalidation since the Constitution, being “the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation,” is deemed written in the law. Hence, the due process clause, which, so Tañada held, mandates the publication of statutes, is read into Section 8 of E.O. No. 279. Additionally, Section 1 of E.O. No. 200 which provides for publication “either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines,” finds suppletory application. It is significant to note that E.O. No. 279 was actually published in the Official Gazette on August 3, 1987. Roy vs CA, G.R. NO 80718 Jan. 29, 1988 The term “laws” do not include decisions of the Supreme Court because lawyers in the active practice must keep abreast of decisions, particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated and published in advanced reports and the SCRA. Ty v. Cam G.R. NO. 127406, Nov. 27, 2000 The two marriages involved in this case was entered during the effectivity of the New Civil Code. The Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights. Floresca vs Philex Mining Corp.,G.R. 30642, April 30, 1985 The application or interpretation placed by the Supreme Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of its enactment since the court’s application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect. Van Dorn vs. Romillo G.R. NO.L-68470 October 8, 1985 It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, RCPI vs CA, 143 SCRA 657 (1986)

Dionela filed a complaint for damages against RCPI alleging that the defamatory words on the telegram sent to him not only wounded his feelings but also caused him undue embarrassment and affected his business as well as because other people have come to know of said defamatory words. There is a clear case of breach of contract by the petitioner in adding extraneous and libelous matters in the message sent to Dionela. Gashme Shookat Baksh vs CA,219 SCRA115 (1993) Where a man’s promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to article 21 of the new civil code not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the wilful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. University of the East vs Jader, G.R. NO. 132344, Feb. 7, 2000 A law student was allowed to graduate by his school with a failing grade but was later on prohibited by the said school to take the bar exams. The negligent act of a professor who fails to observe the rules of the school, for instance by not promptly submitting a student’s grade, is not only imputable to the professor but is an act of the school, being his employer. SPOUSES HING v. ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. G.R. No. 179736. June 26, 2013 Thus, an individual’s right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be confined to his house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to exclude the public or deny them access. The phrase “prying into the privacy of another’s residence,” therefore, covers places, locations, or even situations which an individual considers as private. And as long as his right is recognized by society, other individuals may not infringe on his right to privacy. The CA, therefore, erred in limiting the application of Article 26(1) of the Civil Code only to residences. WILLAWARE PRODUCTS CORPORATION vs. JESICHRIS MANUFACTURING CORPORATION G.R. No. 195549, September 3, 2014 The concept of “unfair competition” under Article 28 is very much broader than that covered by intellectual property laws. Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that “unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers damage.”


Geluz vs CA, July 20, 1961 It is unquestionable that the appellant’s act in provoking the abortion of appellee’s wife, without medical necessity to warrant it, was a criminal and morally reprehensible act, that cannot be to severely condemned; and the consent of the woman or that of her husband does not excuse it. But the immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an award of damage that, under the circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis. Quimiguing vs ICAO, 34 SCRA 132 (1970) A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided under article 40 of the civil code. Cariño v. Cariño, G.R. NO. 132529 , Feb. 02, 2001 351 SCRA 127 Whether or not the certification by the registrar of the non-existence of marriage license is enough to prove non-issuance thereof. The records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. Alcantara v. Alcantara, G.R. NO. 167746 , Aug. 28,2007 531 SCRA 446 Whether or not, a marriage license issued by a municipality or city to a non-resident invalidates the license. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage Niñal vs. Bayadog 328 SCRA 122, March 14, 2000 In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent’s marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day because their cohabitation is not exclusive. The Court ruled that the cohabitation contemplated under said provisions must be in the “nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract” and “characterized by exclusivity meaning nothird party was involved at anytime within the 5 years andcontinuity that is unbroken. Soriano v. Felix, L-9005, June 20, 1958 The affidavit is for the purpose of proving the basis for exemption from the marriage license. Even if there is failure on the part of the solemnizing officer to execute the necessary affidavit, such irregularity will not invalidate the marriage for the affidavit is not being required of the parties. Morigo v. People, G.R. NO. 145226 , Feb. 6, 200

The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage. MINORU FUJIKI v. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013 The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, G.R. No. 198780. October 16, 2013 A marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship is NOT void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent. Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio. Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A “freely given” consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act. Their understanding should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism. Juliano-Llave v. Republic, G.R. NO. 169766 , Mar. 30, 2011 646 SCRA 637 The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given time. Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera, G.R. NO. 80116 June 30, 1989 Whether or not, the complainant, a foreigner, qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint. The person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint. Recio vs. Recio G.R. NO. 138322. October 2, 2001 Whether or not the divorce must be proved before it is to be recognized in the Philippines. Before a foreign divorce


decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient. Rep. v. Orbecido, G.R. NO. 154380, Oct. 05, 2005 Whether or not, a Filipino Spouse can remarry under ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE where his,her spouse is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R.NO. 186571, Aug. 11, 2010 In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. Santos v. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20 (1995) The Supreme Court enumerated the three basic requirements of “psychological incapacity” as a ground for declaration of nullity of the marriage: (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. Chi Ming Tsoi vs CA, 266 SCRA 324 (1997) In this case, there was no sexual contact between the parties since their marriage on May 22, 1988 up to Mar. 15, 1989 or for almost a year. The senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties of sexual cooperation for the procreation of children is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Ochosa v. Alano, G.R. NO. 167459 , Jan. 26, 2011 640 SCRA 517 In this case the court proved that respondent was the sex partner of many military officials. In view of the foregoing, the badges of Bona’s alleged psychological incapacity, i.e., her sexual infidelity and abandonment, can only be convincingly traced to the period of time after her marriage to Jose and not to the inception of the said marriage. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RODOLFO O. DE GRACIA G.R. No. 171577, February 12, 2014 “Psychological incapacity,” as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental – not merely physical – incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68

of the Family Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Mendoza v. Republic, G.R. NO. 157649,Nov 12, 2012 685 SCRA 16 Here, the expert’s testimony on Dominic’s psychological profile did not identify, much less prove, the root cause of his psychological incapacity because said expert did not examine Dominic in person before completing her report but simply relied on other people’s recollection and opinion for that purpose. Expert evidence submitted here did not establish the precise cause of the supposed psychological incapacity of Dominic, much less show that the psychological incapacity existed at the inception of the marriage. Marcos vs Marcos, 343 SCRA 755 (2000 If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. VALERIO E. KALAW vs. MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ G.R. No. 166357, January 14, 2015 Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals. Tenebro v. CA, G.R. NO. 150758 , Feb. 18, 2004 423 SCRA 272 Whether or not, the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of PI is a valid defense for the crime of bigamy. The declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. Nollora v. People, G.R. NO.191425 , Sept. 7, 2011 657 SCRA 330 Indeed, Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that “[i]n case of a marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the [Family Code of the Philippines, or


Executive Order NO. 209, in lieu of the Civil Code of the Philippines] shall apply.” Thus, regardless of his professed religion, Nollora cannot claim exemption from liability for the crime of bigamy. Rep. v. Nolasco, G.R. NO. 94053 , Mar. 17, 1993 220 SCRA 20 In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker’s whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of Janet Monica’s departure, instead of seeking the help of local authorities or of the British Embassy, he secured another seaman’s contract and went to London, a vast city of many millions of inhabitants, to look for her there. Valdez v. Republic, G.R. NO.180863 , Sept. 08, 2009 598 SCRA 646 Since death is presumed to have taken place by the seventh year of absence, Sofio is to be presumed dead starting October 1982. To retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code requiring petitioner to exhibit “well-founded belief” will, ultimately, result in the invalidation of her second marriage, which was valid at the time it was celebrated. Rep. v. Tango, G.R. NO.161062 , Jul. 31, 2009 594 SCRA 560 By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court’s judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code CELERINA J. SANTOS vs. RICARDO T. SANTOS, G.R. No. 187061, 08 OCTOBER 2014 The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive death obtained by extrinsic fraud is an action to annul the judgment. An affidavit of reappearance is not the proper remedy when the person declared presumptively dead has never been absent. Ong v. Ong, G.R. NO. 153206, Oct. 23, 2006 505 SCRA 76 Also without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has abandoned the family, a decree of legal separation should not be granted, following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code which provides that legal separation shall be denied when both parties have given ground for legal separation. The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one year. Pacete vs. Carriaga, G.R. NO. 53880, Mar. 17, 1994 231 SCRA 321

Whether or not, the order declaring in default a respondent in a legal separation case amounts to grave abuse of discretion. In case of non- appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated. Arcaba vs. Batocael, G.R. NO.146683 , Nov.22, 2001 370 SCRA 414 Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code. Dewara v. Lamela G.R. NO. 179010, Apr. 11, 2011 647 SCRA 483 All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Registration in the name of the husband or the wife alone does not destroy this presumption. BOBBY TAN, v. GRACE ANDRADE, ET AL. v. BOBBY TAN, G.R. No. 172017 / G.R. No. 171904 August 7, 2013 The presumption under Article 160 of the New Civil Code, that property acquired during marriage is conjugal, does not apply where there is no showing as to when the property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. The presumption cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved. Moreover, when the property is registered in the name of only one spouse and there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by same spouse, this is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to the said spouse. Moreover, the presumption may be rebutted only with strong, clear, categorical and convincing evidence. There must be strict proof of the exclusive ownership of one of the spouses, and the burden of proof rests upon the party asserting it. Villegas v. Lingan G.R. NO. 153839 , Jun. 29, 2007 526 SCRA 63 Consequently, as correctly held by the CA, Marilou acquired ownership of the subject property. All rights and title of the judgment obligor are transferred upon the expiration of the right of redemption. And where the redemption is made under a property regime governed by the conjugal partnership of gains, Article 109 of the Family Code provides that property acquired by right of redemption is the exclusive property of the spouses redeeming the property. Ferrer v. Ferrer, G.R. NO.166496 , Nov. 29, 2006 508 SCRA 570 The obligation to reimburse rests on the spouse upon whom ownership of the entire property is vested. There is no


obligation on the part of the purchaser of the property, in case the property is sold by the owner- spouse. Pana v. Heirs of Jose Juanite G.R. NO. 164201,Dec. 10, 2012 687 SCRA 414 Contrary to Efren’s contention, Article 121 above allows payment of the criminal indemnities imposed on his wife, Melecia, out of the partnership assets even before these are liquidated. Indeed, it states that such indemnities “may be enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding article have been covered.” No prior liquidation of those assets is required. MBTC v. Pascual, G.R. NO. 163744, Feb. 29, 2008 547 SCRA 246 Termination of Conjugal Property Regime does not ipso facto End the Nature of Conjugal Ownership. While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed their marital bond and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of the properties acquired before such declaration continues to subsist as conjugal properties until and after the liquidation and partition of the partnership. Espinosa v. Omaña, AC. 9081, Oct 12, 2011 659 SCRA 1 Extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval is void. The Court has also ruled that a notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership, which is exactly what Omaña did in this case. The “Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay” has no legal effect and is against public policy. Diño v. Diño, G.R. NO. 178044, Jan. 19, 2011 640 SCRA 178 The trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. JUAN SEVILLA, JR. v. EDEN VILLENA AGUILA, G.R. No. 202370, September 23, 2013 Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code, as in this case. Under this property regime, property acquired during the marriage is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through the couple’s joint efforts and governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the present case, Salas did not rebut this presumption. In a similar case where the ground for nullity of marriage was also psychological incapacity, we held that the properties

acquired during the union of the parties, as found by both the RTC and the CA, would be governed by co-ownership. Valdes vs. RTC Br. 102, QC G.R. NO. 122749, Jul. 31, 1996 260 SCRA 221 Whether or not, Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law spouses. Cariño v. Cariño, G.R. NO. 132529, Feb. 02, 2001 351 SCRA 127 As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage license San Luis v. San Luis G.R. NO. 133743, Feb. 06, 2007 514 SCRA 294 In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil Code SERCONSISION R. MENDOZA vs. AURORA MENDOZA FERMIN G.R. No. 177235, July 07, 2014 As Leonardo and Serconsision were married sometime in 1985, the applicable provision governing the property relations of the spouses is Article 172 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which states that the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband’s consent. In Felipe vs. Heirs of Maximo Aldon, a case decided under the provisions of the Civil Code, the Supreme Court had the occasion to rule that the sale of a land belonging to the conjugal partnership made by the wife without the consent of the husband is voidable. The Supreme Court further ruled that the view that the disposal by the wife of their conjugal property without the husband’s consent is voidable is supported by Article 173 of the Civil Code which states that contracts entered by the husband without the consent of the wife when such consent is required are annullable at her instance during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned. In the present case, the fictitious Deed of Absolute Sale was executed on September 22, 1986, one month after or specifically on November 25, 1986,


Leonardo died. Aurora as one of the heirs and the duly appointed administratrix of Leonardo’s estate, had the right therefore to seek for the annulment of the Deed of Sale as it deprived her and the other legal heirs of Leonardo of their hereditary rights. Arriola v. Arriola, G.R. NO. 177703, Jan. 28, 2008 542 SCRA 666 Furthermore, Articles 152 and 153 specifically extend the scope of the family home not just to the dwelling structure in which the family resides but also to the lot on which it stands. Thus, applying these concepts, the subject house as well as the specific portion of the subject land on which it stands are deemed constituted as a family home by the deceased and petitioner Vilma from the moment they began occupying the same as a family residence 20 years back Modequillo vs. Breva, G.R. No. 86355, May 31, 1990. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law Olivia De Mesa v. Acero, G.R. NO. 185064 Jan. 16, 2012 663 SCRA 40 The family home’s exemption from execution must be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. The petitioners now are barred from raising the same. Failure to do so estop them from later claiming the said exemption. Manacop vs. CA, 277 SCRA 57 (1997) Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code do not have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code. RODOLFO S. AGUILAR vs. EDNA G. SIASAT, G.R. No. 200169, January 28, 2015 As petitioner correctly argues, Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and relationship to the Aguilar spouses under Article 172 of the Family Code; by itself, said document constitutes an “admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.” Labagla vs. Santiago, G.R. NO. 132305, Dec. 04, 2001 371 SCRA 360 A baptismal certificate, a private document, is not conclusive proof of filiation. More so are the entries made in an income tax return, which only shows that income tax has been paid and the amount thereof. Puno v. Puno Ent. Inc., G.R. NO. 177066, Sept. 11, 2009 599 SCRA 58

A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of the certificate. The local civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child on the information of a third person. DE LA CRUZ v. GRACIA, G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 200 1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and 2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence. GRACE M. GRANDE v. PATRICIO T. ANTONIO, G.R. No. 206248. February 18, 2014 An illegitimate child may use the surname of his father if the latter has expressly recognized their filiation. However, the child is under no compulsion to use his father’s surname. When Antonio recognized Andre Lewis and Jerard Patrick as his sons, the two children had the right to use the surname of Antonio. However, they were under no compulsion or mandate to use the same. The law uses the word ‘may’, which dictates that it is merely permissive. Tonog vs. CA, G.R. NO. 122906 , Feb. 07, 2002 376 SCRA 523 In the case at bar, bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor, the appellate court did not err in allowing her father to retain in the meantime parental custody over her. Meanwhile, the child should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and thrust into a strange environment away from the people and places to which she had apparently formed an attachment. Abadilla vs. Tabiliran, Jr. A.M NO. MTJ-92-716, Oct. 25, 1995 249 SCRA 447 Whether or not, a child born out of wedlock, by parents who have a legal impediment to marry each other, can be legitimated. As a lawyer and a judge, respondent ought to know that, despite his subsequent marriage to Priscilla, these three children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate since at the time they were born, there was an existing valid marriage between respondent and his first wife, Teresita B. Tabiliran. ROSARIO MATA CASTRO AND JOANNE BENEDICTA CHARISSIMA M. CASTRO, A.K.A. “MARIA SOCORRO M. CASTRO” AND “JAYROSE M. CASTRO” vs JOSE MARIA JED LEMUEL GREGORIO AND ANA MARIA REGINA GREGORIO G.R. NO. 188801, 15 October 2014, SECOND DIVISION (Leonen, J.) For the adoption to be valid, petitioners’ consent was required by Republic Act No. 8552. Personal service of


summons should have been effected on the spouse and all legitimate children to ensure that their substantive rights are protected. It is not enough to rely on constructive notice as in this case. Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot be privileged over substantive statutory rights. In re: Adoption of Michelle & Michael Lim G.R. NO.168992-93, May 21, 2009 588 SCRA 98 The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario is of no moment. It is not equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage. Until and unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario, the marriage still subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by the husband and the wife is required. Gan vs. Reyes, G.R. NO.145527, May.28, 2002 382 SCRA 357 A judgment ordering for support is immediately executory despite pendency of appeal. De Asis vs. CA, G.R. NO.127578, Feb. 15, 1999 303 SCRA 176 Whether or not, a renunciation of the existence of filiation of the child and the putative father, made by the mother, is valid. It is true that in order to claim support, filiation and/or paternity must first be shown between the claimant and the parent, however, paternity and filiation or the lack of the same is a relationship that must be judicially established and it is for the court to declare its existence or absence. Laxamana v. Laxamana, G.R. NO. 144763, Sept. 3, 2002 388 SCRA 296 It is clear that every child [has] rights which are not and should not be dependent solely on the wishes, much less the whims and caprices, of his parents. His welfare should not be subject to the parents’ say-so or mutual agreement alone. Where, as in this case, the parents are already separated in fact, the courts must step in to determine in whose custody the child can better be assured the rights granted to him by law. The need, therefore, to present evidence regarding this matter, becomes imperative. St. Mary’s Academy v. Carpitanos, G.R. NO. 143363, Feb. 6, 2002 376 SCRA 473 The liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minor’s parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St. Mary’s Academy was only a remote cause of the accident. Neri v. Heirs of Hadji Yusop, G.R. No 194366, Oct. 10, 2012 683 SCRA 253 Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the property and the receipt of fruits according to the natural purpose of the thing. Any act of disposition or alienation, or any reduction in the substance of the patrimony of child,

exceeds the limits of administration. Thus, a father or mother, as the natural guardian of the minor under parental authority, does not have the power to dispose or encumber the property of the latter. FE FLORO VALINO vs. ROSARIO D. ADRIANO, FLORANTE D. ADRIANO, RUBEN D. ADRIANO, MARIA TERESA ADRIANO ONGOCO, VICTORIA ADRIANO BAYONA, AND LEAH ANTONETTE D. ADRIANO G.R. No. 182894, 22 April 2014, EN BANC (Mendoza J.) The law gives the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to Rosario, she being the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was living separately from her husband and was in the United States when he died has no controlling significance. To say that Rosario had, in effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and duty to make arrangements for the funeral of her deceased husband is baseless. The right and duty to make funeral arrangements, like any other right, will not be considered as having been waived or renounced, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent to that end. It is generally recognized that the corpse of an individual is outside the commerce of man. However, the law recognizes that a certain right of possession over the corpse exists, for the purpose of a decent burial, and for the exclusion of the intrusion by third persons who have no legitimate interest in it. This quasi-property right, arising out of the duty of those obligated by law to bury their dead, also authorizes them to take possession of the dead body for purposes of burial to have it remain in its final resting place, or to even transfer it to a proper place where the memory of the dead may receive the respect of the living. This is a family right. There can be no doubt that persons having this right may recover the corpse from third persons. FILOTEO A. ALANO vs. ZENAIDA MAGUD-LOGMAO, G.R. No. 175540, 14 April 2014 There can be no cavil that petitioner employed reasonable means to disseminate notifications intended to reach the relatives of the deceased. The only question that remains pertains to the sufficiency of time allowed for notices to reach the relatives of the deceased. PROPERTY Laurel vs. Abrogar, G.R. NO. 155076, Jan. 13, 2009 International telephone calls placed by Bay Super Orient Card holders, the telecommunication services provided by PLDT and its business of providing said services are not personal properties under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. The construction by the respondents of Article 308 of the said Code to include, within its coverage, the aforesaid international telephone calls, telecommunication services and business is contrary to the letter and intent of the law. Tsai vs. CA, 366 SCRA 324


In the instant case, the parties: (1) executed a contract styled as “Real Estate Mortgage and Chattel Mortgage,” instead of just “Real Estate Mortgage” if indeed their intention is to treat all properties included therein as immovable, and (2) attached to the said contract a separate “LIST OF MACHINERIES & EQUIPMENT”. These facts, taken together, evince the conclusion that the parties’ intention is to treat these units of machinery as chattels. Caltex Phils., Inc., vs. CBAA, May 31, 1982 SC held that the said equipment and machinery, as appurtenances to the gas station building or shed owned by Caltex (as to which it is subject to realty tax) and which fixtures are necessary to the operation of the gas station, for without them the gas station would be useless, and which have been attached or affixed permanently to the gas station site or embedded therein, are taxable improvements and machinery within the meaning of the Assessment Law and the Real Property Tax Code. MERALCO vs. CBAA, May 31, 1982 While the two storage tanks are not embedded in the land, they may, nevertheless, be considered as improvements on the land, enhancing its utility and rendering it useful to the oil industry. It is undeniable that the two tanks have been installed with some degree of permanence as receptacles for the considerable quantities of oil needed by Meralco for its operations. Republic vs CA, 132 SCRA 514 Properties of public dominion is not susceptible to private appropriation and cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription and thus they cannot be registered under the Land Registration Law and be the subject of a torrents title. Manila International Airport Authority vs CA, 495 SCRA 591 Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to levy, encumbrance or disposition through public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on execution or auction sale of any property of public dominion is void for being contrary to public policy. German Management & Services, Inc. v. CA. 177 SCRA 495 (1989) The doctrine of self-help can only be exercised at the time of actual or threatened dispossession, and not when possession has already been lost. Palero-Tan v. Urdaneta AM NO. P–‐07–‐2399, Jun. 18, 2008 When a person who finds a thing that has been lost or mislaid by the owner takes the thing into his hands, he acquires physical custody only and does not become vested with legal possession. In assuming such custody, the finder is charged with the obligation of restoring the thing to its owner. It is thus respondent’s duty to report to his superior or his officemates that he found something.

Mercado v. CA, 162 SCRA 75, 85 1988 To be deemed a builder in good faith, it is essential that a person asserts title to the land on which he builds, i.e., it is essential that he be a possessor in concept of owner and that he be unaware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. Nuguid v. CA, 452 SCRA 243, 252 (2005) The right of retention is considered as one of the measures devised by the law for the protection of builders in good faith. Its object is to guarantee full and prompt reimbursement as it permits the actual possessor to remain in possession while he has not been reimbursed (by the person who defeated him in the case for possession of the property) for those necessary expenses and useful improvements made by him on the things possessed. BPI v. SANCHEZES, G.R. No. 179518, November 11, 2014 The Sanchezes have the following options: (1) acquire the property with the townhouses and other buildings and improvements that may be thereon without indemnifying TSEI or the intervenors; (2) demand from TSEI or the intervenors to demolish what has been built on the property at the expense of TSEI or the intervenors; or (3) ask the intervenors to pay the price of the land. As such, the Sanchezes must choose from among these options within thirty (30) days from finality of this Decision. Should the Sanchezes opt to ask from the intervenors the value of the land, the case shall be remanded to the RTC for the sole purpose of determining the fair market value of the lot at the time the same were taken from the Sanchezes in 1988. Pecson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115814 May 26, 1995 Thus in strict point of law, Article 448 is not apposite to the case at bar. Nevertheless, we believe that the provision therein on indemnity may be applied by analogy considering that the primary intent of Article 448 is to avoid a state of forced co-ownership and that the parties, including the two courts below, in the main agree that Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code are applicable and indemnity for the improvements may be paid although they differ as to the basis of the indemnity. Vda. de Nazareno v. CA, 257 SCRA 598 (1996) Since the subject land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust by the Sun Valley Lumber Co., the accretion was man-made, hence, Art. 457 does not apply. Ergo, the subject land is part of the public domain. Cureg v. IAC, 177 SCRA 313 (1989) The accretion to registered land does not preclude acquisition of the additional area by another person through prescription. Agne v. Director of Lands, 181 SCRA 793, 805 (1990) There need be no act on their part to subject the old river bed to their ownership, as it is subject thereto ipso jure from the moment the mode of acquisition becomes evident,


without need of any formal act of acquisition. Such abandoned riverbed had fallen to the private ownership of the owner of the land through which the new river bed passes even without any formal act of his will and any unauthorized occupant thereof will be considered as a trespasser. Baha’is v. Pascual, G.R. 169272,July 11, 2012 Under Articles 476 and 477 of the Civil Code, the two (2) indispensable requisites in an action to quiet title are: (1) that the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) that a deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding is claimed to be casting cloud on his title. In this case, an action to quiet title is not the proper remedy because petitioner no longer had any legal or equitable title to or interest in the lots. The petitioner’s status as possessor and owner of the lots had been settled in the final and executory December 4, 1985 decision of the Bureau of Lands that the DENR Secretary and the OP affirmed on appeal. Thus, the petitioner is not entitled to the possession and ownership of the lots. Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, 404 SCRA 541, 548, June 20, 2003 Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the others, hence, the relationship of such co-owner to the other co-owners is fiduciary in character and attribute. Santos v. Heirs of Lustre, G.R. NO. 151016, Aug. 06, 2008 Any adverse ruling in the earlier case will not, in any way, prejudice the heirs who did not join, even if such case was actually filed in behalf of all the co-owners. In fact, if an action for recovery of property is dismissed, a subsequent action by a co- heir who did not join the earlier case should not be barred by prior judgment. Rey Castigador Catedrilla v. Mario and Margie Lauron, G.R. No. 179011. April 15, 2013 In suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest. However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and the relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of action for the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be afforded in the suit even without their participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners. VIRGINIA Y. GOCHAN, FELIX Y. GOCHAN III, LOUISE Y. GOCHAN, ESTEBAN Y. GOCHAN, JR., and DOMINIC Y. GOCHAN v. CHARLES MANCAO, G.R. No. 182314, November 13, 2013 Only the redeeming co-owner and the buyer are the indispensable parties in an action for legal redemption, to

the exclusion of the seller/co-owner A party who is not the co-owner of a land subject of a compromise agreement cannot claim that he was defrauded when the parties in the compromise agreement entered into the same. As a third party to the agreement, he is not indispensable for the agreement to materialize. Parilla v. Pilar, G.R. NO. 167680, Nov. 30, 2006 One whose interest is merely that of a holder, such as a mere tenant, agent or usufructuary, is not qualified to become a possessor builder in good faith. Bunyi v. Factor, G.R. NO. 172547, Jun. 30, 2009 591 SCRA 350 For one to be considered in possession, one need not have actual or physical occupation of every square inch of the property at all times. Possession can be acquired not only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of one’s will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right, possession can be acquired by juridical acts. EDCA Publ. V. Santos, G.R. NO. 80298, Apr. 26, 1990 184 SCRA 614 Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired ownership over the books which he could then validly transfer to the private respondents. The fact that he had not yet paid for them to EDCA was a matter between him and EDCA and did not impair the title acquired by the private respondents to the books. PILAR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. RAMON DUMADAG, ET. AL., G.R. No. 194336, March 11, 2013 Squatters have no possessory rights over the land intruded upon. The length of time that they may have physically occupied the land is immaterial; they are deemed to have entered the same in bad faith, such that the nature of their possession is presumed to have retained the same character throughout their occupancy. Quintanilla v. Abangan, G.R. NO. 160613, Feb.12, 2008 As between a right of way that would demolish a fence of strong materials to provide ingress and egress to a public highway and another right of way which although longer will only require a van or vehicle to make a turn, the second alternative should be preferred. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis for setting up a compulsory easement. Reyes v. Ramos, G.R. No. 194488, February 11, 2015 Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis of setting up a compulsory easement. Even in the face of necessity, if it can be satisfied without imposing the easement, the same should not be imposed. Hidalgo Enterprises v. Balandan, et. al, G.R. No. L-3422 Jun. 13, 1952


Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract children. Lurking in their waters is always the danger of drowning. Against this danger children are early instructed so that they are sufficiently presumed to know the danger; and if the owner of private property creates an artificial pool on his own property, merely duplicating the work of nature without adding any new danger, . . . (he) is not liable because of having created an “attractive nuisance.” Gancayco v. Quezon City, G.R. NO. 177807,Oct 11, 2011 The wing walls do not per se immediately and adversely affect the safety of persons and property. The fact that an ordinance may declare a structure illegal does not necessarily make that structure a nuisance. SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC., v. ARSENIO ALDECOA, ET. AL., G.R. No. 166330, September 11, 2013 Commercial and industrial activities which are lawful in themselves may become nuisances if they are so offensive to the senses that they render the enjoyment of life and property uncomfortable. The fact that the cause of the complaint must be substantial has often led to expressions in the opinions that to be a nuisance the noise must be deafening or loud or excessive and unreasonable. The determining factor when noise alone is the cause of complaint is not its intensity or volume. It is that the noise is of such character as to produce actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities, rendering adjacent property less comfortable and valuable. If the noise does that it can well be said to be substantial and unreasonable in degree, and reasonableness is a question of fact dependent upon all the circumstances and conditions. There can be no fixed standard as to what kind of noise constitutes a nuisance. Republic v. Guzman, G.R. No. 132964, February 18, 2000 The donation is null and void when (a) the deed of donation fails to show the acceptance, or (b) where the formal notice of the acceptance made in a separate instrument is either not given to the donor or else noted in the deed of donation, and in the separate acceptance. Villanueva vs. Spouses Branoco, G.R. No. 172804, January 24, 2011 When the donor used the words that the gift “does not pass title during my lifetime; but when I die, she shall be the true owner of the two aforementioned parcels”] the donor meant nothing else than that she reserved of herself the possession and usufruct of said two parcels of land until her death, at which time the donee would be able to dispose of them freely. Quijada vs. CA, G.R. NO. 126444, Dec. 4, 1998 Since no period was imposed by the donor on when must the donee comply with the condition, the latter remains the owner so long as he has tried to comply with the condition within a reasonable period. Only then – when the non-fulfillment of the resolutory condition was brought to the

donor’s knowledge – that ownership of the donated property reverted to the donor as provided in the automatic reversion clause of the deed of donation. LAND TITLES AND DEEDS Legarda vs. Saleeby, G.R. NO. 8936, Oct. 2, 1915 The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. Sta. Lucia vs. Pasig, G.R.NO. 166838, June 15, 2011 While a certificate of title is conclusive as to its ownership and location, this does not preclude the filing of an action for the very purpose of attacking the statements therein. Mere reliance therefore on the face of the TCTs will not suffice as they can only be conclusive evidence of the subject properties’ locations if both the stated and described locations point to the same area. Republic vs. Santos, G.R.NO. 180027, July 18, 2012 Jura Regalia simply means that the State is the original proprietor of all lands and, as such, is the general source of all private titles. Thus, pursuant to this principle, all claims of private title to land, save those acquired from native title, must be traced from some grant, whether express or implied, from the State. Absent a clear showing that land had been let into private ownership through the State’s imprimatur, such land is presumed to belong to the State. SPOUSES BERNADETTE AND RODULFO VILBAR v. ANGELITO L. OPINION, G.R. No. 176043. January 15, 2014 Registration is the operative act which gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land. A certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. Since the spouses Vilbar did not cause the transfer of the certificate title in their name, or at the very least, annotate or register such sale in the original title in the name of Dulos Realty, have no indefeasible and incontrovertible title over Lot 20 to support their claim. LUZVIMINDA APRAN CANLAS vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 200894, 10 November 2014 In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, the Court further clarified the difference between Section 14(1) and Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. The former refers to registration of title on the basis of possession, while the latter entitles the applicant to the registration of his property on the basis of prescription. Registration under the first mode is extended under the aegis of the P.D. No. 1529 and the Public Land Act (PLA) while under the second mode is made available both by P.D. No. 1529 and the Civil Code. Moreover, under Section 48(b) of the PLA, as amended by Republic Act No. 1472, the 30-year period is in relation to possession


without regard to the Civil Code, while under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, the 30-year period involves extraordinary prescription under the Civil Code, particularly Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137. Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds 79 Phil 461 Aliens mat not acquire private or public agricultural lands. Ong Ching Po v. Court of Appeals G.R. NO. 113472, Dec. 20, 1994, 239 SCRA 341. The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Private land may be transferred or only to individuals or entities qualified to acquire lands of the public domain. Halili vs. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 465 A natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law. Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and Acme, 146 SCRA 509 The time to determine whether a person acquiring land is qualified is the time the right to own it is acquired and not the time to register ownership. Tan vs. Republic April 16, 2012 Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine. It is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EMETERIA G. LUALHATI G.R. No. 183511, March 25, 2015 It is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Spouses Vallido v. Spouses Pono, et al., G.R. No. 200173. April 15, 2013

It is a recognized principle that a person dealing on a registered land need not go beyond its certificate of title, it is also a firmly settled rule that where there are circumstances which would put a party on guard and prompt him to investigate or inspect the property being sold to him, such as the presence of occupants/tenants thereon, it is expected from the purchaser of a valued piece of land to inquire first into the status or nature of possession of the occupants. The burden of proving good faith lies with the second buyer (petitioners herein) which is not discharged by simply invoking the ordinary presumption of good faith. After an assiduous assessment of the evidentiary records, this Court holds that the petitioners are NOT buyers in good faith as they failed to discharge their burden of proof. SPOUSE PERALTA v. ABALON, G.R. No. 183448, June 30, 2014 The established rule is that a forged deed is generally null and cannot convey title, the exception thereto, pursuant to Section 55 of the Land Registration Act, denotes the registration of titles from the forger to the innocent purchaser for value. Thus, the qualifying point here is that there must be a complete chain of registered titles. This means that all the transfers starting from the original rightful owner to the innocent holder for value – and that includes the transfer to the forger – must be duly registered, and the title must be properly issued to the transferee. Malabanan vs. Republic, 587 SCRA 172 Only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public domain begin to run. Alvarez vs. PICOP Resources, Inc., 606 SCRA 444 Forest lands cannot be alienated in favor of petitioner private persons or entities. Tan vs. Republic, G.R. No. 193443 G.R. No. 193443, April 16, 2012 There must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. For one to invoke the provisions of Section 14(2) and set up acquisitive prescription against the State, it is primordial that the status of the property as patrimonial be first established. Furthermore, the period of possession preceding the classification of the property as patrimonial cannot be considered in determining the completion of the prescriptive period. AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY vs. SPOUSES JOSE AND MAGDALENA YBAÑEZ G.R. No. 161380, 21 April 2014


Although a deed or instrument affecting unregistered lands would be valid only between the parties thereto, third parties would also be affected by the registered deed or instrument on the theory of constructive notice once it was further registered in accordance with Section 194, i.e., the deed or instrument was written or inscribed in the day book and the register book for unregistered lands in the Office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the realty was located. The only exception to the rule on constructive notice by registration of the deed or instrument affecting unregistered realty exists in favor of “a third party with a better right.” This exception is provided in Section 194, as amended by Act No. 3344, to the effect that the registration “shall be understood to be without prejudice to a third party with a better right;” and in paragraph (b) of Section 113 of P.D. No. 1529, to the effect that “any recording made under this section shall be without prejudice to a third party with a better right.” WILLS AND SUCCESSION In the matter of the Testate Estate of Edward Christensen, G.R. L-16749, January 31, 1963 Whether or not, the intrinsic validity of the testamentary disposition should be governed by Philippine Law, when the national law of the testator refers back to the Philippine Law. Edward is domiciled in the Philippines hence, Philippine court must apply its own laws which makes natural children legally acknowledge as forced heirs of the parent recognizing them. Vitug vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.NO. 82027, Mar. 29, 1990 183 SCRA 755 A will has been defined as “a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a capacitated person disposes of his property and rights and declares or complies with duties to take effect after his death.” Cayatenao vs Leonidas, 129 SCRA 524 The law which governs Adoracion Campo’s will is the law of Pennsylvania, USA which is the national law of the decedent. It is settled that as regards to the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the wills as provided for by article 16 and 1039 of the New Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply. Parish Priest of Victoria vs. Rigor, 89 SCRA 483 The issue in this case is whether or not a male relative referred in the will should include those who are born after the testator’s death. To construe it as referring to the nearest male relative at any time after his death would render the provisions difficult to apply and create uncertainty as to the disposition of the estate. De Borja vs De Borja, G.R. No, L-28040, August 18, 1972 There is no legal bar to a successor to dispose his or her share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent

of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate. The effect of such alienation is to be deemed limited to what is ultimately adjudicated to the vendor heir. Bonilla vs Leon Barcena, G.R. L-41715, June 18, 1976 The right of the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in them even before the judicial declaration of their being declared as heirs. When Fortunata died, her claim or right to the parcel of land in litigation in civil case number 856 was not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Borromeo-Herrera vs Borromeo, 152 SCRA 171 The properties included in an existing inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract. The heirs acquire a right to succession from the moment of death of the decedent. In this case, the purported “waiver of hereditary rights” cannot be considered effective. Baltazar v. Laxa, G.R.NO. 174489, April, 11, 2012 It is an established rule that “[a] testament may not be disallowed just because the attesting witnesses declare against its due execution; neither does it have to be necessarily allowed just because all the attesting witnesses declare in favor of its legalization; what is decisive is that the court is convinced by evidence before it, not necessarily from the attesting witnesses, although they must testify, that the will was or was not duly executed in the manner required by law.” Echavez vs. Dozen Cons., G.R.NO. 192916, Oct. 11, 2010 An attestation must state all the details the third paragraph of Article 805 requires. In the absence of the required avowal by the witnesses themselves, no attestation clause can be deemed embodied in the Acknowledgement of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa. Lopez v. Lopez, G.R.NO. 189984, Nov. 12, 2012 The law is clear that the attestation must state the number of pages used upon which the will is written. The purpose of the law is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and prevent any increase or decrease in the pages. Azuela v. CA, 487 SCRA 119 The signatures on the left-hand corner of every page signify, among others, that the witnesses are aware that the page they are signing forms part of the will. On the other hand, the signatures to the attestation clause establish that the witnesses are referring to the statements contained in the attestation clause itself. Lee v. Tambago, 544 SCRA 393 An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signatory actually declares to the notary public that the same is his or her own free act and deed. The acknowledgment in a notarial will has a two-fold


purpose: (1) to safeguard the testator’s wishes long after his demise and (2) to assure that his estate is administered in the manner that he intends it to be done. Suroza vs. Honrado, 110 SCRA 388 In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that English was a language “understood and known” to the testatrix but in its concluding paragraph, it was stated that the will was read to the testatrix “and translated into Filipino language”. That could only mean that the will was written in a language not known to the illiterate testatrix and, therefore, it is void because of the mandatory provision of article 804 of the Civil Code that every will must be executed in a language or dialect known to the testator. Garcia vs. Vasquez, 32 SCRA 489 The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate), is to make the provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in accordance with his wishes. That the aim of the law is to insure that the dispositions of the will are properly communicated to and understood by the handicapped testator, thus making them truly reflective of his desire, is evidenced by the requirement that the will should be read to the latter, not only once but twice, by two different persons, and that the witnesses have to act within the range of his (the testator’s) other senses. Alvarado vs. Gaviola, Jr., 226 SCRA 348 This Court has held in a number of occasions that substantial compliance is acceptable where the purpose of the law has been satisfied, the reason being that the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills are intended to protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and trickery but are never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy the testamentary privilege. In the case at bar, private respondent read the testator’s will and codicil aloud in the presence of the testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and the notary public. Prior and subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed, upon being asked, that the contents read corresponded with his instructions. Only then did the signing and acknowledgement take place. There is no evidence, and petitioner does not so allege, that the contents of the will and codicil were not sufficiently made known and communicated to the testator. On the contrary, with respect to the “Huling Habilin,” the day of the execution was not the first time that Brigido had affirmed the truth and authenticity of the contents of the draft. The uncontradicted testimony of Atty. Rino is that Brigido Alvarado already acknowledged that the will was drafted in accordance with his expressed wishes even prior to 5 November 1977 when Atty. Rino went to the testator’s residence precisely for the purpose of securing his conformity to the draft. Javellana vs. Ledesma GR. No. L-7179, 97 Phil 258

The subsequent signing and sealing by the notary of his certification that the testament was duly acknowledged by the participants therein is no part of the acknowledgment itself nor of the testamentary act. Hence their separate execution out of the presence of the testatrix and her witnesses cannot be said to violate the rule that testaments should be completed without interruption. Cruz vs. Villasor NO.L-32213, 54 SCRA 31 The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the will. This cannot be done because he cannot split his personality into two so that one will appear before the other to acknowledge his participation in the making of the will. Caneda vs. CA, 222 SCRA 781 The rule on substantial compliance in Article 809 cannot be revoked or relied on by respondents since it presupposes that the defects in the attestation clause can be cured or supplied by the text of the will or a consideration of matters apparent therefrom which would provide the data not expressed in the attestation clause or from which it may necessarily be gleaned or clearly inferred that the acts not stated in the omitted textual requirements were actually complied within the execution of the will. Lopez v. Lopez, 685 SCRA 209 The statement in the Acknowledgment portion of the subject last will and testament that it “consists of 7 pages including the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are written” cannot be deemed substantial compliance. The will actually consists of 8 pages including its acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot be explained by mere examination of the will itself but through the presentation of evidence aliunde. Guerrero v. Bihis, 521 SCRA 394 The issue in this case whether the will “acknowledged” by the testatrix and the instrumental witnesses before a notary public acting outside the place of his commission satisfies the requirement under Article 806 of the Civil Code? Outside the place of his commission, he is bereft of power to perform any notarial act; he is not a notary public. Any notarial act outside the limits of his jurisdiction has no force and effect. Celada v. Abena, 556 SCRA 569 While it is true that the attestation clause is not a part of the will, error in the number of pages of the will as stated in the attestation clause is not material to invalidate the subject will. It must be noted that the subject instrument is consecutively lettered with pages A, B, and C which is a sufficient safeguard from the possibility of an omission of some of the pages. Rodelas vs. Aranza, 119 SCRA 16 The photostatic or xerox copy of a lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then the


authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court. Codoy vs. Calugay, 312 SCRA 333 The word “shall” connotes a mandatory order. We have ruled that “shall” in a statute commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word “shall,” when used in a statute is mandatory.” Ajero vs. CA, 236 SCRA 488 Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the holographic will or on testator’s signature, their presence does not invalidate the will itself. The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes. Kalaw vs. Relova, 132 SCRA 237 To state that the Will as first written should be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of mind of the testatrix. But that change of mind can neither be given effect because she failed to authenticate it in the manner required by law by affixing her full signature. Roxas vs. De Jesus, 134 SCRA 245 As a general rule, the “date” in a holographic Will should include the day, month, and year of its execution. However, when as in the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence and pressure and the authenticity of the Will is established and the only issue is whether or not the date “FEB.,61″ appearing on the holographic Will is a valid compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code, probate of the holographic Will should be allowed under the principle of substantial compliance. Labrador vs. CA, 184 SCRA 170 The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the will. The only requirements are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the hand of the testator. Seangio v. Reyes, 508 SCRA 172 Holographic wills being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law, as illustrated in the present case, should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention of the testator. Palaganas v. Palaganas, 2011 640 SCRA 538 A foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. But, reprobate or re-authentication of a will already probated and allowed in a foreign country is different from that probate where the will is presented for the first time before a competent court. Vda.De Perez vs. Tolete, 232 SCRA 722 What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills either for the testator’s reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person (Civil Code of the Philippines, Article 818).

In the case at bench, the Cunanan spouses executed separate wills. Since the two wills contain essentially the same provisions and pertain to property which in all probability are conjugal in nature, practical considerations dictate their joint probate. Casiano vs CA 158 SCRA 451 Revocation under this condition to be effective must have complied with the two requirements: the overt act as mentioned under the law; the intent to revoke on the part of the testator. The document or paper burned by one of the witnesses was not satisfactorily established to be the will at all, much less the will of Adriana. Adriana Maloto vs. CA, 158 SCRA 451 For one, the document or papers burned by Adriana’s maid, Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily established to be a will at all, much less the will of Adriana Maloto. For another, the burning was not proven to have been done under the express direction of Adriana. And then, the burning was not in her presence. Gago vs. Mamuyac NO. L-26317, 49 Phil 902 Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have been in the possession of the testator, when last seen, the presumption is, in the absence of other competent evidence, that the same was cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption arises where it is shown that the testator had ready access to the will and it cannot be found after his death. It will not be presumed that such will has been destroyed by any other person without the knowledge or authority of the testator. Seangio v. Reyes, 2006 508 SCRA 172 For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same must be effected through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With regard to the reasons for the disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his document, the Court believes that the incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo, and that the matter presents a sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a child or descendant under Article 919 of the Civil Code. Molo vs. Molo NO. L- 2538, 90 Phil 37 The failure of a new testamentary disposition upon whose validity the revocation depends, is equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a suspensive conditions, and hence prevents the revocation of the original will. But a mere intent to make at some time a will in the place of that destroyed will not render the destruction conditional. Gan vs Yap, 104 Phil. 509 The loss of the holographic will entail the loss of the only medium of proof; if the ordinary will is lost, the subscribing witnesses are available to authenticate. In case of holographic will if oral testimony were admissible only one man could engineer the fraud this way.


Rodelas vs Aranza 119 SCRA 16 If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will cannot be probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator. But a photostatic copy or Xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator. Azaola vs Singson 109 Phil. 102 Since the authenticity of the will was not contested, the appellant is not required to produce more than one witness. Even if the genuiness of the holographic will were contested, article 811 cannot be interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having denied the probate. Codoy vs Calugay, 312 SCRA 333 We cannot eliminate the possibility that if the will is contested, the law requires that three witnesses to declare that the will was in the handwriting of the deceased. A visual examination of the holographic will convince us that the strokes are different when compared with other documents written by the testator. Gallanosa vs Arcangel, 83 SCRA 676 After the finality of the allowance of a will, the issue as to the voluntariness of its execution cannot be raised anymore. It is not only the 1939 probate proceeding that can be interposed as res judicata with respect to private respondents complaint. Roberts vs Leonidas, 129 SCRA 33 It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should hearing the two cases. Nepomuceno vs CA, 139 SCRA 206 The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court’s area of inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will. Where practically considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue. Aznar vs. Duncan, 17 SCRA 590 To constitute preterition, the omission must be total and complete, such that nothing must be given to the compulsory heir. Acain vs. IAC, 155 SCRA 100 Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance. The only provisions which do not result in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes are concerned.

Nuguid vs. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 449 The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix’s parents, the forced heirs. It simply omits their names altogether. Said will rather than be labeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer from preterition. Seangio v. Reyes G.R.NO. 140371-72, Nov. 27, 2006 508 SCRA 172 The mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name was included plainly as a witness to the altercation between Segundo and his son, Alfredo. Francisco vs. Francisco-Alfonso, 354 SCRA 112 Obviously, the sale was Gregorio’s way to transfer the property to his illegitimate daughters at the expense of his legitimate daughter. The sale was executed to prevent respondent Alfonso from claiming her legitime and rightful share in said property. Capitle v. Elbambuena, 509 SCRA 444 Although estranged from Olar, respondent Fortunata remained his wife and legal heir, mere estrangement not being a legal ground for the disqualification of a surviving spouse as an heir of the deceased spouse. VEVENCIA ECHIN PABALAN, ET. AL. v. THE HEIRS OF SIMEON A.B. MAAMO, SR., G.R. No. 174844, March 20, 2013 Reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of a reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line from which the property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant. The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to the resolutory condition that such title is extinguished if the reservor predeceased the reservee. The reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable property. He may alienate it subject to the reservation. The transferee gets the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservor. The transferee’s rights are revoked upon the survival of the reservees at the time of the death of the reservor but become indefeasible when the reservees predecease the reservor. Sienes vs. Esparcia, 1 SCRA 750 The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellees was, therefore, subject to the condition that the vendees would definitely acquire ownership, by virtue of the alienation, only if the vendor died without being survived by any person entitled to the reservable property. Inasmuch much as when Andrea Gutang died, Cipriana Yaeso was still alive, the conclusion becomes inescapable that the previous sale made by the former in favor of appellants became of no legal effect and the reservable property subject matter thereof passed in exclusive ownership to Cipriana.


Gonzales vs. CFI, 104 SCRA 479 Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren the reservable properties which she had inherited from her daughter Filomena because the reservable properties did not form part of her estate (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 191). The reservor cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties as long as the reservees survived the reservor. Vizconde v. CA, 286 SCRA 217 Estrellita, it should be stressed, died ahead of Rafael, in fact, it was Rafael who inherited from Estrellita an amount more than the value of the Valenzuela property. Hence, even assuming that the Valenzuela property may be collated collation may not be allowed as the value of the Valenzuela property has long been returned to the estate of Rafael. Palacios vs Ramirez, 111 SCRA 704 The word “degree” means generation and the present code has obviously followed this interpretation by providing that the substitution shall not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted. The code thus clearly indicates that the second heir must be related to and one generation from the first heir. Crisologo vs Singzon, 49 SCRA 491 In fideicommissary substitution clearly impose an obligation upon the first heir to preserve and transmit to another the whole or part of the estate bequeathed to him, upon his death or upon the happening of a particular event. Rosales vs Rosales, 148 SCRA 69 The daughter-in-law is not an intestate heir of her spouse’s parents. There is no provision in the civil code which states that a widow is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. Delos Santos vs Dela Cruz, 37 SCRA 555 In an intestate succession, a grandniece of the deceased cannot participate in the inheritance with the surviving nieces and nephews because the existence of the latter excluded the more distant relatives. In the collateral line, the right of representation does not go beyond the children of brothers and sisters. Corpuz vs Corpuz, 85 SCRA 567 Since, Teodoro was an acknowledged natural child or was illegitimate and since Juanita was the legitimate child of Tomas, himself was a legitimate child, appellant Tomas has no cause of action to recovery of the supposed hereditary share of his daughter, Juanita as a legal heir, in Yangco’s estate. Santillon vs Mirandan, 14 SCRA 563 If there is only one legitimate child surviving with the spouse since they shall equally, one-half of the estate goes to the child and the other half goes to the surviving spouse. Although the law refers to children or descendants, the rule in the statutory construction that the plural can be understood to include the singular.

Bacayo vs Borromeo, 14 SCRA 986 A decedent’s uncle and aunt may not succeed intestate so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed. In this case, the nephews and nieces were not inheriting by right of representation because they only do so if they concur with the brothers and sisters of the decedent. Bagunu vs. Piedad, 347 SCRA 571 The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the decedent and excludes the more distant ones except when and to the extent that the right of representation can apply. In the collateral line, the right of representation may only take place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters of the decedent when such children survive with their uncles or aunts. Sayson vs. CA, 205 SCRA 321 The relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party. Corpus vs. Corpus, 85 SCRA 567 In default of natural ascendants, natural and legitimated children shall be succeeded by their natural brothers and sisters in accordance with the rules established for legitimate brothers and sisters.” Hence, Teodoro R. Yangco’s half brothers on the Corpus side, who were legitimate, had no right to succeed to his estate under the rules of intestacy. Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, 621 SCRA 142 Petitioner’s argument that the successional bar between the legitimate and illegitimate relatives of a decedent does not apply in this instance where facts indubitably demonstrate the contrary – Emilio III, an illegitimate grandchild of the decedent, was actually treated by the decedent and her husband as their own son, reared from infancy, educated and trained in their businesses, and eventually legally adopted by decedent’s husband, the original oppositor to respondent’s petition for letters of administration. Diaz vs. IAC, 150 SCRA 645 It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase “legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother” includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word “relative” includes all the kindred of the person spoken of. The record shows that from the commencement of this case the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Diaz vs. IAC, 182 SCRA 427 The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not defined by it. In accordance therefore with the canons of statutory interpretation, it should be understood to have


a general and inclusive scope, inasmuch as the term is a general one. Heirs of Uriarte vs. CA, 284 SCRA 511 A nephew is considered a collateral relative who may inherit if no descendant, ascendant, or spouse survive the decedent. That private respondent is only a half-blood relative is immaterial. Delos Santos vs Ferraris-Borromeo, 14 SCRA 986 Nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation unless concurring with the brothers or sisters of the deceased which is provided in article 975 when children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive with their uncles and aunts but if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions.

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