persuasion & authority. 2 milgram experiment subjects believe they are participants in a study...
DESCRIPTION
3 Obedience to authority In Milgram shock experiments, all teacher subjects did some shocking and 65% shocked at the maximum level (450 volts), even when thinking the learner was suffering a heart attack Experts predicted 1-2% compliance rate Effects greater When "commander" is an authority figure When "commander" is physically & psychologically close to the teacher When victim is physically & psychologically distant from the teacherTRANSCRIPT
Persuasion & Authority
2
Milgram experiment
Subjects believe they are participants in a study of effects of punishment on learning
They are asked to shock a partner (stooge) when the partner makes learning mistakes
Dependent variable is number of subjects who “go all the way”, delivering 300+ volts of electricity
Qu ickTime™ an d a decomp ressor
are needed to see th is p ictu re.Qu ickTime™ and a
decompressorare need ed to see th is p ictu re.
Qu ickTime™ and a decompressor
are n eeded to see th is p ictu re.
• Strapping the learning in
• Teacher experiences shock
• Teacher refuses
• Milgram video
3
Obedience to authorityIn Milgram shock experiments, all teacher subjects did some shocking and 65% shocked at the maximum level (450 volts), even when thinking the learner was suffering a heart attack
• Experts predicted 1-2% compliance rate
Effects greater• When "commander" is an
authority figure• When "commander" is
physically & psychologically close to the teacher
• When victim is physically & psychologically distant from the teacher
% of subjects shocking at various voltage levels
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
15 75 135
195
255
315
375
435
Voltage
Perc
ent s
till s
hock
ing
4
Compliance decreased as closeness to victim increased
Teacher's proximity to victim
0 20 40 60 80
Remote fmvictim
Voicefeedback
Same room
Touch
% stopping the experiment
• Compliance increased as closeness to authority increased
Teachers proximity to experimenter
0 50 100
Sameroom
Telephonecontact
Taperecorder
% stopping the experiment
Variations
5
• Social pressure defining the situation?• Authority & expertise?• Willing suspension of disbelief?
• Reward & punishment compliance?• Social contract & embarrassment?• Teacher's personality
• Evilness• Uncaringness
What produces this effect?
7
Latane’s Social Impact Theory
Impact of social influence attempt on an individual increases with – Number of influencers
Up to a point– Strength
Status Ability Relationship to target
– Immediacy Proximity in time Proximity in space
Modality Effectiveness
In person canvassing 1 new voter per 14 contacts=$18.67/new voter
Personal phone calls 1 new voter per 50 contacts=$45/new voter
Robo-phone calls No discernable effect=infinite cost
Direct mail 1 new voter per 200 contacts=$100/new voter
Email No discernable effect=infinite cost
• Effectiveness of Get Out the Vote Techniques
8
Challenger Disaster, 1985 Video Jan 28, 1986, Space Shuttle
Challenger takes off from Kennedy Space Center
Explodes 73 seconds after take-off
Dead: – Francis R. (Dick) Scobee, pilot
Michael J. Smith; specialists Judith A. Resnik, Ronald E. McNair and Ellison S. Onizuka; payload specialist Gregory B. Jarvis, a Hughes Aircraft Corp. employee.
Resnick, BS in EE, CMU 1970.
10
Background
O-rings seal sections of booster rocket
Morton Thiokol had evidence since Jan, 1985 of damage to O-rings (Flight 51E)
11
Memo Excerpt
"Subject: SRM O-Ring Erosion/Potential Failure Criticality. This letter is written to insure that management is fully aware of the seriousness of the current O-ring erosion problem in the SRM joints from an engineering standpoint. The mistakenly accepted position on the joint problem was to fly without fear of failure and to run a series of design evaluations which would ultimately lead to a solution or at least a significant reduction of the erosion problem. This position is now drastically changed as a result of the SRM 16A nozzle joint erosion which eroded a secondary O-ring with the primary O-ring never sealing."
"If the same scenario should occur in a field joint (and it could), then it is a jump ball as to the success or failure of the joint because the secondary O-ring cannot respond to the clevis opening rate and may not be capable of pressurization. The result would be a catastrophe of the highest order---of of human life."
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Damage to O-rings & link to cold weather noted by March, 1985
No problems at 100F, loss of seal for 2.4 sec at 75oF & for 10 sec at 50oF
7/1/1985 , M-T provides results of weather tests to NASA
7/31/1985 , M-T engineer writes memo to VP of Engineering
“Management at Thiokol and NASA shows no interest in planning a design change”
13
Dramatization of final teleconference, night before launch Weather on launch day
predicted to be 18oF Two teleconferences
btw Kennedy Space Center, Marshal Space Flight Center & Morton Thiokol to determine whether to lauch
Video
• Roger Boisjoly• M-T Engineer reporting failures
14
Discussion
Why did this decision happen?– ...failures in communication... resulted in a
decision to launch 51-L based on incomplete and sometimes misleading information, a conflict between engineering data and management judgments, and a NASA management structure that permitted internal flight safety problems to bypass key Shuttle managers (Rodgers Commission)
What should the engineers have done?