peru seeing is believing (3)

Upload: marco-antonio-vega

Post on 06-Apr-2018

218 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

  • 8/2/2019 Peru Seeing is Believing (3)

    1/8

    EMERGING MARKETS RESEARCH 8 March 20

    PLEASE SEE ANALYST CERTIFICATIONS AND IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES STARTING AFTER PAGE 5

    PERU

    Seeing is believing

    Even though President Humalas popularity has recovered after the intensificationof social conflicts at the end of last year, businesses seem to remain incredulous

    about the governments capacity to face the countrys challenges.

    Business confidence has remained relatively low despite some recovery in recentmonths, which continues to limit investment growth. Attention is concentrated

    on the future of the mining project Conga. Businesses are waiting for the final

    outcome of this case as a signal of the business environments outlook.

    Despite the political risk we perceive and the economic implications it mighthave, the countrys fundamentals remain strong. Even though we expect an

    acceleration of public expenditures, we still think the public sector will register

    surpluses in the next two years.

    We maintain a neutral position in our credit portfolio for Peru. The spreads are tightcompared with other low betas in the region, and the balance of risk is skewed

    negatively: spreads could underperform if social conflicts escalate, but their

    outperformance is likely to be limited if the situation remains unchanged.

    Is Humala gaining governability?

    In Growth threatened by social conflicts, The Emerging Markets Quarterly, December

    6, 2011, in the context of increased protest surrounding key mining projects, we

    highlighted the risk of a negative effect on economic activity from an increase in the

    number of conflicts. Since then, President Humalas popularity has recovered, which

    could be interpreted as a gain in governability after the crisis created by the paralyzation

    of the mining project Conga, which led to a reshuffling of the cabinet at the end of last

    year. Nonetheless, the number of social conflicts has been increasing, which suggests

    to us that the risks remain latent there, while the government still seems to face the

    task of proving its ability to deal with the countrys challenges.

    Seven months after his inauguration, Humalas popularity remains relatively high by

    Peruvian standards. Compared with an Ipsos-Apoyo August poll conducted after his

    inauguration, his approval rating has gained 4pp, reaching 59% and exceeding the level

    that his predecessors Alan Garcia and Alejandro Toledo had at the same stage of their

    administrations by 9pp and 31pp, respectively (Figure 1). Nonetheless, when analyzing his

    performance by socioeconomic strata, we can see that the increase is partly explained by

    a rise among the higher income population, from which Humala reaches a 75% approval;

    meanwhile, he has registered a 7pp decline in the lowest income population, which was

    his original political base. The persistence of this trend could certainly weaken the political

    support of the government and create some governability problems. However, despite

    this decline, Humalas leadership still seems considerably strong, enjoying an approval

    Alejandro Arreaza

    +1 212 412 3021

    [email protected]

    Alejandro Grisanti

    +1 212 412 5982

    [email protected]

    Donato Guarino

    +1 212 412 5564

    [email protected]

    www.barcap.com

    https://live.barcap.com/go/publications/content?contentPubID=FC1772130https://live.barcap.com/go/publications/content?contentPubID=FC1772130
  • 8/2/2019 Peru Seeing is Believing (3)

    2/8

    Barclays Capital | Peru: Seeing is believing

    8 March 2012 2

    rating above 55% in all segments of the population. Moreover, given the First Lady Nadine

    Heredias high popularity and influence in government decisions, markets should considerher and her eventual successor, while we think the possibility of a constitutional reform to

    introduce reelection (a fear that rose during the electoral campaign) has decreased.

    The risks ahead come from the persistence of structural factors, such as weak institutions

    and the lack of a state presence in certain regions of the country, which could tend to

    undermine governability. For instance, given the existence of rising rents from mineral

    extraction, voters who gave Humala a mandate to increase redistribution are likely to

    intensify their demand and, eventually, if not satisfied, withdraw their political support. In

    such circumstances, threatened by already visible frictions inside his government coalition,

    a return to the populist road could still be a temptation. Time will tell, but this is something

    that market participants should be aware of when considering Perus credit profile, in our

    view, especially taking into account its high valuation.

    Weak confidence breaks investment

    Despite President Humalas high approval rating, it has not been possible for the

    government to totally recover business confidence, which has led to the persistent

    deceleration trend in economic activity (Figure 3), given a slower contribution of investment

    to growth. GDP growth fell from 7.8% in H1 11 to 6.1% in H2, and we expect this trend to

    continue in 2012, estimating a growth of 5.8% mainly supported by persistently strong

    consumption and a rebound of public expenditures. Certainly, this GDP growth continues to

    be relatively high; however, unless there is a recovery in investment, a lower capital

    accumulation could reduce potential growth. This could also weaken job creation, which

    could undermine the strong consumer confidence that is supporting consumption growth.

    In this context, the future of the mining project Conga has more importance than a USD6.9bn

    investment over the next four years. Businesses are waiting for the final outcome of this case

    as a signal of the business environments outlook. That means that weak investment

    confidence could affect economic activity for most of the year, considering that, in the past, a

    recovery in economic activity after a decline in confidence has had a lag of three to five

    months. The projects environmental impact is being reassessed by international experts.

    However, beyond the technical arguments about the projects viability, the situation has

    become increasingly politicized, which heightens the possibility that the involved parties will

    hold their views and just use parts of the experts assessments that support their positions.

    Figure 1: Humalas popularity vs his predecessors (%) Figure 2: Increasing number of social conflicts

    25

    30

    35

    40

    4550

    55

    60

    65

    70

    1 2 3 4 5 6 7

    Humala Garcia Toledo

    210

    215

    220

    225

    230235

    240

    245

    250

    255

    Jul-10 Oct-10 Jan-11 Apr-11 Jul-11 Oct-11 Jan-12

    Social conflicts

    Source: Ipsos-Apoyo Source: Peruvian Ombudsman

    In a scenario in which

    Humala could lose political

    support, a return to the populist

    road could still be a temptation

    Business confidence

    has remained relatively low,

    which continues to limit

    investment growth

    Social conflict is not

    unfamiliar in Peru; however, as

    the stakes increase, conflicts

    tend to intensify, deteriorating

    the business environment

  • 8/2/2019 Peru Seeing is Believing (3)

    3/8

    Barclays Capital | Peru: Seeing is believing

    8 March 2012 3

    Assuming that the government holds the position taken by President Humala that Conga

    should be carried on, the project might move forward, but conflicts are likely to continue too.Certainly, social conflict is not unfamiliar in Peru; however, as the stake increases, the risk is

    that the conflicts tend to intensify, deteriorating the business environment.

    Above all, fundamentals remain strong

    Despite the political risk we perceive and the economic implications it might have, the

    countrys fundamentals remain strong. The rapid increase in government revenues due to

    still relatively high growth and favorable commodities prices, as well as expenditures cut

    due to the withdrawal of the fiscal stimulus implemented after the 2008 crisis, has led to a

    significant improvement in the fiscal balance. Last year, the public sector registered a

    surplus of 1.8% of GDP. Even though we expect an acceleration of public expenditures that

    would deteriorate the fiscal balance, we still expect it to register surpluses in the next two

    years (1.0% and 0.6% of GDP in 2012 and 2013, respectively). This, coupled with the

    growth outlook, is expected to hold the decline to around the 20% of GDP level.

    There has also been an improvement on the external front, with the current account deficit

    declining from 1.7% in 2010 to 1.3% in 2011. This improvement was also supported by the

    better-than-expected performance of non-traditional exports. Given a moderation in mineral

    prices, we expect a deterioration in the current account balance and estimate a deficit of 2.0%

    of GDP in 2012; however, this is more than compensated for by the FDI flow. To mitigate the

    appreciation pressures, the BCRP has maintained a strong FX intervention. In the first two

    months of the year, it already purchased USD3.7bn, with an average of USD85mn per day, six

    times the average in the same year-ago period. We expect this intervention to be reduced in

    the coming months; however, we think the reserve position will likely keep growing andexceed USD56bn by the end of the year, approaching 30% of GDP, which will leave the

    country in a strong position in case of an eventual lower capital inflow.

    In terms of inflation, as growth slows, we expect a progressive moderation in prices during

    the year to return it to the target range. However, strong consumption has allowed

    producers to transfer higher costs to the consumer despite slower demand growth, and

    higher energy and food prices could be a risk ahead. Therefore, even if the economy is

    decelerating, we do not expect monetary stimulus as long as inflation remains above the

    upper bound of the target and GDP remains close to potential. We still expect the BCRP to

    Figure 3: Weak business confidence undermines growth Figure 4: Still strong fundamentals (% GDP)

    30

    35

    40

    45

    5055

    60

    65

    70

    75

    Aug-07 Apr-08 Dec-08 Aug-09 Apr-10 Dec-10 Aug-11

    -4

    -2

    0

    2

    46

    8

    10

    12

    14

    Industrial Confidence GDP

    15.0

    17.0

    19.0

    21.0

    23.0

    25.027.0

    29.0

    31.0

    33.0

    35.0

    2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012F 2013F

    (2.0)

    (1.5)

    (1.0)

    (0.5)

    0.0

    0.51.0

    1.5

    2.0

    2.5

    3.0

    Fiscal balance (RHS) Public debt

    Source: INEI, Barclays Capital Source: INEI, Barclays Capital

    Public sector is

    expected to register surpluses in

    the next two years and keep

    reducing indebtedness level

    Monetary stimulus is

    not expected as long as inflation

    remains above the upper bound

    of the target and GDP remains

    close to potential

  • 8/2/2019 Peru Seeing is Believing (3)

    4/8

    Barclays Capital | Peru: Seeing is believing

    8 March 2012 4

    keep the monetary policy rate unchanged during the year and rely more on the fiscal

    stimulus to contain further deceleration of the economy. As long as the cause of the growth

    moderation is a confidence shock, an interest rate cut might not be effective enough to

    stimulate investment and reaccelerate growth.

    Strategy: Balance of risks not favorable; we remain neutral

    We maintain a neutral position in our credit portfolio for Peru. Despite strong fundamentals,

    price action has been dominated by political risks well before the election. Indeed, while

    debt metrics have been enviable, Peru's bonds volatility has increased considerably over the

    past year compared with other low-beta credits at first because of the political

    uncertainty of the Humala administration and more recently due to the intensification of the

    social conflicts.

    While we do not think the current conflicts pose a threat to the ability to repay USD debt,

    they may increase the risk premium, which could negatively affect performance. Hence,

    since Perus long-end bonds are trading only 20-25bp wider than other Latin American low-

    beta credits (Brazil in particular), we think this is fair to marginally expensive and remain

    neutral while awaiting further developments. In our view, the balance of risk is skewed

    negatively: spreads could underperform if social conflicts escalate, but outperformance is

    likely to be limited if the situation remains unchanged.

    On the bond curve, in line with our sovereign credit strategy, we recommend extending

    exposure to the long end of the curve, which remains steep by historical standards because

    of the recent supply. Indeed, new supply is unlikely, in our view, because Peru just re-tapped

    the PE50s for more than USD500mn. Furthermore, the long-end spread remains attractive,

    especially in a supportive global environment that we consider our base-case scenario for

    the next quarter. Finally, we are not overly concerned about US Treasury movements, which

    should remain range-bound; hence, they should not be a risk for spreads. Our favorite picks

    are the PE33s and PE50s.

    The balance of risk is

    skewed negatively: spreads

    could underperform if social

    conflicts escalate

    Figure 5: Perus premium to Brazil is marginally higher thanpre-election crises levels

    Figure 6: PE33s and PE50s still the cheapest bonds on thecurve

    -20

    -10

    0

    10

    20

    3040

    50

    60

    70

    80

    90

    Jan 10 Jul 10 Jan 11 Jul 11 Jan 12

    Peru 37s - Brazil 41s Average

    PE 16 PE 19

    PE 25

    PE 33PE 37

    PE 50

    80

    100

    120

    140

    160

    180

    200

    220

    240

    2.00 4.00 6.00 8.00 10.00

    Duration

    Spread (bp)

    Source: Barclays Capital Source: Barclays Capital

  • 8/2/2019 Peru Seeing is Believing (3)

    5/8

    Barclays Capital | Peru: Seeing is believing

    8 March 2012 5

    Figure 7: Peru: Macroeconomic Forecasts

    2008 2009 2010 2011 2012F 2013F

    Activity

    Real GDP (% y/y) 9.8 0.9 8.8 6.9 5.8 6.0

    Private Consumption (% y/y) 8.7 2.4 6.4 6.3 6.3 5.8

    Private Fixed Capital Investment (% y/y) 25.9 -15.1 22.1 11.7 7.5 8.0Exports (% y/y) 8.2 -3.2 1.3 8.8 6.8 6.2

    Imports (% y/y) 20.1 -18.6 24.0 9.8 7.7 8.7

    GDP (USD bn) 127.4 126.8 155.2 176.4 196.1 216.0

    External Sector

    Current Account (USD bn) -5.3 0.2 -2.6 -2.3 -3.8 -4.1

    CA (% GDP) -4.2 0.2 -1.7 -1.3 -2.0 -1.9

    Trade Balance (USD bn) 2.6 6.0 6.8 9.3 8.9 6.9

    Net FDI (USD bn) 6.2 5.2 7.1 7.5 7.9 8.3

    Gross External Debt (USD bn) 34.8 35.7 40.5 43.2 46.5 49.5

    International Reserves (USD bn) 31.2 33.2 44.1 48.8 56.7 62.9

    Public SectorPublic Sector Balance (% GDP) 2.3 -1.6 -0.5 1.8 1.0 0.6

    Primary Balance (% GDP) 3.7 -0.3 0.6 2.9 2.1 1.6

    Gross Public Debt (% GDP) 24.0 27.2 23.2 21.7 20.1 18.7

    Prices

    CPI (% Dec/Dec) 6.7 0.3 2.3 4.7 2.9 2.3

    FX (PEN per USD, eop) 3.14 2.88 2.80 2.73 2.64 2.65

    1yr Ago Last 12Q2F 12Q3F 12Q4F 13Q1F

    Real GDP (y/y) 8.8 5.7 5.5 5.8 6.3 6.0

    CPI (% y/y, eop) 2.66 3.85 3.84 3.13 2.90 3.09

    Exchange Rate (PEN per USD, eop) 2.80 2.67 2.66 2.65 2.64 2.64

    Monetary Policy Benchmark Rate (%, eop) 3.75 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25Source: BCRP, INE, Haver, Barclays Capital

  • 8/2/2019 Peru Seeing is Believing (3)

    6/8

    Analyst Certification(s)We, Alejandro Arreaza, Alejandro Grisanti and Donato Guarino, hereby certify (1) that the views expressed in this research report accurately reflect ourpersonal views about any or all of the subject securities or issuers referred to in this research report and (2) no part of our compensation was, is or will bedirectly or indirectly related to the specific recommendations or views expressed in this research report.

    Important DisclosuresFor current important disclosures regarding companies that are the subject of this research report, please send a written request to: Barclays Capital ResearchCompliance, 745 Seventh Avenue, 17th Floor, New York, NY 10019 or refer to http://publicresearch.barcap.com or call 212-526-1072.Barclays Capital does and seeks to do business with companies covered in its research reports. As a result, investors should be aware that Barclays Capital

    may have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this report. Any reference to Barclays Capital includes its affiliates. Barclays Capital and/or anaffiliate thereof (the "firm") regularly trades, generally deals as principal and generally provides liquidity (as market maker or otherwise) in the debt securitiesthat are the subject of this research report (and related derivatives thereof). The firm's proprietary trading accounts may have either a long and / or shortposition in such securities and / or derivative instruments, which may pose a conflict with the interests of investing customers. Where permitted and subjectto appropriate information barrier restrictions, the firm's fixed income research analysts regularly interact with its trading desk personnel to determine currentprices of fixed income securities. The firm's fixed income research analyst(s) receive compensation based on various factors including, but not limited to, thequality of their work, the overall performance of the firm (including the profitability of the investment banking department), the profitability and revenues ofthe Fixed Income Division and the outstanding principal amount and trading value of, the profitability of, and the potential interest of the firms investingclients in research with respect to, the asset class covered by the analyst. To the extent that any historical pricing information was obtained from BarclaysCapital trading desks, the firm makes no representation that it is accurate or complete. All levels, prices and spreads are historical and do not representcurrent market levels, prices or spreads, some or all of which may have changed since the publication of this document. Barclays Capital produces a variety ofresearch products including, but not limited to, fundamental analysis, equity-linked analysis, quantitative analysis, and trade ideas. Recommendationscontained in one type of research product may differ from recommendations contained in other types of research products, whether as a result of differingtime horizons, methodologies, or otherwise. In order to access Barclays Capital's Statement regarding Research Dissemination Policies and Procedures, pleaserefer to https://live.barcap.com/publiccp/RSR/nyfipubs/disclaimer/disclaimer-research-dissemination.html.

    DisclaimerThis publication has been prepared by Barclays Capital, the investment banking division of Barclays Bank PLC, and/or one or more of its affiliates as providedbelow. It is provided to our clients for information purposes only, and Barclays Capital makes no express or implied warranties, and expressly disclaims allwarranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose or use with respect to any data included in this publication. Barclays Capital will not treatunauthorized recipients of this report as its clients. Prices shown are indicative and Barclays Capital is not offering to buy or sell or soliciting offers to buy orsell any financial instrument. Without limiting any of the foregoing and to the extent permitted by law, in no event shall Barclays Capital, nor any affiliate, norany of their respective officers, directors, partners, or employees have any liability for (a) any special, punitive, indirect, or consequential damages; or (b) anylost profits, lost revenue, loss of anticipated savings or loss of opportunity or other financial loss, even if notified of the possibility of such damages, arisingfrom any use of this publication or its contents. Other than disclosures relating to Barclays Capital, the information contained in this publication has beenobtained from sources that Barclays Capital believes to be reliable, but Barclays Capital does not represent or warrant that it is accurate or complete. Theviews in this publication are those of Barclays Capital and are subject to change, and Barclays Capital has no obligation to update its opinions or theinformation in this publication.The analyst recommendations in this publication reflect solely and exclusively those of the author(s), and such opinions were prepared independently of anyother interests, including those of Barclays Capital and/or its affiliates. This publication does not constitute personal investment advice or take into accountthe individual financial circumstances or objectives of the clients who receive it. The securities discussed herein may not be suitable for all investors. BarclaysCapital recommends that investors independently evaluate each issuer, security or instrument discussed herein and consult any independent advisors theybelieve necessary. The value of and income from any investment may fluctuate from day to day as a result of changes in relevant economic markets(including changes in market liquidity). The information herein is not intended to predict actual results, which may differ substantially from those reflected.Past performance is not necessarily indicative of future results.This communication is being made available in the UK and Europe primarily to persons who are investment professionals as that term is defined in Article 19of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Financial Promotion Order) 2005. It is directed at, and therefore should only be relied upon by, persons whohave professional experience in matters relating to investments. The investments to which it relates are available only to such persons and will be entered intoonly with such persons. Barclays Capital is authorized and regulated by the Financial Services Authority ('FSA') and member of the London Stock Exchange.Barclays Capital Inc., U.S. registered broker/dealer and member of FINRA (www.finra.org), is distributing this material in the United States and, in connectiontherewith accepts responsibility for its contents. Any U.S. person wishing to effect a transaction in any security discussed herein should do so only bycontacting a representative of Barclays Capital Inc. in the U.S. at 745 Seventh Avenue, New York, New York 10019. Non-U.S. persons should contact andexecute transactions through a Barclays Bank PLC branch or affiliate in their home jurisdiction unless local regulations permit otherwise. Barclays Bank PLC,Paris Branch (registered in France under Paris RCS number 381 066 281) is regulated by the Autorit des marchs financiers and the Autorit de contrle

    prudentiel. Registered office 34/36 Avenue de Friedland 75008 Paris. This material is distributed in Canada by Barclays Capital Canada Inc., a registeredinvestment dealer and member of IIROC (www.iiroc.ca). Subject to the conditions of this publication as set out above, Absa Capital, the Investment BankingDivision of Absa Bank Limited, an authorised financial services provider (Registration No.: 1986/004794/06), is distributing this material in South Africa. AbsaBank Limited is regulated by the South African Reserve Bank. This publication is not, nor is it intended to be, advice as defined and/or contemplated in the(South African) Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act, 37 of 2002, or any other financial, investment, trading, tax, legal, accounting, retirement,actuarial or other professional advice or service whatsoever. Any South African person or entity wishing to effect a transaction in any security discussedherein should do so only by contacting a representative of Absa Capital in South Africa, 15 Alice Lane, Sandton, Johannesburg, Gauteng 2196. Absa Capital isan affiliate of Barclays Capital. In Japan, foreign exchange research reports are prepared and distributed by Barclays Bank PLC Tokyo Branch. Other researchreports are distributed to institutional investors in Japan by Barclays Capital Japan Limited. Barclays Capital Japan Limited is a joint-stock companyincorporated in Japan with registered office of 6-10-1 Roppongi, Minato-ku, Tokyo 106-6131, Japan. It is a subsidiary of Barclays Bank PLC and a registeredfinancial instruments firm regulated by the Financial Services Agency of Japan. Registered Number: Kanto Zaimukyokucho (kinsho) No. 143. Barclays BankPLC, Hong Kong Branch is distributing this material in Hong Kong as an authorised institution regulated by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. RegisteredOffice: 41/F, Cheung Kong Center, 2 Queen's Road Central, Hong Kong. This material is issued in Taiwan by Barclays Capital Securities Taiwan Limited. This

  • 8/2/2019 Peru Seeing is Believing (3)

    7/8

    material on securities not traded in Taiwan is not to be construed as 'recommendation' in Taiwan. Barclays Capital Securities Taiwan Limited does not acceptorders from clients to trade in such securities. This material may not be distributed to the public media or used by the public media without prior writtenconsent of Barclays Capital. This material is distributed in South Korea by Barclays Capital Securities Limited, Seoul Branch. All equity research material isdistributed in India by Barclays Securities (India) Private Limited (SEBI Registration No: INB/INF 231292732 (NSE), INB/INF 011292738 (BSE), RegisteredOffice: 208 | Ceejay House | Dr. Annie Besant Road | Shivsagar Estate | Worli | Mumbai - 400 018 | India, Phone: + 91 22 67196363). Other research reports aredistributed in India by Barclays Bank PLC, India Branch. Barclays Bank PLC Frankfurt Branch distributes this material in Germany under the supervision ofBundesanstalt fr Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin). This material is distributed in Malaysia by Barclays Capital Markets Malaysia Sdn Bhd. This material isdistributed in Brazil by Banco Barclays S.A. This material is distributed in Mexico by Barclays Bank Mexico, S.A. Barclays Bank PLC in the Dubai InternationalFinancial Centre (Registered No. 0060) is regulated by the Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA). Principal place of business in the Dubai International

    Financial Centre: The Gate Village, Building 4, Level 4, PO Box 506504, Dubai, United Arab Emirates. Barclays Bank PLC-DIFC Branch, may only undertake thefinancial services activities that fall within the scope of its existing DFSA licence. Related financial products or services are only available to ProfessionalClients, as defined by the Dubai Financial Services Authority. Barclays Bank PLC in the UAE is regulated by the Central Bank of the UAE and is licensed toconduct business activities as a branch of a commercial bank incorporated outside the UAE in Dubai (Licence No.: 13/1844/2008, Registered Office: BuildingNo. 6, Burj Dubai Business Hub, Sheikh Zayed Road, Dubai City) and Abu Dhabi (Licence No.: 13/952/2008, Registered Office: Al Jazira Towers, HamdanStreet, PO Box 2734, Abu Dhabi). Barclays Bank PLC in the Qatar Financial Centre (Registered No. 00018) is authorised by the Qatar Financial CentreRegulatory Authority (QFCRA). Barclays Bank PLC-QFC Branch may only undertake the regulated activities that fall within the scope of its existing QFCRAlicence. Principal place of business in Qatar: Qatar Financial Centre, Office 1002, 10th Floor, QFC Tower, Diplomatic Area, West Bay, PO Box 15891, Doha,Qatar. Related financial products or services are only available to Business Customers as defined by the Qatar Financial Centre Regulatory Authority. Thismaterial is distributed in the UAE (including the Dubai International Financial Centre) and Qatar by Barclays Bank PLC. This material is distributed in SaudiArabia by Barclays Saudi Arabia ('BSA'). It is not the intention of the Publication to be used or deemed as recommendation, option or advice for any action (s)that may take place in future. Barclays Saudi Arabia is a Closed Joint Stock Company, (CMA License No. 09141-37). Registered office Al Faisaliah Tower, Level18, Riyadh 11311, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Authorised and regulated by the Capital Market Authority, Commercial Registration Number: 1010283024. Thismaterial is distributed in Russia by OOO Barclays Capital, affiliated company of Barclays Bank PLC, registered and regulated in Russia by the FSFM. BrokerLicense #177-11850-100000; Dealer License #177-11855-010000. Registered address in Russia: 125047 Moscow, 1st Tverskaya-Yamskaya str. 21. Thismaterial is distributed in Singapore by the Singapore branch of Barclays Bank PLC, a bank licensed in Singapore by the Monetary Authority of Singapore. For

    matters in connection with this report, recipients in Singapore may contact the Singapore branch of Barclays Bank PLC, whose registered address is OneRaffles Quay Level 28, South Tower, Singapore 048583. Barclays Bank PLC, Australia Branch (ARBN 062 449 585, AFSL 246617) is distributing this materialin Australia. It is directed at 'wholesale clients' as defined by Australian Corporations Act 2001.IRS Circular 230 Prepared Materials Disclaimer: Barclays Capital and its affiliates do not provide tax advice and nothing contained herein should be construedto be tax advice. Please be advised that any discussion of U.S. tax matters contained herein (including any attachments) (i) is not intended or written to beused, and cannot be used, by you for the purpose of avoiding U.S. tax-related penalties; and (ii) was written to support the promotion or marketing of thetransactions or other matters addressed herein. Accordingly, you should seek advice based on your particular circumstances from an independent taxadvisor.Barclays Capital is not responsible for, and makes no warranties whatsoever as to, the content of any third-party web site accessed via a hyperlink in thispublication and such information is not incorporated by reference. Copyright Barclays Bank PLC (2012). All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any manner without the prior written permissionof Barclays Capital or any of its affiliates. Barclays Bank PLC is registered in England No. 1026167. Registered office 1 Churchill Place, London, E14 5HP.Additional information regarding this publication will be furnished upon request.

  • 8/2/2019 Peru Seeing is Believing (3)

    8/8

    US20911