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The Cosmological System of Pierre BayleAuthor(s): Juliette Carnus

Reviewed work(s):Source: Philosophy of Science, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Oct., 1941), pp. 585-597Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/184517 .

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T h e Cosmological S y s t e m o f

P i e r r e B a y l eBY

JULIETTE CARNUS

HE philosopher whose work best represents the

type of thought and expresses the aspirationsof the French writers of the eighteenth centuryis, beyond any doubt, Pierre Bayle (I647-I706).Not so well known as many of the others, it was

he, nevertheless, who started the dialectic move-

ment of philosophic thought which was very characteristic of

that era. Furthermore, in his extensive writings, he accumulatedmaterial from which his successors could draw freely and

copiously.It is the controversial and critical works of Bayle in particular

which his commentators have made known to posterity; his work

of criticism is vast. There is, however, a positive phase of his

writings which has not been adequately expounded (or which has,to some extent, escaped the attention of philosophers), and I have

taken the positive philosophy of Pierre Bayle as the topic of thispaper. Bayle did not formulate a connected and coherent systemof ideas; he merely disseminated throughout his books, especiallyin his Dictionnaire Historique et Critique (I720), ideas which have

to be gathered from a mass of details, observations, and systemsof thought, which are apparently self-contradictory. But his

positive views, when put together connectedly, present an in-

teresting cosmological system for they exhibit a mind operatingat its apogee, the motives which animated it during its struggle

585



586 Cosmological System of P. Bayle

against the despotism of tradition and the use of a scientific

method that was more and more comprehensive of the aspects

of reality.Bayle had had the opportunity to analyze the pros and cons

of the various religious sects which were struggling against each

other at this period of history. He was the son of a Protestant

minister and was, naturally, brought up in his father's religion;he became converted to Catholicism, but later reverted to the

faith of his childhood. Persecuted and forced to resign his posi-tion as professor of philosophy at the University of Sedan, he

fled to Holland. During his exile here, at Rotterdam, he

par-ticipated in the fights occurring between Protestants and

Catholics. He lost his faith but he did not withdraw from the

fray. By comparing the arguments advanced by the different

religious sects, he ascertained that these controversies and dis-

agreements were not the result of unchallengeable reasons but

that, most frequently, they could be traced to motives which

were human and capricious. Of a dispute between two parties,

Bayle stated that it seemed to him "that it made no material

difference which side you chose to take; that both arguments arejustified by Holy Writ." 1

Thus he came to associate the idea of religion, no matter which

particular creed it might be, with that of intolerance. He looked

upon religion as an aberration of human thought and thence he

proceeded to the study of religions as well as the philosophieswhich supported these religions so as to discover the cause of this

intellectual vice. It was not mere curiosity which prompted him

to this investigation; he was desirous of setting thought right;he himself had been subjected to many annoyances which had

shown him how absurd intolerance was. He believed that he

perceived in reason the very cause of the countless contradictions

which he had observed in the various religious sects because reason

lays down a priori postulates, dominates inexorably the realm of

speculative thought and disregards the data of experience. Now

it was from the standpoint of experience that Bayle proceeded

1(Euvresdiverses, I737 (4 vol.), vol. I, "Lettre a son pere," 21 Septembre, 1671 (p. lob).



J. Carnus 587

to criticize the postulates of reason, the bases of theological and

metaphysical dogmas. Thus he came to consider religious contro-

versies merely as intellectual pastimes of unparalleled futility.If the mind is here triumphant, the triumph so obtained has no

significance apart from the satisfaction thus derived and experi-enced by the mind. But the dogmas founded on speculationassume the right of directing the mind and of influencing the will.

Now the will lies outside their jurisdiction; and this is what

Bayle undertakes to prove. Man's actions are not motivated byhis philosophic or theological ideas; the theatre of human be-

havior is the world we livein,

the world of facts and it isaltogetherdifferent from the world of speculative thought and from the

domain of the absolute where reason reigns. "The real motive

of our actions has so little foundation in the speculative judgmentswhich we form about the nature of things that nothing is more

commonplace than to see orthodox Christians who live bad lives

and free thinkers who lead good ones." 2

In comparing the various philosophic systems, Bayle notices

that some of them (which he designates as the "dogmatic") ac-

cept only the rational verities and reject the data of experiencewhile the others, "the sceptics," reject the rational verities and

limit themselves to empirical knowledge. Therefore the criterion

of truth, which is evidence, can be found in reason or in experience.

Bayle will give its due to both reason and experience, but for him

reason is not absolute but relative. Ideas derived from reason

in order to be true must be capable of being verified by our ex-

perience.

"Such, for example, are the propositions that the whole isgreater than the part. If you take away two equal parts from

two equal quantities, what remains will be equal. Two and two

make four. These axioms have the advantage not only of being

very clear in our minds but they also come within the range of our

senses. Our daily experiences confirm them; consequently, it

would be unnecessary to try to prove them. The same is not

true of those propositions which lie beyond the range of our

2Dictionnaire historique et critique, 1734 (5 vol.). Arc6silas, Dictionnaire, t. I,

p. 420b.




senses or which can be refuted by other propositions; such propo-sitions need to be discussed and proved." 3

Among these latter are to be found all the propositions ofspeculative reason, on which are based theology and dogmatic

philosophy. A clearly evident proposition can be refuted byanother just as evident; whereas facts offer irrefutable proof of

their existence. At this conjuncture we perceive the idea of a

scientific method developed in the mind of Bayle which was to be

reinforced, not particularly in the eighteenth century which was

too absorbed in logical and mathematicalclarity but subsequently,

and which was recognized and appreciated before the advance-ment of scientific knowledge made it possible to establish its

importance. History is the science which reveals the facts of

life better than any other branch of learning and we must go to

history, asserts Bayle, if we desire to discover truth. He com-

pares historic certitude with mathematical certitude,-which

was, at that time, regarded as all-important; and he concludes

that the former is superior to the latter. He says: "I maintain

that the truths of history can attain to a degree of certitude more

incontestable than that which can be attained by the geometrictruths; be it understood, of course, that we weigh these two kinds

of verities according to the degree of certitude peculiar to each

of them." 4

One encounters contradiction as soon as one states propositionssuch as: "Bodies have a distinct space; bodies do not have a

distinct space." One of these maxims cannot be true unless it is

absolutely and immutably true and uncontradictable. Conse-

quently there is either in the first or in the second proposition anecessary truth or an impossible falsehood. Each of these

propositions, however, is supported by such strong proofs, or

rather, refuted by so many overwhelming and inextricable objec-tions that it is very difficult to decide whether we find the argu-ments advanced in favor of the true more convincing than those

advanced in favor of the false." 5

S. v., Maldonat, Dictionnaire, v., 79n.4

"Dissertation a du Rondel," Dictionnaire, t. V, p. 711.6Commentairephilosophique, 0., xi, I9.



J. Carnus 589

Evidence is not a perfectly clear notion, such as Descartes

believed it to be. "Everyone knows, or ought to know, that

evidence is a relative quality."6

History shows that metaphysical systems, just as religiousdoctrines, vary according to the country, the people and the

epoch. "I admit to you," he says, "that I hardly ever read

history for the sake of learning about past events but only to find

out what was said in the different countries and by different per-sons about what was going on." 7

Bayle strives to disassociate from the notions the a priori

part

which

theycontain and to

exposethe contradictions therein

discovered. He experiences, first of all, a neophyte's joy; but

this joy soon becomes purely intellectual curiosity. In particular,he analyzes very thoroughly the notions on which dogmas are

based, likewise the philosophic systems which substantiate the

dogmas, that of Descartes, for instance, and especially that of

Spinoza. Whatever cannot be corroborated by experience is

discarded as unreal and untrue. At the same time Bayle retains

from these philosophies whatever has the mark of truth and which

will help him to construct his cosmological system. His system,consequently, represents an eclectism of philosophic thought at

the beginning of the eighteenth century. Bayle offers it not asa system of absolute and immutable truths but rather as an

hypothesis which seems to him to be the best and the one most

capable of explaining reality in its total compass. Again, we

have proof of his feeling for a genuine scientific method which

reveals to him that the truths we believe we have discovered are

simply points of view taken from reality and which are destinedto be superseded by the progress of knowledge and philosophy.If the Cartesian notion of clear and distinct evidence is not the

one that Bayle adopts, he nevertheless realizes that Descartes

knew how to fix clearly the limits of the domain of the mind and

the body. It is Cartesian physics that he prefers, but he holdsthat extension is not a notion which has more importance than

any other of the qualities that we discover by experience and this

6Ibid., p.396.7"Critique gen6rale de l'histoire du Calvinisme," CEuvres ivseses, I , Io6.




made him hesitate to consider extension as a substance and he

accepts the atomistic theory, of which the works of Gassendi had

made him see the advantages. The void, however, is an incom-prehensible and therefore inadmissible idea; but, apart from that,the atomistic theory is the best fitted to account for phenomenathat we observe in our daily life. Bayle repudiates the substance

One of Spinoza for it is contrary to our experience and what we

understand by the notion of perfection or God; indeed, our ob-

servation shows us that "extension is composed of parts actually

separate and distinct one from the other."8

Extension, therefore, is acomposite entity;

moreover "how can

one imagine that an independent nature, which exists per se and

which possesses infinite perfections to be subjected to all the mis-

fortunes of the human species."9Such, for example, as are to be seen in the destruction and

decomposition of matter. Neither can Extension be a mode be-

cause we should have no way of knowing what substance is.

And Bayle prefers Descartes' point of view because the latter

considers extension as an essential element of substance. How-

ever neither the Cartesian mechanism nor the atomism ofDemocritus could account adequately for phenomena.

But causes must not be multiplied unnecessarily, and, although

Bayle takes care to see only facts, he also is dominated by an

idea, which is that knowledge is one, that everything in the uni-

verse is connected, and that a single principle must be sufficient

to explain all phenomena. It is an exigency of the analyticalmethod which influences at the same time his conception of the

world. There must be one single substance if we are to haveunity of knowledge. Now thought seems to be a real substance

and extension as well, especially since Descartes has definitelyasserted it to be so. On the other hand, we have a variety of

experiences; for example, we notice things external to ourselves,such as bodies which are the objects of our experience of the world

about us. Also, there are phenomena of another nature, such as

feeling, conscience, thought; these constitute another form of

8

Article, Spinoza, Dictionnaire,vol. V, Rem

EE, p.226a.

9Article, Spinoza, Dictionnaire, vol. V, Rem N., p. 3x3b.



J. Carnus 591

experience which is not less real than the external one. The

Cartesian mechanism can explain only bodies, that is, phenomena

whereof we perceive extension, impenetrability, and movement;but if one observes, as one does in living beings, a special activity,which is life, this points to an adaptation of means to a single end,and this presupposes choice. Consequently, in our choice of

what we shall make of the substance, we must consider finality.If thought also exists with laws different from those which govern-

the body, it must also be a part of the substance, "because in the

living body the only thing that the arrangement of the organscan do is

reduced,like in a

clock,to one local movement that is

diversely modified. The difference is only one of degree. But

since the arrangement of the various wheels which make up a

clock would not be able to produce the effects of this machine if

each wheel, before being set in a certain way, did not have im-

penetrable extension which is necessary to produce movement

when it is set in motion. I say, further, that the arrangementof the organs of the body would not be able to produce thought if

each organ before being put in its place did not actually have the

power of thinking; or this power is something other than im-penetrable extension for all that you can do to this extension by

pulling it, striking it, pushing it in every imaginable direction,is a change of situation of which you fully perceive the entirenature and essence without needing to assume the existence of

any feeling."10

Bayle wishes to include movement in the atom, but he hesitatesbecause this notion seems to lead him to the occult forces of the

schoolmen, which Descartes had rejected in his Physique. Fur-thermore the notion of thought has nothing in common with thenotion of extension; consequently it cannot be united to, noraffect extension. He states that Leibnitz did not offer a more

satisfactory solution by explaining the internal development ofthe soul by its spontaneity and liberty; that is contrary to factbecause "if this were the case, how are we to explain the con-catenation of opposite feelings which succeed each other for-

tuitously according to the impressions coming from without in10Dictionnaire, II, 628a, s. v. "Dic6arque."




such a way that a feeling of pain may follow a feeling of

pleasure.""

Bayle thinks that the hypothesis of the English philosopherCudworth (with whom he was personally acquainted) is not clear,because if matter and mind are not enough to explain the organiza-tion of living beings, the "plastic natures" are not enough either,these beings which are neither extended nor immaterial, are in-

comprehensible and useless; they are the "active principles which

carry out God's plan almost in the same way that certain men

carry out the plan of an engineer."12It is

God,in the last

analysis,who acts and one comes back to

"accepting the Cartesian dogma which one had wished to

reject."l3It is interesting to note the criticisms that Bayle makes of each

system. If he also indulges in reasoning, it is always so as to

throw into relief that part of truth in each system which is in

conformity with the facts of experience, and to separate the ra-

tional from the empirical. He criticizes Locke, who said that

perhaps matter was capable of thinking; but Bayle does not be-

lieve that this is impossible and therefore he includes in substance,in addition to extension, movement and thought because, in his

opinion, these three factors can explain all the phenomena of

experience. "If every atom had sensibility, we could understand

that a collection of atoms could form a composite capable of

undergoing certain special modifications; as much in respect to

sensations and knowledge as well as movement. The diversityof passions that one notices in rational and irrational animals

could be generally explained by the various combinations of theatoms."14

But each of these factors is only a quality of a single unknowable

substance and which moreover Bayle does not consider it worth

while knowing.He thinks that in addition to extension, movement and thought

other qualities may exist but they are not manifested to our ex-

11"Rponses auxquestionsd'unprovincial,"p. I4, 3e partie,ch. XV, p. 94ib.2 Oeuvres

diverses,IV,

183.13Oeuvres iverses, V, 183.14Dictionnaire,.v., Leucippe, II, 647a.



J. Carnus 593

perience. Thought is only a quality; it cannot be a substance

because the soul would think continuously; now we perceive that

thought functions only intermittently and, besides, is apparentlyinfluenced by the body. "The experience everyone has of the

control which his body exercises over his soul shows how feeble

reason is in infancy, in old age, in illness and even in a healthyman when asleep."15

Other proofs abound which reveal the influence of the bodyover the soul and which were the topics of numerous discussions

at that time. The sensibility of animals seems to be of the same

nature asman's;

it differsonly

indegree.

If we concede an im-

mortal soul, a spiritual substance to man, we must also concede

it to animals. In making sensation or thought a quality of

substance, Bayle will easily be able to solve the question of the

immortality of the soul; the most important dogma of the majorityof religious and metaphysical beliefs. By endowing the atom

(which is uncreated and eternal) with movement, he explainsall physical and corporealphenomena without the instrumentalityof a prime mover, and thought effects the selection of the means

for a single end-that is to say, thought will be able to accountfor organic finality. Thought also explains the phenomena,found in man, rational thinking; the interdependence of mind

and body will account also for a fundamental phenomenon which

is man's instinct and man's passion. For it is passion that

motivates man's actions more than reason. Reason represents

only our past experience which has been favorable to the indi-

vidual and to the species; it is not something ready-made and

perfect at the moment when it begins to function; it develops,and takes a good deal of time to do so. Bayle has shown the

relativity of our knowledge and our means of acquiring knowledge;in this way he drew attention to the study of history wherein

human experience can be observed in the process of changing into

intelligence. But like Fontenelle (I657-I757), from whom he gotthe idea, Bayle holds that experience furnishes reason with more

elements than it can assimilate so as to transform them into

15"R6ponsesauxquestionsd'unprovincial,"Oeuvresdiverses,t. III, 3e partie,chap.XV, p. 94Ib.




intelligence. These observations supplied Auguste Comte, in

the following century, with the idea which enabled him to formu-

late the Law of the Three Stages of the development of the mind.Although Bayle does not seem to have been influenced by the

i'reatiseon thePassions of Descartes, he attaches great importanceto the interdependence of mind and body not only so as to explainhuman nature without the help of religious dogma but especiallyto explain many facts, in particular the role that passion plays in

human conduct, likewise in human reasoning. It is by passionthat Bayle explains error which results from the feebleness of the

mind and not from ourcorrupt

nature "because however little

thought we may give to the way in which our soul is united to

our body, we realize that owing to this union our knowledge is

limited and defective; for besides this union compels the soul to

think in conformity with the impressions which objects make on

the brain, it is also necessary for the mind to have an infinity of

thoughts which have to do with the preservation of the body,which are only confused feelings, or passions and not the distinct

image of any object such as it is in itself, being, most of the time

affected by modifications which do not clarify it, which do not

amplify its true knowledge and which persuade the soul to judge

objects by deceptive appearances without its knowing what they

really are like."'6

This idea of the influence of the body on the soul was analyzedin detail and in a systematic manner by Cabanis (I757-I808),a scholar and a doctor, who drew attention to what should con-

stitute genuine medical science in his work: Rapportsdu Physique

et du Moral de l'homme.Bayle shows that morality has nothing to do with religion

and it is a mistake to believe that men behave according to their

religious beliefs. "It is temperament, a natural inclination for

pleasure, the desire for contact with objects, a habit formed in

association with friends, or some other disposition which rises

from the depth of our nature."'7"Human life is nothing but a continual struggle between the

16"Supplement du Commentaire philosophique," 0., XI, 494b.17 "Pensees diverses," Oeuvres diverses, t. III, sect. CXXXVII, p. 88.



J. Carnus 595

passions and conscience, in which the latter is nearly always de-

feated. What is most strange and singular in this conflict is

that very often the side is victorious which clashes with our ideasof integrity and also with our temporal interest.'18

Passion is confused thought, that is, thought which is unelabo-

rated in consciousness; it shows the influence either on the mind

of external things to which we are exposed or of our own tem-

perament. Here Bayle has indicated that something can be done

to better human conduct by improving human environment.

Helvetius (I715-I77I) profited from this idea in his work De

l'esprit. Baylelooks

uponsocial

groupsas natural

productsarising from the needs of human nature. He was the first to show

what Montesquieu (I689-1755) afterwards expressed in his work

L'Esprit des lois.

Moral virtues result from social life; morality, therefore, has

no significance apart from human society-a standpoint that

d'Holbach (I723-I789) supported in his work Le Syst?me de la

Nature.

But Bayle does not glorify man as Rousseau did; man has

passions which he strives to satisfy; some are good, others are bad,but both have their part to play and their usefulness; and thus

Bayle solves the problem of evil-the object of so many con-

troversies.

"If the mind, by its subtlety, contrives deceptive stratagems,it can also inspire great confidence and provide several ways of

circumspection. If, in a republic such as those of Athens and

Rome, where one made no boast of intellect or of liberty, plots

and conspiracies against the government were inevitable; yetthere were people to be found to overthrow these plans. I mayadd that in countries where the people are astir, restless and

clever, one faction will restrain another by its constant viligance."19

Biological science was beginning to engross the attention of

scholars. Bayle was interested in it, but he would not admit the

vitalist hypothesis of Boherhave. He could view human nature

only from the true positive angle. He repudiated all that was

18"H l1ne," Dictionnaire, III, 263b.91"Continuation es Penses diverses,"Chap.CXIX, 0., t. III, p. 354b.




ascribedto the interventionof an immaterialcause which could

changethe courseof naturallaws. Moreover,he rejectedwhat-

ever was innate wherebycertain English deists of his time ex-plained prevailinggeneralnotions such as the existenceof God;

Bayle showedthat there wereraces who had no conceptionof adivine being.

In his philosophicalexplanationBayle was confronted withseveral difficultieswhich he attempted to solve:

i. a collection f atomscannotmakea unityof substance;2. theassembledlements f thought annotmakea unityof con-

sciousness;3. furthermore,owcanthoughtwhich s indivisible e unitedto

extensionwhich s divisible?

These problemsembarrassednot only Bayle but also all theother philosophersof the eighteenthcentury; they were due tothe concept of substance which Descartes and the schoolmenentertainedand which they could not elucidateso as to explainphenomena.

Bayle offersa solutionof these problems,but does not attach

great importance o them becausehe is moreconcernedwith the

explanationof phenomena han with the solvingof metaphysicalquestions. Since he accepts the atom which is an indivisible

entity, he can unite thoughtto it withouttaking awaythe latter's

identity. As to the unity of consciousness,he believes it to beconceivable because the elements of thought are not exterior to

each other like the elements of extension. Thereforethey can

be reciprocallypenetratedso as to give a unity of consciousness.Bayle's cosmological system marks a stage of progress of

philosophicthought and also shows the applicationof scientificmethods to the study of man and his behavior. Undoubtedlymanydiscoverieshave beenmadeand muchastonishingprogress,which show the amount of groundcovered since Bayle's philo-sophic contribution. But to him belongsthe credit of pointingout the way andhe hadcourageenoughto attackfallacious hink-

ingwhich,morethan

anythingelse,hinderedntellectual

progress.



J. Carnus 597

His idea of the animated atom suggested to Diderot (1713-1784)the possibility of a single living matter which was subsequently

known as the organic cell.Bayle believed less than the other philosophers in mathematical

reasoning or in philosophic dialectic. If he were better known

and better understood, he would acquaint us with a philosophythat would be more human, more true, and more constructive.

BrooklynCollege.

peter bayles cosmology

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