petitions challenging cybercrime act

8/13/2019 Petitions Challenging Cybercrime Act

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PETITIONS CHALLENGING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10175

1. G.R. No. 203299o Louis "Barok" C. Biraogo Vs. National Bureau of Investigation and Philippine National Police

2. G.R. No. 203306o Alab ng Mamamahayag (alam), Hukuman ng Mamamayan Movement Inc., Jerry S. Bertini "Toto"

Causing, Hernani Q. Cuare, Percy Lapid, Tracy Cabrera, Ronald E. Renta, Cirilo P. Sabarre, Jr.,Dervin Castro, et a. Vs. Office of the President, represented by President Benigno Simeon AquinoIII, Senate of the Philippines and House of Representatives

3. G.R. No. 203335o Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr., Rowena S. Disini, Lianne Ivy P. Medina, Janette Toral and Ernesto

Sonido, Jr. Vs. The Secretary of Justice, The Secretary of the Department of Interior and LocalGovernment, The Executive Director of the Information and Communications Technology Office,The Chief of the Philippine National Police and the Director of the National Bureau ofInvestigation

4. G.R. No. 203359o Senator Teofisto DL Guingona III Vs. Executive Secretary, The Secretary of Justice, The Secretary

of the Department of Interior and Local Government, The Chief of the Philippine National Police,and Director of the National Bureau of Investigation

5. G.R. No. 203378o Alexander Adonis, Ellen Tordesillas, Ma. Gisela Ordenes-Cascolan, H. Harry L. Roque, Jr., Romel

R. Bagares, and Gilbert T. Andres Vs. The Executive Secretary, The Department of Budget andManagement, The Department of Justice, The Department of the Interior and Local Government,The National Bureau of Investigation, The Philippine National Police, and the Information andCommunications Technology Office-Department of Science and Technology

6. G.R. No. 203391o Hon. Raymond V. Palatino, Hon. Antonio Tinio, Vencer Mari Crisostomo of Anakbayan, Ma.

Katherine Elona of the Philippine Collegian, Isabelle Therese Baguisi of the National Union ofStudents of the Philippines, et al. Vs. Paquito N. Ochoa Jr., in his capacity as Executive Secretaryand alter-ego of President Benigno Simeon Aquino III, Leila De Lima in her capacity as Secretaryof Justice

7. G.R. No. 203407o Bagong Alyansang Makabayan Secretary General Renato M. Reyes, Jr., National Artist Bienvenido

L. Lumbera, Chairperson of Concerned Artists of the Philippines, Elmer C. Labog, Chairperson ofKilusang Mayo Uno, Cristina E. Palabay, Secretary General of Karapatan, Ferdinand R. Gaite,Chairperson of Courage, Joel B. Maglunsod, Vice President of Anakpawis Party-List, Lana R.

Linaban, Secretary General of Gabriela Women's Party, Adolf Ares P. Gutierrez and Julius GarciaMatibag Vs. His Excellency Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, President of the Republic of thePhilippines, Hon. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., Executive Secretary, Senate of the Philippines,represented by Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile, House of Representatives, represented bySpeaker Feliciano Belmonte, Jr., Hon. Leila De Lima, Secretary of the Department of Justice,Louis Napoleon C. Casambre, Executive Director of the Information and CommunicationsTechnology Office, Nonnatus Caesar R. Rojas, Director of the National Bureau of Investigation,D/Gen. Nicanor A. Bartolome, Chief of the Philippine National Police, Manuel A. Roxas II,Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government

8. G.R. No. 203440o Melencio S. Sta. Maria, Sedfrey M. Candelaria, Amparita Sta. Maria, Ray Paolo J. Santiago.

Gilbert V. Sembrano, and Ryan Jeremiah D. Quan (all of Ateneo Human Rights Center) Vs.Honorable Paquito Ochoa in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Honorable Leila De Lima in hercapacity as Secretary of Justice, Honorable Manuel Roxas in his capacity as Secretary of the

Department of the Department of Interior and Local Government, The Chief of the PhilippineNational Police, The Director of the National Bureu of Investigation (all of the ExecutiveDepartment of Government)

9. G.R. No. 203453o National Union of Journalistsj of the Philippines (NUJP), Philippine Press Institute (PPI), Center

for Media Freedom and Responsibility, Rowena Carranza Paraan, Melinda Quintos-De Jesus,Joseph Alwyn Alburo, Ariel Sebellino and The Petitioners in The e-Petitionhttp://www.nupj.org/no-to-ra10175/Vs. The Executive Secretary, The Secretary ofJustice, The Secretary of the Interior and Local Government, The Secretary of Budget andManagement, The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, The Cybercrime Investigationand Coordinating Center, and all Agencies and Instrumentalities of Government and All Persons
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/203299.phphttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/203299.phphttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/203306.phphttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/203306.phphttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/203335.phphttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/203335.phphttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/203359.phphttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/203359.phphttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/203378.phphttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/203378.phphttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/203391.phphttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/203391.phphttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/203407.phphttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/203407.phphttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/203440.phphttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/203440.phphttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/203453.phphttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/203453.phphttp://www.nupj.org/no-to-ra10175/http://www.nupj.org/no-to-ra10175/http://www.nupj.org/no-to-ra10175/http://www.nupj.org/no-to-ra10175/http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/203453.phphttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/203440.phphttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/203407.phphttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/203391.phphttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/203378.phphttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/203359.phphttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/203335.phphttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/203306.phphttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/203299.php


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Acting Under Their Instructions, Orders, Direction in Relation to the Implementationof RepublicAct No. 10175

10. G.R. No. 203454o Paul Cornelius T. Castillo & Ryan D. Andres Vs. The Hon. Secretary of Justice, The Hon. Secretary

of Interior and Local Government11. G.R. No. 203469

o Anthony Ian M. Cruz; Marcelo R. Landicho; Benjamin Noel A. Espina; March Ronald C. Rimorin;Julius D. Rocas; Oliver Richard V. Robillo; Aaron Erick A. Lozada; Gerard Adrian P. Magnaye; JoseReginald A. Ramos; Ma. Rosario T. Juan; Brendalyn P. Ramirez; Maureen A. Hermitanio; KristineJoy S. Rementilla; Maricel O. Gray; Julius Ivan F. Cabigon; Benralph S. Yu; Cebu Bloggers Society,Inc. President Ruben B. Licera Jr.; and Pinoy Expat/OFW Blog Awards, Inc. Coordinator Pedro E.Rahon Vs. His Excellency Benigno S. Aquino III, in his capacity as President of the Republic of thePhilippines, represented by Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile, in his capacity as Senate President; House ofRepresentatives; Hon. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., in his capacity as Executive Secretary; Hon. LeilaDe Lima, in her capacity as Secretary of Justice; Hon. Louis Napoleon C. Casambre, in hiscapacity as Executive Director, Information and Communications Technology Office; Hon.Nonnatus Caesar R. Rojas, in his capacity as Director, National Bureau of Investigation; andP/Dgen. Nicanor A. Bartolome, in his capacity as Chief, Philippine National Police

12. G.R. No. 203501o Philippine Bar Association, Inc. Vs. His Excellency Benigno S. Aquino III, in his official capacity as

President of the Republic of the Philippines; Hon. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., in his official capacityas Executive Secretary; Hon. Leila M. De Lima, in hes official capacity as Secretary of Justice;

Louis Napoleon C. Casambre, in his official capacity as Executive Director, Information andCommunications Technology Office; Nonnatus Caesar R. Rojas, in his official capacity as Directorof the National Bureau of Investigation; and Director General Nicanor A. Bartolome, in his officialcapacity as Chief of the Philippine National Police

13. G.R. No. 203509o Bayan Muna Representative Neri J. Colmenares Vs. The Excutive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr.

14. G.R. No. 203515o National Press Club of the Philippines Inc., represented by Benny D. Antiporda in his capacity as

President and in his personal capacity Vs. Office of the President, Pres. Benigno Simeon AquinoIII, Department of Justice, Department of Interior and Local Government, Philippine NationalPolice, National Bureau of Investigation, Department of Budget and Management and All OtherGovernment Instrumentalities Who Have Hand in the Passage and/or Implementation of RepublicAct 10175

15. G.R. No. 203518o Philippine Internet Freedom Alliance, composed of Dakila-Philippine Collective for Modern

Heroism, represented by Leni Velasco, Partido Lakas ng Masa, represented by Cesar S. Melencio,Francis Euston R. Acero, Marlon Anthony Romasanta Tonson, Teodoro A. Casio, NoemiLardizabal-Dado, Imelda Morales, James matthew B. Miraflor, Juan G.M. Ragragio, Maria FatimaA. Villena, Medardo M. Manrique, Jr., Lauren Dado, Marco Vittoria Tobias Sumayao, Irene Chia,Erastus Noel T. Delizon, Cristina Sarah E. Osorio, Romeo Factolerin, Naomi L. Tupas, KennethKeng, Ana Alexandria C. Castro Vs. The Executive Secretary, The Secretary of Justice, TheSecretary of Interior and Local Government, The Secretary of Science and Technology, TheExecutive Director of the Information Technology Office, The Director of the National Bureau ofInvestigation, The Chief, Philippine National Police, The Head of the DOJ Office of Cybercrime,and the Other members fo the Cybercrime Investigation and Coordination Center

Consolidated Comment of the Solicitor General

The Office of the Solicitor General vigorously defends the constitutionality of R.A. No. 10175, in its entirety,except only as to Section 19, on restricting or blocking access. With all due respect to the Congress, the OSGsubmits that Section 19 is constitutionally impermissible, because it permits a form of final restraint on speechwithout prior judicial determination. As to Section 12, on the real time collection of traffic data, the OSG defendsits constitutionality. However, again with all due deference to Congress, the OSG submits that the Congress may,in its wisdom, consider amending the Section to provide for prior judicial authorization.

Preliminary Issues:
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/203454.phphttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/203454.phphttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/203469.phphttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/203469.phphttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/203501.phphttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/203501.phphttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/203509.phphttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/203509.phphttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/203515.phphttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/203515.phphttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/203518.phphttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/203518.phphttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/203518.phphttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/203515.phphttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/203509.phphttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/203501.phphttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/203469.phphttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/203454.php


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Issue Sol Gens Argument

Whether petitionershave standing to bringthe petitions.

transcendental public importance dispenses with the requirement that petitioner hasexperienced or is in actual danger of suffering direct and personal injury, casesinvolving the constitutionality of penal legislation belong to an altogether differentgenus of constitutional litigation. Compelling State and societal interests in theproscription of harmful conduct necessitate a closer judicial scrutiny of locus standi.

the following are determinants of whether a matter is of transcendental importance:(1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of aclear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the publicrespondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and, (3) the lack of the anyother party with a more direct and specific interest in the questions being raised. Noneof the foregoing determinants are established by petitioners.

Petitioners who invoke the transcendental importance doctrine have not identifiedtheirpersonal stake in the outcome of the controversy. They fail to particularize howthe implementation of specific provisions of RA No. 10175 would result in direct injuryto their organization and members.

Neitherlocus standibe conferred upon individual petitioners as taxpayers andcitizens. A taxpayer suit is proper only when there is an exercise of the spending ortaxing power of Congress, whereas citizen standing must rest on direct and personalinterest in the proceeding. None of the individual petitioner-citizens has alleged anydirect and personal interest in the implementation of the law. Generalized interests,albeit accompanied by the assertion of a public right, do not establish locus standi.Evidence of a Direct and personal interest is key.

Whether the issuesraised are ripe foradjudication.

Penal statutes have generalin terrorem effect resulting from its very existence, and ifa facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be preventedfrom enacting laws to deter socially harmful conduct.

on-its-face invalidation of penal statutes are not allowed in this jurisdiction

petitioners merely claim that they are suing in their respective capacities as: citizen,netizen, legislator, internet blogger, internet user, multimedia journalist, mediaorganization, or person maintaining a twitter or facebook account.

petitioners also fail to establish that there is an imminent threat of an actual filing ofa criminal offense against them for violation of the assailed law to warrant its review.

Substantive Issues and Arguments:

Whether the following sections of Republic Act No. 10175 are unconstitutional for the reasons given:

Provision Description Petitioners Argument Sol Gens Argument

I. Sec. 4(a)(1) Makes access to the wholeor part of a computersystem without right acybercrime;

Failure to meet strictscrutiny standards (PIFA,et al. Petition)

The application of strict scrutinyis not called for because Section4(a)(1) regulates hacking, asocially harmful conduct; it doesnot regulate, prevent or punishspeech.

Considering that illegal access isglobally recognized as a offenseagainst the confidentiality,


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a civil action, or abatementwithout judicial proceedings.

IV. Sec. 4(b)(3) Makes the intentionalacquisition, use, misuse,transfer, possession,alteration or deletion of

identifying informationbelonging to anotherwithout right a cybercrime;

Violation of due processclause (Reyes, et al.Petition)

Violation of right toprivacy ofcommunication andcorrespondenceguarantee (Reyes, et al.Petition)

Violation of the freedomof the press guarantee(Reyes, et al. Petition)

Section 4(b)(3) is intended toprotect ones right to privacy andto protect ones right to property.The offenders rights to privacy

and protected speech areirrelevant in computer-relatedoffenses.

Petitioner Reyes fear focus onthe words acquisition transerand possession in relation tojournalists fundamental work ofreporting information isunfounded.

Petitioners Reyes fear can beeasily soothed when theprinciple noscitur a sociis is

applied. By noscitur a sociis, thecorrect construction of a word orphrase susceptible of variousmeanings may be made clear andspecific by considering thecompany of words in which it isfound or with which it isassociated.

the words intentionalacquisition, transfer, andpossession, must be associatedwith the term identity theft andmust be understood to mean any

such acts done with the intentionof appropriating anothers identityfor acquisitorial use.

V. Sec. 4(c)(1) Makes the willfulengagement, maintenance,control, or operation,directly or indirectly of anylascivious exhibition ofsexual organs or sexualactivity, with the aid of acomputer system, for favoror consideration acybercrime;

Violation of freedom ofexpression clause(Guingona, et al.Petition)

Congress, in enacting Section4(c)(1), seeks to punish cyberprostitution, white slave trade andpornography for favour andconsideration. This includesinteractive prostitution andpornography, i.e., by webcam.

The risks to publishers ofpublishing nude materials in theinternet or to film producers ofcreating artistic works is nodifferent or greater than therisks presently confronting themunder Article 201 of the RevisedPenal Code. Since 1932, Article201 punishes obscene publicationsand exhibitions and indecentshows. To date, Article 201 hasnot been declared


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unconstitutional.

VI. Sec. 4(c)(3) Makes the transmission ofcommercial electroniccommunication with the useof computer systems seekingto advertise, sell or offer for

sale products and services acybercrime;

Violation of due processclause (ALAM, et al.Petition)

Violation of equalprotection clause (PIFA,et al. Petition)

Unsolicited CommercialCommunications or SPAM isoutlawed because worldwide,SPAM messages waste the storageand network capacities of Internet

Service Providers (ISPs), and aresimply offensive to the unwillingrecipient.

Flooding the internet with uselessand nuisance and bulk emailsburden the internet networks andreduce the efficiency of commerceand technology. They also resultto tremendous losses in revenue ifleft unpunished.

Spam can, in principle, properlybe considered a type of trespass-

since it is a means by which thespammer uninvitedly use anothersproperty. Spam can also beconsidered a nuisance because ofits substantial interference withthe peaceful enjoyment of aproperty, which causesconsiderable amount of damageconsisting of clogged disc spaces,network congestion, financial lossand loss of productivity.

Spamming is at most commercialspeech not worthy of

constitutional protection. It isintrusive to the privacy of theinternet users and unlawfulappropriates the storage andnetwork of ISPs withoutcompensation and for profit. Thegovernment has an interest in thefree, efficient flow of information,commercial technology in theInternet.

VII. Sec. 4(c)(4) Makes libel as defined underArt. 355 of the RevisedPenal Code when committedthrough a computer system

or any other similar means acybercrime;

Violation of due processclause (Biraogo Petition;Guingona Petition;Adonis, et al. Petition;

Palatino et al. Petition;Reyes, et al. Petition;Sta. Maria et al. Petition;Castillo, et al. Petition;Cruz, et al. Petition;PBA, et al. Petition;NPCP et al. Petition;

Violation of equal

Online libel is not a new crime.Online libel is a crime punishableunder the Articles 353, in relationto Article 355 of the Revised Penal

Code. Section 4(c)(4) just madeexpress an avenue already coveredby the term similar means underArticle 355, to keep up with thetimes. This would immediatelynegate the oft-used defense thatlibel committed through the use ofthe internet is not punishable.That said, the relevant provisionsof the Revised Penal Code on libel


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protection clause(Guingona Petition; Sta.Maria, et al. Petition;Castillo et al. Petition;NPCP, et al. Petition)

Abridgment of freedomof speech, expressionand press guarantees(Biraogo Petition; Disini,et al. Petition; Adonis, etal. Petition;

and jurisprudence on the subjectgives ascertainable standards andwell-defined parameters whichwould enable an accuses todetermine the nature of hisviolation.

The computer system is justanother means of publication

Libel committed through acomputer system can therefore bedefined as a public and maliciousimputation of a crime, or of a viceor defect, real or imaginary, orany act, omission, condition,status, or circumstance tending tocause the dishonor, discredit, orcontempt of a natural or juridicalperson, or to blacken the memoryof one who is dead, committed

through a computer system or anyother similar means which may bedevised in the future.Libel is not constitutionallyprotected speech.

even without Section 4(c)(4), apublic malicious imputation of acrime, or of a vice or defect, realor imaginary, or any act, omission,condition, status, or circumstancetending to cause the dishonor,discredit, or contempt of a naturalor juridical person, or to blacken

the memory of one who is dead,made with the use of thecomputer system alreadyconstitutes libel.

online libel was already a crimepunished under Articles 353 to 362of the Revised Penal Code, and todate, has never been declaredunconstitutional on the ground ofabridging the right to free speech,freedom of expression and of thepress.

it must be emphasized that cyberlibel was not given a higherpenalty under Section 4(c)(4).Notably, R.A. No. 10175 did notprovide for a distinct penalty forSection 4(c)(4). The one degreehigher penalty was imposed underSection 6 for all the crimes underthe Revised Penal Code andspecial penal laws committed with


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the use of ICT.

Violation of the rule ondouble jeopardy (NPCP,et al. Petition)

Being a bill of attainder

(NUJP, et. al. Petition)

Being an ex postfactolaw (PIFA et al.Petition)

libel committed by usingcomputer system is punishableunder Articles 353-362 of theRevised Penal Code. Section4(c)(4) merely made expressedanother venue for the commissionof libel. Said addition does notmake said provision ex post facto.Libelous statements made throughcomputer systems prior to theenactment of R.A. No. 10175 arealready considered punishableunder the Revised Penal Code.

Violation of theInternational Covenanton Civil and PoliticalRights (Adonis, et al.Petition; Reyes, et al.Petition)

Libel is unprotected speech. Itremains to be a crime in manynations.

The text of the ICCPRdoes notmandate thedecriminalization of libel. In fact,ICCPR recognizes that the freedomcarries with it special duties andresponsibilities and may besubject to certain restrictions asare provided by law and as arenecessary for the respect of the

rights or reputations of others

VIII. Sec. 5 Declares the aiding orabetting in the commissionof Cybercrime and theattempt in its commission asa cybercrime offense.

Violation of due processclause (Reyes, et al.Petition; Sta. Maria, etal. Petition; Cruz, et al.Petition; PBA, et al.Petition; NPCP, et al.Petition)

Violation of equalprotection clause (NPCP,et al. Petition)

Violation of freedom ofexpression clause (NUJP,et al. Petition)

Violation of rule ondouble jeopardy (NPCP,et al. Petition)

Being a bill of attainder

A criminal statute does notbecome void just because of itsreference to general terms, or inthis case, of its use of the termsaid or abet, and attempt.There is no constitutional orstatutory duty on the part of thelawmakers to define every word ina law, as long as the intent can begathered from the entire act.

The test in determining theambiguity of a statute is whetherthe words convey a sufficientlydefinite warning with respect tothe proscribed conduct based oncommon understanding andpractice. The words of a statuteare interpreted in their plain andordinary meaning. There is noneed for absolute precision inorder to appreciate the words ofthe statute. A reasonable degree


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(NUJP, et al. Petition) of certainty and flexibility, withclearly delineated limitations, isacceptable.

a person who is guilty of aidingand abetting is simply considered

an accomplice. Section 5, whenread together with Section 8, lastparagraph of R.A. No. 10175,shows that a person guilty ofaiding and abetting is penalized asan accomplice.

The laws on libel and as nowcontained in Section 4(c)(4) donot operate as prior restraints tospeech. These libel acts providefor subsequent punishment.Thus, petitioners are freetoexercise their right to speak out.If what they express is libelous,

then they risk subsequentpunishment.

IX. Sec. 6 Imposes a penalty onedegree higher for crimespenalized by the RevisedPenal Code and special laws,if committed with the use ofinformation andcommunication technology.

Violation of due processclause (Guingona, et al.Petition; NUJP, et al.Petition; Cruz, et al.Petition; NPCP, et al.Petition)

Violation of equalprotection clause(Guingona, et al.Petition; Adonis, et al.

Petition; Sta. Maria, etal. Petition; Cruz, PBA etal. Petition; NPCP, et al.Petition)

Violation of freedom ofexpression clause (NUJP,et al. Petition; Cruz, etal. Petition; NPCP, et al.Petition)

Violation of rule ondouble jeopardy (Disiniet al. Petition; Reyes, et

al. Petition; Sta. Maria,et al. Petition; NPCP, etal. Petition)

Being a bill of attainder(NUJP, et al. Petition)

Being incompatible withArt. 19, par. 3 of the

The presumption is that thelanguage used in a statue, whichhas a technical or well known legalmeaning, is used in that sense bylegislation.

thus the first sentence of Section6 is clear, delimited in scope andis valid.

Double jeopardy is inherently a

procedural defense or a shieldthat forbids a defendant frombeing subjected to the possibilityof being penalized twice, or beingtried again on the same (orsimilar) charge following alegitimate acquittal or conviction.It is not a constitutionalprohibition against laws that maypresent possible prosecution for anoffense penalized under otherlaws or statutes. Hence, the merepossibility of prosecution for twoseparate offenses by itself would

not render either lawunconstitutional.

The Supreme Court hassubscribed to the conclusivenessof an enrolled bill. It hasconsistently refused to invalidatea law or provision of law, on theground that the bill from which itoriginated contained no such


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X. Sec. 7 Provides that prosecutionunder this law is withoutprejudice to any liability forviolation of the RevisedPenal Code or special laws.

Violation of due processclause (NUJP, et al.Petition; Cruz, et al.Petition)

Violation of equal

protection clause (Disiniet al. Petition; Sta.Maria, et al. Petition;NUJP, et al. Petition)

Violation of freedom ofexpression clause (NUJP,et al. Petition; Cruz, etal. Petition)

Violation of rule ondouble jeopardy (Disiniet al. Petition; Guingona,et al. Petition; Adonis, et

al. Petition; Reyes, et al.Petition; Sta. Maria, etal. Petition; NUJP, et al.Petition; PBA, et al.Petition)

Supreme court said that whentwo different laws defines twocrimes, prior jeopardy as to onedoes not bar prosecution of theother although both offenses arisefrom the same fact, if each crime,involve some important act which

is not essential element of theother, the protection againstdouble jeopardy is only for thesame offense.

XI. PenalProvisions

Unconstitutional(Biraogo, et al. Petition)

it is within the power of thelegislature to determine what actsor omissions other than those setout in the Revised Penal Code orother existing statues are to becondemned as separate, individualcrimes and what penalties shouldbe attached thereto. Thislegislative power is not diluted or

improperly wielded simply becauseat some prior time the act oromission was but an element oringredient of another offense, ormight usually have beenconnected with another crime.

XII. Sec. 12 Authorizes law enforcementauthorities, by technicalmeans, after finding duecause, to collect or recordtraffic data in real-time,associated with specifiedcommunication transmittedby means of a computer

system.

Violation of due processclause (Castillo, et al.Petition)

Violation of freedom ofexpression clause(Biraogo, et al. Petition;Castillo, et al. Petition)

Violation of rule onsearches and seizures(Reyes, et al. Petition;Castillo et al. Petition,Cruz, et al. Petition;PBA, et al Petition)

Allows warrantless

The collection of traffic data willnot result in any search or seizureof petitioners persons and/orproperty.

The right to privacy does notextend to traffic data.

Traffic data is non-content datathat consists of the origin,destination, route, time, and dateof the communication.

The rationale for the collection oftraffic data is analogous to theone used and recognized in a validwarrantless search of a moving


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electronic surveillance(NUJP et al. Petition)

Violation of right toprivacy (Reyes, et al.Petition; NUJP et al.

Petition; Castillo et al.Petition, Cruz, et al.Petition; PBA, et alPetition)

vehicle and to that under exigentcircumstances under existingtechnology, it is quite impossibleto describe the place, things andpersons to be searched becausewhat is originally posted or madeavailable online or stored in local

computer systems may bechanged, removed, or passed on toanother instantaneously.

Real-time collection of traffic datais akin to the collection ofinformation derived from visualsurveillance of an open physicalspace and does not intrude intoprivate space.

There is no necessity to secure awarrant where there is no invasionof personal space.

Because traffic data is non-content information, theConstitution does not require thatit may be collected only upon theprior authority of a judicialwarrant.

No privacy can be expected frominformation revealed to or madeavailable to a third party.

XIII. Sec. 13 Preserves data. Violation of due processclause (Palatino, et al.

Petition)

Violation of right toprivacy (PIFA, et al.Petition)

Sec. 13 is directed to a serviceprovider and not to individual

users.

Requirement under the firstsentence of Sec. 13 is a mereamendment to the franchise oftelephone companies.

Sec. 13 only calls for thepreservation of traffic data andsubscriber information Thesubscribers use and disposition ofthe preserved data are not beingrestricted.

XIV. Sec. 14 Empowers law enforcementauthorities, upon securing asearch warrant, to issue anorder requiring any personor service provider todisclose or submit trafficdata within his possession orcontrol.

Undue delegation ofjudicial powers to PNPand NBI (NUJP et al.Petition)

The order referred to in Sc. 14 isto be issued upon securing a courtwarrant.

There is no need to conduct thesearch and seizure themselves,law enforcement agencies will justrequire or order the datecustodian to produce the relevant


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data. Its done pursuant to a courtissued warrant.

The power to issue subpoena isinherent in the power toinvestigate and may thus be

exercised by the law enforcementauthorities.

Having subpoena powers does notnecessarily clothe lawenforcement agencies withjudicial power.

XV. Sec. 15 Defines the powers andduties of law enforcementauthorities in theimplementation of thesearch and seizure warrant

Undue delegation ofjudicial powers to PNP(NUJP et al. Petition)

Being an unlawful searchand seizure (Palatino, etal. Petition)

Search and seizure is a plainly lawenforcement function.

This Honorable Court alreadyrecognized the authority of lawenforcement agencies to seize,retain, and destroy computerhardware and software containingpornographic materials in violationof Art 201 of the Revised PenalCode.

XVI. Sec. 17 Authorizes service providersand law enforcementauthorities, upon expirationof the periods under Sec. 13and 15 to immediately andcompletely destroy thecomputer data subject of apreservation andexamination.

Violation of due processclause (Reyes, et al.Petition; Palatino, et al.Petition)

Sec 17 merely provides for aprocess of clearing up the telcossystems to avoid overloading theirstorage capacity.

The clean up protects individualsfrom unnecessary delay in theinvestigation and prosecution of acybercrime.

XVII. Sec. 19 Authorizes Department ofJustice to issue an order torestrict or block access tocomputer data foundprimafacieto be in violation of RA10175

Violation of due processclause (Disini, et al.Petition; Guingona, et al.Petition; Sta. Maria, etal. Petition; NUJP, et al.Petition; Castillo, et al.Petition; Cruz, et al.Petition; NPCP, et al.Petition)

Being an unlawful searchand seizure (Guingona,et al. Petition; Castillo,

et al. Petition; Cruz, etal. Petition; NPCP, et al.Petition)

Violation of right toprivacy ofcommunication (Sta.Maria, et al. Petition;Castillo, et al. Petition;

Sec. 10 is an impermissible finalrestraint on the freedoms ofspeech and expression.

Sec. 19 seeks to restrain access to,circulation and dissemination ofcomputer data prima facie foundto be violative of the provisions ofRA 10175. It covers not justconduct but broadly anddangerously sweeps speech.

DOJs findings are unprotected

speech and expression.

It does not provide forconstitutionally mandatedprocedural safeguards that wouldjustify final restraint.


14/15


15/15

"The Court Resolved to EXTEND the Temporary Restraining Order issued on October 9, 2012, until further ordersfrom this Court."

"NOW, THEREFORE, effective until further orders from this Court, You, Respondents, your agents, representatives,or persons acting in your place or stead, are hereby CONTINUALLY ENJOINED from implementing and/on enforcingRepublic Act No. 10175 (Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012)."

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/Retrieved 11/28/13

Cybercrime Law Oral Arguments Set on January 15; Justice Abad Confers withCounsels for Orderly Oral Arguments

Posted: January 4, 2013; By Gleo Sp. Guerra

The 15 petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 10175, more commonly known astheCybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, will be coming up for oral arguments before the Supreme Court in the

afternoon of Tuesday, January 15, 2013. It is the first oral arguments of the Court to be presided over by ChiefJustice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno since her appointment as such on August 24, 2012.

To help prepare the counsels for the parties in relation to the multiple issues raised, SC Associate Justice RobertoA. Abad took the initiative of meeting with the said counsels this afternoon to discuss possible ground rules. One ofthe purposes of the meeting was to determine which of the many issues presented by the various petitions shouldbe heard on oral arguments and which of the remaining issues could be argued in written Memoranda to besubmitted to the Court after the oral arguments.

The final list and sequence of issues to be argued, the counsels to argue the same, the time allotted for the saidcounsels to present their arguments, and additional dates for oral arguments, if any, will be resolved by theCourt en banc in its first session of the year on January 8, 2012, and embodied in an Advisory to be issued to allthe parties.

Last October 9, the Court had issued a temporary restraining order, effective for 120 days, against theimplementation/enforcement of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 after various groups from the media andcivil society; and several individuals, including some members of Congress, had petitioned the Court to strike downsome or all of the provisions of the law. The Solicitor General, as counsel for the government, has alreadysubmitted its Comment to the various petitions arguing in favor of the constitutionality of a majority of theprovisions of the law.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/bulletin1.phpRetrieved 11/28/13
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/bulletin1.phphttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/bulletin1.phphttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/bulletin1.phphttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/

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