phenomenal intentionality in thought
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Phenomenal Intentionality in Thought
Angela MendeloviciThe University of Western Ontario and the Australian National
University
Melbourne University, March 1, 2012
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Overview
1 Phenomenal intentionality theory
2 The content of concepts
3 Phenomenal intentionality and thought
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Overview
1 Phenomenal intentionality theory
2 The content of concepts
3 Phenomenal intentionality and thought
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Intentionality
The ofness or aboutness of mental states that we at leastsometimes notice introspectivelyOstensive definitionMental states with intentionality can be said to representA mental state’s content is what it representsThere might be other distinct semantic properties, such asreference, truth conditions, and truth
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Intentionality
The ofness or aboutness of mental states that we at leastsometimes notice introspectivelyOstensive definitionMental states with intentionality can be said to representA mental state’s content is what it representsThere might be other distinct semantic properties, such asreference, truth conditions, and truth
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Intentionality
The ofness or aboutness of mental states that we at leastsometimes notice introspectivelyOstensive definitionMental states with intentionality can be said to representA mental state’s content is what it representsThere might be other distinct semantic properties, such asreference, truth conditions, and truth
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Theories of intentionality
Tracking theoriesFunctional role theoriesPhenomenal intentionality theory
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Theories of intentionality
Tracking theoriesFunctional role theoriesPhenomenal intentionality theory
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Theories of intentionality
Tracking theoriesFunctional role theoriesPhenomenal intentionality theory
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Theories of intentionality
Tracking theoriesFunctional role theoriesPhenomenal intentionality theory
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Phenomenal intentionality theory
Phenomenal intentionality theory (PIT) A mental state’s (orsubject’s) intentional properties are identical with(some of) its phenomenal properties
Phenomenal character The particular “what it’s like” of a mentalstate (e.g. redness, painfulness)
We either instantiate phenomenal characters or are otherwiserelated to them
Phenomenal property Instantiating a phenomenal property is eitherinstantiating a phenomenal character or beingotherwise appropriately related to a phenomenalcharacter
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Phenomenal intentionality theory
Phenomenal intentionality theory (PIT) A mental state’s (orsubject’s) intentional properties are identical with(some of) its phenomenal properties
Phenomenal character The particular “what it’s like” of a mentalstate (e.g. redness, painfulness)
We either instantiate phenomenal characters or are otherwiserelated to them
Phenomenal property Instantiating a phenomenal property is eitherinstantiating a phenomenal character or beingotherwise appropriately related to a phenomenalcharacter
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Phenomenal intentionality theory
Phenomenal intentionality theory (PIT) A mental state’s (orsubject’s) intentional properties are identical with(some of) its phenomenal properties
Phenomenal character The particular “what it’s like” of a mentalstate (e.g. redness, painfulness)
We either instantiate phenomenal characters or are otherwiserelated to them
Phenomenal property Instantiating a phenomenal property is eitherinstantiating a phenomenal character or beingotherwise appropriately related to a phenomenalcharacter
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Phenomenal intentionality theory
Phenomenal intentionality theory (PIT) A mental state’s (orsubject’s) intentional properties are identical with(some of) its phenomenal properties
Phenomenal character The particular “what it’s like” of a mentalstate (e.g. redness, painfulness)
We either instantiate phenomenal characters or are otherwiserelated to them
Phenomenal property Instantiating a phenomenal property is eitherinstantiating a phenomenal character or beingotherwise appropriately related to a phenomenalcharacter
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Phenomenal intentionality theory
Basic idea: What your mental states represent is a matter ofwhat it’s like to be you
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Motivations for PIT
In clear introspectible cases, phenomenal properties andintentional properties do not appear distinct1
To the extent to which we can separately focus on phenomenalproperties and intentional properties, the two go together
1This is related to transparency intuitions. Gilbert Harman (1990). TheIntrinsic Quality of Experience. Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52, and MichaelTye (2000). Consciousness, Color, and Content. MIT Press.
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Motivations for PIT
In clear introspectible cases, phenomenal properties andintentional properties do not appear distinct1
To the extent to which we can separately focus on phenomenalproperties and intentional properties, the two go together
1This is related to transparency intuitions. Gilbert Harman (1990). TheIntrinsic Quality of Experience. Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52, and MichaelTye (2000). Consciousness, Color, and Content. MIT Press.
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Motivations for PIT
In clear introspectible cases, phenomenal properties andintentional properties do not appear distinct1
To the extent to which we can separately focus on phenomenalproperties and intentional properties, the two go together
1This is related to transparency intuitions. Gilbert Harman (1990). TheIntrinsic Quality of Experience. Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52, and MichaelTye (2000). Consciousness, Color, and Content. MIT Press.
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Motivations for PIT
In clear introspectible cases, phenomenal properties andintentional properties do not appear distinct1
To the extent to which we can separately focus on phenomenalproperties and intentional properties, the two go together
1This is related to transparency intuitions. Gilbert Harman (1990). TheIntrinsic Quality of Experience. Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52, and MichaelTye (2000). Consciousness, Color, and Content. MIT Press.
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
PIT in perception
Perception is a good case for PIT
1 Phenomenal properties seem to co-occur with the intentionalproperties PIT wants to identify them with
2 Perceptual phenomenal characters seem to matchco-occurring perceptual intentional contents
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
PIT in perception
Perception is a good case for PIT
1 Phenomenal properties seem to co-occur with the intentionalproperties PIT wants to identify them with
2 Perceptual phenomenal characters seem to matchco-occurring perceptual intentional contents
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
PIT in perception
Perception is a good case for PIT
1 Phenomenal properties seem to co-occur with the intentionalproperties PIT wants to identify them with
2 Perceptual phenomenal characters seem to matchco-occurring perceptual intentional contents
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Matching
Phenomenal characters match intentional contents iff theyhave
a similar structurea similar “quality”
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Matching in perception
It’s plausible that in perception, phenomenal charactermatches intentional contentE.g. represented blueness and phenomenal blueness
Plausibly similar simple structurePlausibly similar “quality” (the blueness bit)
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Matching in perception
It’s plausible that in perception, phenomenal charactermatches intentional contentE.g. represented blueness and phenomenal blueness
Plausibly similar simple structurePlausibly similar “quality” (the blueness bit)
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Matching in perception
It’s plausible that in perception, phenomenal charactermatches intentional contentE.g. represented blueness and phenomenal blueness
Plausibly similar simple structurePlausibly similar “quality” (the blueness bit)
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Matching in perception
It’s plausible that in perception, phenomenal charactermatches intentional contentE.g. represented blueness and phenomenal blueness
Plausibly similar simple structurePlausibly similar “quality” (the blueness bit)
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Matching in perception
Complex perceptual states have intentional contents thatmatch their phenomenal characters too
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
PIT in thought
For PIT to be plausible in the case of thought,
1 The phenomenal properties of thought must correspond to theintentional properties of thought that PIT wants to identifythem with
2 The phenomenal characters of thought must match theco-occurring intentional contents of thought
I’ll grant (1)2
But (2) seems to fail2See Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (2002). The Intentionality of
Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality. In David J. Chalmers(ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. OxfordUniversity Press, and David Pitt (2004). The Phenomenology of Cognition, or,What is It Like to Think That P? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research69 (1):1–36.
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
PIT in thought
For PIT to be plausible in the case of thought,
1 The phenomenal properties of thought must correspond to theintentional properties of thought that PIT wants to identifythem with
2 The phenomenal characters of thought must match theco-occurring intentional contents of thought
I’ll grant (1)2
But (2) seems to fail2See Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (2002). The Intentionality of
Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality. In David J. Chalmers(ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. OxfordUniversity Press, and David Pitt (2004). The Phenomenology of Cognition, or,What is It Like to Think That P? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research69 (1):1–36.
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
PIT in thought
For PIT to be plausible in the case of thought,
1 The phenomenal properties of thought must correspond to theintentional properties of thought that PIT wants to identifythem with
2 The phenomenal characters of thought must match theco-occurring intentional contents of thought
I’ll grant (1)2
But (2) seems to fail2See Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (2002). The Intentionality of
Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality. In David J. Chalmers(ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. OxfordUniversity Press, and David Pitt (2004). The Phenomenology of Cognition, or,What is It Like to Think That P? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research69 (1):1–36.
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
PIT in thought
For PIT to be plausible in the case of thought,
1 The phenomenal properties of thought must correspond to theintentional properties of thought that PIT wants to identifythem with
2 The phenomenal characters of thought must match theco-occurring intentional contents of thought
I’ll grant (1)2
But (2) seems to fail2See Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (2002). The Intentionality of
Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality. In David J. Chalmers(ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. OxfordUniversity Press, and David Pitt (2004). The Phenomenology of Cognition, or,What is It Like to Think That P? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research69 (1):1–36.
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
PIT in thought
For PIT to be plausible in the case of thought,
1 The phenomenal properties of thought must correspond to theintentional properties of thought that PIT wants to identifythem with
2 The phenomenal characters of thought must match theco-occurring intentional contents of thought
I’ll grant (1)2
But (2) seems to fail2See Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (2002). The Intentionality of
Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality. In David J. Chalmers(ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. OxfordUniversity Press, and David Pitt (2004). The Phenomenology of Cognition, or,What is It Like to Think That P? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research69 (1):1–36.
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
The apparent failure of matching in thought
Similar structure: It seems that thoughts havefairly complex intentional contentsbut fairly simple phenomenal characters
Similar “qualities”’: What it’s like to think doesn’t really seemsimilar to what thoughts represent
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
The apparent failure of matching in thought
Similar structure: It seems that thoughts havefairly complex intentional contentsbut fairly simple phenomenal characters
Similar “qualities”’: What it’s like to think doesn’t really seemsimilar to what thoughts represent
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
The apparent failure of matching in thought
Similar structure: It seems that thoughts havefairly complex intentional contentsbut fairly simple phenomenal characters
Similar “qualities”’: What it’s like to think doesn’t really seemsimilar to what thoughts represent
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
The apparent failure of matching in thought
Similar structure: It seems that thoughts havefairly complex intentional contentsbut fairly simple phenomenal characters
Similar “qualities”’: What it’s like to think doesn’t really seemsimilar to what thoughts represent
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Example
Modal realism is true.
Different structure: Fairly complex content possible worldsexist in the same way the actual world exists, but fairly simplephenomenal characterDifferent “qualities”: Nothing possible-worlds-y about thephenomenal character
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Example
Modal realism is true.
Different structure: Fairly complex content possible worldsexist in the same way the actual world exists, but fairly simplephenomenal characterDifferent “qualities”: Nothing possible-worlds-y about thephenomenal character
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Possible solutions
1 The phenomenal character of thought is like what wecurrently think the intentional content of thought is like(David Pitt?, H&T?)
2 The intentional content of thought is like what we currentlythink the phenomenal character of thought is like3
Thoughts represent fairly simple contentsAnd that this makes it plausible that their contents are similarin quality to thought phenomenal characters
3David Bourget (2010). Consciousness is Underived Intentionality. Noûs 44(1):32–58 employs a similar strategy.
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Possible solutions
1 The phenomenal character of thought is like what wecurrently think the intentional content of thought is like(David Pitt?, H&T?)
2 The intentional content of thought is like what we currentlythink the phenomenal character of thought is like3
Thoughts represent fairly simple contentsAnd that this makes it plausible that their contents are similarin quality to thought phenomenal characters
3David Bourget (2010). Consciousness is Underived Intentionality. Noûs 44(1):32–58 employs a similar strategy.
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BackgroundThe problem of multimodal experiences
SummaryExtras
The roles of content and modalities in thephenomenology of sensory experience
David Bourget
Institute of Philosophy
University of London
Monash University, March 2, 2012
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Possible solutions
1 The phenomenal character of thought is like what wecurrently think the intentional content of thought is like(David Pitt?, H&T?)
2 The intentional content of thought is like what we currentlythink the phenomenal character of thought is like3
Thoughts represent fairly simple contentsAnd that this makes it plausible that their contents are similarin quality to thought phenomenal characters
3David Bourget (2010). Consciousness is Underived Intentionality. Noûs 44(1):32–58 employs a similar strategy.
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Possible solutions
1 The phenomenal character of thought is like what wecurrently think the intentional content of thought is like(David Pitt?, H&T?)
2 The intentional content of thought is like what we currentlythink the phenomenal character of thought is like3
Thoughts represent fairly simple contentsAnd that this makes it plausible that their contents are similarin quality to thought phenomenal characters
3David Bourget (2010). Consciousness is Underived Intentionality. Noûs 44(1):32–58 employs a similar strategy.
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Possible solutions
1 The phenomenal character of thought is like what wecurrently think the intentional content of thought is like(David Pitt?, H&T?)
2 The intentional content of thought is like what we currentlythink the phenomenal character of thought is like3
Thoughts represent fairly simple contentsAnd that this makes it plausible that their contents are similarin quality to thought phenomenal characters
3David Bourget (2010). Consciousness is Underived Intentionality. Noûs 44(1):32–58 employs a similar strategy.
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Overview
1 Phenomenal intentionality theory
2 The content of concepts
3 Phenomenal intentionality and thought
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
The basic idea
Thoughts and the concepts that compose them don’t behaveas if they represented complex contentsSo we shouldn’t attribute complex contents to them
Concepts Vehicles of representation that constitute thoughts
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
The basic idea
Thoughts and the concepts that compose them don’t behaveas if they represented complex contentsSo we shouldn’t attribute complex contents to them
Concepts Vehicles of representation that constitute thoughts
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
The basic idea
Thoughts and the concepts that compose them don’t behaveas if they represented complex contentsSo we shouldn’t attribute complex contents to them
Concepts Vehicles of representation that constitute thoughts
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Candidate complex contents (CCCs)
What are candidate complex contents that concepts might besaid to represent?
DefinitionsCharacterizationsSets of featuresReal definitions or essencesComplex properties
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Candidate complex contents (CCCs)
What are candidate complex contents that concepts might besaid to represent?
DefinitionsCharacterizationsSets of featuresReal definitions or essencesComplex properties
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
How might contents behave like they’re represented byconcepts?
They might contribute to the phenomenologyThey might contribute to further thought and behavior
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
How might contents behave like they’re represented byconcepts?
They might contribute to the phenomenologyThey might contribute to further thought and behavior
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Concepts’ CCCs don’t make a difference forphenomenology
Supervenience’s CCC: the relation that obtains betweentwo types of facts when, necessarily, two worlds that are alikewrt on set of facts are alike wrt the other
(Tables 1) The facts about tables supervene on the physical facts.
(Tables 2) Necessarily, two possible worlds that are alike with respectto the physical facts are alike with respect to facts about tables.
In thinking (Tables 2), you seem to “grasp” contents likepossible worlds and likenessBut not in thinking (Tables 1)
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Concepts’ CCCs don’t make a difference forphenomenology
Supervenience’s CCC: the relation that obtains betweentwo types of facts when, necessarily, two worlds that are alikewrt on set of facts are alike wrt the other
(Tables 1) The facts about tables supervene on the physical facts.
(Tables 2) Necessarily, two possible worlds that are alike with respectto the physical facts are alike with respect to facts about tables.
In thinking (Tables 2), you seem to “grasp” contents likepossible worlds and likenessBut not in thinking (Tables 1)
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Concepts’ CCCs don’t make a difference forphenomenology
Supervenience’s CCC: the relation that obtains betweentwo types of facts when, necessarily, two worlds that are alikewrt on set of facts are alike wrt the other
(Tables 1) The facts about tables supervene on the physical facts.
(Tables 2) Necessarily, two possible worlds that are alike with respectto the physical facts are alike with respect to facts about tables.
In thinking (Tables 2), you seem to “grasp” contents likepossible worlds and likenessBut not in thinking (Tables 1)
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Concepts’ CCCs don’t make a difference forphenomenology
Supervenience’s CCC: the relation that obtains betweentwo types of facts when, necessarily, two worlds that are alikewrt on set of facts are alike wrt the other
(Tables 1) The facts about tables supervene on the physical facts.
(Tables 2) Necessarily, two possible worlds that are alike with respectto the physical facts are alike with respect to facts about tables.
In thinking (Tables 2), you seem to “grasp” contents likepossible worlds and likenessBut not in thinking (Tables 1)
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Concepts’ CCCs don’t play a role in further thought andbehavior
Sometimes we need a concept’s CCC to answer certainquestions
What is supervenience?Does a necessary god supervene on everything?
Answering such questions requires the retrieval of a definitionor characterization of supervenience
Unpacking The process by which definitions/characterizationsare retrieved
This suggests that (Tables 1) doesn’t representsupervenience’s CCCFailure to unpack can cause us to fail in such tasks
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Concepts’ CCCs don’t play a role in further thought andbehavior
Sometimes we need a concept’s CCC to answer certainquestions
What is supervenience?Does a necessary god supervene on everything?
Answering such questions requires the retrieval of a definitionor characterization of supervenience
Unpacking The process by which definitions/characterizationsare retrieved
This suggests that (Tables 1) doesn’t representsupervenience’s CCCFailure to unpack can cause us to fail in such tasks
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Concepts’ CCCs don’t play a role in further thought andbehavior
Sometimes we need a concept’s CCC to answer certainquestions
What is supervenience?Does a necessary god supervene on everything?
Answering such questions requires the retrieval of a definitionor characterization of supervenience
Unpacking The process by which definitions/characterizationsare retrieved
This suggests that (Tables 1) doesn’t representsupervenience’s CCCFailure to unpack can cause us to fail in such tasks
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Concepts’ CCCs don’t play a role in further thought andbehavior
Sometimes we need a concept’s CCC to answer certainquestions
What is supervenience?Does a necessary god supervene on everything?
Answering such questions requires the retrieval of a definitionor characterization of supervenience
Unpacking The process by which definitions/characterizationsare retrieved
This suggests that (Tables 1) doesn’t representsupervenience’s CCCFailure to unpack can cause us to fail in such tasks
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Concepts’ CCCs don’t play a role in further thought andbehavior
Sometimes we need a concept’s CCC to answer certainquestions
What is supervenience?Does a necessary god supervene on everything?
Answering such questions requires the retrieval of a definitionor characterization of supervenience
Unpacking The process by which definitions/characterizationsare retrieved
This suggests that (Tables 1) doesn’t representsupervenience’s CCCFailure to unpack can cause us to fail in such tasks
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Concepts’ CCCs don’t play a role in further thought andbehavior
Sometimes we need a concept’s CCC to answer certainquestions
What is supervenience?Does a necessary god supervene on everything?
Answering such questions requires the retrieval of a definitionor characterization of supervenience
Unpacking The process by which definitions/characterizationsare retrieved
This suggests that (Tables 1) doesn’t representsupervenience’s CCCFailure to unpack can cause us to fail in such tasks
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Concepts’ CCCs don’t play a role in further thought andbehavior
Sometimes we need a concept’s CCC to answer certainquestions
What is supervenience?Does a necessary god supervene on everything?
Answering such questions requires the retrieval of a definitionor characterization of supervenience
Unpacking The process by which definitions/characterizationsare retrieved
This suggests that (Tables 1) doesn’t representsupervenience’s CCCFailure to unpack can cause us to fail in such tasks
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Might CCCs play a role in unpacking?
One might suggest that a concept’s CCC determines how it isunpacked, so this is evidence that it is represented byconcepts and is not inertResponse:
There are other explanations of unpacking - perhaps from astory of concept acquisitionIf this suggestion is correct, we’d expect CCCs to play otherroles as well in the generation of thought and behavior, butthey don’t
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Might CCCs play a role in unpacking?
One might suggest that a concept’s CCC determines how it isunpacked, so this is evidence that it is represented byconcepts and is not inertResponse:
There are other explanations of unpacking - perhaps from astory of concept acquisitionIf this suggestion is correct, we’d expect CCCs to play otherroles as well in the generation of thought and behavior, butthey don’t
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Might CCCs play a role in unpacking?
One might suggest that a concept’s CCC determines how it isunpacked, so this is evidence that it is represented byconcepts and is not inertResponse:
There are other explanations of unpacking - perhaps from astory of concept acquisitionIf this suggestion is correct, we’d expect CCCs to play otherroles as well in the generation of thought and behavior, butthey don’t
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Might CCCs play a role in unpacking?
One might suggest that a concept’s CCC determines how it isunpacked, so this is evidence that it is represented byconcepts and is not inertResponse:
There are other explanations of unpacking - perhaps from astory of concept acquisitionIf this suggestion is correct, we’d expect CCCs to play otherroles as well in the generation of thought and behavior, butthey don’t
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Concepts don’t represent CCCs
Concepts don’t behave as if they represent their CCCsSo we shouldn’t attribute their CCCs to them - such contentswould be inertSimilar points apply to other concepts
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Concepts don’t represent CCCs
Concepts don’t behave as if they represent their CCCsSo we shouldn’t attribute their CCCs to them - such contentswould be inertSimilar points apply to other concepts
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Concepts don’t represent CCCs
Concepts don’t behave as if they represent their CCCsSo we shouldn’t attribute their CCCs to them - such contentswould be inertSimilar points apply to other concepts
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Two questions
1 What do concepts represent?2 What is the status of CCCs?
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
2. The status of CCCs
Concepts derivatively represent at least some of their CCCs(possibly definitions or characterizations)4
Derived mental representation is a matter of dispositions tounpack and have experiences of accepting certain unpackingsof concepts
4David Bourget (2010). Consciousness is Underived Intentionality. Noûs 44(1):32–58, Angela Mendelovici (2010). Mental Representation and CloselyConflated Topics, PhD Dissertation, Princeton University, and Uriah Kriegel(forthcoming). The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program. In U. Kriegel(ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
2. The status of CCCs
Concepts derivatively represent at least some of their CCCs(possibly definitions or characterizations)4
Derived mental representation is a matter of dispositions tounpack and have experiences of accepting certain unpackingsof concepts
4David Bourget (2010). Consciousness is Underived Intentionality. Noûs 44(1):32–58, Angela Mendelovici (2010). Mental Representation and CloselyConflated Topics, PhD Dissertation, Princeton University, and Uriah Kriegel(forthcoming). The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program. In U. Kriegel(ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Example of derived content
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Example of derived content
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Example of derived content
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Circumstances
In different circumstances, we might accept different contentsas the contents of our conceptsE.g. In some circumstances, you might unpack bachelor asunmarried man, in others as man available for long-termrelationshipWe might consider certain circumstances authoritative,e.g. circumstances in which you aren’t drunk, etc.
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Circumstances
In different circumstances, we might accept different contentsas the contents of our conceptsE.g. In some circumstances, you might unpack bachelor asunmarried man, in others as man available for long-termrelationshipWe might consider certain circumstances authoritative,e.g. circumstances in which you aren’t drunk, etc.
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Circumstances
In different circumstances, we might accept different contentsas the contents of our conceptsE.g. In some circumstances, you might unpack bachelor asunmarried man, in others as man available for long-termrelationshipWe might consider certain circumstances authoritative,e.g. circumstances in which you aren’t drunk, etc.
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Pluralism about derived content
Focusing on different circumstances might yield differentnotions of content, which might be useful for ifferent purposesCircumstances in which you do not discover new informationyield a kind of narrow contentCircumstances that allow for worldly interaction might yield akind of broad contentE.g. Burge’s BertSummary: There are only right or wrong ways to cash outyour concepts relative to circumstances.
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Pluralism about derived content
Focusing on different circumstances might yield differentnotions of content, which might be useful for ifferent purposesCircumstances in which you do not discover new informationyield a kind of narrow contentCircumstances that allow for worldly interaction might yield akind of broad contentE.g. Burge’s BertSummary: There are only right or wrong ways to cash outyour concepts relative to circumstances.
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Pluralism about derived content
Focusing on different circumstances might yield differentnotions of content, which might be useful for ifferent purposesCircumstances in which you do not discover new informationyield a kind of narrow contentCircumstances that allow for worldly interaction might yield akind of broad contentE.g. Burge’s BertSummary: There are only right or wrong ways to cash outyour concepts relative to circumstances.
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Pluralism about derived content
Focusing on different circumstances might yield differentnotions of content, which might be useful for ifferent purposesCircumstances in which you do not discover new informationyield a kind of narrow contentCircumstances that allow for worldly interaction might yield akind of broad contentE.g. Burge’s BertSummary: There are only right or wrong ways to cash outyour concepts relative to circumstances.
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Pluralism about derived content
Focusing on different circumstances might yield differentnotions of content, which might be useful for ifferent purposesCircumstances in which you do not discover new informationyield a kind of narrow contentCircumstances that allow for worldly interaction might yield akind of broad contentE.g. Burge’s BertSummary: There are only right or wrong ways to cash outyour concepts relative to circumstances.
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
1. What concepts really represent
There is reason to think that concepts have some content,even if it’s not their CCCsThere is some content that plays some role:
In phenomenologyIn further thought and behavior
Since concepts don’t represent CCCs, their contents are fairlysimple (the alternative would be that they represent otherconcepts’ CCCs)
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
1. What concepts really represent
There is reason to think that concepts have some content,even if it’s not their CCCsThere is some content that plays some role:
In phenomenologyIn further thought and behavior
Since concepts don’t represent CCCs, their contents are fairlysimple (the alternative would be that they represent otherconcepts’ CCCs)
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
1. What concepts really represent
There is reason to think that concepts have some content,even if it’s not their CCCsThere is some content that plays some role:
In phenomenologyIn further thought and behavior
Since concepts don’t represent CCCs, their contents are fairlysimple (the alternative would be that they represent otherconcepts’ CCCs)
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
1. What concepts really represent
There is reason to think that concepts have some content,even if it’s not their CCCsThere is some content that plays some role:
In phenomenologyIn further thought and behavior
Since concepts don’t represent CCCs, their contents are fairlysimple (the alternative would be that they represent otherconcepts’ CCCs)
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
1. What concepts really represent
There is reason to think that concepts have some content,even if it’s not their CCCsThere is some content that plays some role:
In phenomenologyIn further thought and behavior
Since concepts don’t represent CCCs, their contents are fairlysimple (the alternative would be that they represent otherconcepts’ CCCs)
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Which fairly simple contents? Some options
Proper parts of CCCs (e.g. some possible worlds view)Jesse Prinz’s proxytype theory (perceptual imagery)
Verbal representations (e.g. “supervenience” or “some modalrelation”)
Chris Viger, others who think we think in words
New simple contents (e.g. supervenience)Tim Williamson with knowledge, G. E. Moore with good
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Which fairly simple contents? Some options
Proper parts of CCCs (e.g. some possible worlds view)Jesse Prinz’s proxytype theory (perceptual imagery)
Verbal representations (e.g. “supervenience” or “some modalrelation”)
Chris Viger, others who think we think in words
New simple contents (e.g. supervenience)Tim Williamson with knowledge, G. E. Moore with good
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Which fairly simple contents? Some options
Proper parts of CCCs (e.g. some possible worlds view)Jesse Prinz’s proxytype theory (perceptual imagery)
Verbal representations (e.g. “supervenience” or “some modalrelation”)
Chris Viger, others who think we think in words
New simple contents (e.g. supervenience)Tim Williamson with knowledge, G. E. Moore with good
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Which fairly simple contents? Some options
Proper parts of CCCs (e.g. some possible worlds view)Jesse Prinz’s proxytype theory (perceptual imagery)
Verbal representations (e.g. “supervenience” or “some modalrelation”)
Chris Viger, others who think we think in words
New simple contents (e.g. supervenience)Tim Williamson with knowledge, G. E. Moore with good
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Which fairly simple contents? Some options
Proper parts of CCCs (e.g. some possible worlds view)Jesse Prinz’s proxytype theory (perceptual imagery)
Verbal representations (e.g. “supervenience” or “some modalrelation”)
Chris Viger, others who think we think in words
New simple contents (e.g. supervenience)Tim Williamson with knowledge, G. E. Moore with good
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Which fairly simple contents? Some options
Proper parts of CCCs (e.g. some possible worlds view)Jesse Prinz’s proxytype theory (perceptual imagery)
Verbal representations (e.g. “supervenience” or “some modalrelation”)
Chris Viger, others who think we think in words
New simple contents (e.g. supervenience)Tim Williamson with knowledge, G. E. Moore with good
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Which simple contents? Some options
Different options might be true of different conceptsAll these options are compatible with PIT, so I will not try toadjudicate between them
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Which simple contents? Some options
Different options might be true of different conceptsAll these options are compatible with PIT, so I will not try toadjudicate between them
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Back to thoughts
Thoughts are composed of concepts, and their contents aredetermined by the content of their constituent conceptsSo it’s plausible that thoughts don’t represent their CCCs andthat they represent simpler contents instead
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Back to thoughts
Thoughts are composed of concepts, and their contents aredetermined by the content of their constituent conceptsSo it’s plausible that thoughts don’t represent their CCCs andthat they represent simpler contents instead
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Overview
1 Phenomenal intentionality theory
2 The content of concepts
3 Phenomenal intentionality and thought
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Challenge
The phenomenal characters of thoughts don’t seem to matchtheir intentional contents
Different structureDifferent “qualities”
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Challenge
The phenomenal characters of thoughts don’t seem to matchtheir intentional contents
Different structureDifferent “qualities”
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Challenge
The phenomenal characters of thoughts don’t seem to matchtheir intentional contents
Different structureDifferent “qualities”
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Response
Same structure: Concepts represent fairly simple contents andhave fairly simple phenomenal charactersSimilar features: Some options:
Intentional content Phenomenal characterwords verbal phenomenology
perceptual perceptualnew simple content new simple phenomenology
parts of intuitive content depends
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Response
Same structure: Concepts represent fairly simple contents andhave fairly simple phenomenal charactersSimilar features: Some options:
Intentional content Phenomenal characterwords verbal phenomenology
perceptual perceptualnew simple content new simple phenomenology
parts of intuitive content depends
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Response
Same structure: Concepts represent fairly simple contents andhave fairly simple phenomenal charactersSimilar features: Some options:
Intentional content Phenomenal characterwords verbal phenomenology
perceptual perceptualnew simple content new simple phenomenology
parts of intuitive content depends
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
Response
Same structure: Concepts represent fairly simple contents andhave fairly simple phenomenal charactersSimilar features: Some options:
Intentional content Phenomenal characterwords verbal phenomenology
perceptual perceptualnew simple content new simple phenomenology
parts of intuitive content depends
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
PIT meets the challenge
Thought phenomenal characters arguably match thoughtintentional contentsThis removes an important obstacle from applying PIT tothought
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
PIT meets the challenge
Thought phenomenal characters arguably match thoughtintentional contentsThis removes an important obstacle from applying PIT tothought
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
PIT about thought
Intentional properties are phenomenal propertiesBut the content of thoughts is fairly simple - it is not thecomplex content we intuitively associate with thoughtsSome of the contents we intuitively associate with thoughtsare derivatively represented by thoughts, where derived mentalrepresentation is a matter of dispositions to unpack conceptsand dispositions to accept certain unpackings
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
PIT about thought
Intentional properties are phenomenal propertiesBut the content of thoughts is fairly simple - it is not thecomplex content we intuitively associate with thoughtsSome of the contents we intuitively associate with thoughtsare derivatively represented by thoughts, where derived mentalrepresentation is a matter of dispositions to unpack conceptsand dispositions to accept certain unpackings
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
PIT about thought
Intentional properties are phenomenal propertiesBut the content of thoughts is fairly simple - it is not thecomplex content we intuitively associate with thoughtsSome of the contents we intuitively associate with thoughtsare derivatively represented by thoughts, where derived mentalrepresentation is a matter of dispositions to unpack conceptsand dispositions to accept certain unpackings
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Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought
The End
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