phi125$$ mattersof$life$and$death$ course$booklet

PHI 125 Matters of Life and Death

Course Booklet

Lecturer: Chris Bennett ([email protected]) Office Hours: Thursday 1-‐3pm Rm B14, Dept of Philosophy, 45 Victoria St


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Contents

Course Outline and General Info...................................................... p. 3

Department Statement on Use of Unfair Means.......................... p. 5

Lecture Schedule and Reading List.................................................. p. 6

Tutorial Discussion Topics and Tutorial Preparation Exercises................................................................................................... p. 9

Coursework Essay Questions...........................................................p. 23


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Course Outline The “Matters of Life and Death” course aims to get students to think critically and reflectively about important moral decisions that people have to make in real life. These are issues that students may well have a view on already. We will draw out some of the main moral principles that influence our thinking in this area, and assess the relevance of particular principles to particular issues. The central questions the course deals with have to do with the prohibition on killing, and the validity of exceptions to that principle. In pursuing these questions, we will look at questions such as the following. Who or what qualifies for moral status? Can we lose the right to life? How far can we be required to sacrifice our own interests for the needs of others? To what extent should we be permitted to take risks with our own life, perhaps up to the point of ending it when we so choose? We will investigate these questions by looking at how philosophers have approached various practical life and death issues, such as: capital punishment; suicide and euthanasia; abortion; using and eating non-‐human animals; allowing starvation and malnutrition in countries less fortunate than our own; and war and self-‐defence. By the end of the course, students will have a clearer grasp of some important moral issues, and the principles underlying them. They will also have a better grasp of how to think critically about these principles. General Course Information Books to buy P. Singer (ed.), Applied Ethics (Oxford UP, 1986) H. LaFollette (ed.), Ethics in Practice, 3rd edition (Blackwell 2007) Lectures Lectures are on Thursdays 4-‐4.50 and Friday 12-‐12.50, both in Sir Frederick Mappin Building Lecture Theatre 6. Attendance at lectures is essential to this module. In lectures I will be setting out the main issues that you will be expected to be familiar with in tutorials, essays and exams, and critically examining some of the main arguments. Tutorials Tutorials give you a chance to discuss the issues from lectures in a small-‐group setting, exploring your own ideas as well as clarifying issues you don’t fully understand. You will also write tutorial preparation exercises for most tutorials (not the first one), which your tutor may choose to give you a chance to discuss at the start of the tutorial. Attendance at tutorials is mandatory. You will face action from the department if you miss tutorials without explanation, and could risk failing the module if you are reported for unsatisfactory progress. You can choose to attend a tutorial at a time convenient to you. You can do this by signing up to a tutorial group through the PHI 125 page on MOLE from the Monday of Week 2.


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Tutorials run from Week 3 until Week 11. Tutorials will be on at a range of times that you can fit in to your timetable. Assessment is by means of coursework essay (50%) and a one-‐hour exam (50%). You will also write tutorial preparation exercises for each tutorial. These tutorial preparation exercises must be submitted electronically (through MOLE) in advance of your tutorial, and a paper copy brought to the tutorial. Failure to submit these exercises on time will result in the loss of marks from your overall grade for the module. See below for further information. Essays Essays are due at 4pm on Tuesday of Week 11 (10th December). Essays must be between 1000 and 1500 words in length. Essays are marked anonymously, so there should be no record of your name on the essay itself. Please make sure that your registration number is at the top of your essay instead. The university-‐wide policy is that essays submitted late will be docked 5% for each working day after the deadline, unless the Director of First-‐Year Studies has granted the student an extension. Essays submitted more than five days late without permission will be given a mark of zero. If you have circumstances that justify an extension, please write to the Director of First-‐Year Studies, George Botterill: [email protected] All essays must be submitted both electronically and in paper form. Electronic submission is done through MOLE, which you can access through your MUSE web-‐page. Go to the Assignments link of the relevant module, and upload your essay there. Be sure to press the submit button. The paper copy must be submitted to the Philosophy Departmental Office (45 Victoria Street). Tutorial Preparation Exercises You will write short preparation essays (roughly 300 words) for six of the eight tutorials. The purpose of these short preparation exercises is both to focus your thinking on the topic of that tutorial, and to give you practice in various skills essential to writing longer essays (both in this module and in your degree programme more generally). Tutorial preparation xercises are designed for preparation and practice, and are not formally assessed. However, failure to submit a tutorial preparation exercise on time or failure to make a reasonable attempt at addressing the question will result in a five-‐point reduction in your module grade. This means that you could lose 30 marks simply by not submitting these exercises.


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Departmental Statement on Unfair Means The following four examples of unfair means are serious academic offences and may result in penalties that could have a lasting effect on a student’s career, both at University and beyond (including possible expulsion from the University). Plagiarism (either intentional or unintentional) is the stealing of ideas or work of another person (including experts and fellow or former students) and is considered dishonest and unprofessional. Plagiarism may take the form of cutting and pasting, taking or closely paraphrasing ideas, passages, sections, sentences, paragraphs, drawings, graphs and other graphical material from books, articles, internet sites or any other source and submitting them for assessment without appropriate acknowledgement. Submitting bought or commissioned work (for example from internet sites, essay “banks” or “mills”) is an extremely serious form of plagiarism. This may take the form of buying or commissioning either the whole assignment or part of it and implies a clear intention to deceive the examiners. The University also takes an extremely serious view of any student who sells, offers to sell or passes on their own assignments to other students. Double submission (or self plagiarism) is resubmitting previously submitted work on one or more occasions (without proper acknowledgement). This may take the form of copying either the whole assignment or part of it. Normally credit will already have been given for this work. Collusion is where two or more people work together to produce a piece of work, all or part of which is then submitted by each of them as their own individual work. This includes passing on work in any format to another student. Collusion does not occur where students involved in group work are encouraged to work together to produce a single piece of work as part of the assessment process.


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Lecture Schedule and Reading List Life and Death Week 1: What is Bad About Death? Lucretius, On the Nature of the Universe, tr. R. E. Latham (Penguin 1961), Bk III 855-‐977 T. Nagel, “Death” in Singer (ed.), Applied Ethics G. Scarre, Death, Ch. 5 & 6 Also: F. Feldman, ‘Some Puzzles About the Evil of Death,’ Philosophical Review vol. 100 (1991) S. Luper-‐Foy, ‘Annihilation,’ Philosophical Quarterly vol. 37 (1987) ‘It’s your life’? Paternalism, Harm and Risk Week 2: Suicide and Euthanasia D. Hume, ‘Suicide’ in P. Singer (ed.), Applied Ethics J. D. Velleman, “Against the Right to Die” in LaFollette (ed.), Ethics in Practice J. Hardwig, ‘Dying at the Right Time: Reflections on (Un-‐)Assisted Suicide’ in LaFollette (ed.), Ethics in Practice Also: P. Foot, ‘Euthanasia’ in her Virtues and Vices F. Cohn and J. Lynn, ‘A Duty to Care Revisited’ in LaFollette (ed.), Ethics in Practice T. Beauchamp, ‘Justifying Physician-‐Assisted Deaths’ in LaFollette (ed.), Ethics in Practice M. Cholbi, ‘Suicide Intervention and Kantian Non-‐Ideal Theory,’ Journal of Applied Philosophy 19 (2003) Week 3: Drugs and their Legalisation J. S. Mill, ‘Freedom of Action’ in LaFollette (ed.), Ethics in Practice J. Q. Wilson, ‘Against the Legalisation of Drugs’ in LaFollette (ed.), Ethics in Practice D. Husak, ‘Why We Should Decriminalise Drug Use’ in LaFollette (ed.), Ethics in Practice J. Waldron, ‘A Right to Do Wrong,’ Ethics vol. 92 (1981) How Much Must We Sacrifice for Others? Week 4: The Survival Lottery J. Harris, ‘The Survival Lottery’ in P. Singer (ed.), Applied Ethics P. Singer, ‘Famine, Affluence and Morality’ in LaFollette (ed.), Ethics in Practice J. Arthur, ‘Famine Relief and the Ideal Moral Code’ in LaFollette (ed.), Ethics in Practice Also: C. Morillo, ‘As Sure As Shooting,’ Philosophy 51 (1976) L. Pascal, “Judgement Day” in Singer (ed.), Applied Ethics J. Rachels, “Active and Passive Euthanasia” in Singer (ed.), Applied Ethics


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Week 5: Thomson on Abortion J. J. Thomson, ‘A Defence of Abortion’ in Singer (ed.), Applied Ethics B. Brody, ‘Thomson on Abortion,’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1972) M. O. Little, ‘The Moral Permissibility of Abortion’ in LaFollette (ed.), Ethics in Practice Also: M. Tooley, ‘Abortion and Infanticide’ in Singer (ed.), Applied Ethics M. A. Warren, ‘On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion’ in LaFollette (ed.), Ethics in Practice Can We Lose the Right to Life? Week 6: Capital Punishment J. S. Mill, ‘Speech in Favour of Capital Punishment’ in P. Singer (ed.), Applied Ethics C. H. Wellman, ‘The Rights-‐Forfeiture Theory of Punishment,’ Ethics vol. 122 (2012) Also: C. W. Morris, ‘Punishment and Loss of Moral Standing,’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (1991) R. Lippke, ‘Criminal Offenders and Right Forfeiture,’ Journal of Social Philosophy J. Rachels, ‘Punishment and Desert’ in LaFollette (ed.), Ethics in Practice L. Pojman, ‘In Defence of the Death Penalty’ in LaFollette (ed.), Ethics in Practice J. Reiman, ‘Against the Death Penalty’ in LaFollette (ed.), Ethics in Practice Week 7 – Writing Week (no lectures or tutorials) Week 8: War and Self-‐Defence J. J. Thomson, ‘Self-‐Defense,’ Philosophy and Public Affairs vol. 20 (1991) J. Boyle, ‘Just War Doctrine and the Military Response to Terrorism’ in LaFollette (ed.), Ethics in Practice C. Beitz, ‘The Justifiability of Humanitarian Intervention’ in LaFollette (ed.), Ethics in Practice R. Fullinwider, ‘War and Innocence,’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 4 (1975)

To whom or what do we owe moral consideration? Week 9: Marquis on Abortion

D. Marquis, ‘An Argument that Abortion is Wrong’ in LaFollette (ed.), Ethics in Practice M. Warren, ‘On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion’ in LaFollette (ed.), Ethics in Practice M. Tooley, ‘Abortion and Infanticide’ in P. Singer (ed.), Applied Ethics


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Also: A. Norcross, ‘Killing, Abortion and Contraception: A Reply to Marquis,’ Journal of Philosophy 87 (1990) P. McInerney, ‘Does a Fetus Already Have a Future-‐Like Ours?,’ Journal of Philosophy 87 (1990) R. Hursthouse, ‘Virtue Theory and Abortion’ in LaFollette (ed.), Ethics in Practice Week 10: Non-‐Human Animals P. Singer, “All Animals Are Equal” in Singer (ed.), Applied Ethics M. A. Fox, “The Moral Community” in LaFollette (ed.), Ethics in Practice R. G. Frey, “Moral Standing, the Value of Lives and Speciesism” in LaFollette (ed.), Ethics in Practice T. Regan, “The Case for Animal Rights” in LaFollette (ed.), Ethics in Practice Also: P. Carruthers, The Animals Issue Distant Lives Week 11: Wrongful Life? J. Feinberg, ‘Wrongful Life and the Counterfactual Element in Harming,’ Social Philosophy and Policy vol. 4 (1986) D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, Ch. 16 (the ‘non-‐identity’ problem) S. Smilansky, ‘On Not Being Sorry About the Morally Bad,’ Philosophy vol. 80 (2005) S. Smilansky, ‘Morally, Should We Prefer Never to Have Existed?’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy (available online) Week 12: Review of the course


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Week Three – Death NO TUTORIAL PREPARATION EXERCISE THIS WEEK This week’s Tutorial Reading: T. Nagel, ‘Death’ in P. Singer (ed.), Applied Ethics Questions for discussion 1. Three arguments for why death could not be a bad thing for the person who dies: Epicurus: ‘Accustom thyself to believe that death is nothing to us, for good and evil imply sentience, and death is the privation of all sentience.’ Epicurus: ‘Death, therefore, the most awful of all evils, is nothing to us seeing that, when we are, death is not come, and, when death is come, we are not.’ Lucretius: ‘Look back at the eternity that passed before we were born, and mark how utterly it counts to us as nothing. This is a mirror that Nature holds up to us, in which we may see the time that shall be after we are dead. Is there anything terrifying in the sight – anything depressing – anything that is not more restful than the soundest sleep?’ Put these arguments into your own words. Then look at Nagel’s statement of these arguments (‘Essentially, there are three types of problem,’ p. 12). Has he done a good job of explaining them, or could you offer improvements? 2. Can you explain why Nagel says that ‘All these problems have something to do with time’ (p. 12). Is he right? 3. ‘... it is arbitrary to restrict the goods and evils that can befall a man to non-‐relational properties ascribable to him at particular times’ (p. 14). What are ‘non-‐relational properties’? What is ‘ascribing’? Is Nagel right that some goods and evils that people undergo are relational properties? 4. What is Nagel’s solution to Lucretius’s ‘problem of temporal asymmetry’ (p. 15)? Is it successful? 5. Nagel closes with the question whether ‘death, no matter when it occurs, can be said to deprive its victim of what is in the relevant sense a possible continuation of life’ (p. 17). If the answer is yes, does it follow from Nagel’s view that it would be better never to die?


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Consider, by contrast, this passage from Bernard Williams: “The Don Juan in Hell joke, that heaven’s prospects are tedious and that the devil has the best tunes, though a tired fancy in itself, at least serves to show up a real and (I suspect) a profound difficulty, of providing any model of an unending, supposedly satisfying, state or activity which would not rightly prove boring to anyone who remained conscious of himself and who had acquired a character, interests, tastes and impatiences in the course of life already, a finite life. The point is not that for such a man boredom would be a tiresome consequence of the supposed states or activities, and that they would be objectionable just on the utilitarian or hedonistic ground that they had this disagreeable feature. If that were all there was to it, we could imagine the feature away, along no doubt with other disagreeable features of human life in its present imperfection. The point is rather that boredom, as sometimes in more ordinary circumstances, would be not just a tiresome effect, but a reaction almost perceptual in character to the poverty of one’s relation to the environment. Nothing less will do for eternity than something that makes boredom unthinkable. What could that be? Something that could be guaranteed to be at every moment utterly absorbing? But if a man has and retains a character, there is no reason to suppose that there is anything that could be that. If, lacking a conception of the guaranteedly absorbing activity, one tries merely to think away the reaction of boredom, one is no longer supposing an improvement in the circumstances, but merely an impoverishment in his consciousness of them. Just as being bored can be a sign of not noticing, understanding or appreciating enough, so equally not being bored can be a sign of not noticing, or not reflecting, enough.” (B. Williams, “The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality” in his Problems of the Self, pp. 94-‐5) Try to explain Williams’s point in your own words, and assess whether he is correct.



Week Four – Suicide and Euthanasia Reading for this week’s tutorial: J. D. Velleman, ‘Against the Right to Die’ in H. LaFollette (ed.), Ethics in Practice Tutorial Preparation Exercise Topic One of the skills necessary in order to do philosophy (or any other humanities subject) well is close reading. However, philosophy texts are often difficult to understand on a first reading: they can be complex, or they can be written in a style that is not easy to read. It can be hard to follow the argument. In this exercise we will concentrate on one particular text and try to draw out its arguments through close reading. ‘Tis impious, says the old Roman superstition, to divert rivers from their course, or invade the prerogatives of nature. ‘Tis impious, says the French superstition, to inoculate for the small-‐pox, or usurp the business of providence, by voluntarily producing distempers and maladies. ‘Tis impious, says the modern European superstition, to put a period to our own life, and thereby to rebel against our creator; and why not impious, say I, to build houses, cultivate the ground, or sail upon the ocean? In all these actions we employ our powers of mind and body, to produce some innovation in the course of nature; and in none of them do we any more. They are all of them therefore equally innocent, or equally criminal . . . “Let us now examine . . . whether Suicide be . . . a breach of our duty to our neighbour and to society. A man, who retires from life, does no harm to society: He only ceases to do good; which, if it is an injury, is of the lowest kind. – All our obligations to do good to society seem to imply something reciprocal. I receive the benefits of society and therefore ought to promote its interests, but when I withdraw myself altogether from society, can I be bound any longer? But, allowing that our obligations to do good were perpetual, they have certainly some bounds; I am not obliged to do a small good to society at the expense of a great harm to myself; why then should I prolong a miserable existence, because of some frivolous advantage which the public may perhaps receive from me? . . . – But suppose that it is no longer in my power to promote the interest of society; suppose that my life hinders some person from being much more useful to society. In such cases my resignation of life must not only be innocent but laudable . . . (David Hume, “Of Suicide”) BEFORE YOU BEGIN, check you understand the language Hume is using: e.g. ‘impious,’ ‘prerogative of nature,’ ‘providence,’ ‘period,’ ‘reciprocal,’ ‘laudable.’ Then identify ONE argument in the text quoted above, state it in your own words, and see if you can say one thing in favour of the argument and one thing against it. Questions for discussion in the tutorial: 1. Velleman worries that, in some arguments for ‘dying with dignity,’ the idea of dignity is ‘incompatible with being cared for,’ merely reflects ‘our culture’s obsession with



independence, physical strength and youth’ and is ‘not worth having’ (p. 82). What arguments does he have in mind? Is he right in his assessment of them? 2. ‘... so long as patients would be competent to exercise an option of being euthanized, their doing so would be immoral, since their dignity as persons would still be intact’ (p. 82). Can you think of any justification for what Velleman says here? One thing to think about might be: Can there be moral duties to oneself? Specifically, can one have a duty to oneself not to commit suicide? 3. Check you understand what Velleman means by saying his main argument is not Kantian but consequentialist. 4. What role in the argument is played by Velleman’s assumption that ‘patients are infallible’ in their requests to die (p. 83)? 5. Velleman’s main argument begins in section IV. What point is he making with e.g. the union negotiator example (pp. 83-‐4) and the dinner party example (p. 84) about the undesirability, in some cases, of having options? Is he right? 6. How does Velleman argue that the case of euthanasia is, in important respects, like the examples mention in the last question? Is he right? 7. Is Velleman correct to say that his argument is not paternalistic (check you understand what this means)?



Week Five – Legalisation of Drugs Reading for this week’s tutorial: D. Husak, ‘Why We Should Decriminalize Drug Use’ in LaFollette (ed.), Ethics in Practice

Tutorial preparation exercise topic Imagine that you are a civil servant in a policy unit working for a government minister who is interested in the possibility of decriminalising or legalising drugs. The minister, though ambitious for her policy, does not have time to read long documents, so she needs something informative but very concise. What she wants is a sense of the main relevant considerations she needs to think about in considering her policy options. Prepare a 300-‐word briefing document for her. Note: At the start of his essay, Husak distinguishes ‘cost-‐benefit’ analyses of drug policy from ‘arguments of principle.’ Your task is to write something that succinctly sets out the major costs, benefits and issues of principle that bear on the question of drug legalisation.

Questions for discussion in the tutorial 1. In discussing the meaning of his idea of ‘decriminalization,’ Husak claims (p. 336) that it would be incoherent to hold that drug use should not be decriminalised, but that no one should be punished for merely using a drug. Why does he say this? Do you agree with him?

2. Husak rejects the libertarian argument to decriminalisation that would be based on the principle of ‘the freedom to do whatever you want to your own body’ (p. 337). He says rather that: ‘Whether you have a right to do something you want to your body depends on what happens when you do it.’ Is Husak right to reject this kind of libertarianism? Would J.S. Mill (who defends the Harm Principle) agree?

3. What is the difference between the ‘compelling state interest’ test and the ‘rational basis’ test (p. 338)? Is Husak right to think that the ‘rational basis’ test is too weak in the case of criminal laws for drug use?

4. Husak admits that the state ‘may have good reasons to discourage people from using drugs’ but that it does not have a justification for punishing them. What else could the state do short of punishing? Would this be a better alternative? Does it need to punish as well?

5. On p. 340 Husak considers the possible consequences of allowing lawsuits against producers of drugs for the harm their drugs cause. What does he think the potential consequences of this might be? Is he right? Could this be a better way to contain the market in drugs than criminalisation?



6. One argument in favour of criminalising drug use has to do with the deterrent value of the threat of punishment. Is Husak successful in his rejection of this argument?

7. Some people think that decriminalising drug use would be to condone the taking of drugs. On this view the criminal law is a marker of what society deems acceptable. Is this a good argument in favour of criminalisation? How would Husak respond?



Week Six – The Survival Lottery

Reading for this week’s tutorial: J. Harris, ‘The Survival Lottery’ in P. Singer (ed.), Applied Ethics

Tutorial preparation exercise topic Consider this excerpt from “The Survival Lottery” (pp. 89-‐90):

[E]veryone should be given a sort of lottery number. Whenever doctors have two or more dying patients who could be saved by transplants, and no suitable organs have come to hand through ‘natural’ deaths, they can ask a central computer to supply a suitable donor. The computer will then pick the number of a suitable donor at random and he will be killed so that the lives of two or more others may be saved … With the refinement of transplant procedures such a scheme could offer the chance of saving large numbers of lives that are now list. Indeed, even taking into account the loss of the lives of donors, the numbers of untimely deaths each year might be dramatically reduced, so much so that everyone’s chances of living to a ripe old age might be increased. If this were to be the consequence of the adoption of such a scheme, and it might well be, it could not be dismissed lightly.

Whether you agree with Harris’s scheme or not, try to put forward an argument against the Survival Lottery. Try to make your argument as persuasive as possible. If Harris considers your argument in his article (and has a counter-‐argument against it), acknowledge this and see if you can provide a response to his counter-‐argument. Remember you need to be as brief and concise as possible to fit this into 300 words.

Questions for discussion in the tutorial 1. Harris (in the guise of ‘Y and Z’) initially puts forward an argument that it is right that one person should be killed to provide healthy organs to save two. He imagines a response to this that says that this would involve killing the innocent. Against the idea that killing one to save two involves killing the innocent, however, Harris points out that the two are just as innocent as the one, and that the decision not to kill one to save two is just a decision to prefer the interests of the lucky – i.e. those lucky enough not to have developed life-‐threatening illness – to the interests of the unlucky. Is Harris’s argument successful? Why do we think killing the innocent is wrong? Does it rule out killing one to save two (or more)? 2. Is a scheme like the survival lottery a sign of a society in which ‘individuals [are] seen merely as interchangeable units in a structure’ (p. 91)? 3. Is it a good objection to the Survival Lottery that it would be ‘playing God,’ determining when people are going to die rather than allowing deaths that will happen ‘naturally’?



4. Is it a good objection to the Survival Lottery that there is an important moral difference between killing and letting die? 5. On balance, would society be fairer if the Survival Lottery were introduced?



Week Eight – Thomson on Abortion Reading for this week’s tutorial: J. J. Thomson, ‘A Defense of Abortion’ in P. Singer (ed.), Applied Ethics Tutorial Preparation Exercise Topic In 300 words, explain whether you agree that you would be within your rights to unplug the violinist in Thomson’s example. Give reasons and arguments for your conclusion. Questions for discussion in the tutorial 1. Is Thomson’s violinist example helpful in thinking about the ethics of abortion. 2. Does a woman have a right to an abortion in a case in which she will otherwise die? An argument for a negative answer to this question (what Thomson calls ‘the extreme view’) might point out that a foetus has a right to life and is an innocent human being; morality forbids killing the innocent. Do you agree with this argument? If not, where does it go wrong? How does Thomson argue against the ‘extreme view’? 3. Does Thomson give a good argument against the view that the right to life means ‘having a right to be given at least the bare minimum one needs for continued life’ (p. 45)? 4. Does the violinist have a right not to be killed? If he does, does this mean he has the right to the continued use of your body? 5. Could it be the case that a foetus has a right to the continued use of a woman’s body? How would it get that right? 6. Does Thomson give a good argument for her claim that a refusal to give the violinist the use of your kidneys for the hour he needs them would be callous, but not unjust (p. 51), on the grounds that he has no right to the use of your kidneys (compare the case of the child eating all the chocolates on p. 50).



Week Nine – Capital Punishment

Reading for this week’s tutorial: C. H. Wellman, ‘The Rights-‐Forfeiture Theory of Punishment,’ Ethics vol. 122 (2012) Tutorial Preparation Exercise Topic “When there has been brought home to any one, by conclusive evidence, the greatest crime known to the law [i.e. aggravated murder]; and when the attendant circumstances suggest no palliation of guilt, no hope that the culprit may ever yet not be unworthy to live among mankind, nothing to make it probable that the crime was an exception to his general character rather than a consequence to it, then I confess that it appears to me that to deprive the criminal of the life of which he has proved himself to be unworthy – solemnly to blot him out from the fellowship of mankind and from the catalogue of the living – is the most appropriate, as it is certainly the most impressive, mode in which society can attach to so great a crime the penal consequences which for the security of life it is indispensable to annex to it.” (J. S. Mill, ‘Speech in Favour of Capital Punishment’ in Singer (ed.), Applied Ethics, p. 98) In 300 words, explain Mill’s justification for this view of capital punishment, and explain whether his view commits him to the position that those who commit aggravated murder forfeit their right to life. Questions for discussion in the tutorial 1. Wellman argues that punishment can involve treatment that would otherwise violate a person’s rights to life, liberty and/or property; and hence, if punishment is permissible, it must be because a person no longer has those rights. So, it has to be explained how they have lost or forfeited those rights. Does this seem correct? 2. Some people think that we have fundamental human rights to life, liberty, etc. simply in virtue of being human. But then how can we forfeit or lose those rights? This is what Wellman calls the ‘problem of status.’ Is he right to think that this is not a deep problem for his view? 3. If a person forfeits some of their rights by doing bad things, does this mean that anyone would be justified in punishing them (this is Wellman’s problem of ‘indeterminate authorization’)? Is this a problem? 4. If a person forfeits their rights, are they fair game for anyone to do those things to them that would constitute fair punishment, even if they do them for other reasons (the ‘problem of relatedness’)? E.g. if you have forfeited your right to life, would it now be permissible for me to kill you, even if I kill you because I have always hated you rather than doing it in order to punish you?



5. If forfeiture theory is correct, do killers lose the right not to be killed, and rapists lose the right not to be raped? Is that an unacceptable consequence of this theory? 6. Can the forfeiture theorist give any good explanation of which rights are lost by virtue of which criminal actions? Do you lose precisely those rights that you violated? Or some other set of rights? For how long? Does the forfeiture theorist have a non-‐arbitrary answer to these questions? 7. Are there any good grounds for thinking that in doing some moral wrong, you forfeit your right to something to which you would otherwise have been entitled?



Week Ten – War and Self-‐Defence Reading for this week’s tutorial: J. J. Thomson, ‘Self-‐Defense,’ Philosophy and Public Affairs vol. 20 (1991) Tutorial Preparation Exercise Florida’s ‘stand your ground’ laws became notorious after the fatal shooting in 2012 of unarmed black teenager Trayvon Martin by George Zimmerman. Zimmerman proved difficult to prosecute – and was eventually acquitted – because of the protection these laws give to those who claim to be acting in self-‐defence. This raises the question whether there are limits to the action that can reasonably be taken in self-‐defence. In 300 words, write the Introduction to an essay answering this question: ‘Do Florida’s ‘stand your ground’ laws provide a legal right to unreasonable and excessive use of force?’ NOTE: The point of this exercise is to get you to think about a) planning an essay, and b) writing a good Introduction. In your Introduction you should explain what you are going to argue for in your essay, and how you are going to go about it. Questions for discussion in the tutorial 1. Do you agree with Thomson that it is permissible to kill the Innocent Aggressor and the Innocent Threat?

2. Do you agree with Thomson that it is impermissible to Use, Substitute or Ride-‐Roughshod-‐Over a Bystander?

3. Can you make your answers to 1) and 2) consistent? (I.e. if you think, like Thomson, that you can kill an Innocent Threat, why can’t you Use a Bystander?

4. What does Thomson take to be the Doctrine of Double Effect? What are her criticisms of it? Are they valid (is she right to say that intentions and fault are irrelevant to permissibility)?

5. Is Thomson right to say that ‘Trolley-‐Pre-‐emption is Strategic Bomber without the war between the Good and the Bads’ (p. 296-‐7)? Should this make us think that Strategic Bomber is impermissible? 6. Can a person who is an Innocent Threat violate your right not to be killed without choosing to do so, or without being at fault for doing so? Can s/he thereby lose her right not to be killed? 7. Is it impermissible for a Villainous Aggressor to fight back against a justified act of self-‐defence (p. 305)? Is an Innocent Threat allowed to fight back (p. 304)?



Week Eleven – Marquis on Abortion Reading for this week’s tutorial: D. Marquis, ‘An Argument that Abortion is Wrong’ in LaFollette (ed.), Ethics in Practice No Tutorial Preparation Exercise this week Questions for discussion in the tutorial 1. Does Marquis’s view of what makes killing wrong follow straightforwardly from Nagel’s view of what is bad about death – that it deprives us of the goods of life we might have had?

2. ‘The pro-‐choice syllogism can be attacked by attacking its major premise: Only persons have the right to life. This premise is subject to scope problems because the class of persons includes too little: infants, the severely retarded, and some of the mentally ill seem to fall outside the class of persons as the supporter of choice understands the concept’ (p. 139). Put this argument into your own words, explaining what position (or syllogism) is being attacked, and what the problem is. Does this seem a plausible criticism of the standard pro-‐abortion argument? Does Marquis succeed in providing an account of what is wrong with killing that does not appeal to the idea of personhood?

3. Is Marquis right that his account gives a good explanation of e.g. the ethics of euthanasia (p. 142)? What do you think Marquis would say about a person’s right to commit suicide? Would it be wrong to deprive oneself of a valuable future?

4. Is it a strength or a weakness of Marquis’s argument that it is a ‘potentiality argument’ (p. 144)?

5. What does Steinbock mean when she argues that foetuses ‘lack interests’ because they lack sentience (discussed by Marquis pp. 144-‐5)? Is she right?

6. Is it a problem for Marquis’s account that it would mean that the killing of younger people with a longer future would be morally worse than the killing of older people?

7. Is it a problem for Marquis’s account that it would mean that the use of contraception prevents beings having a valuable future they might have had, and is thus as bad as killing?



Coursework Essay Questions This essay is to be handed in by 4pm on Tuesday of Week 11 (Tues 10th December). Your essay should be anonymous, with only your registration number by way of identification. Your essay should be between 1000 and 1500 words. Please hand in a paper copy to the Department of Philosophy at 45 Victoria St, and an electronic copy through MOLE. 1. Is there any good argument for the conclusion that death – considered as the permanent and irrevocable end of our existence – is not a bad thing for the person who dies? 2. Are there grounds for thinking that we should not legalise voluntary euthanasia because of the bad consequences it would bring? 3. ‘The heavy use of crack, unlike the heavy use of tobacco, corrodes those natural sentiments of sympathy and duty that constitute our human nature and make possible our social life’ (J. Q. Wilson, ‘Against the Legalization of Drugs’ in H. LaFollette (ed.), Ethics in Practice, p. 334). Is this, or any other argument, a sufficient reason to criminalise drug use? 4. Would society be fairer if it adopted the Survival Lottery? If you answer yes, does it follow that we should adopt the Survival Lottery? 5. ‘Surely the question of whether you have a right to life at all, or how much of it you have, shouldn’t turn on the question of whether or not you are the product of a rape’ (J. J. Thomson, ‘A Defense of Abortion’ in P. Singer (ed.), Applied Ethics, p. 39). What is the significance of this claim in Thomson’s defence of abortion? Is she right? 6. Is it a good justification for punishment to say that criminals have forfeited their rights against loss of life, liberty, hard treatment, etc.?

phi125$$ mattersof$life$and$death$ course$booklet

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