philippine army journal 1st quarter 2013

7/28/2019 Philippine Army Journal 1st Quarter 2013

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The Road to Profciency:The PGS Prociency Report of the Philippine Armyby THE Army GovErnAncE And STrATEGy mAnAGEmEnT officE (AGSmo)

The ARMY

JOURNAL

After-Activity Report on thePhilippine Armys Journey towardsPGS Profciencyby JACKIE LyN N NUNAG, Army GovErNANCE

ANd StrAtEGy mANAGEmENt offICE (AGSmo)

Non-International Armed Conictsin the Philippinesby LtGEN rAymUNdo b fErrEr AfP &

LtC rANdoLPH G CAbANGbANG (INf) PA

A Case for Increasing theAustralian Defense Training Aid tothe Philippinesby LtC romEo N bAUtIStA III (INf) PA

The Sabah Claim: A Historical andFactual Narrativeby mAJ WILfrEdo b mANALANG III (mI) PA

The Asian Arms Raceby mAJ LEAH L SANtIAGo (fA) PA

The Relationship between TerrorGroups and the Media: Its Impactin Combating the Terrorist Threatsby mAJ mArIA vICtorIA b AGoNCILLo (CAv) PA

tHE ACAdEmIC JoUrNAL of tHE PHILIPPINE Army

January - March 201


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EdItorIAL boArd

LTGEN NOEL A COBALLES AFP

ChairmanMGEN MAXIMO G CARO AFP

Vice Chairman

COL GERRY P AMANTE GSC (OS) PA

Secretary

COL MACAIROG S ALBERTO GSC (MI) PA

COL MELQUIADES L FELICIANO GSC (INF) PA

COL RAMIRO MANUEL A REY GSC (INF) PA

LTC RANDOLPH G CABANGBANG (INF) PA

Members

EdItorIAL StAffCOL GERRY P AMANTE GSC (OS) PA

Editor-in-Chief

MAJ RUEL G ROMBAOA (INF) PA

Managing Editor

LTC VINCE JAMES DG BANTILAN (MI) PA

MAJ JIMMY V JIMENEZ (INF) PA

MAJ BENJAMIN C SOLIS JR (INF) PA

MAJ CRIZALDO A FERNANDEZ (INF) PA

Associate Editors

LINUS VAN O PLATA

Copy Editor & Circulation Manager

WARLOU JOYCE S ANTONIO

MA. KATHLEEN C CABAL

MA. PATRICIA M LANSANG

AIS LYNN FABIOLA G MANUEL

Proofreaders

HARRY JAMES A CREOLayout Artist

The Army Journal is an academic journal published quarterly by Headquarters, PhilippineArmy with the Army Governance and Strategy Management Ofce (AGSMO) as the ofce of

primary responsibility. It serves as a tool to publish original research or related literature on

subjects relevant to the PA or the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). It also makes such

information available to other scholars and researchers. Furthermore, the journal contributes

to the advancement and extent of knowledge in the PA or the AFP in particular and the

Philippine society in general.

The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reect the ofcial

position of the Philippine Army. The Editorial Board ensures accuracy of the information

contained herein, but does not accept responsibility for errors and omissions. The authors are

responsible for the accuracy and source documentation of the material that they provide. The

Army Journal reserves the right to edit the materials.

Submissions are not limited to the ofcers, enlisted personnel, and civilian employees of the

Philippine Army and the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Articles, notes from the readers,

and book reviews by other writers outside the PA are highly encouraged and would be greatly

appreciated. Please send them to:

The Editor, The ARMY JOURNAL

Army Governance and Strategy Management Ofce (AGSMO), Philippine Army

Fort Andres Bonifacio, Metro Manila

E-mail: [email protected]

[email protected]

IN tHIS ISSUE

1 TheRoadtoProciency:ThePGSProciencyReportofthePhilippineArmy

(Executive Summary)by JACKIE LYN N NUNAG, Army Governance and Strategy Management Ofce

(AGSmo)

7 After-ActivityReportonthePhilippineArmysJourneytowardsPGS

Prociencyby JACKIE LYN N NUNAG, Army Governance and Strategy Management Ofce

(AGSmo)

17 Non-InternationalArmedConictsinthePhilippines LTGEn rAymUndo b fErrEr AfP

& LTc rAndoLPH G cAbAnGbAnG (inf) PA

27 A Case for Increasing the Australian Defense Training Aid to the Philippines LTc romEo n bAUTiSTA iii (inf) PA

35 TheSabahClaim:AHistoricalandFactualNarrative mAJ WiLfrEdo b mAnALAnG iii (mi) PA

45 The Asian Arms Race mAJ LEAH L SAnTiAGo (fA) PA

59 TheRelationshipbetweenTerrorGroupsandtheMedia:ItsImpactin

Combating the Terrorist Threatsb mAJ mAriA vicToriA b AGonciLLo (cAv) PA

The ARMY

JOURNAL

on THE covEr:

d. Jesus Estasla

(Chairman, Institute

for Solidarity in Asia)

and LTGEn noEL

A cobALLES

(Commanding General,

Philippine Army) placethe third heart on the Armys Performance

Governance System (PGS) plaque, symbolizing

the third stage in the PGS Pathway that the

organization has successfully passed last 19

March 2013 at the Public Governance Forum.

(Photo by OACPA, PA)

TiP: SCAN THECODE USING YOURSMARTPHONETO VISIT THEPHILIPPINE ARMYSOFFICIAL WEBSITE.


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EdItorS NotE:A frESH Army JoUrNAL

The Army Journal is a venue for academic discourse that serves a three-fold purpose: one, it serves as a tool to

publish research or related literature on subjects relevant to the Philippine Army; two, it makes information

available to other parties for the fur therance of their scholarly pursuits; lastly, it contributes to the advancement

and extent of knowledge of the Philippine Army in particular and the Philippine Society in general. All thesepurposes fulll the Armys strategic objectives under the Army Transformation Roadmap (ATR) to engage and

partner with key stakeholders, develop and communicate a brand image consistent with the Armys Core Values,

and become a professional Army loved by the people.

This issue of the Army Journal - and the succeeding issues, henceforth - puts on a fresh face in many ways: rst: it

is now being managed by the Army Governance and Strategy Management Ofce (AGSMO), an ofce created

last October of 2012 to ensure the success and sustainability of the Army Transformation Roadmap; second, the

articles go through a systematic process of peer-review and editing to ensure that they represent more scholarly

outputs; and third, it introduces a new format that is aesthetically appealing, and intellectually stimulating.

For this issue, reports and perspectives on various topics and in various levels are presented from the prog-

ress of the Philippine Army on its Performance Governance System Pathway (the framework on which the Army

Transformation Roadmap is anchored), to the various issues affecting not only state of affairs of the Philippine

Army but also those affecting the nation as a whole. We, therefore, invite our dear readers to par ticipate in the

discourse, so that we foster a healthy exchange of ideas, and together we can all contribute to the attainment of

our vision of a World Class Army tat is a source of National Pride by 2028.

COL GERRY P AMANTE GSC (OS) PA

Editor-in-Cief


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Background

For years, the Philippine Army (PA) has been hounded by issues and controversies that tarnished its image and

integrity. Through the involvement of a few in coup dtats, various cases of corruption, as well as the violation

of human rights, have been further magnied by the black propaganda of left leaning militants. Further, times are

changing and so are the needs of the nation. Although war ghting remains as the core function of the Armed

Forces, the Army is also increasingly expected to perform non-traditional roles in disaster response, peacekeeping

operations, and national development support.

tHE roAd to ProfICIENCy:tHE PGS ProfICIENCy rEPort

of tHE PHILIPPINE Armyby JAckiE Lyn n nUnAG, Army GovErnAncE And STrATEGy mAnAGEmEnT officE (AGSmo)

1

Atr CommItmENt CErEmoNy (28 NovEmbEr 2012). Major subordinate unit commanders and heads and chief

of ofces pledge their commitment to the transformation program of the Philippine Army. (Photo by OACPA)


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Army Vision: By 2028, A world-clAss Army thAt is A source of nAtionAl pride

Army core purpose: serVing the people, securing the lAnd

2

rationale for change and changeagenda

In view of these, the PA saw the need to reform

its ways and focus on addressing the following: (1)

improve public perceptions and meet the peoples

expectations; (2) be a better army; (3) synchronize

systems and processes to the Defense System ofManagement (DSOM), and support the thrusts of

the AFP Internal Peace and Security Plan Bayanihan

(IPSP); and (4) ensure organizational cohesion.

These very reasons led to the formulation the ATR

that highlights the commitment of the PA to pursue

genuine reforms founded on good governance

and performance excellence. It sets the focus on

the institution rather than individual personalities,

considers long-term strategies rather than short-term

tactics, and, approaches all matters from a systemsperspective in order to address interconnected

priorities instead single issues. Its primary purpose is

to transform the PA into a more capable, responsive,

reliable, and professional organization committed to its

mandate by addressing noted deciencies on systems,

organizational and individual levels.

components of transformation

This strategic shift in the management of the PAs

affairs is aimed at the attainment of the Armys ultimate

vision to be a world-class Army tat is a source

of national pride by 2028. The Army Governance

Charter articulates the concepts and principles

dening the character and purpose of the PA whilethe Army Strategy Map illustrates the strategy and

outlines the goals that must be achieved in order to

realize the vision. Furthermore, the Army Performance

Scorecard, which is what differentiates the ATR from

previous reform programs of the Army, is composed

of objectives, measures and performance targets that

translate the vision into actionable details to address

the strategy implementation gap.

army performance reportUsing this scorecard mechanism, the Army was able

to assess its performance for CY 2012 vis--vis the set

targets. Based on the Army Performance Scorecard

Report for CY 2012, out of the 25 performance

indicators, 7 or 28% of the indicators fall signicantly

short of their target or data is unavailable; 15 or 60%

Atr bASE CAmPS. Since the ATR is a long-term plan, the Army identiedfour (4) base camps from the time the ATR was conceived in April 2010

up to 2028, the vision year. (Diagram by OG5, PA and AGSMO)


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Army Vision: By 2028, A world-clAss Army thAt is A source of nAtionAl pride 3


fall just below the expected targets; while 3 or 12%

meet or exceed their target.

In spite of these improvements, there is still a need

to further rene some of the performance indicators,

especially in terms of validity and reliability of data. By

having a valid tool and an appropriate representation

of the target respondent or data source, the PA will

also be able to generalize claims in the analysis of its

performance.

performance drivers

The PA has developed and implemented strategic

programs to drive these performance measures

and attain the desired end-state. Based on the latest

Strategic Program Review, 31% or 5 out of these 16

strategic initiatives fall signicantly short of targets,

while 69% or 11 of the 16 strategic initiatives fall just

below expected targets.

Because of this, the PA saw the need to conduct

a more in-depth review of the different strategic

initiatives and their impact on the performance

indicators of the enterprise scorecard. This requires

determining which among the sixteen (16) initiatives

should be managed at the strategic level, and at the

ofce level only. Signicant changes in the initiatives and

resources should also be taken into consideration todrive improvement.

pa strategy management system

Based on the results of the strategy and strategic

program review, the Army needs to improve the

validity and reliability of the indicators, focus on

Army GovErNANCE CHArtEr ANd StrAtEGy mAP. While the Charter articulates the concepts and principles dening the character and

purpose of the Army, the Strategy Map visually captures the organizations strategy to realize its vision. (Diagram by OG5, PA and AGSMO


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4

attaining 2013 targets, and to conduct of periodic

review of strategic performance. In this regard, the PA

formulated the PA Strategic Management System (PA

SMS) to harmonize the two strategic management

tools adopted by the PA: the PGS and the Defense

System of Management (DSOM). Since both systemshave unique processes and deliverables, there is a

need to integrate them so that the PA can function

with utmost efciency and effectiveness. Hence, the PA

SMS was developed and approved on 20 May 2011

as the Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) No. 5,

and was later on revised to be SOP No. 4. DSOM is

reinforced and complemented by the PGS at the core

of the revised PA SMS. It is an overarching framework

that reconciles and governs the Philippine Armys

planning and operating systems in order to achieve itslong-term, medium-term, and annual goals. To ensure

the synchronized implementation of the different

functional systems, key PA SMS deliverables were

outlined with specic Army Staff designated as ofce of

primary responsibility (OPRs) that will assist the Army

Governance and Strategy Management System in the

overall implementation of the PA SMS.

army governance and strategymanagement office

Another key step towards the Armys PGS Prociency

journey is the establishment of the Army Governance

and Strategy Management Ofce (AGSMO).

During the initial stages of the ATR, the Army Plans

Division (OG5 PA) took the pr imary responsibility

of advocating and implementing the ATR. However,

as the responsibilities in pursuing the ATR increased

and involved more cross-functional processes, the

need for an ofce of strategy management arose.

Thus, the Army organized the Army Governance

and Strategy Management Ofce last October 2012,

Army GovErNANCE ANd StrAtEGy mANAGEmENt offICE (AGSmo).

This ofce manages the implementation of the ATR. (Photo by AGSMO)


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which now serves as the principal staff assistant of

the Commanding General in all matters pertaining

to governance and strategy implementation. In the

exercise of this mandate, AGSMO reports to the Chief

of Staff, PA, and directly coordinates with the staff. It is

the ofce responsible for the execution of the PA SMS,

and as such, the focal point in the ATR implementation.

monitoring and reporting mechanism

One of the core functions of the AGSMO is the

conduct of Strategy and Strategic Program Reviews as

part of the PA SMS framework. The Strategy Review

is done to evaluate the performance status of each

measure vis--vis the strategic objectives; while the

Strategic Program Review is conducted to evaluate the

status of strategic programs vis--vis the performanceindicators. These reviews start with AGSMO

consolidating the reports of concerned ofces, which

is followed by the HPA Staff evaluation. Afterwards,

it will be forwarded to CGPA for his guidance, and

then the performance report is presented to the PA

Multi-Sector Advisory Board (PA MSAB) for their

information and additional inputs or advice. The

feedback gathered during the series of presentations

will be incorporated by AGSMO in the preparation of

the nal report and recommendations for approval of

the CGPA.

alignment mechanisms

Another key element in the successful implementation

of the ATR is alignment. The PA has achieved

organizational alignment by cascading the ATR,

linking the budget to strategy, and communicating it

consistently.

Alignment of the organization involves creating a

synergy between units by pursuing a commonality of

interests and functions. Towards this end, the PA has

cascaded the ATR to all the units of the PA all over the

country from 07 March 2012 to 10 February 2013.

Second level cascading was done in 35 HPA ofces, 27

major subordinate units, and 816 army personnel.

Next is linking budget to the strategy. Looking at the

PA SMS, the development of budget is anchored

SPrEAdING trANSformAtIoN. ATR Cascading Workshop at the 2nd Mechanized Infantry Brigade,

LAD, PA, Maria Cristina, Balo-I, Lanao del Norte (08-10 February 2013). (Photo by AGSMO)


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6

on the crafted strategy and the capability and

organizational plans. Based on the Annual Plan and

Budget (APB) for Fiscal Year 2013, 94.98% or 38.50

billion out of the 40.61 billion total budget of the

PA budget is aligned to the ATR. Moreover, strategy-

budget alignment is also expressed in the developmentof the PA medium-term program 2014 - 2019 as

manifested in its Program Objectives Memorandum.

The resulting medium-term program that specically

aims to institutionalize DSOM and PGS processes

among others, requires a total of 314.53 billion pesos.

The PA also aligned its units to the ATR by

communicating it. This was done with the PA

Command Information Mechanisms based on the

Army Civil-Military Operation framework and the

communication plan called BREAKTHROUGHRESULTS ALPHA.

plans moving forward

Determined to attain its ultimate goal, the PA came

up with plans that will help sustain its transformation

agenda. These are intended to make sure that the

Army successfully implements the ATR and, in short-

term, realize the 2013 base camp to have a disciplined

and motivated Army capable of addressing all internal

security threats. The plans include the following:

(1) Empowerment of Small Unit Leaders;

(2) Establishment of Performance Scorecard

Management Information System; and

(3) Governance Pathway for Army Units;

However, the PA is also focused on attaining set

performance targets for the next three years, and lay

down the building blocks to attain the 2016 base camp

to be a well-equipped Army that has established a

respectable image in Southeast Asia. To be a relevant

force in the Southeast Asia, the PA shall implement

its Capability Development Plan. It will strengthenits engagement with its local and international

stakeholders, and endeavor to be full mission-capable

in terms of internal peace and security operations.

All of these are aimed to institutionalize good

governance and performance excellence practices in

the organization, and to make this culture of ATR, the

culture of the Philippine Army.

aBout the author

Jacie Lyn N Nunag is Defense Research Ofcer I at the Army Governance and Strategy Management Ofce

(AGSMO). She is a graduate of BA Public Administration at the University of the Philippines Diliman.


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2AftEr-ACtIvIty rEPort oN tHEPHILIPPINE ArmyS JoUrNEy

toWArdS PGS ProfICIENCyby JAckiE Lyn n nUnAG, Army GovErnAncE And STrATEGy mAnAGEmEnT officE (AGSmo)

i. introductionThe Army Transformation Roadmap (ATR) is based on the Performance Governance System (PGS), which

espouses a performance-based good governance culture. Through the PGS, the ATR promotes an Army that is

institution-led and not personality-driven; thinks of long-term rather than of short-term strategies; and pursues

interconnected, sustained, and continuous priorities instead of single issues. The Philippine Armys progress

in institutionalizing the culture of good governance and performance excellence in the entire organization is

guided by the four-way PGS Pathway. After it was awarded the Initiated and Compliant Status last 23 September

LEtS tALK AboUt CHANGE. LTGEN NOEL A COBALLES AFP, Commanding General of the Philippine Army, repo

on the progress of Army transformation at the Public Governance Forum on 19 March 2013. (Photo by OACPA)


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8

2010 and 14 October 2011, respectively, the PA

has relentlessly persevered to hurdle the next stage,

Prociency, to bring about change in the management

and conduct of its affairs.

With the activation of the Army Governance

and Strategy Management Ofce (AGSMO), the

requirement of the Prociency stage of establishing

an ofce of strategy management had already been

satised. Hence, determined that the PA is prepared to

comply with the rest of the requirements of being PGS

Procient, then Commanding General of the Philippine

Army (CGPA) approved the PAs pursuance of the

Prociency Stage. Thus, in response to the invitation

of the Institute for Solidarity in Asia (ISA) President,

Mr Francisco C Eizmendi Jr, to participate in the Public

Governance Forum on 19 March 2013, the PA sent aletter of conrmation to undergo the PGS Prociency

Evaluation Process.

ii. oBjective

Undergoing the PGS Prociency Evaluation Process

is essential in validating the PAs Prociency level. This

will confer with the Procient Status and subsequently

advance to Institutionalization, the last stage of the PGS

Pathway.

iii. the pgs proficiency evaluationprocess

To successfully obtain the Procient Status, the PA

has to undergo the rigid PGS Prociency Evaluation

Process, which is a 3-step procedure that includes: (a)

Self-Assessment; (b) Third-Party Audit; and (c) Public

Revalida.

The rst stage is the self-assessment, which consists of

the following: strategic readiness test, focused group

discussion and interviews. This phase of the process is

essential in determining the PAs progress in terms of

embedding the PGS in the organization.

The third-party audit is designed to validate the level

of Prociency of the PA by ensuring that the elements

of this stage are present and operational. The result

of the third-party audit will then determine the PAs

advancement to the last par t of the process, the Public

Revalida.

The Public Revalida is the nal step towards the

conferral of the Prociency Stage, which is validated by

a panel of exper ts from different sectors of society.

Serving as the PAs guide in these processes is the

presence of the following PGS Prociency elements:

Ofce of Strategy Management1.

Functional Scorecards2.

Further Cascading3.

Consistent Communication4.

Link to Budget5.

Operations Review6.

Strategy Review7.

Functional MSGC8.

iv. results

A. Self-ASSeSSment

The self-assessment phase started with the

distribution of the survey questionnaires for the

Strategic Readiness Test star ting 16 January 2013. The

PA employed the use of online and paper and pen

survey, generating a total of 109 respondents. The

respondents prole is summarized in the table below:

PERSONAL INFORMATIONBY POSITION

Senior Leader 2

Leader 5

Assistant to Leader 15

Supervisor 50

Staff 37

TOTAL 109

BY DESIGNATION

General Headquarters 50

Combat Units 11

Combat Support Units 19


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PERSONAL INFORMATIONService Support Units 29

TOTAL 109

BY MEMBERSHIP

Ofcer 78

Enlisted Personnel 19

Non-uniformed personnel 12

TOTAL 109

ATTENDANCE TO ATR SESSIONS

Has attended at least one ATR Session 104

Has not attended any ATR Session 5

TOTAL 109

Another tool for the self-assessment is the focus

group discussion held last 29 January 2013, which

was facilitated by Ms Ma Socorro L Escueta fromISA. During this activity, the members of the technical

working group were asked about the accomplishments

of the ATR after almost three years of implementation.

The group was also asked about the notable changes

brought about by the establishment of AGSMO.

Accordingly, the creation of a separate ofce that

oversees the cross-functional processes related to

strategy management is a good move to ensure the

progress of the ATR.

For the interviews, the following personalities wereinterviewed to further determine the level of

Prociency of the PA:

INTERvIEWEE DATELTGEN NOEL A COBALLES AFP 01 Feb. 2013

MGEN NICANOR E DOLOJAN AFP 29 Jan. 2013

COL GERRY P AMANTE (OS) GSC PA 29 Jan. 2013

MS SAMIRA ALI GUTOC-TOMAWIS 01 Feb. 2013

From the results of the aforementioned activities, ISA

came up with an initial prociency evaluation report.According to the said repor t, the components of the

ATR have already demonstrated real, transformative

and attainable attributes with the organization focusing

on internal development in terms of clarity of strategy.

There is also a sense of ownership of the strategy from

the top leadership down to the lower units.

For the Ofce of Strategy Management, the

smooth transition of the function of managing the

implementation of the ATR from Plans Division (OG5)

to the Army Governance and Strategy Management

Ofce (AGSMO) was observed. This was attributed

to the proper keeping in place of the formers systemsand processes. Through the creation of AGSMO,

it is apparent that more focus is given on strategy

execution.

The report also cited that the Army Performance

Scorecard is already operational, and that it is

continuously being improved, along with its subsidiaries

This is being done to enhance the validity of the

performance measures.

On fur ther cascading, it was reported that the PA

is capable of conducting cascading workshops to

generate the scorecards of infantry divisions. Also, a

distinct observation is the PAs creation of modules

and templates to help make the PGS more suitable to

military culture and conditions.

The PAs internal communications on the other hand,

is deemed as one of its strongest feature. This was

observed through the effective use of the components

of the ATR in speeches, documents, and reports. It was

also noted that social media has been the main channe

in communicating the ATR externally. However, the use

of social media still needs to be improved.

Furthermore, the ATRs link to the PA budget is

ensured through the inclusion of AGSMO in the

program and budget advisory committee. This

guarantees that the ATR strategic initiatives that drive

performance measures are actually funded.

Other than that, the monitoring of the performance

of these initiatives and the performance measures

is ascertained through the conduct of strategy andstrategic programs (operations) review.

Lastly, the regular conduct of the PA Multi-Sector

Advisory Board (MSAB) meetings and the productive

results of these meetings demonstrated the presence

of a functional multi-sector governance coalition

(MSGC) in the PA.


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0

Based on these observations, it was determined that the PA is eligible to proceed to the next phase of the

evaluation process. The initial performance evaluation repor t was then forwarded to the third-party auditors to

serve as their guide.

B. third-PArty Audit

For the third-party audit, select auditors from the Institute of Internal Auditors-Philippines (IIA-P) were

commissioned by ISA to verify if the aforementioned Prociency elements are present and operational, thus

determining their level of the entrenchment in the PA.

These auditors include the following:

Mr Amador Racpan1.

Mr Alvin Mendoza2.

Mr Mags Mendez3.

Ms Richel Mendoza4.

Mr Eric Ebro5.

Ms Tanya Teves6.

The kick-off meeting with the auditors was conducted last 25 Februar y 2013 wherein the AGSMO team

presented the overview of the ATR. The audit team then gave a short brieng on how they will conduct the

auditing process. On the same day, the team requested for the documents to demonstrate the presence of the

Prociency elements in the organization. The off-site auditing was from 25-27 February, while the on-site audit

was conducted from 28 February-01 March 2013. During the on-site auditing, the team visited the different

key HPA Staff and two of the major subordinate units, namely, the Light Armor Division (LAD) and Training and

Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

The table below provides a quick look on the ndings of the audit-team:

ELEMENT MAINASSESSMENT NOTES

Clarity of Strategy Good Practice

ATR is shown to be internalized well by those who are aware of it.

Systems have been placed to ensure sustainability and support from

the top. Cascading of vision and mission down the line must persist.

Alignment to AFP and DND strategy has to be validated.

Ofce of Strategy

ManagementGood Practice

The creation of a separate OSM is a good step towards the progress of

the ATR. Full utilization of the roles of the OSM to ensure sustainable

strategy execution, and improve on the systems and processes within

OSM, and its relation with other units should be looked into.

Functionality of

Scorecards Getting Started

Measures and data in the rst-level scorecard should be nalized and

made operational. Constant reviews and renements should be done for

second-level scorecards to be fully functional.

Further Cascading Emerging Best Practice

Enthusiastic effort to cascade the strategy covering all infantry divisions

is shown. This has become instrumental in the commitments of second-

level leaders to the CGPA. Continuous efforts to cascade the strategy

must be sustained.


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ELEMENT MAINASSESSMENT NOTES

Consistent

CommunicationEmerging Best Practice

There is good utilization of subliminal messages aimed at PAs internal

audience and active usage of new media. Feedback mechanisms for

internal and external communication could be strengthened.

Link to Budget Good Practice

Annual planning for the budget takes into consideration the targets of

the ATR as quick win projects are also seen to be moving. Monitoring of

the initiatives progress is also being regularly done. Stronger internal

controls for funds outside GAA need to be established.

Monitoring

& Reporting

Mechanisms:

1. Operations Review

2. Strategy Review

Getting Started

Regularization of reviews have to be sustained while measures must be

operational and data inow more available. Analysis on how the impact

of measures or initiatives affects each other has to be strengthened.

Breakthrough results should be more present and communicated down

the line.

Functional MSGC Emerging Best Practice

Dynamic relationship with MSAB paves way for sustainment of the

ATR. Accountabilities are more permanently set. Duplicating ef fective

mechanisms such as the formation of a third-level MSAB could be

explored more.

According to the audit report submitted, the PAs consistent communication, MSAB, and fur ther cascading efforts

are emerging best practices, while the AGSMO and link of the ATR to PA budget are good practices.

C. revAlidA

Through the report and ndings of the audit team, the PA has qualied to proceed to the next and nal part of

the Prociency Evaluation Process.

Hence, last 19 March 2013, the PA participated in the Public Governance Forum, which was organized by ISA in

cooperation with the National Competitive Council. The Commanding General, Philippine Army, LTGEN NOEL A

COBALLES AFP, delivered the PAs revalida presentation at the Edsa Shangri-La Manila. Supporting him during the

public revalida were chiefs of the key HPA ofces.

The presentation lasted twenty (20) minutes, which was broken down into the following:

MINUTES ITEMS/CONTENT

2 minutes

CONTEXT SETTING (AVP or PPT Slides)

Current realities and reasons for adopting a good governance program

Strategic change agenda, or major transformations expected as a result of implementing the strategyMajor issues encountered in strategy implementation

3 minutes

PERFORMANCE PROGRESS OF THE ENTERPRISE STRATEGY

Highlight the critical elements of the strategy using the:

Charter Statement1.

Strategy Map2.

Governance Scorecard3.

Strategic Initiatives4.


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2

MINUTES ITEMS/CONTENT

3 minutes PA STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

3 minutes

OFFICE OF STRATEGY MANAGEMENT

Creation and Sustainability of the Ofce for Strategy Management

Placement in the organization1.

OSM full-time plantilla2.OSM Part-time counterparts3.

Main functions and process ow in the OSM

Calendar of activities

3 minutes

MONITORING AND REPORTING MECHANISMS

Operations Review

Strategy Review

Multi Sector Governance Coalition

4 minutes

ALIGNMENT MECHANISMS

Scorecard Infrastructure

Status of Second level scorecards

Further cascading to lower unit levels

Link to Budget

How the strategy drives key strategic initiatives

Link initiatives and strategy to budget

Consistent Communication

Alignment of strategy to command guidance, key priorit ies, etc.

Communication materials and paraphernalia

2 minutes

PLANS MOVING FORWARD

Soft and hard benets attained as a result of using the PGS

Emerging best practices

2015 Commitments Emerging breakthrough results

Plans moving forward

The revalida presentation was immediately followed by the panel evaluation, wherein the panel members were

given ample time to raise questions and clarications, and provide inputs and recommendations. The panel was

composed of these select PGS and Balanced Scorecard experts and members of the PA Multi-Sector Advisory

Board (MSAB):

Dr. Jesus P. Estanislao1.Chairman, Institute for Solidarity in Asia & Institute for Corporate Directors (Panel Chair)

Mr. Pedro P. Benedicto Jr.2.President, Republic Surety & Insurance Co. Inc.

Mr. Gordon Alan Joseph3.

Director and CEO, Phil-Pacic Insurance Brokers

Asec. Danilo Francia4.Department of National Defense

Atty. Fe B. Barin5.Fellow, Institute for Corporate Directors

Ms. Doreen Yu6.Columnist, Philippine Star


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Ms. Solita Collas-Monsod7.Professor, University of the Philippines, School of Economics

Atty. Alexander Lacson8.Partner, Malcolm Law

Mr. Alber to A Lim9.Director, Development Bank of the Philippines

Thereafter, the aforementioned personalities deliberated on whether or not the PA has successfully completed

the Prociency requirements. Each panellist was given a score sheet in which they graded the PA based on the

revalida. The passing score for the revalida is 7.5, while it takes a rating of at least 8.5 for an organization to beconferred with a Governance Trailblazer seal.

After the panel deliberation, the PA garnered an over-all rating of 8.8 which enabled it to pass the PGS

Prociency Stage, and acquire the Silver Trailblazer Seal. The breakdown of this 8.8 mark is shown in the following

table:

rEvALIdAtEd. The Philippine Army passed the PGS Prociency Stage and acquired the Silver Trailblazer Seal at the Public Governance Forum.

Dr. Jesus Estanislao, Chairman of the Institute for Solidarity in Asia (ISA), awarded these distinctions to LTGEN COBALLES. (Photo by OACPA)


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4

CATEGORY REMARkS RATING

Commitment to

Transformation

The commitment in seeing the Army Transformation Roadmap (ATR) through is clearly

seen in the members of the Philippine Army (PA). Several panel members commended

the PA for showing their dedication to the ATR as seen in its progress and sustainment

despite changes in leadership. This connotes the enculturation of the transformation

program in the organization, rather than mere compliance to the demands of the

Commanding General (CGPA).

9.50

Ofce of

Strategy

Management

The panelists have noted the establishment of the Army Governance and Strategy

Management Ofce as a positive movement towards magnifying the needs of the

ATR and, at the same time, providing solutions to hit targets or amend the strategy. Its

set-up and organization is seen to be effective in so far as the ofce has been fullling

its roles as the OSM. Guarantees that would ensure sustainability of the ofce should,

however, be more evident.

9.19

Monitoring

and Reporting

Mechanisms

Internal monitoring of units and the analysis of the data gathered appears to be

present in the PA. While this is so, external body monitors that aims to check the

movement of targets should be an alternative that could be looked into. As suggested

by one panelist, this mechanism could authenticate and provide more substance to

the ndings of AGSMO or the Inspector General of the PA. The panel noted that the

PA must strengthen the statistical assessment of the data of the scorecard such as in

percentage improvements. PA can strengthen how an improvement in one measure

or initiative affects another scorecard component. Nonetheless, the act of regular

reporting and monitoring is already a step forward in setting accountability within the

organization. With respect to the usage of data, assessment of the strategy, and the

operations should be able to provide assistance in decision-making, particularly in the

capability development aspect of the PA.

8.81

Accountability to

the MSGC

The panel has acknowledged the dynamic relationship of the Multisectoral Advisory

Board (MSAB) members with the PA. Due to the positive effect of the MSAB in

being a functioning tool towards improving the PA and keeping those in the rst and

second level units in check, duplication in the provinces must be done to ensure

that transformation is dispersed even in the grassroots level as the strategy is being

brought down.

8.81

Scorecard

Infrastructure

Functionality of the CGPA Scorecard has been recognized but it is apparent that

some measures such as the Quality Recruit Index should be reviewed. As noted by

one of the panel members, a more coherent way of gauging the movement of targets

should also be explored to provide a clear picture of where the PA is at, in relation to its

progress. Moreover, the thrust of the new CGPA, LTGEN NOEL A COBALLES, to bring

the scorecard down to the line should be pursued aggressively. Another panelist noted

that cascading must be a two way process and that inputs from the eld must enrich

the enterprise strategy.

8.88

Link to Budget

While there is a direct relation to the strategy and the budget, some of the panelists

were not very clear on the linkage of the PA to the Department of Budget andManagement and the Congress. It was mentioned that the allocation of funds for

strategic initiatives should be well-communicated to these two bodies to ensure that

the important ATR-related projects are factored in the approved GAA.

8.75


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CATEGORY REMARkS RATING

Consistent

Communication

The communication strategies for both the internal and external audience of the PA

are seen to be impressive. Some panelists have commended the approach to focus

on communicating the strategy to the lower units as this indicates the desire for

truly institutionalizing the ATR. In fact, it was relayed during the revalida that ofcers

assigned in far-ung areas such as Basilan and Samar know about the ATR and

have found their place in the strategy. External communications, on the other hand,

is seen to be well-conceptualized but public knowledge of the PAs efforts towards

transformation must be measured to ensure that the approach being used now is

successful.

8.63

Plans Moving

Forward

Efforts to cascade the strategy down to the individual have been highlighted as the

focus of the PA with regard to the ATR. For the panel members, it is clear that the

organization is certain on what they want and are consciously competent at their

work towards becoming a world-class Army that is a source of national pride.

Therefore, the PA needs to ensure sustainability and continue to improve in their

performance of the strategy.

9.06

v. recommendations

In view of the above, the following are recommended:

Ensure the sustainability of the ATR;1.

Monitor responsiveness of external communications;2.

Duplicate effective mechanisms like the MSAB in the provincial-level;3.

Strengthen review mechanisms of the objectives and measures in the Army Performance Scorecard;4.

Align the ATR with current realities through a Strategy Refresh;5.

Communicate stories of individuals to garner more external stakeholder support; and6.

Move towards PGS Institutionalization.7.

aBout the author

Ms Jacie Lyn N Nunag is Defense Research Ofcer I at the Army Governance and Strategy Management Ofce

(AGSMO), PA. She is a graduate of BA Public Administration at the University of the Philippines Diliman.


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3NoN-INtErNAtIoNAL ArmEdCoNfLICtS IN tHE PHILIPPINES1

by LTGEn rAymUndo b fErrEr AfP & LTc rAndoLPH G cAbAnGbAnG (inf) PA

Many US soldiers in the Joint Special Task Force -

Philippines (JSOTF-P) who had been deployed in

Afghanistan, Iraq, and other theaters of war have

repeatedly described the non-international armedconict (NIAC) in Mindanao to be par ticularly

complex. In a place where you have a strong gun

culture, where local residents are part-time insurgents,

and kinship ties serve as force multipliers, how indeed

do we distinguish civilians from armed insurgents?

This article discusses NIAC in the Philippines and,

towards the end, briey notes the challenges it poses

on the security sector in applying the rules of the

International Humanitarian Law (IHL). To provide

readers the basic framework in understanding thenature of conict in the Philippines, we begin with an

organizational level of analysis of the NIAC. However,

it must be noted that on the ground, that is, from the

individual and operational levels of analysis, it is not so

neatly delineated. For example, organizational identities

in southern Mindanao, unlike in the West, are highly

temporal and uid. Civilians could be recruited to work

seasonally for an insurgent group and then quickly and

seamlessly resume their civilian life after operations are

completed.

Added to this complexity are the changing

organizational labels civilians effortlessly assume

without much question. Some civilians may work for

one insurgent group that has an outstanding peace

agreement with the government, then on the same day

join a command structure of a known terrorist group,

and then very quickly switch to supporting relatives

and kin who belong to a group currently in peace

negotiation with the government.

Organizations in the Philippines revolve around

personalities rather than positions.2 We in the ArmedForces of the Philippines strive to have interoperability

among ourselves and our allies, but here is our enemy

for whom interoperability seems like second nature.

NIAC in the Philippines is largely a homegrown

phenomenon with some components heavily

inuenced by foreign elements. Conicts rooted in

ideologies outside the Philippines have been co-opted

to provide a philosophical justication for a grassroots-

driven insurgency.

This paper will primarily focus on two major NIAC

facing the Philippines for convenience, we shall call

them the two Ms: the Maoist group and the Moro

group. We will quickly trace their origins and describe

some of their basic strategy and structure.

The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and

its armed wing, the New Peoples Army (NPA), use

a Maoist ideology to justify its armed struggle against

the government. The CPP is considered the biggest

threat in the security of the Philippines.3 Their scope is

nationwide. While strongest in the nor thern region of

the Philippines, the Maoist group also has a presence

in northern and eastern Mindanao where it tends

to target for recruitment farmers in the rural areas,

workers in mining industry, teachers, youth, women

groups, and many other segments in the working class

population that are vulnerable to the persuasion of the

Maoist ideology.


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8

The Moro group, on the other hand, limits itself to

southern Philippines. Like the CPP-NPA, it is also

homegrown a secessionist movement that has been

ghting for independence for more than a hundred

years now. Islamic ideology inspires its members to

ght for self-determination and recognition of theirethnic identity.

The Maoist and Moro groups both exploit conditions

of poverty and marginalization in marshalling their

armed struggle against the government. According

to the Asian Development Bank in 2008, about 26

million Filipinos out of 92 million live below the Asian

Poverty Line.4 In other words, they are living on about

USD1.35 per day. The poorest of the poor live in

Muslim Mindanao. The Muslim poor are par ticularly

marginalized from mainstream Filipino society and thisfuels much of their grievance against the Philippine

government. So while the Maoist group targets people

through their occupation, the Moro group on the other

hand appeals to ethnicity and shared history in their

recruitment efforts.

the maoist movement

The communist insurgency the longest-running

Maoist insurgency in the world is waged by the

Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its

armed wing the New Peoples Army (NPA). In August

2002, the United States designated the NPA as a

foreign terrorist organization; not too long after, on

November 2005, so would the European Union.5 The

CPP-NPA, together with its legal arm, the National

Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP),6 seeks to

overthrow the Philippine government.

The CPP was established in 1968 as part of a larger

sociological wave that was then taking the world by

storm the rise of student activism in the 1960s and

1970s. However, many scholars argue that the roots

of the organization could be traced all the way back

to the Hukbalahap a contraction of the Filipino

term Hukbong Bayan Laban sa mga Hapon which

means Peoples Army against the Japanese.7 Also

known as the Huks, these ghters mobilized against

Japanese occupation. The Huks were largely farmers

from central Luzon, estimated by one source to have

about 15,000 to 20,000 active members and 50,000

in reserve in the ear ly 1940s. After World War II, theHuks moved on to wage a guerilla war against the

United States. By the early 1960s, the Huk campaign

began to wane and the Sino-Soviet split at that time

further fractured the group. The CPP established itself

separate from the Soviet-style organization and in

1969 renamed the remnants of the Huks as the New

Peoples Army. The current strength of the NPA is

estimated to be around 4,200.

The Maoist group believes that the power of the gun

is necessary to protect ordinary citizens from humanrights abuses perpetuated by the government and

local politicians. For the NPA, a protracted peoples

war would bring about the downfall of the status quo

and the Philippine government would be replaced by a

socialist state.

The modus operandi of the NPA involves

the targeting of foreign investors and

businesses for extortion, or what it

euphemistically terms as revolutionary taxes.

The ultimate goal is to drive these investors

out of the Philippines and to bankrupt the

economy. NPAs also admit to assassinate

individuals such as politicians, members of

the media, and other personalities they

deem to stand in the way of them in

attaining their objectives.

GEArING UP. Members of the leftist New Peoples Army (NPA) performing military

drills at an unidentied location in the Philippines. (Photo by Keith Bacongco)


23/72



It is observed that the general trend of the rise and

fall of the CPP-NPA membership coincides with the

level of violence associated with each presidential

administration. During the Marcos era (1965 to

1986), rampant human rights abuses fueled the

rise of membership in the CPP-NPA. Followers ofMarx and Mao in Philippine colleges and universities

formed student organizations protesting the plight

of farmers in the countryside and the urban poor.

Anti-government activism was fashionable back in the

1970s. College students then did not carry cell phones.

Instead, they carried a small red book which they used

as a reference when they gathered together to talk

about the ideology of Mao Tse Tung and a classless

society.

In 1972, Marcos declared Martial Law and for thenext 13 years under that dictatorial leadership, the

CPP attracted many recruits. But the trend shifted in

1986 when Corazon Cory Aquino, the mother of the

current president Benigno Aquino III, came to power.

She became the rst woman president through the

seminal people power movement in 1986 which was

largely propelled by the outpouring of outrage against

Marcos over the assassination three years earlier of her

husband, Ninoy.8

Early into Corys term (1986 to 1992), ceasere

with the NPA was declared, political prisoners were

released, and peace talks with the CPP-NDF-NPA

were initiated. However, when the talks collapsed

in 1987, the NPA returned to arms. The situation

worsened when security forces violently dispersed and

killed some peasants rallying for land reform one year

after Cory assumed power. Acting under the advice of

the United States, Cory launched a total war against

the NPA.

Sustained military offensives successfully reduced the

communist forces from 25,200 in 1987 to 14,800 in

1991. A two-pronged strategy was used that could

be described in current counterinsurgency parlance

as hard power or military offensive and soft power or

socio-economic development. To aid matters along,

there were also brutal purges within the Maoist group

that further demoralized its rank and le.9

On 11 September 2001, the NPA declared an all-out

war against the central government, believing it to be

controlled by the United States through its global war

on terror. Although the NPA most likely will not win a

military victory against government forces, its presence

persists in the countryside where poverty, injustice,

and the lack of social services provide conditions

for marshalling the peoples grievance against the

government.

the moro front three forms ofstruggle

In contrast to the CPP-NPA, the secessionist Moro

insurgency largely limits its armed struggle in the

southern portion of the country where the majority

of Muslim Filipinos reside. Similar to the organizational

pattern of the CPP-NPA, the oppressive rule of former

President Marcos Martial Law in the 1970s triggered

the Moro outcry against the central government which

they believed to be the cause of Moro suffering.

Like the CPP-NPA, the perception of marginalization

drives the underlying anger that fuels the Moro armed

struggle. For three centuries under Spanish rule and

nearly 50 years of US dominance in the Philippines, the

Moros were never conquered as a group. However,

they feel that they have to live under the Filipino

Christian rule of the central government and abide by

its non-Islamic way of governance.

PErILoUS. Talks between the government and the NPA have been

touch and go. (Photo and caption by the BBC)


24/72



20

Philippine Muslim academic Macapado M. Abaton10

neatly summarized six key elements in the Moro

grievance: economic marginalization and destitution;

political domination; physical insecurity; threatened

Moro and Islamic identity; a perception thatgovernment is the principal culprit; and a perception of

hopelessness under the present order of things.

Indeed, on matters of economic marginalization and

destitution, the regions where most Muslims reside in

Mindanao still remain among the poorest regions in

the Philippines. Unemployment, illiteracy, and poverty

rates are highest in Muslim Mindanao.11 In terms of

political representation in the government, Muslims

in Mindanao still feel that they do not have a voice

in the central government.12 And while tremendousgains have been made over the past several years to

reduce the extremist hold in the various islands in

Mindanao, the condition for physical security is still not

where it should be. There is more to be done in order

to encourage business investments in Mindanao and

change the perception of rampant lawlessness in the

islands.

The fth and sixth elements are also related to the

Moro identity, namely the perception of the inability

of the central government to understand Muslim

Mindanao and the general apathy of most politicians

in the north with matters concerning the south.

Marginalization of the south has always been an

effective rallying cry for those who seek to manipulate

Moro grievance for ultimately extremist causes. The

perception of hopelessness in the status quo is partly

driving the moral justication for an armed struggle in

southern Mindanao. The current President however is

trusted by many Muslims and the attempt of Manila

to extend various social services into the far reaches

of Mindanao is slowly defeating the perception of

hopelessness in many Muslim sectors in southern

Philippines.

These six elements of Muslim grievance have been

used in one form or another in the rhetoric of many

insurgent groups. Two major Moro insurgent groups

in the southern Philippines are the Moro National

Liberation Front (MNLF) and the notorious Abu Sayyaf

Group (ASG). The MNLF already signed a Final Peace

Agreement with the government in 1996, although it

argues that such has not been fully implemented. For

its part, the ASG lacks command and control and in

many ways, like the MNLF, is no longer a formidableghting might.

the mnlf and the origins of the milf

Around the same time the CPP-NPA was formed, Nur

Misuari, who was very much inuenced by the Maoist

ideology, founded the MNLF in 1972. He started an

underground youth movement in Mindanao. His goal

was to free the Muslims from what he described as the

terror, oppression, and tyranny of Filipino colonialismand to secure a free and independent state for the

Bangsamoro.13

Bangsa means country or nation. Moro is derived from

the term early Spanish colonizers used to refer to the

Moors, and had over time stuck as the collective word

used to call all the various Muslim ethnic groups in

Mindanao. Muslims in Mindanao turned this pejorative

term into a badge of honor. Bangsamoro means Moro

Nation.

When Nur Misuari declared Jihad against the Philippinegovernment, the MNLF led the armed resistance of

all Muslims in Mindanao against Martial Law in 1972.

The MNLF became the organizational vehicle that

symbolized the Moro cause of 13 disparate Islamized

ethno-linguistic groups in Mindanao. Their aim the

establishment of an independent Moro nation.

momENt of PEACE. The MNLF signed a signicant peace agreement

with the government in 1996. (Photo and caption by the BBC)


25/72



Four years of bloody war in Mindanao prompted the

Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) to pressure

the MNLF to accept some form of political autonomy

in lieu of secession and independence. The MNLF

signed the Tripoli Agreement in 1976 but frustrations

over its implementation a year later led Misuari torevert back to armed struggle while his Vice Chairman

Salamat Hashim broke away from the MNLF to

establish the second Moro secessionist group, the MILF,

in 1984.

The MNLF-MILF split was largely based on differences

in political strategy and ideological orientation. The

MILF could be described as Islamic revivalist while the

MNLF is more secular-nationalist. Hashim of the MILF

wanted to push for the peace process under the Tripoli

Agreement and his commitment to peace negotiationsremains to be one of the dening points of the MILF.

The MNLF, however, believe in the use of force the

same armed struggle that Maoists nd necessary in

achieving peace in southern Philippines.

The MILF wants to govern the Moro homeland under

the ideals of Islam and the Shariah law. Religion is

central to the workings of the MILF, as could be seen

in the active involvement of the Ulama or Islamic

scholars in the leadership and internal workings of

the organization. The MNLF, on the other hand, largely

concerns itself with ghting for independence.

The leadership style of the MILF is consultative where

a central committee drives the organizations agenda,

while the MNLF is centralized where decisions

revolve around the leader. In addition, the MILF is

mostly dominated by the Maguindanaos from central

Mindanao, while the MNLF is largely composed

of ethnic Tausugs, the warrior class, from the Sulu

Archipelago. Traditionally, these two Muslim tribes could

not stand each other.

The rise of the MILF coincided with Misuaris descent.

The MNLF became increasingly fragmented in 1982

and ceased to be a formidable ghting force when it

inked the Final Peace Agreement with the government

of the Philippines in 1996. Some of the MNLF rebels

were integrated into the armed forces and national

police and some of them joined various livelihood

programs to help them reintegrate back into society.

Many of these livelihood programs were sponsored

by the United States Agency for International

Development (USAID) and the United Nations

Development Program (UNDP), and these have been

very successful. Fisheries, seaweed farming, and various

other livelihood programs beneted many former

MNLF rebels in the Sulu archipelago.

the milf today

The 12,000-strong MILF is mainly based in central

Mindanao, although it has presence in Palawan, Basilan,

and other islands in the Sulu Archipelago. Since 1997,

it has been pursuing peace negotiations with thegovernment.

The MILF leaders have put in signicant effort in

bringing in international audience into its peace

negotiations. The International Monitoring Team (IMT)

composed of representatives from Malaysia, Brunei,

Libya, Japan, Norway and European Union oversee the

ceasere agreement between the MILF and the GPH.

With international monitoring, over 70 agreements

have been reached between the MILF and the

Philippine government since 1997.

alliance with the asg

One Moro group that remains without any form of

ceasere agreement with the government and is not

considered by the International Committee of the

Red Cross (ICRC) as a NIAC is the Abu Sayyaf Group

HomE. The MILF is mostly based in remote islands in central

Mindanao. (Photo and caption by the BBC)


26/72



22

(ASG). However, in its early years, one could argue that

it could be considered as a NIAC.

The inspiration for the al Qaeda-linked ASG came

from radical Islamism notably the jihad against Soviet

invasion of Afghanistan. Around the time that the

MNLF was engaged in peace negotiations with the

Philippine government in the late 1980s/early 1990s, an

underground movement of disenchanted youth began

to be mobilized by a charismatic preacher in Basilan,

Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani.

Janjalani wanted an independent state for the Muslims

in Mindanao. Academics continue to debate whether

Janjalani in fact fought during the Afghanistan war.

Whether he did or not, the primary driving force

behind ASGs formation is rooted in a Jihadist war

that the MNLF failed to follow through according to

the perception of many idealistic Muslim youth. The

disenchanted Muslim youth felt that the older cadres

abandoned the spirit of the Bangsamoros struggle

against the government in the 1970s. They felt that the

MNLF leaders betrayed their cause and acquiesced to

the Philippine government when it entered into peace

negotiations.

Janjalani formally founded the ASG in 1992 and

justied his Jihad based on the following arguments:

(1) The Philippine government with the help of its

Christian allies, notably the US, severely oppressed

the Bangsamoro people; (2) This oppression came

about by the unwelcome intrusion of Christians into

the Muslim homeland; (3) To defeat this oppression,

the struggle for the cause of Allah must be waged

against the Christian invaders; and (4) It is the personal

obligation of every Muslim to carry out this Jihad and

failure to do so would be a sin against Allah.

Driven by its secessionist and extreme Islamic ideology,

the ASG quickly became internationalized with the

involvement of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), whose goal is

to establish a Muslim caliphate throughout Southeast

Asia. However, with the death of Janjalani and the

demise of several key ASG leaders, ASGs Jihadist

ideological fervor has died down particularly among

the rank and le. Many argue that the ASG has now

degraded into criminality.14

Kidnapping has always been a consistent staple for ASG

to raise funds, prompting many observers to argue

that Janjalanis Jihad has become a cloak to justify the

criminality of ASG. While the old timers remain loyal to

the cause, the nancial pressures, lack of loyalty among

the rank and le, and the US-backed military offensives

against the ASG have degraded the once notorious

Moro ghters into a bunch of thugs.

challenges in applying the rules of ihl

The rules of the IHL apply to war and armed conict

that, for humanitarian reasons, seek to limit the harmful

effects of these on non-participants. While these rules

do not prevent the use of force by the state, theselaws and customs do restrict the means and methods

to be employed for warfare. Memorandum Order #9

issued on 7 August 1998 directed state security forces

in the Philippines to implement the Comprehensive

Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and the

International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL),

which was signed by the NDFP and the Philippine

government ve months earlier in The Hague.15 Earlier

than this, the issue of human rights protection and the

application of the IHL rules were not clearly spelledout to parties to the NIAC in the Philippines.

For over forty years, the two concurrent NIACs in

the southern Philippines have extracted an exorbitant

toll in the number of lives, damage to property and

government resources, and economic opportunities

lost due to prolonged wars. The social cost of the

orIGIN. The Abu Sayyaf is a breakaway faction from the MNLF.

(Photo and caption by the BBC)


27/72



conict in terms of damaged social cohesion and the

diaspora of Muslims in Mindanao is arguably much

bigger a price.

During the early years of the conict, there were

indeed some violations committed by the major

players the government forces, the Moro rebels,

and communist insurgents. Most of the abuses blamed

on the government forces happened during the

Martial Law years from 1972 to 1981. The protracted

conicts,16 however, make it appear that there were

widespread and continuing violations of human rights.

In fact, during the ear ly years of the Moro secessionist

and the Maoist communist insurgencies, NIAC rules

were not at all clear to state security forces. The Cold

War period was characterized by wars of national

liberation or internal wars. The Geneva Conventions

I-IV were made in 1949 as an offshoot of World War II,

while the Additional Protocols I and II were made only

in 1977. These rules would emerge after either front

had already initiated hostilities with the state forces.

The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has

been involved in Internal Security Operations (ISO)

since Martial Law was declared by President Marcos

in September 1972. Since then, the AFP and the

Philippine National Police (PNP) had been performing

law enforcement and combat operations against

insurgent groups. For lack of legal framework, the

Human Rights Law (HRL) and the IHL rules got mixed

up in these two types of missions.

The nature of the NIAC in the Philippines today and

the operational strategies they employ pose serious

challenges to the enforcement of the IHL rules.

Discussed below are some of the ner points of these

challenges.

on the principle of distinction

The Principle of Distinction requires that combatants

be distinguished from non-combatants. This distinction

is hard to make out in the case of militias employed

by the Maoist group who can be farmers during the

day and ghters at night. Habitually, also, the Maoist

group uses unarmed civilians as couriers, messengers,

early warning system, and bearers of logistics for their

ghters. When arrested, these civilians invoke their

human rights to be distinguished as non-combatants.

Note that most cases of such arrests are carried out

by government troops based only on intelligence

information. And while no arrest is made until the

intelligence information is corroborated by informants

or captured enemy personnel, such information will

not hold in cour t without physical evidence, which, in

most cases, could not be supplied.

Regular communist guerillas usually carry guns similar

to those issued to the state security forces. Disguisedin regulation uniforms and bearing arms, the insurgents

can deceive civilians enough to avoid detection and

get inside police stations or military detachments to

successfully conduct raids.

In their operations, communist guerillas are known

to mingle with civilians. They move around villages

for propaganda work and to solicit foodstuffs. When

government troops come upon them in the villages,

civilians could get caught in the crossre. Also, within

NPA camps, civilians who are mostly relatives ofthe rebels are utilized as cooks, errand persons, or

lookout. So while these camps are situated well away

from civilian villages and are no problem at targeting,

endangering the civilians within could become a human

rights issue that their Maoist groups mass organizations

and propaganda desks could exploit.

No fINGEr IN tHE PIE. Military wouldnt meddle in Sayyaf-MNLF

ghting last February. (Photo and caption by philstar.com)


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24

For the MILF, on the other hand, their camps are also

their communities. It is not uncommon then for MILF

villages to be for tied with trenches, ring positions,

outposts, guard posts, and other defense structures.

Usually, Muslims build a mosque or madrasah within

their camps where, because of the communal natureof their society, houses are clustered around. During

ceasere, the MILF members have their families staying

in the camps to farm and to do other chores.

The AFP does not have precision-guided munitions

in its inventory, such that its system of targeting is not

very accurate. Civilian objects are sometimes hit by the

AFPs bombs or artillery rounds. In order to address

this limitation, the AFP has established a Rule of

Engagement (ROE) whereby a Forward Air Controller

(FAC) of a Forward Observer (FO) is required toengage a target with indirect res.

principle of proportionality andlimitation on the use of methods and

means of comBat

This principle is generally dened by AFP ROEs issued

by higher authorities to operational commanders. It

is, for example, generally prohibited to use ar tillery or

bombs to attack NPA camps unless it is well fortied

since the NPAs do not use big guns17 and to avoid

creating fear among the civilians living nearby.

on children involved in armed conflict

The Maoist group use children as child soldiers. There

were many incidents when our troops captured child

soldiers, both male and female.

on the use of landmines

Landmines of various kinds continue to be used

by rebel groups particularly by the NPA, MNLF,

and the ASG in the several armed conicts in the

Philippines. Some of its uses are in accordance with

IHL, while some are not. In the period 2000-06, total

reported landmine and improvised explosive device

(IED) casualties (killed and wounded) were 362, of

which 299 were soldiers and policemen while 63 were

civilians, some of them children. In addition, unexploded

ordnance (UXO) or explosive remnants of war (ERW)

left in the battleeld pose danger to IDPs returning to

their homes and farms in conict-affected areas. That is

why during the cessation of hostilities, the AFP is taking

extra effort to recover these UXOs and ERWs.18

The Maoist group commonly uses improvised

command-detonated anti-personnel mines (APMs)

and anti-vehicle mines (AVMs). In recent years they

have extensively used improvised Claymore mines in

command-detonated mode, using scrap metal in lieu

of steel balls. Because of CARHRIHL, the CPP-NPA-

NDFP made certain commitments which generally

adhered to IHL rules on the use of landmines.

CHILdrENS rIGHtS ArE ALSo HUmAN rIGHtS. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) continues its mandate to protect childrens

rights in conict areas. (Photo by the Ofce of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process or OPAPP)


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On the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons

(SALW)

Small arms and light weapons proliferate in the

Philippines, complicating the armed conicts especially

in the Southern Philippines. There are an estimated1 million licensed rearms in the country and more

than 2 million illegally acquired rearms in Mindanao

alone.19 The proliferation of SALW contributes to the

formation of private armed groups and warlordism,

as well as the frequency and intensity of lawlessness

and clan wars in Mindanao.

addressing niac in the southernphilippines

There are now two parallel peace tracks currently

underway in connection with non-international

armed conicts in southern Philippines. The Philippine

government (GPH) is pursuing peace negotiations with

the CPP-NPA and with the MILF.

Localized conicts these days have become increasingly

intertwined with the social values of a larger

international audience, bringing about the downfall

of institutions and governments. Small grassroots

movements and extremist cells throughout the

world have capitalized on social media networks to

gain sympathy from an international audience all too

willing to impose their moral values and judgments

on the legitimacy of armed conicts. In the case of the

Philippines, however, one could argue that these two

NIACs with long roots from the past largely remain

outside the reach of an increasingly globalized world.

These NIAC appear to be propagated in the hearts

and minds of people who simply refuse to let go of the

past.

And yet, there is hope for the future generation where

the fatigue of war and the rhetoric of grievance no

longer inspire the same intense anger. In my experience

working with variouscommunities in promoting peace

as another way to defeat the enemy, I have learned

that people will behave according to the way they are

viewed: If you treat them as an enemy then they will

become one; if you treat them as partners then they

will respond in kind.

With all their complexities, non-international armed

conicts in the Philippines could be viewed simply as a

cry for human security the need to have a dignied

way of life where the basic necessities of survival

become a fundamental right for each and every

individual.

CoNfLICt IN tHE SoUtH. The southern Philippines has a

long history of conict, with armed groups including Muslim

separatists, communists, clan militias and criminal groups

all active in the area. (Photo and caption by the BBC)

aBout the authors

LT GEN RAYMUNDO B FERRER AFP commanded the Western Mindanao Command in Zamboanga City

from November 2010 to January 2012 while LT COL RANDOLPH G CABANGBANG PA served as the

Assistant Chief of Unied Command Staff for CMO, U7 and Spokesman of WestMinCom from November

2010 to November 2012. Both ofcers are graduates of the Civil Affairs Qualication Course and Psychological

Operations Course at US Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.


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26

endnotes1 Revised from the authors presentation delivered during the Conference on

Non-international Armed Conict at the US Naval War College, Newport, R.I.on 22 July 2011.

2 See The Mindanao-Sulu Power Game: An Ethnography of Emergent Players Final Report. This is a commissioned research recently completed byBrandLab for a restricted audience.

3 See the First Semester 2011 Intelligence Report of the Deputy Chief of Stafffor Intelligence, J2, Armed Forces of the Philippines. This restricted source isalso used for gures on enemy strength and operational strategies employedby armed threat groups that are cited elsewhere in this paper.

4 See http://beta.adb.org/news/podcasts/launch-key-indicators-2008-introducing-asian-poverty-line?page=5

5 See http://balita.ph/2010/03/28/npa-transforms-into-terrorist-group-says-afp/.

6 The NDFP serves as the umbrella for various mass organizations of Maoistpersuasion.

7 See http://www.onwar.com/aced/data/papa/philippines1946.htm

8 Ninoy, or Senator Benigno Aquino, Sr., was recognized as the staunchest criticof the Marcos regime. He was assassinated on 21 August 1983.

9 See Abinales, 2008, pp 77-98.

10 See Abaton, 1994.

11 See Philippine Human Development Report 2005.

12 Positive changes may yet emerge to improve political participation with theongoing peace process and the political will of the current president to addressthe Moro problem.

13 See McKenna, 1998, p. 164.

14 Such perception of the ASGs transition from revolutionary to criminality ispicked up by community residents in Jolo and Basilan where ASG presencehad been and continues to be strongest. See Ilagan, 2011, pp. 42-47.

15 Implementation of the CARHRIHL would only be activated in 2004 with theformation of the GRP-NDF Joint Monitoring Committee. In December 2005, theNDFP Human Righs Monitoring Committee published a primer CARHRIHL thatsummarizes the points of the agreement. The CARHRIHL is also available onopen sources in the Internet.

16 In the southern Philippines, the conicts were made more complicated bythe proliferation of arms. Also, civilian armed group and vigilante groups areutilized to serve the personal interests of political warlords. See Santos et al.,2010.

17 The NPAs have a few mortars only and usually have light machineguns todefend their positions.

18 See Primer on Landmines Issue and Bill in the Philippines, 2010, pp. 28-30.

19 See Santos et al., 2010.

referencesAbaton, Macapado M. 1994. The Moro Armed Struggle in the Philippines: The

Nonviolent Autonomy Alternative. Marawi City: Mindanao State University.Abinales, Patricio N. 2008. Shifting Tactics: Politics and the Power of the Local in

the Philippines. In Ilagan, Gail Tan and Actub, M. Isabel S., eds. Tambara(25). Davao City: Ateneo de Davao University.

Civil Society Initiatives for International Humanitarian Law. 2010. Primer onRA No. 9851: A Breakthrough Law for International Humanitarian Law

in the Philippines. Quezon City: Civil Society Initiatives for InternationalHumanitarian Law.Human Development Network. 2005. Philippine Human Development Report

2005. Manila: Human Development Network.Ilagan, Gail T. 2011. The Mindanao Resilient Communities Project Report. Davao

City: Alternative Forum for Research in Mindanao and the United StatesEmbassy Manila.

Mastura, Datu Michael O. 2007. A Time for Reckoning for the BangsamoroStruggle. In Alejo, Albert E., Ilagan, Gail T., & Actub, M. Isabel S., eds.Tambara (24). Davao City: Ateneo de Davao University.

McKenna, Thomas M. 1998. Muslim rulers and rebels: Everyday Politics andArmed Separatism in the Southern Philippines. Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press.

Mindanao Development Authority and the Autonomous Region in MuslimMindanao. 2010. Unpublished policy paper on the issue of InternallyDisplaced Persons (IDPs) in selected areas of Mindanao.

National Democratic Front of the Philippines Human Rights Monitoring Committee.2005. Booklet Number 5: Primer on the Comprehensive Agreement toRespect Human Rights and the International Humanitarian Law. Manila:

NDFP Human Rights Monitoring Committee.Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines. 2010. Primer on the Landmines Issueand Bill in the Philippines, 2nd ed.

Santos, Soliman S., Santos, Paz Verdades M., & Dinampo, Octavio M. 2010.Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in thePhilippines. Quezon City: South-South Network for Non-State Armed GroupEngagement and the Small Arms Survey.


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4A CASE for INCrEASING tHEAUStrALIAN dEfENSE trAINING AId

to tHE PHILIPPINESby LTc romEo n bAUTiSTA iii (inf) PA

CoNSIdErING AUSSIE PArtICIPAtIoN. CPT FELIPE ESTRADA greets Australian Armys LTC ROD LONG at a school

construction site. Long is part of an observation team in the Philippines to help determine whether or not Australia

would join the Balikatan Exercises. (Photo by US Marine Lance Cpl Cansin P. Hardyegritag)

introduction

On 08 May 2012, the Australian Minister for Defense, Stephen Smith MP, announced the provision of AUD3.307

million to the Defense Cooperation Program (DCP) budget to the Philippines for 2012-2013.1 This represents

an annual 13.9% decrease from the 2009-2012 DCP budgets to our country.2Although reecting the scal

pressures3experienced by Australia, there are compelling reasons to increase the defense training aid program to

the Philippines based on strategic and economic interests of both.


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28

The aim of this essay is to discuss the need to increase

Australias defense training aidto the Philippines for

2013-2014 and beyond. The objective is to provide

input for policy makers and the general public of both

countries given that an Australian Defense White

Paper (DWP) is set to be published in 20134

and theArmed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), particularly the

Philippine Army, embarks on a road for organizational

transformation and the end of the four-decade

insurgency.5 It will discuss the rationale and focus of

the defense training aid, proceed to the arguments

of increasing the aid, and provide appropriate

recommendations.

the current australian defense

training aidThe two countries defense cooperation dates back

to World War II when around 4,000 Australians

fought with their Philippine counterparts in the 1944-

1945 liberation of the islands.6 This partnership was

formalized when a Memorandum of Agreement was

signed in 1995. Relations were further strengthened

when the Australian Minister for Defense and the

Philippine Secretary of Department of National

Defense (DND) signed the Status of Visiting Forces

Agreement (SOVFA) on 31 May 2007, which was

subsequently ratied by the Philippine Senate on 24

July 2012.7

The rationale of Australias defense cooperation

with the Philippines is mainly geographic in nature

as encapsulated in its DWP 2009. It is in Australias

strategic interest to have stable neighbors in Southeast

Asia such as the Philippines which sit[s] astride its

northern approaches.8 Owing to this, the Philippines

is the 8th largest recipient of Australian aid in 2011-12

amounting to AUD123.1 million.9 This development aid

will increase to AUD128.7 million in 2012-2013, with

the Philipp

philippine army journal 1st quarter 2013

Documents