philosophical origins of neoclassical economics- by joseph belbruno

8/11/2019 Philosophical Origins of Neoclassical Economics- by Joseph Belbruno

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Philosophical Antecedents of the Sphere of Exchange

[Cf also M.Friedman, Kant,Kuhn&Ration.of Science about the rules of the game!

And there is then no doubt at all, Kuhn further suggests, that science, throughout its development,

has become an increasingly efficient instrument for achieving this end. In this sense, therefore,

there is also no doubt at all that science as a whole is a rational enterprise.This Kuhnian defense of the rationality of scientific knowledge from the threat of conceptual

relativism misses the point, I believe, of the real challenge to such rationality arising from Kuhns

own historiographical work. For it is surely uncontroversial that the scientific enterprise as a whole

has in fact become an ever more efficient instrument for puzzle-solving in Kuhns sensefor

maximizing quantitative accuracy, precision, simplicity, and so on in adjusting theoretical

predictions to phenomenological results of measurement. What is controversial, rather, is the

further idea that the scientific enterprise thereby counts as a privileged model or exemplar of

rational knowledge ofrational inquiry intonature. And the reasons for this have nothing to do

with doubts about the incontrovertible predictive success of the scientific enterprisethey do not

call into question, that is, theinstrumentalrationality of this enterprise. What has been called

into question, rather, is what Jurgen Habermas callscommunicativerationality.12Communicative rationality, unlike instrumental rationality, is

concerned not so much with choosing efficient means to a given end, but rather with securing

mutually agreed upon principles of reasoning whereby a given community of speakers can

rationally adjudicate their differences of opinion.18411. Kuhn, Afterwords note 1! a"ove#, $$. %%8&%%'.

12. See Habermas,(heorie des Kommunikativen )andelns(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1981), vol.

1, chapter 1; translated as(he (heory of Communicative Action(Boston: Beacon, 1984).]

What Mach calls a thought experiment is of course not an experiment at all. At bottom it

is a grammatical investigation.

Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Remarks(19!" p. #

Empiricism and Machism Influence on Neoclassical Theory.

Schop. to Mach

Neoclassical Theory is unthinkable without both Schopenhauers ethical metaphysics and

Machs philosophy of science. And Machs philosophy of science is unthinkable without the

filter of Schopenhauers empiricism and pessimism, not without the all-important

mediation of Kants critique of Hume and Schopenhauers critique of Kant, after which

Machism will become not just a Weltanschauung but rather a Lebensphilosophie.


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A World separates the truth of the British empiricists and of Classical Political

Economy from the truth of thenegatives Denken contemplative the former (a

stable, immutableadaequatio mentis et reithat does not challenge the Newtonian

mechanistic vision of reality [Berkeley, Hume], epistemology [Locke], and even of

self-identity [Hume]) and the activist notion of truth canvassed by the latter.The distinction lies in the fact that British empiricism involves a subjectivism of

both experience and values (also founded on experience as in Lockes nominalism)

that does not theorise the relationship of Subject to Object in its practical

ethical and political dimension.

The empiricist perspective interprets reality entirelyfromwithinthe world of

human perception andfrom withoutits quidditas, its thinginess; in other

words, empiricism does not seek to pose the problem of the thing in itself even

when, as in Berkeley, it denies itssubstanceas matter. British empiricism, from

Hobbes and Bacon to Locke and Hume, is profoundly subjective; its world view

is cinematic or imagistic or pictographic or impressionistic, and delivers a

passive, inert, contemplative Subject: it is more interested in the theory of

knowledge (how we learn things) than in the theory of reality (what things are,

in themselves [an sich] and for us [fur uns]). The empiricists had a subjective

perspective on what they still believed and considered to be objective truth, even

in the skeptical Humean version.

Despite his insistence that the guide of life is not reason but custom, Humes

denial of the existence of a necessary causal link between cause and effect

betrays the very rationalist bias that his skepticism was aiming to explode!

Even for Hume, the world exists independently of the idea (Vorstellung) and

refers us back to those objects that the subject cannot com-prehend. His

ontology is not idealist; his skepticism does not nullify or deny the validity of

meta-physics but merely exposes the limits of human understanding or intellect

or intellectual reason (Verstand)rationallyto com-prehend the world. Similarly,

despite his insistence on the existence of an autonomous entity, Pure Reason, that

could give a conceptual sense to the intuitive content supplied by things in

themselves, Kant could never overcome the insuperable antinomy of noumenonand phenomenon, the formalism of autonomy and heteronomy. It is by making

this hiatus (Fichte) between the I and the thing absolute that Neo-Kantism

was able to replace Kants transcendental idealism with the formal positivism

espoused by the Austrian School and by Max Weber.


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British empiricism confined its subjectivism to epistemology, tohowwe know,

whilst it still posited the existence of an objective reality whether of things

(Hume, Kant) or ideas (Berkeley).This is why British empiricism could produce

Classical Political Economy founded on the labour theory of value, but not the neoclassical

economic theory that came out of Germany and Austria with its extreme Schopenhauerianform of subjectivism.The German epigones of empiricism and of classical German

Idealism, from Schopenhauer through Kierkegaard to Mach and then the Neo-

Kantians, extended subjectivism to reality itself by eliminatingmeta-physics as a

relevant or legitimate field of human enquiry, either because of its impenetrability

and inscrutability (Kants thing-in-itself and Schopenhauers Will asqualitas

occulta) or else because of its pragmatic irrelevance (Mach once notably said that

things in themselves are superfluous [see Scotts review of Machs

psychologism] a comment that could have been echoed by Peirce and the

American pragmatists and by the Vienna Circle who mistakenly thought to have

the support of Wittgenstein. (The subtle misreading of Wittgenstein by the Wiener

Kreis has been discussed lucidly by KO Apel inSee also Cacciari in K.)

Schopenhauer could rightly claim that Kants grosste Verdienst (greatest service)

was to distinguish betweenErscheinungen(appearances) andDinge an sich(things-

in-themselves) because the British empiricists never inquired into or enquired

about the thing in itself and the active or practical role of the Subject in the

world. By separatingErscheinungenandDinge an sich, Kant opened up the

entire question of how truth is more than the simple correspondence or

adaequatioof the intuition (Anschauung) to the thing (res) by means of the

understanding or intellect (intellectus), which we call here instrumental reason or

Verstand. For Kant, despite his formalism, as well as for Schopenhauer, despite his

pessimism, the world will no longer be something to be interpreted, to be

contemplatedor observedfrom without; rather it will be a Wirklichkeit (activity,

worklikeness, actuality) that encompasses the Subject and itsoperari(working or

labouringof the world). Both interpret thecogito(the I think) as being not just an

esse(I am) butalso avelle(I will) that implies aposse(I can) whether in its

formalistic Kantian or in its negative Schopenhauerian, or even in the laterdialectical Hegelian and historico-materialist Marxian versions, or indeed in

the evolutionary dimension favoured by Schumpeter and Hayek. The neat

Cartesian dualism of ares cogitansthat merely reflects or mirrors theres extensa

without inter-vening or acting upon the world to transform its reality is forever

eschewed.


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Even as early as Vicos verum ipsum factum itself a late reflection on

Machiavellis political realism - the active side of truth had replaced the static

vision of Scholastic memory. Kant wrote in the Preface to the Second Critique:

The starry sky above me and the moral law within me - meaning that any theory

of reality must encompass dialectics, that is, the active role of the Subject (actingautonomously and rationally, morally) within reality, within the cosmos (the starry

sky). Nietzsche himself will emend Descartesscogito ergo sumto vivo ergo cogito

(I live therefore I think) to indicate the precedence of existence and experience over

thought and reason. The Subject is no longer a receptive or reflective or

regulative entity: it now yields - whether in its formal or dialectic or in its

negative (anti-)dialectic guise - a Will that is either free or from which the

intellect or understanding (theVerstand/Vernunftof classical philosophy) has to

be freed to serve a purely instrumental or operational function. The Will

displaces Reason from the pre-eminent position that it had occupied since Plato.

Whereas Western metaphysics since Plato had sought to account for reality as a

static and immutable presence, philosophy after Kant, even when it pretends to

encompass reality in its totality as in Hegel, will seek to preserve the active

role of the Subject, of Reason.

Yet thenegatives Denkenfrom Schopenhauer to the Austrian School will chastise all

such totalizing philosophical systems, including Kants critical philosophy, as

attempts to turn the freedomofthe will into a freedomfromthe will to the

degree that the systems of classical German Idealism aim to chain the will to the

rule of reason, even in its Hegelian guise as the ruse of reason (Welt-weisheit).

In reply, thenegatives Denkenwill undertake a supreme effort to privilege the will

in its complete free-dom - a free will that is either a freedom to will or a

will to freedom, and then a power to will (Pouvoir-Vouloir) or a will to

power (Vouloir-Pouvoir). This is the apotheosis of Vichian historicism according

to whichverum ipsum factum what is true is not some abstract objective reality

but rather the very doing (factum) on the part of human beings -, but this time in

negative guise, that is to say, the doings of human beings do not constitute a

rational sequence, aProgressustoward a common humanistic goal, aninter esse;

rather, they are the record of meaningless strife and irresoluble conflict betweenirreducibly selfish and atomised in-dividuals.

Schopenhauers empiricism becomes more than materialistic or mechanical: it

becomes instrumental, neutral from a meta-physical viewpoint indeed, it

becomes anti-metaphysical and scientific in its instrumentality (the body is

objectified Will). That is why, whilst he shares Berkeleys insight that the world


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is my idea esse est percipi-, Schopenhauer objects that this superficial version of

idealism cannot be carried deeper than its vague universal tone to the

particulars of Kants analysis (WWV, p.xxv and p.4). Similarly, Humes

skepticism is derived from the inability of experience understood uncritically

as evident to yield the principle of causation or sufficient reason, whereasSchopenhauer makes this principle the very foundation of experience (v.On the

Four-Fold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason).

Hence, realism and idealism face dogmatism and skepticism in an endless

squabble over the nature of reality and knowledge (WWV, pp.15-6). Hobbes and

Hume, just as much as Berkeley and Kant, remain in a realistic world where

objects(Gegenstande) may well be unknowable or things in themselves, and yet

they stillmake impressions or images on minds. Even in Berkeleys idealism,

ideas need to be objectified in God. This is still, albeit in a pictographic

form, a Newtonian world in which even subjective utilities are

commensurable through a commonality of experience as in Benthams

utilitarian worldview.

Schopenhauer first and Machism later e-liminate this Kantian obscure veil

(Nietzsche) that separates human experience from the world with its obfuscatory

dichotomy of formalistic transcendental Pure Reason on one side and

inscrutable things-in-themselves on the other side that we intuit or perceive as

phenomena and order rationally and causally (scientifically) in accordance

with the laws of reason. The stated aim of thenegatives Denken(negative thought)

with its new empiricism and positivism was to abolish this meta-physics, this

dichotomy or dualism of Subject and Object (noumenon/phenomenon) and with

it to abolish the notion of causality with its Newtonian attributes of space

(external intuition) and time (even in Kants version asinternalintuition) as

absolutephysical dimensions, and to reinstate (Berkeleyan) empiricism:esse est

percipi.

Before Schopenhauer, metaphysics is still rationalist and deistic, even though

epistemology is already empiricist. It was Kants attempt to reconcileepistemological empiricism with rationalist ontology that prompted Nietzsches

baleful sarcasm in his direction: - Kant is an astute theologian. Even as he

expounded on the heteronomy of instrumental reason, Kant still believed in a

transcendental Reason (Vernunft) that con-nects and regulates the intellect with

respect to the thing. Kant sees the technical/instrumental property of logico-

mathematical identities, but these are then subordinated to, indeed they form the


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apodictic foundation of, a Reason a transcendental autonomous entity that is a

causa noumenon(Iii ofKPV) because it cannot be itself a heteronomous

phenomenon or appearance - that is transcendent and that orders the world

teleologically, has causal truth value, with its ethical-practical judgement. This is

the foundation of Kants Dialectic of Pure Reason that leads to the notion ofPractical Reason. Kant mistakenly extends the apodicticity of logico-

mathematical categories (as being synthetic a priori) to the physical category of

causation. By so doing, Kant sought to overcome Humes skepticism and turn

physical causation into a property of pure reason, independent of noumena in its

reasoning or form and yet originating with and prompted by them in the

sense that pure reason without noumena is empty form:- Thoughts without

sense are empty; sense without concepts is blind. Only thus can Pure Reason

(Vernunft) con-ceptualise and con-nect the various merephenomena (bloss

Erscheinungen) it perceives through its intuition (Anschauung) and orders

through its intellect or understanding (Verstand), and then link these phenomena

into synthetic a priori judgements or causal laws. Kant himself will gradually raise

doubts about the validity of his critical philosophy from the Third Critique on

Judgement to theOpus Postumumwhere he will search in vain for anUbergang(an

overpass) to overcome the formalism of his metaphysics. Yet the necessity of

overcoming this dualism, this hiatus irrationalis (Fichte) between

heteronomous naturegoverned byscientific laws gleaned by the intellect

(Verstand), on one side, and then theautonomous sourceof these laws, pure

reason (Vernunft), on the other, is what opened the way to Hegels dialectic (see in

particular his discussion of Fichte and Schelling).

In Schopenhauer, the KantianDing an sichis still present, but this time in the entity

of the Will whose objectification is the body. Therefore the external world

exists no longer, as in Kant, as a re-ality (Lt.res, thing), as a world of things or

ob-jectsop-posed to(cf. Lt.ob-jactatum, thrown against, and GermanGegen-stand,

standing against) the Subject, but rather only as a re-presentation (Vor-stellung)

that the Will makes to itself through the Body, whence the Body does not have an

ec-sistenceindependentlyof the Will but is instead theobjectificationof the Will,

that is, an emanation of the Will. This is why for Schopenhauer the World as Willand Re-presentation (or Idea,Vorstellung) can be com-prehendedscientificallyby

the Understanding (Verstand) in accordance with the Principle of Sufficient Reason.

In the Schopenhauerian version of thenegatives Denkenthe world is still a Wirk-

lichkeit, a work-likeness, an actu-ality in which the humanoperariis

conditioned by scientific logico-mathematical laws just as it was in Kant,

whose greatest merit for Schopenhauer consisted precisely in this separation of


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thing-in-itself and phenomena. Except that Schopenhauer effects a re-versal

(Um-kehrung) of Kants metaphysics: the external world therefore is not an

inscrutable Ob-ject, an unknowable reality of noumena op-posed to (once

again, ob-ject,Gegen-stand, standing against) the Will, - a world of which we can

only register phenomena. But because it is now the subjective side, the Will,that is the thing-in-itself from which the phenomena, the objectifications

originate, the scientificity of experimental observations, of phenomena, is

guaranteed by theunityof their re-presentation (Vorstellung) as subject-object

a unity that overcomes the infamous Kantian antinomies of thought:esse est

percipi what you see is what you get. In Schopenhauers metaphysics there is no

longer any ontological difference between noumena and phenomena, between

reality and appearance; indeed, no such dif-ference is ontologically possible

because all appearances, all perceptions, are equally valid ontologically, though

they may not be so from a practical or instrumental point of view. The task of

science, therefore, is not to distinguish between reality and appearance, but rather

to construct a con-nection between appearances that is as much as possible (a)

economical and (b) certain.

It is most interesting to note the difference between the strict rationalist con-

nection that Kant sought to establish between concepts (empty without intuition)

and intuition (blind without concepts) and the similar designation of science by

the positivists after Schopenhauer and Mach (see Marshall and Dupuit quoted in

Ebert) who seek scientificity purely in the predictability and certainty of

scientific theory. For the positivists, science represents the union of mathematical

formulae and empirical facts. The problem with this description of science is that

no mathematical formula will ever tell us the empirical facts to which it is

supposed to be applied, and no collection of empirical facts will ever suggest in

and of itself the mathematical formula that applies to it! In other words, the nexus

between fact and theory or norm is one that is volunteered by the human

theoretician and not ever by nature itself (as was the belief of early scientists

since Leonardo and Galileo). Kant sought a universal telos; the positivists sought

merely to control the world. The difference is that Kant sought a universal human

validity, an inter-subjective truth, in scientific laws that could support and promoteuniversal human interests (inter esse, common being or human communion). In the

case of thenegatives Denken, instead, such communion, such inter esse, is no longer

possible indeed it is excluded and eschewed a priori by the fact that it is the Will

and not Reason that directs the intellect instrumentally in the pursuit of its entirely

subjective interests.If anything, the instrumental use of the intellect by the Will, far from

establishing a rational commonality of human interests in its application to the world,


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finds this commonality only to the degree that agreement over scientific laws

furtherseconomicallythe private and even conflicting interests of human in-dividuals!

The economy intended here is not one that furthers human interests understood

collectively as a universal reality shared by all being human, but rather it is aneconomy that is purely instrumental in character and therefore can serve only

the interests of human beings taken as in-dividuals and not collectively. We will

see soon that the very notion of utility that subtends all neoclassical economic

theory is and must be based entirely and exclusively on the in-commun-icability

of private utilities. And because private utilities (a pleonasm) are incommunicable,

the only manner in which these utilities can be measured is objectively, that is,

through their observable manifestation in market prices. Utility therefore does not

explain prices for the simple reason that in neoclassical economic theory prices are

the ultimate facts that allow of no further explanation. Whereas classical

political economy sought to discover a reality behind prices that could enable

the maximization of welfare asmeasuredby a universal substance that is,

labour or labour-time or labour-power -, neoclassical theory does not admit of any

such universal substance or source of wealth. Neoclassical theory understands

wealth in purely subjective terms and that is why prices must be the sole and

ultimate manifestation (not explanation!) of (individual, subjective) utilities.

"oubtless, #eidegger is being $ind %see almer on #uss'#eid, and intro to KM(. )ut

he and Scho*enhauer agree that Kants greatness lies *recisel+ in this! ' that he idened

the sco*e of *hiloso*hical reflection %meta*h+sics( on to the *ossibilit+ of e-*erience.he *roblem is that, in doing so, Kant *osited a dualism of Sub/ect and 0b/ect hereb+ the

latter is inscrutable sa1e as it is sha*ed or configured b+ the Sub/ects on aesthetic

constitution. he forms of e-*erience are in1estigated2 but the origin or ground of

e-*erience 3 the )eing of being ' is left to one side. his is h+ Scho*. insists that onlythe other side of human being can disclose to us the other side of the inner being of

things. his is a re'statement of 4ugustines in interiore homine habitat veritas or e1en

of 5icos verum ipsum factumbut not in theological terms, in search of the ruth, orin ontic humanistic terms %$noledge(, but rather in search of the being of e-*erience, of

our aareness of it, of its hori6on. he 7ill is the thing e $no best, according to

Scho*enhauer, not because e $no its contents, and certainl+ not because e $no it

as causa finalis or as the summum bonum %Kants ure and ractical Reason or latos8ood(, but because e $no its boundaries 3 because it is the qualitas occulta 3 the

other side of hat e $no, the noumenon that Kant had confused *artl+ ith a hing

[in itself9 and *artl+ ith a Sub/ect %Reason [5ernunft9 and the :ntellect [5erstand9 to thee-tent that it is based on the idea of the ob/ect, the re*resentation [5orstellung9(. :t is

aareness of the 7ill that is the being of e-*erience, our e-*erience %or ith

#eidegger,presentment( of the "ing an sich, the *ossibilit+ of the orld, the 7orld'Realit+or 7elt*rin6i* hose im*enetrable limit or hori6on is time itself, the e1er'*re'sent"a'


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sein %aareness of being'in'time, of the *ossibilit+ of nothingness, being'toard'death, the

Position[Stellen9 of being'in'the'orld(. osition is defined on *;


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H8., :, **.


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Lualitas occulta, then e ha1e to Lualitates occultae, one on the sub/ecti1e and one on the

ob/ecti1e side, se*arated b+ Eiet6sches obscure 1eil 3 a logical im*ossibilit+ because

then there can be no adaeLuatio at all beteen intellectus and res.

So Scho* turns inard, e-amining *ure intuition as the source of the 0b/ect and of the

causal chain. his a1oids the regressio ad infinitum of 4ristotles causa causans b+ electinga sub/ecti1e Lualitas occulta as the intuitus originarius for hich all beings are

ob/ectifications 3 the 7ill. 4gain, e ha1e a transcendentalfons et origo, a qualitas

occultathat is not a causa causans but is an intuiti1e origin of being. his is here#eidegger is connected ith Scho*enhauer and becomes his direct descendant. #eidegger

also cannot concei1e of the immanence of being human, and therefore needs to *lace or

situate it ithin the hori6on of time 3 indeed, as time itself, as facticit+, but not in

s*ace as embodimentN ', he then needs transcendence as a re*lacement for sub/ecti1it+and as the foundation of "asein, the interrogation of )eing.

nli$e Scho* and li$e Kant, #eidegger does not abolish the ob/ect of the idea so that the

se*aration of.aseinfrom the ob'/ect is retained. he ob/ect is not an e-'*ression orob/ectification of the 7ill. Rather, #eidegger maintains the tension of Scho*s original

intuition, the ec'stasis in1ol1ed in the consciousness of a Lualitas occulta, and turns thisconsciousness from a conscious'ness %a Luidditas( to an ec'stasis of "a'sein,

aareness of finitude and ec'sistence such that the orld or )eing hinges on

nothing'ness and "a'sein is thron into the orld'of'essents! "asein becomes being'in'the'orld. 7hereas Scho* turns our intuition of the 7ill into the intuition of a Lualitas

occulta, #eidegger turns intuition itself into the intuition of *rimordial time so that

)eing is tem*oralised and becomes ec'static.

he resulting ga* or tension beteen )eing and ime is the result of de'sub/ectif+ing

)eing so that transcendence allos the ec'static *ers*ecti1e or s+no*sis of )eing

ithout a Sub/ect that does the 1ieing. hat is hat distinguishes meta*h+sicageneralis from meta*h+sica s*ecialis, namel+, the ontological s+nthesis reLuired to

locate or *osition not the )eing of beings as causa causans, as +et another being that is

a ring in the causal chain, but rather the hat'ness of beings or essents understood notas a substance or substratum but as the dimension or *ure intuition of that chain.

Meta*h+sica generalis becomes a meta*h+sics of meta*h+sics, to Luote Kant. 0n the

ob/ects or essents side, this ontological s+nthesis retains the ob'/ect ithout turning

it into a "ing an sich and, b+ reflection, the tem*oralit+ or facticit+ of *ure intuitioninto a transcendental sub/ect or ego, hich is hat Kant ended u* doing. 0nl+ through

finite transcendence and ontological s+nthesis can #eidegger a1oid the soli*sism of

his conce*tion of *ure intuition as time, as intuitus deri1ati1us that retains theinde*endence of the ob'/ect and does not turn it into an e'/ect of an intuitus originarius.

:t can be said that u* to the%antbuch#eidegger maintained this e-istential tension, but

that later he turned it into a m+sticism of )eing.

#usserl *oignantl+ remar$s in a marginal note in%P/ that he could not see

h+ sub/ecti1it+, es*eciall+ a *urified transcendental sub/ecti1it+, as an

unacce*table basis for *henomenolog+'and b+ e-tension for *hiloso*hical

in1estigation. o the 1er+ end, #usserl felt that #eidegger had ne1er


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understood hat he meant b+ transcendental sub/ecti1it+ and the im*ortance of

going bac$ to the transcendental ego. 2or .eidegger, 3asein as not "ust

another name for human sub"ectivity but a ay of avoiding the concept of

sub"ectivity itself! 4s the later essa+s, li$e the @he 4ge of the 7orldicture@%>D;B( and the @Oetter on #umanism@ %>D=A( ma$e Luite e-*licit,.eidegger could not make sub"ectivity, even a &transcendental& sub"ectivity,

the anchor of his reflection. #usserlGs marginal notes 1i1idl+ sho us his

dee* disa**ointment, e1en outrage, at #eideggerGs desertion, but the+ ne1erabandon the hori6on of sub/ecti1it+, the 1ision of *hiloso*h+ as rigorous

science, and the Luest for a reliable grounding for $noledge. #is remar$s in

the margins of%P/ all testif+ to this 1ision of *hiloso*h+, a 1ision #usserl

more and more reali6ed that #eidegger did not share and reall+ had ne1ershared.

)ac$ to KM, in *ar.>< #eidegger reminds us that the ob'/ect of *ure intuition and thes+nthesis a *riori enabled b+ the transcendental schema %through the subsum*tion that

results in the understanding( 3 this ob'/ect is not an e'/ect, or the creati1e *roduct of the

%di1ine( intuitus originarius as against the deri1ati1us %human and finite(! Kant calls it anP, the "ing an sich %**>B(.

#eidegger is hereb+ re'defining Kants "ing an sich from an un$noable ob'/ect,hich ould confine Kant to e*istemolog+, to that hose )eing reLuires an ontological

s+nthesis, a meta*h+sics of meta*h+sics or meta*h+sica generalis. 4nd this is the to*ic of

Section ;. almer again,

$he second issue has to do ith .eidegger's discussion of the "finitude of

human knowledge" as discussed in 45! .ere .eidegger, originally a theology

student, follos #ant in comparing the supposed mode of divine knoing as

originary and creative, an intuition that is intuitus originarius, ith human

knoledge as the reception into knoledge of something hose nature one did not

oneself create! $his #ant calls intuitus derivativus! ut .eidegger notes here

also a moment of &finite transcendence,& in that human knoing gains access to

something other than itself, something of hich it had no prior knoledge and

did not create! $his process, the &veritative synthesis,& involves the

synthesis of intuition and thought by hich a thing &becomes manifest& as hat

it is! .eidegger finds in #ant's close analysis of this synthesis a more

nuanced description of hat he had inSZ connected ith &the ontological

comprehension of eing,& the hermeneutical as, and his definition of

phenomenology as &letting something appear from itself!&Small onder, then,

that 7illiam Richardson, in his length+ stud+,0eidegger' Through Phenomenology to

Thought, de1otes a


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reflected u*on b+ the understanding. :t is an im*ortant *aragra*h because #eidegger here

notes ho Kant e-amined the first in the 4estheti$ and the third in the Oogi$, largel+

confining himself to Formal Oogic and, b+ so doing, neglecting to reflect on theontological status of the imagination. :t is this s+nthetic unit+ of intuition and reflecti1e

thought that #eidegger focuses on 3 something that anal+ticall+ *uts him ahead of

Scho*enhauer. :t is the inabilit+ of the latter to se %fugen( these elements of *ure$noledge together that leads to the materialistic e-cesses listed b+ sanoff %*J>(.

#eidegger 1irtuall+ re*eats Scho*s ob/ection that as Kant climbs u* the ladder of

conce*tuali6ation, aa+ from *erce*tion, the ser1ant becomes the master %*JD( in thatthe understanding no seems to *osit the ob/ect increasingl+, to re'duce it to an em*t+

schematism of categories until the latter almost dis'a**ears in the *ond of *erce*tion.

his is here #eidegger re'introduces the *rimac+ of time as the hori6on of intuition%**>IBff(. Eotice that in the no'ness or *re'sence of being, the unit+ of being in

terms of sub'stance [#eidegger *refers ousia as almer notes9,hat stands under or

su*'*orts being( and being'ness, the time dimension of sub'stance, are

inconcei1able se*aratel+ and form conce*tuall+ a unity. #eideggers abstruse 1erbiagema$es it hard to dis6cern%inno( his meaning, but that is hat he is doing %*>>;(. here

is an intra'mundanit+ of being /ust as there is an intra'tem*oralit+ of the ego or theself. For #eidegger, being and ego are the interrogation of these 3 hat is dis'closed

hen their not'being or nothing'ness is countenanced 3 resulting in "a'sein and self'

consciousness res*ecti1el+. )ut the *ure intuition of intra'tem*oralit+ is *rimordialtime. :ntra'tem*oral time or the *ure no'seLuence is hat #eidegger indicates as

time, hich is simultaneousl+ s*atial.

Eo, if e return to Scho*s notion of the 7ill, it is e1ident that if the 7ill itself istime'less and onl+ its consciousness %conscious'ness still belongs to the 7ill, hich is

the Lualitas occulta, from hich e1er+thing s*rings out or is e-trinsic'ated or mani'

fested or ob/ecti'fied( is tem*oral, this is onl+ because the 7ill is the e1er'*resent, theala+s'no. Oi$e #eidegger, Scho*enhauer refrains from turning the 7ill into the *ure

no'seLuence, into intra'tem*oralit+. )ut he fails to e-*ress or articulate %fugen( the

7ill as something that can be intuited b+ consciousness as "a'sein, as ?$'stasis or ?c'sistence that is not sub/ecti1e or a Oebens$raft or 7elt*rin6i*. #eidegger maintains

the tension of ec'stasis, of the ontological s+nthesis through the *ositioning of )eing

in the hori6on of time. Scho*enhauer ends u* ith the 7ill filling u* %ob/ectif+ing( all

e-istence or being! #eidegger sees )eing onl+ through the -'ra+ of nothing'ness. hat istranscendental imagination.

#ere is almer on #usserls notes on #eidegger, shoing some of the same *er*le-ities onthese *oints!

4 fourth ma/or issue beteen #usserl and #eidegger in the margins of%P/ is

the nature of the transcendental self.0o is such a self to be conceived8 According

to .eidegger inBeing and Time, both 3escartes and #ant rongly thought of the

famous &1 am& in terms of a static metaphysics of presence, hile .eidegger

anted to see 3asein as a factical, temporally existing entity! As .eidegger

sa it, .usserl in his 6789 lectures on internal time consciousness had already

taken a step beyond #ant in making time a definitive factor in consciousness!


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And no here in the #antbook, .eidegger goes further to credit #ant ith

shoing that the shaping poer of the imagination is temporal; indeed, says

.eidegger, imagination &must first of all shape time itself! Only when we realize

this do we have a full concept of time& :69

finitude, are keys to a more adequate fundamental ontology, and it is important

to make them also the essential core of the self! 2or .usserl, the transcendental

ego functions as the philosophically necessary anchor of his phenomenology! 1n

order to be transcendental, .usserl's transcendental ego ould need in a

certain sense to transcend at least ontic time!:nterestingl+, at this *oint

#usserl instead of differing ith #eidegger on the tem*oralit+ of the ego seems

to be tr+ing hard to understand hat #eidegger is sa+ing. #usserl in the

margin refers to @the immanent life of the ego@ and as$s! @:s the ego theimmanent time in hich ob/ecti1e time tem*orali6es itself@ %>B=(, as if he

ere tr+ing here *rinci*all+ to gras* #eideggerGs conce*t. Oater, for

instance, he rites in the margin, as if *ara*hrasing! @he immanent life of

the ego as, rather, originall+ tem*orali6ing@ %>BJ(.#t ould seem here he ismerely restating hat he understands to be 0eidegger&s point, for he concedes,

9an immanent temporal horizon :of the ego; is necessary9 (3hat 0usserl

may be saying is' Time is of course an essential component of the

transcendental ego+ hat baffles me is all this talk about hat time is

9primordially9? >hat is the 9primordial essence9 of time8 >hy is it soimportant here8 #eideggerGs anser to this Luestion comes in the ne-t

section, here he states, &Primordial time makes possible the transcendental

poer of the imagination :6==

and asks% &+hat does this 'makes possible' mean>& 2or .usserl, .eidegger is

not describing the experience of time phenomenologically, or even accounting

for it philosophically; rather, he is doing metaphysics and bringing #ant along

ith him! ?es of course there is an immanent temporal hori/on for

transcendental sub"ectivity, says .usserl, but ho does that make the

transcendental ego into &time itself&> @ot only is .eidegger's language

strange here, he also seems to be making philosophical assumptions or claims

about the metaphysical nature of 3asein, hich raises the issue of the nature

of man, and more pointedly for .usserl of philosophical anthropology as a basis

for philosophy. Ma+be #eidegger here is reall+ doing *hiloso*hicalanthro*olog+, #usserl thin$s2 in an+ case, he is not doing *henomenolog+, again

not doing hat *hiloso*h+ toda+ ought to be doing.

3ing an sich and $ranscendence

Returning to our starting *oint ith Scho*, hat ma$es the 7ill or *ure intuition a Lualitasocculta is *recisel+ the inabilit+ of consciousness to $no and to be 7ill at once,

because the conce*t of a realit+ is not the realit+ itself! this im'*ossibilit+ ma$es the

Lualit+ of the 7ill or *ure intuition occult, in'scrutable. hat is h+ consciousness canec'sist onl+ as self'consciousness. 4nd it ec'sists not merel+ in time, as #eidegger see$s to

establish b+ a**ealing to Kants in'there and out'there. )ut the 1er+ fact that there can

be no *h+sical or *s+chological boundar+ beteen in and out %and because the+ areboth there, the+ are being(, it is e1ident that consciousness or being'in'itself that is

simultaneousl+ being'for'itself must also ec'sist in s*aceN


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his means that all "asein is at once both in time and in s*ace 3 and that therefore the

Cartesian transcendental distinction beteen mind and bod+ %res cogitans and res e-tensa(

is fictitious %un'real( and fallacious %false(. %Kant e-*resses this at once ith at thesame time, in connection ith the *ossibilit+ of e-*erience being also the *ossibilit+

of the ob/ects of e-*erience 3 see KM, *>;.( he mind, consciousness, necessaril+

ec'sists in both s*ace and time if it ec'sists at allN he Kantian and #eideggerian*ri1ileging of time is unarranted. %Kant s*ea$s of e-'*osition and ?$stasis, *>;. he

*roblem is that Kant is ala+s thin$ing of the sub/ect as se*arate from the ob/ect, and

therefore transcending and dominating it.( :ndeed, it is this conscious'ness that is bothself'consciousness and consciousness of being'in'time'and's*ace, that is,

consciousness of immanence, that allos human beings to ha1e con'science, scientific

consciousness of their being'in'the'orld 3 here orld stands for both s*ace and

time, for both mind and matter, for histor+ and nature %see belo for discussion of theseconce*ts in #eidegger(, so that trans'scendence is utterl+ meaningless.

0nce again, S*ino6as "eus si1e Eatura ma+ be con1erted into Mens si1e Cor*us.

here is a cor*o'realit+ of mind %/ust as 8regor+ )ateson s*o$e meta*horicall+ ofecolog+ of mind(. he anser lies alread+ in Kants characteri6ation of the

ranscendental 4esthetic, hich reLuires both time and s*ace in aesthesis 3 hichmeans also that transcendental aesthetic is an o-+moron, /ust as immanent aestheticis a

*leonasm. hat this *roblematic is foremost in #eidegger is e1inced b+ the *aragra*h on

*>= here once more it is the *ossibilit+ of e-*erience and of its ob/ects in reference tothat hich ma$es it *ossible that *reoccu*ies him. )ut this that hich ma$es

e-*erience and its ob/ects *ossible is erroneousl+ seen as a transcendent facult+ %*>=,

intrinsic unitar+ structure of transcendence( 3 not an immanent one, as e ha1e shon it

must be. %)elo e ill follo #eidegger in the anal+sis of the ob'/ect.(

:n the footnote, #eidegger then shos that he must ha1e been gra**ling ith Scho*s

critiLue of Kant, because he refers to the *rinci*le of sufficient reason as no obstacle tothe ec'sistence of the facult+ that ma$es *ossible the s+nthesis of /udgements, the

acLuisition of totall+ different $noledge %*>I(. )ut it is in e-*osing the

instrumentalit+ of $noledge 3 the ina**licabilit+ of s+nthetic /udgements to science 3that Scho* attac$s Kants schematism %and derision about all good things come in

threes(. Kants lament about schematism is one of the most difficult *oints is in the

*osthumous ritings %cited on *>>B(. 7hat #eidegger considers to be the most *unctilious

*art of the KR5 %eighed ord for ord, *>>J(, Scho* *illoried mercilessl+ for itsschematism. Kants search for a medium beteen the understanding and aesthesis that

ould account for its abilit+ to subsume ob/ects ith conce*ts %see KM, *>>A( ends

ith the magical unco1ering of the transcendental schema ! ' a gross *iece oflegerdemain. Kant calls it a mediati1e re*resentation [hat else9 at once intellectual and

sensible. :t is neither, in fact, e ould argueN )eteengeneralisandspecialis, this is

metaphysica speciosaN hus begins the ranscendental Oogic.

:n this being a force, the 7ill is at once the time hori6on and in'concei1able im*ulse, it

is a ill'to'li1e 3 the *recursor of the Eiet6schean ill to *oer once Scho*s

sub/ecti1it+ arising from the 5erstand'5ernunft is remo1ed. he Luestion arises of ho


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the 7ill then comes to be self'consciousness. "ifferentl+ and con1ersel+ *ut, the

Luestion is ho this unit+ of substance and time in be'ing 3 this *re'sentment of being

3 can be se*arated or as*orted or s*lit from self'consciousnessN nless e do aa+ ithall notions of consciousness, of self itselfN #ere sanoffs /udgement ma+ be a**lied

to Scho* as ell as to #eidegger 3 but he obscures the fact that Scho*s critiLue is no

directed more at #egel %for hom Kant o*ened the door( than at the Konigsberger.

henomenalistic idealism

and 1oluntaristic materialism, aesthetic Luietism and ethical

nihilism, are ad1ocated one after another2 and, hile the criticism

of KantGs *rinci*les often la+s bare the concealed inconsistenciesof the Critical s+stem, the solutions offered are as often inadeLuate.

:s not the real e-*lanation of the situation to be found

in the fact that Scho*enhauer is not the true successor of Kant

at all :nstead of being a neo'rationalist, as Kant, on the hole,remained, he is fundamentall+ an irrationalist, so far as his

attitude toards ultimate realit+ is concerned.e is keen in

perceiving and criticising !ants confusion of various aspects

and elements of e#perience$ but, instead of tracing their immanentorganic unity, which !ant imperfectly realizes and formulates,

he goes so far, in almost every case, as to assert their actual

separation!his as seen to be true of his treatment of *erce*tionand conce*tion, understanding and reason. :nstead of

recogni6ing their unit+ in the concrete *rocess of $noledge,

Scho*enhauer dogmaticall+ se*arates them in a scholastic manner,

thus substituting a lucidl+ rong theor+ for KantGs confusedl+right one. %.J


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conce*ts, e1en hen he tac$les the inter'sub/ecti1it+ of conce*ts! ' namel+, the *rocess

b+ hich it is *ossible to allo both the *re'sence of intuition and the aareness of the

other, and then the *ossibilit+ of beings human that are *art of the out'there, of s*atialse*aration %*h+sis(. 4lthough not resorting to Kantian schematisms of *ure reason or

*ro'/ections %Scho*, Fichte( into *ractical reason, #egel also remains loc$ed in the

transcendental s*here.

his is ho Richardson %#eidegger( summarises #eideggers *osition 3 a *assage e

read ell o1er a +ear after e too$ these notes %N(!

)efore e mo1e on, e should note that beteen the to t+*es of intuition, time en/o+s a distinct

*riorit+ o1er s*ace2 for in all *resentations the act of *resenting is ala+s a modifi'[>>B9cation of the

interior sense hich ta$es its *lace in the succession of moments e call time. )ecause of this greater

uni1ersalit+, time must be more fundamental to ontological $noledge than s*ace. hat is h+ the

author in his anal+sis of *ure intuition feels /ustified in restricting himself almost entirel+ to the

intuition, time %7 Richardson, #eidegger! From h. o hought, **>>J'B(

"iscussing #eideggers return to Kants schematism in the conte-t of #egels critiLue ofS*ino6as notion of time in the ?thics, Eegri concludes %S*ino6as 4nti'Modernit+, *B


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y a @othing e mean not an essent but nevertheless something-B according to its essence it is purehori/on! #ant calls this C the transcendental ob"ect-B perceived by transcendence as its hori/on,

%KM, *>J(.

o begin ith, then, the imagination en/o+s a *eculiar inde*endence ith res*ect to the essent,

%*>;;Jff shos neatl+ ho both thin$ers fail to see that the abilit+of the mind to imagine ab'sent ob/ects does not in the least mean that its act of

imagining is not an acti1it+ ith an ob*ect, that includes an ob/ect 3 that indeed the 1er+

fact that it is an acti1it+ im*lies the materialit+ of the mind, its being'in3the3orld.he fact that the imagination can dis*ense ith this or that ob/ect does not remotel+ mean

that it is a Ooc$ean tabula rasa, or that indeed it is a tabula rasa ith *re'formed

intuition and thought articulated b+ imagination, because then e ould concei1e ofhuman faculties %#eidegger discusses the ord from *>;D( as ca*able of being mental

or *s+chological, that is inde*endent of ob'/ects. For this to be *ossible, for these

faculties to allo the *ossibilit+ of e-*erience and of the ob/ect of e-*erience, thesefaculties must transcendQ the finitude of human $noledge and therefore encom*ass

the im*ossible %see *>=J2 see also Eegri Luote abo1e, *BA(. hat is h+ #eideggerishes to a1oid anthro*olog+, to e-*ose its limitations and lac$ of transcendence,

the better to e-alt the merits of ontolog+ %*>;D 3 #eidegger calls an+ attem*t to colla*sethe latter into the former useless and a mista$e(.

#eidegger a**reciates the *oint made abo1e, that intuition cannot be form ithoutcontent %*>=D(. #e Luotes Kant to insist that the forms of intuition %s*ace and time( are an

ens imaginarium that, although ithout ob'/ect, are still somethingQ but are not

themsel1es ob/ects hich can be intuited %*>(

4nd he hastens to add!

he ens imaginarium *ertains to the *ossible forms of @Eothing,@to hat is not an essent in the sense ofsomething actuall+*resent. ure s*ace and *ure time are @something,@ but the+are not ob/ects. %*>


19/24


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school of Eeo'Kantains ho treat the categories of the Schematism as deri1ed from the

ranscendental Oogic as Formal Oogic %*>


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orld in hich, although the differences of individuals are in

no ay cancelled, a bridge is built from individual to individual!

$hat 1 find again and again in the primal phenomenon of language!

Everyone speaks his on language, and yet e understand

one another through the medium of language! $here is

something such as the language, something such as a unity over

and above the endlessly different ays of speaking% $herein lies

the decisive point for me!4nd therefore : start from the ob/ecti1it+of the s+mbolic Form because here @the inconcei1able

= M4R:E #?:"?88?R

is achie1ed,@ hat is hat : should li$e to call the orld of

ob/ecti1e s*irit. here is no other a+ from one e-istence["asein9 to another e-istence ["asein9 than through this orld

of Form. :f it did not e-ist, then : ould not $no ho such a

thing as a common understanding could be. Cognition, too, is

therefore sim*l+ onl+ a basic instance of this *osition, becausean ob/ecti1e assertion is formulated hich no longer ta$es into

consideration the sub/ecti1it+ of the *articular indi1idual.

7e ould *art a+s ith Cassirer here, here the Forms begin 3 a neo'Kantian

delusion. )ut the Luestion of meaning does not sto* ith linguistic anal+sis. Mathematics

and logic ma+ ell be language games2 but language itself is not %cf iana Oectrs. on7itt(. )eteen Ratio and Rationalisierung lies *ra-is and not scientia. he *roblem for

Cacciari %Confronto con #( is that he as$s us to thro out, not 7ittgensteins ladder after

climbing the all or the raft after crossing the ri1er, but the bab+ ith the bathater %see

his discussion on **BI'>(.

(The world as Will and Representation [Vorstellung])

[Neo-Kantism]

Lukacss critique of Kants formalism is fully comprehensible only through the

screen of Schopenhauers reversal of Kant.


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(Intro. to GoldmannsLukacs et Heidegger, p.15 in Italian trans.)

(Intro. to GoldmannsLukacs et Heidegger, p.11 in Italian trans. Footnote refers to

HeideggersDie Frage nach dem Ding, but recall also the Davos diatribe with

Cassirer referred to above.)


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Yet it is the very identification of subject and object in the representation, astheorized by Schopenhauer,that opens the way, not to a Hegelian totality, but

rather to a new positivism of isolated facts and isolated sciences as in neo-

Kantism and Machism.

philosophical origins of neoclassical economics- by joseph belbruno

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