philosophy of rebt

67 � 2000 Human Sciences Press, Inc.

Journal of Rational-Emotive & Cognitive-Behavior TherapyVolume 18, Number 2, Summer 2000

BASIC ASSUMPTIONSCONCERNING HUMAN NATURE

UNDERLYING RATIONAL EMOTIVEBEHAVIOR THERAPY (REBT)

PERSONALITY THEORY

Daniel J. ZieglerVillanova University

ABSTRACT: In this article it is argued that all major theories of personality,including the currently developing REBT personality theory, rest upon cer-tain basic philosophic assumptions concerning human nature made by thetheorist. If REBT theory preferably is to develop into a more comprehensivetheory of personality, then it would be helpful in that effort to identify thebasic philosophic assumptions underlying it. For that purpose Ellis’ basic as-sumptions in this regard are here identified, articulated, and documented.Theoretical and treatment implications are also explored. In the case of eachphilosophic assumption it is briefly indicated how Ellis’ position on that as-sumption may translate into the theory and practice of REBT.

The Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT) movement has hada substantial, growing, and indeed profound impact upon clinical psy-chology and related disciplines for approximately the last half-century.REBT was and is the premier form of the cognitive-behavior therapiesso popular today. And along with Sigmund Freud and Carl Rogers,REBT’s originator, Albert Ellis, is widely recognized as one of the mostinfluential psychotherapists of the 20th century (Smith, 1983).

Yet unlike Freudian psychoanalysis, Rogerian person-centered ther-

The present article is a completely revised and updated version of a previously published chap-ter: Ziegler, D. J. (1989). A critique of rational-emotive theory of personality. In M. E. Bernard &R. DiGiuseppe (Eds.), Inside rational-emotive therapy: A critical analysis of the theory and prac-tice of Albert Ellis. San Diego: Academic Press.

Address correspondence to Daniel J. Ziegler, Department of Psychology, Villanova University,800 Lancaster Avenue, Villanova, PA 19085.

68 Journal of Rational-Emotive & Cognitive-Behavior Therapy

apy, and a number of other prominent psychotherapeutic systems,REBT currently lacks a comprehensive and detailed theory of person-ality at its base. Instead, it has a nicely developed theory of personalitychange, especially in relation to disturbances in cognition, affect, andbehavior (Ellis, 1974, 1978, 1979a). Elsewhere the need for a morecomprehensive REBT personality theory has been delineated (Ziegler,1989) and has been, for the most part, agreed to by Ellis (Ellis, 1989a).Happily, advances toward this objective have been made over the lastdecade. To illustrate, Ellis (1991a) has articulated in much greater de-tail, the ABCs of REBT (and cognitive-behavior therapy as well) andan explicit definition of the term personality in REBT theory has re-cently been proposed (Ziegler, 1999).

A reasonable next step toward the needed comprehensive REBT per-sonality theory would be the clear identification and articulation of thebasic philosophic assumptions concerning human nature underlyingEllis’ view of personality. Elsewhere it has been argued that such basicassumptions underlie all major theories of personality and the posi-tions of other major personality theorists on these assumptions havebeen identified and described (Hjelle & Ziegler, 1992). In the presentarticle Ellis’ positions on each of these assumptions will be identified,articulated, and documented. Theoretical and treatment implicationswill also be briefly explored; in the case of each philosophic assumptionit is briefly indicated how Ellis’ position on that assumption maytranslate into the theory and practice of REBT. But first attention isdirected to the nature of the basic philosophic assumptions them-selves.

BASIC ASSUMPTIONS CONCERNING HUMANNATURE UNDERLYING PERSONALITY

THEORIES

It is here argued that every personality theorist holds a set of basicphilosophic assumptions concerning human nature and that these as-sumptions, whether explicitly recognized by the theorist or not, play amajor role in his or her theory construction. That is, probably rooted ina theorist’s own personality makeup and life experience are a set ofbasic assumptions (implicit or explicit) about what human beings fun-damentally are; these assumptions are necessarily at the foundation oftheory construction and potently guide the directions of theory build-

Daniel J. Ziegler 69

ing. Elsewhere (Hjelle & Ziegler, 1992) nine such basic assumptionshave been identified as follows:

1. Freedom Determinism2. Rationality Irrationality3. Holism Elementalism4. Constitutionalism Evironmentalism5. Changeability Unchangeability6. Subjectivity Objectivity7. Proactivity Reactivity8. Homeostasis Heterostasis9. Knowability Unknowability

The assumptions are depicted here as relatively continuous, bipolardimensions along which any personality theorist can be placed interms of his or her position regarding that assumption. In other words,each assumption is portrayed as a continuum with a pole, or extremeposition, at its opposite ends, e.g., Freedom is at one pole of the firstcontinuous dimension, while Determinism is at the opposite pole orend. Philosophically speaking, the issues inherent in these assump-tions might be considered dichotomous rather than continuous, e.g.,human behavior results from either some degree of freedom or is to-tally determined. Nonetheless, portrayal of these assumptions as rela-tively continuous allows discernment of the degree to which a theoristemphasizes freedom or determinism in his or her personality theory(Hjelle & Ziegler, 1992). Finally, the nine assumptions are seen ascomparatively independent of one another and no particular signifi-cance should be attached to their order or respective polarity place-ments, e.g., Freedom-Determinism is seen as comparatively indepen-dent of Constitutionalism-Environmentalism and no necessaryrelationship is assumed between Freedom and Constitutionalism orbetween Determinism and Environmentalism. As will be evidentshortly, Ellis’ positions on these nine assumption dimensions tend tobe clear and, perhaps more than any other personality theorist, ex-plicit.

Essentially, it is also here argued that individuals (including espe-cially psychotherapists!) treat people in accordance with how they con-strue people in the first place. It is hypothesized that individuals beginwith a set of basic philosophic assumptions concerning human nature(Hjelle & Ziegler, 1992), which then leads to either an implicit or ex-plicit conception (theory of sorts) of personality, which then leads to an


overall preferred approach to treating personality or emotional distur-bances. Admittedly, some therapists function with only implicit, andperhaps even vague, awareness of the basic assumptions they holdabout the people they treat. But since its inception REBT has had astrong scientific, logico-empirical emphasis (Ellis, 1994). Thus, REBTtherapists would be in a much better position, philosophically speak-ing, if they had a clear and explicit understanding of the basic assump-tions concerning human nature underlying the conception of person-ality they use in their everyday practice. If nothing else, such anunderstanding would furnish them with a philosophic context for pre-cisely why they are targeting what they are targeting for therapeuticchange. And, finally, such a philosophic understanding would providea more solid groundwork for the training of future REBT practitioners.

ELLIS’ BASIC ASSUMPTIONS CONCERNINGHUMAN NATURE

Ellis’ positions, depicted in Figure 1, on each of the nine basic as-sumptions concerning human nature are discussed below (see Figure1).

Freedom-Determinism

The age-old freedom-determinism issue focuses on what degree ofinternal freedom, if any, humans actually possess in directing theirown behavior. Do people truly have choice, or is their behavior actuallydetermined by a whole host of factors, some outside the sphere of con-scious awareness? Wherever Ellis squarely addresses this issue (Ellis,1977, 1979a, 1985a, 1987a, 1992; Ellis & Bernard, 1986), he explicitlycomes down on the side of a moderate degree of freedom in humanconduct. Eschewing both extreme poles of this assumption dimensionas untenable, Ellis concludes: “A soft determinism, or the belief thathumans have some degree of choice that is limited by environmentalsituations and by innate biological predispositions, seems much morerealistic” (Ellis, 1985a, p. 286). Elsewhere, describing the unique fea-tures of REBT, he says: “It particularly emphasizes the importance ofwill and choice in human affairs, even though it accepts the likelihoodthat some human behavior is partially determined by biological, social,and other forces” (Ellis & Bernard, 1986, p. 23). So in REBT theory wefind an underlying commitment to some degree of choice in human

Figure 1

Ellis’ Position on the Nine Basic Assumptions Concerning Human Nature (The shadedareas indicate the degree to which Ellis favors one of the two bipolar extremes.)


makeup, but certainly not the kind of absolute, untrammeledfreedom one typically encounters in existential theories. Rather,in REBT theory human choice is clearly limited by a variety ofmitigating factors, most especially Ellis’ strong emphasis on thebiological basis of personality and emotional disturbance (see hisposition on the Constitutionalism-Environmentalism assumptiondimension).

What are some of the reflections in REBT theory and practice ofEllis’ underlying assumption of moderate freedom? Concerningtheory, consider the historical centrality of cognitive processes inREBT; with the exception of George Kelly (1955), Ellis (1962) wasroutinely talking about these processes long before other person-ality theorists were. Especially as Ellis conceptualizes them, cog-nitive processes are precisely those features of human personalitythat permit free choice to operate. In outlining REBT’s position onthis issue, he writes: “It hypothesizes that the more rationallypeople think and behave, the less deterministic they act” (Ellis,1978, p. 307). And a major goal of REBT itself is to help peoplealter their cognitive processes—to rid themselves of their irra-tional beliefs (IBs) and to begin to think “straight”—such thatthey may at least partially rise above their determined circum-stances and freely, rationally, and continuously choose to move inthe direction of greater mental health.

One important treatment implication of Ellis’ commitment tofreedom is that, in REBT practice, clients are seen as beinglargely (but not completely) responsible for their own distur-bances. Unlike some other therapies that view clients as merepawns of fate, victims of child-rearing practices, or products oftheir current environments, REBT sees them, within the confinesof their biological makeup, as comparatively free and responsiblein this unfortunate regard (Ellis, 1992). But another important(and very positive!) treatment implication here is that clients canalso continuously choose to combat their largely self-created dis-turbances (Ellis, 1987a). The REBT practitioner, then, views cli-ents as somewhat able to choose—and continue daily to choose(albeit with very hard work!)—to change their thinking and thuscombat their emotional disturbances. Such a view of potentialtherapeutic improvement stems directly from the underlying andpreceding conviction that people indeed possess at least some de-gree of choice, i.e., the basic philosophic assumption of freedom.


Rationality-Irrationality

The basic issue underlying the rationality-irrationality dimension isthe degree to which human reasoning powers can or do actually influ-ence everyday human behavior. Are humans primarily rational crea-tures who direct their behavior through reason, or do human actionsprincipally result from irrational forces? Again, Ellis is clear on thisissue. In the first edition of his seminal work Reason and Emotion inPsychotherapy, (and back in the days when REBT was called RT), heasserted: “The central theme of RT is that man is a uniquely rational,as well as a uniquely irrational, animal” (Ellis, 1962, p. 36). In nu-merous subsequent writings, he strongly and emphatically has reas-serted the position that the duality of rationality and irrationality isthe inherent human condition (Ellis, 1974, 1976, 1978, 1979a, 1994).On the rationality-irrationality assumption dimension, then, Ellisstands squarely in the middle.

Critics of REBT often seem not to understand precisely what Ellismeans by the terms “rational” and “irrational” for it is not the stan-dard meaning of the terms (Ellis, 1989b, 1990). To wit: “The term ra-tional, as used in RET, refers to people’s (1) setting up or choosing forthemselves certain basic values, purposes, goals, or ideals and then (2)using flexible, scientific, logico-empirical ways of attempting to achievesuch values and goals and to avoid contradictory or self-defeating re-sults” (Ellis, 1979b, p. 40); “Rationality, then, is a method or techniqueof effectively gaining certain values; it does not exist in any intrinsic orabsolutistic sense” (Ellis, 1974, p. 311). As for irrational: “Irrationalitymeans any thought, emotion, or behavior that leads to self-defeating orself-destructive consequences—that significantly interferes with thesurvival and happiness of the organism” (Ellis, 1976, p. 145). Thus, acritically important point for appreciating the REBT position is that“rational” and “irrational” are relativistic, human goal-oriented con-cepts and have no independent existence or meaning in REBT outsideof this framework. And throughout his writings Ellis argues for the co-equal weight of both in influencing human behavior.

However he defines rationality and irrationality, Ellis’ middle-ground position on this assumption allows him theoretically to addressand articulate aspects of human nature downplayed by personalitytheorists taking more extreme positions on this issue. Take Freud forinstance. When one considers Freud’s life vs. death instincts in rela-tion to Ellis’ rationality (rational beliefs) vs. irrationality (irrational


beliefs), there are some intriguing similarities. Both theorists see thehuman being as forever in conflict between two diametrically opposedand very basic forces. And in both theories the forces themselves arebiologically based, species-wide, triggers to behavior, and fundamen-tally related to human survival and happiness. But, as the subsequentdevelopment of ego psychology within the psychoanalytic movementattests, Freud’s basic assumption of irrationality prevented him fromproperly recognizing and addressing the more “rational” (“ego”) compo-nents of human nature. Ellis’ more moderate position on this assump-tion dimension allows him to do precisely that—via cognitive pro-cesses and rational beliefs.

On the other side of this issue are humanistic theorists such as Mas-low and Rogers who clearly assume rationality (Hjelle & Ziegler,1992). Commenting on Maslow and Rogers in relation to this issue,Ellis, in his inimitable fashion, says: “But what tenderhearted human-ists like these unrealistically forget is that we are also born—yesborn—with several highly irrational, self-sabotaging human tenden-cies—such as the easily nourished tendency to damn ourselves, devil-ify and deify others, and whine about (instead of moving our asses torectify) life’s hassles” (Weinrach, 1980, p. 154). Precisely. And becauseEllis takes a more moderate position on the rationality-irrationalitydimension, he is able to describe irrational beliefs and, in an articleentitled “The Biological Basis of Human Irrationality” (Ellis, 1976),actually list and categorize 259 major “human irrationalities”! Thus,Ellis’ middle-of-the-road position on this assumption allows him nicelyto address both the rational and irrational aspects of human person-ality (Ellis, 1995).

The essential implication of Ellis’ position here for REBT practice isthat psychotherapy necessarily and fundamentally represents a battle-ground between inherent rational and irrational forces. Clients andtheir therapists must constantly do battle against a basic part of theclient’s nature, viz., irrationality. Every effort needs to be made to com-bat disturbance-producing irrationality while simultaneously foster-ing, developing, and strengthening mental health-producing ratio-nality. Because both rationality and irrationality are basicallyinherent in human nature and about equal in strength, this effort, asEllis (1987b) often emphasizes, requires constant hard work. And per-haps it is in part why REBT employs so many different cognitive, emo-tive, and behavioral strategies. Successfully combating something sobasic to one’s nature (irrationality) requires both hard work and manyeffective strategies!


Holism-Elementalism

Are human beings best understood as individual totalities (holism)or is human behavior better comprehended by breaking it down intoits component parts (elementalism)? On this assumption dimensionEllis is moderately inclined toward holism. He addresses the issue asfollows: “While RET sees people as having units or elements (e.g., highsexuality or low energy) that influence their whole lives, it also seesthem as having interacting parts (including cognitions, emotions, andbehaviors) that cannot be separated” (Ellis, 1978, p. 306). And on theinterplay among the important parts, he says: “Human cognition, emo-tion, and behavior do not constitute separate entities but all signifi-cantly interrelate and importantly affect each other” (Ellis, 1977, p. 6).Thus, Ellis recognizes component parts of personality but clearly seestheir holistic interrelatedness as being more central in understandinghuman makeup (Ellis, 1999).

The main theoretical implication of Ellis’ holism assumption is astrong and increased emphasis upon construct interaction, especiallyin recent years. Cognitions, emotions, and behaviors are increasinglyseen as holistically interacting (Ellis, 1994), as are the revised ABCs ofREBT (Ellis, 1991a). But unlike some personality theorists almost ex-clusively committed to holism, Ellis’ more moderate stance allows himto address important distinctions within and among these constructs(Ellis, 1991a, 1994). Yet their holistic interaction seems the increas-ingly more salient feature of REBT personality theory.

The treatment implications of the underlying holism assumption areequally in evidence. Concerning the concept of the interaction andoverlap of cognitions, emotions, and behaviors, Ellis says: “I have ap-preciably added to this concept and have stressed forceful emotive andeducative, as well as strong behavioral, techniques of RET in recentyears” (Ellis, 1991a, p. 167). Thus, while in REBT the emphasis isvirtually always upon changing the client’s thinking underlying dis-turbed behavior, there are many cognitive, emotive, and behavioralstrategies to accomplish this objective precisely because cognitions,emotions, and behaviors a priori are assumed to holistically interactand overlap.

Constitutionalism-Environmentalism

How much of human personality results from constitutional factorsand how much is a product of environmental influences? How much is


“nature” and how much “nurture?” On this issue Ellis leans strongly,although not totally, in the direction of constitutionalism. While in nu-merous writings he clearly acknowledges the importance of both con-stitution and environment in personality formation (Ellis, 1974, 1977,1978, 1979a, 1994), Ellis practically never misses an opportunity toinstruct his readers on the more basic and much greater influence ofthe former. To wit: “Although almost all contemporary schools of psy-chotherapy and personality formation take a different view, it seemsprobable that the main influence on human personality comes fromhereditary sources. . . . My RET-oriented theory of personality saysthat probably 80% of the variance in human behavior rests largely onbiological bases and 20% or so on specific environmental training”(Ellis, 1979a, p. 17). And further he asserts that human irrationality isrooted in basic human nature (Ellis, 1976), that the related “real”causes of human disturbance are largely innate (Ellis, 1979a), andthat the human “conditionability” which permits the environment tohave personological impact is innate (Ellis, 1974). Moreover, Ellis’ viewof personality innateness appears in part to account for why REBT isbasically “constructivist,” as opposed to “rationalist,” in its approach topsychotherapy (Ellis, 1990).

Future REBT theory has a tremendous opportunity here because ofEllis’ strong constitutionalism assumption. In his argument for thepowerful biological basis of human personality and disturbance, Ellismay well be on to something significant that others in the cognitive-behavioral movement, precisely because of their environmentalism as-sumption, do not and cannot see. While there is a long road ahead, oneultimate personality theory goal might be a careful, systematic, anddetailed account of the origin of irrational beliefs (and rational beliefs)in terms that are compatible with and, if possible, grounded in theknown facts of genetics and neuroscience. While Ellis has argued con-vincingly for the biological basis of human irrationality (Ellis, 1976), itwould be a substantial advance for REBT personality theory to hy-pothesize in scientifically acceptable detail the precise biological un-derpinnings for the origin, development, and maintenance of irrational(and rational) beliefs.

The overriding treatment implication of Ellis’ constitutionalism as-sumption is that people are the way they are largely (but not com-pletely) because of biological makeup. In terms of emotional distur-bance, it is not so much the environmental A’s that are cruciallyimportant, it is what the person constitutionally brings to the A’s. IfEllis is correct here, it just may be that, due largely to biological pre-


dispositions, the client’s psychological processes are individually, char-acteristically, and somewhat uniquely organized. However effectiveREBT interventions are in changing thinking, feeling, and behavior(as the available evidence indicates), there just might be a powerfultendency to persist in, and return to, one’s (largely) constitutionallypredisposed organization of psychological processes, however maladap-tive that may be. (Herein could be the personality root of both psycho-therapeutic resistance and relapse.) Following Ellis’ lead, then, wewould do well to target what can and what cannot be changed as we goabout the business of providing REBT to our clients.

Changeability-Unchangeability

The basic issue involved in this assumption is the degree to whichhuman beings are seen as capable of fundamental personality changethroughout life. Can an individual’s basic personality really changesubstantially over time? Or are the surface changes observable in hu-man behavior merely that—superficial behavioral changes that occurwhile the basic underlying personality structure remains unalterableand intact? On this assumption dimension Ellis appears moderatelycommitted to changeability. He says: “the RET theory of change holdsthat, no matter how humans originally get certain personality charac-teristics and no matter what developmental processes they go throughin connection with these characteristics, they can almost always sig-nificantly change them” (Ellis, 1979a, p. 28). And Ellis has spent a richand extraordinarily productive professional lifetime helping people todo precisely that—change their basic personality characteristics to thedegree that their constitutional makeups will permit.

Personality change is possible in REBT theory, but it isn’t easy.Throughout his writings Ellis repeatedly make the point that if peoplereally want to change, they will need to “think and work hard” (Ellis,1984, p. 208) and that, in fact, most people have a natural tendency toresist basic personality change (Ellis, 1979b, 1987b). Despite the per-sistent difficulty, however, Ellis argues that some personality changecan and does take place, that cognitive awareness and philosophic re-structuring are the most elegant ways to bring about such change, andthat REBT is the preferred therapeutic vehicle of choice in such mat-ters (Ellis, 1979a, b, 1994).

Given Ellis’ moderate commitment to the changeability assumption,a significant step for REBT theory would be a detailed description ofpersonality development and change in the normal course of events.


While Ellis has written volumes explicating how REBT helps power-fully to change people’s personalities and behavior, what couldstrengthen REBT as a comprehensive personality theory would be acareful account of how personality develops and changes throughoutthe life span without REBT intervention. Presumably the countlessindividuals who do not seek, want, or need REBT nonetheless experi-ence at least some degree of personality change. How? Based on all ofEllis’ writings, some sort of self-initiated and maintained cognitive re-structuring process presumably would be central (along with emo-tional and behavioral corollaries), and REBT personality theory couldbe greatly strengthened by a detailed description of such processes.After all, the durability of Freudian personality theory in 20th centurypsychology in no small measure rested on its detailed account, how-ever empirically unvalidatable, of personality formation and develop-ment (Hjelle & Ziegler, 1992). There is no a priori reason why cogni-tive-behavioral theory could not offer a better, and empiricallytestable, account for the 21st century and beyond.

Regarding treatment implications, Ellis’ positions on the constitu-tionalism and changeability assumptions need to be considered in tan-dem. That is, within the constraints imposed by a client’s constitution,just how much therapeutic personality change can realistically be ex-pected? One way to think about this issue is found in the definition ofpersonality proposed elsewhere for REBT theory as “the person’s psy-chological individuality as manifested primarily in his/her cognition,emotion, and behavior, and their interrelationships” (Ziegler, 1999, p.24). While “psychological individuality” is seen as largely constitu-tional and highly resistant to change, important components of person-ality (i.e., cognitions, emotions, behaviors, and their interrelation-ships) can, within individual biological limitations, be changed to somedegree. And in practice that is precisely what REBT attempts mightilyto do.

Subjectivity-Objectivity

Do individuals live in a highly personal, subjective world of experi-ence that is the major influence upon their behavior? Or is humanbehavior influenced primarily, if not exclusively, by external, objectivefactors. On this assumption dimension underlying theories of person-ality, Ellis comes down strongly on the side of subjectivity.

In discussing the philosophic precursors of REBT (e.g., Ellis, 1984),Ellis seems fond of quoting Epictetus, who in the first century A.D.


wrote in The Enchiridion: “Men are disturbed not by things, but by theview which they take of them.” To underscore the importance of thispoint for REBT theory, Ellis says: “From its inception RET has takenthe humanistic and existentialistic position that people create theirown world by the phenomenological view they take of what happens tothem” (Ellis, 1979b, p. 47). Indeed, the entire A-B-C theory rests onthis premise. Again, Ellis: “My personality-change hypothesis makesB, the individual’s Belief System, the crucial issue. A does not deter-mine C; rather, B does!” (Ellis, 1979a, p. 16). So in REBT theory, it isclearly the individual’s subjective Beliefs (rational and irrational),rather than objective external factors per se, that most potently influ-ence his or her behavior.

While Ellis also acknowledges the importance of objective factors ingeneral behavior, he more greatly emphasizes subjective factors in dis-turbed behavior (Ellis, 1989a) and, perhaps by implication, individualpersonality structure. And the underlying subjectivity commitmentalso seems evident in Ellis’ recent efforts to articulate the “construc-tivist,” as opposed to “rationalist,” nature of REBT personality theory(Ellis, 1990, 1993). To wit: “From a constructivist view, which RETaccepts, even ‘external reality’ is partly created or constructed by self-organizing humans and, for us humans, does not entirely exist in, of,and by itself” (Ellis, 1991a, p. 148). So in REBT theory, even the objec-tive factors affecting us are partly a product of our subjective worlds.

The subjectivity assumption is also manifest in REBT practice. TheA’s, insofar as they represent objective reality, are not dwelled upon indetail; rather, therapeutic attention is focused on the B’s, the subjec-tive personality factors assumed to underlie disturbance. While theconstant A-B-C interplay, as well as the use of various treatmentstrategies, are avowed, the most elegant therapeutic solution is vir-tually always to change the client’s (subjective) thinking.

Proactivity-Reactivity

The proactivity-reactivity assumption is concerned with locus of cau-sality in human behavior. Do people generate their behavior internallyor is their behavior actually a series of responses to external stimuli?On this issue Ellis comes down strongly on the side of proactivity.

An examination of Ellis’ ABC theory clearly reveals that A’s (Acti-vating events) alone practically never directly trigger human behavior.The ABC theory really begins with G, people’s Goals, which they pro-actively seek to attain: “Humans, biologically and by social learning,


are goal-seeking animals” (Ellis, 1991a, p. 142). And further: “TheRET theory of personality and of personality disturbances begins withpeople’s trying to fulfill their Goals (Gs) in some kind of environmentand encountering a set of Activating events or Activators (As) thattend to help them achieve or block these Goals” (Ellis, 1985b, pp. 314–315). Elsewhere it is noted: “Activating events virtually never exist ina pure or monolithic form but almost always interact with and partlyinclude beliefs (B’s) and consequences (C’s). People bring themselves(their goals, thoughts, desires, and physiological propensities) to bearon activating events” (Ellis & Bernard, 1986). Thus, Ellis’ strong proac-tivity assumption is clearly in evidence in his ABC theory of person-ality and emotional disturbance.

Proactivity also underlies treatment strategies. In REBT, the clientis not seen simply as a passive reactor to the A’s in his or her life.Rather, the client is virtually always proactive in this regard. Indeed,the first of the three important “insights” recommended for REBT cli-ents to achieve is the understanding that self-defeating or disturbedconsequences stem mainly from the Irrational Beliefs that people bringto the Activating Events in their lives (Ellis, 1979b). And clients canimprove their situations by proactively choosing to change their IBsand then proactively pushing themselves consistently in more ratio-nal, healthful directions. Thus, in both REBT theory and practice, theperson is seen largely as generating his or her behavior internally, i.e.,the proactivity assumption.

Homeostasis-Heterostasis

The homeostasis-heterostasis assumption is fundamentally con-cerned with human motivation. Are humans motivated primarily orexclusively to reduce tensions and maintain an internal state of equi-librium a la Freud’s (1915–1917/1943) homeostatic pleasure principle?Or is their basic motivation directed toward growth, stimulus seeking,and self-actualization a la Rogers’ (1959) heterostatic actualizing ten-dency?

Perhaps the best way to depict Ellis’ position on this dimension is“midrange” because (a) he appears to accord about equal weight toboth homeostatic and heterostatic elements in his system, and (b) nei-ther homeostasis or heterostasis per se is central to his concept of mo-tivation. In describing people’s motivation, Ellis says: “They have pre-dispositions . . . to be creative . . . and to actualize their potentials forlife and growth. They also have propensities . . . to be short-range


hedonists . . . and to avoid actualizing their potentials for growth”(Ellis, 1984, p. 196). Moreover, he asserts that practically all peopleare motivated by four “basic human values”: (1) to survive, (2) to berelatively happy (satisfied and free from unnecessary pain) while sur-viving, (3) to live in and get along with members of a social group orcommunity, and (4) to relate intimately (and satisfactorily) with a fewselected members of this group (Ellis, 1974). Ellis further argues thatthe desires associated with such values are biologically based and thathuman hedonism, i.e., staying alive and seeking happiness, is likewisebiologically rooted (Ellis, 1979a, b). Finally, he makes the point thatpeople are motivated by desires and tendencies, not needs or necessi-ties, unless “people foolishly define them as such” (Ellis, 1984, p. 209).

All of the above constitutes a good start toward a systematic accountof human motivation. But to become a more comprehensive theory ofpersonality, REBT would do well to develop a more precise and de-tailed description of what motivates people. There have been promis-ing moves in this direction, e.g., Ellis’ (1985b, 1991a) brief listing ofthe main “subgoals” as people strive for happiness, Ellis’ (1991b) ac-count of the REBT approach to self-actualization—but an even moresubstantive and systematic description of human motivation wouldgreatly strengthen REBT personality theory in the future.

A major treatment implication of Ellis’ midrange position on thisassumption is that client motivation is, simply stated, complex. To il-lustrate, a Rogerian therapist necessarily views his or her client asalways and only motivated by the “actualizing tendency,” due toRogers’ strong commitment to heterostasis (Hjelle & Ziegler, 1992), re-gardless of the client’s presenting problem (e.g., divorce, being fired,anxiety, depression, etc.). The REBT practitioner is not so constrained.In REBT, due to Ellis’ midrange position, the client can be viewed asheterostatically motivated toward growth and also homeostaticallymotivated by desires which may pertain to his/her disturbances. Theinterplay of both homeostatic and heterostatic motives, in part, allowsthe REBT therapist the needed flexibility to treat each individual cli-ent’s problem as presented.

Knowability-Unknowability

The final basic assumption poses the question—is human naturefully knowable in scientific terms or for some reason does it transcendthe potential of scientific understanding? Despite the emphasis uponscientific, logico-empirical approaches and methods throughout Ellis’


writings, a careful inspection of these same writings reveals an almostparadoxical, and at least moderate, commitment to the unknowabilityassumption. There appear to be at least two major reasons for thisseeming paradox: (1) Virtually nothing is absolute in Ellis’ thinking(including the powers of reason and science, and indeed even REBTitself), and (2) Personality (and by implication, human nature) is sim-ply too complex to be captured by any one approach—even that of sci-ence.

Concerning the limits of reason, Ellis says: “RET looks skeptically atanything mystical, religious, transpersonal, or magical, when theseterms are used in the strict sense. It believes that reason itself is lim-ited, ungodlike, and unabsolute” (Ellis, 1984, p. 210). And elsewhereEllis has pointedly argued that personality is too complex and variedto be entirely encapsulated by a single theory comprised of empiricallytestable concepts (Ellis, 1978, 1979a). Indeed, he strongly questionsthe usefulness of personality theorizing itself: “Is theorizing about per-sonality, then, a rather hopeless and futile pursuit? To some extent,yes. For we probably won’t for the present - and perhaps never will—arrive at precise and satisfactory hypotheses that cover all or most ofthe observed data” (Ellis, 1979a, p. 27).

Ellis’ apparent commitment to the unknowability assumption hassome consequences for the potential development of REBT as a com-prehensive personality theory. In part, it probably lies at the root ofwhy REBT is presently an incomplete personality theory. If one is ba-sically pessimistic about the prospects of ever fully understanding hu-man nature via a scientifically based, comprehensive personality the-ory, then it doesn’t make much sense to devote a disproportionateamount of one’s time trying to develop and refine one. His un-knowability assumption notwithstanding, however, Ellis has givenREBT and the cognitive-behavioral movement an excellent start in thedirection of an eventual comprehensive account of personality and hu-man behavior. To move further in that direction in the future, col-leagues and successors with a stronger inclination to the knowabilityassumption and a more optimistic view of personality theorizing seemrequired.

The overriding treatment implication of the unknowability assump-tion is that REBT therapists preferably should accept (and be comfort-able accepting) that they probably do not fully understand (nor proba-bly ever will) the complete nature of any given client. While REBTitself furnishes a strong theoretical base for treatment as well as a richvariety of useful therapeutic strategies, the full nature of the clients to


whom it is applied remains partially unknown. Thus in part the flex-ibility, pragmatism, and constant willingness of REBT therapists toadapt their strategies to each individual client. Because we ventureinto the realm of personality unknown, we continuously need to exer-cise the empiricism, “unabsolutism,” and restraint appropriate to sci-ence. As Ellis observes regarding the construct “personality” itself: “letus exert, at least for the present, due scientific caution!” (Ellis, 1989a,p. 206).

CONCLUSION

REBT as a psychotherapy system could be greatly strengthened bythe development of a more comprehensive theory of personality at itsbase. Such a theory, like all personality theories, rests upon certainbasic philosophic assumptions concerning human nature. Ellis’ basicassumptions in this regard ideally could serve as a foundation onwhich future REBT personality theory can be built. It is hoped thatthe identification of these basic assumptions here, along with some oftheir theoretical and treatment implications, will assist REBT to moveforward as a developing comprehensive theory of personality.

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